COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judge Humphreys and Senior Judge Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

MICHAEL WAYNE STALLINGS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1687-14-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 NOVEMBER 10, 2015 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge 

 M. Lee Smallwood, II, Senior Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

 Christopher P. Schandevel, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. 

Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Michael Wayne Stallings (“Stallings”) appeals his conviction from the Circuit Court of 

the City of Danville (the “circuit court”) of felony possession of oxycodone in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-250. Stallings claims the circuit court erred in convicting him of possession of oxycodone 

because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he was aware of the nature and character of 

the item possessed as a controlled substance. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court “must examine 

the evidence that supports the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it.” Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 

S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (2008). The relevant inquiry is whether “‘any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kelly v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Jackson 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This Court’s deference to the fact finder “applies not 

only to findings of fact, but also to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may 

have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676, 701 S.E.2d 

61, 63-64 (2010). “‘Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as 

direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis 

except that of guilt.’” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665, 705 S.E.2d 510, 513 

(2011) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 

(1983)). “Circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 

Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, 

the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, 

may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.”’ Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 

425, 410 S.E.2d 662, 669 (1991) (citations omitted). 

 Code § 18.2-250 makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess 

a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 

prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice.” 

Therefore, “[i]n a prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must 

produce evidence sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and intentional.” Young v. Commonwealth, 

275 Va. 587, 591, 659 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2008). “[T]he plain language of Code § 18.2-250 

requires a defendant to know that the substance he possesses is in fact a controlled substance, but 

that it does not require him to know precisely what controlled substance it is.” Sierra v. 

Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 770, 775, 722 S.E.2d 656, 658 (2012). “A defendant’s knowledge 

of the presence and character of a drug may be shown by evidence of the acts, statements, or 

conduct of the accused, as well as by “other facts or circumstances” tending to demonstrate the 
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accused’s guilty knowledge of the drug.” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 506-07, 

704 S.E.2d 135, 140-41 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 

 It is undisputed that Stallings possessed oxycodone on his person. Therefore, the only 

issue before this Court is whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Stallings had 

knowledge of the nature and character of the pills as a controlled substance. In support of his 

argument that he was unaware of the nature and character of the pills he had in his possession, 

Stallings relies on his own testimony at trial that he did not know the pill bottle in his pocket 

contained prescription pills. However, “[t]he credibility of a witness and the inferences to be 

drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination.” Marable v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). “In its role of judging 

witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the 

accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Id. at 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 

at 235. In this case, there is ample evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s finding 

that Stallings’s testimony was not credible. 

First, Stallings admitted to providing Officer Dixon with fraudulent identification, which 

could reasonably lead the fact finder to conclude that Stallings was attempting to conceal his 

guilt. See Christian v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 603, 613, 721 S.E.2d 809, 814 (2012) 

(holding that the trial court “could infer appellant’s consciousness of guilt” as it related to his 

possession of crack cocaine in his pocket from the false identification he had provided to police). 

 Additionally, Stallings’s testimony at trial was controverted by the testimony of Officers 

Merrill and Dixon. Stallings claimed that Officer Dixon only asked for his name once, 

approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after Stallings’s uncle fraudulently provided Officer 

Merrill with Stallings’s name and birth date. However, both Officers Merrill and Dixon testified 

that they had asked Stallings’s uncle and Stallings for their names and birth dates when they first 
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approached the vehicle at “the same time.” Officer Dixon explained that Stallings had been 

asked about his identity three separate times—when Officer Dixon first approached the car, after 

Officer Dixon discovered the pill bottle from his search of Stallings, and after Officer Merrill had 

run the name “Michael Wayne Stallings” through the DMV system. The circuit court explicitly 

credited Officer Dixon’s testimony that Stallings had falsely identified himself again after 

Officer Dixon had found the pills in Stallings’s pocket. 

 Finally, Stallings’s contradictory testimony at trial undermined his explanation about how 

he came to have the pills in his possession. On brief, Stallings claims that he could have thought 

that the pills had come from a pharmacy, but were not “controlled substances.” At trial, Stallings 

testified first that he was unaware of what was in the bottle. Later in his testimony, Stallings 

explained that he had concluded that the pills “were okay” because he had seen a list of eight to 

ten different medications and their usages and dosages posted in the back of his uncle’s truck and 

had concluded, based on the list, that his uncle must have had “medical issues.” The circuit court 

could have reasonably concluded that if Stallings was truly ignorant to the bottle’s contents, it 

would not have been necessary for him determine the pills “were okay” before retrieving them 

for his uncle and carrying them on his person. Therefore, finding Stallings’s testimony to not be 

credible, the circuit court was entitled to conclude that Stallings testified falsely “in an effort to 

conceal his guilt.” Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004). The 

circuit court could also “‘consider whatever [it] concluded to be perjured testimony as 

affirmative evidence of guilt.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 127, 134, 607 S.E.2d 110, 

114 (2005) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).

 The circuit court was also presented with other evidence indicating Stallings was aware 

of the nature and character of the pills. First, the seven pink pills were packaged inside a plastic 

baggie and stuffed inside a pill bottle that did not have a label. The circuit court could 
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reasonably conclude that such packaging would make it obvious to an observer that the pills had 

not been packaged by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription or doctor’s order. Further, the 

circuit court heard evidence that a “visual examination of the physical characteristics [of the 

pills], including shape, color and manufacturer’s markings” was consistent with the 

pharmaceutical preparation of oxycodone. Therefore, the circuit court could soundly infer that it 

would be obvious to Stallings that the pills were prescription medication, as opposed to other 

over the counter medicines, and that those pills had not been prepared by a pharmacy. 

Moreover, the circuit court noted that no explanation was offered as to why Stallings had 

continued to have the pills in his possession if they belonged to his uncle, who was sitting right 

next to him in the vehicle. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia Practice Series: Criminal Offenses & 

Defenses, 180 (2015-16) (“When the drugs are found in the actual, physical possession of the 

accused . . . such possession is also evidence that the accused knew what he possessed.”). 

Notably, there was no evidence that Stallings’s uncle, or anyone else for that matter, had a valid 

prescription for oxycodone. Accordingly, the circuit court found that Stallings knew he was in 

possession of a controlled substance. Concluding there was sufficient evidence in the record for 

a reasonable fact finder to find Stallings did knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled 

substance in violation of Code § 18.2-250, we affirm Stallings’s conviction. 

 Affirmed.