# Palau - United States Department of State

- Palau HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Palau				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Palau																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Palau during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of serious government corruption.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, and there were no credible reports that government officials employed them.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention center conditions were inadequate and did not meet international standards.Abusive Physical Conditions: The country’s only jail, in Koror, had no infirmary. Police escorted ill prisoners to the emergency room at the national hospital and guarded them there.Administration: There were no known allegations by prisoners or others of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring: There was no system of independent monitoring.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required warrants for arrests, and officials observed the law. The law provided for a prompt judicial determination of the legality of detention, a requirement authorities observed. Authorities informed detainees promptly of charges and provided prompt access to family members and lawyers. If a detainee could not afford a lawyer, the public defender or a court-appointed lawyer was made available. There was a functioning system of bail.An arrested person had the right to remain silent and to speak to and receive visits from counsel, family members, or the person’s employer. Authorities were required to release or charge those arrested within 24 hours and had to inform detainees of these rights.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, and the government respected judicial independence and impartiality.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary enforced this right.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence, and there were no reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status. The government provided some protection against expulsion or return of potential refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections in 2020 were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No laws prohibited or limited the participation of women or members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process, if they were citizens. Women in elected office included: the vice president, two (of 16) governors, two (of 29) federal legislators, and 34 (22 percent of total) state legislators. Some elder matriarchs believed women held political power via their traditional role in choosing candidates for office and so women did not need to run for office. Younger women, however, argued that because women clan leaders preferred to select men over women to run for office, women’s voices were diluted in the political process.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption. The Office of the Special Prosecutor, an independent entity, was authorized to prosecute all acts of corruption in the government.Corruption: The Office of the Special Prosecutor received multiple reports of corruption and mismanagement of public funds.In May media reported that the Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted an online survey of employees from the private sector and national and state governments regarding corruption; 86.7 percent of respondents said they witnessed some form of corruption.On August 4, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged House of Delegates Speaker Sabino Anastacio with misconduct in public office for leasing land without a business license and failing to pay taxes on the lease.On August 11, local media reported that Aimeliik State Public Land Authority Chairman Clarence Sriderio Renggulbai leased land in September 2022 to a Chinese national without proper approvals and received direct payment.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were often cooperative and responsive to their views.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Office of the President included an Office of the Ombudsman, but it was vacant since 2016. The special prosecutor position, with sole authority to prosecute corruption cases, became vacant in August.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women, including spousal rape, was a crime punishable by a maximum of 25 years’ imprisonment, a substantial fine, or both. Domestic violence was a criminal offense. The government enforced laws on rape and domestic violence effectively when incidents were reported. Many persons, however, were reportedly reluctant to call police in these situations due to societal pressure. A nongovernmental organization (NGO), Semesemel Klengeakel (Strengthening Family), helped families at high risk of domestic violence with counseling sessions and services, working closely with the Ministries of Justice and Health. The Palau Red Cross, the Division of Human Services, and religious institutions provided temporary shelter to victims.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: According to UN Women, the law did not protect women from sexual harassment in the workplace. Each ministry was responsible for managing and tracking cases of work-related harassment; there was no central depository of this information.Discrimination: The law provided the same legal status and rights for women and men and those laws were generally respected. The inheritance of property and of traditional rank, however, was matrilineal. The law protected women from job discrimination and provided for equal pay for equal work. There were no reports of unequal pay for equal work or gender-related job discrimination; women occupied 33 percent of senior management positions in private sector companies.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis, for survivors of sexual violence.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										While the constitution outlined the fundamental rights of every citizen, it did not explicitly protect racial or ethnic minorities from violence or discrimination. Authorities did not pursue or prosecute crimes committed against foreigners with the same vigor as crimes against citizens.The constitution afforded citizenship only to ethnic Palauans. Members of other communities such as Filipinos or Bangladeshis, including those born in the country and long-term legal residents, were not citizens. Such noncitizens made up approximately one-third of the country’s resident population.The law prohibited noncitizens from purchasing land, and there were no provisions for naturalization. Some foreign nationals experienced discrimination in employment, pay, housing, education, and access to social services, although the law prohibited such discrimination.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law prohibited child abuse and made it punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. By law any person authorized to provide care for a child was required to report suspected incidents of child abuse. Failure to report was a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year’s imprisonment, a fine, or both. Observers said child abuse was a serious problem and was underreported because it was a taboo topic in traditional culture.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: There was no minimum age for marriage between two citizens. The minimum age for marriage between a citizen and a noncitizen was 18 for a man and 16 for a girl, and girls younger than 18 had to obtain parental permission. Underage marriage was not common.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law did not explicitly prohibit child pornography; it did prohibit the commercial sexual exploitation of children, and the law was enforced. The age of consensual sex was 17. Sexual assault of a child younger than age 15 and child sexual abuse were felonies subject to maximum imprisonment of 25 years, a substantial fine, or both.																																				Antisemitism										There were reportedly fewer than 20 persons in the Jewish community. There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ .																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. There were no reports of neutral laws being disproportionately applied to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.Violence and Harassment: There were no reports of violence based on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or sex characteristics, but NGOs working to promote the rights of LGBTQI+ persons indicated such acts sometimes went unreported or were misreported.Discrimination: The law did not protect LGBTQI+ persons from discrimination. The constitution defined marriage as between a man and a woman. The NGO Living All Inclusive in Belau (LAIIB) reported bullying of LGBTQI+ individuals and discrimination in the health-care system and stated stigma against LGBTQI+ persons in traditional culture prevented them from seeking redress for discrimination. Some traditional leaders aimed public derogatory remarks at LGBTQI+ persons.According to LAIIB, HIV treatment in state-run facilities focused more on abstinence and the harm of same-sex activity than on providing treatment for HIV, although private clinics run by foreigners were less judgmental.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not allowed, and there were no mechanisms for individuals to change their name or gender identity.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of “conversion therapy” practices or intersex normalization surgeries.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no such restrictions. Several public figures supported LGBTQI+ rights and LAIIB hosted several public events supporting the LGBTQI+ community.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law included a provision for access to government buildings for persons with disabilities; the government generally enforced this in new facilities, although most older government buildings were not accessible. Most public schools had programs to address the educational needs of students with disabilities, including mainstreaming them with other students. Employment discrimination against persons with disabilities was prohibited.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of all persons to join and organize labor unions and to bargain collectively; no laws regulated trade union organization. The law neither provided for nor prohibited the right to strike, and the government did not address this issue. There was no law barring antiunion discrimination.There were no active labor unions or other employee organizations.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See also the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/ .																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all the worst forms of child labor. The minimum age of employment for citizens was 16; for noncitizens it was 21, excluding entertainers applying for temporary identification certificates. The law required the government to protect children from exploitation. The Office of Labor Compliance was responsible for enforcing child labor laws and regulations. The government effectively enforced the law, and penalties were commensurate with those for analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping. There were no reports of children working in the formal economy, but some assisted their families with fishing, agriculture, and small-scale family enterprises. There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a minimum wage for government and private-sector employment above the poverty income level. The minimum wage did not apply to foreign migrants working as agricultural laborers or domestic workers, to students, to temporary or probationary work by students, or to persons younger than 21.The workweek for public employees was 40 hours a week. For private sector employees the workweek depended on the terms of the contract; the legal minimum time off was one day per week. Foreign workers in the private sector were entitled to one day off per week, consisting, however, only of 10 continuous hours without work between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.Occupational Safety and Health: The law required employers to adopt reasonable and adequate occupational safety and health (OSH) rules; it did not set safety and health standards and rules were not regularly followed with heavy equipment and transportation. No law protected workers who filed complaints about hazardous conditions. Foreign workers could have self-censored complaints due to fear they would lose their job if they removed themselves from situations endangering their health or safety. There were no statistics available regarding OSH violations. The government did not take a proactive approach to inspecting labor conditions.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Office of Labor Compliance had eight labor officers/inspectors responsible for enforcing minimum wage laws, regulations regarding working conditions of foreign employees, and verifying the adequacy of firms’ safety standards. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Although migrant workers could raise complaints to a labor dispute resolution board, they rarely did so. When complaints were raised, employers would usually quickly repatriate the worker to their home country to avoid further investigation.Penalties for violations of wage laws or OSH rules were commensurate with those for similar crimes such as fraud and negligence. Penalties include fines or imprisonment but were rarely applied against violators. Noncompliance with minimum wage requirements entailed a civil penalty in addition to repayment of back due taxes, social security contributions, and wages (with interest also levied on unpaid wages).Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections of workplaces and employer-provided housing. Inspections could also be based on the specific complaint of an employee. They were able to initiate sanctions, but the number of inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance and penalties were rarely applied against violators.There were continued reports of the mistreatment of foreign workers by employers. Noncitizens were especially at risk of labor abuses. Migrant workers were commonly employed in the tourism sector; those most likely to be abused included domestic and farm workers, waitresses, cashiers, beauticians, hostesses in karaoke bars and massage parlors, and construction and other semiskilled workers, the majority of whom were from the Philippines and Bangladesh. Local workers were largely employed in the government sector.According to the International Labor Organization, in 2021 the informal economy accounted for more than half of all jobs in the country. The government was unable to consistently enforce labor laws in the formal and informal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Palau
- Digital Press Briefing with Taylor V. Ruggles, Department of State Senior Advisor for COFA Implementation, and Keone Nakoa, Department of the Interior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs Taylor V. Ruggles, Senior Advisor for COFA Implementation, U.S. Department of StateKeone Nakoa, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs, U.S. Department of the InteriorMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Taylor V. Ruggles, the U.S. Department of State’s Senior Advisor for COFA Implementation, and Keone Nakoa, the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs.  Senior Advisor Ruggles and Deputy Assistant Secretary Nakoa will provide an overview of the recent enactment of U.S. legislation providing approval and funding to bring into force new assistance agreements related to the Compacts of Free Association between the United States and, respectively, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, collectively referred to as the Freely Associated States.The speakers will also discuss what is contained in the new agreements, the uniquely close nature of the U.S. relationships with the Freely Associated States, and the positive impact that the compacts continue to have on people in the Freely Associated States.With that, let’s get started.  Senior Advisor Ruggles, thanks for joining us.  I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.MR RUGGLES:  Great, thank you, and good evening from Washington; good morning to those of you on the other side of the date line.  We’re really thrilled to have this opportunity to speak with you all about the recent passage by the U.S. Congress of legislation related to the Compacts of Free Association, or COFA.  The enactment of this legislation is really a historic occasion and one worth celebrating.On March 9th, President Biden signed into law the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024, and this represents another milestone in our deep and abiding relationships with the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, collectively known as the Freely Associated States.  As Secretary Blinken said following the law’s enactment, “Our special and uniquely close relationships with the Freely Associated States, underpinned by the Compacts, have been an anchor of U.S. engagement in the Pacific for decades,” and now, “We look forward to working with our partners in the  over the next two decades of COFA-related cooperation.”In the case of the Marshall Islands, it’s important to note that action by the Nitijeļā, their parliament, is required to approve the agreements.  I understand that the Nitijeļā is considering the COFA-related agreements this week and that the foreign minister tabled the legislation on Monday.  So we’ll be excited and interested to follow that process.I’ll just note that the enactment of this legislation by the United States provides approval and funding for new assistance agreements between the United States and each of the Freely Associated States.  In total, the new COFA-related agreements include $7.1 billion in assistance for a full 20 years.  The long-term nature of the package is a reflection of the unwavering U.S. commitment to these key Pacific partners and affirms our shared visions for the future.To our friends in the Freely Associated States, we acknowledge that the past few months have been uncertain at times.  We’ve heard your concerns about the need to get COFA-related agreements done, and frankly, we shared them.  Getting COFA-related agreements across the finish line was a top priority for the administration, and we worked hard with the Congress, with the White House, our overseas embassy teams and interagency partners, especially the Department of the Interior, to make that happen.  And with continued strong bipartisan support in Congress for these agreements, we got it done.Now, while the impetus for our discussion today was the recent successful passage of the legislation, it might be worth recalling that this is a – in this historic moment, where we came from, and why the compacts received such bipartisan support.  I think DAS Nakoa will provide a little bit of historical context of our relationships that date back to World War II – the Freely Associated States – but if I can just touch on some recent history, I’ll mention that these agreements, the economic assistance agreements, are only renegotiated every 15 to 20 years.  So starting in the 1980s, this was the third iteration of such negotiations, and the legislation that President Biden signed on March 9th concluded a process that began nearly five years ago when then-Secretary Pompeo announced the start of negotiations to extend the Compact-related assistance.The negotiations picked up pace when President Biden appointed Ambassador Joseph Yun as Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations in March of 2022, and throughout ’22 and into 2023, we were gradually able to reach agreements with our FSM, Palau, and RMI counterparts on a range of agreements establishing the parameters for U.S. economic support for the next 20 years.  And this includes funding in key areas including environment, health, education, infrastructure, and more.One thing I wanted to underscore is the flexible nature of the funding that’s provided through the COFA-related agreements.  It reflects the kind of relationship the United States maintains with the Freely Associated States, one of partnership, not prescription.  We believe the economic package contained in these agreements is going to play a vital role in building and maintaining a brighter, more prosperous future for the people of the Freely Associated States.I’ll just also add that while the topline figures and the nature of COFA-related assistance over the next two decades is now secured, we’re continuing negotiations with the Marshall Islands and Palau for federal programs and services agreements.  So those remain active and ongoing.In terms of protocol, there’s a process for these agreements to formally enter into force, with the United States and each country required to take certain steps.  For FSM and Palau, an exchange of diplomatic notes effectively brought them into force.  Earlier today, Deputy Secretary Kurt Campbell and FSM President Simina exchanged notes, and last Friday, March 15th, President Whipps of Palau and our ambassador in Palau, Joel Ehrendreich, exchanged notes.  And as I mentioned before, the next step for the Marshall Islands is that their legislature will consider the new agreements in the Nitijeļā.I’ll just conclude saying these are very carefully negotiated agreements that reflect the hard work of our teams together, and we believe they provide an excellent framework through which we will propel our partnerships forward in continued support of a more secure, stable, free, and prosperous Pacific.So let me stop there and turn it over to my friend and colleague, DAS Keone Nakoa from the Department of the Interior.MR NAKOA:  Thank you, Taylor, Senior Advisor Ruggles.  I appreciate it.  Aloha.  This is Keone Nakoa, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs.  And I am here on behalf of the leadership at the Interior who joins Taylor and the rest of the world, really, in applauding the finalization of the amendments to the COFA, Compacts of Free Association, which would provide another 20 years of economic assistance to the FAS.The $6.5 billion of assistance is critical for economic stability and quality of life for people in the FAS, which is the FSM, the RMI, and Palau.  The packages will provide an economic assistance of $3.3 billion to the FSM; $2.3 billion to the RMI; and $889 million to Palau – all over the span of 20 years, or through FY2043.The funding will provide support for basic public service deliveries such as health and education, improve infrastructure, and bolster the health of the Compact Trust Funds previously established for each of the FAS.  Congress also included $634 million over the next 20 years to ensure the continued provision of U.S. Postal Service to the FAS.As recently stated by Secretary of the Interior Deb Haaland, “Strong ties between the United States and the Pacific Islands form the foundation of our engagement and presence in the Pacific. The provision of 20 years of new economic assistance sends a clear signal of the United States’ commitment to the long, historical relationships we have held with the Freely Associated States.”The FAS have been important to the U.S. national interest in the Indo-Pacific for more than 75 years, and the Interior has played an important role in that relationship, starting during the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.The new amendments in the – to the Compacts of Free Association deepen our relationships with the FAS over the coming decades and serve as a clear signal of the United States commitment to achieving and maintaining a free and secure Indo-Pacific region.  Interior has proudly served as a lead domestic implementing agency, providing and administering funding for the U.S. Government to the FAS under the Compacts of Free Association for the last four decades, during compact one from 1986 to 2001 for the FSM and RMI, and then compact two from 2003 to 2023; and then for Palau from 1994 to 2009, and 2010 through 2024.We believe the new Compacts maintain strong U.S. oversight over every taxpayer dollar being proposed, and at the same time we have carved out room to accommodate FSM, Palau, and RMI requests for more autonomy and flexibility in framing the annual budget proposals for the effective expenditure of economic assistance.As Senior Advisor Ruggles mentioned, through the Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs, we have a long history of serving and working with the FAS through the administration of Compact funding and also through the administration of other discretionary funds that Congress has provided to the OIA for insular areas, which includes the FAS.The Joint Economic Committee with the FSM and the Joint Economic Committee with the RMI, JEMCO and JEMFAC, currently are chaired by Assistant Secretary Carmen G. Cantor and have been chaired for the Interior for more than the past 20 years – or I’m sorry, for the past 20 years.  I am also currently serving as the Compact Trust Fund Committee chair for the FSM and for the RMI, and this committee has also been chaired by the Interior for the past 20 years as well.Every year, the OIA administers discretionary assistance and funding outside of the Compact that provides important support to the FAS as their populations – and their populations in additional ways, including through Close Up and Junior State foundation, Prior Service Benefits Trust Fund for retirees, TAP and MAP funds to the FAS, and support for regional groups such as the Island Government Finance Officers Association, the Association of Pacific Islands Public Auditors, and the Executive Leadership Development Program.Another important piece of this passage was the inclusion of CIFA, the Compact Impact Fairness Act, which passed with the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024.  Through this measure, Congress addressed longstanding challenges for citizens of each of the FAS who chose or choose to reside lawfully in the United States as provided for under the Compact agreements.  This law restores eligibility for key federal programs for the FAS individuals while they are lawfully present in the United States – an important long-term solution to the financial impacts that some FAS communities have – may have on U.S. state and territorial governments.  Restoring access to federal public benefits will address gaps in needed social services for families and have a significant impact on the communities where they reside.The law also ensures that the federal government provides without significant additional administrative costs a significant portion of the financial burden currently being borne by state and territorial governments of the FAS – or for the FAS communities.  Benefits and compensation from the federal government will be available to FAS individuals in whichever state or territory within the United States they choose to reside.The COFA, though previously negotiated between our respective administrations, as Taylor mentioned, must also be passed and approved by our respective legislative bodies.  The Congress of the FSM and the National Congress of the Republic of Palau, or the OEK, have both passed the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act, and as we speak the legislation is being deliberated by the national parliament of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Nitijeļā.  We applaud the quick legislative action that has already been conducted in the FSM and Palau, and we look forward to a fruitful and positive response from the RMI as they conduct their own democratic process.In closing, the Department of the Interior is proud to partner with the Department of State in honoring and upholding the U.S. Government’s commitments to the FSM, RMI, and Palau, and we look forward to carrying out our responsibility to implement these cornerstone agreements for the next 20 years and beyond.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Deputy Assistant Secretary.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Mar-Vic Cagurangan from the Pacific Island Times, based in Guam, who asks:  “Regarding CIFA, some of the benefits that are now available to COFA migrants, such as the Supplemental Security Income, do not apply to U.S. citizens living in Guam or other territories.  Will FAS migrants living in Guam be eligible for SSI?  If yes, then how does the U.S. Government intend to address the apparent distortion?”MR NAKOA:  Thank you for the question.  It’s important, and I appreciate raising awareness on this.  I think there’s been some confusion about what benefits CIFA transfers or transmits in the past.  So to be clear, CIFA will not provide eligibility to FAS communities living in Guam or anywhere else where the local residents do not also include those benefits.  Essentially, CIFA just places the COFA communities in the same shoes as the residents living in whatever state or territory that they choose to reside.  So in California they have the benefits that any California resident would have, in Hawaii the same, and in Guam the same.  Hopefully that is able to shed some light on what CIFA does or does not do.  But happy to answer any follow-ups.MODERATOR:  Okay.  The next question comes to us from Dave Rising at the Associated Press, based in Bangkok, Thailand, who asks:  “In February, the presidents of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands wrote a joint letter expressing their concerns that the COFA agreements had not yet been implemented, suggesting that the delay had opened the door to, quote, ‘undesirable opportunities for economic exploitation’ by China.  Does this put the U.S. at a disadvantage as it now works to implement COFA?  What obstacles now need to be overcome?  And more broadly, how great is the U.S. fear of these three nations falling under – more under Chinese influence and what can the U.S. do to counter this?”MR RUGGLES:  Thank you.  I’ll take that.  I’ll note that we have really a unique and special relationship with the Freely Associated States, arguably one of the closest relationships possible between sovereign nations.  Their citizens serve in the U.S. military.  They can travel and work freely in the United States.  Our military provides for the national defense of these countries.  We’re as close as countries can be, and this has been a longstanding relationship that the Compact has underpinned.  And so this relationship really supports the security, stability, freedom, and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific.We understand the past several months have been frustrating for and uncertain for our friends in the Pacific.  We heard their concerns about getting COFA done, and frankly, we shared those frustrations and that priority.  It was a top priority for this administration, top levels of the State Department, the Interior Department, the Pentagon, working with the Congress, the White House to secure that bipartisan support in Congress.And I’ll just note that for observers of the United States, clearly there are a number of national security priorities that are still being hammered out with Congress.  But I think it’s notable of all these that COFA is the one that made it through.  I think that speaks volumes to the bipartisan support and importance that COFA holds for the United States.And so these agreements have a total of $7.1 billion in funding for a full 20 years.  There’s not going to be annual appropriations.  This locks in place assistance numbers for 20 years.  And we believe that the economic package in these agreements is going to play a vital role in building and maintaining a brighter future for the people of the region.  And we’re – continue to be committed to work with the Freely Associated States to preserve an open, secure, and prosperous region.I’ll just say that our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific does not exclude any country, but we’ll continue to build on this already strong relationship and of course follow any developments closely, working closely with our regional partners.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Cleo Paskal from The Sunday Guardian, based in New Delhi.  Cleo, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Oh, there you go.  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay, great.  Thank you.  First of all, congratulations to you both and to the entire team for getting this through.  I know it was a tough haul, and you did a great job.  Two questions.  One, is there still an option for universal basic income in the RMI agreement?  And how was the congressional logjam over funding broken?  Did it involve an offset?  Thank you.MR RUGGLES:  Thank you, Cleo.  You have played a – you’ve been a great partner and voice in highlighting the importance of the COFA, and appreciate your support and engagement on these important relationships.  I just wanted to acknowledge that.The agreement with the RMI as with the other two countries was designed to reflect the priorities of the – of our Pacific partners, the Freely Associated States.  And so in negotiating – and I’ll invite DAS Nakoa to maybe elaborate, but I’ll just say that in negotiating the agreement with RMI, they wanted to at least preserve the option of having some sort of direct individual support distributions for the population.  We’ll need to sit down with them on the implementation phase and through the Trust Fund Committee that DAS Nakoa chairs and the JEMFAC that Assistant Secretary Cantor chairs to go over those priorities.  But it’s a bit premature to (inaudible) since we haven’t had those discussions.In terms of offsets, I don’t have direct knowledge of that part of the agreement.  The Office of Management and Budget handled the negotiations with the Hill on getting the final agreement, so I might refer you to them or to contacts on the Hill on what finally secured the deal.  But again, we’re just happy it made it through and thrilled at the overwhelming support.  Thank you.MR NAKOA:  Thank you.  This is Keone Nakoa.  First, I want to echo Taylor’s comments to thank you and a lot of your work.  I don’t know that there was perhaps any single specific thing, but there was kind of, like, a groundswell of support.  I’m not sure how much to credit any individual, but I know people were definitely paying attention to some of your articles and there were several letters from FAS, from ambassadors, from other countries, and there was also a very strong championing of several members of Congress, particularly of Senate Natural Resource – or House and Senate Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, and HASC and SASC.  So I think it was a culmination of a lot of support.From what I understand, there was no specific offset provided other than things that were contained within the continuing appropriations act in general.  And I believe, yes, there – I’ll have to consult the letter of the RMI Trust Fund Agreement, but there is the possibility to have distributions that would resemble universal distributions.  But that’s something that Nitijeļā would have to pass or have additional action if they wanted to access, and then there are specific pieces of the Trust Fund Agreement that would need to be satisfied.MODERATOR:  Okay, I think we have time for one last question.  We have Jessica Stone from VOA, based in Washington.  Jessica, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Okay, thank you so much and thanks for doing this call, guys, and congratulations to both of you as well.  I wanted to drill down a little bit on the nuclear legacy in the RMI and how that is being handled.  As I reported a few months ago, that was a major sticking point.  I wonder if that’s still your view on it that that was really the thing that had to be settled to get the agreement signed.  We all know the congressional saga, but I’m curious how you view handling the nuclear legacy in the RMI going forward.MR RUGGLES:  Hey, thanks, Jessica.  I think just objectively this is a sensitive issue, and we remember just on March 1st we commemorated Nuclear Remembrance Day.  And I’ll just say that the United States has long recognized the effects of the nuclear testing program and has accepted and acted on its responsibility.  But the – in negotiating the agreements with RMI, as I mentioned in response to Cleo’s question, it’s really a desire to be responsive to RMI’s priorities and needs while at the same time observing and respecting the fact that we have this agreement from 1986, the so-called Section 177 Agreement where we reached a full and final settlement concerning those issues.And so I don’t want to be – I don’t want to belabor the point.  As I said, the Nitijeļā is considering legislation.  I think we’ve found an agreement that is robust and provides great discretion for the Government of the RMI to respond to the needs, the health, environmental needs of its population.  I don’t want to convey the impression that this is a closed chapter or that this is not something that will continue to pop up, that we’ll need to work through together, but I do think that the negotiators on our side, led by Ambassador Yun, have crafted an agreement that respects the interests and priorities of both countries.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Oh, I’m sorry.  Senior Advisor Ruggles, thank you so much.  If you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back to you now.MR RUGGLES:  Oh, thank you.  I’ll just say, one, I appreciate the interest.  As I said, we had President Simina of FSM in town today.  It was a great opportunity meeting with the Deputy Secretary, and I know he also met with Secretary Haaland in Interior and the Peace Corps director and many other meetings that they’ll have this week.  We certainly are going to be looking for other opportunities to highlight and celebrate implementation of COFA.  I do not want to prejudice the outcome of the deliberations in the Marshall Islands, so we’ll watch that process carefully and look forward to working with all three governments moving forward.But really, a historic moment and I’m pleased that we’ve passed this milestone.  So thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Senior Advisor Ruggles.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Nakoa, if you have any last words, please go ahead.MR NAKOA:  Thank you so much.  And I just really want to echo what Taylor just said.  Very much appreciative of all the work of everyone on this call and the interest in this topic.  I think that was definitely a piece of how Congress – or why Congress acted.  And very much looking forward to implementation stage of this next third generation, or compact three, or however it’s being called – working with the United States and the Freely Associated States.So there’s a lot more to come, a lot – a very busy year ahead of us.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thanks for your questions, and huge thanks to Senior Advisor Ruggles and Deputy Assistant Secretary Nakoa for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.  Take care.
- On the Enactment of Compact-Related Legislation Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe Department welcomes the enactment of legislation providing approval and funding to bring into force new assistance agreements under the Compacts of Free Association (COFA). Passage of this legislation, which was signed into law by the President today, serves as another milestone in our relationships with the Freely Associated States (FAS) of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.This step follows the successful negotiation of the Compact-related economic assistance agreements between the United States and the Freely Associated States.  The 20-year duration and commitment of $7.1 billion of mandatory funding is reflective of our steadfast commitment to these strategically important partners.  We appreciate the continued strong bipartisan support for COFA in Congress.Our special and uniquely close relationships with the Freely Associated States, underpinned by the Compacts, have been an anchor of U.S. engagement in the Pacific for decades.  Extending Compact-related assistance is a critical component of the Administration’s Pacific Partnership, Indo-Pacific, and National Security Strategies.  We look forward to working with our partners in the Freely Associated States over the next two decades of COFA-related cooperation.
- Strengthening Climate Security Through Enhanced Security Sector Governance Bureau of Political-Military AffairsAmanda Ans, Sarah Bufano, Sara Ratliff, and Ilyssa TuttelmanAs the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) in Dubai concluded on December 12, the United States and our partners have advanced global efforts to address shared climate challenges.  For two weeks, COP28 participants discussed common challenges for climate and global security and set the stage for effective collaboration.The United States recognizes that a whole-of-government approach and international engagement are required to achieve climate security.  Climate security is a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from the adverse impacts of climate.  Climate change introduces new security risks and vulnerabilities, which is why the Department of State is working with partners and allies to strengthen their resilience.  One example of this is the Department of State’s Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), which provides strategic-level advisors to select countries to enhance security sector governance.  Advisors assist countries in their efforts to establish effective systems and mechanisms such as legislation, policies, strategies, regulations, procedures, oversight, and accountability.  These in turn enhance countries’ capacities to respond to their people&#8217;s security needs in a coordinated, efficient, and effective way.  In countries such as Madagascar, Palau, Peru, and Ecuador, GDRP advisors are also supporting partners by helping them anticipate and plan for severe climate change impacts, such as flooding, wildfires, droughts, and stronger El Niño cycles, thus enabling them to be more resilient to climate change.Strengthening Climate Security Can Enhance the Maritime Security of Island NationsRising ocean temperatures, a result of climate change, have created new migration paths for fish stocks that cross through two or more exclusive economic zones (EEZs).  As the fish move, foreign fishing vessels and fleets follow them, often without regard for international maritime norms, customs, and laws regarding fishing.  These sometimes-lawless movements and illegal fishing create food security and maritime security governance challenges for island nations in that they are forced to address the increased threat of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in their EEZs.  GDRP advisors collaborate with partner nations like Madagascar and Palau to enhance maritime security governance and safeguard their EEZs, thus strengthening the ability of partner countries to effectively address maritime security and governance challenges partially induced by climate factors.&nbsp; GDRP Maritime Security Advisor Douglas Poole meets with Head of the Malagasy Navy Rear Admiral Honoré Ga, Office of Security Cooperation Chief Lieutenant Commander Ty-Jebeck Ruun, Rear Admiral Tsiriniaina, and other officers in January 2022. &nbsp;Rampant IUU fishing has dramatically strained Madagascar’s already limited fish stocks.  A GDRP advisor supports the Ministry of National Defense and Navy with strategy development, human resources planning, and career management to build a force capable of patrolling the island nation’s EEZ of 473,075 square miles (1,225,259 square kilometers), the 25th largest in the world.  These strategies align with national goals, such as fostering a blue economy, which accounts for the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and a robust marine ecosystem.  By addressing vulnerabilities partially caused by climate change, in this case IUU fishing, the ministry is contributing to a more efficient and effective government-wide response to challenges found in the maritime economy.  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office Director Michael Smith and the Honorable J. Uduuch Sengebau Senior, Vice President and Minister of Justice, discussed GDRP in Palau. &nbsp;Palau, an island nation consisting of 340 islands and an EEZ of 230,197 square miles (596,208 square kilometers)—the 42nd largest in the world—considers its marine ecosystem a vital source of food and income.  Unfortunately, the ecosystem is highly vulnerable to climate change.  Climate change has caused rising sea levels, warming water temperatures, and drastic weather changes that affect Palau’s marine ecosystem and aquaculture, and result in more fish in its EEZ.  This increase in fish stocks has been accompanied by an increase in harmful IUU fishing.  In accordance with the U.S. Integrated Country Strategy for Palau, the United States supports Palau in increasing its “resiliency to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters &#8230;  economy in an environmentally friendly way, through sustainable tourism, fisheries, and agriculture.”  The GDRP maritime security advisor works with the Bureau of Public Safety’s Division of Maritime Security and Fish and Wildlife Protection and the National Security Coordinator’s Office to develop more robust processes and structures that support a whole-of-government approach to information sharing and reporting suspected IUU vessels in the EEZ.  The increased coordination and responsiveness diminish the negative impact on Palau’s fisheries and shore up its climate security.Fostering Coordinated Disaster Responses to Climate-Induced Emergencies and Destruction The U.S delegation outside of the PERAR headquarters where they were hosted by PERAR Crl. Carlos Gil, DIPLANE Director, Gral. Ricardo Anibal Benavides Febres, and GDRP Advisor Gerry Olivarez in October 2023. &nbsp;Navigating diverse climates from the Andes mountains to the Amazon, Peru faces an increased amount of natural weather phenomena induced by climate change that have wreaked havoc on its communities and environment.  El Niño cycles—such as the damaging 2017 event that triggered catastrophic flooding, displaced 100,000 Peruvians, and inflicted $1.4 billion in damages—are expected to persist.  The United States has partnered with Peru to enhance citizen safety by addressing security threats, including natural disasters.  Over the past three years, an embedded GDRP advisor with the Peruvian Army allowed the Department of State to support Peru in implementing an emergency response strategy and developing a program for military first responders.  Today, Peru has a well-established training center for personnel assigned to its 1st Multipurpose Brigade, which conducts search and rescue, radiological detection, and river bridging, often in response to climate-related disasters.  This initiative fosters an integrated whole-of-government response through collaboration with national government entities under the National Disaster Risk Management System, nongovernmental organizations, and civilian defense institutions.  Peru, with GDRP advisory support, is building a comprehensive and coordinated approach to disaster response that can address the challenges posed by climate change.  GDRP Advisor Rick Pineiro meets with Captain J. Benitez (JointCommand), General C. Carillo (retired), General F. Adatty (MOD Sub-Secretary), and Luis Auz (National Secretariat of Public and State Security) at the Ecuador Ministry of National Defense to discuss multi-domain awareness. &nbsp;Home to rainforests, glaciers, and the Galápagos Islands, Ecuador is classified as a mega-diverse country because of its abundance of distinct climates.  While an asset in many ways, this diversity makes Ecuador vulnerable to the impacts of climate change such as increased flooding, droughts, and a stronger El Niño effect.  To build greater resilience, a GDRP advisor assists Ecuador’s Ministry of National Defense in the development of robust multi-domain awareness to holistically monitor and respond to events across air, land, and sea.  As Luis Auz, the Director of Planning and Coordination in the Secretariat for National Security and Public Order explains, this strategy enables the country to better assess the “interrelationship of the environment with  domains, which will help&#8230;  catastrophic events.”  Multi-domain awareness will streamline information-sharing across Ecuador’s military so it can be faster and better coordinated in responding to severe climate events, and thus Ecuador can be more responsive to its people’s safety and security needs.Advancing Global Climate SecurityCOP28 underscored the importance of collaborative action and a proactive and inclusive approach to establishing and maintaining protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from the adverse impacts of climate change.  The United States demonstrates its commitment to climate security collaboration through programs such as the Department of State’s Global Defense Reform Program, which strategically assists partner nations such as Madagascar, Palau, Peru, and Ecuador to develop the governance processes, strategies, and structures to be more resilient to climate change.  These efforts prepare nations to respond efficiently and effectively to the escalating climate events and protect people and the nation’s vital natural resources.About the Authors:  Amanda Ans, Sarah Bufano, Sara Ratliff, and Ilyssa Tuttelman serve in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Global Programs and Initiatives at the U.S. Department of State.
- Palau National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Palau and extend my best wishes on your 29th Independence Day.Our nations are close friends and partners. We share a commitment to a free, open, resilient, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.Last week, with our Pacific neighbors, we demonstrated our solidarity and friendship at the U.S.-Pacific Island Forum Summit at the White House. Just a few months ago, we reaffirmed our partnership and expressed our clear intentions to improve Palau’s economic resilience by signing the 2023 U.S.-Palau Compact Review Agreement. We thank Palau for its leadership regarding environmental protection of Pacific islands.We are grateful for the contributions of Palauan citizens who are currently serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, and we thank Palauan veterans for their service. We also thank Palau for hosting U.S. military exercises, which further demonstrates our shared commitment to peace and security.The friendship between our nations and the bonds between our people tie the United States and Palau together, and we look forward to a future of peace and prosperity.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsDr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and OceaniaMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists today to the on-the-record briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania.  The speakers will provide a readout on the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.With that, let’s get started.  Dr. Rapp-Hooper, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, and thanks to you all for being here this evening, this morning.  We’re glad to have the opportunity to read you out the President’s really consequential summit of Pacific Islands Forum leaders here in Washington just a few days ago, and thrilled to be joining my friend and colleague Dan Kritenbrink to do so.As you know, this week, leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum were all in Washington for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Island Leaders Summit.  By all accounts, this was an extremely successful and productive visit for the PIF leaders and for the President.  I’ll start with a brief recap of the leaders’ engagements over the past few days, and then I’ll discuss in brief some of the key deliverables that were announced over the course of the summit before handing the floor over to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.In advance of the formal meetings that took place in Washington, we got our summit started early on Sunday when Pacific Island Forum leaders took a trip from New York on a special Amtrak train down to Baltimore.  In Baltimore, the leaders attended a Baltimore Ravens game, where they were recognized for their role as American friends in the Indo-Pacific.  They even made it onto the field, where they were recognized before the game began.After the game, they toured a Coast Guard cutter ship in the Baltimore Harbor, the USS Forward, and had a meeting and opportunity to exchange views with Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Linda Fagan on key issues to Pacific Island leaders, including combating illegal fishing and effectively managing maritime domains.Following the Pacific Island Forum leaders’ trip to Baltimore, the leaders came to Washington, where they were hosted by President Biden at the White House on Monday for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Summit.  They also attended a climate roundtable hosted by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry as well as a dinner hosted by Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield about which Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will say more in just a moment.On Tuesday, the leaders also met with members of the philanthropic community, U.S. businesses, and members of Congress.  We closed out the summit with a reception hosted by our friends at the Australian embassy, emphasizing the depths of our people-to-people ties.  And I look forward to Dan speaking to those engagements in a bit more detail very soon.At the summit with PIF leaders on Monday, President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to shared regional priorities and to deepening our cooperation, including to tackling the climate crisis, advancing economic growth, promoting sustainable development, countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and expanding our people-to-people ties.Before getting into the deliverables that we unveiled on Monday, I’d first like to take a step back and recognize the milestones of engagement with PIF countries that we have passed over the course of the last couple of years.Just in the last year, we have opened new embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga in record time, thanks in no small part to the extraordinary work of our colleagues at the State Department.  We opened a USAID regional mission in Fiji and are returning the Peace Corps to the region after years of relative absence.  We are enhancing our engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum as the region’s leading institution, and we continue to expand U.S. cooperation and assistance programs throughout the region.At this year’s summit, we announced expanded ties with our recognition, our diplomatic recognition, of the Cook Islands and Niue, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with both of these Pacific Island nations.Since last year’s summit, this May, Secretary Blinken met with the Pacific Island Forum leaders in Papua New Guinea, and at this week’s summit, the Biden-Harris administration has continued to show that we are delivering on our promises.  All told, we have now announced a commitment to work with Congress towards over $8 billion in new funding and programs for the Pacific Island region.  And again, this is just in the last year.On Monday, President Biden announced a new slate of activities, including plans to work with Congress to request and provide nearly $200 million in new funding.  These programs seek to address the priority issues we hear about from Pacific Island leaders, including the climate crisis – which is existential for many of our Pacific Island friends – and we always stand shoulder to shoulder with them as they work to meet the challenge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.The President on Monday also reaffirmed his commitment to the security of the Blue Pacific Continent, and to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, the United States has announced that it will provide over $11 million to bring cutting-edge maritime domain awareness technology to the Pacific through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to help improve the maritime picture and law enforcement information analysis and provision amongst our Pacific Island friends.We’re also delivering on our promise to invest in the prosperity of the region.  As the President has announced, we will invest an additional $40 million working with Congress to expand our Pacific Islands Infrastructure Initiative.  Through this initiative, we’re bringing technical assistance and project preparation work needed to identify commercially viable projects through partners in the U.S. Government, including the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.These are just a few of the key initiatives announced as part of our summit.  One more that I’d flag that we’re happy to go into during our question-and-answer period involves a new microfinance facility that will offer small and micro loans to Pacific Island businesses so that entrepreneurs there have the chance to thrive.  And these deliverables we are working towards illustrate the depths of our collaboration with the Pacific Islands and the promise of expanding our partnership for many years to come.As President Biden has said, the United States is and will long remain a proud Pacific nation.  And as a Pacific nation, the United States is here for the long haul and will continue to deliver on our promises to our partners in the region.I’ll hand the floor over to Dan to talk more about Secretary Blinken’s consequential engagements with the PIF leaders throughout the summit.  Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, thanks so much, and good evening, everyone.  I think, as my esteemed colleague Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper has outlined, this was a tremendously successful summit that I think demonstrates further the breadth and depth of America’s commitment to the Pacific.  And Mira, I thought that was really a tremendous rundown of a momentous series of events related to the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.I thought that I would focus my remarks a bit more narrowly on some of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s significant engagements with the Pacific Island leaders here in Washington, and then also mention briefly the engagement involving the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry’s meetings during the summit as well.As Secretary Blinken put it, our engagements were designed to show that we’re seizing on the possibilities of this moment to build a more secure, resilient, inclusive, and prosperous Pacific region.As Secretary Blinken also said on Monday night, the fundamental fact is this:  Our fates are tied together.  We’ve long been committed development partners to the Pacific Islands, and we’re excited to bring new energy and resources to the Pacific, working with partners in the Pacific Islands on our shared goal of meeting Pacific priorities and supporting Pacific institutions.We saw this last week, last Friday at the UN – at the end of the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, when Secretary Blinken hosted a Partners in the Blue Pacific ministerial in New York.  And at that meeting on Friday, we aimed to highlight the tremendous work we’ve done to advance more effective and efficient cooperation and engagement with our Pacific partners, designed to strengthen Pacific regionalism and to facilitate and encourage other partners and institutions to engage and consult with the Pacific.  And of course those efforts flowed nicely into the Pacific Islands Forum Summit itself, which began, as Mira indicated, on Monday.I think a clear sign of our commitment to the Pacific region came through the establishment of diplomatic relations with both Niue and the Cook Islands.  Following an announcement from President Biden earlier on Monday, Secretary Blinken hosted Niue Premier Dalton Tagelagi and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown for two separate signing ceremonies here in the State Department Treaty Room to make these momentous occasions.  These historic announcements reaffirmed our joint commitments to deepen our cooperation as equal and sovereign partners, guided by respect, genuine engagement, and partnership.  We fully anticipate working even closer with Niue and the Cook Islands on our shared priorities, which include the climate crisis, renewable energy, Pacific regionalism, and good governance, among many others.Secretary Blinken then had the pleasure of joining the millennium compact corporation CEO Alice Albright and iKiribati President Taneti Maamau for a signing ceremony for an MCC-Kiribati threshold program grant agreement that will provide up to $29.1 million to promote safe, accessible, decent, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers, both in Kiribati and across the region.  This will be the United States’ largest direct grant investment in Kiribati to date, and it is an agreement that we believe will deliver clear results and benefits to people in the Pacific Islands and solve real challenges to shape our future.I wanted to mention, also on Monday evening, Secretary Blinken hosted really a spectacular dinner here at the State Department in the newly renovated Benjamin Franklin Room, which was an opportunity for the Secretary and other leaders across the U.S. Government to meet with all of the Pacific Island leaders and to discuss in more detail ways that we can expand our cooperation in the future.  The Secretary was delighted to host the banquet with his co-host, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield – of course, America’s Permanent Representative to the UN – and at the dinner, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced that she will be America’s representative to the next Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Summit in November of this year.I think the final event of the summit, the two-day summit, for Secretary Blinken was his meeting with representatives from the Freely Associated States.  Namely, he met with Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ading, he met with Federated States of Micronesia President Simina, and with Palau President Whipps.  That was on Tuesday, late Tuesday afternoon.During the meeting, the Secretary took the opportunity to underscore the strong people-to-people ties and shared history underpinned by the Compacts of Free Association between the U.S. and these three Freely Associated States.  The Secretary commended the dignitaries for the progress in the negotiations on the compact-related agreements, which we believe signals a new era in our partnerships that will help advance a secure, free, and open Pacific.  And we look forward to further progress on these Compacts of Free Association agreements in the months to come.Finally, of course, climate change, as Mira indicated, was a major topic of discussions since it is such an existential challenge, and we recognize it, as our partners do, as the single greatest threat facing the Blue Pacific.Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry met with Pacific leaders on Monday to discuss the climate crisis and ocean resilience.  Secretary Kerry reiterated the United States’ new policy on sea-level rise and statehood that President Biden had earlier announced as well as new investments in strengthening early warning systems and sustainable development.So in the interest of time, why don’t I stop there.  I know that Mira and I will be delighted to take your questions.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.  We’ll now turn it over to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  The first question will go to Ralph Jennings from the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, who sent his question in advance:  “How does the recent U.S. engagement with the South Pacific help offset China’s economic influence in the region?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, do you want to take that one first or you want me to dive in?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  I’m happy to take that one, Dan.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Please.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  And I’ll turn to you in just a moment to add your thoughts.  Thanks for the question.  I would say just as a topline matter, when we’re working with our Pacific Island friends, we’re really not focused principally on China.  We’re focused on what the United States can offer as a likeminded partner to this group of countries.  And we are very focused on delivering positive, attractive alternatives to these countries that can help them and their people thrive.  But it’s really about what we stand for together alongside our Pacific Island partners, not about who or what we’re against.But with that in mind, I will note that, as the President announced, our $200 million in new programs for Pacific Island Forum nations do include some really consequential new programs that we believe are going to help our friends in the Pacific to generate the economic dynamism that they’re looking for to offset and combat climate change and to continue their recovery from the pandemic, where they were especially hard-hit.Just as a few examples, we’re stepping up our infrastructure efforts.  Specifically, as I mentioned, the President announced $40 million to new infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands.  He also announced that the United States will be undertaking new submarine cable projects in the Pacific Islands to build secure, reliable connectivity amongst Pacific Island nations and to ensure that our friends there have the basic digital infrastructure that they need, like reliable, speedy internet on which so many businesses and individuals rely.  And of course, that submarine cable work builds on work we have been doing in recent years, including with the East Micronesia Cable, where we’ve already begun work to improve high-quality and more reliable secure communications for over 100,000 people in the Pacific Islands.  So infrastructure is a big part of our work.We are also delivering a new Millennium Challenge Corporation project with the Government of Kiribati, which is intended to advance economic growth in Kiribati in partnership with the International Labor Organization and American Councils of International Education to bolster and promote safe, accessible, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers.Through the Quad, we are partnering with the Government of Palau to implement the deployment of a new ORAN network that is a next-generation, secure mobile network to help Palau get the secure connectivity that it needs.  And as we mentioned at the top of the call, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency is working throughout the Pacific Islands to identify through its technical work opportunities for more viable projects in the months and years to come.So this is just a sampling of the work that we’re doing to try to bring the economic tools we have to bear to help Pacific economies thrive, but I’ll hand it back to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to see what he might like to add.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, that’s a brilliant answer.  I – all I could really do is foot-stomp what Mira has already said.  We approach the region from the perspective of advancing our affirmative agenda – the shared interests and values that we hold in common with our Pacific partners.That’s our focus, not any notion of focusing on a third party.  And as we often say, we have a regional strategy.  We’re focused on our affirmative agenda.  And I think if we continue to deliver benefits to our partners in the Indo-Pacific, I’m very confident and optimistic about our future together.In particular, as Dr. Rapp-Hooper has indicated, our entire approach to the Pacific is predicated on meeting our Pacific Island friends where they live.  In other words, in conversation with our Pacific partners, we have understood clearly what their needs and concerns and interests are, as outlined very clearly in the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.  And by design, our work and the work of our other partners through the Partners in the Blue Pacific is specifically designed to address the needs that they themselves have outlined in their strategy.Again, that is the focus of our efforts, not any third parties.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  The next question is going to go to Rurika Imahashi, who submitted the question on the chat, the Q&amp;A box here on Zoom.  “Our understanding is that the Marshall Islands parliament will soon certify the compact deal with the U.S.  What is the U.S. understanding on the development of the agreement?”  So we’ll answer that part.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, why don’t I take an initial stab at this one and we’ll ask you, obviously, to add anything else that you would like.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Sounds good.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I guess what I would say to any friends with questions about the compacts, I would just simply underscore that the compacts remain of vital importance to the United States.  I think they recognize our deep and historic ties to the three Freely Associated States.  I think they embody the strong ties between the peoples and the governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.  And we remain very optimistic about the progress that we’ve made in the compact-related negotiations.I know when Secretary Blinken sat down with the leaders of the three Freely Associated States, he really commended them for the progress that we’ve made.  I think as everyone is tracking, we signed COFA-related agreements with Palau in May and with the Federated States of Micronesia in May, and we’ve made tremendous progress with our friends in the Marshall Islands.  We’re confident that we will conclude all of these agreements very soon and we will continue to build out these incredibly significant relationships that are central to everything we hope to achieve in the Pacific.And I think, as friends are tracking, that these compacts really are extraordinary agreements that are 20-year agreements in duration, and again, we’re confident that we will conclude them and implement them very soon.But, Mira, would you like to add anything to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Not much that I could add, Dan, except just to foot-stomp the point that we believe we are well on our way; we’ll soon be at a successful conclusion and very much look forward to being able to mark that milestone after months of really terrific cooperation with all of the Freely Associated States.  That’s all for me.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Yeah, and maybe just one final comment.  I think Mira’s comments reminded me that I do want to recognize that obviously this work is all being done at the direction of President Biden and Secretary Blinken, but our Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joe Yun and his team have also done a brilliant job and I really commend them.  And as Mira indicated, we’re very close and look forward to implementing them very soon.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to Stephen Wright from Radio Free Asia’s BenarNews Service.  Stephen, I also see that your hand is up.  If you’d like to unmute and ask your question, please go ahead.  Yeah, please go ahead and unmute.QUESTION:  Yeah, thanks.  Prime Minister Sogavare didn’t attend the recent summit and subsequently he said the U.S. should show respect to Pacific Island leaders and not lecture them at summits.  What do you think that shows about the progress of U.S. and Solomon Islands relations?  And are there any plans to have an ambassador at the new but smaller embassy in the Solomon Islands?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks very much.  This is Mira; I’m happy to take a first crack at this, and Dan, perhaps I’ll pass to you just on the embassy piece.We were disappointed that Prime Minister Sogavare was unable to attend the summit in Washington.  We did reach out, including at the very highest levels, to encourage him to join us for this terrific conversation that we’ve been laying out for you here, this opportunity to engage amongst friends, and we’re disappointed that he declined to do so.I don’t have much to say about the specific comments except to note, I think as we have been throughout this call tonight, that the conversation with the President, with the Secretary of State, with every cabinet official and member of Congress at the Pacific Island Forum leaders met with was collaborative, constructive, forward-looking, and I think most importantly involved an incredible amount of listening by U.S. Government officials to continue to refine their understanding of what our Pacific Island Forum friends are most looking for from us.So that’s the approach that we’re going to continue to take.  We continue to believe that it’s the right approach.  We feel that our three really dynamic days of programming show that we’re on the right track, and we look forward to continuing that work on the road ahead.Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Mira.  Maybe specifically on the question regarding our presence in the Solomon Islands, I’ll just note that we were excited and honored to open our new U.S. embassy in Honiara in January of this year, which was less than one year after Secretary Blinken announced our intent to do so.  Really excited about the work that our embassy colleagues there, led by Chargé Russ Comeau – excited about the work that they’re doing, again, to build our friendship and our ties with the people of the Solmon Islands and ensure that we work to deliver tangible benefits to our partners there.Of course, any new first step in opening an embassy involves staffing it, and of course our chargé d’affaires currently leading our embassy efforts there, and we recognized him for his really stellar work there.I would simply say at this point we have taken a number of steps internally to identify the U.S. ambassador, the next U.S. ambassador to the Solomon Islands, and I don’t have anything to announce to you this evening.  But I hope we’ll have something to announce in the near future, but we are certainly working towards that end.  Thank you.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Dan, if I may just jump in really quickly to add one additional detail.  I did want to note, as Dan noted, the – our wonderful Chargé Russ Comeau in the Solmon Islands was given a really important inaugural award at the dinner so graciously hosted by Secretary Blinken during the Pacific Island Forum Summit.  That inaugural award commemorates intrepid diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, and Chargé Comeau really embodies that to a T.  He has been just absolutely indefatigable in working to build U.S.-Solomons ties.I underscore that because I do want to make clear that the purpose of an award like this is to continue to draw attention to and raise up Americans who are doing their utmost on the ground to build ties with the Pacific Islands.  And I think the fact that we’ve established this award this year, that it was given by the Secretary of State, is just yet another demonstration that we are continuing to create incentives, recognize achievements so that Americans continue to step up and deliver on our promises throughout the Pacific.MODERATOR:  Okay.  I realize that we’re running a little bit over.  We started a few minutes late, so we’ll take a couple more questions.  We have one from Daniel Hurst from The Guardian.  “To what extent is the United States concerned about the newly announced comprehensive strategic partnership between Timor-Leste and China?  Why or why not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Perhaps I can take an initial crack at that one and then ask Mira to chime in.  Look, I think as we indicated earlier, our message to partners in the region is that we’re not asking countries to choose.  We’re in the business of trying to ensure that countries have the ability to make their own sovereign decisions and their own choices free from coercion.My second point would be, as indicated earlier, we’re focused on our affirmative agenda in the region, including with friends in Timor-Leste, and we’ll continue to do that.  We’ll focus on how we can further build out our friendship and partnership with counterparts in the region, including Timor-Leste, and focus on the great work that we can do together.But again, we’re not in the business of asking countries to choose, and I don’t really think it’s beneficial to try to get into some kind of a comparison game or comment on engagement of other partners with the PRC.But, Mira, what would you like to add to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  I’m in violent agreement.MODERATOR:  Great.  We are – let’s see.  If the speakers are okay, can we take one more question?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Absolutely.  Please.MODERATOR:  Great.  Great.  And this one is from Mar-Vic Cagurangan from the Pacific Island Times, based in Tamuning, Guam, who sent it in advance:  “How will a federal shutdown affect the Compact of Free Association, COFA?  Will the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau continue to receive funds throughout the shutdown?  Do you think this affect – this will affect the U.S. credibility with the Freely Associated States?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, perhaps I could provide an initial answer on this one as well and then be happy to turn to you.  Yeah, I really do appreciate the question, and I’ll just underscore what I mentioned earlier.  We’re really excited about the progress we’ve made in the compact negotiations and we’re confident that all of these agreements will be concluded soon.The issue that you raised here was discussed in some detail in the meeting between Secretary Blinken and the three leaders from the Freely Associated States, and I can assure you that we are in very close and constant communication with our friends both in the Freely Associated States and with leaders on Capitol Hill to make sure that we have a plan going forward under all circumstances that will allow us to meet our obligations under the compacts.I think, as friends may be tracking, that the draft Compact of Free Association agreements, the draft legislation on the Hill includes authority to continue programs and services at the same levels provided under current agreements until the new agreements are in place so as to avoid a lapse in services.  And we’re also working very closely with our friends so that if there were to be any kind of a lapse in appropriations that we can take the appropriate mitigating steps wherever possible to minimize any possible impacts on our friends in the Freely Associated States.But I think that I can assure you we’re in close and frequent contact with our friends in the Freely Associated States and I’m confident we have a plan to work through any contingency.Mira, what would you like to add?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  Thanks so much.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And for our closing remarks, I’d like to turn it back to Dr. Rapp-Hooper.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, folks, for joining us this evening.  I think from this conversation you’ve gotten a pretty good lay of the land of the incredibly substantive set of conversations that took place in Washington this week.  The point I want to emphasize before we let you go is that for us, this project, this promise to renew our ties, renew our commitment to the Pacific Islands, is really about much more than a three-day summit.  It’s about delivery on the promises that we’ve made in the last two years, which I think we showed in spades this week, but on delivery on those new conversations and those new commitments that have been made just this week.We have clear instructions from the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and many others to move out expeditiously on everything that we announced alongside our Pacific Island friends earlier this week, and we intend to literally put our money where our mouth is and deliver on everything that we seek to do together in the Pacific, whether that is providing finance so that friends in the Pacific can more quickly and readily adapt to climate change or providing micro and small loans to entrepreneurs and small businesses so that women leaders in particular can get the financing they need to allow them to contribute to increasingly dynamic Pacific economies.So we’re really just still in the opening chapter of the new Pacific story that we’re writing here under the Biden administration, but we feel like we have made tremendous progress in just the last two years, and we are emerging from this week’s summit energized and ready to hit the ground running with this new set of programs and new set of promises, and we look forward to being back in touch to share more about how this exciting work is all going.MODERATOR:  And Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for any closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I can’t say it any better than that.  Beautifully summarized by Mira.  Really grateful to all of our friends in the media for joining us here tonight.  And as Mira indicated, we’re committed to now implementing all of the agreements and the objectives that we’ve set out flowing from this latest summit, and very optimistic, again, about our future ahead with friends in the Pacific.  Thanks again for joining us tonight.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time today.  Thank you for your questions and thank you to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink and Dr. Rapp-Hooper for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ading, the FSM President Simina, and Palau President Whipps Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with the Republic of the Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Jack Ading, the Federated States of Micronesia President Wesley Simina, and Palau President Surangel Whipps, Jr., in Washington, DC. The Secretary underscored the strong people-to-people ties and shared history that are underpinned by the Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the three countries, collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). The Secretary commended the FAS dignitaries for the progress in the negotiations on Compact-related agreements, which signal a new era in our partnerships and help achieve a secure, free, and open Indo-Pacific.
- Secretary Blinken, FSM President Simina, Palau President Whipps, Jr., and Republic of the Marshall Islands Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Ading Before Their Meeting Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C. Treaty RoomSECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, good afternoon.  It’s a real pleasure to welcome our colleagues from Palau, from Micronesia, from the Marshall Islands.  We’ve had a, I think, very, very invigorating couple of days working with all of our colleagues from the Pacific Islands, but it’s particularly good to be here with our colleagues as we are working on the important compacts that I think we’ve made tremendously good progress on, and we’re really grateful for that.These compacts of free association really go to the heart of our collective security, our collective prosperity, and they build on decades and decades of friendship, of collaboration, people-to-people ties.  But the compacts that we’ve been negotiating I think so effectively really take us into a new era, and I’m grateful to the presidents, the foreign minister for the terrific work that we’ve been able to do together.  So we’re committed to getting this done and committed to strengthening even more the compacts of free association that we enjoy with Palau, with Micronesia, with the Marshall Islands.Thank you all very much.
- Palau HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Palau				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Palau																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Screening of FDI																																																																											New Local Tax Reform																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																																																									Bilateral Investment Treaty																																																																																	3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources																																																																											Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery																																																																											Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				The Republic of Palau is a small island nation of about 350 islands in the western Pacific Ocean, with an estimated population of about 18,000 people. The government is the country’s largest employer, with approximately 30 percent of the workforce, and the tourism sector was Palau’s biggest economic driver, contributing an estimated 40 percent to GDP. GDP in 2021 was $257 million, approximately $14,243 per capita. Palau’s official currency is the U.S. dollar, and the country has three U.S.-headquartered banks. Apart from tourism, commercial industries include wholesale/retail trade, business services, local commercial fisheries, and construction. Fish, coconuts, breadfruit, bananas, and taro cultivation constitute the subsistence sector, though the country’s agricultural base is small. Palau has a limited export base and production capacity, thus highly vulnerable to external shock. The limited exports hit bottom with the implementation of the Palau Marine Sanctuary, as foreign companies were prohibited from fishing in the Palau Exclusive Economic Zone. Alternative revenue from mid-year 2022 to the present came from U.S. military exercises which supported the economy through the purchase of fuel, hotel rooms, car and boats rentals, and some diving activities. Assistance from the U.S. Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (IOA) went to eligible individuals in the tourism industry. The Palau Coronavirus Relief One-Stop Shop (Act funded by an Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan of $41 million in 2020 provided aid to laid-off foreign workers from companies in the tourism industry that had to close or minimize operations from 2022-2023. The country continues to rely heavily on imports and continues to run trade deficits. It is affected by weakening global demand and supply. The country&#8217;s exports to the United States were $500,000 in 2021.The government is reshaping its priorities, plans, and policies for investment in infrastructure affecting the economy, education, health, environment, and human resources. Limited resources require public/public; public/private; and private/private collaboration and partnership to improve standards of living the business environment.Palau’s economy remains dependent on donor funding. Since independence, Palau has operated under a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States. The COFA is currently under negotiation and will provide about $120 million in grants. Palau receives additional aid from Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries with which it has diplomatic relations. It also receives funding from international organizations such as the World Bank, ADB, and UDP toward energy security, urban planning and management, water and sanitation, public financial management, and private sector development. Additionally, Australia awarded $22 million to a U.S. based company to build a solar photovoltaic facility and battery energy storage which provides supplementary efforts for renewal energy and opening job opportunities for residents.According to the ADB’s Outlook, it forecasted for 2023 GDP growth rate is anticipated to be 3.8%, compared to 2022 at 1.0%, and 2021 at -17.1%. Tax revenue remained low at 16.8% of GDP in FY 2022.The Foreign Investment Act guides the foreign investment process in Palau, and Foreign Investment Regulations restrict some sectors to Palauan citizens, including wholesale or retail sale of goods, all land and water transportation, travel and tour agencies, and commercial fishing. Other sectors are semi-restricted, requiring a Palauan partner. While the government welcomes foreign investors, Palau’s investment climate poses challenges. Some U.S. investors have made allegations of corrupt practices when seeking government permits, doing business with local partners, and in public procurement processes. Establishing secure land title may be complicated due to the complexity of Palau’s traditional land ownership system and occasional over-lapping claims. Foreigners cannot own land in Palau, but they can lease land and own buildings on leased land. But leased lands cannot be released or transferred from the lessee to a potential new lessee. Leased land must be returned to the State Government unless it was with a private landowner.Palau is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization, the WTO, or any other organization or convention protecting intellectual property rights. Palau has no bilateral investment protection agreements and is not a member of any free trade association. Human resource constraints are a challenge for foreign investors and, third country nationals from Bangladesh and the Philippines comprise a large proportion of the labor force.An overview of the World Bank indicated that by the end of 2021 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows accounted for $14.9 million, compared to $22 million in 2020. The stock of FDI grew to $488 million in 2020. Traditionally, FDI is mostly directed towards the tourism and real estate sectors. Main investment partners include China, Taiwan, and Singapore.Table 1: Key Metrics and Rankings (no records for 2022 on this website)MeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index2021N/Ahttp://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewGlobal Innovation Index2021’22 n/aN/Ahttps://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicatorU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2021$10 millionhttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/World Bank GNI per capita2021$12,790https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD   																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										The government actively seeks foreign direct investment, and the country’s Foreign Investment Board (FIB) is responsible for approving and regulating foreign investment. There are no specific financial incentives extended to foreign investors.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										The Foreign Investment Regulations detail the significant number of restricted and semi-restricted sectors. Semi-restricted businesses can include foreign ownership, as long as a Palauan citizen also has an ownership interest. These semi-restricted businesses are as follows:handicraft and gift shops;bakeries;bar services;operations [selling] products being produced by wholly Palauan-owned manufacturing enterprise;equipment rentals for both land and water within the Republic, including equipment for the purpose of tourism; andany such other businesses as the Foreign Investment Board may determine.Sectors not listed as either closed or semi-restricted are presumed to be open for foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Board may, however, amend the semi-restricted sector list for “any such other businesses as the Board may determine.”																																				Screening of FDI										The FIB must approve all foreign direct investment. In addition to the sector in which the investment will flow, the Board requires a statement of the level of investment (in U.S. dollar amounts), the length of time the investment will be in Palau, the nationality of the investors, and the percent ownership of each investor. The Board may request additional documentation from investors if it has questions about the details of the investment.																																				New Local Tax Reform										Implementation of Palau Goods and Services Tax (PGST) took effect on January 01, 2023. This replaced the Gross Revenue Tax (GRT). The PGST adds a 10% surcharge to all goods and services purchased in Palau.The Government of Palau has not conducted an investment policy review through any organization or institution in the past five years.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																																																Bilateral Investment Treaty										Palau has no bilateral investment protection agreements and is not a member of any free trade associations.Bilateral Taxation TreatyPalau does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States. The European Union in 2020 added Palau to its list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions, the “blacklist.”																																												3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										Regulatory and accounting systems are largely consistent with international norms. Bureaucratic procedures (e.g., permitting processes, approvals, etc.) may lack transparency and be influenced by cronyism, partly due to the country’s small size and extensive family networks. Proposed laws and regulations are available in draft form for public comment pursuant to the Administration Procedures Act, Title 6 of the Palau National Code. Generally, tax, labor, environment, health and safety, and other laws and policies do not impede investment. There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. The Government of Palau, through the Financial Investment Act and the Environmental Protection Act, requires companies’ ESG disclosure to facilitate transparency and inform the application process in distinguishing between low- and high-end investment.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										The Pacific Island Forum, of which Palau is a member, has a model regulatory and policy framework focused on competition, fair trading, and consumer protections. Palau is not a WTO member.																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										The legal system in Palau is composed of a mix of civil, common, and customary law. Palau also has a specialized Land Court for disputes arising from conflicting claims of land ownership, which is a complex issue in the country. The legal system is patterned on common law proceedings as they exist in the United States. The judiciary comprises a four-member Supreme Court, a Court of Common Pleas, and a Land Court. The Supreme Court has a trial division and an appellate division. Court rulings, legal codes, and public law can be found on their website:  http://www.palausupremecourt.net/ .																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										All non-citizens wishing to invest in the Republic of Palau must obtain a Foreign Investment Business License (FIBL). The FIBL is obtained from the Registrar of Foreign Investment in the office of the Attorney General. In coordination with the Investment Promotion Unit at the Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce, the Ministry of Finance reviews the application and ensures that the business does not fall under the categories of the National Reserved List listed above. The application process usually takes 7-10 working days.																																				Competition and Anti-Trust Laws										Palau does not currently have any anti-trust legislation, although the Foreign Investment Board considers competition-related concerns in its review process.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										Although the Palauan constitution provides for the right of the government to condemn land for national interest (“eminent domain”), there are no reported property-expropriation cases. Most of the land is privately owned by Palauan citizens through complex family lineages.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Palau is not a member of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						There are no ongoing investment disputes involving the Government of the Republic of Palau and foreign investors. There is a very limited record of foreign investment disputes in Palau due to the small size of foreign investment in the country. The most common type of business disputes is with landowners over land use, and land rights issues, and as there is currently no official dispute resolution procedure, these are frequently resolved informally or only after protracted court disputes.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						The Republic of Palau does not have any alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms or domestic arbitration bodies available as a means for setting disputes between two private parties.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										There is no legal provision for bankruptcy in the Republic of Palau. It ranks 166 out of 190 for resolving insolvency in World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										The Government of Palau does not offer incentives to domestic or foreign investors.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										The Free Trade Zone Act of 2003 established the Ngardmau Free Trade Zone Authority. Another “Tax Free Zone” was established in the state of Melekeok, covering a one-mile radius around the Federal capitol building.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Palau does not currently have laws or regulations on domestic storage or localization requirements.The Palau government requires all investors employing non-resident workers to agree to:Cover the cost of repatriating non-resident workers to the place hired.Train one or more citizen workers to perform the work for which the non-resident worker is employed.This requirement is set and evaluated on a case-by-case basis and is usually included as part of a whole package that also includes investment incentives such as favorable taxation statuses. U.S. Citizens do not require a visa to enter Palau and may be employed in Palau without obtaining a work permit or a visa. They must register as a non-resident worker with the Bureau of Immigration annually.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																						Other than the foreign-ownership restrictions for certain business sectors, there are no restrictions on private entities to engage in all forms of remunerative activity.																										Real Property										Establishing secure land title may be complicated due to the complexity of the traditional land ownership system and occasional over-lapping claims. Banks offer mortgages, and the recording system is reliable. The Land Court has primary responsibility to adjudicate disputes over land ownership. Non-Palauans may not purchase land, although they are able to lease for up to 99 years. Non-citizen investors must negotiate lease agreements directly with private owners or the state government.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										Palau is not a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the WTO, or any other organization or convention protecting intellectual property right. In general, Palau does not strictly enforce intellectual property rights.Resources for Rights HoldersEmbassy ContactMission Deputy Andrew J. Mclean+680-587-2920Country ResourcesFor a list or lawyers in Palau, please see:  https://pw.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/attorneys/.For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										There are no stock exchanges or financial regulatory institutions in the country.																																				Money and Banking System										Palau uses the U.S. dollar and has no central bank. The country has three U.S.-headquartered banks: Bank of Hawaii, Bank Pacific, and Bank of Guam. All three are publicly owned U.S. companies with headquarters in Honolulu and Guam. There are several smaller private banks and a national bank, the National Development Bank of Palau.The Palau Financial Institutions Commission is the regulatory body responsible for establishing and maintaining the financial supervisory system in Palau.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						The government does not impose any restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment. There have been no reported difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange as most funds are in U.S. dollars. Other than best practices to review suspicious money transfers (e.g., money laundering), there are no restrictions on converting or transferring funds associated with an investment.Since 2011, Palau has had five successful money laundering cases, though the risk of money laundering within the country persists, particularly given large real estate transactions, the reliance on cash transactions, and relative low capacity for government regulatory oversight.						Remittance Policies						While the government encourages reinvestment of profits locally, there are no laws restricting repatriation of profits, dividends, or other investment capital acquired in Palau.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										Palau has no sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or asset management bureau (AMB), but the Compact of Free Association established a Trust Fund for Palau that is independently overseen by the COFA Trust Fund Board composed five members who are appointed by the President of Palau and confirmed by the Senate.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						In Palau, most of the major industries are controlled by state-owned- or quasi-state enterprises. These include the utilities sector, telecommunications, and the national bank. The SOE sector continues to underperform and to impose significant risks and burden on the fiscal system and economy.																										Privatization Program										Palau has no on-going privatization program.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						Many businesses provide corporate donations to environmental and social Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and /or engage in environmental corporate social responsibility programs to preserve Palau’s environment and wildlife. Most CSR activities are conducted via donation, partly attributable to the available tax deduction of up to 10 percent of a company’s Gross Revenue for donations to non-profit organizations.Palau has some basic worker protection laws, including a minimum wage and protections for foreign workers.																										Additional Resources										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOffice of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions ).Department of LaborFindings on the Worst forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ ).																																				Climate Issues										As an island state, Palau is highly vulnerable to climate change, and as a result has developed a national Climate Change Policy. Policy objectives include mitigating global climate change by working towards low carbon emission development, maximizing energy efficiency, protecting carbon sinks, and minimizing greenhouse gas emissions. Palau also plans to become the world’s first carbon neutral tourism destination. This project, launched in August 2020, aims to reduce Palau’s carbon footprint both domestically and by foreign tourism, while increasing the production of locally sourced food.Palau has been a vocal proponent of climate mitigation measures and has several government policies in addition to the Climate Change Policy, which seek to achieve outcomes that preserve biodiversity and other ecological benefits. Although government does not specify any specific expectations on the private sector to contribute to achieving targets and goals, there is spirit of collaboration that exists between the private sector and the government that enables efficiency and progress in environmental protection.																																												9. Corruption						    																						Corruption remains a challenge to doing business in Palau, despite a robust legal mechanism to detect and prosecute corruption. The Code of Ethics regulates transactions by national and state public employees, officials, and elected officials, as well as persons making campaign contributions. The law prohibits personal gain through governmental transactions, prohibits conflict of interest, restricts incompatible outside employment, prohibits solicitation of gifts, and severely restricts the size of campaign contributions, limiting such contributions to Palauan citizens.The Special Prosecutor Act established the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), who has the power to investigate and prosecute the national and state governments, and its officials, for violations of the Constitution and laws of the Republic or for failure to implement such laws. OSP works closely with the Palau Ethics Commission (established by law) who review financial disclosures for national and state elected officials and other public officials required to file annually. OSP and Ethics Commission also coordinate with the Office of the Public Auditor (established by law) who audit national, state governments, and semi-government agencies. Local media often reports on alleged corruption cases and serves as an informal watchdog. Palau does not appear in Transparency International’s Index of Corruption. There are no formal anti-corruption NGOs or international watchdogs based in Palau.																										UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery										Palau acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in March 2009. It has been a member of the Asian Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML) since 2002.Palau is not a member of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.																																				Resources to Report Corruption										Allegations of corruption can be reported to the Special Prosecutor through the Attorney General’s Office:Ernestine RengiilAttorney General+680-488-2481UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCOC)UNCOC has been working with Palau on wide range of corruption effect on societies, from reporting, investigations, filing charges, toUN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting BriberyPalau acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in March 2009. It has been a member of the Asian Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML) since 2002.Palau is not a member of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Palau is stable, and not prone to political violence. The World Bank placed Palau in the 84th percentile in its 2015 rating of country political stability.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						With an estimated total of 18,000 Palauan nationals in country (including non-working individuals, such as children and elderly) and 4,300 estimated foreign workers, foreign labor comprises a large proportion of Palau’s labor force. Palau has a fairly low unemployment rate across all age categories.Under the Compact of Free Association, Palauan citizens are entitled to live, attend school, and work in the United States visa-free as “nonimmigrant residents.” Accordingly, many skilled and professional workers migrate to the U.S. for its higher wages and standards of living.Professional, medical, management, and other special labor skills are in high demand in Palau. Given the scarcity of resident qualified workers, Palau allows investors to employ non-resident workers provided they agree to cover the cost of repatriation, that they hire and train at least one citizen to perform the same work.In October 2013, Palau established the minimum wage for workers. Foreign workers are generally hired on a contract basis with opportunities for annual renewals.As of 2020, there are no new labor related laws or regulations enacted during the last year as well as no pending draft bills.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs						    																						Palau is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2015$2872019$274www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/A2020$10BEA data available athttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/AN/AN/ABEA data available athttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-dataTotal inbound stock of FDI as % host GDPN/AN/AN/AN/AUNCTAD data available athttps://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report   Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIData not available.																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Andrew J. McLeanDeputy Chief of MissionU.S. Embassy KororRepublic of PalauTel: +680-587-2920 x 2002McLeanAJ@state.gov																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											The Bahamas											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Netherlands											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Screening of FDI																																																						New Local Tax Reform																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																																							Bilateral Investment Treaty																																																			3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources																																																						Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							UN Anticorruption Convention, OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery																																																						Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Other Investment Insurance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Palau
- Completion of the Palau Bilateral Economic Consultation Meetings Office of the SpokespersonRepresentatives from the United States of America and the Republic of Palau convened in Koror, Palau, June 21-22 for bilateral economic consultations as called for under the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Palau Following the Compact of Free Association Section 432 Review, signed by the United States and Palau in 2010.U.S. Department of the Interior Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs Carmen G. Cantor and U.S. Department of State Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Whitney Baird led the U.S. delegation. The President of Palau, H.E. Surangel Whipps Jr., led the Palau delegation with the Minister of Finance, Kaleb Udui, Jr., and other cabinet officials. The bilateral economic consultations included briefings and a review of recommendations from the Palau Economic Advisory Group regarding the country’s economic, financial, and management reforms. The bilateral consultations are one of the requirements under the Agreement to review Palau’s progress in achieving reforms, consistent with the 2010 Compact Review Agreement, as amended. This was the first bilateral economic consultation between the two countries since the first annual report of the Palau Economic Advisory Group was released in April of this year.In addition to consultations on matters as required in the 2010 CRA, as amended, during these meetings Palau expressed an interest in joining the Blue Dot Network for infrastructure certification.  Palau is the site of one of the Blue Dot Network’s pilot projects, a sub-sea internet cable to securely connect and expand the country’s telecommunications to the rest of the world. The Compact-mandated Palau Economic Advisory Group was launched in 2022, with funding provided through the U.S. Department of the Interior.  Additional information about the Palau Economic Advisory Group, its annual report, and other related documents can be found at the Pacific and Virgin Islands Training Initiatives website.