In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00104-CV 

 

IN THE MATTER OF L.M.P., A CHILD 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Potter County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 11150-2-JV, Honorable Matthew H. Hand, Presiding 

August 31, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

L.M.P., a juvenile, appeals from the order modifying disposition and committing

him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In October of 2019, thirteen-year-old L.M.P. was adjudicated delinquent for 

committing the offenses of robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and 

assault. The juvenile court placed him on probation in the home of his mother. 

Disposition was subsequently modified several times; L.M.P. was placed at the Floyd 
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County Parent Adolescent Center, the Youth Center of the High Plains, and again with 

his mother. In February of 2023, the State filed its final motion to modify disposition

alleging four violations of the terms of his probation. L.M.P. pleaded true to all four 

allegations. The State recommended commitment to TJJD, while L.M.P. sought 

placement with his grandparents. The juvenile court found L.M.P. violated conditions of 

his probation and committed him to TJJD for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed 

the time when he shall be nineteen years old. L.M.P. brought this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The juvenile court’s decision to modify a juvenile’s disposition to commit him to the 

TJJD is discretionary and subject to review for an abuse of discretion. In re J.P., 136 

S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2004). The court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence 

supports its decision. In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no 

pet.). A violation of a single condition of probation can be sufficient to modify a juvenile’s 

disposition and send the juvenile to TJJD. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(f); In re R.L., No. 

03-99-00334-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 471, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 21, 2000, no 

pet.).

ANALYSIS

L.M.P. raises two issues on appeal, asserting that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by improperly admitting opinion testimony and hearsay. Any error in the 

admission of the objected-to evidence is reviewed under the civil harm analysis in Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1(a). See In re D.V., 955 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (when State proceeds with indeterminate sentencing in 
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juvenile proceeding, we review disposition with civil harm analysis). Therefore, even if 

the court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, we must ask whether the 

admission “probably caused the rendition of an improper [order].” TEX. R. APP. P.

44.1(a)(1).

L.M.P.’s first issue arises from testimony given by the juvenile probation officer 

who worked with L.M.P. He testified about L.M.P.’s dangerous behaviors, “chronic 

persistency of juvenile delinquency,” additional referrals to the juvenile system, failure to 

attend school, and failure to report to the probation department. The officer was then 

asked if public safety would be increased if L.M.P. were committed to TJJD. L.M.P.’s 

counsel objected that the question called for speculation, but the juvenile court overruled 

the objection. The officer then answered the question with a “Yes.” L.M.P. argues that 

the officer was not qualified to offer this opinion testimony and that its admission into

evidence was an abuse of discretion.

Even if we assume that it was error to admit this portion of the officer’s testimony, 

our review of the record shows that any such error was harmless. L.M.P. had, by his own 

admission, committed three serious offenses and repeatedly failed to abide by the 

conditions of his probation, including by failing to report to the probation department and 

failing to attend school as directed for a fifteen-month period. The evidence presented 

showed that previous efforts to keep L.M.P. at home had been unsuccessful and that 

L.M.P. was unlikely to accept supervision by his grandparents. Considering the record 

as a whole, we conclude that the admission of the officer’s statement did not cause the 

rendition of an improper order. See In re D.V., 955 S.W.2d at 380 (disregarding error that 
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did not probably cause rendition of improper judgment). Therefore, we overrule L.M.P.’s 

first issue.

In his second issue, L.M.P. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

by improperly admitting hearsay. At the hearing, the probation officer was asked, “What 

happened in [L.M.P.’s] case with the one incident he’s had since January?” Counsel for 

L.M.P. raised a hearsay objection, to which the State stated, “Your Honor, the part that’s 

business records – and he has obviously qualified, through the business-records 

exception, the ability to talk about them.” The juvenile court overruled the objection. The 

officer then briefly described an incident at the youth center during which L.M.P. had to 

be restrained and then threatened that he would slap staff members when he was 

released. The incident resulted in an administrative disciplinary seclusion.

Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that the juvenile court erred in 

admitting the complained-of testimony, L.M.P. has not demonstrated that he has been 

harmed by the alleged error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1. As set forth above, even without 

the statement about L.M.P.’s most recent incident, there was an abundance of evidence 

to support the juvenile court’s findings that L.M.P. violated reasonable and lawful orders

of the court, is in need of rehabilitation, and that commitment to TJJD is appropriate. 

Thus, any error in admitting this testimony does not constitute reversible error. See In re 

A.W., 661 S.W.3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) 

(erroneous admission of evidence warrants reversal only if error probably caused 

rendition of improper judgment). We overrule L.M.P.’s second issue.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the juvenile court.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice