NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0225 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD39408

The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa

By H. Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant Mother

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jennifer L. Thorson

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 5-4-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Savannah N. (“Mother”) and Robert M. (“Father”) appeal the 

juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their child, C.M.

Because reasonable evidence supports the termination order, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) removed C.M. from 

her parents’ custody the day after she was born in May 2020. Five days later, 

DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that C.M.’s parents were “unable 

or unwilling to provide proper and effective parental care and control” due 

to their homelessness, Mother’s marijuana use during pregnancy, Father’s 

reported methamphetamine use, and the parents’ “admitted . . . history of 

domestic violence.”

¶3 Mother regained physical custody of C.M. in September 2020,

conditioned on the presence of a live-in safety monitor in her home. C.M.’s 

return to Mother’s care was short-lived. After only ten days, DCS 

successfully moved to again take custody of C.M. following an incident in 

which Mother began screaming and cursing in frustration over C.M.’s 

persistent crying. After Mother angrily rebuffed the safety monitor’s 

attempts to step in to try to soothe C.M., police intervention was required 

to restore calm to the home. After this incident, Mother admitted to a DCS 

child safety specialist that she “felt very overwhelmed” and “triggered” by

C.M.’s crying.

¶4 In November 2020, the court granted the dependency petition 

as to both parents.

¶5 DCS offered the parents many services to facilitate their 

reunification with C.M., including parent aide services, psychological 

evaluations, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence treatment, 

psychiatric evaluations, supervised visitations, and individual counseling.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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3

¶6 Mother and Father were inconsistent in their participation in 

these services. Both parents successfully completed a one-on-one parenting 

program. Mother successfully completed substance abuse treatment, 

consistently tested negative for all substances, and completed several 

sessions of individual counseling with a doctoral-level therapist. Neither 

parent, however, engaged in domestic violence counseling or treatment.

1

Although the parents engaged in supervised visits with C.M., they both 

frequently arrived unprepared and late, often by 30 minutes or more, to 

scheduled visits. And the parents’ parent aide services were “closed 

unsuccessfully” due to “lack of consistent engagement.”

¶7 In October 2020, Mother completed a psychological 

evaluation with Dr. Jeremiah D. Isbell. In connection with the evaluation, 

Dr. Isbell interviewed Mother (who described an unstable childhood 

characterized by domestic violence between her parents and sexual abuse 

at the hands of her stepbrother) and administered psychological tests. After 

completing his evaluation, Dr. Isbell diagnosed Mother with post-traumatic 

stress disorder (“PTSD”), unspecified personality disorder with mixed 

traits (dependent, borderline, and antisocial), cannabis use disorder, 

stimulant use disorder, unspecified alcohol related disorder, and borderline 

intellectual functioning with an IQ of 75. After noting that Mother accepted 

no responsibility for the removal of C.M. from her care for the second time 

in September 2020, claiming instead that the child was removed because 

“my safety monitor flipped out,” Dr. Isbell found that Mother “appears to 

have limited awareness and insight into her dysfunctional attitudes and 

behaviors.” Dr. Isbell opined that Mother’s “maladaptive personality traits” 

appear to have given rise to “a pervasive and excessive need to be taken 

care of by others,” an issue of particular concern since “she does not have a 

healthy support system.” These factors, Dr. Isbell determined, 

“significantly negatively impact[]” Mother’s “ability to meet the complex 

needs of her very young child.” Because of Mother’s “untreated PTSD,” her 

“underlying maladaptive personality traits,” and “the dysfunctional 

thinking and behaviors she has developed over the years,” Dr. Isbell 

concluded that the prognosis for Mother’s ability to parent C.M. safely in 

the foreseeable future was “guarded.” Finding Mother “in dire need of 

individual counseling addressing her PTSD and maladaptive personality 

pathology,” Dr. Isbell recommended that she receive individual counseling

1 After Mother reported enrolling in domestic violence counseling with 

Terros, DCS contacted Terros and learned that Mother had not, in fact, 

enrolled. Ultimately, Terros “close[d] out service” due to Mother’s 

“fail[ure] to attend.”
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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“from a DBT2 orientation . . . at minimum[,] once per week” for “at least 12 

months.” 

¶8 A DCS Progress Report dated July 16, 2021 reflects that, 

despite Dr. Isbell’s determination that Mother “was ‘in dire need’ of DBT 

therapy” and DCS’s offer to help Mother enroll in the recommended 

therapy, she still had “not enrolled in the service” nine months later.

¶9 In October 2021, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights on the grounds of mental illness/deficiency, see

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), and C.M.’s out-of-home placement for fifteen months 

or longer, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

¶10 Over a year after Dr. Isbell’s psychological evaluation, Mother 

completed a second evaluation, this time with Dr. James S. Thal. Mother 

again described a childhood marked by physical and sexual abuse. She 

insisted, however, that she was “untroubled by the sexual abuse she 

endured as a child.” She denied the validity of the concerns that led DCS to

remove C.M., blaming her aunt, in whose care C.M. had been placed, for 

“lying” to DCS. According to Mother, “her aunt contacted DCS” to make 

false accusations against her because her aunt wanted a girl “and could not 

have any more children of her own.”

¶11 Like Dr. Isbell, Dr. Thal diagnosed Mother with PTSD, 

unspecified personality disorder (noting borderline traits), stimulant use 

disorder, and an unspecified intellectual disability. Dr. Thal opined that 

Mother’s “unstable moods, emotions, behaviors, and past drug use have 

rendered her incapable of safely and effectively parenting a child.” Dr. 

Thal’s prognosis for Mother’s ability to parent C.M. safely in the foreseeable 

future was “marginal.” Dr. Thal recommended that Mother receive

“[a]pproximately 20 sessions [of] individual therapy” to “address her PTSD 

symptoms, maladaptive behaviors, and deficient coping skills,” adding that 

“[i]t may be helpful for [Mother] to have weekly or every other week 

sessions with a doctoral level clinician.”

¶12 In February 2022, Mother began to engage in the 

recommended therapy with a doctoral-level therapist. Mother attended 

2 Dr. Isbell explained that dialectical behavior therapy, or DBT, is a form of 

therapy that addresses “trauma-related symptoms” and aims to “help[] the 

client achieve better emotional stability to challenge some of their attitudes 

that may be . . . irrational or dysfunctional.”
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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only four therapy sessions, however, before she stopped attending in midMarch 2022.

¶13 After initially refusing DCS’s request that he participate in a 

psychological evaluation, Father completed such an evaluation with Dr. 

Stephanie Leonard in February 2021. During his interview, Father reported 

that “he was mentally, emotionally, and physically abused” as a child and 

that he “moved out of his parents’ home” when he was eleven years old, 

thereafter living “off and on” with his grandparents. Like Mother, Father 

reported no healthy support system, identifying his “current social 

support” as “[m]yself.” His scores on psychological tests were consistent 

with those of people who are “distrustful” and “self-centered,” and who 

“tend to be uninsightful.”

¶14 Dr. Leonard diagnosed Father with a personality disorder

and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), opining that his 

“symptoms can impact his ability to adequately parent a child.” The doctor 

noted Father is “self-preoccupied” and exhibits the “strong need for 

attention and affection” that is characteristic of “self-centered” parents who 

“often place” their own needs “above the needs of their children.” Dr. 

Leonard also observed that Father has a “paranoid predisposition” which 

“keeps him rigid and inflexible to meet the needs of his child and learn new 

information that can help him increase his parenting skills.” She

recommended that Father engage in individual therapy with a doctorallevel counselor and suggested that Father may benefit from counseling on 

“the cycle of abuse” and “how domestic violence affects children.” Dr. 

Leonard warned that “[t]he prognosis that [Father] can provide minimally 

adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable future is dependent on [the]

success of proposed interventions,” noting that “successful results may take 

several months.” If Father “engage[d] in therapy consistently,” however, 

Dr. Leonard opined that the prognosis for his ability to parent a child 

effectively “may increase” from “poor” to “adequate.”

¶15 The record indicates that by the end of 2021, Father enrolled 

in individual counseling, but not with a doctoral-level therapist, and had 

only completed “approximately 4 sessions.” His therapist indicated they 

had not addressed themes of domestic violence and Father had failed to 

provide documentation showing he had engaged in other domestic 

violence treatment. By March 2022, DCS records indicated that Father no 

longer had “an open chart” with the service that provided him individual 

therapy.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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¶16 DCS’s motion to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights proceeded to a six-day trial in 2022.

¶17 Dr. Isbell testified at trial that Mother’s “turbulent 

background” and “ongoing trauma symptomology” necessitate 

“meaningful treatment” before she could “parent in a healthy manner.” He 

further testified that Mother had not yet engaged in sufficient therapy to 

warrant changing his prognosis of her future parenting ability as 

“guarded.”

¶18 Dr. Thal similarly testified that Mother’s “unstable moods, 

emotions, [and] impulsive behavior” would impair her “ability to safety 

and competently care for a child,” describing “[h]er ability to meet a 

minimally adequate [parenting] standard” as “very uncertain.” Dr. Thal 

explained that after completing his evaluation, he considered Mother’s 

prognosis “pretty bleak unless she could turn things around.” The 

information available to him, he went on, indicated that Mother has not 

been “consistently involved in services” to the extent necessary to warrant 

modifying Mother’s unfavorable prognosis.

¶19 Rob Petsche, a licensed professional counselor, testified that 

he began counseling Mother in November 2021 and was still treating her at 

the time of trial. Mr. Petsche expressed a positive view of Mother’s progress 

and ability to parent, asserting that her confidence, assertiveness, 

responsibility, and ability to take ownership of her actions had improved. 

Mr. Petsche testified that he believed Mother had developed adequate 

coping skills to parent C.M. effectively, that he did not believe Mother’s 

mental health would bar her from parenting C.M., and that he believed 

Mother could complete DCS’s services if given more time to do so.

¶20 In their testimony at trial, both parents acknowledged that 

they did not consistently engage in services that DCS offered. Mother, for 

example, admitted that she did not successfully complete parent aide 

services, while Father admitted that he was closed out of counseling 

services for lack of engagement.

¶21 After the trial, the juvenile court determined that the State had 

proven grounds for termination under A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3) (mental 

illness/deficiency) and -533(B)(8)(c) (fifteen months’ out-of-home 

placement). As to the former, the court found that neither parent had 

engaged in services offered by DCS to the extent necessary to address their 

“significant cognitive impairments and serious and significant mental 

health issues.” The court further found that termination would be in C.M.’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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7

best interests, and so terminated the parental rights of both Mother and 

Father. Both parents appeal. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶22 Parents’ right to the custody and control of their children, 

while fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 

Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Termination of parental rights may be 

warranted where the moving party proves, by clear and convincing 

evidence, one of the statutory grounds set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Id. at 

249, ¶ 12. Evidence is “clear and convincing” if it is “highly probable or 

reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284-85, ¶ 25 (2005) 

(citation omitted).

¶23 “We review an order terminating a parent’s relationship with 

his or her child . . . in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior 

court’s ruling.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 (App. 2013). 

We “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable 

evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This Court does not reweigh the evidence on 

review but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the 

court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 

(App. 2004).

¶24 The juvenile court may find grounds for termination of a 

parent-child relationship if there is clear and convincing evidence that “the 

parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental 

illness [or] mental deficiency” and “there are reasonable grounds to believe 

that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶25 Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s findings about 

the severity of her mental health issues and the negative impact those issues 

have on her ability to safely parent a child. She nonetheless contends that 

no reasonable evidence supports the court’s “forward-looking finding” that 

her condition would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.

¶26 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion 

that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s mental 

infirmities would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. Both 

psychologists, who independently evaluated Mother a year apart, 

expressed significant concerns about Mother’s ability to parent. Each gave 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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an unfavorable prognosis for Mother’s ability to parent C.M. safely in the 

foreseeable future. Both psychologists recommended Mother engage in 

individual therapy. As the court found, Mother did not begin the 

recommended doctoral-level counseling until February 2022 and attended 

only four sessions before she stopped attending the following month. At 

the time of trial, Mother had not attended a counseling session in over two 

months. Both Dr. Isbell and Dr. Thal testified that they did not believe 

Mother had engaged in enough therapy to address her mental infirmities. 

A reasonable factfinder could conclude from this testimony that Mother’s 

impaired ability to safely parent would continue for a prolonged and 

indeterminate period. 

¶27 Mother argues that the juvenile court gave too much weight 

to the testimony of Dr. Isbell and Dr. Thal and not enough to Mr. Petsche’s. 

Noting that the psychologists “only met with [her] once and had no 

ongoing treating relationship with her,” Mother insists that their testimony 

could not “constitute a reasonable basis for the required clear and 

convincing findings.” This is especially so, Mother argues, when 

contrasting the psychologists’ testimony with Mr. Petsche’s “boots-on-theground perspective and testimony that Mother had progressed sufficiently 

to adequately parent, and her real-life success in overcoming substance 

abuse and housing/employment instability.”

¶28 This Court will not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the 

credibility of witnesses, see Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8, “even when 

sharply disputed facts exist,” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 

151, ¶ 18 (2018) (cleaned up). Here, the juvenile court expressly found the 

testimony of Dr. Isbell and Dr. Thal more persuasive than that of Mr. 

Petsche, and we will not disturb that finding.

¶29 Referring to Dr. Thal’s statement at trial that “[h]er ability to 

meet a minimally adequate [parenting] standard . . . is very uncertain,” 

Mother contends that Dr. Thal’s testimony was too equivocal to constitute 

clear and convincing evidence. On the contrary, she asserts, Dr. Thal’s 

characterization of her ability to parent in the future as “very uncertain” 

establishes “that even Dr. Thal wasn’t convinced” Mother could not meet her 

parental duties in the near future.

¶30 A reasonable factfinder could interpret Dr. Thal’s description 

of Mother’s ability to parent at a minimally adequate level as “very 

uncertain” to mean it was unlikely she would be able to do so. Moreover,

Dr. Thal also testified that “unless [Mother] made major headway, the 

probability was she was not going to be able to parent her child competently 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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safely, adequately within the statutory time limits” and that “it doesn’t 

sound like those things have happened or improved.” Dr. Isbell similarly

determined that Mother is “incapable of safely and effectively parenting a 

child” due to her unstable moods, emotions, and behaviors, and that her 

“marginal” prognosis was unlikely to improve in light of her past inability 

to “establish[] and maintain[] emotional stability.” Viewed as a whole, a 

reasonable factfinder could conclude from this evidence that DCS had met 

its burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable 

grounds exist to believe Mother’s condition would continue for a 

prolonged, indeterminate period. See Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284-85, ¶ 25.

¶31 The evidence in the record is more than sufficient to support 

the juvenile court’s conclusion that DCS met its evidentiary burden to 

establish grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3). 

¶32 Noting that his parental rights were terminated on grounds 

different from the suspected drug use alleged in the initial dependency 

petition, Father complains that DCS unfairly “mov[ed] the goal posts . . . 

midway through [the] case.”

¶33 Father’s suggestion that DCS cannot allege grounds for 

termination other than those alleged in the initial petition finds support in 

neither logic nor the law. During the course of a dependency case, DCS may

(and often does) learn of additional grounds for termination that were not 

apparent, and may not have even existed, at the outset of the dependency 

case. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 355 (App. 

1994) (rejecting parent’s contention that superior court “violated her due 

process rights by terminating her parental rights based on a ground that 

did not exist when the petition was filed”). To hold that termination cannot 

be based on grounds different from those alleged at the outset would, in 

effect, impermissibly require DCS and the court to ignore relevant evidence 

simply because it did not come to light until after the dependency began. 

See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, ¶ 1 (holding that “courts must consider the 

totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance 

determination”). 

¶34 “[T]he ultimate focus of [appellate] inquiry” in termination 

cases is “on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is 

being challenged.” John M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 320, 324, ¶ 14 

(App. 2007) (cleaned up). When a new ground for termination is alleged 

during the pendency of a dependency case, fundamental fairness will be 

found as long as the parent is given “adequate notice” of, and “an 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

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opportunity to defend against,” the new allegations. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at

355. Here, DCS alleged A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) as a ground for termination over 

six months before the termination hearing. Father had ample opportunity 

to prepare to defend against this ground, and he does not contend 

otherwise. We reject Father’s suggestion that the juvenile court violated his 

due process right to fundamental fairness by terminating his parental rights 

on grounds not alleged in the initial dependency petition. 

¶35 Father also argues that the juvenile court lacked reasonable 

evidence to terminate his parental rights on grounds of mental 

illness/deficiency. He does not dispute the court’s findings that DCS 

“offered [Father] a variety of services” to “help address, directly or 

indirectly, the issues that led to” C.M.’s removal, and that Father “failed to 

engage in services in a meaningful or extended period.” Father nonetheless 

argues that, though he “may not have participated in all services DCS 

requested of him,” “he clearly . . . made progress in developing parenting 

skills.”

¶36 Whatever progress Father may have made in developing his 

parenting skills does not, by itself, preclude termination on the mental 

illness/deficiency ground. In her evaluation, Dr. Leonard explained that 

Father’s prognosis to be able to safely parent C.M. “is dependent on [the]

success of the proposed interventions,” and that “successful results may 

take several months.” Dr. Leonard recommended that Father engage 

consistently in therapy at a doctoral level, attend domestic violence groups, 

and receive psychiatric services. At trial, Dr. Leonard testified that if Father 

failed to participate in these services, Father’s prognosis for being able to 

parent C.M. safely in the near future “would be poor.”

¶37 Father engaged in counseling, but not with a doctoral-level

therapist, and only completed “approximately 4 sessions.” Father never 

engaged in any recommended domestic violence counseling or treatment 

and never submitted proof of completion of a psychiatric evaluation to 

DCS. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Father’s failure to engage 

meaningfully in Dr. Leonard’s recommended services made it highly 

probable that his mental infirmities would continue for a prolonged,

indeterminate period. See Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284-85, ¶ 25.

¶38 Father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding that DCS 

“made the necessary diligent efforts required by law.” “[T]he State, in 

mental-illness-based severances, . . . [must] demonstrate that it has made a 

reasonable effort to preserve the family.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 33 (App. 1999). DCS need not provide “every 
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conceivable service,” but it “must provide a parent with the time and 

opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s

ability to care for the child.” Id. at 192, ¶ 37 (citation omitted). 

¶39 Father does not dispute that DCS provided him with, or 

otherwise referred him to, parent aide services, a psychological evaluation, 

domestic violence treatment, a psychiatric evaluation, supervised visits, 

and individual counseling. He complains, however, that DCS made “no 

‘concerted effort’ to help with housing needs.” Noting that the DCS case 

manager testified at trial that housing was a “significant barrier to 

reunification” with C.M., Father contends that DCS failed to provide 

adequate “assistance and support” to “alleviate[] the housing concern,” 

specifically citing a $1,800 housing stipend that DCS could have pursued 

for him. 

¶40 Father was assigned a parent social worker who “assist[ed] 

him with obtaining housing.” The case manager testified at trial that she

recommended services Father could reach out to for housing assistance,

and even offered to make calls on his behalf, but Father declined her offer 

of help. From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

DCS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made reasonable 

efforts to provide housing assistance to help preserve the family. See Mary 

Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 33. 

¶41 Because clear and convincing evidence supports the 

termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights under the A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3) mental illness/deficiency ground, we need not evaluate 

whether reasonable evidence supported the court’s determination that DCS

also established grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). See 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear and convincing evidence 

supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court 

ordered severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other 

grounds.”).

¶42 To terminate a parent’s rights, the court must not only find a 

statutory ground for termination, but it must also determine that 

termination is in a child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Michael J., 196 

Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12. Here, the court found that termination is in C.M.’s best 

interests because she is currently “thriving” in the “loving and nurturing 

home environment” of a kinship placement with a maternal relative who 

wants to adopt her, thereby providing her with permanency and stability. 

The court also found that denying termination “would be detrimental” to 

C.M. because Mother and Father “have failed to adequately address their 
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12

extensive mental health issues and cognitive limitations.” Neither party 

challenges the court’s “best interests” determination on appeal. We 

therefore accept it and need not address it further. 

CONCLUSION

¶43 We affirm.