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S. Hrg. 110–552 

ADDRESSING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 24, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, 

FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Staff Director 

KATY FRENCH, Minority Staff Director 

MONISHA SMITH, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 10 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 12 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Obama ................................................................................................. 55 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY APRIL 24, 2008 

Hon. Arlen Specter, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania .................. 1 

Hon. Dianne Feinstein, a U.S. Senator from the State of California .................. 5 

Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and Jeffrey Feltman, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 13 

Hon. Dennis Ross, Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy ............................................................................. 34 

Stephen G. Rademaker, Senior Counsel, Barbour Griffith and Rogers, LLC .... 38 

Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 

and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University’s John 

F. Kennedy School of Government ..................................................................... 41 

Jim Walsh, Research Associate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ........... 43 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Allison, Graham: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 127 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 74 

Feltman, Jeffrey: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77 

McNerney, Patricia: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77 

Rademaker, Stephen G.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 121 

Ross, Hon. Dennis: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 90 

Specter, Hon. Arlen: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Walsh, Jim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 132 

APPENDIX 

Question and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Ross ............................................................................................................ 150 

Mr. Allison ........................................................................................................ 152 

Mr. Walsh .......................................................................................................... 159 

‘‘A Study of USG Broadcasting into Iran Prepared for the Iran Steering 

Group,’’ submitted by Senator Carper ................................................................ 164 

(1) 

1The prepared statement of Senator Specter appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

ADDRESSING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICE,

AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Coburn, Coleman, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Welcome, 

Senator Specter. And very soon we will be joined by Senator Feinstein and a number of my colleagues. I want to thank you for joining us today, and our other witnesses who will be coming in the 

moments ahead. 

I am especially delighted that Senator Specter, ranking member 

of the Senate Judiciary Committee and former chairman of the 

Senate Intelligence Committee, and Senator Feinstein, a member 

of both the Intelligence and the Judiciary Committees, can join us 

this morning to kick off this hearing. Thank you both for your willingness to share your informed views on what the United States 

should be doing in relation to Iran. If now is a time for creative, 

courageous ideas, your voices, colleagues, should figure prominently in that discussion. 

Senator Specter, your entire statement will be entered into the 

record. Feel free to summarize it, however you wish. But we are 

delighted that you are here, and we thank you for your leadership 

on this issue and, frankly, for encouraging us to reach out openly 

to other countries with whom we do not always agree. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,1 A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I begin by complimenting you for starting on time. I note the presence of all the 

other expected participants, but it is a unique practice in these hallowed halls. 

2 

I compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and the Subcommittee for undertaking this issue because it is of such vast importance that it 

ought to be considered by a broader range of Members of Congress 

in trying to move a realistic policy toward Iran. 

All of the major issues confronting the world are tied up in the 

U.S.-Iran conflict: Terrorism, military nuclear capabilities, energy, 

Iraq, the Palestinian dilemma, the presence of Hamas and 

Hezbollah, as destabilizing forces. And in this context, for some 

strange, I think inexcusable reason, at least in my opinion, the 

United States refuses to engage in direct bilateral talks with Iran. 

Two propositions span centuries but articulate what I think are 

the sensible approaches. Sun Tzu’s advice was to ‘‘keep your 

friends close and your enemies closer.’’ President Ronald Reagan 

said, on November 21, 1985, in an address to Congress following 

the U.S.-Soviet Geneva Summit, ‘‘We agreed on a number of matters. We agreed to continue meeting. There is always room for 

movement, action, and progress when people are talking to each 

other instead of about each other.’’ 

Perhaps not relevant, but the first assignment I had as an assistant district attorney decades ago was to interview inmates under 

the death sentence at the Pennsylvania State Prison. My job was 

to get their views as to why they ought to have the death sentence 

changed to life imprisonment. And I found that they were people 

like anybody else—thugs, violent criminals, reprehensible, but 

human beings. 

The experience I have had in my work on the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee, which I 

chaired during the 104th Congress, has led me into contacts with 

some of the world’s reportedly unsavory people: Syrian President 

Hafez al-Assad; his successor, President Bashar al-Assad; Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat; Iraqi President Saddam Hussein; 

Cuban President Fidel Castro; Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; 

and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. 

I have found that there is an ingredient which runs through all 

of these discussions, and that is the ingredient of civility and courtesy in dealing with people and not to demean them. I think it is 

a great act of foolishness to try to tamper with somebody else’s 

pride. And I think that is what we do with Iran when we take the 

proposition that we will engage in bilateral talks on the condition 

that they cease enriching uranium. 

Well, that is the object of the discussion. So how in good faith 

can there be an insistence that the other party make the concessions sought in the dialogue, in the negotiations, as a precondition 

to meeting? It seems to me it is exactly wrong, and I have asked 

the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State on the 

record that question recently and have gotten a very unsatisfactory 

answer. 

In discussions that I have had with Hafez al-Assad on many visits to Syria since 1984, I think it is not an overstatement to say 

that perhaps there was little influence on Assad. He was totally opposed in 1991 to attending the Madrid Conference unless all five 

superpowers participated. He wanted to have four allies with the 

United States being Israel’s only ally. And he finally relented and 

sent representatives to Madrid with only the United States and the 

3 

U.S.S.R. I had early conversations with him about letting the Jews 

leave Syria, and he was opposed to the idea. They were Syrians 

and they ought to stay in Syria. Whatever factors ultimately led 

Hafez al-Assad to change his mind, he did, and he let the Jews 

leave. 

There has been no blacker thug terrorist in history than Muammar Gaddafi. Maybe others could challenge him for that title, but 

I do not think any could exceed him, and I doubt that any even 

equaled him. He blew up the discotheque in Berlin, which resulted 

in the killing of American soldiers; brought down Pan Am 103, 

which he has later conceded; has made reparations, has decided 

that he wants to come back into the family of nations; and he 

stopped his activities on developing nuclear weapons. And if you 

can talk to Gaddafi and you can make a deal with Gaddafi, you can 

make a deal, I think, with anyone. 

Regrettably, the jury is still out on North Korea, but there have 

been promising developments, but only when the United States 

was willing to, in a dignified way, negotiate bilaterally with North 

Korea. And I think that is an illustration of where you have to 

maintain the multilateral talks, because I think we must continue 

with multilateral talks with Iran. But there is no substitute for direct, dignified negotiations. 

Two more brief points. You have been very generous, Mr. Chairman, in not starting the time clock, but I will not abuse the courtesy. 

One is a comment which was made to me by Walid al-Mouallem, 

who is now the Syrian Foreign Minister. When he was the Syrian 

Ambassador to the United States, a position he held for about a 

decade, he said to me, ‘‘We like you because you do not hate us.’’ 

I thought that was a most extraordinary statement. Such a modest, 

really low threshold for acceptance. Why should it be a unique 

mark for one man or woman not to hate another man or woman? 

But that is what he said to me. And when I wrote a book 8 years 

ago, I wanted to put it in the book, but before I did so, I asked 

Walid al-Mouallem if it was acceptable to him to put it in the book. 

But that is the level of courtesy which is sub-minimal. 

The final point on the Iranian-U.S. relations is what I think is 

the importance of developing the idea by Russian President Putin 

to have Russia enrich Iran’s uranium, and that way there could be 

certainty that the uranium was not being used for military purposes. And that idea has gotten very little publicity. And when Secretary of State Rice was before the Appropriations Committee a 

couple of weeks ago, I raised the issue with her. She thought it was 

a good idea. And I urged her to develop it. 

I think we put Iran on the defensive, justifiably, on that point. 

They have no reason, aside from national sovereignty and pride, 

which is insufficient reason in the premises, not to do that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Specter, thank you for an excellent 

statement. 

We have been joined by Senator Feinstein, and just before I recognize Senator Feinstein, let me just ask two quick questions of 

you, Senator Specter. And we are just delighted that you are both 

here today. Just delighted. 

4 

Senator Specter, you were a member of the Senate for, I think, 

the final decade of the Cold War. You have alluded to that in your 

statement. Let me just ask what parallels can be drawn between 

that conflict and the current impasse that we face with Iran. What 

lessons should we take from our experience in the Cold War and 

apply those to the formulation of our policy today with respect to 

Iran? 

Senator SPECTER. I believe there is a close parallel and a great 

lesson to be learned; that is, to note that President Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be the ‘‘Evil Empire,’’ just as President 

Bush has declared Iran to be part of the ‘‘Axis of Evil.’’ And then 

President Reagan promptly initiated bilateral direct talks, a series 

of summit meetings, and the quotation I read was the agreement 

on many matters, and the agreement to continue talking, which 

President Reagan recommended. And he is a pretty good role model 

for the current Administration, I think. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. How do you respond to the argument that Tehran is at fault for the absence of a U.S.-Iranian dialogue as the Bush Administration has, I believe, offered Iran bilateral discussions but Tehran has turned the offer down by not first 

suspending their enrichment and reprocessing efforts? 

Senator SPECTER. To offer bilateral negotiations with a precondition is no offer at all, in my judgment, especially when the 

precondition is the object of the negotiations. Beyond that, Mr. 

Chairman, I would be more direct and say that it was insulting, 

which I think characterizes a good bit of U.S. foreign policy, which 

has earned us the title of ‘‘The Ugly America.’’ But it is not a oneway street. Iran does pretty well on bilateral insults. The object is 

to try to move from that level of discourse to civility. 

Mr. Chairman, as I told you before, I have to excuse myself. I 

will follow what Senator Feinstein has to say, as I always do. But 

I am ranking on the Judiciary Committee, and I expect to have 

some civil but fiery dialogue on the confirmation issue in 15 minutes. 

Senator CARPER. As you prepare to take your leave, again, I 

thank you. I have been in the Senate for 7 years. I have very much 

admired both of you, the work that you do, and most of all, I appreciate the partnership that you have shown in providing leadership 

for the rest of us on a wide range of issues. That certainly includes 

the issue that is before us today. So, Senator Specter, thank you 

so much. We will see you later on the floor today, but much 

obliged. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Feinstein, welcome. We are delighted 

that you have come. Thank you. I know you had to adjust your 

schedule, but it means a great deal to me that you are here, and 

we welcome you. Whatever statement you have for the record, it 

will be included in its entirety. You are welcome to summarize as 

you wish, but thanks so much for joining us. 

5 

1The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein appears in the Appendix on page 74. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,1 A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I thank you and Senator Coleman. 

For many years now, I have been interested in trying to be a constructive force for peace and stability in the Middle East, which I 

think most of us regard as the ‘‘powder keg’’ in which nations and 

values collide. 

I have watched as the Iraq War continues, Israeli and Palestinian peace remains elusive, Iran begins to exert itself in the region, and Sunni nations grow more and more concerned. 

Iran, today—isolated and belligerent—constitutes both a present 

and future challenge to the stability and security of many concerned nations, as well as our own. 

Last year, the United States indicated its alarm about Iran’s supplying of weapons and tactical support to Shia militias, and the Administration has called Iran ‘‘public enemy number one in Iraq.’’ 

Also, Iran’s support of terrorist organizations, particularly 

Hezbollah and Hamas, remains of deep concern and continues 

unabated. And, finally, the government of Iran’s intransigent hatred of Israel and its willingness to deny Israel the right to exist 

is unacceptable and a major hurdle to peace and security in the region. 

So it is within this context that we must understand the number 

one question of the day: Does Iran seek nuclear weapons and for 

what purpose? 

In November 2007, the U.S. intelligence community released a 

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), on Iran’s nuclear program. It 

was an eye-opener and the source of major controversy. 

The NIE’s first conclusion, front and center, was that the intelligence community judges, ‘‘with high confidence that in the fall of 

2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. . . .’’ This signified a major shift from the judgments of past intelligence reviews. I serve on the Intelligence Committee. I have reviewed both 

the classified and unclassified versions. To my knowledge, they 

have never been contraindicated. 

A footnote in the NIE made clear that a nuclear weapons program has three parts: One, the enrichment of fissile material; two, 

a ‘‘weaponization’’ program to make that material into a weapon; 

and, three, a means to deliver the weapon. 

Now, the halt refers specifically to the weaponization part. The 

other two parts—the enrichment of fissile materials and the making of a delivery system—remain serious concerns. 

But equally as clear, the NIE judged—again with high confidence—that until the fall of 2003, Iran was pursuing an illegal, 

covert nuclear weapons program. 

This was the strongest intelligence statement to date—it is 

backed up with evidence in the classified text of the NIE—that 

Iran had, in fact, a program and that Iran’s leaders in Tehran 

could turn that program back on at any time. 

Finally, the NIE made a statement that is central to the question 

of whether and how to approach Iran diplomatically. It said, ‘‘Our 

6 

assessment that the [nuclear] program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be 

more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.’’ 

The NIE, in essence, suggests a window of opportunity to begin 

to engage Iran in discussion, and with the help of European and 

other allies, to see if Iran can be moved toward positive engagement with the Western World—on this vital question, as well as 

other issues of concern. 

So this NIE, in my view, presents the first opening for real engagement. 

How should we proceed with Iran? I believe we should begin to 

pursue a robust, diplomatic initiative with Iran on all issues and, 

like Senator Specter, without preconditions. 

Working with our European allies, the United Nations, and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, we should put together a 

package of carrots and sticks that will serve as the basis for discussion with Iran. 

The goal would be to convince Iran to: Permanently abandon any 

intention to re-start a nuclear weapons program; 

Second, to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors full access to all Iranian nuclear facilities and suspected nuclear facilities; 

Third, to comply once again with the additional protocol to the 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for intensified inspections by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran had actually accepted this in 2003 and then suspended compliance in 2005; 

Fourth, provide an accounting for all past nuclear activities and 

allow full transparency to international inspectors; 

Fifth, cease its support for the terrorist activities of Hamas and 

Hezbollah worldwide; and 

Sixth, promote stability and cease lethal support to militias in 

Iraq. 

The key is this: We can recognize that Iran has a right to a 

peaceful, civilian nuclear energy program, but not to nuclear weapons programs. 

Now, of course, there is no guarantee that these talks will succeed. It is likely to be a long and difficult road. But we are sure 

to fail if we do not at least try. 

One proposal that deserves a closer look is one which was described to me by Iran’s former Ambassador to the United Nations. 

It is similar to one made by Ambassador Bill Luers, Secretary 

Thomas Pickering, and Jim Walsh. Mr. Walsh is on the second 

panel today. 

The basic premise is this: Establish an ‘‘on-the-ground 24/7 International Consortium’’ to manage and monitor all aspects of nuclear 

activity. This is something that Iran might actually consider—as 

long as there is an openness on the part of the United States to 

discuss other issues as well. In other words, no preconditions, an 

open table, come in, and both sides present their views. Participants could include the United States, the United Kingdom, 

France, Germany, China, Russia, the United Nations, and the 

IAEA. 

7 

Such a proposal deserves serious consideration and could go a 

long way toward building confidence on both sides. Remember, we 

have not talked to Iran in 30 years. Our military does not talk to 

their military. Isolation, we should have learned well by now, is a 

very dangerous posture to push a Nation into. We saw it with 

North Korea, and it is happening with Iran as well. 

I believe that an Iranian policy based on a military solution 

makes little sense. Only by talking and bringing to bear the best 

efforts of diplomacy can real progress be made. 

The next Administration must evaluate anew our Nation’s approach to this Middle Eastern arena and evolve a new approach— 

one based on robust diplomacy, rather than constant threat of war. 

The process is likely to be difficult—we all know that, but the rewards may well be significant. And one day, it could lead to a more 

stable and peaceful Middle East. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Feinstein, thank you for an excellent 

statement and for thinking outside the box, as you do in so many 

other arenas. 

Do you have time for one quick question from me? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I do. 

Senator CARPER. And I know you have your Judiciary Committee 

that is about to begin its work as well. 

Just thinking again about the proposal that you have laid on the 

table, a question I would ask, not just rhetorically but just ask, 

what do we have to lose in pursuing what you have just prescribed? What is the downside? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We do not have anything to lose, and I think 

there is a very limited understanding of the Iranian Government 

as well. The President, Ahmadinejad, this is not his arena. It is the 

arena of the Supreme Leader. And the need is really to develop 

contacts that run to the Supreme Leader and try to open a floor 

for constructive dialogue. 

There have been some back-channel negotiations among certain 

Americans and Iranians. I think there is reason to believe that 

there are many Iranians that do not want their country to have a 

nuclear weapons program. There are many Iranians that see that 

peace and stability and economic upward mobility of their country 

offers their citizens much more than a belligerent stance does, and 

that isolation is not to the benefit of Iran. It is not to the benefit 

of other nations as well. 

And as we watch Iran extend its influence, as we watch the Revolutionary Guard buy properties in Iraq, set up businesses in Iraq, 

extend their influence into Iraq, coming to grips with Iran becomes 

more and more important if we ever want to effect a stable region. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You are very welcome. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Coleman, would you like to ask a question of Senator Feinstein? 

Senator COLEMAN. No. I know that the Senator is busy. I appreciate it. The Senator is one of the most thoughtful members of this 

institution. I have perhaps some different perspectives on some of 

this, but I always greatly appreciate, as you talked about, the outof-the-box thinking and very thoughtful approach, and hopefully we 

8 

will figure out some common ground and a way to move forward. 

But I thank the Senator for her presentation. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. I am going to go ahead and give an opening 

statement. It is going to run a bit beyond 5 minutes, and I would 

just beg your indulgence of my colleagues, Senator Coleman and 

then others who have joined us. 

Before we welcome the first panel, let me just say that Iran is 

considered the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism. We 

know Iran is behind Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 

as well as militant Shia elements in Iraq. Our first two Senators 

have already indicated as much in their statements. 

In his Senate statement and testimony on April 8, General 

Petraeus stated that Iranian armed militias are the biggest threats 

to stability in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran has started arming the 

Taliban. Iran is a formidable threat. Obviously, a nuclear weapon 

makes it even more so by giving Iran the confidence to frustrate 

U.S. policy objectives without fear of U.S. reprisals. 

Although military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites should remain on the table, they would prompt widespread retaliation 

throughout the region, would lack international support, and 

would, therefore, be ill-advised presently. 

In fact, our Secretary of Defense said at a meeting that we had 

several months ago with a number of Senators, when asked what 

the practical effect would be of a military strike by the United 

States against the Iranian nuclear targets, he said they are a lot 

smarter than the Iraqis were. The Iraqis, they built their nuclear 

facilities out in the open, above ground, almost like you put a bull’s 

eye around it and said come and get us. The Iranians are smarter. 

They have dispersed their nuclear activities. They have put them 

underground. And Secretary Gates, I will paraphrase what he said. 

He said, ‘‘one thing—I am not so sure that we would be effective 

in taking out their nuclear facilities. One thing I know for sure, we 

would rally the Iranian people to the support of their President in 

no other way that I could think of.’’ 

But, anyway, there was little evidence that deterrence has or 

would work. Regime change after Iraq is no longer viewed as a realistic short-term option, even to those in the Bush Administration. 

Given the lack of good alternative options, a more robust diplomacy, to quote Senator Feinstein, which would include comprehensive talks with the Iranians that address both its nuclear program 

and its support of terrorism, might be better than the not-so-good 

options presently before this country. 

The December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate stated that 

Iran has stopped its nuclear weapons development program in the 

fall of 2003. And although the NIE’s release led some to question 

the immediacy of the Iranian threat, it affirmed Iran’s continued 

enrichment of uranium and its simultaneous pursuit of ballistic 

missile delivery capabilities. 

As former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns recently said, 

‘‘The straightest avenue to nuclear weapon capability is not 

weaponization but enrichment and reprocessing.’’ 

9 

Given that the production of fissile material is the most challenging aspect of the process of building a nuclear weapon, Iran’s 

continued enrichment of uranium is cause for real concern and 

warrants the continued action by the United States and the international community. 

While there is a shared view among most observes to prevent a 

nuclear Iran, the primary goal of the Bush Administration’s policy, 

there is vigorous disagreement about how the United States should 

try to achieve that goal. I called this hearing for that purpose: To 

examine what the United States and its allies must do to develop 

a more effective Iran strategy and to discuss specifically what actions we should consider taking in light of what we learned last 

December. 

I believe that the way to stop or at least to mitigate Iran’s enrichment activities is to present Iran with an enhanced set of carrots and sticks not unlike those suggested by Senator Feinstein in 

order to change its cost/benefit analysis of the issue. Hammering 

out those incentives and disincentives is the challenge that is before us. 

To its credit, the Bush Administration has shifted rather significantly in recent years from rhetoric centered on regime change to 

a more pragmatic approach in dealing with Iran through multilateral talks with other permanent members of the U.N. Security 

Council—China, France, Russia, Britain, plus Germany. 

Part of this diplomacy included a package of incentives that the 

United States offered Iran in 2006 with the stated objective that 

if Iran suspended its enrichment-related and proliferation-sensitive 

activities, our Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, would meet directly with her Iranian counterpart to discuss anything, but Iran 

refused. 

Two years of respectable but inadequate diplomatic efforts and 

four U.N. Security Council resolutions later, the last three of which 

imposed sanctions on Iran until it suspends its enrichment-related 

and reprocessing activities, have not let Iran to do so. Nor do many 

experts think that this path will prevent a nuclear Iran from 

emerging. In fact, some now assume a nuclear Iran as their starting point for how the United States should approach Iran. 

I am not of that mind-set and agree that it should be U.S. policy 

to prevent a nuclear Iran. Add to this the Iranian President’s April 

8 pronouncement that Iran’s scientists and experts have started to 

install 6,000 new centrifuges at Natanz, the uranium enrichment 

facility. These are in addition to the 3,300 that the Director of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency said are already operating 

there. Furthermore, Iran has stated that it will move toward largescale uranium enrichment that will ultimately involve 54,000 centrifuges. 

Finally, last week’s talks in Shanghai by the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany and the European 

Union, which focused on incentives to get the Iranians to stop their 

nuclear program, ended with no clear outcome. 

These disturbing facts lead to a series of urgent questions. First 

of all, last weekend Secretary Rice stated, ‘‘This is not the time, I 

think, to expect major changes’’ in terms of either incentives or 

sanctions. What, therefore, will the United States do in the short 

10 

term, say between now and January 2009, vis-a-vis Iran? And how 

further along down the nuclear road, will Iran be? 

Although I continue to be a believer in progressively ratcheting 

up sanctions on the Iranian regime, which is why I cosponsored S. 

970, the Iran Counterproliferation Act, can we expect the relatively 

low impact sanctions of the U.N. resolutions to ultimately force 

Iran to cease its enrichment activities? If not, what are we aiming 

at? 

Why does the United States continue to insist on preconditions 

to negotiations with the Iranians? What other changes in U.S. policy should be considered that may alter the Iranian decisionmaking 

calculus with regard to its nuclear ambitions? To what extent 

would a position that allows Iran to continue enrichment work 

while negotiations on a final settlement are proceeding undermine 

the four U.N. resolutions that demand that Iran suspend uranium 

enrichment? Should the next Administration consider direct talks 

with Iranians without preconditions? Realistically, what would direct talks accomplish? How should those talks be structured? 

What lessons can we learn from our involvement with North 

Korea and Libya? And are any of those lessons applicable to Iran? 

And, finally, how do we prepare for the possibility that our best efforts might not persuade Iran’s leaders? 

Today, with those questions in mind, I want to try to do the following: First of all, to accurately assess to date the diplomatic efforts of the Bush Administration; and, second, to discuss the most 

effective or least bad strategic policy option regarding Iran; third, 

to analyze the pros and cons of specific proposals about how to approach Iran; and, fourth, to review what lessons, if any, can be 

gleaned from the U.S. involvement with North Korea and with 

Libya and how those actions might be applicable to Iran; and finally, to solicit ideas about how Congress can play an active and 

effective role in the path forward. 

Again, we welcome our witnesses. We thank you all for joining 

us today and for the time and energy that you put into preparing 

for your statements and your responses to our questions. Senator 

Coburn is going to be joining us shortly. I am delighted that we 

have been joined by my colleague from Minnesota, and I would be 

pleased to recognize Senator Coleman for whatever statement he 

might wish to make. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have a 

formal statement. I want to make just some observations. And it 

is dangerous because I do not have notes on this, but I want to respond a little bit, just at least to set the stage and then listen to 

the witnesses and inquire further with them. 

But I do appreciate the thoughtful presentations of my colleagues, and I appreciate the thoughtful manner in which you approach this. And these are complex issues. This is not easy stuff. 

What do we have to lose without preconditions moving forward? 

I would suggest that particularly if you look at the North Korean 

example, what we have to lose, if not done correctly, is the support 

and confidence of our allies in the Middle East. As the ranking 

member on the Near East Subcommittee, I can tell you that the 

11 

Iranians are of deep concern to the Saudis, to the Jordanians, to 

the Egyptians. The greatest threat facing stable governments in 

the Middle East is terrorism. It is Hamas. It is Hezbollah. It is a 

threat in Syria and Lebanon. 

And so if you look at the North Korean experience where we actually pulled together the Six-Party Talks, because we understood 

that direct negotiation was unlikely to yield any fruitful results due 

to the prior history with North Korea, it needed others in the region who have a stake in this. The reality is that Iran is not just 

the U.S.’s problem, and it is not just Israel’s problem. Iran is a 

threat to the House of Saud. Iran is a threat to Abdullah in Jordan. 

Iran is a threat to stability in the entire region. And I do not think 

that it is asking too much when we say negotiate without preconditions. Iran right now is engaged in what I would call—and I 

am going to say this very straightforward—acts of war against this 

country. They are killing American soldiers. There is no question 

whatsoever that there is Iranian support for the Revolutionary 

Guard, the Qods Force support of terrorist organizations in Iraq, 

supplying them with the most modern explosively formed projectiles. They are actively involved in killing coalition soldiers. In 

other times, that is an act of war. And I do not think it is asking 

too much as a precondition to sit down and talk about the larger 

issues. I agree certainly with this issue of the nuclearization, which 

is the big issue. That is the 800-pound gorilla. But before you sit 

down with someone to say as a precondition for us to have a fruitful conversation, we would like you to step back from supplying 

weapons that are killing our soldiers; we would like you to cut off 

your training of terrorists in the region, then we could talk to you. 

Because I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that we need to be ratcheting 

up the talks at a higher level than they are now. There is just no 

question that I think we are missing opportunities. 

There are talks going on—I think this is public information—at 

the sub-ambassador level. But I do believe that it is reasonable in 

international diplomacy, before you sit down with someone, particularly if they are involved in killing your soldiers, to have that 

kind of conversation. And my fear would be that if we did not, the 

way we would be looked at in the region would undermine our entire ability to move forward with promoting stability in the entire 

region. Talk to the Saudis. Talk to the Egyptians. Talk to the Jordanians. Talk to the Kuwaitis. 

And so this is a complicated area. We have to have levels of discussion beyond what we have now. The threat is real. The NIE 

talked about Iran suspending weaponization, but not uranium enrichment, which we know they are doing in violation of U.N. resolutions, and not the delivery capacity, which we know they are 

doing. The easiest thing to re-start is weaponization. And our intelligence only goes back to 2003. We do not know what they are 

doing today. 

And so I applaud your efforts at pursuing a rational kind of conversation about how we move forward, but I would suggest, Mr. 

Chairman, that there is an affirmative answer of what we have to 

lose if done incorrectly, and what we have to lose is an undermining of our efforts to promote stability in one of the most dangerous regions of the world. And so I look forward to the witnesses, 

12 

and I look forward to the conversation, and I appreciate your leadership on this matter. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much. Dr. Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

The real principle here is reconciliation. Where we find ourselves 

is alienated. But the real practical matter in the world today is we 

have no means of containment with which we can deal with the situation in Iran. And before we give up and lose all leverage with 

Iran in terms of high-level talks, you have to have some other leverage somewhere. And I know I missed part of Senator Coleman’s 

talking points, but as I look at how we handled North Korea and 

how we are, in my thoughts, regrettably handling it today, with no 

accountability and no transparency, we send a signal to the Iranians to stand ground because we are never going to do anything 

any different. 

So I am adamantly opposed to how we are handling North Korea 

today because I think it complicates our ability to deal with Iran. 

They see weakness rather than strength. They see delay as their 

asset. They see lack of unity on our part. And what you hear from 

their leaders is statements about the destruction of one of our allies. And it ought to be U.S. policy that if you attack Israel, you 

have attacked the United States. And that ought to be our policy, 

and that ought to be first and foremost our policy. And then we 

stand on that, and then we act in regards to that. 

So the rhetoric does need to calm down. Our statements against 

Iran or about Iran have nothing to do with the Iranian people because they have what I would consider a despot government that 

does not reflect the true values of the Iranian people that I know 

and their desires for a future. 

So I look forward to our hearing, and I look forward to our testimony. We have a big problem in front of us, and it is not just this 

country that has a big problem. The entire world has a big problem 

because uranium enrichment in Iran means uranium enrichment 

in multiple other places throughout the Middle East. You can deny 

that if you want, but that is what is going to happen. And we need 

to be prepared for that. We need to be unified in how this country 

stands. And there is a place for reconciliation, but reconciliation 

has to be built on trust, it has to be built on verification. And there 

is none of that now in terms of true verification and true trust. 

And so one of my biggest concerns is that we have failed in terms 

of our diplomacy through things such as Voice of America, through 

Radio Farda, through presenting the options in a standard way, 

with a complete view of our viewpoint, one that directs our respect 

and love for the Iranian people but expresses our disdain for the 

statements that have been made by the Iranian leadership. 

This is a different area, not just for this country, and I have 

some concern over our allies in terms of the—we have three United 

Nations resolutions on sanctioning, which are not effective, obviously, since we continue to see enrichment. And if we are not going 

to push for more sanctions, then what we have said is that we, in 

fact, are going to allow enrichment to continue. And if we are going 

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1The joint prepared statement of Ms. McNerney and Mr. Feltman appears in the Appendix 

on page 77. 

ment throughout the whole Middle East. And we need to recognize 

that as the endpoint in this game, and then see what we have 

done, i.e. that we have no more nonproliferation treaties because 

we will have had proliferation throughout the entire Mideast. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Coburn, thank you very much. 

I am going to invite our first panel of witnesses to join us, and 

as they come to the table, I will introduce each of them. 

Jeffrey Feltman is a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service 

currently serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in 

the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, previously served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon. He also headed the Coalition 

Provisional Authority’s Office in the Irbil province of Iraq. He spent 

much of his career in the Eastern European and Near East Affairs. 

Welcome. 

Joining Mr. Feltman is Patricia McNerney. She is the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, acting head of that bureau. 

We are delighted that you are here. Your entire testimony will 

be entered and made part of the record. You are welcome to summarize it as you prefer, and with that, Mr. Feltman, if you would 

like to kick it off, and then we will turn to Ms. McNerney. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. We had arranged that I would set it off and 

then turn to Ambassador Feltman. 

TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA MCNERNEY,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, AND JEFFREY FELTMAN, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

I very much welcome the opportunity to speak with you today, and 

I look forward to your questions. I request that our full joint statement be placed in the record. 

Senator CARPER. It will be, without objection. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Iran presents a profound threat to U.S. national 

security interests. The radical regime in Tehran threatens regional 

and international security through its pursuit of technologies that 

would give it a nuclear weapons capability, obviously its support of 

terrorist groups and militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, its expansive regional ambitions, and its lack of respect for human rights 

and civil society. 

From its location at the crossroads of the Middle East and South 

Asia, a nuclear-armed Iran could threaten U.S. national security 

interests on three continents, and even U.S. homeland directly. The 

international community’s failure to prevent Iran’s acquisition of 

such weapons would additionally imperil the international nonproliferation regime, as Senator Coburn had indicated, by casting 

doubt on our collective ability and commitment to prevent the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction abroad. 

14 

Our goal is to convince Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program and urge Tehran to become a partner in bringing peace and 

stability to the region. The diplomacy to which we remain committed is the best course of action, we believe, in pressuring the 

Iranian regime to change its behavior. 

However, to respond to the range of challenges presented by 

Iran, the Administration has stressed the use of a range of diplomatic tools available: Multilateral diplomacy, support for the IAEA, 

financial measures, counterproliferation actions such as interdictions, and, as a final resort, hold available the threat and use of 

military force. 

The U.S. diplomatic strategy toward Iran consists of a dual-track 

approach in concert together with the permanent five members of 

the U.N. Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, the United States—plus Germany (the P5+1). These 

tracks are mutually reinforcing and complementary. The first is the 

incremental escalation of pressure on the Iranian regime to help 

prompt a revision of their strategic nuclear calculus, specifically, a 

decision to abandon once and for all Iran’s long-term nuclear weapons ambitions. The second track is an offer to negotiate a generous 

package of incentives that cover the gamut of political, economic, 

technological, and social benefits that would accrue to the Iranian 

people were the regime to resolve international concerns with its 

nuclear activities. As part of this offer, Secretary Rice announced 

in May 2006 that, should Iran create the necessary conditions for 

negotiations by meeting its U.N. Security Council obligation to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, the 

United States would be willing to meet with Iran at any time, any 

place, to discuss any issue. 

Ambassador Feltman will provide some introductory remarks addressing Iran’s regional behavior and U.S. civil engagement programs, but I would like to discuss the nuclear front by noting that 

we seek to present Iran with an increasingly stark choice between 

two paths: Confrontation and isolation, or cooperation and reward. 

While we believe we are having an impact, we have yet to 

achieve our objective of persuading Iran to step off its current nuclear course. No one tool can succeed on its own. Iran’s past behavior shows that it can be responsive to international pressure. This 

dual-track approach is our best tool for making clear to Iran the 

costs and benefits for its defiance and dissuading the Iranian regime to take a different path. 

At a minimum, these sanctions are limiting Iran’s access to sensitive technologies and goods, with the possible impact of slowing 

Iran’s nuclear and missile development. These sanctions are also 

impairing their ability to access the international financial system, 

to fund its weapons programs and terrorist activities, and to secure 

investment for its strategic sectors, as many States and firms no 

longer wish to associate themselves with the Iranian regime. The 

sanctions keep Iran on the defensive, forcing it to find new finance 

and trade partners and replace funding channels it has lost—often 

through more costly and circuitous mechanisms. 

Major banks such as Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, and HSBC 

have decided that the risk of doing business in Iran is too great 

and have ended or limited their relationships with Iran. The effects 

15 

of Iran’s growing international stigma may, in the end, be as substantial as the direct economic impact of any sanction. Losing the 

ability for a single Iranian bank, such as Iran’s Bank Sepah, to 

conduct business overseas is painful to the Iranian economy. Having major international financial institutions refuse to do business 

with Iran because of the legitimate business risks that such trade 

present is even worse. 

The sanctions are also having a psychological impact. Iran has 

demonstrated its desire to assume the economic and political role 

it believes it deserves in the region, and to be seen as a legitimate 

player in the international community. But the series of U.N. resolutions has shown the world and Iran that it is isolated by the 

international community and will not be tolerated as an irresponsible actor. 

In addition to sanctions, a key element of our strategy is to work 

with the International Atomic Energy Agency in its ongoing investigation of Iran. As the main international institution with responsibility for verifying the non-diversion of nuclear materials and providing credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, the IAEA’s work in Iran is essential. 

Press reports have indicated that many States are sharing more 

and more information with the IAEA to further its investigation; 

we look forward to the IAEA’s continued efforts to uncover the true 

extent of Iran’s nuclear weapons-related work and ambitions. We 

will continue to lead strong international consensus that Iran must 

make a full disclosure of any nuclear weapons-related work and 

allow the IAEA to verify that it has stopped. Anything short of a 

demand for full disclosure would undermine not only our efforts to 

provide international verification that Iran is not developing or preserving a nuclear weapons option, but also would undermine the 

integrity of the IAEA safeguards regime worldwide. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield to my colleague to address some of the 

regional aspects, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Ms. McNerney. Mr. Feltman. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Dr. Coburn, Senator Coleman, for this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy options regarding Iran. 

As Ms. McNerney has described, we are taking many steps to address the challenges posed by Iran on the nuclear front, but we are 

also deeply concerned by Iran’s overall behavior, both in terms of 

Iran’s malign influence in the region as well as Iran’s oppression 

of its own people. 

Iran poses multiple threats to U.S. interests, as your opening remarks have indicated. It destabilizes its neighbors. It is the world’s 

No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism, continues the oppression of Iranian civil society, and I would add Iranian-funded militias and Iranian-funded weaponry are killing our troops and diplomats in Iraq. 

I had the honor to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon for 31⁄2

years, and I saw every day the malign Iranian influence in Lebanon in terms of Iran’s support for Hezbollah—Hezbollah that, 

with Iranian support, dragged Lebanon into war with Israel in 

2006; Hezbollah, which continues to try to undermine legitimate institutions of the government of Lebanon and seeks to create a state 

within a state there. 

16 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force continues to bolster Hezbollah financially as well as rearming the group with rockets and other weapons, which are systematic violations of multiple 

U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

Iran also supports other terrorist groups, including certain Shia 

militant groups in Iraq, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. 

Farther to the east, Iran seeks to destabilize the Karzai government in Afghanistan by sending lethal assistance to the Taliban, 

once Iran’s enemy. 

Through its malign influence, Tehran undermines the elected 

Government of Iraq and endangers our soldiers and diplomats by 

providing lethal support to Iraqi militants. The President has made 

clear that Iran has a choice to make. It can choose to live in peace 

with its neighbors, enjoying strong economic, religious, and cultural 

ties, or it can continue to arm, fund, and train illegal militant 

groups, which are terrorizing the Iraqi people and, in fact, turning 

them against Iran. America would welcome a peaceful relationship 

between Iran and Iraq, but make no mistake: The United States 

will act to protect its interests, our troops, and our Iraqi partners. 

In terms of the nuclear file. Ms. McNearney has already outlined 

our dual-track strategy towards Iran and our approach to the challenges posed by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities. But let me 

emphasize that the United States remains committed to finding a 

multilateral diplomatic solution to address the threat posed by 

Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and its overall destabilizing influence in the region. As Ms. McNerney outlined, we 

are working closely with our P5+1 partners to both pressure the 

Iranian regime and offer it incentives to revise, as you said, Chairman Carper, the cost/benefit analysis that Iran has. The P5+1 

package of incentives covers the gamut of political, economic, technological, and social benefits, including active international cooperation to help Iran develop state-of-the-art civil, peaceful nuclear energy technology and obtain an assured nuclear fuel supply 

for a genuinely civilian nuclear energy program. 

In addition to that offer, Secretary Rice has said multiple times 

since May 2006 that, should Iran create the necessary conditions 

for negotiations by suspending all proliferation-sensitive activities, 

including uranium enrichment, she personally would sit down with 

her Iranian counterpart any place, any time, to discuss any interest—an issue of interest to Tehran, to discuss all of the multiple 

issues that you addressed in your opening remarks, Senators. 

Let’s talk about human rights for a second. Iran’s foreign and nuclear policies are only part of the challenge Iran poses to the world. 

The regime’s record of human rights abuse remains abysmal and 

has only grown worse over the years. The regime regularly commits torture and other forms of inhumane treatment on its own 

people and restricts the basic freedoms of expression, press, religion, and assembly in order to discourage political opposition. The 

regime has purged liberal university professors, threatened, imprisoned, and tortured dissidents, journalists, labor leaders, and women’s rights activists. 

The regime also denies its people the freedom of expression and 

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17 

papers, censoring Internet use, and blocking satellite dish ownership—all in an effort to control access to information. 

Secretary Rice noted at Davos earlier this year that the United 

States has no desire to have a permanent enemy in Iran, even after 

29 years of difficult history. We have no conflict with the Iranian 

people. An important component of our Iran strategy is to build 

bridges—bridges directly to the Iranian people—through official exchanges and civil society development programs. We have grave 

problems with Tehran on a range of issues, but we have the greatest respect for the citizens of Iran, their culture, and their rich heritage. 

Through official, professional, educational, cultural, and athletic 

exchanges, we are attempting to strengthen mutual understanding 

of our two peoples. Additionally, we are trying to provide the Iranian people with a better understanding of American foreign policy, 

our society, and our culture through our Persian language television and radio broadcasting on Voice of America and Radio 

Farda, as well as through the Internet and other media. 

The United States stands with the Iranian people in their struggle to advance democracy, freedom, and the basic civil rights of all 

citizens. 

In closing, I would note that we have presented Iran an option. 

The regime can continue down its current path toward isolation 

and further sanctions, or it can choose to reengage with the international community, opening up opportunities for better relations 

and a brighter future. Should Iran comply with its U.N. Security 

Council obligations to suspend all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including enrichment, and cooperate with the IAEA, the 

Secretary has said, ‘‘We could begin negotiations and we could 

work over time to build a new, more normal relationship, one defined not by fear and mistrust, but growing cooperation, expanding 

trade and exchange, and the peaceful management of our differences.’’ 

The choice is Iran’s. The challenges posed by Iran are daunting, 

but we are confident that our current approach, working in concert 

with the international community on the nuclear and other issues, 

will move us toward a peaceful resolution to the problems posed by 

Iran. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. My thanks, our thanks to both of you for your 

testimony and for your service to our country. 

Let me just start off with a question to both of you, if I could. 

One of the underlying points of the NIE was that Iran responds to 

pressure and calculates the costs and the benefits of certain actions 

that we might take against them. The idea is that Iran stopped 

work on designing a nuclear weapon because of the perceived costs 

internationally of pursuing such work. 

First of all, has the Administration done an assessment to determine the magnitude of economic pressure needed to dissuade the 

Iranian Government from continuing to pursue all the unacceptable elements of its nuclear program, including enrichment? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think as we review that question, partly 

you have to understand what the regime itself is willing to bear in 

order to continue pursuit of these weapons—or this nuclear path. 

18 

We have seen some polling and sort of calculated that the Iranian people as a whole, believing that their program is for the civil 

nuclear purposes, indicate that they would like to pursue the nuclear path. But when you ask them a different question, which is 

what costs are you willing to take for pursuit of that path, the calculus starts to change, and public support starts to diminish in 

terms of the support for what they believe to be a civil nuclear 

path. 

So our goal is to start to have an impact to such a degree that 

you start to change that popular support for the path the regime 

is on. We believe we are starting to have that impact. We do not 

believe there is sufficient pressure yet in that direction. Obviously, 

we have been trying to do this in a multilateral way so it is—sometimes working through the United Nations is a little more painful, 

a little slower. But over time it is the accumulation of these impacts. And as I mentioned in my testimony, the additional downstream impact of businesses themselves choosing to withhold investment and look elsewhere for their business are all ways that 

we are looking to increase that pressure and change that calculus. 

One of the things, too, looking back to the 2003 decision, there 

were no sanctions at the time, but there was obviously a lot of activity happening in the region. So the mix of pressures is beyond 

simply the sanctions, but also international scrutiny, that was the 

time that the programs were revealed, the covert nature of these 

programs; obviously a build-up in Iraq in the region. And so there 

is this really, I think, broad set of tools and pressures that we want 

to bring to bear. 

Senator CARPER. This is for either of you. Do you have any idea 

of the level of pressure that we need to apply to the Iranians, in 

order to succeed in our goal of no nuclear weapon capability? We 

have these three U.N. Security Council resolutions. We have imposed unilaterally additional sanctions of our own. They appear to 

be having some effect. Unfortunately, since the promulgation of the 

NIE, it looks like some other countries, particularly the Russians 

and the Chinese, have decided that they need not be as stringent, 

I think, in adhering to pressure on the Iranians themselves. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I do not think we have—there is no sort of 

magic ‘‘this is the amount’’ that sort of tips the balance. But I think 

if you actually look to the Libya situation, it actually took some 10- 

plus years to really get to that balance. We do not believe we have 

that kind of time and—— 

Senator CARPER. I do not believe we do either. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Yes. And so the question is how do you get there 

quicker, and, obviously the high price of oil has really helped this 

regime weather some of these sanctions in a way that they might 

not have otherwise? 

Senator CARPER. Although I am told that their ability to pump 

oil drops each year by about 500,000 barrels. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Yes, I am no oil expert. I understand that is the 

case. 

Senator CARPER. And, meanwhile, their consumption of oil continues to rise. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. But the price that they get for what they do 

pump continues to rise as well. So some of the other things that 

19 

work in our favor are that the actual economic management of this 

leadership is particularly weak, so that also exacerbates some of 

the sanctions as well. 

But, again, I do not know that we know what is that magic number or amount of economic isolation. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Feltman. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I would echo what my colleague has said. We do 

not know exactly at what point that cost/benefit analysis will start 

turning, the cost/benefit analysis that you referred to in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. But we are going to continue to pursue this dual track multilaterally, that we will look at how we, ourselves, can impose unilateral pressure in a variety of ways on Iran, 

and we will work through the P5+1 and through the IAEA to see 

how we can impose international pressure. 

The Security Council resolutions, the three Chapter VII Security 

Council resolutions, have had an increasing number of sanctions of 

punishment and penalties on Iran, and I do not believe we have 

seen the full impact of those yet. 

Senator CARPER. When are we likely to? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Well, right now we, ourselves, are bringing our 

own system into compliance with the most recent resolution. The 

European Union is doing the same in adopting resolution 1803 into 

their common policy. The European Union is looking at making 

some autonomous sanctions beyond resolution 1803. We are doing 

the same. We are doing this all in coordination multilaterally because I think all of us recognize that the danger is multilateral and 

that the sanctions also have to be multilateral to have this sort of 

impact. But we do not know the exact point where the cost/benefit 

analysis will start switching in the way we want. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. McNerney, Libya is a lot smaller, as we 

know, than Iran, and it does not have the oil reserves that Iran enjoys. So if it took Libya—what did you say?—7 to 10 years in order 

to, if you will, change their course, according to your calculation 

how long do you think it is going to take for the Iranians to change 

their course? And do we have the luxury of waiting that long? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. The point I was making is just that sometimes 

over time these pressures build. I do not think we have that kind 

of luxury. But I also think that Libya was a little different in the 

sense of perhaps relishing that isolation in a different way than 

Iran. As a country, the people are very certainly used to traveling 

globally, used to visiting Europe, used to a very different kind of 

life, I think, than perhaps you would compare to the Libyan people, 

and certainly have a more robust kind of society. So, there are 

some differences. 

I think the original—one of the values of the U.N. Security Council process is not only these economic sanctions but the fact that 

the entire Security Council unanimously continues to line up 

against the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. So all 

these things we believe can have a larger and more direct impact 

on the civil society kind of impact. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you for your testimony. 

I am concerned about the time frame that Senator Carper mentioned, and you mentioned, Secretary McNerney, further sanctions 

20 

may be needed. How do we know when further sanctions are needed? And why wouldn’t we put the full press of all the sanctions 

that we can now? You have in the press and stated by the President of that country that they are adding 6,000 centrifuges right 

now. They intend to go to 50,000 centrifuges. Is there a real nuclear need for power in that country when they have the world’s 

second largest reserves of natural gas that can generate power for 

500 years if they needed to? If there are further sanctions that are 

needed—and I have some concern that Secretary Rice has signaled 

that no further sanctions are going to be brought before the United 

Nations in the near term—where is the balance there? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think her statement was just to suggest 

that we are not going to move away from the policy that we are 

following. We do intend to continue working the U.N. Security 

Council track, including additional sanctions. At the same time, we 

are also trying to renegotiate this package of incentives, and Dan 

Fried led meetings in China last week, and they are continuing to 

work among the P5+1 to redevelop or refresh that package of incentives. 

Additionally, the United States has had a complete embargo on 

Iran for many years. What we have been trying to do with this 

strategy is really broaden that, especially to our European allies, 

as well as some of the key Asian economic powers. And that, we 

believe, is where we need to continue to ratchet up the pressure. 

Thus, the importance really of maintaining this U.N. Security 

Council track to increase—many of those countries are much more 

comfortable doing these sanctions with the U.N. Security Council 

mandates. 

Now, when we work with them, you use that as a starting point, 

but it also is an opportunity to expand beyond the strict requirements of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. So when the EU reviews its sanctions package in the coming weeks, they intend to go 

beyond the strict requirements of the U.N. Security Council, and 

we believe that is an important avenue as well. So we do not want 

to simply suggest that the U.N. track is the only way to do sanctions. 

Senator COBURN. Should we believe the President of Iran when 

he said there are not any incentives that they would ever accept? 

Is that posturing? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I mean, when it comes from him, I do not want 

to pretend to know what he is thinking. 

Senator COBURN. Well, I mean, it is a fairly straightforward 

statement: ‘‘There are no incentives you can offer us to stop us 

from our nuclear enrichment program.’’ 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think they have made statements in the 

past that they will not do things, but then if you look at how things 

have evolved, they were not going to talk to the IAEA about nuclear weapons issues. They did announce this week that they will, 

in fact, be doing that next month. Now, whether they do that in 

any real way or in any substantive way, that remains to be seen. 

But, some of these statements certainly can be posturing. 

I do think, as I mentioned before, that the Iranian people actually can put pressure on their leadership in ways maybe in a country like a North Korea would certainly not even be an element. 

21 

Senator COBURN. There is no question it is difficult to get consensus on the P5+1. Obviously, it has been a hard road to get 

there. 

What if you cannot get consensus for the next step? What are we 

doing in terms of building relationships for containment given the 

ultimate plan which most of our leaders think is nuclearization of 

Iran? What are we doing in terms of building containment? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. The U.N. path and the P5+1 path is one element. We reach out regularly through dialogues and through our 

embassies to countries, particularly in the Gulf Region, to countries 

in Asia—Japan and Korea and China—Russia is obviously difficult 

in the U.N. Security Council context, but they every step of the 

way also have agreed with this policy that we need enrichment and 

reprocessing to stop in Iran and that there is a threat posed by 

Iran to international peace and security. So, whether the P5+1— 

that is one element of our strategy, but certainly part of containment is maintaining a coalition, and that is a key element of what 

we are doing. 

It was mentioned earlier, the Russian plan for an enrichment 

and reprocessing facility in Russia, we think that is part of the 

P5+1 package and remains a viable avenue for allowing Iran to get 

the benefits of nuclear energy without the know-how that can bleed 

into the nuclear weapons capability. 

Senator COBURN. In 2007, the State Department gave half of the 

2007 Iran democracy promotion funding to the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors. Much of this money was diverted from democracy 

promotion to general infrastructure—half of it, as a matter of fact. 

The BBG also claims its mission is not to promote democracy but 

to balance news between the U.S. perspective and regime propaganda. Farsi-speaking BBG whistleblowers and a 2006 National 

Security Council report said the BBG many times fails to balance 

the regime’s propaganda with the truth. 

In light of this, does the State Department plan to divert any of 

the 2008 Iran democracy funding to the BBG? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Dr. Coburn, the short answer to your question is 

yes, but I would like to talk a minute about the broadcasting part 

of the overall strategy, because the broadcasting part has two 

goals: One is to be able to allow us to send messages directly to 

the Iranian people, not through the filter of their government, and 

not through the filter of their state-controlled media. 

Senator COBURN. I understand that. 

Mr. FELTMAN. The second is to provide an example of what 

would a free media look like. If they were not living in this oppressive regime under this dictatorship, under this crazy, autocratic regime, what would a free media look like? And a free media has a 

wide variety of views expressed in it. 

Now, at the same time, we have discussed the issues you allude 

to with the Voice of America, Radio Farda, and Broadcasting Board 

of Governors officials. As you know, there is new leadership now. 

There is new management. They are changing personnel. They are 

looking at the content. They are addressing some of the concerns 

that you have raised, that we have raised. But the important thing, 

I believe, is that we have now increased the broadcasting to Iran. 

22 

Voice of America is now 24 hours a day, up from 8 hours a day. 

The original Persian language content—— 

Senator COBURN. What is the content in the Voice of America 

broadcasts? 

Mr. FELTMAN. The content is now—there is original content that 

is now up to 6 hours a day; it was only 2 hours a day. It is news. 

Senator COBURN. How do we know what it is? 

Mr. FELTMAN. We have a constant discussion with the new leadership of VOA, with the BBG, about the content because—— 

Senator COBURN. They have nobody on the board and nobody in 

the leadership that speaks Farsi. They have no idea what they are 

broadcasting because we cannot get translation from the State Department about what they are broadcasting. We do not know what 

they are doing, and we know what they have done. And it is not 

about a balance. It is about giving oftentimes, in many instances, 

where we give credence to what their own government is saying in 

an unbalanced fashion. 

And so the only way to see if we get that is to have translation 

services of what we are promoting. If we are going to use the people of Iran as a tool for freedom, then we ought to know what we 

are saying. And we have an absolute refusal to present to this category and the American people what we are broadcasting into Iran. 

And based on the track record of the 2006 report plus the track 

record of whistleblowers, what we know is it is not what the Secretary has suggested. It is oftentimes supportive of the regime. 

If we are going to use it as a tool to help the Iranian people see 

what a free democracy is about and have a true balanced point of 

view, not one that supplants and supports the leadership of Iran, 

we have to have transparency. And there is no transparency now 

because nobody at BBG knows, because none of them speak Farsi. 

How will we know? How do we know that we are effective in the 

tool that you want to use to promote freedom and liberties inside 

Iran through Voice of America and Radio Farda? How do we know? 

Mr. FELTMAN. All I can say, Dr. Coburn, is that the Secretary is 

using her position as an ex officio member on the BBG in order to 

have these sorts of conversations directly with the leadership, the 

new leadership of VOA and Radio Farda, about these issues. This 

is an important part of our strategy, and the Secretary and those 

below the Secretary are engaged with the BBG on these issues. 

Senator COBURN. Well, it would just seem to me that if we are 

going to use that as a tool, the State Department ought to know 

what we are saying. We ought to know what we are saying to see 

if it is an effective tool. It is called a metric, and it is called transparency. That is the only way you get accountability. And, quite 

frankly, based on what we have heard from whistleblowers inside 

Voice of America, inside BBG, is they do not know, and oftentimes 

the message is not what we want to send. 

So the only way to do that is if you require transparency, then 

they are going to know that we are going to know what we are saying. To me it is unconscionable that we would use a tool and not 

know whether the tool is working and not know whether it is the 

appropriate tool. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Your time has expired. 

23 

Let me just say for the record, Dr. Coburn and I have a different 

take on this issue. I think one of the important things is if we want 

people in these countries to listen to what is being reported on in 

the news, we have to provide fair and objective reporting. People 

in these countries do not listen to their own radio—their own 

media because they do not believe it. They know it is propaganda. 

And one of the best ways for us to make sure they do not listen 

to our stuff is for them to be convinced that we are putting out 

propaganda as well. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one addition 

to this discussion, and that is, in terms of democracy funding, Iran 

also blocks access to the Internet. What we have seen in this country is bloggers are very effective for us in getting at independent 

voices. Are we focusing on the prospect or opportunity to unleash 

the voices of the people in Iran through some blogging and other 

things? Are there some technological things that we could be supporting with democracy funding? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Senator, thank you. We actually do have an active 

blogging program. That is part of our program. In fact, we have an 

active website. We are using technology as best we can, and the 

number of hits we get is actually quite impressive. I am not a technological expert myself, but those that are tell me that they can 

trace back that most of the hits that we are getting, something 

over 4 million hits last year, are from Iran itself on our website. 

So we are using the blogging tool. 

Senator COLEMAN. In addition to our website, what I am talking 

about is technological strategies that unleash the potential blogs in 

Iran itself—in other words, the capacity of Iranians to tap into 

that. The voice of the people of Iran is the voice that should be 

heard, and certainly that presents an opportunity. 

Let me get back to you, Ms. McNerney, you mentioned the Russians and, one of the concepts that this Administration has talked 

about that the President has been supportive of is the Russian concept of we can go in there and we can work with the Iranians and 

oversee that their nuclear capacity is for civilians, civil and not 

weaponization means. My concern is with the Russians and about 

Russian behavior, and the problem we have right now is that, on 

the one hand, it would be one thing if that is all the Iranians were 

doing, but, on the other hand, they are doing enrichment. They are 

doing delivery systems. And so we are talking about giving them, 

on the one hand, opportunities to develop a nuclear capacity, and 

yet we know that they are not listening, not responding to IAEA 

requests, not responding to Security Council resolutions. 

Let me just talk about the Russians for a second. It has been my 

understanding that the Russians continue to assist the Iranians in 

a long-range missile program, and again, there are three parts to 

having a nuclear weapon: The enrichment, weaponization, and delivery. So the delivery part is a critical part. And, by the way, that 

would put a significant portion of NATO under the threat of Iran 

having a nuclear weapon. 

Have we certified that the Russians have ended their support of 

the Iranian long-range missile program? 

24 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Without getting into, obviously, intelligence 

judgments, my understanding is that the part we are still concerned about with Russia is not in the ballistic missile side, but in 

these defensive missiles, like the SA–15 and things of that sort. We 

believe that Russia should not be selling any kind of weapons system to Iran given the situation. They have continued to supply, 

however, these defensive kinds of missiles which are below any 

threshold for the U.N. Security Council resolution list of conventional weapons. 

So that is our area where we believe they continue to cooperate, 

but, again, that would not be in the ballistic missile side. 

Senator COLEMAN. It seems to me that it is inconsistent to push 

for a American-Russian nuclear civil cooperation agreement, which 

I understand will be signed in several weeks, and I can tell you 

that I plan to send a letter from numerous colleagues to demonstrate there is a real concern with Congress over this deal, and 

that it undermines our diplomacy with respect to Iran. Now, we 

have got the Russians, who are, whether it is below the level or 

not, they are involved in developing Iranian missile programs. In 

January, Moscow made a final shipment to the nuclear facility with 

the massive power reactor at Bushehr, so that will give the Iranians the capacity to produce enough near weapons grade plutonium for roughly 60 nuclear weapons. Russia has been involved in 

this assistance for a period of time. 

Russians have refused to limit conventional arms sales to Iran, 

something even the Clinton Administration made a point of demanding, as I recall, and looking at my notes here, in the 1990s 

as a condition of U.S.-Russian cooperation. So now we have them 

selling advanced air defenses that could be deployed to defend Iranians’ nuclear sites. Can you describe the logic for reversing the 

policies of the Clinton Administration? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, the way we have looked at the civil nuclear agreement is in the context of working with Russia to create 

incentives for Iran not to go down the enrichment and reprocessing 

path but, rather, the proposal is that within Russia you develop 

this enrichment and reprocessing capability. And when we look 

globally at countries, there is a growing interest in nuclear with 

the energy shortages and greenhouse gases. Many countries around 

the world are beginning to look at nuclear energy. What we have 

been encouraging is they do that in a way that does not create this 

enrichment and reprocessing technology. 

And so Russia really is the key to having this ability to produce 

the fuel and also take back the spent fuel. And so the whole approach with Russia is to further that kind of approach and make 

it a contrast to Iran. For example, we have reached some memorandums of understanding with UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, and it is all 

done with the explicit requirement that there not be enrichment 

and reprocessing capability development. So we are getting the 

benefits of civil nuclear without some of these nonproliferation 

problems. 

Similarly, the Russian relationship with Iran on Bashehr is not 

with the enrichment and reprocessing side but simply with this 

light water reactor technology and the fuel—and there is an agreeVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Oct 21, 2008 Jkt 042750 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42750.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
25 

ment that there be IAEA safeguards and also a takeback of the 

spent fuel. 

So all this in the context of creating the right way to do civil nuclear and receive the NPT promises, the benefits of civil nuclear, 

but also to limit or redirect some of the desire to have this enrichment and reprocessing. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I understand what the goal is. My concern is that you cannot deal with this in kind of an abstract sense, 

so you have got a goal of saying if we could get a nuclear program 

with all the safeguards, that would be a very good thing. And if the 

Russians could take back the spent fuel, that would be a very good 

thing. But at the same time, you have the Iranians ignoring U.N. 

Security Council resolutions. You have the Russians providing support for Iran when part of our efforts are to cut off Iran, not to do 

it unilaterally. This is a country that needs to import 40 percent 

of its gasoline. This is a country that needs hundreds of billions of 

dollars of investment to maintain its oil infrastructure. And we 

have the Swiss and Iranians doing a gas deal worth 18 billion 

euros and 27 billion euros over a 25-year period. 

So, on the one hand, you have this laudable goal, but the circumstances in which it is being implemented cause a lot of concern, 

and so in the end, it is very easy to move from civilian—dual purpose, to civilian to military purposes. And I know my time is up, 

but I just want to reflect on something that my colleague Senator 

Coburn said earlier on. The fact is that if the Iranians get a nuclear weapon, the Saudis are going to buy one. The Egyptians are 

going to buy one. And we are going to live in a world in which I 

am not going to sleep well at night because we will have lost all 

ability to contain proliferation in very unstable areas. 

And so it would just appear to me that those efforts, if we are 

really looking to put pressure on Iran economically and a country 

that we believe is susceptible to that pressure, then we need to 

have a little more support from our ‘‘allies,’’ including the Russians, 

and the idea of us moving forward on a Russian-U.S. civilian civil 

nuclear arrangement I think is counterproductive in light of the 

Russian relationship and trade and other things that they are 

doing with Iran. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think the way we have looked at it, actually this agreement creates more leverage for us to continue to put 

pressure on Russia to do it the right way. We have the Bush-Putin 

initiative where they talk about doing broader civil nuclear cooperation around the world, but with these nonproliferation requirements and fencing around it. The creation of this enrichment 

center in Russia would allow for less of the proliferation of that 

kind of technology. It keeps me up at night as well to worry about 

Saudi Arabia and Egypt and others starting to go down the nuclear 

weapons path. 

So what we are trying to do is create a different way of approaching this so that Iran really is isolated as going down the wrong 

path and that countries around the world instead are looking at a 

different way to get the benefits of nuclear energy. A light water 

reactor obviously still can be abused, but much less. The problem 

with a lot of the enrichment and reprocessing capability that we 

worry about is once you develop that knowledge, you can take it 

26 

underground and take it out of the public eye, and our ability from 

the intelligence standpoint to detect that activity is much more difficult when you are talking about some of these other paths to nuclear energy. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. I want to talk with you just a little bit about 

who calls the shots in Iran. I think I understand for the most part 

how government works in this country, although every now and 

then I get illuminated that I did not have it quite figured out. But 

they have recently had parliamentary elections over there, but instead of having a multi-party system, if I use an analogy, it is like 

we permitted elections for the Congress here and only one party 

could run candidates, but only the extreme wing of that one party 

could run candidates and nobody else could. And in spite of that 

kind of situation, they have gone through where a lot of people who 

used to be members of parliament are not allowed to run, and folks 

who would like to run were not allowed to run unless you happened to be at one extreme end of the spectrum in their political 

thinking. Those folks got to run and some of them got elected, but 

apparently they are having a run-off here in the next week or two. 

What is going on? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, the short answer of who is in 

charge, it is the supreme commander more than the president. In 

terms of the parliamentary elections, yes, parliamentary run-offs 

are tomorrow, in fact, for the seats that have not yet been decided. 

Iran went to extraordinary lengths this year in manipulating those 

parliamentary elections. Even by Iranian standards, they went to 

extraordinary lengths in disqualifying a record number of candidates, in manipulating the information that was available to voters. They claimed that there was a 65-percent turnout of vote. We 

estimate it was more like 50 percent, and those people probably 

turned out in large part because they wanted to make sure that 

their voter registration card was stamped because that stamp is 

important for university registration, for the equivalent of food 

stamps, things like that. 

But basically the system went to extraordinary lengths to manipulate the parliamentary election to produce the result that you 

said, which is that the parliament is in control of the extremist 

wing of one party there. 

One wonders why they had to go to that—the analysis that is interesting is why did they go to that extreme this year. Is there a 

sense of desperation? Is there something happening inside that we 

need to know, that we need to be evaluating? We do not have a diplomatic embassy in Tehran for all the reasons we know, so we do 

not have some of the normal diplomatic tools to look at Iranian society. So the analysis is still out, and we will see how these runoffs go. 

But I think you have seen a shift in who runs the country away 

from the sort of traditional clerics who ran it with the onslaught 

of the revolution 30 years ago to much more of the sort of Revolutionary Guard type force. There are more and more people who are 

coming out of the Iran Revolutionary Guard in positions of influences. This is not a healthy development. This is not a good development. The Revolutionary Guards are not just some rogue crimiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Oct 21, 2008 Jkt 042750 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42750.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
27 

nal element that is carrying out terrorism through the Qods Force 

outside of Iran. They are part of the system inside. The IRGC is 

doing economic projects. They are controlling the black market. 

They are expanding the Tehran metro. They are mentioned in the 

Constitution of the Islamic Republic. But the Revolutionary Guard 

and the Qods Force as one of the five pillars of that Revolutionary 

Guard seem to be playing an ever more prominent role in reporting 

directly to the supreme commander. 

Senator CARPER. Do we have a pipeline to the supreme commander, direct or indirect? 

Mr. FELTMAN. No. Our channel, our official channel to the Iranians is via the Swiss. We have used the Swiss for almost 30 years 

now to convey information. Much of what we use the Swiss for is 

consular related. There are many American citizens who are either 

living in Iran or have connections with Iran. And so we use the 

Swiss for our official communications. 

On the subject, though, of talks and of communication, I think 

it is worth looking at the example of where we do have an official 

means of communication, and that is Iraq. There are trilateral 

talks in Iraq that we are doing at the request of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government asked us to go into these talks. We 

made the decision to say yes in order to help support the Iraqi Government. So there is a history of direct communication with the 

Iranians via these trilateral talks. There have been three sessions 

since April of last year—two chaired at the ambassador level, one 

was chaired on our side by the political military counselor in Baghdad, Ambassador Marie Ries. And, frankly, I think that it was 

clear from the testimony given by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker a few weeks ago up here that it has not been a real 

encouraging example of the sort of talk that many people would 

like to see us engage in, because we have had these three things, 

and the Iranians at the same time have continued to supply, fund 

the special groups that are basically killing our troops, killing our 

diplomats, firing into the international zone, and trying to destabilize the Iraqi Government. 

So the one area where we do have direct talks with the Iranians, 

which is the tripartite talks in Baghdad, has not been an encouraging example. 

Senator CARPER. All right. In the testimony of one of our other 

witnesses, they talked about one of the things that the mullahs 

fear is the economic destabilization, the deterioration of the economy, where people’s earning power, standard of living continues to 

deteriorate. Rather than Ahmadinejad being able to deliver on his 

campaign promises, actually things are getting worse, not better, 

and one of the other witnesses says that is something that they 

fear. 

How do we make that even worse for them? Not that we have 

it in for the Iranian people. I have a lot of affection for them, and 

I think if they were actually able to vote for their parliament and 

vote for their leaders, we would probably have a pretty good relationship with those folks. But how do we ratchet up the economic 

pressure? And one of the ways, it seems to me, to ratchet up the 

economic pressure is it is not enough for us to put in place our unilateral sanctions, which we have done and which we are doing; it 

28 

is not enough for us to work with the British, Germans, French, 

and others, and hopefully the Russians and the Chinese. But there 

are too many leaks in the sanction, there is too much give in it, 

and we have to be able to make it tighter if we are going to have 

any success here. 

One of the thoughts that comes to mind for me is as much as 

I admire what Secretary Rice has said, ‘‘Stop enriching your uranium, your fissile materials, we will meet you anywhere, anytime, 

talk about anything.’’ That is a pretty generous offer. It has not 

worked, and in the meantime, the Iranians are doing more bad 

stuff than they were before. 

If we were to say we will meet you anytime, anywhere to talk 

about anything without preconditions, how does that strengthen 

our ability to go out and get the Russians to stand shoulder to 

shoulder, to get the Chinese to stand shoulder to shoulder with us, 

and some of these other countries that are going around our back 

and continuing to have activities with the Iranians that tend to 

take away the economic pressure that the mullahs apparently fear? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think we made the same judgment, that 

is the fear. You saw the gas rationing and sort of the impact it had 

in terms of certainly the uprising by people. We are looking to figure out ways to obviously have these kind of economic impacts. 

One of the practical reasons why talking without them stopping 

enrichment and reprocessing is important is if that activity continues while we are doing the talking, if you look at the North 

Korea example, for example, it was about 4 years before we got 

them to shut Yongbyon. So 4 years of talking and 4 years of developing enrichment and reprocessing technology, it is pretty clear 

that they could potentially, according to the NIE, have the capability and master that enrichment and reprocessing—— 

Senator CARPER. That is a good point, but let me just interrupt 

you. Whether it is 4 weeks or 4 months, certainly 4 years is unacceptable. But something has to happen during that period of time 

during which those open negotiations are being offered, the invitation for those open negotiations are being extended, and that is, the 

other countries that are not supporting the efforts of a number of 

us in clamping down economically on the Iranians. That has to kick 

in on a much higher level than is currently existing, and that has 

to happen a lot sooner than 4 years from now. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, that was going to be my next point. If you 

look at how internationally they tend to react in terms of sanctions, 

when there seems to be some engagement, some softening, the ability to get countries to actually impose those sanctions will only diminish. We see that in the case of North Korea. We have seen that 

in other examples. 

So this notion that somehow if we started talking we would be 

able to increase the pressure that other countries would put on, I 

just do not think that is the way things tend to operate. And so, 

again, part of the practical reason for this condition is that we need 

that activity to stop so that we can talk and deal with these issues 

in as long or as short a time as we need without Iran basically 

using that process to, in fact, develop their capability. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. Dr. Coburn. 

29 

1The study referred to appears in the Appendix on page 164. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. I would like unanimous consent to 

put the NSC 2006 report on Radio Farda and Voice of America in 

the record.1

Senator CARPER. Without objection. 

[The information follows:]??? WAITING FOR COPY 

Senator COBURN. And with all deference to my good friend and 

Chairman, I do not want us to have propaganda either. I want us 

to have the truth. So I will spend one second on this and get off 

it, the BBG. 

I would like for you to answer in written form why the American 

people shouldn’t have transcribed to them what is being broadcast 

into Iran, both from Radio Farda and Voice of America, why the 

American people shouldn’t know what we are saying, and as a 

check. Transparency creates accountability, and so tell me why we 

should not do that. And I will stop with that. 

We are having some hearings today in other aspects of the Senate on the nuclear facility in Syria, and there is no question that 

there was involvement from a couple of countries on that. One was 

Iran and one was Korea. What do we know about Iran’s involvement in that facility that you can speak about at this hearing? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Senator, I think I will have to defer to the experts to do it in these other briefings, and they will be providing 

some of that information through all the committees. 

I do not think you will find that there is an Iranian angle, except 

to the degree it really highlights the destabilizing influence of these 

covert activities, nuclear activities, and the importance of really 

rallying international support to put the pressure on Iran to stop 

its ability, because as I said, once they develop this enrichment and 

reprocessing technology, unlike the plutonium-based example you 

will be hearing about, the enrichment and reprocessing effort can 

quickly go underground and be almost undetectable. 

Senator COBURN. But does it say anything about proliferation? 

We have been spending all this time talking with North Korea, and 

at the same time they are building a nuclear facility in Syria, and 

we are going to a point where we have limited verification. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I think it really speaks to the significant challenges. Obviously, we have been very cautious and promising good 

results from North Korea given the record and what we saw in the 

1990s and their ability to talk to us and do one thing, and then 

obviously quietly be also engaged in an enrichment and reprocessing program. 

One of the key elements that we are talking about now in the 

next phase is verification, and having North Korea come clean and 

actually open up, declare its facilities and open them up will be a 

key challenge of that next process. I do not want to pretend that 

I would guarantee that North Korea is being completely honest 

with us, because I think their record says otherwise. 

Senator COBURN. Do we have any knowledge that during all this 

discussion that this was initiated in Syria at the same time they 

were negotiating with us about nonproliferation? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I think we will just have to defer to the other 

briefings for now. 

30 

Senator COBURN. OK. I want to go back a little bit where Senator Coleman was, in terms of the proliferation to Iran, and in 

terms of nuclear material. If we look the other way with Russia on 

this one aspect, does it not send the wrong signal to other countries 

that might be helping Iran proliferate? In other words, basically 

they are sending the material in there, but they are on our team. 

We are saying, OK, there are no consequences to that that we can 

actually do something about right now. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, one of the things, their activities are allowable under the U.N. Security Council resolutions. What is not 

allowable is cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing and the 

heavy water reactor. And so, obviously, we would prefer no cooperation with Iran, but at the same time, it can be a counter example of civil nuclear, light water reactor versus these real concerning proliferation—— 

Senator COBURN. So does the United Nations sanctions trump 

U.S. law? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Well, I think it—— 

Senator COBURN. It is not allowable under U.S. law now to promote and ship enriched uranium to Iran. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Are you talking about the fuel for the—— 

Senator COBURN. Yes. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. But that is low-enriched uranium versus highly 

enriched. 

Senator COBURN. I understand, but they are building the capability to build highly enriched. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. That is through the enrichment and reprocessing, which are separate, obviously, nuclear pathways. 

Senator COBURN. So there is no question it is difficult to bring 

everybody together with a common purpose. What is your hope, you 

and Ambassador Feltman, as you look at where we are today and 

where we are going, what is your hope 2 years from now, a year 

and a half from now, what do you see in terms of the sanctions, 

the ongoing process? Where do you think we are going to be? 

Ms. MCNERNEY. I guess I would look at a couple places. I would 

hope that we could continue to build increasing support within Europe, within Asia, within the Gulf countries and other Middle East 

countries to continue to really apply these resolutions not only 

strictly, but also the spirit of the resolutions, which is to hold Iran 

accountable for violating its Security Council obligations. The 

other, obviously, in terms of Iran, we hope that they will realize 

that this is a path that is going to continue. The isolation will only 

increase. And we need to find a way to start talking about this 

under a baseline that not only the United States but the entire 

international community has laid out for them, which is to stop enrichment and reprocessing activities. 

And with that, obviously, then you can have a fullsome conversation because you do not have these nuclear activities continue. But, 

I think Ambassador Feltman may talk about this a little more, but 

obviously that is just one aspect. They are shipping arms to the 

Taliban, to Iraqi insurgents. They are a destabilizing influence 

through Hamas and other organizations. Again, all of that is important to a broader dialogue. 

Senator COBURN. Ambassador Feltman. 

31 

Mr. FELTMAN. I will not touch on the nuclear side because I will 

let Ms. McNearney’s words stand for themselves. But our agenda 

with Iran is enormous. We want Iran to realize it is unacceptable 

to be killing our troops, our diplomats—and destabilizing Iraq. We 

want Iran to realize that they must stop funding Hezbollah, 

Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. They must stop shipping 

arms to the Taliban. The agenda is huge. And we are working unilaterally and multilaterally to try to change Iran’s behavior across 

the board, not simply on the nuclear file. The nuclear file is the 

trigger for the possibility of direct talks on these things, following 

up on Secretary Rice’s initiative from 2 years ago. But it is certainly not the only issue and it is not the only important issue. 

Iraq is an interesting venue to watch right now because there are 

some signs that perhaps the Shia Iraqis are disgusted with what 

Iran has done in funding Shia militias in Iraq. This is almost a 

parallel to the fact that the Sunnis are disgusted to see the Sunni 

militia activity. And Iran must be noticing that there was a revulsion in Iraq against what the Iranians were doing in terms of providing arms. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask perhaps a little philosophical question. One of the 

things that frustrates—not frustrates me, but I listened to some of 

the discussion about conversation with Iran, and I do believe that 

we need to ramp up and be more aggressive. But my concern is 

that there is almost a sense that every—let me step back. We often 

get criticized for some of our actions, for instance, in the Middle 

East by saying we do not understand the culture, we do not understand tribal culture, we do not understand what is going on, and 

we do not understand the forces that kind of hold things together 

in the Middle East. And at the same time, we have folks who are 

saying, if we just sat down and had a conversation, did not have 

any preconditions, and just walked in there, that somehow we 

could make this better. And to me, I think there is a conflict there. 

The fact is that not everyone perceives with Western thought that 

flowed from the Enlightenment, Rousseau, to where we are today, 

and analyzes things the same way. 

I would suggest from my certainly more limited knowledge than 

the witnesses and others, but strength is something that is measured in the Middle East. And weakness has great consequences; 

perception of weakness has consequences. I am going to say this: 

President Carter’s conversation with Hamas; I am shocked by it. I 

think Hamas is a terrorist force, committed to the destruction of 

Israel, has killed Americans. And I think it sends a signal, one that 

gives legitimacy and kind of sends almost a sense of weakness that 

I think we pay a price for. 

Mr. Ambassador, you have said a number of times, it’s unacceptable to keep killing our troops. Iran is killing our troops. They are 

supplying weaponry. They are killing American soldiers. If we were 

to simply walk in and say we are going to sit down and without 

any preconditions, including a precondition that says stop killing 

our soldiers, if you want to expand economic opportunity, if we 

want to work out a resolution to this very complex issue of the 

32 

nuclearization with understanding the consequences of failure to 

resolve it, stop killing our soldiers, stop having Qods Force supply 

advanced weaponry to terrorists, and by the way, maybe while you 

are at it, put a little hold on Hezbollah and sending rockets into 

Sderot and maybe step back a little bit on Hamas and have a little 

stability in the Palestinian areas. 

President Abbas is in town today. He is being undermined by 

Hamas. He is being undermined by Iran. And so Iran is—we actually have this unique opportunity in the Middle East now that you 

have many other Arab nations looking at Iran as the enemy. Not 

the Jews, not Israel, not the United States, but Iran. 

If we were simply to walk forward—the question the Chairman 

raised earlier—into a discussion without precondition, the most significant being stop killing our troops, would that be perceived by 

the Saudis, the Egyptians, and others as a lack of strength? And 

would that have the potential to undermine some of the influence 

and stability that we are seeking in the region? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Senator, you addressed this in a sort of philosophical way, and I will say that when we hear the discussions 

about talking to Iran, it is at one level a philosophical issue. Some 

say that we should be talking without preconditions, we should 

simply try it, what do we have to lose? Others will say, my gosh, 

the conditions you put on suspension of enrichment and proliferation-sensitive activities is not sufficient given everything else that 

is going on, we need to have more conditions, not less conditions. 

So it is a philosophical question. 

But if there is ever a decision to talk to the Iranians, even if the 

Iranians would meet the Secretary’s requirement, there needs to be 

a serious conversation with the Gulf Arabs and other allies so that 

they understand what it is that we are doing. You mentioned this 

in your opening remarks, and I could not agree more. Again, having served in Lebanon for 31⁄2 years, I can guess how the Lebanese 

would see it perhaps better than I can guess how the Gulf Arabs 

would see it. But they would want to understand what it is we are 

doing, why we are doing it, and that we are doing it from a position 

of strength, that we are not doing it from a position of weakness. 

If we are talking philosophically, I have to ask myself just based 

on my limited knowledge of what happens in Iran, do the Iranians 

really want to talk to us at the leadership level? Because if they 

did want to talk to us, I would think that they would be sending 

us different signals that would be unmistakable. Regarding the tripartite talks in Baghdad that I mentioned earlier, if they wanted 

us to see that talking actually work, you would think that they 

would stop shipping arms, and stop funding the Shia militias that 

are attacking us in Iraq. 

You are probably aware of the American citizen that disappeared 

on Kish Island more than a year ago, in March of last year. I met 

with his wife and other family members on March 6, about the 1- 

year anniversary of his disappearance. We have sent numerous 

notes via the Swiss, numerous messages about help investigate, 

and help find what happened to this guy in Iran. We do not find 

the answers or the lack of answers to be credible from Iran. There 

are signals they could be sending us if, in fact, they were interested 

33 

in talking to us. I am expressing my personal view from looking at 

the information. 

Our policy is the Secretary’s offer remains valid. If they suspend 

enrichment and proliferation-sensitive activities—which is an international obligation. It is not simply a U.S. condition; it is an international obligation on Iran—we are willing to talk. But if we get 

to that point, I agree with you 100 percent, we need to have a serious talk with our Gulf partners and others, and we need to be talking from a position of strength. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. This has been illuminating, and I much appreciate it. We appreciate your being here today, the service you have 

provided for our country, and your responses to our questions. 

There may be some follow-up questions that we will ask for the 

record, and others that are not here, and we would appreciate your 

prompt response to those questions. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. 

Now we welcome the second panel. I am going to go ahead and 

ask our panelists to take their seats, and I am going to begin the 

introduction of each of them while they do that. 

Ambassador Dennis Ross is Washington Institute’s Counselor 

and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow. Ambassador Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process. He was the U.S. point man on the peace process in both the 

Administration of George Herbert Walker Bush and President Clinton, where he was awarded the highest State Department honor. 

He was instrumental in helping the Israelis and Palestinians reach 

the 1995 Interim Agreement, brokered the 1997 Hebron Accord 

successfully, and participated in the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace 

Treaty. 

Stephen Rademaker joined Barbour Griffith and Rogers. Is that 

Haley Barbour, Governor Barbour? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. He was one of the founders. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Rademaker joined Barbour Griffith and 

Rogers in January 2007. He previously served, I understand, as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and the 

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation where he directed nonproliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea. He 

also recently served as policy director for National Security Affairs 

and senior counsel for our colleague, former Senator Bill Frist. And 

rumor has it you may have spent some time in Delaware. Did you 

grow up in Delaware? Where did you go to high school? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Newark High School. 

Senator CARPER. Well, welcome. We are glad that you are here. 

It is not every day we have a Yellowjacket to come by and share 

some thoughts with us. We are glad that you have come here. 

Thank you for joining us. 

Dr. Graham Allison is Director of the Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, where he also served as dean. Dr. Allison 

previously served as Special Adviser to the Secretary of Defense 

under President Reagan and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

34 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ross appears in the Appendix on page 90. 

Policy and Plans under President Clinton. He has been a member 

of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Policy Board for Secretaries 

Weinberger, Carlucci, Cheney, Aspin, Perry, and Cohen. His 1971 

book, which I understand was your first, ‘‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,’’ ranks among the best sellers in 

political science in the 20 Century. I do not know what you are 

going to do for an encore, but that is pretty impressive. 

Dr. Jim Walsh, a research associate at Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology, where my son is a sophomore in mechanical engineering, so this is a home game for you. Dr. Walsh previously 

served as Director of the Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer 

Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and he 

chaired Harvard’s International Group on Radiological Terrorism. 

Dr. Walsh has traveled to Iran twice in the past 6 months for discussions with Iranian officials and analysts and will return to Iran 

in June. He also participates in three Track 2 projects that bring 

together former U.S. officials and experts with current and former 

Iranian officials. 

Senator Collins has joined us. Senator Collins, welcome. We are 

delighted that you are here. Actually this is officially our second 

panel, but actually it is number three. We welcomed and led off 

with Senators Specter and Feinstein. We are just delighted with 

the people that are here. This is a great panel as well. Would you 

like to make any brief statements before we go to the panel? 

Senator COLLINS. No, Mr. Chairman. I did have a very busy 

schedule today, including a classified briefing, which is why I am 

late. But I actually think I have timed my arrival perfectly because 

this panel has the expertise that I really want to hear, and I commend you for holding this hearing on such an important topic. 

Senator CARPER. We are delighted that you are here. Thank you 

so much for joining us today. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. To our panel, I normally do not stick real closely to the clock. We are going to start voting at 12:15. We have a 

couple of votes in sequence. We want to get as much from you and 

back and forth in the Q&As, so I am going to ask you to try to stick 

fairly close to 5 minutes, and if you get much over it, I will tap the 

gavel. 

Our friend, Mr. Ross, welcome. We are delighted you are here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DENNIS ROSS,1 COUNSELOR AND ZIEGLER DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted testimony 

for the record. What I am going to do is just offer a number of observations, in part based on the testimony, but also based on what 

I heard you say earlier. And, actually, I want to start off with a 

question that Dr. Coburn asked the last two panelists. 

You asked them what is it that they hope for in the next year 

or two, and I have to say, as someone who has been in administrations and had to testify in the past, oftentimes when you are up 

here you have to say what the administration line is. Obviously, we 

35 

are free of that. And I can say given where we are, given the path 

we are on right now, next year Iran is going to be a nuclear power. 

The path we are on right now is one that is going to put them 

there. 

Certainly, it is quite possible that President Ahmadinejad was 

exaggerating in terms of where they are in terms of being able to 

install the 6,000 new IR–2 centrifuges which are five times as efficient as the 3,300 that are already there. But the fact is, they are 

going to be in a position where they can begin to stockpile fissionable material, and the problem with what we heard from the Administration witnesses is there is a mismatch between the character of the pressure that they are applying and the pace of the 

Iranian activities. So what we have to do is ask ourselves the question: Where are we going to be and how can we change the situation that unquestionably is about to unfold? 

There are some people who look at the path that we are on right 

now, and they say, you know what? It is impossible to stop the Iranians. They are going to become not just a nuclear power but a nuclear weapons state. And given that reality, the only thing we can 

do is let’s focus on containment, let’s focus on deterrence, and let’s 

just live with it. There are others who say, well, the problem is you 

have a regime that has messianic elements in it, and you heard 

Jeff Feltman say that the Revolutionary Guard is increasingly important in terms of the overall control in the system. True, they answer to the Supreme Leader, but the fact is they are very heavily 

guided by a spirit that they have to spread the revolution. And, by 

the way, they are the ones who control the nuclear program. 

So others say, well, this is not a group that can be deterred, and 

even if it is possible to prevent them from actually carrying out direct attacks and Iran with nuclear weapons is going to cast such 

a shadow over the region, it is going to produce the Saudis and others going nuclear. It will be the end of the NPT. It will embolden 

Hamas. It will embolden Hezbollah. It will change the landscape in 

the region. We really cannot afford it. So not only can we not live 

with it, we need to use military force against them—to forestall it. 

Those are two poles in the discussion. One basically says you can 

live with it. The other says you cannot. And I would say that if 

each of those are going to produce outcomes that are not particularly acceptable, we ought to look for a third way. And what I am 

going to try to do here is suggest to you that there may be a set 

of diplomatic options that are worth pursuing as a third way. And 

even if they do not succeed, they put you in a better position to 

pursue one of those two other approaches more effectively than you 

might otherwise. 

So let me start with what I will describe as a statecraft approach. Having written a book on statecraft, necessarily I tend to 

talk about things through that lens. 

One critical element of statecraft is leverage, and the key here 

is recognizing that the Iranians actually do have vulnerabilities. It 

is not wrong to try and put pressure on the Iranians. What is 

wrong is that we are not putting on pressure that is going to be 

effective. They do have vulnerabilities that are economic and quite 

pronounced, whether it is the fact that they have very high inflation right now, very high unemployment. The price of oil, in fact, 

36 

has not changed their economic vulnerabilities, although obviously 

it helps them to some extent. The mullahs do want to preserve 

their power and their privilege. They do need to be able to buy off 

their publics, and that is why they use the revenues they generate 

from their oil exports. 

The fact is it is hard for them to continue to produce what they 

are doing in the oil area and export what they have been exporting 

at a time when their own internal consumption is rising. Can we 

squeeze them more effectively through economic means? Yes, I 

think we can, but only if, in fact, we come up with different ways 

to do so. 

I am not going to go through all this. Let me just sort of encapsulate the options in the following fashion: 

Option No. 1, again, focused on their vulnerabilities, is tighten 

the noose. Now, that could be a good approach if you can persuade 

others to join with you. It is clear that the path we are on right 

now is not getting others to do as much as they would need to to 

be able to affect the Iranians. And I would also say if you are focused only on the tighten the noose option, the problem is going to 

be the Iranians may also feel this is an effort to not just humiliate 

them but to defeat them; and if we are about regime change, from 

their standpoint better not to give in because the consequences are 

too high. Look at some of the speeches that both Ahmadinejad and 

the Supreme Leader have made, and you will find that they focus 

heavily on, using their language, if we concede to the arrogant powers, they will never stop. 

Option No. 2 would be some of what we have heard today, which 

is engage the Iranians without any conditions. They have great 

suspicions. They have too much leverage. They still have cash to 

insulate them, at least for the time being. And the fact is unless 

you go in an unconditioned way to them, you cannot get anywhere, 

and put everything on the table. Everything. In a sense, a comprehensive approach where what you put on the table is responding to some of their desires, which are they want regime recognition. They want to know that they have a place in the region that 

is accepted. They want the economic boycotts to end. They want us 

to unfreeze the assets we have held since the time of the revolution. They want to be able to have civil nuclear power. That is 

what they want. But for them to get that, then the counterpoint 

would be, well, you want to be accepted in the region, you want us 

to accept the regime as well. Well, you cannot be engaged in terror. 

You cannot be supporting Hamas and Hezbollah. You cannot be opposing the idea of peace. You cannot be declaring that Israel is not 

only illegitimate but is going to collapse imminently. And if you 

want civil nuclear power, then there has to be a kind of intrusiveness in terms of inspections to ensure you do not have a covert program and you do not have a breakout capability. In other words, 

a comprehensive approach puts everything they want on the table, 

but also everything we require in return. 

The problem I have with this option, I will tell you, is that I am 

a veteran of negotiating in the Middle East. I know something 

about the mind-sets. Senator Coleman, you raised the issue of sort 

of culture and mind-set when it comes to negotiations. I can tell 

you, in my experience, what I have found with everybody I negoVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:43 Oct 21, 2008 Jkt 042750 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42750.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
37 

tiate with in the area is when they were strong, they did not feel 

the need to compromise; when they were weak, they felt they could 

not afford to compromise. So the key here is in the Iranian case, 

if you concede up front and there are no conditions and you are just 

going to engage them, my guess is that they are going to think, 

OK, we have now conceded to the fact that we are going to accept 

them being a nuclear weapons state. Whatever we say, the negotiations are a process, but eventually we will simply give in. 

So that leads me to a third option, and the third option is what 

I would call engage the Iranians without conditions but with pressure. They must not think that, in fact, we have already surrendered when we go to the table. And so I would, in effect, say marry 

option 1 and 2. Marry and tighten the noose with the engagement. 

Now, one of the issues that I think one of you raised was—the 

idea of talking, if we talk that will make it easier for others to do 

more in the sanctions area, and I think that one of the panelists 

before was saying, look, when we do that, the fact is others just go 

ahead and they think they really do not have to apply sanctions. 

I would actually suggest a somewhat different approach. 

I would say our readiness to talk should be, in effect, with others 

conditioned on them doing more. In other words, rather than focusing on the conditionality vis-a-vis the Iranians, you focus on the 

conditionality vis-a-vis others. 

With the Europeans, say to them, you know what? You want us 

to go to the table. You think there is a deal there. We might even 

be prepared to do that. We might even be prepared to put a comprehensive proposal on the table along with you that goes beyond 

what has been put on the table so far. But the price is you have 

to cut the economic lifeline before we go so the Iranians know it. 

Cutting the economic lifeline means no more credit guarantees to 

your companies doing business there. You do not do any commerce, 

you do not do business with any of the Iranian banks. 

With the Chinese, who frequently fill in whenever the Europeans 

cut back, we focus on, yes, we are willing to talk, but we have to 

do more than that. 

The Saudis have enormous financial clout, and if the Chinese 

had to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia, they would choose 

Saudi Arabia. Right now, just to put it in some perspective, the 

Saudis and the Chinese right now are—I will take one more 

minute? Thirty seconds? 

Senator CARPER. Thirty seconds. 

Mr. ROSS. All right. Thirty seconds. Just to put it in perspective 

how you could use Saudi leverage if, in fact, you are going to have 

a comprehensive approach where you are trying to build the pressures even as you are prepared to talk, the Saudis right now are 

filling the Chinese strategic petroleum reserve with Saudi oil. The 

Chinese are investing enormously in the petrochemical industry in 

Saudi Arabia. And, jointly, they are developing and investing in refineries around the world. So if it is a choice between Saudi Arabia 

and Iran, China, given their mercantile mind-set, they are going to 

choose Saudi Arabia. We have to have a strategy with the Saudis 

that makes them more likely to take these steps. They are not 

doing it right now. 

38 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker appears in the Appendix on page 121. 

So let me just wrap up by saying you do not want to leave yourself with two unacceptable outcomes. Try a diplomatic approach. 

But if you are going to try that diplomatic approach, from my 

standpoint talking makes sense, but you have got to have the talking take place in a context in which the Iranians do not think they 

have already won and that they are under pressure. You concentrate the Iranian mind even as you show them a pathway that 

says, all right, there is a way out for you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much for an excellent statement. Thank you. 

Mr. Rademaker, welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER,1 SENIOR COUNSEL, 

BARBOUR GRIFFITH AND ROGERS, LLC 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me say to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Dr. Coburn and 

Senator Coleman, I was very interested in your opening statements, and I thought all of you did an excellent job identifying the 

seriousness and intractability of the problem that we face with 

Iran. And, Mr. Chairman, I think I agree with your observation 

that the basic challenge before us is identifying the least bad approach among the approaches that we have available. 

Broadly speaking, there are three alternatives before our country 

on Iran. One is to essentially accept that we are not going to stop 

Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability and just plan for 

that eventuality. The second is to decide that that is unacceptable 

and to use military force to prevent that eventuality from coming 

to pass. And the third is to put together some sort of diplomatic 

approach to the problem that successfully keeps the Iranian nuclear threat under control, that persuades the Iranians to change 

their current course. And obviously, among those three options, 

there is no question that a diplomatic solution that persuaded Iran 

to change course would be far and away the best. 

It is in that context that in my prepared remarks I spend a considerable amount of time explaining why the National Intelligence 

Estimate that came out last December was such a damaging development for not just U.S. foreign policy and not just Bush Administration foreign policy, but the foreign policy of the entire international community, particularly our European allies. And I was 

gratified to see that Ambassador Ross in his prepared remarks appears to agree fully with my assessment of the NIE and its implications, and the fundamental problem with the NIE. 

The fundamental problem is not the intelligence conclusions. The 

fundamental problem is the way that those conclusions were expressed. They were expressed in a way that lent them to being misunderstood, misinterpreted, and thereby undercut the prospect that 

the diplomatic efforts that we and our allies have been undertaking 

can succeed. And that is a most unfortunate development because 

to the degree the prospects for successful diplomacy recede, the 

prospects that we will have to go with one of the other alternatives—either accepting the Iranian nuclear weapons program or 

39 

using military force—the prospects of one of those two alternatives 

having to be embraced increases. 

One of the observations that I make in my prepared remarks and 

that I will repeat here is that with regard to the phrasing of the 

National Intelligence Estimate, I simply do not know which is 

worse: That the authors of that estimate did not appreciate the implications for the international diplomacy of the way they expressed their conclusions, or that they fully appreciated those implications and were indifferent to them. I do not know which is 

worse, but I think it is a question that maybe someone in the U.S. 

Congress ought to start asking. 

Now, I think one of the principal issues that is on the mind of 

everyone and has figured prominently in the hearing so far today 

is the question of whether we should drop the existing precondition 

to direct U.S. negotiation with Iran about the nuclear issue and engage the Iranians directly. I make two observations about that notion in my testimony. 

The first is that if we are going to engage directly with Iran, we 

want our engagement to be successful. We want to be able to reach 

a negotiated outcome that is acceptable to us. In order to do that, 

we have to come into the negotiations from a position of strength. 

The NIE guarantees that, as of today, we are in a position of considerable weakness. The Iranians perceive us as weak. They perceive U.S. policy as collapsing. And I think to drop the existing precondition, the precondition that has been in effect for many years, 

will be seen by the Iranians as a further U.S. concession, further 

evidence that U.S. policy, the demands that the United States has 

been making up until now, are falling by the wayside and that they 

are winning. 

In other words, to engage successfully diplomatically, I think we 

have to figure out a way to overcome the problems that were created for us by the NIE and engage from a position of strength. 

Ambassador Ross in his prepared statement outlines such an approach. I think he agrees with what I am saying about needing to 

negotiate from a position of strength. He outlines a way that we 

could try to do so. I think it is an interesting approach to try and 

work with Europeans in advance of negotiations. 

I think I read into his testimony, though, that should such an effort to get the Europeans to join with us in imposing sanctions up 

front—strengthening sanctions up front—fail, should they not be 

prepared to agree to do that, I think he would agree with me that 

then it would not be ripe to drop the existing precondition. I do not 

want to put those words in his mouth, but—— 

Senator CARPER. Let the record show that Ambassador Ross was 

nodding his head yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The second point I make about direct negotiations with the Iranians is we need to figure out what outcome we 

are prepared to accept. Here I think the critical question is: Are we 

prepared to accept enrichment in Iran or not? U.S. policy up until 

now and the policy of our allies and the policy of the U.N. Security 

Council as reflected in four binding resolutions is there should not 

be enrichment in Iran. 

Dr. Walsh in his prepared testimony says that is unrealistic, that 

we are not going to achieve that, and so we should stop demanding 

40 

that and, in fact, we should develop a fallback proposal that we 

think the Iranians would accept. 

I am not prepared personally to agree that the U.N. Security 

Council has it wrong and our allies have it wrong and we have it 

wrong and we have to give the Iranians—we have to move in the 

Iranian direction and allow them to enrich in Iran. I think that 

would be a dangerous development because, yes, there might be enhanced safeguards, enhanced inspections, enhanced verification, 

but I think we would never have confidence with the current regime that if enrichment was taking place in Iran at declared locations that were under international supervision, that there was not 

a parallel covert program somewhere using some of the same 

equipment, the same technology, and engaging in enrichment, producing fissile material, without our being aware of it. I do not have 

the same high level of confidence in the ability of international 

verification mechanisms to detect covert enrichment at undeclared 

sites that Dr. Walsh has. 

Let me make one final observation and then I will finish. Dr. 

Walsh also says as part of his suggestion that we need to accept 

enrichment in Iran that what we should do is talk to the Iranians, 

propose to the Iranians that they multilateralize or multinationalize the enrichment facility in Iran, take the Natanz facility and 

bring in foreign partners. As a former diplomat, I do not think I 

would have a whole lot of trouble selling that idea to the Iranians. 

I think it is an idea that would sell itself. I would go to the Iranians and say, boy, do I have a deal for you. You are under international sanctions. You cannot get the technology you need. You 

are a pariah because of what you are doing. Here is the bargain: 

We will help you raise capital. We will bring in foreign investors. 

They will invest in your plant. They will bring in expert managers 

to help you run it. They will bring in foreign technology to overcome the technical problems you have been having. And best of all, 

you will get international legitimacy. Your nuclear program will no 

longer be an outlaw nuclear program. All you have to do is agree 

to some enhanced inspections and some foreign involvement in 

your program, and the future changes. 

I think the Iranians would be foolish to reject such an offer. 

Would we be foolish to offer it? 

Senator CARPER. I am going to ask you to wrap it up. But go 

ahead, finish your thought. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. President Bush in 2005 proposed that there be 

a global ban on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology 

to any country that does not currently have it. He proposed that 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group adopt that as a policy. The NSG has 

not yet done that, but pending that, since 2005, the G–8 members 

have every year agreed that they will not transfer enrichment and 

reprocessing technology to any country that does not have it. 

I do not understand how, if we are going to stand up a multinational enrichment facility in Iran, we do not undermine this notion that there should not be transfers of that kind of technology 

to any country that does not have it, because if it is a multinational 

facility the foreign partners are going to fully expect to be able to 

bring in the technology for the project to succeed. And once Iran 

41 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Allison appears in the Appendix on page 127. 

gets it, how can you justify denying that same sort of capability to 

others? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Rademaker, thank you very much. 

And, Dr. Allison, I think he set you up pretty well here to come 

right in and say your piece. But you are recognized. Your full statement will be made part of the record. 

TESTIMONY OF GRAHAM ALLISON,1 DIRECTOR, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND 

DOUGLAS DILLON PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD 

UNIVERSITY’S JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 

Mr. ALLISON. Thank you very much for your leadership in drilling down on what is certainly the central challenge to American 

national security going forward over the next several years. And I 

think you introduced the conversation in just the right terms, recognizing that the choices at this point are between very bad and 

horrible. Those are the alternatives. There are no good choices. 

I also agree very much with Dr. Coburn’s earlier proposition that 

the challenge that Iran poses is not simply a challenge in itself. It 

is a challenge to the entire global nuclear order and the nonproliferation regime, and I address both of those in the testimony 

that I have submitted. 

I also submit for you a case from the course that I teach at Harvard that I gave to my students a month ago in which they had 

to play a red team exercise as if they were working for the Iranian 

Supreme Leader who wants three bombs by the end of 2009. If you 

are going to drill down on this, I suggest you look at the case because you will find it interesting. It stretches the facts of the current situation to the very worst case. Getting three bombs by the 

end of 2009 will be extremely ambitious for Iran, but just at the 

edge. And I think as one goes through this, one sees a lot about 

the strategy that we have been following and its consequences. 

In my prepared testimony, I offered short answers to seven quick 

questions, and let me go through them quickly. 

First, is Iran seriously seeking nuclear weapons? Yes. 

Two, is the Bush Administration’s strategy of a slow diplomatic 

squeeze that we heard presented today working? No. 

Three, what has the Bush Administration’s approach achieved 

and not achieved at this point? I would say that diplomacy in getting four Security Council resolutions has been nothing short of extraordinary. But the fact is that Iran is 7 years closer to its goal 

line than it was when the Bush Administration came to office. So 

in one line, the Bush Administration’s efforts to organize diplomatic sanctions have essentially succeeded in giving Iran more 

time to advance nuclear facts on the ground. 

Four, has the Bush Administration’s approach missed opportunities to stop Iran’s program? Yes. The best opportunity we had was 

in the spring of 2003. The exchanged piece of paper had a list of 

all the things to be negotiated that needed to be negotiated. We do 

not know whether we would have succeeded if negotiations had 

been entered, but we know that we failed to try. 

42 

Five, on the current track, when will Iran acquire its first nuclear bombs? The NIE offers the best consensus judgment that Iran 

will not produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapons before the end of 2009, and even that is unlikely. It 

is more likely Iran would have this capability during the 2010– 

2015 time frame. So I would not disagree with that proposition, 

and I think as you go through the exercise of how Iran would actually seek and get a nuclear weapon, the case that I gave you, that 

becomes even more plausible. 

Six, responding to the question you raised in the letter that you 

sent inviting us to testify, are there lessons from the wrestling 

match with North Korea that provide relevant insights for dealing 

with Iran? And I think the answer is yes. The results of the BushCheney-Bolton strategy, as I characterize it, of threaten and neglect—or the quote from Vice President Cheney says, ‘‘We don’t negotiate with evil. We defeat it’’ are in. We can now look and see 

what results this produced. Kim Jong-Il: Eight additional nuclear 

bombs; Bush: Zero. This is a strong statement, but look at the 

facts. North Korea has eight plutonium nuclear bombs that it did 

not have in January 2001. I believe this is the largest and most 

dangerous failure in nonproliferation policy for the United States 

in recent decades. We basically sat by while North Korea withdrew 

from the NPT, ejected the IAEA inspectors, shut down the 24/7 

cameras that were watching six bombs worth of plutonium, trucked 

the plutonium over to a reprocessing plant and reprocessed it, 

turned the Yongbyon reactor back on, and started producing another bomb or two annually, and then conducted a nuclear test. All 

this has happened. These are brute facts. 

In the aftermath of that, in what John Bolton has rightly called 

‘‘a flip-flop’’ from the prior approach, the Bush-Hill-Rice current approach that has engaged the Six-Party talks and North Korea bilaterally has succeeded in at least closing down the Yongbyon reactor. 

The benefit of that is that North Korea is not producing more plutonium. Has it done all the things that we need to do about every 

other subject? Absolutely not. Will they do it? Absolutely not. But 

is it better not to have one or two more North Korean bombs every 

year? I would say it is unseemly, it is tawdry, but it is better than 

the alternative. 

Finally, are there relevant historical analogies that may offer 

some insight to this? I note in my testimony that the unfolding 

U.S.-Iranian confrontation is like the Cuban missile crisis in slow 

motion. That was the most dangerous moment in history, 1962, Soviets sneaking missiles into Cuba. Kennedy confronts them, demands that the missiles be withdrawn. There follow 13 very tense 

days. At the end of that crisis, Kennedy invented an option that he 

would not have considered at the beginning of the week, that many 

of his advisers actually would not have agreed to, but that succeeded in getting the missiles withdrawn without war. And I think 

it is only when we face up to the fact, as Mr. Ross was saying before, that the two options at the end of this road are acquiesce and 

attack, and as you analyze the consequences of each of those and 

see how unacceptable each is, that we will finally get real in looking at options that are unpalatable, tawdry, ugly, but better than 

either of those two alternatives. The danger is that as we postpone 

43 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh appears in the Appendix on page 132. 

this moment of truth, we let Iran create new facts on the ground 

every day. 

For a long time, we said Iran would not be allowed to master the 

technology of enriching uranium, and I still hear that statement repeated today. The answer is, they have 75 kilos of low enriched 

uranium that they have already enriched. So I would say their 

facts on the ground are moving all the time while we have been 

struggling trying to figure out what kind of option we would actually pursue. So I subscribe to Mr. Ross’ proposition that we should 

at this stage be getting all of our carrots, all of our sticks, all of 

our allies into the discussion. 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Allison, thank you very much for that statement. 

Dr. Walsh, you are recognized, please. 

TESTIMONY OF JIM WALSH,1 RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, 

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Coburn, 

Senator Coleman, and Senator Collins. It is a privilege to be back 

before this Subcommittee and an honor to be with this distinguished panel. 

My focus is going to be on the nuclear issue. That is my background, as the Chairman alluded to. But I have also through the 

course of my work met over 100 Iranian officials from the Expediency Council, the Foreign Ministry, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and I have spent 5 hours with President Ahmadinejad 

and with North Korean officials as well. 

After the hearing, I am more than happy to respond to questions 

in writing if you have additional questions, and I got up early this 

morning and wrote a brief memo on the recent revelations about 

the Syrian-North Korean connection and its implications for policy 

in Iran, and I am happy to share that if there is any interest in 

that. But let me get to the task at hand. 

First, current U.S. policy. You have heard this morning that U.S. 

policy is multifaceted, but as regards the nuclear issue, really the 

core strategy is based on sanctions. I think sanctions have enjoyed 

some success. For example, some people said the United States 

would never be able to get any sanctions resolution through the 

United Nations, but we were able to do that. I think the big picture 

here, as my colleagues have said, is that the sanctions strategy is 

failing. 

Now, when I appeared before you 2 years ago, there were 164 

centrifuges in Iran and no sanctions. Ten days after I testified, you 

had the first resolution authorizing sanctions. We have had three 

sanctions resolutions, and since that time that I testified, we now 

have 3,000 centrifuges. That is, I guess, about a thousand centrifuges per sanctions resolution. And Iran have announced that 

they are going to build 6,000 more. I think on its face, the policy 

is clearly not working. 

In the race between centrifuges and sanctions, the centrifuges 

are winning, and even senior U.S. officials concede that point. I 

think the situation is unlikely to get better, and as the comments 

44 

by the Chairman and Dr. Coburn I think implied, what we have 

here is a disconnect. Sanctions are a policy for the long term, to 

deal with long-term public policy problems. The nuclear issue, by 

contrast, is near to a intermediate term, and so I think even at its 

best—and there is a big debate whether sanctions are generally effective—we are dealing with a disconnect between policy instruments and policy problems. 

There are alternatives. In my testimony, I examine soft regime 

change and containment, but like sanctions, these do not work in 

a relevant time frame. It is a policy mismatch. By the time soft regime change or containment and reassurance work, Iran will have 

already built thousands and thousands of centrifuges. These are 

post-nuclear approaches. This is not true of military action, but I 

think that at best military action would simply delay and, at worst, 

would create a determined proliferator, and it would be prohibitively costly. Secretary Gates said just the other day, ‘‘Another war 

in the Middle East is the last thing we need and would be disastrous on a number of levels.’’ 

So the final option that people talk about is direct talks without 

precondition. There are people who simply call for talks, and then 

you have others who also say they want a grand bargain. I think 

the first is too little and the second is more than is practically possible. 

We have to do more than simply have talks. We have to be able 

to have something to say when we talk to them. We have to have 

a proposal that will advance the process. I think the grand bargain 

is too much. 

You will remember that in 2003 the Iranians through the offices 

of the Swiss did propose at least a negotiation on what might be 

characterized as a grand bargain with the United States in which 

terrorism, the nuclear program, the Arab-Israeli dispute were all 

on the table. That proposal, alas, was not responded to. I think 

under the current leadership and the current conditions, it is too 

much to ask for a grand bargain. We can achieve progress in important areas like the nuclear issue without having to achieve 

progress on everything. 

What do we say to the Iranians, is this proposal that my colleagues and I have put forth, the multilateralizing or multinationalizing of Iran’s fuel cycle. And while I appreciate Mr. Rademaker’s 

interest in the proposal, I think I have a slightly different characterization of it. 

I think the basic dilemma we face here is U.S. policy insists on 

no centrifuges, and Iranian policy is enrichment on Iranian territory. And there seems to be not much room in between those two 

positions. 

Multi-lateralization tries to do is square that circle by saying 

there will be enrichment on Iranian territory, but it will not be a 

national program solely owned and controlled by Iranians. It will 

be internationally owned and managed. There is a difference. The 

Iranians will participate, but the ownership, management, and operation of that facility, whatever its size and whatever its technology—which I do not prejudge—would be done not by Iran alone, 

which is what we are looking at here, but by Iran with others, eyes 

and ears on the ground. I think that is better than the status quo. 

45 

I think that is better than where we are headed. I believe in a reality-based policy, and right now we are not dealing with reality. 

This proposal would call for upgraded inspections, eyes on the 

ground, greater transparency. Yes, there are risks. I review some 

of those risks in my written testimony. But I think they can be 

minimized, and at the end of the day the question is compared to 

what? And the ‘‘what’’ looks pretty bad right now. So I think this 

proposal has a better chance of achieving our objectives in nonproliferation specifically than much of what is talked about. 

In terms of lessons from North Korea and Iran, I think there are 

some lessons. The general lesson is it is a mistake to assume inevitability, that it is destiny that a country will become a nuclear 

weapons state and will hold onto those weapons forever. I think 

these cases and the historical record more generally show that we 

can engage with countries we do not like, that allies are important 

but the United States has to engage in direct conversations with 

potential proliferators, and that the other guy has to get something 

out of a negotiated settlement. A proposal that is all restrictions 

and no benefits—that is not an agreement that is going to happen 

or going to be sustainable. 

As regards North Korea, I think the lesson is that it is not 

enough simply to talk. We have to have something to say. And 

when you reach an impasse, it is more for more. You get more but 

only if you do more—that is how you transform the negotiation. 

As regards Libya, as I say, I think it illustrates (1) how it shows 

how sanctions work, i.e., they are really a long-term proposition, (2) 

the importance of the United States following through on its promises and (3) the IAEA has an important role to play here. 

Let me conclude by saying that not only IAEA but Congress, all 

of you, have a critical role to play in your oversight, information 

collection—this hearing is a great example of what we need to have 

more of—and as a policy innovator. I think you can develop the legislative ties with Iran if that opportunity arises and promote smart 

engagement. Those concepts are described in the written testimony. 

Let me end here by again thanking you for the opportunity to reappear before your Subcommittee. 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Walsh, thank you very much. 

We are going to start voting, I am told, about 12:15. Senator 

Coburn and I have probably about 20 minutes after that to get to 

the floor and actually start voting. We are going to have a series 

of votes. He and I have discussed it, and what we are going to do 

is ask some questions and look for your responses, and then we will 

probably be closing this down by 12:30. And I understand, Dr. Allison, you have a plane to catch, and that works, I think, with your 

schedule. 

Thank you for an excellent presentations. This is an excellent 

panel. I want to go back to Ambassador Ross and just ask you 

again to outline your third way proposal for us. Then I am going 

to ask of our other three panelists to respond to that third way suggestion. 

Mr. ROSS. The essence of the third way proposal is what I call 

engagement without conditions but with pressure. It is an amalgam of what I call those who say let’s only tighten the noose and 

46 

others who say let’s engage without any conditions at all. And the 

essence of it is basically use your readiness to talk as a device to 

get others who have been holding back in terms of providing the 

real sanctions to do much more than they have been willing to do. 

It is premised on several different assumptions. 

Assumption No. 1 is that the Europeans believe there is a deal 

that can be struck, but only if the United States is at the table because what the Iranians want is not just the political and economic 

side of things, but they want certain things from us, especially as 

it relates to recognition, security, a place in the region. 

Assumption No. 2 is that you have to bring the Chinese in, but 

we have not been applying any leverage on the Chinese. Now, our 

leverage on the Chinese can be applied in one of several ways. One 

is argumentation. Don’t put us in a position where the only option 

left to prevent the Iranians from going nuclear is the use of force. 

A second way to deal with them is, in fact, to focus on what seems 

to motivate them in a pretty consistent way. They have what I call 

a mercantile mind-set. There is enormous Saudi financial clout. 

Find a way to bring the Saudis into this. The Saudis will not do 

what we want if we just ask them to do it, because they will not 

want to expose themselves to some potential risk unless they know 

what is our overall strategy and where they fit into it. Use the 

Saudis as a way of affecting the Chinese. 

Third, I would also try to bring the Russians in. Now, there are 

multiple ways to try to bring the Russians in. I say it in the testimony. One is they do have an interest. I heard Dr. Coburn agreed 

with what Senator Coleman was saying about the issue of nuclear 

cooperation with them. They have enormous economic interest in 

this and use that as a potential lever; also the issue of missile defenses in Eastern Europe. The rationale for the missile defenses in 

Eastern Europe are protection against the Iranians. This is a very 

big issue that Putin has made. Say to them, look, if you really join 

us—and we have to be very specific in terms of what it means— 

in terms of preventing Iran from being such a threat, well, then, 

we do not actually have to proceed with the missile defenses in Europe. That is the essence of it. 

Senator CARPER. Great. OK, thanks. 

With that outline, again, Mr. Rademaker, why don’t you just 

weigh in. What do you like about it? What do you question about 

it? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, to the degree that what Ambassador Ross 

is saying is that we should not begin direct negotiations with Iran 

today, I fully agree with him, and I think the rationale that he has 

is the same as mine, which is that our position today politically 

and diplomatically is too weak to successfully negotiate with the 

Iranians. So what this is is a suggestion about how we could 

strengthen our position in order to be able to hopefully negotiate 

successfully. 

I think it is a creative idea, and I think it would be worth pursuing, but I will flag two concerns I have. One, I think part of the 

idea is that the Europeans impose the sanctions before the negotiations, thereby strengthening the pressure on the Iranians before 

the talks begin. The Europeans may well say no to that idea, and 

then we are back to the situation we are in today. 

47 

My second point is if we are going to enter a joint negotiation 

of this sort, we are going to have to have an understanding with 

the Europeans about what it is we are seeking to achieve. What 

is the outcome that we want? And, in particular, the issue that I 

flagged in my opening remarks: Is the final outcome we are seeking 

one in which there is no enrichment in Iran, full stop? Or is it one 

along the lines that Dr. Walsh has outlined where we say, OK, we 

are going to allow you to have enrichment under certain conditions? That is a critically important decision, but there has to be 

a meeting of the minds between us and the Europeans under this 

concept. And I have not heard Ambassador Ross’ suggestion about 

what our bottom line should be. 

My view is clear, and I state it in my prepared remarks. I think 

our bottom line has to remain no enrichment in Iran, because allowing enrichment in Iran would just be too dangerous given the 

history and nature of their program. And so if the Europeans came 

to us and said we will undertake this with you, we will even impose sanctions up front, but you have to join us in agreeing that 

we will settle for some arrangement with Iran under which they 

are able to engage in enrichment in Iran, I would not think that 

is a bargain we would want to strike with them. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Allison, what do you like and what do you question about 

Ambassador Ross’ proposal? 

Mr. ALLISON. Mr. Ross and I have talked about this before, and 

I like the general idea, but I think it is somewhat unrealistic in the 

short run. I think in the first instance, as Steve has said, rightly, 

the Bush Administration does not know its own mind. It does not 

have an agreement on what it would accept. If you do not have a 

notion of what is acceptable in the reality zone, that is one reason 

not to talk. 

Two, it does not have an agreement with the other parties with 

respect to what would be acceptable. That would be extremely difficult to do, and in any case, the Bush Administration cannot do 

it between now and then. 

Three, when is ‘‘then’’? A new Administration comes, Senator 

McCain or one of the other Senators. It takes 6 months or a year 

to get its act together. All the time, Iran is just there moving facts 

on the ground. The reality of this situation is the facts on the 

ground are worsening constantly as we have done whatever we 

have done. So there we are. 

I think with respect to where we want to get to is something like 

what Mr. Ross is proposing—a grand bargain negotiation. I outline 

that in the 2004 book, Nuclear Terrorism. Basically we take all of 

the carrots to the table, and that most importantly for the Iranians 

is some assurance that we are not going to attack them to change 

their regime by force, and that we are not going to support groups 

that are undermining them inside; and all the sticks. 

I am in favor of being able to threaten attack. I like very much 

the Israeli stick in the closet kind of looking out a little bit. So I 

think you need a lot, a lot of sticks and you need a lot, a lot of carrots, and you need a coherent position. You need to sit down with 

the other parties as part of the game, though the United States has 

to be the dealmaker because it is the threat to the regime that the 

48 

Supreme Leader thinks he is responsible for keeping in place. It is 

the regime that we threaten, credibly, when first we announced 

there was an Axis of Evil and said that the solution to this problem 

is toppling the regimes, and then toppled this neighbor next door 

in 3 weeks, whom he had fought 8 years to a standstill war with. 

So that was May 2003 when our strength was at a maximum position. I think recovering a position of strength for such negotiations 

will be extremely difficult, but not impossible. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Last word. What do you like? What do you question about this, 

Dr. Walsh? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I like the idea of using it as a device to get 

others to do more. You heard in the first panel one of the witnesses 

said, well, if you start talking to the Iranians, our allies will do 

less. I think the historical record shows that to be absolutely 

wrong. It was after Secretary Rice’s announcement in May that we 

got the first sanctions resolution. So I do think it is a device to get 

people on board. 

I do agree with Mr. Rademaker in this regard, that you have to 

be clear about the goal. Is it zero enrichment? What is it you are 

actually going for? Again, I really doubt, for reasons of national 

pride and internal politics, and now bureaucratic politics, whether 

they are suddenly going to go from 3,000 or 9,000 or 10,000 to zero. 

I have grave doubts about that. 

As for sanctions, I think that would be great. They are useful. 

But I think there is a tendency to overemphasize sanctions as if 

it is a be-all and end-all when actually the record is quite mixed. 

Iran is a big country. For all the Gulf states that fear it, a lot of 

those Gulf states are investing in Iran, even with the international 

sanctions right now. And you run the risk of repeating the North 

Korea syndrome, which is you are talking to Iran, then you impose 

sanctions, and then Iran pulls out because Tehran objects to the 

sanctions. And then it is only once you begin to address the sanctions that they come back to the table. But, in general—I know 

that sounds negative. In general, I am positive about it with just 

those observations. 

Senator CARPER. Fine. Thank you very much. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. How many of you all think that Iran desires to 

have a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. WALSH. Elements within Iran; I believe that the government 

has not made a final determination to seek nuclear weapons. 

Senator COBURN. Well, how many of you all realize—or would 

agree that who we are talking to indirectly now is not the people 

who are making the decisions? IDRC, we are not talking to them, 

right? 

Mr. WALSH. Supreme Leader. That is the person who calls the 

shots. 

Senator COBURN. Well, but they work for the Supreme Leader. 

They do not work for Ahmadinejad. Comment on sanctions. There 

are sanctions and then there are sanctions. We have not had real 

sanctions yet. Intriguing idea, Ambassador Ross. We are in a pickle, and the question is: How do we get out of the pickle? 

If we do what Ambassador Ross says, and it is related only to 

enrichment instead of killing our troops, denying human rights in 

49 

Iran, and all the other consequences, what happens if we fail? 

What happens if you think they are going for a nuclear weapon 

and we say we will talk on the basis of the fact that we have got 

to enhance sanctions, and the talking does not work? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I think, these policies move in sequence, and 

the one thing you do not want to do is prejudge and you miss an 

opportunity to resolve the problem. If we assume that they are 

bound and determined to get a nuclear weapon, which is not the 

finding of the NIE. 

Senator COBURN. But that is based on 2003 intelligence data. It 

is not based on the most recent revelations of what has been in the 

press about their accomplishment with Chinese drawings, molds. 

Mr. WALSH. Well, I have always thought when you look at the 

history of the Iranian nuclear weapons program that started in the 

mid-1980s—we will ignore the fact that the Shah wanted it as well. 

The curious thing here is that they did not make more progress 

than they did—this has been a program that has been up and 

down and up and down. And I think the key finding in the NIE, 

as I explained in my testimony, the key finding is not whether 

today they are working on weaponization or not. The key finding 

is whether they are a rational actor that under circumstances 

would be willing to give up their nuclear weapon or talk about it. 

And the answer on that is pretty clear. 

If we presume they are going to get nuclear weapons no matter 

what, then if there is actually an opportunity to stop it, we will 

completely blow past that on our way to other policy—— 

Senator COBURN. Is it your assumption they are a rational actor? 

Mr. WALSH. Oh, definitely. 

Senator COBURN. Is it your assumption they are a rational actor? 

Mr. ALLISON. I would say more or less. If the NIE proposition 

that they respond to costs and benefits I think is essentially correct, then I think if you look at the behavior of the regime, it has 

been reasonably predictable. 

Senator COBURN. How about you, Mr. Rademaker? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The premise of all the international diplomacy 

that has taken place since 2002—the imposition of carrots and 

sticks, incentives, disincentives—the premise is that they are a rational actor and if under enough pressure will do what we are asking them to do. I mean, it is hardly a revelation in the NIE to say 

that is our premise. 

Senator COBURN. Ambassador Ross. 

Mr. ROSS. I think generally, they have elements in the leadership 

that are not, that believe fundamentally in something else. What 

is the balance of forces within that leadership? And how do you affect it so that those who are pragmatic—when you say rational, I 

say those who are pragmatic in terms of protecting their interests 

and the regime. So that you affect those who reflect that mind-set, 

and they hold greater power right now. 

Mr. ALLISON. If I could, on your sanction point earlier, I think 

that I agree very much with the proposition that it is bizarre, I say 

in my testimony ironic even, that many of the members of the 

sanctioning coalition seem readier to run the risk of a military attack on Iran than to impose sanctions that would be sufficiently 

harsh to have a chance of changing Iran’s behavior. 

50 

Senator COBURN. They behave like U.S. Senators. They are rational to the next general election, but not to the future of the 

country. There is a great correlation. It is like fixing Social Security 

or Medicare or Medicaid. Well, we know we have got to fix it, but 

we cannot do anything about it because it might affect the short 

term. 

Mr. ALLISON. As you said earlier, 40 percent of the gasoline that 

is used every day in Iran is imported. Is it possible to interrupt 

that? Yes, it is. Now, would it have an impact on gas prices? Yes, 

it would. Who is in favor of that? Not the Administration. I do not 

know how many Senators are. 

Senator COBURN. Well, the fact is we have a big problem, and 

there are a couple of coming consequences. Are we willing to pay 

some of the sacrifice to have that consequence? One is some military action at some point in time, or some cost and sacrifice on our 

part to avoid that from an economic standpoint. That is not always 

necessarily clear and out there among the choices that we get to 

make. 

I want to make one other point and see if you all agree with it, 

and we have seen this be true in the past. And I want to take issue 

a little bit. I think Libya came to the table because there was an 

invasion of Iraq, and it did not have anything to do with sanctions. 

I think they finally just said, ‘‘I give up. I do not want this happening to us.’’ I think there was some pressure with sanctions, but 

the real truth of the matter is here is this bold move and we do 

not think we want to invite that. So, I think there was a big difference, and we had testimony earlier on the fact that at the time 

in 2003, we did not have sanctions on Iran at the time we invaded. 

And the Secretary correctly pointed out that that was a big impact 

in 2003. 

Can you not have uranium enrichment and still have weaponization? 

Mr. ALLISON. Unless Iran were successful in buying enriched 

uranium from another state, no. 

Senator COBURN. Well, if they have enriched uranium, if they 

have that at some point in time, is it clear to you that they would 

have the capability to weaponize that? 

Does everybody agree with that? 

Mr. ALLISON. Yes, if they have enough enriched uranium, they 

can make a bomb, yes. 

Mr. WALSH. Not 3 to 5 percent enriched uranium, but yes, weapons grade enriched—— 

Senator COBURN. Yes, weapons grade. 

Mr. WALSH. Over some time, yes. 

Mr. ROSS. Can I answer the question you posed earlier? 

Senator COBURN. Yes, please do. 

Mr. ROSS. You said if talking does not work, what are the 

choices? Well, then the choices are basically two: One is you come 

up with what is a very vigorous containment approach, which is 

quite visible within the region, or you act militarily to forestall 

what they are doing with the message that you will do it again if 

they proceed. 

Those are the kind of choices you have. I would say this: I think 

that the reason I prefer the third way is because I do not really 

51 

like either of those outcomes, because I can see all sorts of consequences that are not so great. But you put your finger on something. There is no cost-free approach right now, and we have to decide which of the least costly or least bad options are the ones that 

are available to us. 

Senator COBURN. Ambassador Ross, would it behoove us to work 

on containment now given the fact that our other options are not 

great? In other words, plan for containment, signal containment, 

put that out there as another leg in the stool? 

Mr. ROSS. For me the answer is yes, and for a particular reason. 

Deterrence is not just deterrence at the time. Deterrence can also 

be about dissuasion. And if you are trying to persuade, again, that 

part of the Iranian leadership that they are not going to gain anything, they have a lot to lose and they are not going to gain anything, and if they think that nuclear weapons capability is going 

to give them leverage in the region, they should think again. 

Senator COBURN. So that takes time, so you would agree that we 

should start that process now. 

Mr. ROSS. I would. 

Senator COBURN. Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I guess I would just add one footnote to Ambassador Ross’ comment, responding to your earlier point. The risk 

that diplomacy may not succeed certainly is something—it is not 

an outcome we want, but that risk is not an argument for making 

an offer to the Iranians that is so attractive that they have to say 

yes to it. In other words, a successful diplomatic outcome is not 

necessarily preferable to some of the other alternatives. 

Dr. Walsh has a statement in his prepared remarks, and I will 

just read it to you because I disagree with it. He said, ‘‘The worst 

possible outcome is a purely national program on Iranian soil, 

whether it is unsafeguarded . . . or under-safeguarded . . . ’’ I 

think what he means by that is basically they continue deploying 

additional centrifuges, they stand up the enrichment capability 

they are seeking, and we do not have any additional international 

safeguards than exist today. That is the worst possible outcome, according to his testimony. 

I think that is not right, because at least today it is an illegitimate program. The U.N. Security Council has condemned it four 

times. Sanctions have been imposed. It is an illegitimate program. 

Certainly one consequence of any diplomatic settlement with the 

Iranians on this issue is going to be that illegitimacy, that stigma, 

will be removed. The U.N. sanctions will be lifted, the U.N. Security Council will back away, and whatever program we sign off on 

will be internationally legitimate. And if it is essentially the same 

program that they are going to achieve if they continue down the 

current path and diplomacy fails, but it is legitimate, I think that 

is a worse outcome than them continuing down the current path. 

I think the rejoinder to what I have just said is, well, international inspections are reliable, and if we can get as part of a diplomatic settlement enhanced international verification, inspections, 

then we can have a higher level of comfort about that kind of outcome. 

I just want to read you a quote, which I have always enjoyed, 

and this is on the issue of international inspections. ‘‘Every form 

52 

of deception and every obstacle baffled the Commission. The work 

of evasion became thoroughly organized. Under civilian camouflage, 

an organization was set up to safeguard weapons and equipment. 

Even more ingenuity was used to create machinery for future production of war material.’’ 

Sounds like George Bush on Iraq. It is not. It is Winston Churchill on Weimar Germany and their evasion of the international inspection regime that was set up under the Treaty of Versailles. So 

the idea that international inspections will save us from a bad outcome is not new. 

Senator COBURN. It goes to whether or not we have rational behavior on the part of the Supreme Leader and the IDGC. 

Mr. WALSH. If I may respond, that would not have been my rejoinder. It seems to me if the choice is between a stigmatized on 

the one hand and a nuclear weapons capability on the other, I will 

take stopping the nuclear weapons capability every day of the 

week. An Iranian program that is nationally owned and is not 

transparent but opaque. How do you feel about minimum safeguards or Iran pulling out of the NPT, that is the quickest route 

to a bomb. 

Our proposal is about preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, not enhancing it. 

Senator COBURN. There is nobody that I have asked in the leadership in this country and no expert that I have asked that does 

not believe that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon. Nobody. What 

would make us think that anything other than cold, hard consequences to that is going to work? 

Mr. WALSH. Well, the nuclear age would be one. Look at the history of the nuclear age—— 

Senator COBURN. But you have already answered the question 

about how rational they are. The reason we were very successful 

during the Cold War is, one, we talked; but two, is that there was 

a rational pattern of thought that was not based on martyrdom. It 

was based on survival. It was based on staying alive. That is a consequence that has to be figured in in terms of how we negotiate 

with these people and how we think about how they think. 

Senator Coleman raised that issue, and I think it is a great 

issue. That is something we have not ever dealt with before as a 

Nation. Ambassador Ross, you have in terms of the Middle East in 

certain areas, but that is not routinely what we see. And this assumption that survival is a guide to bring people to the table, 

when, in fact, there is tremendous human rights violations of the 

people who are not in the religious leadership in Iran today and 

what they claim about what they believe really mixes the common 

sense and logic that we could defer from having negotiations. 

Mr. WALSH. Senator Coburn, we heard the same thing about the 

Soviet Union, the same sort of cultural argument from Colin Gray 

and others who said the Soviets would accept unacceptable levels 

of deaths, they were not the same as Americans. It turned out not 

to be true. 

I am not saying that the Iranians are perfectly rational. Like 

Americans, they can be prideful. They can make mistakes. They 

can bear significant economic costs in the defense of things they 

think are important. But in the main, they have been a status quo 

53 

power. Some had thought that they had chemical weapons after the 

Iran-Iraq war. Did they turn around and attack Israel? Have they 

picked a big war against Israel? No. 

And on this issue of the regime, What did Saddam do when inspectors were on the ground? He decided that he would shelve his 

weapons program. This is from the Iraqi Survey Group and from 

others. He would shut it down. He still had ambitions, but he gave 

up the program because he did not want to get caught when there 

were inspectors on the ground. 

I think there is a lesson to be learned there and a lesson that 

applies here. 

Senator COBURN. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. You bet. This has been just an extraordinary 

panel. We have hearings every day of the week around here. Sometimes they are pretty good. This has just been extraordinary. And 

I thank you for thinking outside the box. I thank you for making 

us think outside the box and for very constructive testimony and 

going back and forth with one another, I think in a most constructive and respectful way. 

Is there something else? 

Senator COBURN. Yes, just unanimous consent. I have several 

questions that I would like to submit for the record and ask that 

you answer them, if you would. We cannot take the time here to 

get—I would like to spend 2 days with you all. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. The hearing record will stay open for 2 weeks. 

I am going to have some questions, as well. 

But we thank you very much for being here with us today and 

for your thought and your responses. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

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