If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JASON D. GIORDANO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

April 25, 2019

v No. 342386

Oakland Circuit Court

WILLIAMS INTERNATIONAL CO., LLC, LC No. 2016-155873-CL

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MURRAY, C.J., and SAWYER and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor 

of defendant in this wrongful employment termination case. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a certified aviation mechanic, served as a full-time technician for defendant

from September 2007 until defendant terminated him on November 5, 2015. A year later 

plaintiff sued defendant claiming that it discharged him in violation of public policy because he 

refused to violate federal laws or regulations. Plaintiff claimed that defendant requested that he 

violate 14 CFR 43.3(d) (2012) and 14 CFR 43.12 (1982) but he refused and was fired.

Plaintiff alleged that his supervisor, Jeffrey Siedlaczek, asked him to falsify maintenance 

and repair records in violation of 14 CFR 43.3(d) (2012) by verifying the completion of work 

that plaintiff did not personally perform or witness being performed and by resubmitting aircraft 

engine oil samples to determine contaminant levels to obtain more favorable results. Defendant 

denied that it asked plaintiff to do anything contrary to law or safety requirements. After 

conducting discovery, defendant moved for summary disposition.

Defendant relied on Siedlaczek’s deposition testimony. He testified that plaintiff 

stamped work of other individuals only when the work plainly indicated what had been 

performed by others. On occasion he affixed his stamp to a process to indicate that an internal 

company process requirement was done. Doing so did not violate any Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) regulation. Siedlaczek agreed that intentional falsification of an FAA 
-2-

required maintenance record would violate FAA regulations but defendant’s procedure of 

“stamping” the various engine processing steps was not subject to any FAA regulation. The log 

books maintained by defendant when working on an engine pertained to processes internal to 

defendant’s operations and not record keeping governed by or subject to FAA regulations.

Defendant also relied on the affidavit of Frank Smith, another employee, who served as 

the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) Holder and as the onsite representative of the 

FAA. He had responsibility to ensure that defendant complied with all FAA regulations,

processes and controls, and the requirements of the ODA manual pertaining to FAA processes 

and certification. Smith reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and opined in his affidavit that plaintiff’s 

allegations lacked accuracy and were incorrect for several reasons, including:

A. There is no federal law and no FAA regulations governing any 

documents that are stamped and/or signed off on by technicians performing repair 

or maintenance work on aircraft engines, including the Process Plans and/or 

Process Checklists and documents regarding “stretch numbers” and the 

measurement of possible contaminants in aviation oil.

B. None of the documents that are stamped by technicians performing 

repair or maintenance work on aircraft engines, including the Process Plans and/or 

Process Checklists and documents regarding “stretch numbers” and the 

measurement of possible contaminants in aviation oil, are regulated under 14 CFR 

§ 43.12. In particular, none of those documents constitute “any record or report 

that is required to be made, kept, or used to show compliance with any 

requirement under this part” under 14 CFR § 34.12(a).

C. Federal law and FAA regulations regarding documentation are directed 

exclusively to performance criteria for an aircraft engine’s return to service. . . . 

When [an Acceptance Test Procedure] is completed it is documented on the 8130-

3 form “Authorized Release Certificate”, which certifies that an engine has passed 

performance tests and is ready to return to service. That is the only document that 

the FAA requires [defendant] to make, keep, or use to show compliance with 14 

CFR § 43.12.

D. The Repair Station has trained and authorized qualified mechanics to 

issue the Authorized Release Certificate 8130-3 in accordance with FAA order 

8130.21H. [Plaintiff] had nothing to do with any aspect of the Authorized 

Release Certificate 8130-3.

E. All of the documents [plaintiff] could or would be allowed to 

stamp/sign off on, including the Process Plans and/or Process Checklists and 

documents regarding “stretch numbers” and the measurement of possible 

contaminants in aviation oil, are internal documents of [defendant], created and 

maintained by [defendant] for its own purposes, not to comply with federal law or 

FAA regulations.
-3-

Smith also testified that 14 CFR 43.3(d) (2012) did not apply to defendant because it does “not 

return to service any product under an individual’s A&P certificate.”

Defendant also offered the expert testimony of Daniel Allison, the current president of an 

aviation consulting firm and a retiree of the FAA. Allison averred that he reviewed the affidavit 

provided by Smith and “agree[d] that the information contained therein is true and accurate.” 

Allison indicated that he also reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and found that plaintiff misstated

the existence and application of federal law and FAA regulations regarding documents and 

operations at defendant’s facility. Allison indicated that 14 CFR 43.3(e) (2012) applied to 

defendant and that defendant had authorization to approve aircraft for return to service under 14 

CFR 43.7(c) and (d), but plaintiff lacked qualification or authorization “to make Return to 

Service decisions” or “to sign any of [defendant’s] return to service documents[.]” Allison 

concurred with Smith that federal law and FAA regulations relied on by plaintiff did not govern 

“any documents that are stamped and/or signed off by a basic level technician performing repair 

or maintenance work,” including “ ‘stretch numbers’ and the measurements of possible 

contamination in the applicable aviation oil tested at [defendant].” Allison confirmed that 

defendant was required to comply with FAA regulation 14 CFR 43.12 (1982), regarding the 

completion of Form 8130-3, but that plaintiff lacked the training, qualification, or authorization

to complete that form.

Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion. Plaintiff relied on his deposition testimony in 

which, among other things, he testified that Siedlaczek ordered him to “stamp off” on work in 

the log books even though he did not perform or observe the work and that Siedlaczek ordered 

him to falsify data measurements in violation of FAA regulations. Plaintiff asserted that because 

he refused to engage in illegal and unethical conduct, Siedlaczek placed him on a performance 

improvement plan and later initiated plaintiff’s termination.

The trial court considered the record evidence and granted defendant’s motion. This 

appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion brought under MCR 

2.116(C)(10). Stock Bldg Supply, LLC v Crosswinds Communities, Inc, 317 Mich App 189, 198; 

893 NW2d 165 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In Stock Bldg Supply, this Court 

summarized:

A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual 

sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition 

brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, 

depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10) is proper when there is no genuine issue regarding any 

material fact. A reviewing court may not employ a standard citing the mere 

possibility that the claim might be supported by evidence produced at trial. A 

mere promise is insufficient under our court rules. While it is true that the trial 

court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other 
-4-

evidence submitted by the parties, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere 

allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts that show that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists. [Id. at 198-199 (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).]

III. ANALYSIS

In Michigan, in the absence of a contract, the general rule of at-will employment applies 

and defines the employment relationship between employers and their employees. Suchodolski v 

Mich Con Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982) (citation omitted). Under the 

general rule of at-will employment, either the employer or employee may terminate the 

employment relationship with or without cause at any time. Id. Our Supreme Court explained in 

Suchodolski that an exception to the general rule has been recognized:

based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so 

contrary to public policy as to be actionable. Most often these proscriptions are 

found in explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or 

other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right 

or duty.

The courts have also occasionally found sufficient legislative expression 

of policy to imply a cause of action for wrongful termination even in the absence 

of an explicit prohibition on retaliatory discharges. Such a cause of action has 

been found to be implied where the alleged reason for the discharge of the 

employee was the failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. 

[Id. at 695 (citations omitted).]

In Clifford v Cactus Drilling Corp, 419 Mich 356, 368; 353 NW2d 469 (1984) (citation 

omitted) our Supreme Court clarified:

Of course, it is not this Court’s function to legislate employee job security. 

Nonetheless, the employee does have an interest in protection from discharge 

based solely on refusal to act in an unlawful manner or attempt to exercise a 

statutorily or constitutionally conferred right. Likewise, society has an interest in 

ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not contravened. These 

interests can be equitably balanced by recognizing an action for retaliatory 

discharge only when important and concretely articulated public policies are 

contravened.

* * *

Three elements of a cause of action based on a public policy exception to 

the employment-at-will rule may be distilled. . . . First, plaintiff engaged in 

protected activity. The activity’s protection may stem either from a constitutional 

or statutorily granted right or from an obligation favored by statutory policy. 

Second, plaintiff was discharged. Third, a causal connection exists between the 

plaintiff’s protected activity and the discharge. [Id. at 368-369 (citation omitted).]
-5-

In Piasecki v Hamtramck, 249 Mich App 37, 43; 640 NW2d 885 (2001), this Court held 

that the defendants were entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff’s claim that she was 

discharged because she refused to violate the law because the statute cited by plaintiff contained 

a provision or exception that did not render the release of information a violation of the cited 

statutory provision relied on by plaintiff for a public policy argument. Piasecki stands for the 

proposition that, where a plaintiff alleges termination against public policy based on the refusal 

to violate a law, an actual law must exist that would have been violated if the plaintiff acted as 

required by the employer.

In this case, plaintiff contends that his employer required him to violate FAA regulations;

and, when he refused, defendant terminated him in contravention of public policy. To establish 

his right to relief, plaintiff had to show that the law actually prohibited the conduct that he 

alleged defendant required him to perform. The unrebutted evidence proffered by defendant, 

however, established that the FAA regulations on which plaintiff relied did not comprise a law 

that applied or could be violated by plaintiff’s performance of the requested work. Allison and 

Smith both testified that 14 CFR 43.3(d) (2012) and 14 CFR 43.12 (1982) did not apply to the 

work defendant requested plaintiff to do. Plaintiff did not have to prove that he or defendant in 

fact violated the FAA regulations, but he was required to establish that the regulations prohibited 

the conduct that he refused to perform in order to establish that his termination violated public 

policy. The record reflects that the paperwork defendant required of plaintiff applied to internal 

business processes and none of it was required by or governed by federal law or regulation. It is 

axiomatic that an employer cannot violate public policy by terminating an at-will employee for 

refusing to perform work that, if done, does not violate any law. In this case, because the 

conduct requested by defendant did not violate any law, plaintiff’s wrongful discharge as against 

public policy claim failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted 

defendant summary disposition.

We also find no merit to plaintiff’s contention that 14 CFR 43.9 (2004) expanded the 

scope of records subject to regulation under 14 CFR 43.12 (1982). Plaintiff cites no authority 

that supports this argument. “ ‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it 

to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give issues cursory 

treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.’ ” Movie Mania Metro, Inc v GZ 

DVD’s, Inc, 306 Mich App 594, 605-606; 857 NW2d 677 (2014) (citation omitted). Further, the 

record reflects that Smith’s and Allison’s testimonies established that no federal law and no FAA 

regulations governed the internal documentation of which defendant required plaintiff to stamp 

or sign.

Plaintiff also contends that, because the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), MCL 

15.362, permits claims based upon suspected violations of law or regulation, by analogy, his 

termination should have been held as against public policy because he reasonably but incorrectly 

believed that defendant required him to violate a law or regulation. We reject this argument.

In Kimmelman v Heather Downs Mgt Ltd, 278 Mich App 569, 573; 753 NW2d 265 

(2008), this Court explained, that:

courts may only derive public policy from objective sources, our Supreme Court’s 

enumerated “public policies” in the context of wrongful termination all entail an 
-6-

employee exercising a right guaranteed by law, executing a duty required by law, 

or refraining from violating the law.

Michigan caselaw does not support the proposition that a plaintiff’s subjective and incorrect 

beliefs have any bearing on the issue whether the employee’s termination was contrary to public 

policy. To have a viable claim, the terminated employee must establish that he exercised an 

actual right guaranteed by law, executed a duty required by law, or refrained from violating the 

law. Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. Plaintiff’s incorrect understanding of the applicable 

law cannot serve as the foundation on which to claim that his termination violated public policy. 

Therefore, the trial court correctly granted defendant summary disposition.

Affirmed.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ James Robert Redford