J-S33037-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

CHRISTY GASKIN 

 Appellant No. 1332 EDA 2010 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 29, 2010

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0010890-2009 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON, and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2014 

Appellant, Christy Gaskin, appeals from the April 29, 2010 judgment of 

sentence imposing two concurrent sentences of six to twelve months of 

house arrest followed by three years of probation for possession of a 

controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance (“PWID”) (35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(16) and (30), respectively). 

We affirm in part and vacate in part. 

The record reveals that Officer William Carrion (“Officer Carrion”) was 

on duty in plain clothes on January 17, 2003. N.T. Trial, 3/10/10, at 14. 

Officer Carrion engaged in a conversation with Corey Parks (“Parks”) on the 

3300 block of Kensington Avenue in Philadelphia. Id. at 15. Parks directed 

the officers to 3320 Kensington Avenue, where Officer Carrion observed 

Appellant hanging out of a second floor window. Id. Parks and Appellant 
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conversed, and Appellant left the window to come to the front door. Id. at 

15-16. While Appellant was en route, Officer Carrion handed Parks a 

prerecorded five dollar bill. Id. at 16. When Appellant opened the front 

door, Parks handed her the five dollar bill and Appellant handed Parks two 

heat-sealed plastic packets later determined to contain cocaine. Id. at 16-

17. The interaction among Officer Carrion, Parks, and Appellant occurred 

while Officer Ernest Brown (“Officer Brown”) was conducting surveillance 

from twenty feet away. Id. at 30. Brown also observed the initial 

conversation between Officer Carrion and Parks. Subsequent to the 

transaction Officers Carrion and Brown summoned backup, and Appellant 

and Parks were arrested. Id. at 16, 30. 

Appellant proceeded to a March 10, 2010 bench trial, at the conclusion 

of which the trial court found her guilty of the aforementioned offenses. The 

trial court imposed sentence on April 29, 2010 and Appellant filed this timely 

appeal on May 12, 2010. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in 

support of both convictions and argues her sentence for possession is illegal 

because it is a lesser included offense of PWID. Appellant’s Brief at 2. We 

will address these contentions in turn. 

We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim according to 

the following: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 2014 Pa LEXIS 1647 (Pa. July 7, 2014). 

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient because police did not 

recover the prerecorded five dollar bill or any drugs from her person, and 

because Parks later denied engaging in the transaction with her. In its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court rejected Appellant’s argument 

based on its credibility assessments. Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/13, at 4.1

 

Specifically, the trial court found Officers Carrion and Brown credible, and 

____________________________________________ 

1

 On September 2, 2010, this Court sent the trial court a notice of 

delinquency in regards to our receipt of the certified record. The record also 

reflects that substitute counsel was appointed to represent Appellant on July 

15, 2011. On September 27, 2011, substitute counsel filed a request for an 

extension of time to comply with the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) order, 

alleging the clerk of courts provided the incorrect record, and then provided 

an incomplete one. Other than these items, we are unable to discern from 

the record the reasons for the lengthy delay in the processing of this appeal. 
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Parks not credible in light of 11 prior crimen falsi convictions. Put simply, 

Officer Carrion provided an eyewitness account of a drug transaction that 

took place while he was in the immediate presence of both parties. Officer 

Carrion personally observed Appellant hand two packets to Parks in 

exchange for money. The trial court was free to deem Carrion’s account 

credible. Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756. Subsequent testing revealed that the

packets contained cocaine. Appellant cannot obtain relief on her sufficiency 

of the evidence argument. 

Next Appellant argues her sentence is illegal because her possession 

and PWID convictions arise from the same act, and because possession is a 

lesser included offense of PWID.2

 Merger implicates the legality of a 

sentence, and as such our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 

1786 (Pa. Super. July 5, 2014). This Court has indeed held that possession 

under § 780-113(a)(30) is a lesser included offense of PWID and that the 

two offenses merge for sentencing purposes if they arise from a single act. 

Commonwealth v. Rippy, 732 A.2d 1216, 1223-24 (Pa. Super. 1999). 

Instantly, Appellant’s convictions plainly arise from the same act, that 

being the transaction with Parks. The Commonwealth concedes the validity 

____________________________________________ 

2

 “No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise 

from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense 

are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9765. 
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of Appellant’s argument. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11. We therefore 

vacate the judgment of sentence for Appellants’ violation of 35 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 780-113(a)(16). Since the trial court imposed identical concurrent 

sentences, our result does not disturb the trial court’s sentencing scheme. 

We therefore need not vacate the entire sentence and remand for 

resentencing. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/25/2014