National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

National Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Penalty for Private Use, $300

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Postage & Fees Paid

NTSB

Permit No. G-200

Highway Accident Report

Multivehicle Collision on Interstate 90

Hampshire–Marengo Toll Plaza

Near Hampshire, Illinois

October 1, 2003

NTSB/HAR-06/03

PB2006-916203 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7776A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted April 18, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Multivehicle Collision on Interstate 90, Hampshire–

Marengo Toll Plaza, Near Hampshire, Illinois, October 1, 2003. Highway Accident Report

NTSB/HAR-06/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On October 1, 2003, a multivehicle accident occurred on the approach to an Interstate 90 toll

plaza near Hampshire, Illinois. About 2:57 p.m., a 1995 Freightliner tractor-trailer chassis and cargo

container combination unit was traveling eastbound on the interstate, approaching the Hampshire–

Marengo toll plaza at milepost 41.6, when it struck the rear of a 1999 Goshen GC2 25-passenger specialty

bus. As both vehicles moved forward, the specialty bus struck the rear of a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado 1500

pickup truck, which was pushed into the rear of a 1998 Ford conventional tractor-box trailer. As its cargo

container and chassis began to overturn, the Freightliner also struck the upper portion of the pickup truck’s

in-bed camper and the rear left side of the Ford trailer. The Freightliner and the specialty bus continued

forward and came to rest in the median. The pickup truck was then struck by another eastbound vehicle, a

2000 Kenworth tractor with Polar tank trailer. Eight specialty bus passengers were fatally injured, and 12

passengers sustained minor-to-serious injuries. The bus driver, the pickup truck driver, and the Freightliner

driver received minor injuries. The Ford driver and codriver and the Kenworth driver were not injured.

Major safety issues identified in this investigation include toll plaza design and the lack of national

standards for toll plaza design, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration oversight of passenger motor

carriers operating on revoked authority, collision warning system performance standards and requirements

for new commercial vehicles, and vehicle incompatibility and heavy truck aggressivity. As a result of this

accident investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the U.S. Department of Energy, the

U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Highway

Administration, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and the

International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association. The Safety Board reiterates two recommendations

to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Records Management Division, CIO-40

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2006-916203 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Freightliner Tractor-Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Goshen Specialty Bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chevrolet Pickup, Ford Tractor-Box Trailer, and Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer . . . 7

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Vehicle 1: Freightliner Tractor-Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Vehicle 2: Goshen Specialty Bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Vehicle 3: Chevrolet Pickup Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Vehicle 4: Ford Tractor-Box Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Vehicle 5: Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Freightliner Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bus Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Other Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Vehicle Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Freightliner Tractor-Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Goshen Specialty Bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Chevrolet Pickup Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Ford Tractor-Box Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Operations Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Frontline Transportation Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Leisure Pursuit Charters, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Illinois State Toll Highway Authority System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Hampshire–Marengo Tollbooth Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Rumble Strips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Toxicological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Specialty Bus Tail Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Freightliner Gear Speed Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Forensic Evidence Documentation and Accident Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Toll Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Federal Highway Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

International Toll Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

State Vehicle Codes for Intermodal Trailer, Chassis, and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Vehicle Incompatibility and Heavy Truck Aggressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Accident Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Freightliner Driver Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Collision Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Intermodal Chassis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Oversight of Passenger Carriers Operating on Revoked Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Vehicle Incompatibility and Heavy Truck Aggressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Reiterated Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Appendixes

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

B: Freightliner Combination Vehicle Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

C: SDM Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

D: State Toll Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

E: SAFETEA-LU 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

F: Illinois Vehicle Code, Intermodal Equipment Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

ACC adaptive cruise control

AE algorithm enable

CDL commercial driver’s license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COSCO China Ocean Shipping Company

CSA Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 Initiative

CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

CWS collision warning system

DMV Department of Motor Vehicles

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

ECE Economic Commission for Europe

ECM electronic control module

EDGEN Engineering Dynamics Corporation General Analysis Tool

EDSMAC4 Engineering Dynamics Corporation Simulation of Automobile 

Collisions

EEPROM electronically erasable programmable read-only memory

ETC electronic toll collection

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

Florida DOT Florida Department of Transportation

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMCSRs Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

FY fiscal year

GCWR gross combination weight rating

GVWR gross vehicle weight rating

HM hazardous materials

HVE Human Vehicle Environment

I-90 Interstate 90

IBTTA International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association

ICC Interstate Commerce Commission

ITS intelligent transportation systems
Acronyms and Abbreviations vi Highway Accident Report

ISP Illinois State Police

ISTHA Illinois State Toll Highway Authority

IVI Intelligent Vehicle Initiative (NHTSA)

LTV light trucks and vans

MCMIS Motor Carrier Management Information System

MCSAP Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program

MP milepost

MUTCD Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NHS National Highway System

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

OOS out of service

ORT open road tolling

PRISM Performance Registration Information Systems Management

psi pound per square inch

SafeStat Safety Status Measurement System

SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 

Legacy for Users

SDM sensing diagnostic module

SIMON Simulation Model Nonlinear

TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century

U.S.C. United States Code

VMT vehicle miles traveled
vii Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On October 1, 2003, a multivehicle accident occurred on the approach to an

Interstate 90 (I-90) toll plaza near Hampshire, Illinois. About 2:57 p.m., a 1995

Freightliner tractor-trailer chassis and cargo container combination unit was traveling

eastbound on I-90, approaching the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza at milepost 41.6, when

it struck the rear of a 1999 Goshen GC2 25-passenger specialty bus. As both vehicles

moved forward, the specialty bus struck the rear of a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado 1500

pickup truck, which was pushed into the rear of a 1998 Ford conventional tractor-box

trailer. As its cargo container and chassis began to overturn, the Freightliner also struck the

upper portion of the pickup truck’s in-bed camper and the rear left side of the Ford trailer.

The Freightliner and the specialty bus continued forward and came to rest in the median.

The pickup truck was then struck by another eastbound vehicle, a 2000 Kenworth tractor

with Polar tank trailer. Eight specialty bus passengers were fatally injured, and 12

passengers sustained minor-to-serious injuries. The bus driver, the pickup truck driver, and

the Freightliner driver received minor injuries. The Ford driver and codriver and the

Kenworth driver were not injured.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accident was the failure of the Freightliner truck driver, who was operating his vehicle

too fast for traffic conditions, to slow for traffic. Contributing to the accident was the

traffic backup in a 45-mph zone, created by vehicles stopping for the Hampshire–Marengo

toll plaza. The structural incompatibility between the Freightliner tractor-trailer and the

specialty bus contributed to the severity of the accident.

The following safety issues were identified in this investigation:

• Toll plaza design and the lack of national standards for toll plaza design,

• Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) oversight of passenger

motor carriers operating on revoked authority,

• Collision warning system performance standards and requirements for new

commercial vehicles, and

• Vehicle incompatibility and heavy truck aggressivity.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes

recommendations to the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of

Transportation, the FMCSA, the Federal Highway Administration, the American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and the International Bridge,

Tunnel and Turnpike Association. The Safety Board reiterates two recommendations to

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

Synopsis

About 2:57 p.m.1 on October 1, 2003, a 1995 Freightliner tractor-trailer chassis

and cargo container combination unit, operated by Frontline Transportation Company of

Elk Grove Village, Illinois, was traveling eastbound on Interstate 90 (I-90) approaching

the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza (plaza 7) at milepost (MP) 41.6 near Hampshire,

Illinois (see figures 1 and 2), when it struck the rear of a 1999 Goshen GC2 25-passenger

specialty bus operated by Leisure Pursuit Charters, Inc. (Leisure), of Lake Bluff, Illinois.

(See figures 3 and 4.) As both vehicles moved forward, the specialty bus struck the rear of

a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 extended cab pickup truck, which was pushed into the

rear of a 1998 Ford conventional tractor-box trailer. (See figures 5 and 6.)

The Freightliner also struck the upper portion of the pickup truck’s in-bed camper

and the rear left side of the Ford trailer as the Freightliner’s cargo container and chassis

began to overturn. The Freightliner and the specialty bus continued forward and came to

rest in the median; the Freightliner’s trailer overturned completely. The pickup truck was

then struck by another eastbound vehicle, a 2000 Kenworth tractor with Polar tank trailer.

(See figures 7 and 8.) Eight bus passengers were fatally injured, and 12 passengers

sustained minor-to-serious injuries. The bus driver, the pickup truck driver, and the

Freightliner driver received minor injuries. The Ford driver and codriver and the

Kenworth driver were not injured.

.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times in this report are central daylight time.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

Figure 1. Regional map of accident location.

Figure 2. View of accident location, I-90 eastbound.

KANE

COUNTY

90

Lake

Michigan

DE KALB

COUNTY

McHENRY

COUNTY

Chicago

Accident location

(see inset)

N

90

Accident location

PLAZA 7

Hampshire-Marengo

Hampshire

20
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

Figure 3. Damaged Freightliner tractor-trailer. (Courtesy of Illinois State Police)

Figure 4. Damaged Goshen specialty bus.
Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

Figure 5. Damaged pickup truck. (Courtesy of Illinois State Police)

Figure 6. Damaged Ford tractor-box trailer.
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

Figure 7. Damaged Kenworth tractor-tank trailer.

Figure 8. Accident scene diagram.

Goshen

specialty bus

Freightliner

tractor-trailer position

Furrow and

plow marks

Gouge and

scrape marks

I-90

Westbound

Center median

I-90

Eastbound

Utility pole

Tire marks

Gouge and

scrape marks

Curved

tire marks

Kenworth tractor-tank

trailer position

Chevrolet

pickup truck

Ford tractor-box

trailer position

Milepost

41.5

Scale in feet

0 50 100 150 200

NORTH
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

Freightliner Tractor-Trailer

The Freightliner driver reported that on the morning of the accident, about

6:00 a.m., he picked up his tractor at a rental space in Chicago, Illinois, and completed a

10- to 15-minute pretrip inspection, verifying that the lights, tires, brakes, and other

equipment were in safe operating condition. Before picking up the accident chassis, he

picked up another chassis trailer and cargo container and delivered both to a rail yard. He

then drove to the Hamilton rail yard, where he picked up the accident chassis and empty

cargo container. He reported conducting a 14-minute inspection of the chassis trailer and

container—including the brakes,2 tires, and lights—and also said that he inspected the

cargo container for cleanliness and damage. From the Hamilton yard, he drove to Midwest

Recycling in Rockford, Illinois, where the cargo container was loaded with bundled

recycling paper. He then departed for the return trip to Chicago.

The Freightliner driver reported that he was traveling at a speed of 40 to 45 mph in

the right lane of I-90 east, following a specialty bus by about two car lengths.3

 He stated

that he routinely maintained this vehicle separation distance to prevent other vehicles from

changing lanes into his path.4 He reported that he remained in the right lane from the time

he departed Rockford until he reached the accident location and that he experienced

difficulty pulling the loaded container because of the small engine in his truck. The driver

said that traffic was moving normally into the toll plaza and that the sun was high and to

his rear, without glare or reflection. He stated that he maintained a constant view ahead

and was startled when he saw the specialty bus stopped just in front of his vehicle.

According to the Freightliner driver, the bus was not displaying brake lights. The driver

stated that he braked hard and turned the steering wheel to the left in an unsuccessful

attempt to avoid a collision. He said that he felt the truck brakes “grab,” but the braking

action was insufficient to stop the truck, and the trailer shifted to his left5 and went out of

control; the trailer overturned and the truck came to a stop in the median. The driver

remained in his truck until the police arrived and asked him to exit the vehicle.

Goshen Specialty Bus

On October 1, 2003, about 9:25 a.m., the accident specialty bus left Chicago with

20 passengers on board for a roundtrip sightseeing charter to Rockford. About 2:15 p.m.,

the bus departed Rockford for the return trip to Chicago. The bus driver stated that he was

in the left lane while on I-90 east and switched to the right lane 1 to 1.5 miles prior to the

accident location. He reported that he was traveling at a speed of approximately 45 mph

2 To ensure that the brakes were operational, the driver said that he visually inspected them, then

pulled the trailer forward and applied the brakes to bring the trailer to a stop.

3 A car length is typically 15 to 20 feet.

4 Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles, Illinois Commercial Driver’s License Study Guide

(Springfield, Illinois: Illinois DMV, 2003) 11, 43–44. “Following the vehicle ahead too closely is the failure

of a truck to leave sufficient distance for being overtaken by another vehicle.” One example given for proper

following speed is: “Over 40 mph, you would need 7 seconds for a 60-foot vehicle. Remember to add 1

second for speeds above 40 mph.” At 40 mph, a driver would need a headway of 410 feet—and at 45 mph,

462 feet. Both of these distances are more than 10 times the 2 car lengths (40 feet) described by the driver as

his typical following distance.

5 The trailer actually shifted and rolled to the right.
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

about 1 mile west of the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza when he observed a line of

vehicles approaching the plaza and gradually began to reduce speed to ensure passenger

comfort. The driver stated that the line of traffic was a little longer than usual and that only

one manual toll booth appeared to be in operation. According to the driver, this toll plaza

does not operate an automatic toll lane for commercial vehicles.

The bus driver reported that the sun was above and behind him at the time of the

accident and that he did not experience adverse sun glare or reflection. He said that he was

driving 10 mph about 0.5 mile from the toll plaza, when he observed in his left side mirror

a red tractor-trailer approaching in his lane at a high rate of speed. The driver reported

feeling the impact of the tractor-trailer and feeling his vehicle hit a vehicle ahead of him in

the right lane. The driver’s air bag deployed, the bus was pushed into the median, and the

driver reported steering to the right to avoid entering the westbound traffic lanes. The

driver said that he unbuckled his seat belt and stepped out of the bus to call for emergency

assistance.

Chevrolet Pickup, Ford Tractor-Box Trailer, and Kenworth Tractor-Tank 

Trailer

When the specialty bus was struck by the Freightliner, it was pushed forward and

struck a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck equipped with a bed-mounted camper. The

pickup truck driver stated that he had been traveling in the right lane at a constant speed of

50 mph when he suddenly heard a loud crash and was simultaneously forced back into his

seat by the impact of something striking his vehicle from behind. The driver reported that

he had been looking forward and did not observe the traffic behind him and had no

recollection of the vehicles ahead of him. He stated that he heard no other sounds prior to

the collision and had not braked, changed lanes, or made any other maneuver before the

accident. He remembered that his vehicle came to rest beneath a large truck and that he

was trapped in the driver’s seat. He had been wearing his three-point seat belt, and his air

bag deployed.

When the pickup truck was struck from behind by the specialty bus, the truck was

pushed forward into the rear of a 1998 Ford tractor pulling a box trailer. The driver of the

Ford combination unit stated to Safety Board investigators that he had been traveling in

the right lane at a speed of 30 to 35 mph while approaching the toll plaza. He recalled

following another tractor-semitrailer that was about two truck lengths ahead of him and

said that he had not noticed the traffic to his rear. He reported hearing a loud “explosion”

and feeling a simultaneous impact involving the rear of his vehicle, followed by two other

impacts, and immediately brought his truck to a stop. After departing his vehicle, he said

that he talked to the driver trapped in the cab of the pickup truck until emergency

personnel arrived.

The fifth vehicle involved in this accident was a 2000 Kenworth tractor-tank

trailer. The driver reported that he drove the same route weekly and, on the day of the

accident, was traveling in the right lane after reducing his speed from 62 mph in the posted

45-mph work area speed zone, anticipating slower traffic on the approach to the toll plaza.

He stated that he was following a pickup truck, which was 50 to 100 feet ahead of his
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

vehicle, and the pickup truck was closely following a Ford tractor-box trailer, when the

specialty bus and the Freightliner tractor-trailer passed him in the left lane and then

merged back into the right lane in front of him. He reported that, as he approached the toll

plaza, he did not notice whether a line of vehicles was waiting to go through the manual toll

booth. The Kenworth driver said that he observed the Freightliner in the left lane, braking

hard with brake lights illuminated, and then watched it collide with the Ford tractor-box

trailer and overturn. According to the Kenworth driver, he saw the pickup truck collide with

the Ford and then lost sight of it as his vehicle skidded forward. During this sequence, he

reported that he braked hard in an attempt to avoid becoming involved in the accident and

later realized that the front of his vehicle had collided with the pickup truck.

Injuries

Eight specialty bus passengers were killed, four passengers received serious

injuries, and eight received minor injuries. (See figure 9.) The bus driver, the pickup truck

driver, and the Freightliner driver sustained minor injuries.6

 The Ford driver and codriver

and the Kenworth driver were not injured. (See table 1.)

Table 1. Injuries.

6 Safety Board postaccident inspection of the specialty bus, pickup truck, and Freightliner drivers’

three-point seat belts revealed abrasions or “load marks” indicative of use at the time of the accident.

InjuryA

Specialty bus 

driver

Specialty bus 

passengers

Pickup truck and 

tractor-trailer 

driversB Total

Fatal 0 8 0 8

Serious 0 4 0 4

Minor 1 8 2 11

None 0 0 3 3

 Total 1 20 5 26

A Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results

in death within 30 days of the accident. It defines a serious injury as any injury that requires

hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days of the date of injury; results in a

fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe

hemorrhages or nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves secondor third-degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

B

 Chevrolet pickup truck, Freightliner tractor-trailer, Ford tractor-box trailer (including codriver), and

Kenworth tractor-tank trailer.
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Figure 9. Specialty bus seating diagram.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

INJURY LEGEND

F = FEMALE M = MALE # = AGE

Source: NTSB

N = None M= Minor S = Serious F = Fatal

 (E)

 (R)

 (NR)

 (PE)

RESTRAINED 

NOT RESTRAINED 

PARTIALLY EJECTED 

EJECTED 

SAMPLE

F - 14 : M

INJURY LEVEL 

AGE 

GENDER 

3

1

2

4

5

6

 F - 76 : F (NR-PE)

 F - 66 : M (NR)

 F - 52 : M (R)

 F - 66 : S (NR-E)

 F - 40 : S (R)

 F - 70 : S (NR)

 F - 64 : F (NR-E)

 F - 66 : F (R)

 F - 75 : F (NR-PE)

M - 57 : M (R) 

F - 73 : M (R) 

F - 56 : M (R) 

F - 53 : F 

F - 67 : M (R-PE) 

F - 74 : F (R) 

F - 54 : F (R) 

M - 74 : S (NR) 

F - 73 : M (NR) 

F - 66 : F (NR-PE) 

F - 78 : M (NR) 

F - 58 : M (NR) 

A B C D

A B C D E
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

Safety Board investigators interviewed 11 of the 12 surviving specialty bus

passengers, and most stated that they were sleeping when the accident occurred. Those

passengers who reported that they were restrained7 recalled their seats being thrown

forward and becoming entangled in the interior vehicle wreckage. Some passengers exited

the bus onto the roadside, and rescue personnel extricated the entrapped passengers. Two

passengers seated in the first row on the right were ejected from the bus, and one was

fatally injured. One passenger seated in the fourth row on the left, though restrained with a

lap belt, was partially ejected and sustained minor injuries. Three other fatally injured

passengers, seated in the fifth and sixth rows, were partially ejected.

Emergency Response

At 2:56 p.m., Kane County Sheriff’s dispatchers and the Illinois State Police (ISP)

were notified of the accident through 911 communications, and they immediately initiated

an emergency response. The first emergency medical personnel and police and fire

responders arrived on scene at 3:05 p.m. The ISP and 27 local fire and rescue departments

and other emergency service agencies responded to the accident, as did 13 ambulances

and 4 medical flight helicopters. A lieutenant from the Hampshire Fire Department served

as incident commander for the medical and fire response.

Damage

Vehicle 1: Freightliner Tractor-Trailer

The Safety Board’s postaccident inspection of the 1995 Freightliner FLD tractor

and Theurer trailer cargo container combination unit revealed tire damage to the steer axle

left and right tires and to the outside tires on the second and third axles; the fourth and fifth

axle outside tires received superficial cuts. The steering and suspension systems were not

damaged. The brake system accessory line had a small air leak due to accident damage.

The trailer frame, which had overturned on the roadway and traveled through the median

before coming to rest, was deformed; the tractor remained upright and attached to the

trailer by the kingpin. The trailer chassis remained engaged to the cargo container at the

rear lock pins (the front left and right lock pins were disengaged, and mud was embedded

in the lock pin opening).

In the tractor cab interior, the floorboard—as well as the firewall and steering

wheel—were displaced aft approximately 11 inches. The dashboard and accessory panel

were deformed rearward within a few inches of the driver’s seat. The driver’s three-point

restraint showed abrasions to the webbing.

7 Although the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards do not require restraints, the passenger seats

were equipped with lap belts.
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle 2: Goshen Specialty Bus

Postaccident inspection of the 1999 Goshen GC2 25-passenger specialty bus

showed accident damage both to the front and rear of the vehicle. The right front corner of

the bus, which struck the bumper of the pickup truck, sustained damage that continued

down the right side of the bus, crushing the boarding door area and sidewall rearward, and

intruded approximately 4 feet into the front of the passenger compartment. Impact damage

from the Freightliner displaced the rear of the passenger compartment interior forward

approximately 5 feet. The right front and right rear tires sustained abrasion damage. (See

figure 10.) Longitudinal deformation of the frame rails was less than 5 inches when

measured from the inside edge on an exemplar vehicle’s bumper. (See figure 11.)

Figure 10. Specialty bus rear-impact damage.
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

Damage to the bus interior was also documented. The 3/4-inch plywood flooring,

which had been bolted through a rubber grommet to anchorage points on the vehicle

chassis frame rails, was buckled in the rear at the floor seam and pushed forward.

Emergency response personnel had removed four seats—the right side pair of seats in

rows four and five—for passenger extrication. In the sixth row, the rear impact tore the

passenger seats (all but the right side window seat) from the floor mountings; the floormounted rails connecting the seats were cut to gain access to passengers during the

emergency response. Several seatback tray tables were broken, and several seat footrests

and both the left and right modesty panels at the front of the bus were deformed. The

driver’s air bag deployed. Seat belt webbing abrasions were observed at the driver’s

location and at passenger seats 2C, 3A, 3B, 3D, 4A, 4B, and 5A. The restraint webbing at

passenger seat 4B was cut during the emergency response.

Vehicle 3: Chevrolet Pickup Truck

The front-loading door area of the specialty bus struck the rear bumper of the 2000

Chevrolet 1500 extended cab pickup truck, and the overturning Freightliner trailer struck

the camper shell in the truck bed. After impact with the rear of the Ford tractor-box trailer,

the pickup truck was struck in the rear by the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer. The roof and

left side rail of the cab were crushed downward, touching the headrest atop the driver’s

bucket seat. Intrusion of the back panel of the extended cab into the driver’s seatback was

significant. The left portion of the dashboard was deformed rearward toward the driver’s

seat. Inspection of the driver’s three-point restraint showed evidence of abrasion to the

webbing near the D-ring on the B-pillar; the driver’s air bag deployed. In addition, the

master cylinder and brake booster were damaged, the left rear wheel assembly was

detached, and the electronic and hydraulic lines were severed.

Figure 11. Overlay of exemplar specialty bus to accident vehicle.
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle 4: Ford Tractor-Box Trailer

The 1998 Ford conventional tractor was not damaged. The Trailmobile box

trailer—approximately 53 feet long and 8.5 feet wide—was damaged at the left rear

corner, where approximately 11.5 feet had been scraped and crushed downward and

inward by the Freightliner trailer as it overturned. Of the two loading doors at the rear of

the trailer, the left door and left corner framing were broken and crushed into the cargo

area, and the center latch area of the right door was damaged. At the left rear corner, the

roof of the trailer had bent upward.

Vehicle 5: Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer

The 2000 Kenworth T803 tractor sustained damage to the quick-connect valve on

the brake’s air system and to the right front of the grill and bumper when it struck the rear

of the pickup truck. The Polar tank trailer of this combination unit was not damaged.

Driver Information

Freightliner Driver

Certification and Experience. The 49-year-old Freightliner driver held a valid

Illinois class A8 commercial driver’s license (CDL), with a corrective lenses restriction

and an expiration date of January 5, 2006. He possessed a valid medical certificate issued

August 6, 2003, approximately 2 months prior to the accident, with an expiration date of

August 6, 2005. The driver had 13 years of truck driving experience and had been

employed full time by Frontline Transportation Company for 6 weeks at the time of the

accident.

Medical. According to the Freightliner driver, he did not take any prescription

medications, was wearing his prescription eyeglasses at the time of the accident, and was

not fatigued.

Duty Status. The Freightliner driver reported that he picked up his tractor about

6:00 a.m.; picked up and delivered a chassis trailer and cargo container; and then picked

up the accident chassis and cargo container and traveled to Midwest Recycling in

Rockford, Illinois, where the container was loaded. He said that he had driven the

Chicago–Rockford route on four or five previous occasions. Table 2 summarizes his 72-

hour history based on the Safety Board’s interview of the driver.

8 Class A license classification includes any combination of vehicles with a gross combination weight

rating (GCWR) of 26,001 pounds or more, provided that the gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of the

vehicle(s) being towed exceeds 10,000 pounds. (Holders of a class A license may, with appropriate

endorsements, operate all vehicles within classes B, C, and D.)
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

Table 2. Freightliner driver’s 72-hour history.

Bus Driver

Certification and Experience. At the time of the accident, the 57-year-old bus

driver held an Illinois class B9

 CDL, with a passenger endorsement and an expiration date

of September 27, 2007. The bus driver did not possess a valid medical certificate in

accordance with 49 CFR 391.41. His medical certificate had been issued in 1999 and had

expired in 2001.

While working for Leisure, the bus driver had accumulated 6.5 years of experience

driving buses similar to the accident bus. He said that he was very familiar with the I-90

route, having traveled it many times. He had previously worked as a professional

firefighter with the Great Lakes Naval Training Center, where he operated heavy fire

department vehicles and served as a driving instructor.

Medical. During an interview with Safety Board investigators, the bus driver

stated that he was a Type II diabetic and used prescribed medications to control the

condition. The driver reported that he was taking the prescription medications Lotensin,

Actose, Amoryl, and Metformin daily; monitored his blood sugar and diet; and had

undergone cataract surgery on his right eye during the year prior to the accident. On

October 10, 2003, following the accident, the bus driver passed a complete physical

examination for commercial driver fitness and was issued a valid medical certificate. The

medical examination report indicated that the driver’s Type II diabetes was well controlled

through the use of prescribed oral medication.

Duty Status. The bus driver reported for duty at 7:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He

then drove the accident bus 35 miles from the company headquarters in Lake Bluff,

Illinois, to downtown Chicago, where he arrived at 9:15 a.m. He loaded his passengers

and departed on a round-trip route from Chicago to Rockford at 9:25 a.m. At 2:15 p.m., he

departed Rockford for the return trip to Chicago. Table 3 presents his 72-hour history

based on the Safety Board’s interview of the driver. The bus driver was not required to

keep driver logs due to the local nature of his operations.10

9 Class B license classification includes any single vehicle with a GVWR of 26,001 pounds or more, or

any such vehicle towing a vehicle not exceeding 10,000 pounds GVWR. (Holders of a class B license may,

with appropriate endorsements, operate all vehicles within class C, which includes any vehicle weighing

26,000 pounds [GVWR] or less designed to transport 16 or more people.)

10 The bus driver’s operations fell within the 100-air-mile exemption. See <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregulations/administration/fmcsr/395.1.htm#e>, January 31, 2006.

 DAY TIME (DAYLIGHT)

1:002:003:004:005:006:007:008:009:0010:0011:0012:0013:0014:0015:0016:0017:0018:0019:0020:0021:0022:0023:0024:00

9/28/2003

9/29/2003

9/30/2003

10/1/2003

 Off Duty On Duty Sleeping

NIGHT TIME (DARKNESS) NIGHT TIME (DARKNESS)
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

Table 3. Bus driver’s 72-hour history.

Other Drivers

Chevrolet Pickup Truck. The 67-year-old pickup truck driver was traveling

eastbound on I-90 from Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, to Bartlett, Illinois. The evening prior to

the accident day he had been camping in Horicon, Wisconsin, and reported that he slept

from 11:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m. in his camper, which was mounted in the bed of his truck.

Ford Tractor-Box Trailer. The 56-year-old Ford driver had 27 years of truck

driving experience as an employee of Penner International, Inc. At the time of the

accident, he was driving eastbound on I-90 en route to Durham, North Carolina, from

Steinbach, Manitoba, Canada, transporting a box trailer containing 25 pallets of

prescription medication. His codriver was asleep in the sleeper berth.

Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer. The 59-year-old Kenworth driver was an

employee of Carl Klemm, Inc., and had 36 years of truck driving experience. At the time

of the accident, he was transporting a tanker load of ink dye capsule liquid and was

traveling eastbound on I-90, en route to West Carrollton, Ohio, from Portage, Wisconsin.

The driver said that he had been on vacation for several days before returning to work on

the day of the accident.

Vehicle Information

Freightliner Tractor-Trailer

The 1995 Freightliner model FLD tractor was equipped with a Cummins Inc.

M11-330E electronic diesel fuel injection engine and nine-speed manual Eaton Fuller

Corporation RTX transmission. The tractor was owned and operated by the accident

driver, who was working for Frontline Transportation Company11 of Elk Grove Village,

Illinois. The wheel base was 235 inches, and the tractor’s GVWR was 46,000 pounds.12

The 1984 Theurer Inc. model 220-CC-40GN trailer chassis was owned by TRAC Lease

Incorporated of New York, New York,13 and leased to China Ocean Shipping Company

(COSCO). The accident trailer had a DOT Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

inspection sticker dated June 2003.

11 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) No. 880860.

12 For tractor, chassis trailer, and cargo container details, see appendix B.

13 At the time of the accident, TRAC Lease owned approximately 205,000 chassis trailers nationwide.

 DAY TIME (DAYLIGHT)

1:002:003:004:005:006:007:008:009:0010:0011:0012:0013:0014:0015:0016:0017:0018:0019:0020:0021:0022:0023:0024:00

9/28/2003

9/29/2003

9/30/2003

10/1/2003

 Off Duty On Duty Sleeping

NIGHT TIME (DARKNESS) NIGHT TIME (DARKNESS)
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

The trailer was about 41 feet long and 8 feet wide and had a GVWR of 72,715

pounds. The tractor-trailer chassis combination unit was equipped with Rockwell

automatic slack adjusters on the first, second, and third axles.14 The fourth and fifth trailer

axles15 were equipped with 6-inch manual slack adjusters. The tractor container trailer

combination unit was equipped with a pneumatic air brake system. COSCO had a contract

with Hamilton Container Service of Chicago, Illinois, to inspect, maintain, and store its

chassis trailers. Hamilton had last inspected the accident trailer on June 5, 2003, and the

last brake adjustment on the trailer had been completed in November 2002. The 40-footlong, 9.5-foot-high cargo container on the chassis was filled with bundled magazines and

newspapers. The gross maximum weight of the chassis, cargo container, and cargo was

67,200 pounds.

The Theurer chassis front lock pins (left and right) could be set in an unlocked or a

slide-in locked position in a metal bracket. During Safety Board inspection of the trailer,

the front two lock pins appeared to be in the unlocked position. Small-gauge wire was

wrapped around the area of the left front lock pin. The rear lock pins were twist locks that

secured the cargo container to the chassis.

During postaccident inspection, Safety Board investigators took pushrod stroke

measurements and compared them to adjustment limits to determine whether they were

within the limit (2 inches) for nondefective brakes. The fourth axle right-side brake

exceeded the 2-inch adjustment limit by 1/16 inch. The left and right brakes on the fifth

axle exceeded the 2-inch limit by 1/2 inch. As clamp-type pneumatic brakes, the fourth

axle right brake and the left and right brakes on the fifth axle would be considered out of

adjustment.16

Postaccident, the ISP weighed the Freightliner and chassis cargo container

combination unit at 76,480 pounds. The heights of the bumper and underlying structural

members were also documented. On a Freightliner exemplar tractor, the front bumper,17

which was 16.8 to 28.8 inches above ground, was about 12 inches high. The structural

member of the truck-tractor front bumper was a 9.25- by 74.3- by 0.179-inch seven-gauge

steel channel. The bottom of the channel on the loaded truck-tractor was approximately

22.1 inches above ground,18 and the top of the channel was approximately 31.4 inches

above ground. (See figure 12.)

14 The steer axle was equipped with 15-inch brake drums; the second and third axles had 16.5-inch

brake drums.

15 The trailer chassis was equipped with 16.5-inch brake drums on the fourth and fifth axles.

16 Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, North American Standard Out-of-Service Criteria

(Washington, DC: CVSA, 2002) 15.

17 The front bumper is constructed of flexible, aerodynamic molded plastic.

18 Freightliner LLC told investigators that the structural component behind the bumper is about 1.75

inches higher in the unloaded condition.
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

Goshen Specialty Bus

The 1999 Ford E-450 Super-Duty chassis was equipped with a 6.8-liter V-10

engine, a four-speed automatic Ford 4R100 transmission, and a 1999 Goshen GC2 body

unit. When inspected postaccident, the odometer indicated 165,457 miles. The chassis was

equipped with four-wheel hydraulic disc brakes with two piston calipers. During

postaccident inspection, the ISP and Safety Board investigators noted no brake system

defects. The GVWR of the specialty bus was 14,050 pounds, and the wheel base was 158

inches. The ISP weighed the specialty bus at 9,860 pounds. On an exemplar bus, the rear

bumper, which was 20.4 to 28.8 inches above ground, was about 8.4 inches high. The

bumper mounts directly to the end of the frame rails on the chassis. (See figure 13.)

The 25-passenger bus body was equipped with a driver’s bucket seat and five rows

of four bench seats, two on each side of the bus. The sixth row, which spanned the width

of the bus, was a bench seat with five passenger positions. Each passenger seat was

equipped with a two-point (lap belt only) restraint system. The driver’s seat was equipped

with a three-point restraint and frontal air bag.

Figure 12. Freightliner bumper heights.
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

Chevrolet Pickup Truck

The 2000 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 extended cab pickup truck was equipped with

a 5.3-liter V8 engine, automatic transmission, and Shadow Cruiser camper mounted in the

pickup bed. The camper was approximately 7 feet wide, 8 feet long, and 62 inches high

when closed. The pickup had a four-wheel antilock braking system, four-wheel hydraulic

disc brakes, and single-piston calipers. This vehicle was also equipped with a driver’s

frontal air bag, which deployed during the accident sequence. The air bag system was

electronically controlled by a sensing diagnostic module (SDM) located under the driver’s

seat. In addition to its primary function of sensing a crash event and deploying the

vehicle’s air bag, the SDM was also capable of recording a limited amount of crash data

related to the air bag deployment. Safety Board investigators and the ISP conducted a

download of the SDM data on October 4, 2003, using the ISP’s Vetronix Corporation

Crash Data Retrieval Tool. (See appendix C for details.)

Ford Tractor-Box Trailer

The 1998 Ford tractor was equipped with a Cummins N14-370F diesel engine and

Fuller transmission. When inspected postaccident, the vehicle odometer indicated 395,896

miles. The Ford did not have a dedicated event data recorder, and the engine’s electronic

control module (ECM) was not designed to capture or monitor operational or accidentFigure 13. Specialty bus bumper heights.
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

related data. The tractor was not damaged in the accident. The 2003 Trailmobile Canada

Limited trailer, which sustained some damage, was 53 feet long and 8.5 feet wide. During

postaccident inspection, Safety Board investigators found no anomalies in the vehicle’s

operating systems.

Kenworth Tractor-Tank Trailer

The 2000 Kenworth T803 tractor was equipped with a Cummins model C12-380

diesel engine and 10-speed Fuller manual transmission. When inspected postaccident, the

vehicle odometer indicated 506,934 miles. The 1981 Polar tank trailer was owned by

Klemm Tank Lines and had a postaccident hub meter reading of 96,509 miles.

Operations Information

Frontline Transportation Company

The Freightliner driver, an owner/operator of his tractor, had leased the tractor to

Frontline and was an employee of Frontline. According to the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration (FMCSA) registration, Frontline Transportation Company19 was an

authorized interstate for-hire carrier20 of general freight and intermodal containers,

headquartered in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. The company began business in 1999. In

October 2003, Frontline reported 14 full-time drivers, 2 company tractors, 12 leased

tractors, and 20 leased trailers. Other employees included the company president, one

manager/supervisor, and two dispatchers.

Frontline operated under contract to COSCO, which operated a fleet of vessels and

leased the intermodal chassis equipment.21,22 Because COSCO was not an interstate forhire carrier, it was not registered with the FMCSA. Ocean carriers such as COSCO use

trailer chassis to move their international shipping cargo containers from ports to rail

yards, from rail yards to customers, or directly from ports to customers. Like COSCO,

which was leasing the accident trailer from TRAC Lease, many ocean carriers contract

with other companies to provide chassis on demand at the port where the cargo is

unloaded.23

19 DOT No. 880860.

20 A “for-hire” carrier is a person or company that transports cargo or passengers for compensation.

21 Most international ocean carrier regulation falls under the Federal Maritime Commission, which is

outside DOT oversight.

22 When COSCO freight arrived at the ports in containers, it was loaded onto chassis trailers for

transport to customers or delivered to rail yards for transport to other rail yards. Once the freight arrived at

the port or final rail yard, Frontline transported the chassis-contained freight to COSCO customers.

23 Peter F. Swan, A Study of the Economic Impacts and the Need for Proposed Changes to Intermodal

Container Chassis Inspection Rules (Alexandria, VA: American Trucking Associations, 2004) 6. See

<www.truckline.com>, January 31, 2006.
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

According to the FMCSA, Frontline received a compliance review on August 23,

2002, that resulted in a conditional rating. Frontline was cited for driver logbook

violations and vehicle and maintenance record violations, as defined in Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs), 49 CFR 396.11(a) and 395.8(a). The FMCSA did

not conduct another compliance review until October 7, 2003. This postaccident review

resulted in an unsatisfactory rating. Frontline was cited for multiple violations, some of

which included:

• Failing to conduct preemployment drug testing (49 CFR 382.301(a)),

• Failing to maintain an accident register (49 CFR 390.15(b)),

• Failing to conduct inquiries with previous employers (49 CFR 40.25(b) and

382.105),

• Failing to maintain vehicle maintenance records (49 CFR 396.3(b)), and

• Failing to require drivers to make a record-of-duty status (49 CFR 395.8(a)).

After receiving the unsatisfactory rating, Frontline had 60 days to correct its

deficiencies or the FMCSA could prohibit it from operating in interstate commerce. On

November 26, 2003, the FMCSA conducted a followup compliance review of Frontline

and found several noncritical violations;24 the FMCSA concluded that Frontline had

improved and gave the company an overall conditional rating.25 In April 2004,

Frontline ceased operations after the FMCSA made an out-of-service (OOS)

determination; Frontline had failed to pay fines assessed during the postaccident

compliance review.

Leisure Pursuit Charters, Inc.

Leisure Pursuit Charters owned the specialty bus involved in the accident. The

FMCSA listed Leisure Pursuit Incorporated, doing business as Leisure Pursuit Charters,

as an interstate for-hire passenger carrier26 operating out of headquarters in Lake Bluff,

Illinois. At the time of the accident, Leisure had a fleet of six buses and employed four

full-time and nine part-time drivers. According to the company, which incorporated in

1989, its business slowed after September 11, 2001, and it dropped its Interstate

Commerce Commission (ICC)27 permit and reduced insurance coverage from the required

24 These violations included failing to require a driver to furnish a list of motor vehicle traffic violations

every 12 months, using a driver who had not completed and furnished an employment application, requiring

or permitting a driver to drive more than 10 hours, failing to require a driver to make a record-of-duty status,

and failing to require a driver to prepare a driver vehicle inspection report.

25 The conditional rating was the result of an “unsatisfactory” in the accident category; the other

categories were rated “satisfactory.” Frontline had 5.714 recordable crashes per million miles (4 recordable

crashes multiplied by 1 million miles, divided by 700,000 total actual operated miles). A rate of 0.00 to 1.50

is considered “satisfactory,” while a rate greater than 1.50 is considered “unsatisfactory.”

26 DOT No. 679636.

27 Effective January 1, 1996, the ICC was abolished, and a number of its functions were eliminated. The

remaining motor carrier (trucking) functions were transferred to the DOT (and are now under the authority

of the FMCSA).
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

$5 million to $1.5 million in December 2001.28 The insurance company notified the

FMCSA of the lowered coverage, and the FMCSA subsequently sent Leisure a letter

saying that its operating authority would be revoked if it failed to comply with the

insurance requirements. According to the FMCSA, Leisure failed to respond to the

notification letter and did not increase its insurance minimum. The FMCSA revoked

Leisure’s interstate operating authority on January 29, 2002. The company president told

Safety Board investigators that he did not receive the FMCSA revocation letter (because

of an office move), and Leisure continued to operate with the reduced insurance.

During the postaccident compliance review,29 the FMCSA documented at least

eight interstate charters taken by Leisure after the date of its revocation of operating

authority.30,31 During one of these interstate trips, on March 5, 2002, a driver was pulled

over in Wisconsin, subjected to a level 332 roadside inspection, and cited for speeding. The

inspection was for the driver only, and information related to the interstate operating status

of the carrier (which had been revoked) was not gathered. The driver had been pulled over

by a patrol officer who was certified to conduct driver-only inspections and did not have

laptop computer access to the FMCSA enforcement database, which would have indicated

that Leisure was inactive. At the time, only ISP Commercial Motor Vehicle Division

officers were certified to conduct vehicle-level inspections and had access to the FMCSA

safety databases.33

When the accident occurred, Leisure owned six vehicles, most of which were

operating either daily or weekly and were similar to the accident vehicle, with a seating

capacity of 16 passengers or more. Because of the number of passengers permitted on

board these vehicles, the operator or carrier was required to maintain $5 million in

insurance because it was still conducting interstate business.

28 Title 49 CFR 387.33 requires that any for-hire motor carrier with a seating capacity of 16 passengers

or more operating in interstate or foreign commerce have a minimum $5 million insurance coverage.

29 During the postaccident compliance review, Leisure was cited and fined by the FMCSA for using a

driver prior to receiving preemployment drug screening results ($1,760), inadequate or lack of financial

responsibility ($2,330), and having no medical certificate in the accident driver’s qualification file ($390).

According to the Illinois Secretary of State, the Leisure Pursuit Corporation was dissolved on July 1, 2004.

30 The compliance review did not result in inspection of every charter trip taken by Leisure after its

revocation date; these eight interstate trips were found during a review of driver records.

31 In addition, the FMCSA compliance review listed the following violations: failing to randomly test

drivers for controlled substances and alcohol; failing to investigate a driver’s background; failing to

maintain a list or certificate relating to violations of motor vehicle laws and ordinances; failing to maintain

medical examiners’ certificates in drivers’ qualification files; operating a motor vehicle providing

transportation without the required registration or beyond the scope of the registration; requiring or

permitting a driver to drive after having been on duty for more than 70 hours in 8 consecutive days; failing to

keep a record of tests on push-out windows, emergency doors, and emergency door marking lights on buses;

and using a commercial vehicle that was not periodically inspected.

32 Level 3 is a driver-only inspection in which the inspector examines the driver’s license, medical

certificate, record-of-duty status, hours of service, and seat belt use.

33 An ISP senior enforcement officer reported that driver-only inspections account for about 25 percent

of roadside inspections, while vehicle walk-around inspections account for the remaining 75 percent. Since

this accident, ISP patrol officers have been certified to conduct both driver-only and walk-around vehicle

inspections and have laptop computer access to the FMCSA databases.
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

The FMCSA was established as a separate administration within DOT on

January 1, 2000, pursuant to the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. Its

primary mission is to reduce accidents, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and

buses. According to the FMCSA, the agency develops and enforces data-driven

regulations and uses safety information systems to focus on higher risk carriers. The

FMCSA requires a motor carrier to have adequate management controls that comply with

applicable safety requirements and uses a rating formula to determine a motor carrier’s

safety fitness. The FMCSA mission is primarily accomplished through on-site compliance

reviews and roadside inspections of a carrier’s vehicles and drivers.

Compliance Reviews. In accordance with 49 CFR Part 385, appendix A, the first

step in the safety fitness rating methodology is an FMCSA-conducted compliance review.

Applying six factors (see table 4), the FMCSA rates a carrier’s compliance with the

FMCSRs, which establish safe operating requirements for commercial vehicle drivers,

carriers, vehicles, and vehicle equipment. A carrier may be selected for a compliance

review if identified as a high risk because of:

• A Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) score,34

• A complaint against the company,

• An enforcement followup to ensure that an enforcement action was effective,

• Involvement in a fatal accident,

• Involvement in a major hazardous materials (HM) accident, 35

• A DOT Office of Inspector General request,

• A congressional inquiry, or

• A carrier’s request.

In fiscal year (FY) 2003, 9,068 Federal compliance reviews were conducted; in FY

2004, 7,637; and in FY 2005, 7,998.36 In Illinois, the FMCSA has revoked the operating

authority of 270 carriers since 2002.

34 SafeStat is an automated, data-driven analysis system that is designed to incorporate on-road safety

performance information and enforcement history with on-site compliance review information to measure

the relative safety fitness of interstate motor carriers.

35 According to the FMCSA, compliance reviews occurring outside the Motor Carrier Safety

Assistance Program (MCSAP) are based on focus areas (HM or passenger carriers) identified in each State’s

safety plan and congressional mandates, such as public complaints and revisiting “conditional”-rated

carriers.

36 See (a) <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/mcspr-03-31-05.html>, January 4, 2006.

(b) <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/mcspr-12-31-05.htm>, February 24, 2006. These

statistics are current as of the dates shown.
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

Table 4. Motor carrier safety rating factors.

The six factors listed in table 4 provide the basis for determining a carrier’s safety

rating, that is, the degree to which the carrier is in compliance with the FMCSRs and

meets the Federal safety fitness standard. As defined below, each factor is rated

“satisfactory,” “conditional,” or “unsatisfactory,” except the accident factor, which is rated

either “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory”:

• A satisfactory rating indicates that the carrier has not violated any acute

regulations37 or shown a pattern of noncompliance with critical regulations.38

• A conditional rating indicates that the carrier has violated one acute regulation

or has a pattern of noncompliance with critical regulations.

• An unsatisfactory rating indicates that the carrier has violated two or more

acute regulations or has a pattern of noncompliance with two or more critical

regulations.

The rating for factor 6, the accident factor, is based on the number of recordable

accidents39 in relation to the carrier’s annual mileage. According to the FMCSA, an

accident rate below 1.5 per million miles is considered “satisfactory”; anything higher is

rated “unsatisfactory.”

The ratings for the first five factors and the accident factor (number of recordable

accidents per million miles traveled in the 12 months prior to the compliance review) are

entered into a rating table, which is used to establish the motor carrier’s overall safety

rating (see table 5). Each of the six factors receives equal weight.

Factor Applicable FMCSRs or other criteria

1–General Parts 387 and 390

2–Driver Parts 382, 383, and 391

3–Operational Parts 392 and 395

4–Vehicle Parts 393 and 396

5–Hazardous materials Parts 171, 177, 180, and 397

6–Accident Recordable preventable rate

37 Acute violations of the FMCSRs or HM regulations—for example, requiring or permitting the

operation of an OOS vehicle before repairs are made—demand immediate corrective action regardless of the

motor carrier’s overall safety posture (49 CFR Part 385, appendix B II(b)).

38 Critical violations indicate deficiencies in the motor carrier’s management controls, such as requiring

or permitting a driver to drive after having been on duty for 15 hours (49 CFR Part 385, appendix B II(b)).

39 The FMCSA defines a recordable accident as an occurrence involving a commercial motor vehicle

operating on a public road in interstate or intrastate commerce that results in a fatality, a bodily injury, or a

vehicle incurring disabling damage that requires it to be towed from the scene (49 CFR 390.5).
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

Table 5. Motor carrier safety rating table.

In September 2005, Safety Board staff met with the FMCSA and learned that it is

currently evaluating the compliance review process as part of the Comprehensive Safety

Analysis (CSA) 2010 Initiative. According to the FMCSA, the CSA 2010 Initiative is an

effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the FMCSA’s current safety compliance and

enforcement programs, such as compliance reviews and roadside inspections, and to

identify better methods of achieving a crash-free environment. The FMCSA indicated that

the evaluation is still in its early stages, no conclusions have been reached, and it is too

soon to speculate on what specific changes may be made in the safety rating process. Full

implementation of any changes proposed by the initiative is not expected until 2010.

Roadside Inspections. Most State roadside inspections are conducted under the

FMCSA-administered MCSAP, a Federal grant program that provides States with

financial assistance to hire staff and implement strategies to enforce the FMCSRs.

MCSAP provides funds to promote the detection and correction of commercial motor

vehicle safety defects, commercial vehicle driver deficiencies, and unsafe motor carrier

practices before they become contributing factors to accidents or HM incidents. Under the

FMCSA roadside inspection program, qualified safety inspectors carry out commercial

vehicle roadside inspections in compliance with the North American Standard Inspection

Program guidelines, which were developed by the CVSA and the FMCSA. During

roadside inspections, an inspector examines vehicles or their drivers or both to determine

whether they meet the FMCSRs. The five levels of inspection are:

• Level I: Examination of the driver’s license, medical examiner’s certificate and

waiver (if applicable), alcohol and drugs, driver’s record-of-duty status (as

required), hours of service, seat belt, vehicle inspection report, brake system,

coupling devices, exhaust system, frame, fuel system, turn signals, brake

lamps, tail lamps, head lamps, lamps on projecting loads, safe loading, steering

mechanism, suspension, tires, van and open-top trailer bodies, wheels and

rims, windshield wipers, emergency exits on buses, and HM requirements.

• Level II: A walk-around driver/vehicle inspection that includes each of the

items specified under the North American Standard Inspection Program

guidelines. At a minimum, level II inspections must include level I items; it is

assumed that the walk-around driver/vehicle inspection includes only those

items that can be inspected without physically getting under the vehicle.

Number of factors with 

unsatisfactory ratings

Number of factors with

conditional ratings

Resultant overall

safety rating

0 2 or less Satisfactory

0 More than 2 Conditional

1 2 or less Conditional

1 More than 2 Unsatisfactory

2 or more 0 Unsatisfactory
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

• Level III: A driver/credential examination that includes, at a minimum, as

required or applicable, examination of the driver’s license, medical

certification, skill performance evaluation certificate, driver’s record-of-duty

status, hours of service, seat belt, and HM requirements. Those items not

indicated in the North American Standard level III driver/credential inspection

procedure are not included in a level III inspection.

• Level IV: A “special inspection,” normally in support of a study or to verify or

refute a suspected trend, that typically includes a one-time examination of a

particular item—for example, a postaccident examination of commercial

vehicles involved in an accident.

• Level V: A vehicle-only inspection that includes each of the vehicle inspection

items specified under level I, without a driver present, conducted at any

location.

Once an inspection is completed, the finding of serious safety violations can result

in the issuance of driver or vehicle OOS orders. Any such violations must be corrected

before the affected driver or vehicle can return to service. (See table 6 for roadside

inspection data.)

Table 6. Registered vehicles, roadside inspections, and OOS data.

According to 49 CFR 350.213(b)(4), to obtain MCSAP funding, a State must

conduct activities to enforce registration requirements under 49 United States Code

(U.S.C.) 13902 and 49 CFR Part 365 and financial responsibility requirements under 49

U.S.C. 31138 and 31139 and 49 CFR Part 387.40 In addition, to qualify for MCSAP basic

program funds under 49 CFR 350.201, a State must enforce financial responsibility

requirements under 49 U.S.C. 13906, 31138, and 31139 and 49 CFR Part 387. In FY 2004,

the State of Illinois received $5.6 million in MCSAP funding.41

Type of 

vehicle

2003 

Registered 

vehiclesA

FY 2003 

Roadside 

inspections

FY 2004 

Roadside 

inspectionsB

FY 2004 

Driver 

inspections 

(OOS rate)

FY 2004 

Vehicle 

inspections 

(OOS rate)

FY 2005

Roadside

inspections

Large 

trucks

7,912,018 2,991,788 

(37.8%)

2,949,487 

(37.3%)

2,859,219 

(6.7%)

2,159,368 

(23.9%)

2,950,640

(37.3%)

Buses 776,550 42,377

(5.5%)

42,864

(5.5%)

23,568

(5.1%)

36,731 

(9.5%)

48,625

(6.3%)

SOURCE: See <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/analysis-statistics/mcspr-03-01-06.htm> and Motor 

Carrier Safety Progress report, June 30, 2004.

ARegistered vehicles are those that have been registered through a State motor vehicle department; as of December 

23, 2005, the most recent year for which data are available is 2003.

BRoadside inspections may include driver and vehicle within the same inspection count. 

40 See <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rules-regulations/administration/fmcsr/350.213.htm>, January 31, 2006.

41 Information obtained from Safety Programs Office, FMCSA.
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

Insurance Compliance and Operating Authority Revocation. According to

FMCSA safety regulations at 49 CFR 387.33, any for-hire motor carrier of passengers

operating in interstate or foreign commerce with a seating capacity of 16 persons or more

must have minimum insurance coverage of $5 million. When a passenger carrier no longer

carries the minimum insurance, or a policy is set to expire, the insurance company notifies

the FMCSA, which then sends a letter to the carrier, giving it 90 days to either renew or

change insurance. If the carrier fails to comply, the FMCSA revokes the carrier’s

operating authority and changes its operating status to “inactive” within FMCSA

databases.42 According to the FMCSA,43 a carrier that continues to operate while inactive

is “rarely prosecuted through compliance reviews or roadside inspections.”44

The FMCSA has indicated that, in January 2004, as part of its insurance

compliance initiatives, it implemented a policy change for revocation of operating status

that reduced the notice period from 90 days to 30 days. If a carrier fails to renew its policy

by the 30th day, the FMCSA immediately revokes its authority to operate, which places

the carrier in OOS status. In addition, the FMCSA stated to Safety Board staff that a

carrier’s OOS status appears in bold red in the Motor Carrier Management Information

System (MCMIS) if its safety data are checked by an MCSAP inspector during a roadside

inspection. The FMCSA also said that it maintains a list of cancellations in the MCMIS

licensing and information report, which shows all carriers currently operating with

canceled insurance—in effect, operating without authority.

On February 8, 2004, the FMCSA Administrator made a speech to the United

Motorcoach Association in Atlanta, Georgia, in which she pledged to work with

association members to get uninsured and “other illegal motorcoach operators” off the

highways. The Administrator further stated:

FMCSA will start to cross-match insurance revocations with inspection and crash

databases, and generate automated claim letters for prompt field enforcement

action. Where a carrier shows inspection or crash activity during the time that its

insurance is suspended, FMCSA will know the company is operating without

authority and enforcement action will be swift. These matches will be done

electronically, supplementing field observations of motor carrier operations.

These changes underscore FMCSA’s commitment to increased safety.

42 The active or inactive designation refers to the status of the motor carrier number assigned to a

company that has applied for operating authority. “Inactive” applies when a carrier either has had its

operating authority involuntarily revoked by the FMCSA or has requested a revocation.

43 E-mail correspondence from Office of Policy and Program Development, FMCSA, September 22,

2005.

44 According to FMCSA regulation 49 CFR 387.41, the penalty for violation of the insurance minimum

is that any person (except an employee who acts without knowledge) who knowingly violates the rules of

this subpart is liable to the United States for civil penalty of no more than $11,000 for each violation, and if

any such violation is a continuing one, each day of violation constitutes a separate offense. In determining

the amount of such penalty, the Administrator or his/her designee takes into account the nature,

circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation committed and, with respect to the person found to have

committed such violation, the degree of culpability, history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability

to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.
Factual Information 27 Highway Accident Report

Performance and Registration Information Systems Management. The

Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) program is a

voluntary Federal–State partnership that makes safe performance a requirement for

obtaining and keeping commercial vehicle registration. PRISM links Federal motor carrier

safety records with a State’s vehicle registration system.45 The DOT number of the carrier

responsible for safety is identified at the vehicle level, allowing the State to determine a

carrier’s safety fitness before issuing license plates. Safety performance is continuously

monitored, and carriers prohibited by the FMCSA from operating in interstate commerce

may have their ability to register vehicles denied. According to the FMCSA, PRISM plays

a key role in its effort to remove high-risk carriers from highways. As of December 31,

2005, 42 States—including Illinois—were participating in the PRISM program.46

The PRISM commercial vehicle registration process establishes a system of

accountability to verify that no vehicle is license-plated without identifying the carrier

responsible for its safety.47 The use of registration sanctions serves as an incentive for

unsafe carriers to improve their safety performance, according to the FMCSA.48 In

addition, through monitoring, carriers that do not improve their safety performance face

progressively more stringent penalties, which may result in unfit or imminent hazard

determinations and the possible suspension of vehicle registrations by the State.

Highway Information

General

The accident occurred on I-90 east at MP 41.6, approximately 2,600 feet west of

the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza. I-90—a divided, straight, and level four-lane asphalt

roadway—is classified as an urban principal arterial road.49 As part of the Illinois State

Toll Highway, this section of roadway is referred to as the “Northwest Tollway,” 76.5

miles stretching from I-294 in Chicago northwest to the Wisconsin State line. At the

accident location, the 41-foot-wide paved portion of roadway comprised two main travel

lanes (25 feet total width), an 11-foot-wide right shoulder, and a 5-foot-wide left shoulder.

A 50-foot-wide depressed grassy median separated the eastbound and westbound lanes.

Because of a construction work zone that extended from MPs 25.5 to 62.5, the posted

45 In some States, legislation must be passed to provide the legal authority to impose vehicle

registration sanctions against motor carriers that have been prohibited from operation by the FMCSA.

46 States not participating in PRISM as of December 2005 are Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,

Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. The State of New York had signed a letter of intent.

47 See <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/analysis-statistics/prism.htm>, January 31, 2006.

48 E-mail correspondence from Office of Policy and Program Development, FMCSA, September 22,

2005.

49 The urban principal arterial road system serves the major centers of activity of urbanized areas, the

highest traffic volume corridors, and the longest trip desires, and carries a high proportion of the total urban

travel even though it constitutes a relatively small percentage of the total roadway network. American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and

Streets (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2004) 11.
Factual Information 28 Highway Accident Report

speed limit for I-90 at the accident site was 45 mph. The signage for the reduced speed

limit began 5.3 miles prior to the accident site, and toll information signage began 0.5 mile

prior to the accident site (at MP 42.1).

Traffic

The ISP accident report stated that traffic at the time of the accident was moderate

to heavy and “normal for this road at this time” of day. According to the Illinois State Toll

Highway Authority (ISTHA), in 2002 the average daily traffic in the vicinity of the

accident site was 43,710 vehicles. (See table 7.)

Table 7. Number of passenger and commercial vehicles traveling through Hampshire–

Marengo toll plaza and average daily traffic count, 1999–2002.

In August 2003, ISTHA vehicle classification data showed that 1,391,327 vehicles

passed through the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza, 224,767 (16.2 percent) of which were

commercial vehicles.

Illinois State Toll Highway Authority System

ISTHA, established in 1953 as the Illinois State Toll Highway Commission, was

created by a special act of the Illinois State Legislature. It is a user-financed administrative

agency of the State of Illinois, the purpose of which is to operate, maintain, and service a

system of toll roads located in northern Illinois. The tollway system encompasses 274

miles of mainline roadway and 20 mainline plazas.

Hampshire–Marengo Tollbooth Configuration

Figures 14 and 15 show the Hampshire–Marengo approach view and toll booth

and toll lane configuration at the time of the accident. Lanes 1–3 (from right to left) were

manual cash lanes with toll collectors for all vehicles, and lanes 4–6 (from right to left)

were automatic coin lanes for cars only. At the time of the accident, the only manual lane

available for commercial traffic was lane 3. Lane 1 was open weekdays during peak

commercial hours, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., and closed the rest of the day. At the time

of the accident, the toll collector for lane 2 was on break, and this lane was closed.50 The

Year Passenger vehicles Commercial vehicles

Average daily traffic 

count

2002 12,807,763 3,146,263 43,710

2001 12,137,871 3,194,329 42,000

2000 10,993,903 3,033,146 39,900

1999 11,430,000 3,133,781 38,470

50 The toll collector was in the toll plaza building’s restroom.
Factual Information 29 Highway Accident Report

lane 3 toll collector stated that he observed no unusual queuing of traffic in lane 3 before

the accident; he said that four or five tractor-semitrailers were in line to pass through the

toll plaza.

Figure 14. Approach view of accident toll plaza.

Figure 15. Accident scene toll plaza lanes.
Factual Information 30 Highway Accident Report

At the time of the accident, the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza was under

construction for conversion of an existing manual lane (lane 3) to an I-PASS51-only lane

for use by both passenger and commercial vehicles. (See figure 15.) The Hampshire–

Marengo toll plaza I-PASS-only lane, completed in November 2003, was designed to

allow I-PASS participants to drive through at a posted speed of 5 mph without stopping.

I-PASS was in use on all lanes at the time of the accident; both passenger and

commercial vehicles were required to stop. When the transponder was detected, a gate was

activated in the automatic lanes or activated by the toll collector in the manual lanes, and the

vehicle could proceed. Eight mainline toll plazas were converted to open road tolling (ORT)

in 2005, and the remaining 12 plazas are expected to be completed by September 2006.52

As a rule, after conversion each plaza will have as many ORT lanes as it has mainline

lanes leading into or exiting the plaza. Vehicles without an I-PASS will exit the new mainline

to pay tolls at express plazas located on the sides of the roadway. These plazas are located so

as not to affect the free flow of traffic on the mainline. The Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza

was scheduled to receive an estimated $42.7 million in 2005–2006 for reconstruction and

consolidation with the Belvidere toll plaza (plaza 5). According to ISTHA, this

reconstruction was part of its ORT conversion; the 10-year $5.3-billion plan is intended to

provide customers with faster, safer, and more reliable travel. ISTHA stated that the

conversion from traditional toll plazas to a barrier-free system, as a first in the United States,

“will allow I-PASS users to travel at highway speeds on the mainline while their tolls are

collected electronically by a gantry overhead, reducing traffic congestion and travel times.”53

As of December 2005, construction work had started on the reconstruction and consolidation

of the two plazas. When the mainline toll plazas are removed, I-PASS customers will have

unimpeded travel over the entire 274-mile tollway. (See figure 16.)

Rumble Strips

The accident occurred at MP 41.6, approximately 2,600 feet west of the Hampshire–

Marengo toll plaza. Rumble strips54 had been installed approximately 1,200 feet prior to the

toll plaza in both the eastbound and westbound directions. According to ISTHA, the rumble

strips were removed because they were not included in the construction plans for the

roadway resurfacing project that began in June 2003, which extended from MPs 36 to 53.55

51 I-PASS is an electronic toll collection (ETC) program developed by ISTHA. Motorists enrolled in

I-PASS obtain a transponder device, which allows them to pay tolls electronically from a prepaid account. In

2001, I-PASS ETC accounted for more than 36 percent of all toll revenue; more than 700,000 transponders

were in use. The I-PASS lane was expected to process 2,000 vehicles per hour; the manual lanes at the

Hampshire–Marengo toll booths processed an average of 300 vehicles per hour. (See appendix D for a table

of States with and without toll facilities.)

52 Telephone communication with ISTHA manager of maintenance and traffic, December 8, 2005.

53 Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, Open Roads for a Faster Future (Springfield, IL: ISTHA, 2005) 4.

54 Rumble strips—intermittent narrow, transverse areas of rough-textured or slightly raised or

depressed road surface—are used to alert drivers to unusual vehicular traffic conditions. By means of noise

and vibration, they attract the driver’s attention to such features as unexpected changes in alignment and to

conditions requiring a stop. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual

on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003) 6F–44F.

55 Illinois State Toll Highway Authority Contract RR-02-5062, Roadway Resurfacing, Northwest

Tollway (I-90).
Factual Information 31 Highway Accident Report

Rumble strips were originally in place at every mainline toll plaza on I-90; ISTHA

started removing the strips in 1987 and 1988 because of pavement and resurfacing

projects and noise complaints from residential neighborhoods adjacent to the toll

highway.56 As a result of the accident, ISTHA began reinstalling rumble strips at several

mainline plazas on I-90, including those at Belvidere, Hampshire–Marengo, and Elgin.

Currently, seven mainline plazas on the ISTHA system have rumble strips. (See table 8.)

Table 8. Current rumble strip locations on ISTHA tollway system.

Figure 16. Graphic depiction of open road toll system. (Courtesy of Illinois State Toll Highway 

Authority)

56 Telephone communication with ISTHA manager of maintenance and traffic, December 30, 2005.

Tollway section Mainline tollbooth plaza Traffic direction

Northwest South Beloit (plaza 1) Both

Northwest Belvidere (plaza 5) Both

Northwest Hampshire–Marengo (plaza 7) Both

Northwest Elgin (plaza 9) Eastbound only

East-west DeKalb (plaza 66) Both

East-west Dixon (plaza 69) Both

Tristate Waukegan (plaza 21) Both
Factual Information 32 Highway Accident Report

Meteorological Information

The National Weather Service at DeKalb-Taylor Municipal Airport, 21 miles south

of the accident site, reported the weather at 3:00 p.m. on October 1, 2003, as mostly sunny

and clear, with a temperature of 50 degrees Fahrenheit, 23 percent humidity, and winds

northwest at 15 mph.

Toxicological Information

Toxicological specimens were collected from the Freightliner driver at a local

hospital following the accident. The ISP laboratory tested the specimens and found the

driver’s blood and urine to be negative for alcohol and other drugs of abuse. The Safety

Board also had the specimens tested 57 and determined that no carbon monoxide, cyanide,

ethanol, or other drugs were present.

Toxicological specimens were collected from the bus driver 2 days after the

accident, on October 3, 2003. The specimens were evaluated locally and were found to be

negative for drugs of abuse. No alcohol testing was conducted. According to 49 CFR

382.303, the employer of a driver of a commercial motor vehicle operating on a public

road in commerce is required to conduct alcohol and controlled substance testing on that

driver if the vehicle is involved in a fatal accident. Safety Board investigators found no

evidence that Leisure completed any postaccident alcohol testing on the bus driver, as

required.

Tests and Research

Specialty Bus Tail Lights

The left and right tail light assemblies from the specialty bus were sent to the

Safety Board’s materials laboratory for examination, which revealed the identification

“CEC 1157” on the base of the right tail light bulb. According to a representative of

General Electric, a manufacturer of type 1157 bulbs, only one filament is used when the

tail lights are on, and both filaments are used when the brakes are applied. Examination of

the filaments within the right tail light bulb revealed that both were severely stretched and

deformed, consistent with their being hot at the moment of impact. Stretched and

deformed filaments indicate that the brakes were applied at impact.

57 The specimens were tested at the Federal Aviation Administration Civil Aeromedical Institute

toxicology laboratory for a wide range of licit and illicit substances, including amphetamines, opiates,

marijuana, antihistamines, meprobamate, methaqualone, and nicotine.
Factual Information 33 Highway Accident Report

Examination of the filaments within the left tail light bulb revealed that one

filament was stretched and deformed, though not as severely as the filaments within the

right tail light bulb.58 The second filament in the left tail light bulb did not display

significant stretching or deformation.

Freightliner Gear Speed Calculations

The maximum rpm setting on the Freightliner tractor engine was read out through

the engine’s ECM as 2,030. The gear ratio of the Dana Spicer DS402 drive axle was 4.11.

The rpm of the tires on both the tractor and trailer (size 295/75R22.5) was 518. Using this

information, the Safety Board calculated various speeds for each transmission gear of the

Freightliner tractor. (See table 9.) According to the ISP report, the Freightliner driver

stated that his tractor was in eighth gear at the time of the accident. The driver also stated

that he was following the specialty bus in the right lane at a speed of 40 to 45 mph. The

posted speed limit in the work zone where the accident occurred was 45 mph.

Table 9. Freightliner gear speed calculations.

Forensic Evidence Documentation and Accident Simulation

Physical evidence found on the roadway included scrapes and gouges consistent

with similar evidence found on the undercarriage of the specialty bus. Curved tire marks

that varied in radius from 227 to 491 feet and had striations running perpendicular to the

direction of travel were also found on the roadway. The tire marks traveled from the right

lane to the left lane and terminated at the center median, where 113-foot-long tire furrows

ran to the final rest position of the Freightliner tractor-trailer. Subsequent to the on-scene

58 The lens on the left tail light was of a different style than the right tail light.

GearA Transmission gear ratio Gear speed range (mph)B

1 12.57 0–4.55

2 7.47 4.56–7.66

3 5.28 7.67–10.84

4 3.83 10.85–14.94

5 2.79 14.95–20.51

6 1.95 20.52–29.34

7 1.38 29.35–41.46

8 1.00 41.47–57.21

9 0.73 57.22–78.37

A

 For each gear, the maximum engine rpm was 2,030, the tire rpm was 518, and the drive axle

gear ratio was 4.11.

B Calculation: 60 times the maximum engine rpm (2,030), divided by the sum of the drive axle gear 

ratio (4.11), multiplied by the transmission gear ratio, multiplied by the tire rpm (518).
Factual Information 34 Highway Accident Report

investigation, faint straight tire marks, 38 feet long, were observed in ISP photographs;

these straight tire marks preceded the curved tire marks.

One set of additional tire marks, 197 feet long, was located in the right lane,

terminating at the final rest position of the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer; and two sets of

tire marks—one 20 feet long, the other 113 feet long—were also located in the right lane,

terminating in the vicinity of the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer.

The Safety Board staff conducted simulations59 of the accident to determine the

speeds of the specialty bus, pickup truck, and Ford tractor-box trailer as they were

approaching the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza relative to the speeds of the approaching

Freightliner and Kenworth tractor-trailers. (See table 10.) The simulations used physical

evidence and data collected on scene, including tire marks, points of impact between the

vehicles, final rest positions, and data from the pickup’s SDM. After the accident, Safety

Board investigators interviewed the drivers of the accident vehicles and obtained their

estimated speeds prior to the collision.

Table 10. Driver-estimated preaccident speeds and simulation preaccident speed 

comparison.

Based on the SDM data and other physical evidence, several scenarios were

identified and evaluated. The results of the simulations that most closely matched the

physical evidence indicate that the vehicles at the front of the accident queue—the

specialty bus, the pickup truck, and the Ford tractor-box trailer—were traveling at

substantially lower speeds (0 to 10 mph) than the Freightliner tractor-trailer (50 mph) and

the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer (55 to 62 mph), which were approaching from the rear.

(See figure 17.)

59 Software used for the simulations included the Human Vehicle Environment (HVE) system,

Simulation Model Nonlinear (SIMON), ReadDataFile by Collision Engineering Associates, Inc.,

Engineering Dynamics Corporation General Analysis Tool (EDGEN), Engineering Dynamics Corporation

Simulation of Automobile Collisions (EDSMAC4), and Autocad and Viewpoint models by Digimation, Inc.

Vehicle

Driver’s stated speed prior 

to collision (mph)

Preaccident speed 

simulation results

Freightliner tractor-trailer (vehicle 1) 40–45 50

Specialty bus (vehicle 2) 10 10

Pickup truck (vehicle 3) 50 3

Ford tractor-box trailer (vehicle 4) 30–35 0–3

Kenworth tractor-tank trailer (vehicle 5) 62 (had begun braking) 55–62
Factual Information 35 Highway Accident Report

The simulations indicated that the Freightliner tractor-trailer was traveling about

50 mph, slightly above the driver’s estimated speed of 40 to 45 mph, prior to striking the

rear of the specialty bus. The simulations showed that the specialty bus was traveling

about 10 mph, the bus driver’s estimated speed, as it approached the toll plaza behind a

pickup truck that was traveling about 3 mph60 (the pickup truck driver recalled that he had

been traveling 50 mph before the accident). The simulations showed the Ford tractor-box

trailer traveling 0 to 3 mph in front of the pickup truck, with a maximum potential speed of

20 mph (the driver had reported traveling 30 to 35 mph before the accident). The

simulations also indicated that the driver of the final striking vehicle—the Kenworth

tractor-tank trailer—was traveling about 62 mph before applying his brakes and

subsequently striking the pickup truck and the Ford tractor-box trailer.

As the “bullet” vehicle, the Freightliner tractor-trailer (vehicle 1) was the first

striking vehicle into the rear of the secondary target vehicle, the specialty bus (vehicle 2).

As shown in table 10, the simulation results indicate a significant difference in speed

between the vehicles at the front of the accident (vehicles 2, 3, and 4), which were

traveling from 0 to 10 mph, and vehicles 1 and 5, which were approaching from the rear at

Figure 17. Accident scene diagram indicating physical evidence.

60 The pickup truck’s SDM indicated that the vehicle was traveling 3 mph for 3 seconds and then less

than 1 second later underwent a negative (rearward) change in velocity (delta-v) of at least 13.77 mph.

Vehicle speed data were sampled at 1-second intervals beginning 5 seconds prior to the collisions that

resulted in the rearward delta-v. See appendix C for further explanation of SDM data.

I-90

Westbound

I-90

Eastbound

Gouge and

scrape marks

Furrow and

plow marks

Gouge and

scrape marks

Location of tire

marks identified

in ISP photograph

Curved

tire marks

Tire

marks

Center median

Milepost

41.5

0 50 100 150 200

Scale in feet
Factual Information 36 Highway Accident Report

speeds of 50 to 62 mph. The simulations also indicate that vehicles 2, 3, and 4 were

traveling at speeds well below the posted 45-mph speed limit as they approached the toll

plaza and manual cash lane queue.

In addition, the physical evidence and the simulation results showed the following:

• Traveling approximately 50 mph, the Freightliner tractor-trailer struck the

specialty bus, which was traveling about 10 mph. (See figure 18.)

• Following the collision, as the specialty bus was moving about 40 mph, its

right front door area contacted the left rear corner of the pickup truck, which

was traveling about 3 mph. (See figure 19.)

• The collision with the pickup truck pushed it forward; and within less than 1

second, the front of the pickup truck struck the rear of the Ford tractor-box

trailer, which was traveling 0 to 3 mph.61 (See figure 20.)

• As the Freightliner and the specialty bus veered toward the center median, the

Freightliner’s trailer rolled onto the bed-mounted camper of the pickup truck

and then onto the rear upper left corner of the Ford box trailer. (See figure 21.)

• The Freightliner and the specialty bus continued toward the median; the

Freightliner trailer overturned in the left lane, while the tractor remained

upright. Both vehicles then entered the median and came to rest.

• Meanwhile, a trailing vehicle—the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer—struck the

pickup truck, which had already been in contact with the rear of the Ford

tractor-box trailer from its initial impact and partial rotation, and pushed the

pickup truck and the Ford combination unit to their final rest positions. (See

figures 22 and 23.)

61 As indicated by the simulation results, the speed of the Ford tractor-box trailer was substantially

slower than the 30 to 35 mph reported by the driver. The simulations showed that if this vehicle had been

traveling any faster than 10 mph, the pickup truck would not have been able to “speed up” during the

collision in time to make contact with the rear of the trailer; the trailer’s speed, if 30 to 35 mph, would have

moved it forward, away from the slower vehicles colliding behind it.
Factual Information 37 Highway Accident Report

Figure 18. Freightliner tractor-trailer strikes specialty bus.

Figure 19. Specialty bus contacts left rear corner of pickup truck.
Factual Information 38 Highway Accident Report

Figure 20. Pickup truck, pushed forward, strikes Ford tractorbox trailer.

Figure 21. Freightliner trailer rolls onto pickup truck camper and

box trailer.
Factual Information 39 Highway Accident Report

Figure 22. Freightliner and specialty bus come to rest in median

and Kenworth tractor-tank trailer strikes pickup truck, already in

contact with box trailer.

Figure 23. Final rest positions of all five vehicles.
Factual Information 40 Highway Accident Report

Other Information

Toll Roads

Accident Statistics. According to FHWA estimates, the United States has 4,927

miles of toll roads, compared to 46,334 miles of interstate highway and 9,213 miles of

urban freeways and expressways. Toll roads constitute approximately 9 percent of the

motorway-standard mileage. Mileage and accident data by vehicle type are routinely

collected on ticket-controlled segments of many toll roads; these tickets distinguish

between commercial and passenger motor vehicles and document miles traveled.

A 2002 study reported that, on most toll roads, tractor-trailers and other

commercial vehicles were involved in more multivehicle accidents than passenger cars.62

In Illinois, commercial vehicles were 57 percent more likely to be in a multivehicle

accident than a passenger car. The study concluded that the difference in accident rates

between large commercial motor vehicles and passenger vehicles appeared to depend on

type of collision, specific toll road, and traffic density.63 Rear-end accidents and

sideswipes were the two most common types of collisions among commercial motor

vehicles. Rear-end accidents accounted for about 30 percent of all collisions, regardless of

vehicle type. From 1998–2002, the rear-end accident rate within a 5-mile radius of the

Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza averaged approximately 40 percent, exceeding any other

type of collision, including sideswipes (at approximately 20 percent). In 2002, the rearend accident rate on the entire ISTHA toll system was 49.6 percent.64 Also in 2002, the

Pennsylvania Turnpike and the New Jersey Turnpike recorded rear-end accident rates

within a 1-mile radius of mainline plazas at 30.2 percent and 37.8 percent, respectively.65,66

Electronic Toll Collection and Open Road Tolling. ETC uses electronic

equipment instead of manual cash collection or automatic coin machine collection. By

means of automatic vehicle identification technology, customers subscribe to a program

that allows their vehicle to be automatically identified in a toll lane by an electronic

transponder. If the customer does not have an electronic transponder, a camera digitally

photographs the license plate, and the registered owner is subsequently billed for the

trip—or, if a cash lane was available, the customer is ticketed or fined for failure to pay the

toll. Benefits of ETC include reduced staffing levels (compared to manually collecting

tolls), increased throughput of vehicles, and reduced operating costs.67 The number of toll

62 Elisa R. Braver, Mark G. Solomon, and David S. Preusser, “Toll Road Crashes of Commercial and

Passenger Motor Vehicles,” Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 34 (2002): 293–303.

63 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, “Commercial and Passenger Motor Vehicle Crashes on Toll

Roads,” IIHS Status Report, Vol. 34, No. 7 (1999): 4–5.

64 Wilbur Smith Associates, 2000–2002 Traffic Crash Data Report for the Illinois State Toll Highway

Authority (Chicago, IL: 2003), 2–8.

65 E-mail correspondence from traffic engineering manager, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,

January 16, 2004.

66 E-mail correspondence from director of operations, New Jersey Turnpike Authority, January 20, 2004.

67 University of South Florida–Florida Department of Transportation, Center for Urban Transportation

Research, Feasibility of Open Road Tolling in Florida (Tampa, FL: USF–Florida DOT, 2001) 10–11.
Factual Information 41 Highway Accident Report

facilities with electronic technology has increased from 49 in 1995 to about 160 in 2003.68

From 1989 until 2004, the proportion of tolls collected by ETC had increased from 0 to 50

percent or more at almost all U.S. toll facilities. A 1996 study determined that a manual

lane processes 300 to 500 vehicles per hour, and an automated coin lane processes 600 to

900 vehicles per hour.69 A dedicated automated vehicle identification lane can average

1,000 to 1,500 vehicles per hour.

The definition of ORT varies among toll authorities. For example, the Florida

Turnpike Enterprise defines ORT as a method and system of collecting tolls on

expressways and other facilities that essentially involves no toll collectors in traditional

toll booths,70 and ISTHA defines ORT as a method of collecting tolls electronically while

driving nonstop at posted highway speeds.71 Generally, ORT refers to a toll collection

scenario in which vehicles are identified electronically instead of having to stop for

manual payment of a toll.

Proponents of ETC and ORT cite reduced congestion, reduced accident rates,

improved fuel economy, and reduced pollution as benefits.72 Cash-paying toll traffic now

constitutes the minority traffic segment.73 Some toll roads provide nonstop travel in lanes

adjacent to the median for ETC or ORT customers, while requiring cash-paying customers

to exit the mainline toll highway to the right and pay tolls at express plazas located along

the sides of the highway. Some States with ORT currently in use, or planned, are Florida

(Florida Turnpike, Orlando–Orange County Expressway, Miami–Dade County

Expressway), New Jersey (Garden State Parkway, New Jersey Turnpike), Colorado (E-470

Beltway, Northwest Parkway), Texas (Dallas North Tollway), Illinois (Illinois Toll

Highway System), Virginia (Pocahontas Parkway), Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania

Turnpike), and California (Transportation Corridor Agency).74

In July 2003, the Florida DOT completed a case study of a conventional mainline

barrier toll plaza renovation on the Orlando–Orange County Expressway that included

ORT.75 Prior to renovation, the plaza was operated during normal conditions (nonpeak

traffic hours) with four lanes in each direction—two manual cash lanes, one automatic

coin machine lane, and one dedicated ETC lane. The ETC lane was located to the left of

68 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Toll Facilities in the United

States: Bridges–Roads–Tunnels–Ferries, FHWA-PL-03-017 (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003) 4–7.

69 Intelligent Transportation Systems Society of Canada, Electronic Toll Collection (Toronto, Ontario:

SRI Consulting, 1996). See <www.itscanada.ca/english/2reps2e.htm>, January 31, 2006.

70 Feasibility of Open Road Tolling in Florida, 10–11.

71 Open Roads for a Faster Future, 5.

72 Electronic Toll Collection.

73 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Developing Traffic Control

Strategies: Geometric and Safety Design, Plaza Operations and Toll Lane Configurations (Washington, DC:

FHWA, 2005) 4.

74 Data obtained from deputy program director, Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, consultants to the

Florida Turnpike Enterprise, Florida DOT, September 14, 2005.

75 Data obtained from Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, consultants to the Orlando–Orange County

Expressway Authority, Florida DOT, September 19, 2005.
Factual Information 42 Highway Accident Report

the other three lanes and had a speed limit of 35 mph. Renovation included demolishing

the middle lanes of the barrier plaza to incorporate four lanes of express ETC. The lanes

were elevated to permit a 70-mph speed limit and were separated from the coin machine

lanes by a barrier. Postconstruction, the plaza configuration consisted of six toll lanes per

direction—two manual cash lanes and two coin machine lanes to the right and two express

ETC lanes to the left. The rear-end accident rate at this location declined from

27 accidents prerenovation (1 year before construction)76 to 12 accidents postrenovation

(1 year after construction).77

In 1999, ISTHA converted two mainline barrier toll plazas on the I-355

North/South Tollway in Chicago to ORT plazas. The Boughton Road plaza renovation

was completed in February of that year, and the Army Trail Road plaza was completed in

December. Prior to construction of the ORT lanes, both plazas operated with six toll lanes

in each direction—three manual cash lanes and three automatic coin machine lanes. The

renovation involved widening the plaza to accommodate four express ETC lanes in the

median. A barrier separated these lanes from the automatic coin machine lanes. The final

plaza configurations consist of eight toll lanes in each direction—three manual cash lanes

on the right, three automatic coin lanes in the middle, and two express ETC lanes on the

left. Prior to renovation of the Army Trail Road plaza, the average daily traffic was 7,150

vehicles per hour in both directions; after renovation, the traffic volume increased to

10,600 vehicles per hour. Prior to renovation of the Boughton Road plaza, the average

daily traffic was 6,500 vehicles per hour in both directions; after renovation, the traffic

volume increased to 9,800 vehicles per hour. The rear-end accident rate at each plaza

declined following renovation.78 (See table 11.)

Table 11. Rear-end accidents at two I-355 North/South Tollway plazas, pre- and postORT renovation.

Toll Plaza Design. Several factors are considered in toll plaza design, such as

proposed location on the roadway, right-of-way, traffic demand, method of toll collection,

infrastructure, and approach and departure geometrics. Other factors taken into account

76 February 1, 2001, through January 31, 2002.

77 August 1, 2003, through July 31, 2004.

78 Data obtained from Wilbur Smith and Associates, consultant to the ISTHA, September 22, 2005.

Year

Number of accidents 

(Army Trail Road)

Number of accidents 

(Boughton Road) Time frame

1996 34 31 2 yr prerenovation

1997 56 34 1 yr prerenovation

2000 15 20 1 yr postrenovation

2001 12 14 2 yr postrenovation
Factual Information 43 Highway Accident Report

include violation enforcement, environmental issues (water, air, noise, and lighting),

budget, staffing, safety, and capacity options; these factors can vary considerably across

toll plazas.79

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

AASHTO is a nonprofit, nonpartisan association founded in 1914 as the American

Association of State Highway Officials. It represents highway and transportation

departments in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The association’s

mission is to advocate transportation-related policies and to provide technical services to

support States in efficiently and safely moving people and goods.80

AASHTO also publishes the guidance for highway geometric design in its book, A

Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets,81 commonly known as the “Green

Book.” An FHWA office memorandum dated February 23, 2005, established that the fifth

edition (2004) of the AASHTO Green Book “should be applied as the design standard for

all projects on the National Highway System (NHS).”82,83 The Green Book is the basis for

the geometric design standards of most transportation agencies.84 The fifth edition of the

Green Book contains no guidance on the design of toll plazas or dedicated lanes.

According to FHWA staff,85 the Green Book will be updated in 2007 or 2008, a process

that entails extensive research and data analysis. One approach to provide the research and

analysis required for an update is the development of written AASHTO guidelines on

particular research subjects.

Federal Highway Administration

As established in 23 CFR Part 655, Subpart F, the FHWA administrator approves

the MUTCD as the national standard for all traffic control devices installed on any street,

highway, or bicycle trail open to public travel in accordance with 23 U.S.C. 109(d) and

402(a). The MUTCD contains the design, application, and placement standards for all

traffic control devices and is the standard used by State and local transportation

professionals in selecting, installing, and maintaining such devices.86 The current edition

of the MUTCD (2003, with Revision No. 1) contains no guidance on the design of toll

plazas or the use of dedicated lanes.

79 Developing Traffic Control Strategies: Geometric and Safety Design, Plaza Operations and Toll

Lane Configuration, 1.

80 See <www.transportation.org/?siteid=37&pageid=330>, February 24, 2006.

81 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design

of Highways and Streets, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2004).

82 See <www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/022305.cfm>, January 9, 2006.

83 AASHTO established the National Highway Task Force in December 1988 to look beyond interstate

completion; the board of directors recommended the creation of a National Highway System. The NHS

Designation Act was enacted in November 1995.

84 Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, National Cooperative Highway Research

Program, Leveraging Resources for Better Transportation (Washington, DC: TRB, 2005) 11.

85 Information obtained from Office of Program Administration, FHWA, November 2, 2005.

86 Traffic control devices include signs, signals, and pavement markings used to guide or warn road users.
Factual Information 44 Highway Accident Report

In January 2003, the FHWA met with representatives of the International Bridge,

Tunnel and Turnpike Association (IBTTA)87 to begin discussing how to achieve

uniformity, efficient traffic flow, and improved safety at toll plazas. The FHWA and

IBTTA agreed to pursue the goal of developing a compendium of best practices and

control strategies for handling traffic within these complex roadway environments. In

January 2004, the FHWA initiated a contract study to identify and define current practices,

to develop guidelines based on multiple sources of information, to achieve consensus

among toll agencies, and to determine possible MUTCD language for traffic control

devices at toll plazas. The study is expected to result in a consistent national traffic control

strategy for toll plazas, enhanced plaza safety and operations, and improved driver

comprehension and reaction at toll plazas.

The study results are to be published in a report entitled State of the Practice and

Recommendations on Traffic Control Strategies at Tollbooth Plazas, which is planned for

completion and distribution by summer 2006.88 The FHWA does not expect operating

agencies to immediately adopt all recommendations and convert existing plazas. Rather, it

advises that the recommendations be seriously considered for future facility retrofits or

reconstructions, as well as any new construction.

The FHWA anticipates including information from the traffic control strategies

report, such as language about express ETC lanes, in the next edition of the MUTCD.89 No

date has been set for publication of a revised MUTCD. Once funding has been obligated,

the rulemaking activities associated with publishing a new edition can begin; this process

generally takes about 3 years.

International Toll Roads

Several fully automated toll roads, with no toll booths or plazas, are already in

operation around the world. Toronto’s highway 407, which runs 65 miles east–west just

north of the city, is one of the world’s first open-access, all-electronic toll highways. It

opened in October 1997. Transponders are required for all commercial vehicles. The

entrances and exits of nontransponder-equipped, noncommercial vehicles are recorded via

license plate optical character recognition high-speed cameras; customers’ addresses are

obtained through the Canadian motor vehicle department, and the users are billed

directly.90

In Norway, drivers entering the city of Oslo have been paying tolls via an ETC

system since 1990. In France, Italy, and Portugal—which have established freeway tolling

infrastructures—the decision to implement ETC is made by toll authorities, primarily as

an aid to reducing operating costs, increasing toll revenue, and providing improved

87 According to IBTTA, the association is a worldwide alliance of toll operators and associated

industries that provides a forum for sharing knowledge and ideas to promote and enhance toll-financed

transportation services. IBTTA has 280 members in 24 countries. See <www.ibtta.org>, March 7, 2006.

88 E-mail correspondence from Office of Transportation Operations, FHWA, October 12, 2005.

89 E-mail correspondence from Office of Transportation Operations, FHWA, October 12, 2005.

90 See <www.roadtraffic-technology.com/projects/407>, January 31, 2006.
Factual Information 45 Highway Accident Report

customer service.91 In Mexico, in addition to limited ETC installations on selected

portions of the roadway system running between Tijuana and Guatemala, interest is

growing in the installation of electronic systems at border crossings between Mexico and

the States of California and Texas.92 In Australia, toll roads can be found in the cities of

Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne. CityLink is a tolled freeway system in Melbourne on

which tolls are collected electronically by e-TAG, and there are no toll booths along the

entire length of the system. In the Philippines, on the main island of Luzon, the 84-

kilometer North Luzon expressway uses ETC.93

Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act

The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy

for Users (SAFETEA-LU) was signed by the President on August 10, 2005, and provides

over $201 billion in funding for highway and safety programs and nearly $46 billion for

public transportation from FYs 2005–2009. These programs include toll road safety

research and motor carrier oversight.

Passenger Carrier Roadside Inspections. The motor carrier safety grants

provisions under SAFETEA-LU amend the State Plan Contents section of 49 U.S.C.

Section 31102(b)(1) to include language that (except in the event of imminent danger or

obvious safety hazards) prohibits the inspection of a vehicle transporting passengers for a

motor carrier of passengers unless the inspection is conducted at a station, terminal, border

crossing, maintenance facility, destination, or other location where a motor carrier may

make a planned stop.

Toll Road Safety. The toll provisions under SAFETEA-LU require the Secretary

of Transportation to conduct a study of the safety of highway toll collection facilities,

including toll booths. The act requires consideration of (1) the effect of design or

construction of facilities on the likelihood of vehicle collisions with the facilities; (2) the

safety of crosswalks used by toll collectors in transit to and from toll booths; (3) the extent

of the enforcement of speed limits in the vicinity of facilities; (4) the use of warning

devices, such as vibration and rumble strips, to alert approaching drivers; (5) the law

enforcement practices and jurisdictional issues that affect safety in the vicinity of

facilities; and (6) the incidence of accidents and injuries in the vicinity of toll booths. (See

appendix E.)

Intermodal Equipment Oversight. The roadability94 provisions under

SAFETEA-LU that relate to the inspection, repair, and maintenance of intermodal

equipment require the Secretary of Transportation, within 1 year, to issue regulations

91 See <www.itscanada.ca/english/2res2e.htm>, January 31, 2006.

92 See <www.itscanada.ca/english/2res2e.htm>, January 31, 2006.

93 See <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_road>, January 31, 2006.

94 Typically, the term “roadability” is defined as the ability of a motor vehicle to maintain a steady,

balanced, and comfortable ride, especially under a variety of road conditions. For motor carrier safety, it is

viewed as the roadworthiness of the vehicle—that is, whether the vehicle meets certain systems

requirements to safely operate on the Nation’s highways.
Factual Information 46 Highway Accident Report

establishing a program to ensure that equipment used to transport intermodal containers is

safe and systemically maintained. In the United States, intermodal chassis are used to

transport cargo valued at more than $450 billion annually.95 Cargo containers hauled by

rail and shipping companies are regularly transferred to trucks before final delivery. Most

chassis are not owned by trucking companies and are not included as part of the existing

compliance review process for truck operators. Data collected by the FMCSA suggest that

trucks hauling intermodal equipment receive OOS notices more frequently than heavy

trucks in general. Intermodal equipment providers own 750,000 chassis nationwide, which

handled more than 20 million container movements in 2002.96 (See appendix E.)

State Vehicle Codes for Intermodal Trailer, Chassis, and Safety

Four States—California, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Illinois—have State laws

under which an intrastate intermodal chassis, trailer, or container owner is responsible for

the maintenance and condition of equipment. In Illinois, the law became effective in July

2000 and prohibits the interchange of intermodal equipment in violation of FMCSRs. (See

appendix F for the full text.) The Illinois law gives the owner of the equipment

responsibility for its upkeep and requires the owner to reimburse truckers for any fines,

penalties, or repair costs incurred because of defects specified by the law. Violations may

result in fines of up to $500. The law, codified in 625 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/18b–

112(b), states, in part:

It is the responsibility of the equipment provider to inspect and, if a vehicle at the

time of inspection does not comply with all federal motor carrier safety regulation

requirements, perform the necessary repairs on all vehicles prior to interchange or

offering for interchange.

Vehicle Incompatibility and Heavy Truck Aggressivity

Vehicle incompatibility is defined as design differences among vehicle types that

result in disproportionate damage patterns following a collision. These differences include

weight, stiffness, and geometry aspects.97 If any of these factors vary significantly

between two impacting vehicles, the vehicles will not be compatible in a collision. One

vehicle will probably absorb more of the impact energy, either through crush or large

accelerations, while the other vehicle is considered to have high aggressivity.

“Crashworthiness” refers to how well a vehicle protects its occupants in an

accident. This protection involves aspects such as the crash behavior of structures and

materials and impact biomechanics. Crashworthiness is a function of the compatibility of

the impacting vehicles and the methods of energy management for occupant protection,

among other factors.

95 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, January 26, 2004, press release (Washington, DC:

NHTSA, 2004).

96 Alan M. Robinson, Intermodal Truck Equipment Safety: Legislation in the 108th Congress,

Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: CRS, May 6, 2004) 1–3.

97 S. Acierno and others, “Vehicle Mismatch: Injury Patterns and Severity,” Accident Analysis and

Prevention, Vol. 36 (2004): 761.
Factual Information 47 Highway Accident Report

In April 2000, the 21st Century Truck Program was announced at a gathering of

U.S. truck and supporting industries, environmentalists, and Federal agency

representatives, including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT. This

multiagency and industry partnership released a “roadmap” for developing a viable

technology for the improvement of safety in the Nation’s trucking industry.98 One of the

program’s many goals and research objectives is to improve truck and bus safety by

fostering advancements in vehicle design and performance, such as reducing truck frontal

aggressivity in multivehicle collisions.99 According to the roadmap, the milestone for

improving crashworthiness—including the completion of laboratory tests and field trials

of systems to reduce the destructive effects of accidents—is mid-2009.100

98 See <www.dieselnet.com/news/2001/01doe2.php>, January 31, 2006.

99 See <www.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/program/21ct_roadmap.pdf>, January 31, 2006.

100 See <www.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/program/21ct_roadmap.pdf>, January 31, 2006.
48 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

The Safety Board considered several factors that may have caused or contributed

to the severity of the multivehicle collision, including the Freightliner driver’s

performance, Federal oversight of intermodal chassis operations and passenger carriers,

lack of collision warning systems on commercial vehicles, and vehicle incompatibility and

heavy truck aggressivity. In addition, this accident raised concerns about toll road design

and operation. The Safety Board is responsible for investigating transportation safety

issues of national significance. Thirty-one States have at least one State or local toll

facility. Of the remaining 19 States, many are planning to create toll authorities. Toll

plazas can be prone to sudden stops and lane changes and to unsafe approach and

departure speeds, particularly in an environment of merging and queuing vehicles, which

effectively increases the probability of a collision.101 Following a brief discussion of

factors that were determined not to be causal to the accident, this analysis discusses toll

plazas and other causal issues.

Exclusions

The weather was clear and dry at the time of the accident. Postaccident inspection

of the specialty bus, pickup truck, Ford tractor-box trailer, and Kenworth tractor-tank

trailer indicated no mechanical problems with the vehicles. No defects in highway road

design were found. The Safety Board concludes that the weather; the mechanical

condition of the specialty bus, pickup truck, Ford tractor-box trailer, and Kenworth

tractor-tank trailer; and the design and condition of the roadway did not cause or

contribute to the accident.

Following the accident, the ISP required a blood sample to be taken from the

Freightliner driver and the specialty bus driver; both samples tested negative for

controlled substances. In addition, the Freightliner driver’s sample tested negative for

alcohol. The bus driver was not tested for alcohol because the ISP investigating officers

detected no evidence of alcohol use. Although 49 CFR Part 382 required Leisure to

conduct postaccident testing for alcohol, the company failed to do so, and the Safety

Board therefore could not determine whether the bus driver was under the influence of

alcohol at the time of the accident. Because the specialty bus was rear-ended, the driver—

whether impaired or unimpaired—probably could not have taken any action that might

have prevented or mitigated the accident. According to the FMCSA, Leisure Pursuit

Charters is no longer in operation; nevertheless, the Safety Board is concerned that the

company failed to fulfill its responsibility to ensure that its driver was tested for alcohol

following the accident.

101 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Developing Traffic Control

Strategies at Toll Plazas: Signing and Markings (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2005) 1.
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

When interviewed by the Safety Board, the Freightliner driver reported that he was

not taking any prescription medications at the time of the accident. In addition, he

possessed a valid medical certificate and a CDL. The 72-hour history for both the

Freightliner driver and the specialty bus driver indicated no fatigue-inducing events or

activities, and neither driver reported sleeping problems. The specialty bus driver did not

have a valid medical certificate at the time of the accident, but he did pass a medical

examination and receive a certificate 9 days later. Although the Safety Board is concerned

that Leisure did not identify that one of its drivers had been operating a passenger carrier

for 2 years on an expired medical certificate, the evidence does not indicate that the bus

driver’s health contributed to the accident.

Emergency responders and medical personnel were expeditiously dispatched to the

accident scene. The injured received medical care on scene and were transported to local

hospitals in a timely manner. The Safety Board therefore concludes that neither the

Freightliner driver nor the specialty bus driver was adversely affected by medications,

medical conditions, or fatigue and that the emergency response was timely and effective.

Accident Discussion

The physical evidence at the accident scene, vehicle damage, and simulation

results indicate that the vehicles at the front of the accident—the specialty bus, the pickup

truck, and the Ford tractor-box-trailer (vehicles 2, 3, and 4)—were traveling at

substantially lower speeds (0 to 10 mph) than vehicle 1, the Freightliner tractor-trailer

(50 mph), and vehicle 5, the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer (55 to 62 mph), which were

approaching from the rear. The simulations also indicate that the three vehicles at the front

of the accident were traveling at speeds well below the posted 45-mph speed limit,

probably because they were approaching the toll plaza and manual cash lane queue.

Based on the pickup truck’s SDM and physical evidence, the simulations showed

that the Freightliner was traveling about 50 mph, slightly above the driver’s estimated

speed of 40 to 45 mph, prior to striking the rear of the specialty bus. This impact caused

the right front door area of the specialty bus (now accelerated to approximately 40 mph) to

contact the left rear corner of the pickup truck, which was traveling about 3 mph. As the

pickup truck was pushed forward, it struck the rear of the Ford tractor-box trailer, which

had been traveling 0 to 3 mph.

As the Freightliner and the specialty bus veered toward the center median, the

Freightliner trailer rolled onto the bed-mounted camper of the pickup truck and then onto

the rear left upper corner of the Ford tractor unit’s box trailer. As the Freightliner and the

specialty bus continued toward the median, the Freightliner trailer overturned in the left

lane, while the tractor remained upright. Both vehicles then entered the median and came

to rest. The simulation also indicated that the final striking vehicle—the Kenworth tractortank trailer—had been traveling about 62 mph before braking and subsequently hitting the

pickup truck (which had already made contact with the rear of the Ford box trailer from its
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

initial impact and partial rotation) and pushing it and the Ford combination unit to their

final rest positions.

The Safety Board identified factors, including physical evidence from the scene

and the driver’s own statements, that indicate the Freightliner driver was traveling at a rate

of speed too fast for traffic conditions. Because the driver stated that he did not observe

brake lights on the specialty bus, the Safety Board examined whether the sun may have

impaired his ability to detect the brake lights and whether it may have contributed to his

inability to recognize the slowed vehicles in front of him. The Safety Board also examined

whether the three out-of-adjustment brakes on the intermodal chassis trailer may have

prevented the driver from being able to stop his vehicle to avoid a collision with the

specialty bus.

Freightliner Driver Performance

When interviewed after the accident, the Freightliner driver stated that he was

following the specialty bus by approximately two car lengths, had maintained a constant

view ahead, and was startled by the appearance of the bus stopped ahead of him and not

displaying brake lights. Safety Board investigators determined that the position of the sun

was above and behind the truck and the driver—opposite to that which would have

interfered with the driver’s vision. Further, the rear-view mirrors on the Freightliner were

set normally to facilitate a horizontal view of traffic to the driver’s rear, at an angle that

probably would not have produced a reflection of the sun into the eyes of the driver.

Although the Freightliner driver reported that he had not observed brake lights on

the specialty bus while approaching the toll plaza, laboratory examination of the brake

light bulbs established that the right tail and brake lights and the left tail and brake lights

of the bus were illuminated at the time of rear-end impact. The angle, altitude, and

intensity of the sun are unlikely to have degraded the effective brightness or contrast of the

bus’s brake lights in a manner that would have contributed to the cause of the accident.

The Freightliner driver stated to Safety Board investigators that he braked “hard

and steered to the left” to avoid a collision with the specialty bus. However, postaccident

examination of the roadway showed no evidence of preimpact tire marks. Physical

evidence at the scene did include 38-foot-long tire marks in the right traffic lane eastbound

that were straight and preceded the curved tire marks, which had striations running

perpendicular to the direction of travel. These tire marks were located on the roadway

west of the location where the Freightliner tractor struck the rear of the bus. Although the

postimpact brake marks are indicative of the driver using his brakes, their location and the

impact in the center of the right lane are evidence that the driver’s steering to the left and

the vehicle’s braking occurred after the collision between the front of the Freightliner

tractor and the rear of the bus.

For commercial vehicle air brake systems, such as the Freightliner’s pneumatic

brake system, a delay occurs between the driver applying the brake pedal and the delivery
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

of full air pressure to apply the brakes at the wheels. This delay, known as “air brake lag

time,” typically ranges from 0.6 to 0.8 second for a tractor to 1.0 second for a trailer. Three

of the 10 brakes on the Freightliner combination unit (all located on the trailer) were found

to be not properly maintained within adjustment limits. Brake force calculations showed

that, even with the three defective brakes, had the driver been applying the brakes for

longer than 1 second prior to impact, in-adjustment brakes would have locked up and left

preimpact tire marks. The left side of the vehicle’s fourth axle on the trailer did in fact

leave tire marks on the roadway surface; however, these marks were made after the front

bumper of the tractor had already struck the rear of the specialty bus.

Given the absence of preimpact tire marks, the Freightliner driver must have been

braking for less than 1 second prior to impact. During this time, air pressure in the braking

system would have been building from 0 pound per square inch (psi) to about 90 to 100

psi for a hard (emergency) brake application. At 90 psi, it was calculated that the

Freightliner could have decelerated at a rate of 0.435 g; however, only about two-thirds of

this value would have been available through the first second of braking because of the

nonlinear rise in air pressure, bringing the preimpact deceleration rate to 0.290 g. If all of

the Freightliner vehicle’s brakes had been in proper adjustment, the calculated preimpact

deceleration rate would have been 0.591 g, two-thirds of which is 0.394 g.

When the preimpact deceleration rate is combined with the approximate 50-mph

Freightliner impact speed, the preimpact speed with the defective brakes is about 56 mph.

Using 56 mph as an initial speed, in 1 second at a deceleration rate of 0.394 g, had all the

brakes been in proper adjustment, the impact speed would have been approximately 47

mph—a difference of only about 3 mph from the 50-mph impact speed with defective

brakes. The Freightliner driver most likely applied his brakes either at or just before

impact. Because of the short amount of time the driver was braking, the braking system

did not have an opportunity to significantly reduce the speed of the Freightliner at impact,

regardless of its mechanical condition. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that brake

force calculations, together with the physical evidence on scene, indicate that the

Freightliner’s out-of-adjustment brakes did not contribute to the accident.

The Freightliner driver admitted that he usually maintained a distance of only two

car lengths from vehicles he was following to prevent other vehicles from crossing into his

path. Two car lengths is normally about 40 feet, and even at a conservative speed of 40

mph (for a tractor-trailer transporting a load in excess of 76,000 pounds), the driver should

have been maintaining a distance of at least 10 times 40 feet. According to the Illinois

DMV, at 40 mph, a driver would need a headway of 410 feet and, at 45 mph, 462 feet to

stop.102 Thus, to have adequate stopping distance, the Freightliner driver should have been

following the vehicle ahead of him by well over 400 feet. Moreover, numerous traffic

controls in the area warned of the toll plaza, traffic was moderate to heavy at the time of

the accident, and the vehicles ahead of him were traveling at a rate much slower than the

posted 45-mph speed limit because of the toll plaza queue. The Freightliner driver, who

had driven this route on four or five previous occasions, was aware that he would be

102 Illinois Commercial Driver’s License Study Guide, 43–44.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

required to stop at the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza on his return trip. Therefore, the

Safety Board concludes that the Freightliner driver had ample cues indicating that he

needed to allow more space between his heavy vehicle and those ahead, and his failure to

maintain adequate following distance and to reduce the speed of his vehicle relative to the

slowing traffic ahead contributed to this accident.

Collision Warning Systems

According to the DOT, preliminary analyses have shown that 1,836,000 policereported crashes, or about 48 percent of accidents, could be prevented by rear-end103 or

run-off-the-road and lane change collision warning systems (CWSs).104 Although the 1995

Freightliner truck was an older model year vehicle, this accident and resultant loss of life

might have been avoidable if the vehicle had been equipped with a CWS. The Freightliner

driver did not perceive the slowing and stopped vehicles ahead and, as a result, did not

apply the brakes in time to slow his vehicle to avoid an accident. If the accident tractor had

been equipped with a warning system based on rear-end CWS design, the system should

have detected the slower moving traffic directly ahead and warned the driver of the

impending collision, providing more time for him to decelerate and avoid a rear-end

accident. The Safety Board concludes that the Freightliner driver did not detect the

slowing traffic ahead of his vehicle, and had the Freightliner truck been equipped with a

CWS designed to detect this type of situation and alert drivers, that technology might have

prevented this accident.

In May 2001, the Safety Board adopted the report Vehicle- and InfrastructureBased Technology for the Prevention of Rear-End Collisions.

105 In 1999 and 2000, the

Safety Board investigated nine rear-end collisions in which 20 people died and 181 were

injured. Common to all nine accidents was the following driver’s degraded perception of

traffic conditions ahead. As the Safety Board had already reported in 1995106 and further

discussed in its 1999 public hearing,107 existing technology in the form of intelligent

transportation systems (ITS) can help prevent rear-end collisions. In the nine such

accidents investigated by the Board, one (and sometimes more) of the available

technologies would have helped alert the drivers to the vehicles ahead and would have

prevented or mitigated the circumstances of the collisions.

103 Rear-end CWS devices use electronic sensors to detect the motion of a lead vehicle, compute

whether a collision is likely, and trigger an alarm to alert the driver to an impending collision. Auditory

warnings are helpful in improving reaction times during deceleration events.

104 See <www.its.dot.gov/ivbss/ivbss_workplan.htm>, February 24, 2006.

105 National Transportation Safety Board, Vehicle- and Infrastructure-Based Technology for the

Prevention of Rear-End Collisions, Special Investigation Report NTSB/SIR-01/01 (Washington, DC:

NTSB, 2001).

106 National Transportation Safety Board, Multiple Vehicle Collision With Fire During Fog Near

Milepost 118 on Interstate 40, Menifee, Arkansas, January 9, 1995, Special Investigation of Collision

Warning Technology, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-95/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1995).

107 National Transportation Safety Board, Docket No. DCA-99-SH-002.
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

As a result of its investigations, the Safety Board issued two recommendations to

NHTSA in May 2001: 

H-01-6

Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control and collision warning

system performance standards for new commercial vehicles. At a

minimum, these standards should address obstacle detection distance,

timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines, such as the mode and type

of warning.

H-01-7

After promulgating performance standards for collision warning systems

for commercial vehicles, require that all new commercial vehicles be

equipped with a collision warning system.

On July 6, 2005, NHTSA responded to the Safety Board that the DOT had established an

intelligent vehicle initiative (IVI) as a major component of the ITS program and was

evaluating the performance of adaptive cruise control (ACC) and CWS. The goal of the

IVI is to improve the safety and efficiency of motor vehicle operations by reducing

accidents through the use of advanced driver assistance systems, such as ACC and CWS.

To achieve this objective, NHTSA—along with the FHWA and the FMCSA—completed

field operational tests to evaluate the performance of advanced safety systems under

normal fleet conditions and released the results report in August 2005. According to

NHTSA, it is evaluating the results data to determine how to improve commercial vehicle

safety, which will allow it to further address the Safety Board’s recommendations; a final

report was expected to be published in fall 2005.

The Safety Board replied to NHTSA on October 31, 2005, informing it that the

status of the recommendations will remain “Open—Acceptable Response” pending

publication of the final report on the field operational tests, application of test results to

improve commercial and passenger vehicle safety through the use of ACC and CWS, and

development of IVI performance standards. As of April 1, 2006, the Safety Board is still

awaiting the final report from NHTSA. To date, though NHTSA has finished field

operational tests and awarded grant funds for further research, it has been 5 years since the

Safety Board issued the recommendations pertaining to collision warning technology.

According to NHTSA’s program milestones, full evaluation of the safety benefits of

vehicles equipped with safety systems to address multiple crash types will not be

completed until 2009—10 years after the Safety Board held its public hearing on existing

ITS technology that could help prevent rear-end accidents. Accidents such as the

Hampshire rear-end collision, with high loss of life, underscore the need for NHTSA to

move forward more expeditiously. Therefore, the Safety Board is reiterating Safety

Recommendations H-01-6 and -7, urging NHTSA to complete rulemaking on ACC and

CWS performance standards for new commercial vehicles, addressing obstacle detection

distance, timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines, such as the mode and type of
Analysis 54 Highway Accident Report

warning; and, after promulgating performance standards, to require that all new

commercial vehicles be equipped with CWS.

Highway

The Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza created a situation in which traffic backed up

in the right lane 0.5 mile from the toll plaza itself; this queue caused vehicles that had been

traveling in a 45-mph zone to come to almost a complete stop. Backups at toll plazas

present a safety hazard; in particular, they tend to increase the incidence of rear-end

collisions.

For example, in 2002, rear-end collisions represented 49.6 percent of all collisions

on the ISTHA system, the highest rate for all types of collisions, exceeding the next

highest category, sideswipes, which accounted for 21.4 percent of all collisions. Further,

from 1998–2002, rear-end accidents within a 5-mile radius of the Hampshire–Marengo

toll plaza ranged from 34.0 to 41.4 percent of total collisions.108 Toll authorities

nationwide experience rear-end collision rates that exceed other types of collisions, in part

because toll plazas interrupt the flow of high-speed traffic to intermittently collect tolls. In

2002, rear-end accidents within a 1-mile radius of mainline plazas on the Pennsylvania

Turnpike and the New Jersey Turnpike accounted for 30.2 percent and 37.8 percent,

respectively, of all accidents.109,110 One advantage of ETC is the elimination of queuing,

and ORT systems improve safety for the motoring public by eliminating the traffic queue

at toll collection locations and significantly reducing the likelihood of rear-end accidents.

According to the DOT, it takes “39 percent longer, on average, to make a peak

period trip in urban areas compared with the time it would take if traffic were flowing

freely.”111 The demand for expansion of the current highway system—both to relieve

congestion in densely populated areas and to meet transportation needs in rapidly growing

areas—continues to increase at a significant rate and shows no signs of slowing.112 The

acceptance of electronic tolling as a strategy to meet and manage demand is growing in

popularity among the general public.113

108 Wilbur Smith Associates, 2000–2002 Traffic Crash Data Report for the Illinois State Toll Highway

Authority (Chicago, IL: 2003) 2–8.

109 Data obtained from traffic engineering manager, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, January 16, 2004.

110 Data obtained from director of operations, New Jersey Turnpike Authority, January 20, 2004.

111 Emilio Suarez and Kevin Hoeflich, “The End of the Tollbooth?” Public Roads, Vol. 68, No. 6 (May–

June 2005): 3–4.

112 Peter A. Kopac, “Dispelling Highway Construction Myths,” Public Roads, Vol. 68, No. 6 (May–June

2005): 3–4.

113 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Tolling Practices for Highway Facilities, A

Synthesis of Highway Practice, Synthesis Report 262 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board of

the National Academies, 1998) 3.
Analysis 55 Highway Accident Report

Current toll industry practices and policies can be a useful frame of reference for

government entities or organizations that are contemplating or implementing tolls on

transportation facilities or retrofitting tolling facilities to increase efficiency and reduce

congestion.114 In the United States, toll plazas have been designed and constructed for

more than 50 years without national design standards.115 An extensive literature search

revealed that no general standards exist for the design of toll plazas.116 The standards

developed by individual toll operators have been based on years of experience in

improving or expanding their facilities.117 Consequently, the design practices and safety of

toll plazas vary considerably nationwide.

Toll authorities are becoming more prevalent across the country, and the Federal

Government supports them through policies118 contained in the Transportation Equity Act

for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and SAFETEA-LU. The new SAFETEA-LU legislation

charges the Secretary of Transportation to address toll plaza safety, focusing on toll

worker safety. Although the Safety Board is confident that the FHWA will appropriately

incorporate information and data derived from its study of toll plaza safety for workers

into the MUTCD, the Board remains concerned about the safety of the traveling public.

Historically concentrated in the eastern States, toll roads operate across the country

today. As more toll roads are built and many toll plazas are retrofitted for ETC, the need

for standards and guidelines to ensure uniformity and safety becomes paramount.

AASHTO is a preeminent source of technical information on highways and other

transportation facilities.119 According to AASHTO staff, the next update of the Green

Book will be in 2007 or 2008. The development of an AASHTO guide document is one

approach used by AASHTO to fulfill the research and analysis requirements for updating

the Green Book.

The FHWA’s MUTCD sets national standards for traffic control devices placed on

streets and highways by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction to

regulate, warn, or guide traffic. The FHWA expects to release State of the Practice and

Recommendations on Traffic Control Strategies at Tollbooth Plazas in 2006. The purpose

of this report is to provide recommended safety and operations guidelines for agencies that

operate or are planning to operate toll facilities. Although the FHWA plans to incorporate

information from this report into the next edition of the MUTCD, as appropriate, the

MUTCD revision process can take 3 or more years. Currently, neither AASHTO’s Green

Book nor FHWA’s MUTCD contains any guidance or discussion of toll plaza design

techniques or ETC systems.

114 NCHRP Synthesis Report 262, 4.

115 Developing Traffic Control Strategies at Toll Plazas: Signing and Markings, 2.

116 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Toll Plaza Design, A Synthesis of Highway

Practice, Synthesis Report 240 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board of the National

Academies, 1997) 1.

117 NCHRP Synthesis Report 240, 1.

118 See <www.fhwa.dot.gov/tea21/index.htm>, April 19, 2006.

119 Leveraging Resources for Better Transportation, 5.
Analysis 56 Highway Accident Report

Much has changed in the tolling industry since 1997–1998, when the most recent

NCHRP synthesis reports were published. Information and guidance on current practices

should be a priority, given the increasing demand for highway expansion and the removal

of toll plazas or incorporation of ETC on existing toll roads. Toll plazas with manual and

coin-operated collection booths create sudden stops in traffic flow. The resultant traffic

queues on high-speed interstates increase the likelihood of accidents and present a safety

hazard to the traveling public that ETC systems largely eliminate. Other benefits of ETC

include reduced congestion, improved fuel economy, and reduced pollution. Some toll

roads even provide ETC customers with nonstop travel lanes adjacent to the median. The

Safety Board concludes that traditional toll plazas, such as the Hampshire–Marengo toll

plaza (as configured on the day of the accident), create traffic backups that present a safety

hazard; the conversion of traditional plazas to ETC systems should greatly reduce such

hazards and improve safety on toll roads.

When either building or redesigning a toll plaza, the responsible authority needs

up-to-date guidelines and standards to help ensure the safety of the traveling public.

NCHRP Synthesis Report 240 identifies problems associated with electronic tolling, many

of which, such as the following, have been resolved since its publication in 1997:

• Differences in systems and protocols between adjacent toll facilities (in Texas,

for example, customers can now buy a TollTag for interoperable use on toll

roads in Dallas, in Houston, at Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport, and at

Dallas Love Field Airport), and

• Incentives to encourage ETC program participation (on the ISTHA system in

Illinois, automobile customers are given a 50-percent discount for using I-PASS

lanes ($0.40) rather than cash lanes ($0.80), and commercial vehicles receive a

discount for traveling during nonpeak hours).

Technology has thus evolved since 1997. To present the current practice in toll plaza

design, a cooperative research and analysis effort among the FHWA, AASHTO, and the

IBTTA (representing the toll industry) is needed to establish new AASHTO guidelines

that will eventually be used in updating the next edition of the Green Book.

The Safety Board believes that the FHWA, AASHTO, and the IBTTA should

cooperate to develop written guidelines on toll plaza design that provide information on

current tolling practices, ETC strategies, and other equipment designed to eliminate

queuing at toll plazas and to improve toll road safety. The Safety Board further believes

that AASHTO should include the information from the written guidelines on toll plaza

design in the next update of the Green Book.
Analysis 57 Highway Accident Report

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

During the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board examined the FMCSA’s

oversight of intermodal chassis operations and passenger carriers operating on revoked

authority, such as Leisure Pursuit Charters.

Intermodal Chassis

Although the Freightliner driver reported to Safety Board investigators that he

conducted a 14-minute inspection of the accident trailer prior to operating the equipment,

postaccident inspection revealed three out-of-adjustment brakes on the intermodal chassis.

When a tractor driver picks up an intermodal chassis, as was the case in this accident, he

or she has the federally mandated responsibility to be satisfied that the vehicle is in safe

operating condition. Although the accident driver visually inspected the trailer brakes, this

pretrip inspection did not identify the out-of-adjustment brakes, which are a safety hazard

because they reduce a vehicle’s braking efficiency. Had the accident trailer been pulled

over by law enforcement for a roadside vehicle inspection, the out-of-adjustment brakes

would have placed the entire vehicle out of service until they were properly adjusted.

The Freightliner driver worked for Frontline Transportation Company, which was

under contract to COSCO, a company that operates a fleet of vessels engaged in

international shipping to U.S. ports. The freight arrives at the ports in cargo containers and

is loaded onto chassis trailers for transport to customers or to rail yards. Once the freight

arrives at the final rail yard, the motor carrier—Frontline in this accident—transports it in

cargo containers on chassis trailers (also known as intermodal equipment) owned or leased

by COSCO, to COSCO customers. The owners or lessees of the intermodal equipment are

usually shipping companies that are not considered motor carriers; therefore, they are not

required to register with the FMCSA, obtain a DOT number, adhere to the FMCSRs, or

undergo compliance reviews, including on-site safety inspections.

Trucking companies and drivers that offer contract transport service to intermodal

equipment owners use the chassis trailers or cargo containers provided, and this

equipment may not comply with the FMCSRs. In this accident, though the Freightliner

driver did visually inspect the trailer provided by COSCO, a quick pretrip inspection was

inadequate to determine whether the brakes were roadworthy. Although motor carriers

and drivers transport such equipment in interstate commerce, they are not the owners of

the equipment and do not have control or authority over its routine inspection, systemic

maintenance, or repair to ensure compliance with Federal safety regulations. However, if

these carriers and drivers are subjected to a roadside inspection, they are cited and fined

for the intermodal equipment safety violations and their safety record is negatively

affected for failure of the equipment owner to provide safe equipment. The owner of the

accident trailer—TRAC Lease—owns more than 200,000 intermodal chassis trailers, and

an average of 54,000 such trailers are being transported daily over our Nation’s

highways.

Recent Federal legislation will help close this safety loophole. Under SAFETEALU, intermodal equipment owners will be required to obtain a DOT number and adhere to
Analysis 58 Highway Accident Report

the FMCSRs. The SAFETEA legislation mandates that the FMCSA enact rulemaking120 to

require that equipment providers meet all safety regulations prior to providing the

equipment for transport and certify and document that inspections and repairs have been

performed. In addition, the FMCSA will be given authority to enter the port facility that

provides the equipment to review the inspection process and ensure compliance with

Federal safety regulations. Further, if a tractor-trailer combination unit is pulled over for a

roadside inspection, and the trailer chassis and container are owned by an intermodal

equipment company, any violations or defects found during the inspection will be assessed

to the owner of the equipment, thus affecting the intermodal carrier’s safety record. The

Safety Board concludes that, by requiring intermodal equipment owners to obtain a DOT

number and adhere to the FMCSRs, the new rulemaking required by SAFETEA-LU will

help close the gap in the FMCSA’s oversight of intermodal equipment, such as that

involved in this accident, and improve freight transportation safety.

Oversight of Passenger Carriers Operating on Revoked Authority

The Leisure-owned specialty bus was rear-ended and thus did not initiate the

accident. Nonetheless, the Safety Board reviewed the motor carrier’s operations as part of

the accident investigation. In addition, the FMCSA conducted a postaccident compliance

review of Leisure and issued the company a safety rating of “conditional” because of its

violation of safety regulations for both drivers and their vehicles. These violations

included:

• Failing to randomly test drivers for controlled substances and alcohol,

• Failing to investigate a driver’s background,

• Failing to maintain a list or certificate relating to violations of motor vehicle

laws and ordinances,

• Failing to maintain medical examiners’ certificates in drivers’ qualification

files,

• Operating a motor vehicle providing transportation without the required

registration or beyond the scope of the registration,

• Requiring or permitting a driver to drive after having been on duty for more

than 70 hours in 8 consecutive days,

• Failing to keep a record of tests on push-out windows, emergency doors, and

emergency door marking lights on buses, and

• Using a commercial vehicle not periodically inspected.

By the very nature of these violations—all of which are safety-related—Leisure placed its

passengers at risk, along with the general public who shared the road with Leisure’s

vehicles and drivers.

120 According to the FMCSA, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is expected to be published in the

Federal Register on June 1, 2006.
Analysis 59 Highway Accident Report

During its investigation, the Safety Board determined that Leisure had been

operating on a revoked interstate authority at least eight times before the accident. On

January 29, 2002, the FMCSA had revoked Leisure’s operating authority because of

inadequate insurance; however, according to Leisure’s president, he had not received the

revocation letter due to an office move. During the FMCSA postaccident compliance

review, inspectors discovered that Leisure had conducted at least eight interstate charters

after having its operating authority revoked. On one of these trips, a driver for Leisure had

been pulled over for an MCSAP roadside inspection (driver only); because of the limited

nature of the inspection, the company’s revoked operating status was not identified, and

the FMCSA was not notified that the company was operating on revoked authority.

Because of the safety violations found during Leisure’s postaccident compliance review,

and the fact that the company had been operating without authority during these

violations, the Safety Board reviewed the process by which the FMCSA monitors

passenger carriers that have lost operating authority to verify that they are no longer

providing for-hire interstate charter services to the public.

According to the FMCSA, once a company receives a final notification of

operating status revocation, it is listed in the FMCSA databases as “inactive.” Although

Leisure’s operating status was revoked and its assigned motor carrier number was

inactive, the company continued to provide charters to the public. Leisure was knowingly

operating without proper authority and in violation of safety requirements, while being

paid by customers to whom it was providing uninspected vehicles and drivers who lacked

medical examination certificates or background checks, as documented in the FMCSA

compliance review. Had the accident not occurred, these violations probably would have

continued because Leisure was not listed as active in FMCSA databases, and the databases

provided no link between roadside inspection and the inactive operating status of the

carrier. The FMCSA believed that the company had stopped operating as a result of the

notice of revocation; however, it had no measures in place to verify that the company had

indeed ceased operations. This situation represents a breakdown in the FMCSA process of

operating authority revocation meant to protect the public from illegally operating and

potentially unsafe companies.

Further, once a carrier becomes inactive—even though it is not removed from the

FMCSA databases that are used to determine the need for a compliance review or safety

audit—it is no longer targeted for a compliance review because it is not registered as

active. Given the inactive designation and in the absence of roadside inspection statistics,

the FMCSA is unlikely to identify an illegally operating carrier as a high-risk carrier for a

compliance review. The FMCSA programs to protect passengers and the traveling public

are directed to carriers with an active operating status.

In a 2004 address to the United Motorcoach Association, the FMCSA

administrator stated that the agency recognizes the reality of passenger carriers operating

without proper authority and promised to work with association members to get uninsured

and other illegal motorcoach operators off the highways. The method discussed to prompt

field action was cross checking insurance revocations with roadside inspection and

accident databases. The Safety Board has received no indication from the FMCSA that it
Analysis 60 Highway Accident Report

has initiated this process. In January 2004, the FMCSA informed the Safety Board that

inactive passenger carriers would be discovered and subsequently placed in OOS status by

means of roadside inspections. However, in 2004, of the approximately 776,550 registered

buses, only 5.5 percent underwent roadside inspections. Further, as a result of new

SAFETEA-LU legislation, the FMCSA cannot conduct roadside inspections of passenger

carriers. In light of such numbers and the new legislation, the likelihood of inspectors

detecting a passenger carrier operating on a revoked authority is extremely low. The

Safety Board is very concerned that the FMCSA does not have a method to guarantee that

passenger carriers whose authority has been revoked will be expeditiously identified and

prevented from further unsafe operations or that they will cease operations.

PRISM is a voluntary Federal–State partnership that makes safe performance a

requirement for obtaining and keeping commercial vehicle registration. PRISM links

FMCSA records on motor carrier safety with a State’s vehicle registration system. The

DOT or motor carrier number of the carrier responsible for the vehicle’s safety is

identified at the vehicle level, allowing the State to determine a carrier’s safety fitness

before issuing license plates. The program monitors safety performance, and carriers

prohibited by the FMCSA from operating in interstate commerce may not be allowed to

register their vehicles. PRISM plays a key role in the FMCSA’s effort to remove high-risk

carriers from highways; however, not all States participate in PRISM.

The use of registration sanctions serves as an incentive for unsafe carriers to

improve their safety performance. However, at the time of the accident, Illinois was not

part of the PRISM program. Even if Illinois had participated in PRISM then, Leisure still

would have been able to continue operating until the vehicle’s registration expired. In

addition, under PRISM, if Leisure was not stopped for a roadside inspection and did not

become a priority for an FMCSA compliance review, the FMCSA would not have

identified it as an unsafe carrier.

Without a process to verify that the operations of revoked passenger carriers have

ceased, undetected inactive carriers can continue to provide unsafe service to the public

and operate on the Nation’s highways without oversight. Other motor carriers can

similarly circumvent the system, operating on revoked authority without the required

amount of insurance and violating key safety regulations. Such motor carriers would not

be identified unless one of their vehicles was either inspected at a “planned stop,” as

dictated in the new SAFETEA-LU legislation, or involved in a fatal accident, a situation

that allows commercial passenger buses to essentially travel unchecked. An agency whose

mission is to ensure safe transportation must close this loophole, which undermines the

effectiveness of Federal safety regulations. The FMCSA process of notifying the operator

in violation of its revocation is only a first step in preventing unsafe carriers from

continuing operation. Relying on the possibility of an inspection or involvement in a fatal

accident to catch those carriers operating without authority is not sufficient as a safety net.
Analysis 61 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board concludes that the FMCSA’s process for revocation of operating

authority is inadequate because, as this accident demonstrates, it fails to follow up and

verify that the OOS carrier has ceased operations. The Safety Board believes that the

FMCSA should establish a program to verify that motor carriers have ceased operations

after the effective date of revocation of operating authority.

The FMCSA indicates that it has begun a project to develop a more effective

operational model for its enforcement and compliance activities, referred to as the CSA

2010 Initiative. However, full implementation of any changes in the safety rating process

is not expected until 2010. The Safety Board is concerned that this long time frame

jeopardizes the safety of the traveling public through unnecessary exposure to possibly

unsafe commercial motor vehicles.

Moreover, though FMCSA staff have indicated that the CSA 2010 Initiative is a

top-to-bottom evaluation of the compliance review system, Safety Board staff have

identified the separate issue of passenger carriers operating on revoked licenses as another

problem area within the FMCSA’s oversight of commercial motor carriers. The Safety

Board understands that all changes resulting from the FMCSA’s compliance review

evaluation would be implemented by 2010, with proposed rulemaking notices issued in

the time leading up to the effective date. However, the CSA 2010 Initiative was first

announced almost 2 years ago, and the Board has received no information regarding the

FMCSA’s plans to implement the initiative, nor is the Board aware of any public

document outlining the specific steps the agency plans to take to accomplish the review

and to implement changes.

The Safety Board believes that waiting 4 more years for significant action to be

taken to amend the troubled motor carrier compliance review system is unacceptable.

Failing to expeditiously implement a program to verify that revoked passenger carriers do

not continue to operate will continue to negatively affect the safety of the traveling public.

Given the lengthy implementation process for the CSA 2010 Initiative and the uncertainty

of results, the Safety Board fully expects that the FMCSA will not wait to develop a

program based on the outcome of the CSA 2010 project, but will instead take action now

to implement the Board’s recommendation for a followup program.

Vehicle Incompatibility and Heavy Truck Aggressivity

During the Hampshire–Marengo accident sequence, the Freightliner driver stated

that he did not see the brake lights on the specialty bus, that the bus suddenly stopped in

front of him, and that—though he braked—he was unable to avoid a collision with the rear

of the bus. When the Freightliner tractor struck the rear of the specialty bus, it overrode

the bus bumper and entered the passenger compartment because of differences in vehicle
Analysis 62 Highway Accident Report

weights121 and structural stiffness and because of geometric mismatch. (See figure 24.)

The differences in weight and stiffness and the geometric mismatch are often referred to as

vehicle “aggressivity.” NHTSA’s Web page, “Heavy Vehicle Aggressivity Program,”122

last updated in June 2000, states that the common belief is that not much can be done to

diminish the consequences of crashes between smaller vehicles and large trucks because

of the significant differences in vehicle mass.

However, research has shown that geometric height differences and a lack of

forgiving front truck structures can be modified to help reduce heavy truck aggressivity

and to mitigate the severity of these types of accidents.123,124,125 Examples of these

modifications, often referred to as “front underride protection systems”—which can result

in reduced intrusion or occupant injury—include energy-absorbing front structures to

offset the weight differences between two impacting vehicles, as well as bumpers

designed to deflect the impacted vehicle away from the front of the truck, thereby

reducing the total change in velocity of the smaller vehicle.

121 Of the 10 passengers interviewed who provided estimates of their weight, the average weight was

144 pounds. The driver weighed about 200 pounds. The total weight of an exemplar bus (including driver)

was 10,420 pounds. Combined with an average weight of 150 pounds for 20 passengers, the difference

between the specialty bus weight of 13,420 pounds and the combination unit at 76,480 pounds was 63,060

pounds, or a ratio of about 6 to 1.

122 See <www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-01/summaries/havp_02.html>, March 23, 2006.

Figure 24. Freightliner and specialty bus bumper height comparison.

123 A. Berg, M. Krehl, L. Riebeck, and U. Breitling, “Passive Safety of Trucks in Frontal and Rear-End

Collisions With Cars,” Proceedings, 18th International Technical Conference on Enhanced Safety of

Vehicles, Nagoya, Japan (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2003).

124 A. K. Prasad, R. M. Clarke, D. Willke, and M. Monk, Reducing Heavy Truck Aggressivity in

Collisions With Passenger Cars, DOT HS 808 476 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 1995).

125 K. Mendis, A. Mani, A. K. Prasad, D. Willke, M. Mond, and R. M. Clarke, “Concepts to Reduce

Heavy Truck Aggressivity in Truck-to-Car Collisions, Proceedings, 15th International Technical

Conference on Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Melbourne, Australia (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 1996).
Analysis 63 Highway Accident Report

In this accident, as a result of the heavy truck’s aggressivity, an almost 5-foot

intrusion into the bus’s passenger compartment led to loss of survivable space for many

passengers seated in the rear; seven of the eight passengers seated in the last three rows of

the bus were fatally injured. Except for the ejected passenger seated in row 1, the

passengers seated forward in the bus (in rows 1–3) sustained minor-to-serious injuries. In

other words, the crash forces experienced by the passengers seated away from the

intrusion area were mitigated by the crushing of the rear of the bus. The Safety Board

concludes that the combination of the large weight difference (almost 6 to 1) between the

Freightliner tractor-trailer and the specialty bus, the impact speed of the tractor-trailer into

the specialty bus, the difference in stiffness between the tractor front end and the bus body,

and the geometric mismatch during the dynamic collision led to the truck overriding the

bus’s rear structure and resulted in extensive intrusion damage into the rear passenger

compartment, a loss of survivable space in that area, and the deaths of seven passengers.

Occupant protection requires that survivable space be maintained for all

passengers, and that the interior structure provide sufficient support and energy absorption

so that crash forces are survivable. Vehicles with high aggressivity, such as heavy trucks,

often compromise the survivable space in the vehicles they hit. Currently, the United

States does not have a requirement for front underride protection126 on heavy trucks.

Europe began studying and testing such devices in 1994 and subsequently established

regulations requiring these protection devices on heavy vehicles. Regulations of the

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) are in place for both front underride and rear

underride protection (ECE-R 93 and ECE-R 58, respectively); the regulations provide

standard specifications for the mount, dimensions, and static stability performance of

these devices.

In the United States, a 2004 study conducted by the NCHRP, entitled A Guide for

Reducing Collisions Involving Heavy Trucks, noted that combination-unit trucks (usually

tractor-semitrailers) were found to have a markedly different crash involvement profile

than vehicles in general. According to the study, these vehicles

have relatively low crash rates per mile traveled, but with much greater crash

costs per year, and over their operational lives, more than four times higher than

most other vehicle types. This means that from a cost-benefit standpoint, safety

investments in tractor-trailers are likely to have much greater per-vehicle benefits

than similar investments in other vehicle types.127

A 1998 NHTSA overview report on vehicle compatibility and light truck (light

trucks and vans [LTV]128) issues stated that the number of LTVs has grown dramatically

since the early 1980s. A 2003 study of vehicle mismatch and injury indicated that motor

126 A front underride protection system is an energy-absorbing structure on the front of a truck that

reduces injuries to occupants in a vehicle struck by the front of the truck.

127 Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, National Cooperative Highway Research

Program, Guidance for Implementation of the AASHTO Strategic Safety Plan, Volume 13: A Guide for

Reducing Collisions Involving Heavy Trucks, NCHRP Report 500 (Washington, DC: TRB, 2004) III-3.

128 According to NHTSA, the LTV category consists of trucks of 10,000 pounds GVWR or less and

includes pickups, vans, minivans, truck-based station wagons, and sport utility vehicles.
Analysis 64 Highway Accident Report

vehicle registrations for the year 2000 showed 77.8 million light trucks in the United

States, a 63.8 percent increase since 1990; LTVs now account for 40 percent of all

registered motor vehicles. During the same 10-year period, the number of registered

passenger vehicles increased by 1 percent.129 In addition to the increase in LTVs, the

number of registered large trucks increased by 30 percent between 1993 and 2003, and

miles traveled by large trucks increased 35 percent.130 If these trends continue, LTVs and

large trucks will soon constitute the majority of vehicles on the road, resulting in even

greater occurrences of vehicle incompatibility in accidents.

In 2003, approximately 457,000 large trucks (GVWR exceeding 10,000 pounds)

were involved in traffic accidents and accounted for 8 percent of vehicles involved in fatal

accidents. These traffic accidents resulted in 4,669 fatalities and 122,000 injuries; 85

percent of those killed and 78 percent of those injured were the occupants of other

vehicles (passenger cars and LTVs), pedestrians, or bicyclists.131 The initial point of

impact for 62.8 percent of the fatal accidents involved the front of the truck.132 In

accidents involving a large truck during 2004, some 4,006 occupants of passenger cars and

LTVs were killed, and 85,000 such occupants were injured.133 According to the DOT, its

goal is to reduce highway fatality rates from 1.46 persons per 100 million vehicle miles

traveled (VMT) in 2004 to 1 person per 100 million VMT by 2008. The FMCSA’s goal is

to reduce commercial motor vehicle-related fatalities from 2.3 per 100 million commercial

motor VMT in 2004 to 1.65 per 100 million commercial motor VMT by 2008.134

Achieving these ambitious goals will clearly require a large reduction in fatalities resulting

from accidents between large trucks and passenger vehicles.

NHTSA has made some progress in testing and evaluating measures to reduce

heavy truck aggressivity; however, the agency has published little recently to indicate

continued testing or the intent to implement changes in the industry. The Safety Board

recognizes that NHTSA has discussed the need to reduce fatalities resulting from large

truck accidents and has stated that research and implementation of ITS technologies for

accident avoidance is a priority. But the agency has not included large truck

incompatibility among its priorities for rulemaking or research support for calendar years

2005–2009.

The 21st Century Truck Program, of which the DOT is a partner, announced in its

“roadmap” in December 2000 the goal to improve truck safety by fostering advancements

in vehicle design and performance, such as reducing truck frontal aggressivity in

multivehicle collisions. However, the milestone set for completing laboratory tests and

129 Acierno, “Vehicle Mismatch: Injury Patterns and Severity,” 761.

130 See <ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/carrierresearchresults/html/2003crashfacts/chap1.htm>, March 28, 2006.

131 See <www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/PriorityPlan-2005.html>, March 23, 2006.

132 See <ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/carrierresearchresults/html/2003crashfacts/tbl42.htm>, March 28, 2006.

133 A total of 761 truck occupants were killed, and about 27,000 were injured. See <wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2004EE.pdf>, March 28, 2006.

134 See (a) <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/rt-5year-strategicplan. htm>,

March 23, 2006. (b) <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/mcspr-12-31-05.htm>, March 23,

2006.
Analysis 65 Highway Accident Report

field trials of systems designed to reduce the destructive effects of truck accidents is not

until midyear 2009. The incompatibility of large trucks with passenger cars is not a new

issue, and the Europeans have been doing work in this area since at least 1994. In keeping

with the DOT’s own goals to reduce fatalities resulting from large truck accidents and the

21st Century Truck Program’s goal to foster advancements in vehicle design and reduction

of truck frontal aggressivity, both the department and the truck program need to increase

their investments in truck design initiatives that could ameliorate the severity of collisions

with large trucks.

The Safety Board therefore concludes that although NHTSA has acknowledged

the seriousness of the vehicle incompatibility problem in contributing to the severity of

traffic accidents, it has not allocated adequate resources to that issue as it affects heavy

trucks, a major cause of death for occupants in both passenger cars and LTVs. Therefore,

the Safety Board believes that the DOT should include heavy vehicles in its research,

testing, and eventual rulemaking on highway vehicle incompatibility, especially as that

incompatibility affects the severity of accidents. In addition, the Safety Board believes that

the DOE should report to the Safety Board the 21st Century Truck Program’s plans and

timetable for prioritizing research, testing, and design enhancements that address heavy

truck aggressivity.
66 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The weather; the mechanical condition of the specialty bus, pickup truck, Ford

tractor-box trailer, and Kenworth tractor-tank trailer; and the design and condition of

the roadway did not cause or contribute to the accident.

2. Neither the Freightliner driver nor the specialty bus driver was adversely affected by

medications, medical conditions, or fatigue; and the emergency response was timely

and effective.

3. Brake force calculations, together with the physical evidence on scene, indicate that

the Freightliner’s out-of-adjustment brakes did not contribute to the accident.

4. The Freightliner driver had ample cues indicating that he needed to allow more space

between his heavy vehicle and those ahead, and his failure to maintain adequate

following distance and to reduce the speed of his vehicle relative to the slowing traffic

ahead contributed to this accident.

5. The Freightliner driver did not detect the slowing traffic ahead of his vehicle, and had

the Freightliner truck been equipped with a collision warning system designed to

detect this type of situation and alert drivers, that technology might have prevented

this accident.

6. Traditional toll plazas, such as the Hampshire–Marengo toll plaza (as configured on

the day of the accident), create traffic backups that present a safety hazard; the

conversion of traditional plazas to electronic toll collection systems should greatly

reduce such hazards and improve safety on toll roads.

7. By requiring intermodal equipment owners to obtain a U.S. Department of

Transportation number and adhere to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations,

the new rulemaking required by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users will help close the gap in the Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s oversight of intermodal equipment, such as

that involved in this accident, and improve freight transportation safety.

8. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s process for revocation of

operating authority is inadequate because, as this accident demonstrates, it fails to

follow up and verify that the out-of-service carrier has ceased operations.
Conclusions 67 Highway Accident Report

9. The combination of the large weight difference (almost 6 to 1) between the

Freightliner tractor-trailer and the specialty bus, the impact speed of the tractor-trailer

into the specialty bus, the difference in stiffness between the tractor front end and the

bus body, and the geometric mismatch during the dynamic collision led to the truck

overriding the bus’s rear structure and resulted in extensive intrusion damage into the

rear passenger compartment, a loss of survivable space in that area, and the deaths of

seven passengers.

10. Although the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has acknowledged the

seriousness of the vehicle incompatibility problem in contributing to the severity of

traffic accidents, it has not allocated adequate resources to that issue as it affects

heavy trucks, a major cause of death for occupants in both passenger cars and light

trucks and vans.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accident was the failure of the Freightliner truck driver, who was operating his vehicle

too fast for traffic conditions, to slow for traffic. Contributing to the accident was the

traffic backup in a 45-mph zone, created by vehicles stopping for the Hampshire–Marengo

toll plaza. The structural incompatibility between the Freightliner tractor-trailer and the

specialty bus contributed to the severity of the accident.
68 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the

following safety recommendations:

New Recommendations

To the U.S. Department of Energy:

Report to the National Transportation Safety Board the 21st Century Truck

Program’s plans and timetable for prioritizing research, testing, and design

enhancements that address heavy truck aggressivity. (H-06-15)

To the U.S. Department of Transportation:

Include heavy vehicles in your research, testing, and eventual rulemaking

on highway vehicle incompatibility, especially as that incompatibility

affects the severity of accidents. (H-06-16)

To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

Establish a program to verify that motor carriers have ceased operations

after the effective date of revocation of operating authority. (H-06-17)

To the Federal Highway Administration:

Cooperate with the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials and the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike

Association to develop written guidelines on toll plaza design that provide

information on current tolling practices, electronic toll collection

strategies, and other equipment designed to eliminate queuing at toll plazas

and to improve toll road safety. (H-06-18)

To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Cooperate with the Federal Highway Administration and the International

Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association to develop written guidelines on

toll plaza design that provide information on current tolling practices,

electronic toll collection strategies, and other equipment designed to

eliminate queuing at toll plazas and to improve toll road safety. (H-06-19)
Recommendations 69 Highway Accident Report

Include the information from the written guidelines on toll plaza design in

the next update of A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets

(Green Book). (H-06-20)

To the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association:

Cooperate with the Federal Highway Administration and the American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials to develop

written guidelines on toll plaza design that provide information on current

tolling practices, electronic toll collection strategies, and other equipment

designed to eliminate queuing at toll plazas and to improve toll road safety.

(H-06-21)

Reiterated Recommendations

The National Transportation Safety Board also reiterates the following

recommendations:

To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control and collision warning

system performance standards for new commercial vehicles. At a

minimum, these standards should address obstacle detection distance,

timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines, such as the mode and type

of warning. (H-01-6)

After promulgating performance standards for collision warning systems

for commercial vehicles, require that all new commercial vehicles be

equipped with a collision warning system. (H-01-7)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARK V. ROSENKER ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS

Acting Chairman Member

DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Member

KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS

Member

Adopted: April 18, 2006

71 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A 

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Hampshire, Illinois,

accident on October 1, 2003. An investigative team was dispatched with members from

the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; and Arlington, Texas, offices. Groups were

established to investigate human performance; motor carrier operations; and highway,

vehicle, and survival factors.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administration; the Federal Highway Administration; the Illinois State Police; the

Illinois State Toll Highway Authority; the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike

Association; Leisure Pursuit Charters, Inc.; Frontline Transportation Company; Ford

Motor Company; Goshen Coach Division of McCoy Miller, Inc.; and the Hampshire Fire

Department.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.
72 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B 

Freightliner Combination Vehicle Information

Freightliner FLD tractor

Manufacturer: Freightliner Corporation

Model: FLD 120064S T

Date of manufacture: August 1994

Gross vehicle weight rating: 46,000 pounds (lbs)

Gross axle weight rating: 12,000 lbs (steer axle)

Gross axle weight rating: 16,000 lbs (rear axles, each)

Curb weight: 16,160 lbs (8,609 lbs front, 7,551 lbs rear)

Unsprung tractor weight: 5,000 lbs (total, approximate)

Theurer trailer chassis

Manufacturer: Theurer Inc. (Subsidiary Kiddie, Inc.)

Model: 220-CC-40GN

Date of manufacture: September 1984

Gross vehicle weight rating: 72,715 lbs

Gross axle weight rating: 19,040 lbs (tandem axles, each)

Tare weight: 16,500 lbs

Curb eight: 16,160 lbs (8,609 lbs front, 7,551 lbs rear)

Overall length, width 40.7 feet (ft), 8.0 ft

Overall height driver side: 48.0 inches (in) (from ground)

Overall height right side: 44.5 in (from ground)

Cargo container

Manufacturer: Yangzhou Tangyun Container Co., LTD.

Type: TYC-112B

Date of manufacture: October 2002

Maximum gross weight: 67,200 lbs

Tare weight: 8,780 lbs
Appendix B 73 Highway Accident Report

Payload: 58,420 lbs

Allowable stack weight: 476,200 lbs

Exterior length, height, width 40.0 ft, 9.5 ft, 8.0 ft

On October 1, 2003, the Illinois State Police weighed the Freightliner tractortrailer using in-ground scales at Arrowhead Shell in Hampshire, Illinois. The steer axle

weighed 9,280 pounds, the second and third axles weighed 38,780 pounds, and the fourth

and fifth axles weighed 28,420 pounds—for a total vehicle weight of 76,480 pounds.
74 Highway Accident Report

Appendix C

SDM Data

Sensing Diagnostic Module

The 2000 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 extended cab pickup truck was equipped with

an advanced frontal occupant protection system, which incorporated manual three-point

safety belts, along with a driver and passenger supplemental restraint system, which

consisted of frontal air bags at both the driver and passenger positions. Under such a

system, crash detection, as well as air bag deployment, is managed by an electronic

control module identified as a sensing diagnostic module (SDM) by the General Motors

Corporation. The primary purpose of the SDM is to “sense” an impending crash event and

to determine when and if air bag deployment is warranted. The SDM does not sense a

rear-end collision as a crash event. Rather, a crash event is sensed when the vehicle rapidly

decreases speed, experiencing a rearward (negative) change in velocity (delta-v).

In addition to its primary function, the accident SDM was equipped with

nonvolatile electronically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) used to

preserve critical operating data, including precrash data, crash severity data, and air bag

deployment, as well as diagnostic trouble codes. According to the SDM, the pickup truck

was traveling 3 mph for at least 3 seconds. It was then most likely struck from behind by

the specialty bus, which had accelerated to about 40 mph from the first rear-end crash.

This rear impact into the pickup truck caused it to increase speed. The pickup truck was

then forced into the rear of the Ford tractor-box trailer. The SDM quite likely sensed the

crash event from this rear impact, activated the driver’s air bag, and recorded a maximum

rearward (negative) delta-v of 13.77 mph. The actual delta-v may have been higher than

this value because the SDM may not have recorded the entire crash pulse.

The information retrieved from the accident vehicle’s SDM revealed 5 seconds of

precrash data. The SDM receives various data, including precrash parameters, from the

vehicle’s class II communications bus1

 asynchronously2 at 1-second intervals. Because the

data are asynchronous, the actual time interval has been determined to vary +/–0.02

second, providing an interval closer to about every 0.8 to 1.2 seconds. Vehicle speeds that

fall within these precrash data intervals are not recorded and therefore are unavailable. By

design, the precrash data obtained from the accident represent the time before the

algorithm enable (AE) occurs. Table C-1 summarizes precrash data from the accident

SDM for vehicle speed and engine speed.

1 A communications bus is a network arrangement in which all devices are directly attached, and all

data pass through each of the devices; each device has a unique identity and can recognize those signals

intended for it.

2 “Asynchronous” pertains to a transmission technique that does not require a common clock between

the communicating devices; timing signals are derived from special characters in the data stream itself.
Appendix C 75 Highway Accident Report

As shown in the table, the data retrieved from the SDM indicated that at 5, 4, 3,

and 2 seconds before AE, the pickup truck’s operational information showed the vehicle

traveling 3 mph.3 The data further indicate that, about 1 second prior to AE, the vehicle

slowed to 1 mph and the engine speed was reported as 0 rpm.4 Other SDM data showed a

recorded crash pulse indicating that the pickup truck experienced a maximum recorded

rearward (negative) deceleration delta-v of at least 13.77 mph within the recorded data.

Table C-1. Partial list of SDM-derived precrash data from Chevrolet pickup truck.

According to information obtained by the Safety Board during the investigation,

the type of SDM on the pickup truck records only a rearward (negative) delta-v. It would

not have recorded an impact to the rear of the vehicle that resulted in a vehicle forward

(positive) delta-v. Because the SDM does not record forward delta-v, the pickup truck was

most likely struck from behind prior to experiencing AE without the SDM detecting the

collision. For example, the specialty bus could have struck the pickup truck between 0.0

and 1.0 second prior to AE. Because the SDM records only whole-second increments

before AE, it would not have detected the speed change as a result of such a collision. As

shown in table C-1, the SDM data indicate that the vehicle’s speed dropped to 1 mph and

the engine rpm dropped to 0 approximately 1.0 second prior to AE. At this point in the

precrash data, the time prior to AE is very possibly between 0.001 and 0.999 second—not

1.0 second. AE is generally located at a value less than 1.0 second and more than 0.999

second.

Safety Board investigators examined the SDM data, along with other evidence.

They applied the reported SDM data to the known accident circumstances and found that,

most likely, just prior to being struck from behind by the specialty bus, the pickup truck

was in the process of slowing to a stop and was traveling 3 mph for a least 3.0 seconds.

This time frame is represented within the SDM precrash data as –5 through –2 seconds.

3 These data are intended to represent the forward, or longitudinal, speed of the vehicle.

4 The SDM receives speed data from the vehicle’s power train control module, which calculates road

speed.

Seconds before AEA

Vehicle 

speed (mph)

Engine 

speed (rpm)

 –5 3 640

 –4 3 512

 –3 3 512

 –2 3 512

 –1 1 0

A

 Algorithm enable (AE), or “wake-up,” refers to negative acceleration (about

–1 to –2 g’s over two consecutive samples) observed by the air bag’s control

module microcomputer. A negative acceleration results in a decrease in the

vehicle’s speed. The module then begins running the “algorithm,” leading to

the deployment decision.
Appendix C 76 Highway Accident Report

(See table C-1.) At this point (somewhere between –2 and –1 seconds), the pickup truck

was struck from behind, pushing it into the rear of the vehicle in front of it, resulting in a

rearward (negative) change in velocity (negative acceleration). If this occurred, the pickup

truck would have traveled at 3 mph for approximately 3.0 seconds and then,

approximately 0.999 to 0.001 second later, undergone a rearward acceleration that resulted

in a recorded delta-v of at least 13.77 mph.

Because of data rebuffering,5 the SDM “precrash” data reported at –1 second to

AE is believed to have occurred “after” AE and, therefore, the reported data would have

occurred after initial impact and during vehicle engagement. In the simulations described

in this report, the pickup truck is traveling 3 mph prior to AE; however, even if the SDM

reported vehicle speed at –1 second, of the 1 mph that occurred prior to AE, this reduction

in speed would not significantly affect the simulation results. Safety Board investigators

obtained no physical evidence to indicate that the reported SDM data were erroneous or

invalid.

Air Bag Deployment

According to the SDM data, the pickup truck underwent a rearward delta-v as a

result of the collision that caused the air bag to deploy. Based on the physical evidence

documented from the accident scene and the Safety Board’s simulations, only two of the

collisions that occurred during this multivehicle accident would have resulted in a

rearward delta-v and decelerations:

1. When the specialty bus pushed the pickup truck forward into the rear of the

Ford tractor-box trailer, and

2. When the Kenworth tractor-tank trailer subsequently struck the pickup truck,

causing it to move forward again and strike the Ford tractor-box trailer in a

secondary collision.

The other collision occurred when the pickup truck was struck from behind by the

specialty bus, following the Freightliner’s collision with the bus. This collision caused the

pickup truck to accelerate forward, increasing its speed, and did not cause the rearward

deceleration and change in velocity needed to deploy the air bag.

5 The accident SDM was identified as belonging to a family of modules in which some precrash data

may actually be recorded after, rather than before, AE. This potential for anomalous precrash data is caused

by a phenomenon known as “data rebuffering,” which may result in some precrash data being recorded after

AE.
77 Highway Accident Report

Appendix D

State Toll Facilities

Table 12. States with and without toll facilities.A

With 1 toll facility More than 1 toll facility No toll facilities

Alaska California Alabama

Arkansas Colorado Arizona

Kansas Delaware Connecticut

Kentucky Florida Hawaii

Maine Georgia Idaho

Missouri Illinois Iowa

Nevada Indiana Minnesota

New Hampshire Louisiana Mississippi

Ohio Maryland Montana

Oklahoma Massachusetts New Mexico

Rhode Island Michigan North Carolina

South Carolina Nebraska North Dakota

New Jersey South Dakota

New York Tennessee

Oregon Utah

Pennsylvania Vermont

Texas Washington

Virginia Wisconsin

West Virginia Wyoming

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 2003 (Washington, 

DC: FHWA, 2004).

A “Toll facilities” exclude ferry facilities.

Table D-1.
78 Highway Accident Report

Appendix E

SAFETEA-LU 2005

The following language is a verbatim excerpt from the Safe, Accountable,

Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, signed into law on

August 10, 2005:

SEC. 4106 MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY GRANTS

(a) State Plan Contents. Section 31102(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended–

(7) By adding at the end the following:

“(X) except in the case of an imminent or obvious safety hazard, ensures that an

inspection of a vehicle transporting passengers for a motor carrier of passengers is

conducted at a station, terminal, border crossing, maintenance facility, destination,

or other location where a motor carrier may make a planned stop.”

SEC. 4118 ROADABILITY

(a) In General. Subchapter III of chapter 311 of title 49, United States Code (as amended

by sections 4116 and 4117 of this Act) is amended by adding at the end of the following:

§ 31151. Roadability

(b) Inspection, Repair, and Maintenance of Intermodal Equipment.

(1) In General. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this

section, the Secretary of Transportation, after providing notice and opportunity for

comment, shall issue regulations establishing a program to ensure that intermodal

equipment used to transport intermodal containers is safe and systemically

maintained.

(2) Intermodal Equipment Safety Regulations. The Secretary shall issue the

regulations under this section as a subpart of the Federal motor carrier safety

regulations.

(3) Contents. The regulations issued under this section shall include, at a

minimum–

(A) a requirement to identify intermodal equipment providers

responsible for the inspection and maintenance of intermodal equipment
Appendix E 79 Highway Accident Report

that is interchanged or intended for interchange to motor carriers in

intermodal transportation;

(B) a requirement to match intermodal equipment readily to an

intermodal equipment provider through a unique identifying number;

(C) a requirement that an intermodal equipment provider identified

under subparagraph (A) systemically inspect, repair, and maintain, or cause

to be systemically inspected, repaired, and maintained, intermodal

equipment described in subparagraph (A) that is intended for interchange

with a motor carrier;

(D) a requirement to ensure that each intermodal equipment provider

identified under subparagraph (A) maintains a system of maintenance and

repair records for such equipment;

(E) requirements that–

(i) a specific list of intermodal equipment components or items be identified

for the visual or audible inspection of which a driver is responsible before

operating the equipment over the road; and

(ii) the inspection under clause (i) be conducted as part of the Federal

requirement in effect on the date of enactment of this Act that a driver be

satisfied that the intermodal equipment components are in good working

order before the equipment is operated over the road;

(F) a requirement that a facility at which an intermodal equipment

provider regularly makes intermodal equipment available for interchange

have an operational process and space readily available for a motor carrier

to have an equipment defect identified pursuant to subparagraph (E)

repaired or the equipment replaced prior to departure;

(G) a program for the evaluation and audit of compliance by

intermodal equipment providers with applicable Federal motor carrier

safety regulations;

(H) a civil penalty structure consistent with section 521(b) of title 49,

United States Code, for intermodal equipment providers that fail to attain

satisfactory compliance with applicable Federal motor carrier safety

regulations; and

(I) a prohibition on intermodal equipment providers from placing

intermodal equipment in service on the public highways to the extent such

providers or their equipment are found to pose an imminent hazard;
Appendix E 80 Highway Accident Report

(J) a process by which motor carriers and agents of motor carriers

shall be able to request the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to

undertake an investigation of an intermodal equipment provider identified

under subparagraph (A) that is alleged to be not in compliance with the

regulations under this section;

(K) a process by which equipment providers and agents of equipment

providers shall be able to request the Administration to undertake an

investigation of a motor carrier that is alleged to be not in compliance with

the regulations issued under this section

(L) a process by which a driver or motor carrier transporting

intermodal equipment is required to report to the intermodal equipment

provider or the provider’s designated agent any actual damage or defect in

the intermodal equipment of which the driver or motor carrier is aware at

the time the intermodal equipment is returned to the intermodal equipment

provider or the provider’s designated agent;

(M) a requirement that any actual damage or defect identified in the

process established under subparagraph (L) be repaired before the

equipment is made available for interchange to a motor carrier and that

repairs of this equipment made pursuant to the requirements of this

subparagraph and reports made pursuant to this subparagraph (L) process

be documented in the maintenance records for such equipment; and

(N) a procedure under which motor carriers, drivers and intermodal

equipment providers may seek correction of their motor carrier safety

records through the deletion from those records of violations of safety

regulations attributable to deficiencies in the intermodal chassis or trailer

for which they should not have been held responsible.

(4) Deadline for Rulemaking Proceeding. Not later than 120 days after the date of

enactment of this section, the Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding for issuance

of the regulations under this section.

(c) Inspection, Repair, and Maintenance of Intermodal Equipment. The Secretary or an

employee of the Department of Transportation designated by the Secretary may inspect

intermodal equipment, and copy related maintenance and repair records for such

equipment, on demand and display of proper credentials.

(d) Out-Of-Service Until Repair. Any intermodal equipment that is determined under this

section to fail to comply with applicable Federal safety regulations may be placed out of

service by the Secretary or a Federal, State, or government official designated by the

Secretary and may not be used on a public highway until the repairs necessary to bring

such equipment into compliance have been completed. Repairs of equipment taken out of

service shall be documented in the maintenance records for such equipment.
Appendix E 81 Highway Accident Report

(e) Preemption Generally. Except as provided in subsection (e), a law, regulation, order, or

other requirement of a State, a political subdivision of a State, or a tribal organization

relating to commercial motor vehicle safety is preempted if such law, regulation, order, or

other requirement exceeds or is inconsistent with a requirement imposed under or

pursuant to this section.

(f) Pre-Existing State Requirements.

(1) In General. Except as provided in paragraph (2), a State requirement for the

periodic inspection of intermodal chassis by intermodal equipment providers that was in

effect on January 1, 2005, shall remain in effect only until the date which requirements

prescribed under this section take effect.

(2) Nonpreemption Determinations.

(A) In General. Notwithstanding subsection (d), a State requirement

described in paragraph (1) is not preempted by a Federal requirement

prescribed under this section if the Secretary determines that the State

requirement is as effective as the Federal requirement and does not unduly

burden interstate commerce.

(B) Application Required. Subparagraph (A) applies to a State

requirement only if the State applies to the Secretary for a determination

under this paragraph with respect to the requirement before the date on

which the regulations issued under this section take effect. The Secretary

shall make a determination with respect to any such application within 6

months after the date on which the Secretary receives the application.

(C) Amended State Requirements. Any amendment to a State

requirement not preempted under this subsection because of a

determination by the Secretary under subparagraph (A) may not take effect

unless–

(i) it is submitted to the Secretary before the effective date of the

amendment; and

(ii) the Secretary determines that the amendment would not cause the

State requirement to be less effective than the Federal requirement and

would not unduly burden interstate commerce.

(g) Definitions. In this section the following definitions apply:

(1) Intermodal Equipment. The term “intermodal equipment” means

trailing equipment that is used on the intermodal transportation of containers over

public highways in interstate commerce, including trailers and chassis.
Appendix E 82 Highway Accident Report

(2) Intermodal Equipment Interchange Agreement. The term “intermodal

equipment interchange agreement” means the Uniform Intermodal Interchange

and Facilities Access Agreement or any other written document executed by an

intermodal equipment provider or its agency and a motor carrier or its agent, the

primary purpose of which is to establish the responsibilities and liabilities of both

parties with respect to the interchange of the intermodal equipment.

(3) Intermodal Equipment Provider. The term “intermodal equipment

provider” means any person that interchanges intermodal equipment with a motor

carrier pursuant to a written interchange agreement or has a contractual

responsibility for the maintenance of the intermodal equipment.

(4) Interchange. The term “interchange”

(A) means the act of providing intermodal equipment to a motor

carrier pursuant to an intermodal equipment interchange agreement for the

purpose of transporting the equipment for loading or unloading by any

person or repositioning the equipment for the benefit of the equipment

provider; but

(B) does not include the leasing of equipment to a motor carrier for

primary use in the motor carrier’s freight hauling operations.

(b) Clerical Amendment. The analysis for such subchapter (as amended by sections 4116

and 4117 of this Act) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“31151. Roadability.”

SEC. 1403 TOLL FACILITIES WORKPLACE SAFETY STUDY

(a) In General. The Secretary shall conduct a study on the safety of highway toll collection

facilities, including toll booths, to determine the safety of the facilities for the toll

collectors who work in and around the facilities, including consideration of-

(1) the effect of design or construction of the facilities on the likelihood of

vehicle collisions with the facilities;

(2) the safety of crosswalks used by toll collectors in transit to and from toll

booths;

(3) the extent of the enforcement of speed limits in the vicinity of the

facilities;

(4) the use of warning devices, such as vibration and rumble strips to alert

drivers approaching the facilities;
Appendix E 83 Highway Accident Report

(5) the use of cameras to record traffic violations in the vicinity of the

facilities;

(6) the use of traffic control arms in the vicinity of the facilities;

(7) law enforcement practices and jurisdictional issues that affect safety in

the vicinity of the facilities; and

(8) the incidence of accidents and injuries in the vicinity of toll booths.

(b) Data Collection. As part of the study, the Secretary shall collect data regarding the

incidence of accidents and injuries in the vicinity of highway toll collection facilities.

(c) Report. Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall

submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of

Representatives and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate a

report on the results of the study, together with recommendations for improving toll

facilities workplace safety.

(d) Funding.

(1) Authorization of Appropriations. There is authorized to be appropriated

to carry out this section, out of the Highway Trust Fund (other than the Mass

Transit Account), $500,000 for fiscal year 2006.

(2) Contract Authority. Funds authorized to be appropriated by this section

shall be available for obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as if the

funds were apportioned under chapter 1 of title 23, United States Code, except that

the Federal share of the cost of the project shall be 100 percent, and the funds shall

remain available until expended and shall not be transferable.
84 Highway Accident Report

Appendix F

Illinois Vehicle Code, Intermodal Equipment Exchange

The following language is a verbatim excerpt from the Illinois Vehicle Code, P.A.

91-622, effective July 1, 2000:

625 ILCS 5/18b-112

Sec. 18b-112. Intermodal trailer, chassis, and safety.

(a) Definitions. For purposes of this Section:

“Department” means the Department of State Police.

“Equipment interchange agreement” means a written document executed by the

intermodal equipment provider and operator at the time the equipment is interchanged by

the provider to the operator.

“Equipment provider” is the owner of the intermodal trailer, chassis, or container.

This includes any forwarding company, water carrier, steamship line, railroad, vehicle

equipment leasing company, and their subsidiary or affiliated companies, owning the

equipment.

“Federal motor carrier safety regulations” means regulations promulgated by the

United States Department of Transportation governing the condition and maintenance of

commercial motor vehicles contained in Title 49 of the United States Code of Federal

Regulations on the day of enactment of this Act or as amended or revised by the United

States Department of Transportation thereafter.

“Interchange [means] the act of providing a vehicle to a motor carrier by an

equipment provider for the purpose of transporting the vehicle for loading or unloading by

another party or the reposition of the vehicle for the benefit of the equipment provider.

“Interchange” does not include the leasing of the vehicle by a motor carrier from an

owner-operator pursuant to subpart B of Part 376 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal

Regulations or the leasing of a vehicle to a motor carrier for use in the motor carrier’s

over-the-road freight hauling operation.

“Operator” means a motor carrier or driver of a commercial motor vehicle.

“Vehicle” means an intermodal trailer, chassis, or container.

(b) Responsibility of equipment provider. An equipment provider shall not interchange or

offer for interchange a vehicle with an operator for use on a highway which vehicle is in

violation of the requirements contained in the federal motor carrier safety regulations. It is
Appendix F 85 Highway Accident Report

the responsibility of the equipment provider to inspect and, if a vehicle at the time of

inspection does not comply with all federal motor carrier safety regulation requirements,

perform the necessary repairs on, all vehicles prior to interchange or offering for

interchange.

(c) Duty of inspection by the operator. Before interchanging a vehicle with an operator, an

equipment provider must provide the operator the opportunity and facilities to perform a

visual inspection of the equipment. The operator must determine if it complies with the

provisions of the federal motor carrier safety regulation capable of being determined from

an inspection. If the operator determines that the vehicle does not comply with the

provisions of the federal motor carrier safety regulations, the equipment provider shall

immediately perform the necessary repairs to the vehicle [so] that [it] complies with the

federal motor carrier safety regulations or shall immediately provide the operator with

another vehicle. . . .

(e) Fines and penalties. Any person violating the provisions of this Section shall be fined

no less than $50 and not more than $500 for each violation.

(f) Obligation of motor carrier. Nothing in this Section is intended to eliminate the

responsibility and obligation of a motor carrier and operator to maintain and operate

vehicles in accordance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and applicable

State and local laws and regulations.

(g) This Section shall not be applied, construed, or implemented in any manner

inconsistent with, or in conflict with, any provision of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Regulations.