The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events: 

Analysis and Solutions 

by 

Fred P. Stone 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 40 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events: 

Analysis and Solutions 

Fred P. Stone 

June 2007 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 40 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 40 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://cpc.au.af.mil/

Contents 

 Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Author................................................................................................. iii

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Case Studies........................................................................................3 

The Goiania Incident .......................................................................3 

The Aum Attack ..............................................................................5 

Anthrax Letters Incident..................................................................7 

III. Understanding the Worried Well......................................................11 

Information Explanations for the Worried Well............................11 

Medical Explanations for the Worried Well..................................13 

Psychological Explanations for the Worried Well ........................18 

Looking for Answers .....................................................................20 

IV. Responding to the Low Risk Patient Response ................................21 

Re-thinking the Worried Well .......................................................21 

Pre-CBRN Event Preparation........................................................23 

Post-CBRN Event: 

Preventing LRPs from Seeking Immediate Care...........................26 

Other Considerations: Security and Liability Coverage................32 

LRP Response Plan Summary.......................................................33 

V. Conclusions.......................................................................................35 

Appendix A: Problems Estimating the Worried Well Response..............37 

Appendix B: The Critical Role of the Department of Defense ................41 

Notes..........................................................................................................43 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Author 

Fred P. Stone is a clinical social worker whose most recent assignment 

was as the Commander, 43rd Medical Operations Squadron at Pope AFB, 

North Carolina. He served as the Chief, Medical Doctrine Development 

in the Office of the Air Force Surgeon General where he developed 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for responding to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction events and Homeland Security. Lt Col Stone also served as 

the Chief of Behavior Medicine at the Eglin AFB, Florida, Family Practice 

Residency. He holds a Ph.D. in Social Work and a Masters in Public 

Administration from the University of Utah. He also has a Master of 

Science in Social Work from the University of Texas at Arlington and 

Masters in Military Operational Art and Strategic Studies from Air 

University. Lt Col Stone started his career in 1983 as a C-130 Navigator 

and has more than 2,500 hours of flying time. 

1 

The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events: 

Analysis and Solutions 

Fred P. Stone 

I. Introduction 

“Driven by fear alone, hordes of the ‘worried well’ could 

overwhelm emergency rooms and clinics, impeding 

diagnosis and treatment of the genuinely ill.”1

–U.S. Representative Chris Shays, Connecticut 

Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the 

hands of a terrorist or a rogue state is one of the greatest threats to the 

security of the United States.2

 These weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) can cause catastrophic loss of life and innumerable injuries and 

challenge the U.S. health care system beyond its capacity to provide 

treatment. Most hospitals do not have the beds, equipment, staff, or 

facilities to adequately respond to a WMD event.3,4

Compounding this problem is that many people who have minimal or 

no exposure to a CBRN agent will seek medical care and slow down 

medical treatment of genuinely affected patients. These “worried well”5

patients may comprise as many as 20 times the number of “legitimate” 

patients6

 and may become one of the most difficult aspects in dealing with 

WMD events.7

 This paper is an examination of the worried well 

phenomenon. It looks at three CBRN events that are often noted for 

unaffected masses seeking medical care—the Goiania Radiation Incident, 

the Aum Shinrikyo Attack, and the Anthrax Letters Incident. 

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a better 

understanding of the worried well response. Existing worried well 

literature often contains bold proclamations of the problem without a 
2 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

substantial analysis, and researchers cite cases but fail to provide any indepth study of them. This paper provides a closer examination of the 

cases and shows that the worried well response is neither irrational nor 

characterized by panic. Instead, when examined from informational, 

medical, and psychological perspectives, the worried well response is 

largely a rational reaction. 

The second purpose of this paper is to provide a strategy to mitigate 

the worried well response in CBRN events. Admittedly, it is beyond the 

scope of this paper to provide a detailed worried well response plan for 

every possible CBRN event. This paper, however, does provide the basic 

elements to reduce the response and still provide proper health care for 

everyone affected by a CBRN event. 

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section looks 

at the worried well response in the three events. The next section 

examines some of the reasons for the worried well response. It looks at 

informational, medical, and psychological motivations of people who 

pursue unnecessary health care during a CBRN crisis. The final section 

outlines a plan to prevent or reduce the response. The paper concludes 

with a look at implications and suggestions for further research and action. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 3 

II. Case Studies 

“This incident sparked panic among the local population, 

resulting in more than 110,000 people demanding to be 

monitored for contamination. This large number of so 

called “worried well” demonstrates the widespread 

psychological and social effects that can grip a populace.”8

–Quoted from Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

The CBRN events examined in this section are three of the most 

commonly cited in discussions of the worried well response. These events 

were relatively small, resulting in less than 25 deaths, yet they each produced 

varying levels of fear, panic, and concern among the affected populations. 

They also produced significant economic costs. This section shows that 

worried well response can be diverse and the result of a number of factors. 

The Goiania Incident 

Goiania is a Brazilian metropolis with a population of 1.2 million. It 

is typical of many South American cities with large skyscrapers at the 

center surrounded by shanties and poverty in outlying areas. During the 

day, the city belongs to the pursuit of commerce, but at night, the trash 

pickers roam the streets looking for scraps that they might be able to sell 

or use. One such trash picker was Roberto Santos Alves who heard that a 

valuable piece of equipment had been left in an abandoned health clinic. 

On September 13, 1987, he along with a friend, Wagner Mota, decided to 

retrieve the equipment—a teletherapy machine. Unbeknownst to them, 

inside the machine was a thimble-size amount of Cesium 137, a 

radioactive isotope. When they cracked the lead and steel casing 

protecting the cesium, they unknowingly exposed themselves to deadly 

radiation and almost immediately felt sick.9

 Unfortunately, they did not 

connect their illness to the machine. 

The device was sold to a junk dealer, Devair Alves Ferreira, who 

noticed a blue light emanating from the container. Fascinated by the 
4 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

powdery substance and believing it was possibly valuable or had 

supernatural properties, he showed it to his family and friends and later, 

shared it among the community.10

On September 23, 1987, Mr. Ferreira’s wife, Maria, became ill and 

went to a local hospital for care. She was diagnosed as having an allergic 

reaction to something she ate.11 The next day another man reported to a 

different hospital and was diagnosed with “a symptom of some disease.”12 

By September 28, 1987, a significant number of people were ill. Mrs. 

Ferreira believed that the powder was the source of the illnesses and took 

it to a local physician. The physician did not examine the bag containing 

the cesium but was cautious enough to take it outside. Meanwhile, several 

more patients made their way to the Tropical Disease Hospital. They were 

misdiagnosed as having a tropical disease,13 but one doctor suspected 

radiation poisoning and contacted a medical physicist. 

On September 29, 1987, he confirmed that the sick villagers had been 

exposed to cesium and alerted national and local authorities. By evening, 

they were making plans to receive the contaminated patients at the 

Olympic Stadium. During the night, residents in the infected areas were 

evacuated. Authorities directed anyone who may have been exposed to 

the cesium to the stadium. 

The next morning, residents woke up to find sections of the city 

cordoned off with no explanation. Rumors abounded and people went to 

the stadium seeking answers and possibly treatment. Eventually, 120,000 

people or 10 percent of the population went to the stadium.14 The 

government did not have the resources to meet the overwhelming 

response.15

Two hundred and forty-nine people were found to have been exposed 

to the cesium with 151 of those contaminated internally. If untreated, 

many of these victims would have developed cancer.16 Twenty people 

required specialized inpatient treatment.17 Ultimately, four victims died 

from exposure. Eighty-five residences were significantly contaminated 

and 41 were either totally or partially destroyed.18 Residences as far away 

as 100 kilometers were found to be tainted.19 The government found 12 

tons of contaminated paper at the junkyard. Two buses and five cars 

required decontamination. Even money was contaminated leading to the 

screening of money at local banks. The government admitted that they 

would only be able to find 70 percent of the contamination.20
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 5 

The official assurances by the government that they had confined the 

radiation assuaged few.21 Protesters attacked the hearse carrying the body 

of two of the victims. They were concerned that the remains, although 

encased in lead coffins, would contaminate the area and destroy the value 

of the surrounding property.22 The panic was not confined to the residents 

of contaminated homes. Others, including relatives, shunned the people of 

Goiania. Hotels expelled Goiania residents whose homes had been 

destroyed during the clean up.23 Sales of Goiania goods fell an estimated 

25 to 50 percent.24,25 

Although the population reacted with fear, only 249 of 120,000 

people were found to be contaminated. The rest were quickly labeled 

worried well. Ferguson and Potter found, “This incident sparked panic 

among the local population, resulting in more than 110,000 people 

demanding to be monitored for contamination.”26 Another author found 

that 5,000 of the first 60,000 people screened had only psychosomatic 

symptoms of radiation exposure.27 They had not been in contaminated 

areas. An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report found, “Of 

the individuals monitored for radioactive contamination, 74% had 

spontaneously gone to be monitored for fear of radiation.”28

The actual victims were surprisingly calm. One treating physician 

from Europe said, “They are very kind, very patient toward us, but they 

are also very lost. If they were Americans or Europeans, they would 

probably be panicked.”29

The Aum Attack 

The Aum Shinrikyo cult was founded by Chizuo Matsumoto, a sightimpaired yoga teacher who transformed his small yoga school and 

publishing house in 1984 into a cult with 40,000 members worldwide at 

the time of the attacks. Taking the title Shoko Asaharra or “Bright Light,” 

he promised his followers salvation from the inevitable end of the world.30 

The group rejected Japanese society and waged an undeclared, 

asymmetrical war on its perceived enemies.31 Prior to the subway attacks 

in 1995, the cult attempted 17 largely unsuccessful biological or chemical 

attacks. 

The cult did successfully attack the town of Matsumoto on June 27, 

1994. In an attempt to kill three judges who were expected to rule against 
6 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

the cult in a land dispute, cult members sprayed the town for 20 minutes 

with sarin gas, a deadly nerve agent. Seven people lost their lives, 58 

were admitted to hospitals, and 253 sought medical care in outpatient 

facilities.32 Interestingly, 277 people did not seek medical assistance 

although they experienced symptoms.33 

On March 20, 1995, Aum struck again, this time attacking pedestrians 

in the Tokyo subway system. Worried that the police would soon raid their 

compound, Asaharra ordered an attack on five subway lines that passed by 

the Kasumigaseki station which was located near police headquarters. The 

attackers hoped to catch as many police officers as possible during the 

morning rush hour. The Aum assault teams placed sarin liquid in plastic 

bags covered with newspaper.34 As they left their trains, each attacker 

punctured the bag with an end-sharpened umbrella, spilling 159 ounces of 

sarin onto the five trains.35 The liquid vaporized into a deadly gas. The 

attack began at 7:46 a.m. and concluded at 8:01 a.m.36

The first patients arrived on foot at St. Luke’s International Hospital 

at 8:28 a.m. At 8:40 a.m., the first ambulances arrived and began 

transporting patients to area hospitals. Within one hour, St. Luke’s 

received 500 patients. Not until 11:00 a.m. did local hospitals along with 

the rest of Tokyo learn that the victims had been exposed to sarin.37 Many 

people who rode the subway that day went to their jobs unaware of the 

attack. They realized that they had been exposed after they saw news 

reports. Often only upon the urging of friends, family, and co-workers, 

did they seek medical assistance.38

The swell of patients overwhelmed the medical system. Ambulances 

transported 688 patients while 4,812 people reached hospitals on foot, in 

taxis or private cars. Two hundred and seventy-eight Tokyo hospitals and 

clinics saw 5,510 patients, 17 of whom were deemed critical injured, 37 

severely ill, and 984 moderately ill.39,40 One hundred and ten staff 

members at St. Luke’s International Hospital, as well as the majority of 

emergency workers who transported patients, reported symptoms of 

exposure.41 Surprisingly, only 10 percent of first responders who were 

unprotected experienced exposure symptoms. They only had mild 

symptoms and did not require treatment.42 In the end, 98 hospitals 

admitted 1,046 patients.43

Among the flood of patients were the worried well. Smithson 

concluded that 85 percent of the patients were “psychogenic cases,” or 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 7

worried well. She caustically concluded, “These psychogenic patients had 

no real chemical injuries, but they nonetheless clamored for medical 

attention.”44 Lillibridge, Liddle, Leffingwell and Sidell reported that 75 

percent of patients who presented as “injured” showed no symptoms of 

exposure.45 Benedek, Holloway, and Becker similarly charged that four 

times as many people who were unexposed reported to hospitals as those 

who had been exposed.46 Stokes and Banderet concluded “73.9% of these 

casualties showed no effects of exposure to nerve agent. These patients 

were the worried well!”47,48 Mathewson claimed, without a supporting 

reference, that 9,000 psychogenic patients presented themselves to local 

health care facilities.49

Anthrax Letters Incident 

The weeks that followed the September 11, 2001, attacks were filled 

with anxiety and fear. The country was concerned not only of another 

strike using airliners but of CBRN attacks as well. Despite the heightened 

state of awareness, the next attack came almost unnoticed. 

Between September 26 and October 2, 2001, eight people in the New 

York area sought medical care for an odd skin condition. At the same 

time in Florida, Bob Stevens,50 63, was admitted to a local hospital with 

“meningitis” and a co-worker was admitted to another hospital with 

“pneumonia.” These seemingly routine medical cases would become the 

first bioterrorism crisis in U.S. history.51 These people had been the 

victim of an anthrax attack.52

Mr. Steven’s doctors began to suspect anthrax as the cause of his 

illness shortly after his admission on October 2, 2001, and two days later, 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed their 

suspicion. Officials, however, maintained that it was unlikely to have 

been a terrorist attack.53

This assessment was proven wrong the next day. The health 

department found anthrax spores throughout the building where Mr. 

Stevens worked. Upon the direction of the health department, more than 

1,000 who either worked at or visited the building were tested for anthrax 

and given a 10-day supply of antibiotics.54 Only one person tested 

positive. She was already on antibiotics and never suffered from 

symptoms of the disease.55 The source of the anthrax was thought to be a 
8 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

letter. The CDC began educating postal workers nationwide on the signs 

and symptoms of anthrax exposure and how to properly handle mail to 

avoid exposure.56

More cases began to appear. Seven people in the New York City and 

New Jersey area were diagnosed with anthrax. All worked for news 

organizations that had received anthrax-laced letters.57 While none would 

die, 2,580 people in New York City received nasal swabs and 1,306 were 

given antibiotics.58 

On October 15, 2001, in Washington, D.C., a senate staffer opened a 

letter to Senator Tom Daschle that contained anthrax. The initial reaction 

in the office was “nonchalant” because they routinely received threatening 

letters,59 but the mood changed quickly when initial checks showed the 

letter contained anthrax. Within days, the Capitol was shut down. The 

next week, Senator Daschle reported that 6,000 people had received nasal 

swabs and 28 had tested positive for anthrax.60 Eventually, 10,000 people 

would take antibiotics.61 

Since the anthrax was being delivered through the mail, the safety of 

postal workers was a primary concern. The letters were processed in 

primarily four processing centers—the Brentwood and Maryland postal 

facilities near Washington, D.C., and the Hamilton and West Trenton 

postal facilities in New Jersey. On October 18, 2001, one postal worker in 

each of the New Jersey facilities contracted subcutaneous anthrax. Those 

facilities were closed the next day. On the same day, a Washington D.C. 

postal employee who worked at both the Brentwood and the Maryland 

Centers was admitted to the hospital because doctors suspected inhalation 

anthrax. By October 21, 2001, three more postal workers in these centers 

tested positive for anthrax, and the centers were closed. A fourth D.C. 

postal worker was evaluated at a local hospital and discharged on the same 

day. He was readmitted the next day and died. 

Two additional cases seemingly unrelated to the letters also 

developed. Kathy Nguyen, 61, died of inhalation anthrax. She worked in 

the stock room of the Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital. Hospital 

workers, patients, and visitors were offered testing and treatment, and 

more than 1,200 sought care.62 None tested positive. The second case 

involved Ottilie Lundgren, 94, who died November 21, 2001. Her case 

was the most peculiar. Mrs. Lundgren lived alone and rarely left her 

house. Although officials were unable to find anthrax spores at her home, 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 9 

some were found at a local mail processing center. Approximately 1,000 

workers were given antibiotics as a precaution.63

In the end, 22 people developed anthrax and five died. More than 

20,000 were considered at risk and advised to accept treatment.64 Other 

sources place the number between 10,000 and 32,000.65 Arguably, more 

than 99 percent of the patients that received treatment were worried well 

because they sought unnecessary medical care. This conclusion, however, 

is somewhat dubious because the overwhelming number of these patients 

did not seek help on their own but were advised to seek care. 

Observers of the attack have differing views of the public response to 

the attacks. In his Scientific American article, “Evaluating the Threat,” Ed 

Regis claims that the attacks caused a “wave of general hysteria with 

civilians buying up gas masks and Cipro [an antibiotic] like there was no 

tomorrow...”66 Leonard Cole, author of the highly regarded book, The 

Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story, characterized the nation as 

being in “turmoil” over the attacks.67 On the other side, Vicki Freimuth of 

the CDC characterized the public reaction as “generally calm.”68 Surveys 

showed that Americans were concerned about anthrax but there was no 

widespread panic.69,70 In an ABC News/Washington Post poll, 5 percent 

of people had spoken to their health care provider about anthrax and 2 

percent had purchased antibiotics.71 Only 3 percent had tried to get a 

prescription according to a Gallup poll.72 Most Americans thought the 

story was “over-hyped” by the media.73

Health departments across the country were inundated with calls, 

overwhelming their capacity to respond.74 From October 21 to October 

27, 2001, nine states reported to the CDC that they received 2,817 

bioterrorism-related calls.75 One department received 25,000 general 

inquiry calls about anthrax during the two-week period of the crisis.76 

Across the nation an estimated 200,000 people called local health 

departments.77 These inquiries are not “technically” worried well since 

they did not seek medical care,78 but they do show a level of concern. 

Laboratories were also in demand. In Illinois there were no cases of 

anthrax or contaminated mail, yet the Department of Public Health 

processed 1,700 specimens.79 Prescriptions for antibiotics increased 

significantly during the months of the attacks and were unwarranted given 

the threat.80

The fact that people called health departments does not necessarily 
10 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

indicate mass panic. And while some people certainly obtained 

prescriptions for antibiotics, most were probably taking a precautionary 

step. Interestingly, at the same time the “real” anthrax letters were sent, 

750 “hoax” letters purporting to contain anthrax were also found, and the 

public largely ignored this development.81

Emergency rooms near the areas where letters were processed had 

significant increases in patient loads. Providence Hospital near the 

Brentwood mail processing center saw as much as a 50 percent increase in 

the 2.5 weeks after the letters were discovered.82 Three hundred and 

twenty-four patients sought anthrax testing at Washington Hospital Center 

during a 2-week period in October. Twenty were admitted but none tested 

positive for the disease. Local clinics also saw increases reporting 10 to 

15 anthrax inquiries per day.83

While some who had little chance of being infected sought care, 

many others who were at significant risk failed to heed the advice of the 

CDC. The RAND Corporation found only 58 percent of the workers in 

the Hart Senate Building complied with the regimen of antibiotics.84 Only 

64 percent of employees complied with the regime at the Brentwood 

postal distribution center although two workers died there. 85 These 

numbers are higher than average but below what might be expected from a 

panicked population. Postal workers were also offered an anthrax vaccine 

but few took it, and some refused to take additional antibiotics although 

they were recommended.86 

Anthrax victims were also remarkably unworried. Many had 

symptoms for several days before seeking care. Many symptomatic 

victims sought care and were misdiagnosed. A 61-year-old woman from 

New York had symptoms for three days prior to going in, and she 

ultimately died. The final victim had a fever, fatigue, dry cough, and 

shortness of breath for three days prior to going to the hospital. She also 

died. If these patient actions are indicative of the public response, there 

was no hysteria around the anthrax incident. 

In the end, it is difficult to argue that the anthrax letters stirred masses 

of worried well. Although the cases involved four separate states and 

emergency rooms may have experienced modest increases in patient loads, 

the surge capacity of the health care system was not seriously tested.87
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 11 

III. Understanding the Worried Well 

This section proposes an explanation of worried well behavior based 

upon the case analyses in the previous section. This explanation looks at 

the problem from three perspectives—informational, medical, and 

psychological. 

Information Explanations for the Worried Well 

The most important factor in determining the worried well response is 

information. This section shows that government officials’ statements and 

actions along with media reports largely drove the worried well response. 

Government Directions 

The government played a key although sometimes unwitting role in 

fostering the worried well response in all of the case studies. In Goiania, 

the government encouraged people to seek assessment and treatment. The 

population of Goiania was clearly fearful when they woke up on the 

morning of September 30, 1987, and found streets blocked off. Fear and 

depression spread throughout the community.88 Screening was a way to 

reassure the public. People flocked to the stadium not primarily seeking 

medical care, but rather the reassurance that they were not contaminated. 

Considering the intense prejudice that people associated with the event 

suffered, seeking a “clean bill of health” was a logical thing to do. The 

screening was remarkably quick, requiring a technician to wave a 

radiation detector device, a dosimeter about the size of a hair dryer, around 

the patient. 

Whether or not the government deliberately encouraged people to go 

to the stadium is debatable. Petterson argues that the government 

discouraged people from going but offers no examples.89 Government 

actions, however, suggest they incited the reaction. Cordoning off 

sections of the city in the middle of the night and not giving information 

stirred the populations’ fear. When faced with angry and hostile crowds, it 

is hard to believe that the people at the site did not actively encourage 

people to get screened. 
12 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

In the anthrax letter case, federal, state, and local authorities 

encouraged anyone who had been in the buildings where contamination 

was found to get tested. Postal workers were also told to get tested and 

were given regimes of antibiotics. Absent this advice, it is difficult to 

estimate how many would have actually sought help. 

In these incidents, it is impossible to accurately measure the number 

of people who would have sought care on their own because so many were 

urged to seek care by the government. From this perspective, federal, 

state, and local officials directly contributed to the size of the worried well 

response. This does not imply that they acted inappropriately, only that 

the governments and not the populations were largely responsible for the 

response. 

Media Reports 

The media was blamed for fueling the worried well response in each 

of the cases studied. In the Goiania incident, media reports were initially 

sensationalized and misinforming.90 News stories compared Goiania with 

Chernobyl although the latter was considerably different and truly 

catastrophic. One headline read, “The contaminated areas will not be 

inhabitable for over 100 years.”91 The media coverage became more 

responsible as the event unfolded and became a useful tool in alleviating 

fear.92 In the anthrax letter case, the media also made errors in reporting. 

“Most of the news we read about ourselves was wrong,” said one 

worker.93 The media was also blamed for providing inaccurate and 

misleading information in the Aum attack.94 Their exaggeration of the 

dangers of the chemical attack directly fueled the worried well response.95

Blaming the media for the worried well response is misguided. While 

they certainly reported inaccurate information, in most cases they received 

the information from government officials. In Goiania, the government 

did not have a consistent spokesman. The media was often given 

conflicting information and left to decide on the “truth.”96 The information 

issued by the government was often contradictory and displayed a 

remarkable lack of technical expertise.97 Consequently, although the local 

Goiania government tried to avoid panic by making public 

pronouncements, the citizens did not trust them and rumors spread. 

Erroneous messages from government officials started immediately in 

the anthrax case. When Bob Stevens was diagnosed with inhalation 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 13 

anthrax, health officials proclaimed that the cause was natural.98 When 

questioned about the potential that it was a terrorist attack, officials 

maintained that it was unlikely. Health and Human Services (HHS) 

Secretary Tommy Thompson declared on October 4, 2001, that “there is no 

terrorism” involved in this anthrax event. Governor Jeb Bush reassured the 

public, “People don’t have any reason to be concerned...this is just a 

coincidence.”99 In the end, the numerous mistaken messages eroded 

confidence in the government’s ability to detect and respond to the event.100

While erroneous information was problematic, a lack of information 

fueled speculation in the press and public. The CDC was reluctant to 

confirm anthrax in the letters. They had routinely received calls that 

indicated anthrax as a possibility, and these reports, in the past, were 

always false. The last case of inhalation anthrax was in 1976 in a man 

who was working with wool.101 The reluctance to discuss the case led to 

some anxiety. Congressional staff workers were frustrated with both the 

lack of communication and the quality of information.102 “I was hearing 

10 different stories,” said one worker who finally decided to evacuate the 

building 45 minutes after the first messages went out.103 Another staff 

member complained, “You hear from CDC, you hear from HHS, you hear 

from the Mayor’s office; and the stories shift from day to day as to what 

the threat is.”104

Even accurate information can lead to some concerns. When the best 

authorities in the world made statements about the anthrax letter case, 

some people feared that “something was really wrong.”105 In their 

reasoning, they believed that a lesser figure would have indicated there 

was a smaller problem. 

The reason people sought unnecessary medical care is easy to see from 

an information perspective. They decided to get tested either because the 

government encouraged them to seek help or the information they read in 

the media encouraged them to seek care. In either instance, they were not 

acting irrationally or panicking. Instead they were making a rational 

health decision choice based upon the information provided to them.106

Medical Explanations for the Worried Well 

Another perspective on the worried well is from a medical point of 

view. The inexactness of the data concerning the worried well in all of the 
14 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

incidents makes this analysis difficult. One point, however, is clear. The 

worried well were not a homogenous group. This section proposes five 

subcategories of the worried well that lend some exactness to this issue. 

These categories are not necessarily discreet, and there may be some 

overlap. 

Group 1. People who were exposed and had minor symptoms 

requiring minimal or no medical care. 

Many of the worried well who flooded hospitals after the Aum attack 

had, in fact, been exposed to the gas. They were either in or near the 

subway when the attacks occurred, but were initially unaware of the 

attacks. Before realizing that they had been exposed, they exhibited 

symptoms including vomiting, eye irritation, and nausea. They went to 

the hospital only after being urged to go by others. The reception they 

received was not always welcoming. 

The following case is typical of many that Haruki Murakami 

documented in his book, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the 

Japanese Psyche. Kei’ichi Ishikura was walking past the station when, 

unbeknownst to him, the attack occurred. He continued on to work but 

started vomiting and had problems seeing. He turned on the television and 

saw the report about the attacks. At the urging of his co-workers, he went 

to a nearby hospital. He told the doctor about the attacks, but the doctors 

said, “This is just a cold” and sent him away. He later received treatment, 

but he may have erroneously been counted among the worried well. More 

than a decade later, he continues to have eye problems and joint pain.107

The worried well in this category most likely received a low exposure 

to the toxin. They may have been worried, but they were not well. A 3-

year follow-up of victims of the Aum attack showed people who were 

deemed to have low exposure (and were treated only as outpatients) had 

significant compromises to their nervous systems including a chronic 

decline in memory function.108

Group 2. People who may have been exposed but had no clear physical 

symptoms related to the event or an organic etiology.109

This group thought that they had been exposed and consequently 

sought health care. Their motivation may have been preventative, hoping 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 15 

to avoid future problems by being treated immediately. They may have 

also been anxious and misinterpreted anxiety as symptoms of the disease. 

The symptoms of sarin gas poisoning are numerous and have a lot of 

overlap with anxiety. The CDC lists the following as symptoms of sarin 

exposure:110

• Runny nose 

• Watery eyes 

• Small, pinpoint pupils 

• Eye pain 

• Blurred vision 

• Drooling and excessive sweating 

• Cough 

• Chest tightness 

• Rapid breathing 

• Diarrhea 

• Increased urination 

• Confusion 

• Drowsiness 

• Weakness 

• Headache 

• Nausea, vomiting, and/or abdominal pain 

• Slow or fast heart rate 

• Low or high blood pressure 

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM 

IV) lists at least seven of these symptoms as part of a panic attack111 and 

almost all of the symptoms with the exception of exhibiting pinpoint pupils 

could be the result of anxiety. These patients may also have misinterpreted 

pre-existing conditions, such as eye pain or nausea, as sarin poisoning.112
16 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

The anthrax incident highlights the same problem because symptoms 

mimic those of the flu. The symptoms of acute radiation exposure such as 

those in the Goiania incident are the same as numerous other health 

problems and include vomiting, diarrhea, and nausea.113

Confusing pre-existing or anxious symptoms for CBRN agent exposure 

should not be surprising. In most cases, it is difficult even for a trained 

medical professional to delineate whether a person has been exposed 

without tests.114 Patients were misdiagnosed in each of the case studies. 

Group 3. People who could not possibly have been exposed but came 

to the hospital seeking care for imagined illnesses or 

prevention. 

People who have imagined illnesses based upon one symptom have a 

condition known as hypochondriasis.115 It is estimated that between 4 to 9 

percent of patients in a general medical practice have this disorder.116

There are no exact figures on the number of people suffering from 

hypochondriasis in the Aum attack, but it is very unlikely that they made 

up a significant portion of the worried well. However, patients with 

hypochondriasis and other somatoform disorders pose especially difficult 

problems during emergency situations. They can be demanding and 

difficult. They can also be real victims. In other words, people with 

hypochondriasis do sometimes get “sick.” Therefore, even this group 

cannot be written off as having entirely psychological symptoms 

following a CBRN incident because they too may have been exposed. 

Some of those who came to the stadium in the Goiania incident had 

been previously treated with psychiatric disorders.117 Stress is known to 

exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness, and it is not surprising that 

they would seek help. There were also 5,000 who sought care at Goiania 

who could not possibly have been exposed yet they exhibited signs and 

symptoms of exposure such as vomiting, diarrhea, and rashes.118

Group 4. Those hoping to profit either financially or emotionally. 

There was little potential for financial gain among the worried well in 

these cases. Although 4,000 people in the Aum attack have filed workers 

compensation claims, few have actually received payments.119 Japan has a 

notoriously low litigation rate. During the 1990s, on average only 14 to 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 17

21 medical lawsuits were brought per year.120 There are several workers 

contesting workers compensation in the anthrax letter case.121 In the 

Goiania case, there were financial advantages in not being exposed. 

Those exploiting the attacks for emotional gain could have also been 

among the worried well although it is doubtful they constituted significant 

numbers. Factitious disorder is a condition in which people deliberately 

make themselves sick in order to play the sick role. The prevalence of this 

condition is unknown but probably very low.122 Disasters, however, 

represent the perfect opportunity to play the sick role. 

Group 5. Those experiencing stress disorders. 

Traumatic events can spur serious psychiatric illness. Acute Stress 

Disorder (ASD) is a mental disorder that includes flashbacks of the 

traumatic event, avoidance behaviors, and increased psychiatric arousal.123 

If the symptoms persist for more than 30 days, then the diagnosis is 

changed to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD can affect 3 to 

58 percent of persons exposed to traumatic events.124 ASD depends on the 

prevalence and duration of the stressor.125 The psychological effects could 

be the greatest health threat in a WMD event.126

In the Aum case, the rate of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder varies 

depending on the study and time elapsed. A study conducted 6 months 

after the attack estimated that 26 percent of victims were at a high risk of 

developing PTSD.127 A survey conducted by the National Police Agency 

of Japan found that 20 percent of victims suffered from PTSD 5 years 

after the attack.128 One of the problems with this survey was that it was 

mailed to 1,477 victims and only 837 responded. 

Noriko conducted an ongoing study for 5 years after the attack.129 He 

found that less than 3 percent of victims met the full criteria PTSD. Seven 

to 9 percent of victims met some of the criteria. The rate increased to 14.1 

percent when the researcher added physical symptoms to the diagnostic 

criteria. Overall, psychological symptoms did not decrease significantly 

during the 5 years following the attack. 

It is difficult to compare psychological symptoms of the Japanese 

with American norms. The stigma of psychological problems is still 

considerable in Japan, and many “psychological patients” present with 

physical symptoms.130 This may explain why approximately 10 percent of 
18 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

patients in one survey have unexplainable physical symptoms such as 

headaches and fatigue.131

How many of the worried well in these cases had stress disorders? 

Again, this is unknown, but intense anxiety will not cause immediate 

serious injury or death by itself. In other words, no one suffering from a 

stress disorder was going to die from their anxiety (with the exception of 

suicidal patients or those with an underlying health condition exacerbated 

by stress). 

One argument supporting these patients seeking immediate health 

care is that early intervention could reduce the incidence of PTSD. While 

early intervention has been shown to reduce the rate, studies typically 

consider early intervention to be within 1 to 3 months.132 Patients who 

showed up at health care clinics with PTSD or other acute stress 

symptoms did not need immediate medical care. 

Psychological Explanations for the Worried Well 

This section explores psychological reasons minimally or unaffected 

people may seek health care during a disaster. It excludes those who are 

clearly mentally ill. 

Survival psychology is the study of how people respond to catastrophic 

events such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters. In his review of the 

psychological impact of catastrophic events, John Leach found that these 

events have a complex underlying dynamic, but people generally respond in 

a predictable manner.133 Contrary to popular opinion, people do not panic 

except in enclosed areas where escape routes are not readily available.134 

Even then, they may not panic. The 1993 World Trade bombing was 

characterized by a surprising amount of calm and cooperation in the 

stairwells.135 Overall, the victims in the Aum attack did not appear to panic. 

One victim recounted, “We were told to leave the station by the rear exit, 

there being some kind of disturbance toward the front of the train. 

Everyone was well behaved and slowly walked back toward the exit.”136

Leach also found that victims are often characterized by apathy and 

denial about catastrophic events.137 In the Aum incident, some people 

apparently did experience denial because they did not immediately rush to 

the hospital. If it had not been for the barrage of media reports and the 

urgings of others, some may have never sought help. Some have argued 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 19 

that a remarkable part of the anthrax letter incident is the overall calm of 

the general population. 

The population overall shows a remarkable degree of denial and 

apathy towards possible CBRN incidents. A recent survey found that 

Americans in general would resist government instructions during a 

smallpox outbreak or dirty bomb incident. Only two-fifths would take the 

vaccine and only three-fifths would take shelter for as long as the 

government recommended in a dirty bomb incident.138,139

Despite these findings and although people may not panic, many will 

most likely seek health care unnecessarily. The key to understanding this 

phenomenon may be appreciating the role of uncertainty in human 

behavior. Health is an unpredictable, complex, and ambiguous situation 

that often leads to uncertainty.140 Exposed to health hazards, people must 

appraise their situation, properly self-diagnose and treat themselves.141 In 

the absence of reasonable certainty, people will seek expert advice. The 

victims in all of the incidents examined in this paper were uncertain. In 

the Aum attack, the Japanese had no public affairs strategy for a chemical 

attack, so people flocked to hospitals to be reassured. In Goiania and the 

anthrax letter incidents, people were dying, and it was impossible to 

ascertain exposure without screening. 

The very nature of these events will always leave a great deal of 

uncertainty.142 Adding to this uncertainty is that these types of events 

often unfold over long periods of time.143 The crisis of the worried well is 

fostered and fed because of the delay in accurately identifying the problem 

and communicating it to the public. 

Similar to the uncertainty perspective is a risk analysis model. People 

may make risk assessments of their situation. Fear increases when people 

are involuntarily exposed to a stimulus that is unfamiliar and invisible.144 It 

is further increased when the threat is poorly understood, and it is difficult 

to predict its course.145 CBRN incidents contain all of these factors. 

Considering that physicians in all of the cases in this study showed 

significant gaps in their knowledge of the threats, it is unfair to expect the 

public not to express fear and concern—and seek medical advice. 
20 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

Looking for Answers 

The above analysis shows that any program to reduce the worried 

well response must take into account several factors. The program must: 

1. Provide accurate and timely information to the public. 

2. Respect the variety of reasons that unaffected people may seek 

care. 

3. Accurately separate and distinguish worried well patients from 

seriously injured patients in a timely manner. 

4. Provide an appropriate level of health care for all victims of a 

CBRN event. 

The next section outlines a program that incorporates these key 

elements. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 21 

IV. Responding to the Low Risk Patient Response 

This section proposes a series of steps that will both reduce the 

number of worried well patients and as necessary, prevent them from 

using unnecessary health care resources. Any plan to prevent a worried 

well surge is predicated on the size of the event, the nature of the threat, 

and the availability of health care facilities. It is beyond the scope of this 

paper to outline a plan for every possible scenario. Therefore, this section 

proposes only a very general plan for reducing the worried well response 

in a CBRN event. 

Re-Thinking the Worried Well 

The first step in developing a worried well response plan is to rethink 

the phenomena. Most analysts take a very negative view of the worried 

well, labeling them as irrational and unreasonably demanding of health 

care.146 Yet the cases analyzed in this study provide a very different picture. 

Most of the so-called worried well acted with surprising rationality. For 

example in the Aum attack, many victims had significant changes in their 

vision. St. Luke’s International Hospital discharged 524 patients to their 

homes who were experiencing eye irritation. Going to a health care facility 

with these symptoms is the right course of action since a threat to sight is 

one of the conditions that warrants immediate medical care. 

In Goiania, many people were unable to conduct business without a 

certificate stating that they were free from radiation so they went to the 

stadium. In the letter incident, the government provided free testing for 

those potentially exposed to anthrax, so thousands were tested. The post 

office did not know how many letters with anthrax were floating around 

the country. Tens of thousands may have had low levels of 

contamination.147 When people who were only peripherally associated 

with the mail died, such as the woman in Connecticut, it seems rational 

that people would call health departments with questions especially when 

government officials warn them to be vigilant. The worried well in all of 

these cases largely exhibited perfectly logical behavior considering the 

circumstances and ambiguous information they were receiving from the 

television and government. It is not only unfair but also counterproductive 
22 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

to judge their behavior as abnormal. The worried well response must be 

viewed differently in order to provide an effective solution. 

The first step to changing this view is to replace the term “worried 

well” along with similar terms such as “mass hysteria” and “mass 

psychogenic illness” with a more exacting term that is less pejorative. 

Alexander and Klein recommend the term “multiple unexplained 

symptoms.”148 This term is less insulting, but it is still inexact. 

A more precise system might consider using the following groupings: 

Group 1. Minimal Exposure 

Group 2. Asymptomatic Exposure 

Group 3. Hypochondriacal 

Group 4. Malingering 

Group 5. Stress Disorder 

This system has the disadvantage of making a determination 

concerning the psychology or motivation of patients. However, this is 

also an advantage. If the patients’ presenting problems can be determined 

to be entirely psychological, fewer resources will have to be used on them. 

In a crisis, every resource will be critical, and the seriously injured will 

need priority treatment. 

Hall, Norwood, Fullerton, Gifford, and Ursano recommend a 

categorizing system that labels patients as high, moderate, or minimal 

risk.149 The advantage of this system is that it “conveys concern and 

promises continued monitoring.”150 The only problem with this system is 

that it may later be confused with medical triage that uses minimal, 

immediate, urgent, and expectant categories. Further complicating the 

problem, different treatment actions would also be necessary depending on 

the risk level, and these have not been developed. 

A simple term that is non-pejorative and accurate is to label worried 

well patients as “low risk patients.” This label acknowledges that these 

patients may have been exposed but do not need immediate treatment. 

Depending on the incident, accessing exposure risk is relatively easy. 

Medical workers need only a brief history to determine where a patient 

was in relation to the incident. The workers could also obtain vital signs 

such as blood pressure, temperature, and oxygen saturation levels and rule 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 23 

out an imminent threat to the patient’s life. Some detection devices can 

also rapidly determine whether or not a person is at a significant health 

risk from a CBRN agent. 

No labeling system is perfect, but the term “worried well” is clearly 

inappropriate and unhelpful during a crisis. The remainder of this paper 

uses the term “low risk patient” (LRP) instead and proposes an LRP 

Response Plan to minimize the impact of these patients on medical 

consequence management in CBRN events. 

Pre-CBRN Event Preparation 

Planning to mitigate the low risk patient response must begin well 

before the actual event, and it starts with preparing the public. There are 

several steps that can promote pre-CBRN event preparation. 

Community Involvement 

First, communities must be involved in terrorist response measures. 

They should engage in drills and exercises similar to those conducted in 

the 1950s and 1960s for responding to a nuclear attack. Those efforts 

placed more responsibility on the citizenry and fostered greater 

community involvement.151 These same steps could prepare communities 

to respond to a CBRN event. While this program has potential problems 

such as inciting unreasonable concerns, the population will be better 

prepared to respond and more understanding that their government cannot 

solve all the problems. It may relieve the government of some of the 

burden of protecting the citizenry while “giving people a tangible role to 

play in the defense of their country.”152

Partner with the Media 

Information is the most important contributor to the low risk patient 

response, and both the media and government officials play a critical role 

in informing the public. Unfortunately, government leaders and the media 

often have a contentious relationship. In each of the three events 

examined, government officials castigated the media for misreporting the 

event and causing the panicky reactions of the public. The media equally 
24 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

criticized government officials for failing to provide accurate and timely 

information. To mitigate the low risk patient response, government 

officials and the media must partner together. 

The LRP Response Plan proposes that federal, state, and local leaders 

need to routinely engage the media prior to a crisis to develop partnerships. 

CBRN-event response plans should have a formal structure for public health 

officials and the media to work together to disseminate information to the 

public, field workers, and health care professionals.153 This structure, 

however, should not merely be public affairs officials providing press 

releases. The media must be treated as genuine allies in CBRN event 

response.154 They should not only cover exercises but be a part of them. 

They should be invited to participate in conferences and to present their 

views to responders.155

Develop Trusted Agents 

In addition to partnering with the media, the government must have 

people who are qualified to speak to the public on CBRN issues and are 

trusted by the public. In other words, the government needs to develop 

and promote “trusted agents” to disseminate information before, during, 

and after a CBRN event. An obstacle in finding trusted agents is that 

someone that the public inherently trusts is not necessarily someone who 

has expertise in the CBRN area. Therefore, trusted agents need to consist 

of “trusted communicators” and “validators.”156

Trusted communicators are people that the public knows, respects, 

and believes.157 They may be nationally-known politicians, media figures, 

or entertainers. For example, Colin Powell would be an excellent trust 

communicator. A Pew Research Center study found that Colin Powell 

was the most credible politician in America.158 The same study found that 

Oprah Winfrey was also a trusted source. Somewhat surprisingly, 

network television anchors ranked very high in trust and credibility, well 

above politicians. Other celebrities rated “trustworthy” include Tom 

Hanks, Ron Howard, Morgan Freeman, Denzel Washington, and James 

Earl Jones.159 These popular figures are trained in communicating 

messages to the public and can attract public attention. 

In addition to these national figures, local trusted communicators can 

also be invaluable in a CBRN event.160 These may be political, civic, 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 25 

business, or religious figures that are known in the community and have 

developed trust among significant portions of the population. Local 

“sports heroes” can also serve as trusted communicators. 

While trusted communicators can attract public attention and win 

public confidence, they would typically not be subject matter experts. 

Therefore, trusted agents must include validators who are experts on 

CBRN events. These validators should be scientists or physicians who 

can provide the most scientifically accurate information on the threat as 

well as the safest courses of action. These experts will need to be viewed 

as apolitical and must be media savvy. They will need extensive training 

to be able to put their recommendations in plain language for the public to 

make the right choices. In past events, experts often mistakenly left the 

translation of scientific information to the media.161

Together, trusted communicators and validators would speak to the 

public during a time of crisis. The trusted communicators could gain 

public attention and confidence while the validator could provide essential 

expert information. Devising a plan to utilize these teams could be 

accomplished almost immediately by soliciting trusted communicators and 

providing them with basic training on their role in a CBRN event. 

Validators should also be recruited, given media training, and could begin 

interacting with the public and the media in advance of an actual event. 

While developing trusted sources is challenging, it will be essential to 

effectively communicate with the public and to maintain the credibility of 

the government and crisis responders. Maintaining credibility may be the 

most difficult aspect of the government response to a crisis, especially as it 

unfolds over many weeks and months.162,163 

Prepare alternate communication channels 

Government officials must develop a communication plan to the 

public that uses all avenues of communication. Besides radio and 

television, they should also have a hotline and website readily available. 

The website should contain information on how to prepare for a CBRN 

event and once an event happens, provide up-to-date information and 

instructions. The site might provide a question-and-answer forum. A 

hotline can also provide information on the latest developments.164

All of these steps should begin immediately. Planning for the LRP 
26 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

response is as important as any other consideration in a CBRN event and 

must be done as part of the planning process. The next section discusses 

the actions that can be taken once the event has occurred. 

Post-CBRN Event: 

Preventing LRPs from Seeking Immediate Care 

The primary goal of the LRP Response Plan is to keep people who do 

not need urgent or immediate care away from health care facilities. Low 

risk patients must be encouraged to stay home or to go to an alternate 

facility for assistance during periods of high demand at health care 

facilities following a CBRN event. To accomplish this task, government 

officials should institute a three tier pre-triage process (Figure 1). 

LRP Facility

Front Door Triage

Tier 3: Provide Robust Medical Care to

Immediate and Urgent Patients

Tier 2: Stop LRPs at the Door

Immediate and 

Urgent Patients 

Proceed to Health 

Care Facility 

Tier 1: Encourage LRPs to Stay Home or go to Alternate Facility

Health Care Facility

Figure 1. Low Risk Patient Response Plan 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 27

Tier 1: Prevent LRPs from Seeking Care 

The first tier of the pre-triage process focuses on two tasks. The 

government must provide clear and effective messages to the public, and it 

must provide an alternate facility for LRPs as necessary. 

Effective Communication. Immediately after a CBRN event, 

government officials must be ready to provide the public with information. 

They must provide clear directions in an effective manner in order to reduce 

the low risk patient response. Effectively communicating with the public 

during a CBRN event will be challenging. These events require leaders to 

make irreversible decisions within a narrow timeframe. The intentional 

nature of WMD attacks “renders information more imperfect or incomplete 

than in other crises and outcomes of decisions markedly uncertain.”165 In 

other words, officials will need to communicate imperfect knowledge 

immediately. Several actions may facilitate more effective communication. 

Prepackaged or prepared messages can speed up message delivery and 

provide accurate information, although it is not a complete solution to the 

problem. The CDC has prepackaged extended and short messages 

concerning CBRN events that can provide immediate information to the 

public and can be tailored for the situation. 

Here is an excerpt from part of a CDC message concerning anthrax: 

• This is an urgent health message from the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS). 

• Public health officials believe that the spores that cause anthrax 

may have been deliberately released in the xxx area. 

• At this time, we do not know the extent or source of the anthrax 

release. Local, state, and federal officials, including HHS, FBI, and 

Homeland Security, are working together. Updated announcements 

will be made as soon as these officials know more. 

• Anthrax is a disease that affects both humans and animals. In people, 

it can be caused by spores that are released as a powder or into the air. 

The spores are not known to spread from person to person. 

• Based on what we know now, only those people who were in xxx 

area on xxx date are at risk for getting sick.166
28 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

These messages do not directly address the low risk patient response 

issue although the information they provide can reduce the problem. 

Adding a line such as, “If you were not in the affected areas or if you do not 

have XXXX symptoms, do not seek health care at this time,” will also 

reduce the LRP response. 

Another problem with communicating during a CBRN event is that 

government officials will also be competing among a host of “voices.” These 

voices will include federal, state, and local authorities as well as commercial 

and media interests with potentially different perspectives on the crisis. 

Politicians will want to weigh in on the conversation, and their 

statements will likely be slanted in a political direction.167 During the 

anthrax attacks, many of the victims believed that the statements made by 

government officials were “spun” for political advantage. 

Another voice may come from commercial interests. Some accused 

the manufacturers of Ciprofloxacin, a drug used to treat anthrax exposure, 

of “stroking the frenzy and playing into public hysteria by promoting their 

drug.”168 Manufacturers of safety equipment may have a vested interest in 

promoting their products as well. Under the umbrella of promoting public 

safety, these manufacturers and retail dealers could make enormous profits. 

There will be a plethora of “experts” flooding the airways with advice 

and analysis. The communication environment is further complicated 

because “experts” often do not agree on the proper course of action.169 

Finally, family and friends as well as other social networks will have a 

significant impact on the decisions that victims make. In the Aum attack, it 

was often co-workers and family members that persuaded people to go to 

the hospital. Even with the best intentions, these voices may offer 

competing advice and analysis. 

To compete among these voices, government officials must manage 

their messages carefully. Their messages must be devoid of political 

motivation. Politicians who attempt to “spin control” public information 

only thwart meaningful communication and undermine public trust.170 The 

information should be honest and include statements that accurately convey 

the known risk at the time. Ironically, governments often fear causing panic 

and avoid giving useful information that might reduce the appearance of 

LRPs.171 During a crisis, the risk adverse approach can be as devastating as 

a reckless information approach.172 Having trusted agents to deliver these 

messages will also greatly aid in its effectiveness. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 29 

Create an alternate site for LRPs. Regardless of governmental 

reassurances, some LRPs will still seek immediate care. Therefore, the 

government should instruct those that are still concerned or unable to 

determine whether or not they are low or high risk to proceed to a predesignated LRP facility. 

Directing low risk patients to go to a local community center or 

school is a better alternative than having people go to hospitals or clinics 

and hampering emergency care. These areas would be primarily 

observation areas that conduct ongoing assessments and provide 

psychological comfort. Depending upon the size of the event, the LRPs 

may be promised that they will eventually be seen at the health care 

facility. However, most will be expected to go home after they have been 

reassured that they do not need immediate help. 

There are some advantages to seeing low risk patients beyond the 

decrease in health care demand.173 First, if symptoms develop hours after 

the attack, medical care will be more readily available. Second, there may 

be psychological benefits to early intervention.174 Of course, if there is a 

significant contagious threat from a biological hazard, then an alternate site 

may be ill-advised. Instead, planners must consider quarantine measures. 

An important question is “who will staff these alternate facilities?” 

The LRP facility will have to be run by a professional who has been 

trained to deal with this problem. A physician, physician assistant, or 

nurse practitioner will also need to be available to provide more robust 

medical evaluations. Volunteers can be a valuable resource. The Red 

Cross can be vital in manning the alternate site and can provide some 

mental health support.175

Mental health professionals can also be a valuable resource. The 

problem of the LRP response is not primarily a mental health problem, 

and planners should not count on mental health professionals such as 

psychologists, counselors, and social workers to solve the problem. These 

professionals, however, can provide important services at the LRP facility. 

Most notably, they can provide psychological first aid. 

Psychological first aid helps the victims of traumatic events cope in 

the immediate aftermath of a disaster or catastrophic event. This approach 

is evidence based, flexible, and culturally sensitive.176 It can provide 

essential care for people who have acute signs of distress such as 

disorientation, panic, excessive worry, and confusion.177 Psychological 
30 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

first aid is not specifically designed for the LRP response but will aid in 

helping ease the anxiety of those that come to the LRP facility. The 

essential steps of psychological first aid include:178

1. Responding to patients in a compassionate manner. 

2. Providing physical and emotional comfort. 

3. Calming and reorienting patients. 

4. Identifying the needs and concerns of patients. 

5. Providing practical assistance if possible. 

6. Assisting with connecting with social support networks. 

7. Providing coping information. 

8. Linking to other services. 

Mental health providers along with other health professionals can also 

take vital signs and histories in order to assist with triage. Admittedly, this 

step would be controversial, but in a crisis, where health care professionals 

are potentially in short supply,179 any reservations about the paraprofessionals making these assessments must be matched with the realism 

that this effort demands. 

Military members in health care specialties other than primary care 

and emergency physicians and nurses can be a valuable asset during these 

events.180 First, some physicians such as dermatologists and other health 

care professionals such as dentists have enough primary care training to 

properly assess patients and can conduct some life saving care. The 

military medical community also has a cadre of health care workers who 

are already trained in basic life support and patient assessment. These 

personnel conduct regular exercises in disaster response and can be 

invaluable in a CBRN event, both at the health care facility and the low 

risk patient facility. 

Tier 2: Stop LRPs at the Door 

Some low risk patients will inevitably proceed to the hospital and 

clinic despite the encouragement to go the LRP facility. All patients must 

be immediately met and triaged, and low risk patients must be directed to 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 31 

the LRP facility. If they are unable to transport themselves, the health 

care facility should have transportation such as buses or other vehicles 

available. Ambulances should not be used as they will be needed for 

seriously injured patients, and transporting LRPs in ambulances only 

reinforces their belief that they have a more serious condition. 

Transportation will inevitably be delayed and a cordoned waiting area for 

LRPs, away from the main entrances, should be included in planning. 

A problem posed by this action is that a health care provider will have 

to make an almost immediate decision about the status of a patient. While 

this appears to be a daunting task, it is actually relatively easy if the 

government is willing to accept a modicum of risk. A patient’s vital signs 

can be taken along with a short history. Determining whether or not a 

patient is in immediate need of medical attention is typically obvious even 

to untrained observers. Health care workers can administer standard 

medical assessment tests to see if patients have been exposed to a 

biological agent. Biological agents can often be defeated if they are 

detected early. In the case of a radiological incident, the workers could 

also screen masses of people with a dosimeter. Early detection tests are 

not as accurate as other tests that take longer to process; however, they can 

be an effective screening tool in a crisis. 

A significant CBRN event will require triage. Triage is the systematic 

method in which patients’ injuries are matched against the available health 

care. In this system, patients are typically categorized into minimal, 

delayed, immediate, and expectant. Minimal patients have minor injuries, 

and delayed patients have injuries that can wait to be treated. Immediate 

patients need attention as soon as possible while expectant patients are 

expected to die because of their injuries. Extensive health care may be 

able to save the life of an expectant patient, but the time and resources 

required may deprive many more immediate patients of life saving care. 

Triage has not been done in this country on a large basis since 1865 

during the American Civil War, and the civilian population may not be 

prepared for the hard decisions that will have to be made. Health care 

providers must sort casualties based upon severity of injury or illness and 

match them with available resources.181 Triage separates patients who 

urgently need help and will likely recover with immediate care from those 

who do not need care or are unlikely to recover. Considering the 

uniqueness of CBRN attacks, medical providers need clear triage 
32 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

guidance. In anticipation of such scenarios, many hospitals and health 

care organizations are already adopting robust triage protocols.182

Inevitably, some high risk patients will be misdiagnosed as low risk 

patients. At the LRP facility, para-professionals may be asked to conduct 

elementary triage, and the chance of errors may be greater than with a 

physician or nurse. Even fully qualified heath care professionals, 

however, are also susceptible to making mistakes, as a number of 

misdiagnoses occurred in each of the case studies covered. The size and 

scope of the CBRN event may require accepting these risks in order to 

serve the most people. 

Tier 3: Comprehensive Medical Care 

Those requiring robust and immediate health care would proceed to 

Tier 3 to receive comprehensive medical attention. It is important to 

recognize that all tiers provide medical care in that taking vital signs and 

providing reassurance is also an important part of medicine. Tier 3 patient 

care, however, would be distinguished in that it would provide more 

complete care for those who require it and will be unencumbered by 

droves of low risk patients. This care would include drug administration, 

wound care, and hospitalization as needed. 

Other Considerations: Security and Liability Coverage 

Two other important issues will need to be addressed in an LRP 

response plan. First, depending on the CBRN event, some LRPs may 

become violent if they cannot receive immediate robust care. Although 

there was no indication of people resorting to violence in the case studies 

mentioned, there is no guarantee of peaceful compliance in future 

incidents. By definition, triage allocates resources, and in a mass casualty 

event, some patients may violently demand immediate medical attention. 

Therefore, robust security both at emergency rooms and the LRP facility 

will be essential. The country may need to be prepared to use a significant 

number of law enforcement and National Guard assets to safeguard health 

care facilities as well as medical stockpiles, especially in the case of 

sudden outbreak of a serious biological threat or what is perceived as such. 

Another potential problem is the legal ramifications for health care 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 33 

providers. Health care providers regularly practice defensive medicine by 

ordering nonessential tests just to be sure of their diagnosis and in order to 

avoid being sued later. A CBRN event may require difficult choices and 

quick decisions. Health care workers (including volunteers at the LRP 

facility) should be free from liability, if an emergency is declared, when 

providing care during a CBRN event. This step may eliminate the small 

number of LRPs hoping to profit from the event. 

LRP Response Plan Summary 

A plan to mitigate the threat from a surge of LRPs in a CBRN event 

requires extensive preparations and tough decisions. The LRP Response 

Plan proposed in this section meets these demands and addresses the 

concerns found in the LRP responses in the three case studies. 

First, it provides important and reasonably accurate information from 

a trusted source to the public. It respects the legitimate motivations of 

LRPs and provides a method for them to both self identify as LRPs and to 

be appropriately triaged. It also provides some monitoring in an effort to 

reduce the level of uncertainty many of them will have, while at the same 

time reducing the number of LRPs at actual health care facilities. Finally, 

it allows medical providers to provide robust care for seriously injured 

patients while reassuring LRPs that they have not been ignored or 

dismissed. 

The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 35 

V. Conclusions 

The Low Risk Patient (LRP) response poses a serious threat to the 

ability of health care facilities to adequately respond to victims of a CBRN 

event. As this study showed, our understanding of the LRP response is 

woefully inadequate and often based on misconceptions of the problem. 

LRPs are not hysterical masses inappropriately seeking attention, but 

rational people seeking accurate information and proper care. 

In order to properly prepare and respond to an LRP surge, planners 

must use appropriate information and medical resources. This paper 

proposes that setting up a system to provide information will significantly 

mitigate the problem. It further proposes that by providing limited 

monitoring at an alternate facility many more LRPs can be kept from 

seeking aid at health care facilities. This plan, however, is only a 

beginning. 

Further research into the LRP response is still needed. This study 

only examines three incidents and largely looks at secondary sources for 

its conclusions. The literature review for this study failed to find a single, 

scientifically valid study of the LRP response. The motivations of LRPs 

need to be more closely examined and predictive models need to be 

developed. 

The federal government should establish a center of excellence for 

understanding the psychological, emotional, and physical consequences of 

CBRN events. The center should partner with efforts that are currently 

being done in several educational institutions. 

Government leaders should also pass the National Resiliency 

Development Act which mandates a “task force for the purpose of 

increasing the psychological resilience and mitigating distress reactions 

and maladaptive behaviors of the American public in preparation for and 

in response to a conventional, biological, chemical, or radiological attack 

on the United States.”183 This legislation should also help to develop 

accurate ways to measure the distress and coping of a community during 

the actual event. Unfortunately, the bill has not yet been able to get out of 

committee. 

One significant way to increase our knowledge of this important issue 

is to study the reactions of people involved in CBRN events. Although 
36 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

CBRN attacks or accidents are rare, incidents do happen. For example, in 

October 2006, a fire at a chemical plant in Apex, North Carolina, forced 

the evacuation of thousands of local residents. Some of these residents 

could be interviewed to measure their reactions and their evaluation of the 

effectiveness of local response. Conducting a qualitative research project 

with these residents could provide invaluable insights into this problem. 

Some actions should be taken immediately. LRP response plans 

should be part of every CBRN response plan. Communities should also 

conduct regular large scale exercises that involve not only health care 

facilities and local responders but also public leaders and the media. 

Exercises such as “Dark Winter,” conducted in 2001, that looked at the 

U.S. response to a smallpox outbreak are excellent opportunities to 

understand the impact of a CBRN event. Similar exercises with local 

responders and the media should be conducted as well. These exercises 

offer the opportunity not only to run plans but build important 

relationships between all responders, not just law enforcement and health 

care. They should also become “media events” in order to raise the 

awareness of the CBRN threat and educate the public on response 

procedures. 

Communities should also be more involved in terrorist response 

preparations on an ongoing basis. Communities should engage in drills 

and exercises that involve a significant number of people beyond official 

responders. 

Community vulnerability assessments looking at resiliency should 

also be conduced before and during a natural disaster or terrorist event.184

This would enable leaders and health care professionals to promote 

resiliency tailored for a community.185 The Institute of Medicine 

recommends that preparations for bioterrorism response include an 

assessment of the psychological impact of an event on a community.186

LRPs flooding into health care facilities during a CBRN event 

threaten the ability to provide proper health care. But by making some 

preparations today, communities and local health care facilities can largely 

mitigate this problem. With further research, better techniques will also 

help. Efforts to build community resilience will also reduce the LRP 

response and greatly aid in preparing communities for a CBRN crisis. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 37

APPENDIX A: 

Problems Estimating the Worried Well Response 

The psychological reactions of the direct victims of CBRN have 

rarely been properly studied.187,188 Despite confident claims that the 

worried well are a significant problem, the review of the literature for this 

study failed to find a single, scientifically-valid study of this phenomena. 

These case studies highlight two problems in accurately accounting for the 

worried well. 

The first problem is that the number of victims is questionable. For 

example in the Aum attack, it is unclear who was counted among the 

victims. St. Luke’s Hospital saw 641 patients the day of the attack but 

another 1,400 came to the hospital in the week that followed.189 One 

hundred and sixty-nine hospitals reported seeing sarin victims in the days 

and weeks after the attack.190 It is unclear whether or not these numbers 

were included in the worried well estimation. On the other hand, some 

victims may have been exposed and never come to the hospital as in the 

case of the Matsumoto attack.191 And some may have needed medical 

care and were sent home. 

Mitsuteru Izutsu was a passenger on the Tokyo subway the morning 

of the attack but did not realize what had occurred until after he arrived at 

work. He thought there was a problem with the lighting in his office 

because everything was dark. His friends and co-workers encouraged him 

to go to the hospital. He was placed on an IV drip but given no other tests. 

After an hour and a half, a hospital staff member announced to those in the 

waiting room, “Would those who feel all right now please go home and 

come back tomorrow.”192 This self diagnosis and triage may be one way 

to clear the waiting room of patients, but it does not assure that the 

patients who leave are in fact well. Mr. Izutsu continued seeking eye 

treatments for 10 days after the incident.193

Naoyuki Ogata provides another interesting story. He had some eye 

problems and was given intravenous fluids. The doctor asked him 

whether or not he was going to go home or stay in the hospital. Mr. Ogata 

decided to go home. Several days later he was diagnosed as having 

kidney failure and admitted to the hospital.194 It is unclear in the official 
38 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

accounts whether patients such as Mr. Ogata were counted as worried well 

because they were sent home quickly, or as a “legitimate victim,” or both. 

The problem is equally troubling in the Goiania incident. Researchers 

are clearly estimating the number of patients when they report rounded 

numbers such as 60,000 and 110,000. It appears there was no clear 

record-keeping of who actually sought care. In addition, the Goiania 

event was very stigmatizing in the region. People, including relatives, 

refused to have contact with those from the city. To combat this problem, 

the government issued a certificate that “proved” a person was free of 

radiation.195 It is very likely that some people came to the stadium not 

because they primarily feared exposure, but wanted to prove to others that 

they were not affected. Eight thousand received certificates.196

In the anthrax incident, victims had a choice of whether or not to seek 

their own medical care, and this has not been documented. On Capital 

Hill, some staffers initially wanted to go to their private doctor or to the 

hospital. The Capitol Hill medical team physician reportedly told them 

that this was unnecessary. They would simply need testing and 

antibiotics.197 Unfortunately, we may never know how many of these 

people, as well as other victims, sought private care. The Washington 

Post reported that local hospitals and clinics had significant increases in 

patient loads during the anthrax incident.198 Unfortunately, these reports 

are largely anecdotal and not closely studied. 

Another problem with estimating the number of worried well is that 

the term is not well-defined.199 Some researchers of the Aum attack 

appear to label all patients who received outpatient treatment only as 

worried well, and only 19 percent of victims were hospitalized.200 This 

standard, however, is too high if we are going to argue that the worried 

well should have stayed away from health care centers. Many patients 

were exposed, and only trained medical staff could competently decide 

whether or not their symptoms warranted hospitalization. It is suspect that 

some researchers based their estimates on chart reviews. The problem 

with this retrospective methodology is that it fails to consider the 

perspective of the patient. A trained medical provider may easily be able 

to look back in hindsight and determine that urgent medical care was not 

needed. At the time, however, this same provider may have urged a 

patient to seek care to determine their level of need. In the anthrax letter 

and Goiania incident, most people merely sought testing and not medical 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 39 

care. Considering that the governments in each case encouraged people to 

get tested, it is unfair to lump them into the worried well category with 

those who sought care on their own. 

The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 41 

APPENDIX B: 

The Critical Role of the Department of Defense 

The Department of Defense (DoD) will have a critical role to play in 

responding to a CBRN event. While they are not likely to be the first 

responders in a catastrophic event, the DoD has significant numbers of 

personnel and equipment along with the ability to move these assets 

quickly.201 Already, military units are part of the Federal Response Plan. 

The military can play a vital role in disaster relief by providing medical 

care. They can also be vital in supporting the LRP response. 

While military primary care and emergency physicians and nurses can 

provide robust medical care at Tier 3, other health professionals can assist 

at the LRP facility. For example, the military has a plethora of mental 

health professionals such as psychologists and social workers that can be 

used to respond in a crisis. These professionals could man the LRP 

facility and provide psychological first aid. Although they are not 

currently credentialed to take vital signs and perform preliminary triage, 

training them to perform this task would benefit not only their disaster 

response capability but make them a more valuable asset in a combat 

zone. The military also has psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses who are 

already qualified to perform basic medical evaluations.202

The military health professionals are also experts in patient 

administration and tracking. They can be vital in providing much needed 

assistance both at the low risk patient facility and the main health care 

center. The military security forces can also provide security at both 

locations.203 The DoD could also fund and organize some mass exercises 

to prepare health care workers. 

The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 43 

Notes 

1. Representative Christopher Shays, “Bioterrorism Risks,” Congressional 

Testimony, 29 November 2001, House Government Reform Committee. 

2. National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2004, 2. 

3. Government Accountability Office, Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban 

Hospitals have Emergency Plans but Lack Capacities for Bioterrorism Response, GAO 

03-924, August 2003. 

4. Agency for Health Care Research and Quality, Bioterrorism and Hospital 

Preparedness, Issue Brief 3, January 2004, On-line, Internet, 7 December 2006, available 

from http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btbriefs/btbrief3.pdf. 

5. The term “worried well” comes from primary care medicine where patients often 

suffering from somatization disorder disproportionately use health care facilities. 

6. M. Debacker, “Hospital Preparedness in Incidents with Chemical Agents,” 

International Journal of Disaster Medicine, vol. 1, 2003, 44. 

7. Ibid., 47. 

8. Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear 

Terrorism, Centers for Nonproliferation Studies: Monterey, California, 2004, 270. 

9. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

Vienna, 1988, 24. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Some of the patients had round inflamed areas on their hands and many 

providers believed that they had been bitten by an insect. 

14. International Atomic Energy Agency, Dosimetrics and the Medical Aspects of 

the Radiological Accident of Accident in Goiania in 1987, Vienna, Austria, 1998, 88, Online, Internet, 22 February 2007, available from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ 

publications/PDF/te_1009_prn.pdf. 

15. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

Vienna, Austria, 1988, 31. 
44 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

16. Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loab, “Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited,” 

Defense Horizons, Number 38, January 2004, 6. 

17. International Atomic Energy Agency, Dosimetrics and the Medical Aspects, 88. 

18. Ibid., 46. 

19. Ibid., 6. 

20. Bradley Graham, “Victims of Radiation Ostracized in Brazil,” Washington Post, 

8 November 1987, A25. 

21. Marlise Simmons, “Deaths Raise Brazil’s Fear of Radiation,” New York Times, 

29 October 1987, A3. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. 

24. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

115. 

25. Bradley Graham, “Victims of Radiation Ostracized in Brazil,” A25. 

26. Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces, 270. 

27. John S. Petterson, “Perception vs. Reality of Radiological Impact: The Goiania 

Model,” Nuclear News, November 1988, 84. 

28. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

115. 

29. Graham, Washington Post, A25. 

30. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The 

Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear 

Arsenals of Russia, (N.Y.: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996), 10. 

31. Kyle Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” Emerging Infectious 

Diseases, 5, no. 4 (July-August 1999), 513. 

32. Amy E. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” in Amy E. Smithson and 

Leslie-Anne Levy Eds. Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the 

US Response, Washington, D.C.: Publication of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 

(www.stimson.org), 1999, 86. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 45 

33. Ibid. 

34. Japanese citizens often wrap goods in newspaper so the sight of these bags was 

not unusual. 

35. D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1996), 

134. 

36. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 93. 

37. Doctors who had treated patients at the Matsumto attack recognized that the 

victims were suffering from sarin poisoning from watching the news reports. One called 

St. Luke’s at 9:30 a.m. to inform them of his suspicions. 

38. Haruki Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese 

Psyche, (New York: Vintage International, 2000), 163, 181. 

39. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 95. 

40. Patients who could not walk were considered moderately ill. Severe cases were 

non-ambulatory and needed ventilation. 

41. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 99. 

42. Mark A. Lee, Seeing the Elephant—Consequence Management Policy for the 

Department of Defense. Monograph from School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. 

Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000-2001, 32. 

43. Robyn Pangi, “Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the 

Japanese Subway System,” BCSIA Discussion Paper, 2002-4, ESDP Discussion Paper, 

ESDP-2002-01, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February, 

2002, 30. 

44. Smithson, “Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 95. 

45. Institute of Medicine, Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of 

Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 

2003), 61. This is a secondary reference to S.R. Lillibridge, J.A. Liddle, S.S. 

Leffingwell, and F. Sidell, Report of the American Delegation to Japan, Atlanta, GA: 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. I was unable to obtain this report. 

46. David M. Benedek, Harry Holloway, and Steven M. Becker, “Emergency 

Mental Health Management in Bioterrorism Events,” Emergency Medicine Clinics of 

North American, Volume 20, 2003, 403. 
46 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

47. James W. Stokes and Louis E. Banderet, “Psychological Aspects of Chemical 

Defense and Warfare,” Military Psychology, 9, no. 4, 406. 

48. This estimate is based upon a report from the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention. I made repeated attempts to locate this report but was unsuccessful. 

49. Judith Mathewson, “The Psychological Impact of Terrorist Attacks: Lessons 

Learned for Future Threats,” in Homeland Security Papers, eds. Michael W. Ritz, Ralph 

G. Hensley, Jr., and James C. Whitemire, (Maxwell AFB: USAF Counterproliferation 

Center, February 2004), 197. 

50. Mr. Stevens was the first fatality from a biological weapon in the United States. 

Ed Regis, “Evaluating the Threat,” Scientific American, 285, Issue 6, (December 2001), 

21. 

51. J.J. McIntyre and Steven, Venette, “Examining the CDCynergy Event 

Assessment Tool: An Investigation of the Anthrax Crisis in Boca Raton, Florida,” 

Disasters, 30, no. 3 (2006), 352. 

52. Anthrax is the disease not the microorganism. The bacterium that causes 

anthrax is Bacillus anthracis. I use the term anthrax for the bacterium to reduce any 

confusion. 

53. McIntyre and Venette, “Examining the CDCynergy Event Assessment Tool,” 

352. 

54. Leonard A. Cole, Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story, Washington, 

D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2003, 33. 

55. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 46. 

56. Government Accountability Office, Issues Associated with Anthrax Testing at 

the Wallingford Facility, GAO-03-787T, May 2003, 34. 

57. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 54. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Kathy Chen, Gregg Hitt, and Laurie McGinley, “Trial and Error; Seven Days in 

October Spotlight Weakness of Bioterror Response—Health Officials were slow to Grasp 

anthrax hazard for D.C. Postal Workers,” Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2001, A1. 

60. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 58. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 47

61. Eunice Moscoso and Ahan Kim, “Guidance on anthrax options Postal staff want 

advice on vaccine vs. Antibiotics,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 22 December 2001, 

A10. 

62. Rick Hampson and Martha T. Moore, “Anxiety rises in wake of latest death; 

Vietnamese immigrant was an unlikely victim of attack,” USA Today, 1 November 2001, 

A03. 

63. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 9. 

64. Julie L. Gerberding, James M. Hughes, and Jeffrey, P. Koplan, “Bioterrorism 

Preparedness and Response: Clinicians and Public Health Agencies as Essential 

Partners,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 287, no. 7, 20 February 2002, 

898. 

65. Fran Pilch, The Worried Well: Strategies for Installation Commanders, On-line, 

Internet, 22 February 2007, available from http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ 

OCP53.pdf, 12. 

66. Ed Regis, “Evaluating the Threat,” Scientific American, 285, Issue 6, 

(December 2001), 21. 

67. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 107. 

68. Vicki S. Friemuth, “The Anthrax Experience ‘Lessons Learned,’ ” Presentation, 

26 August 2002, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, http://www.hhs.gov/ 

ophep/presentation/freimuth.html. 

69. Public Agenda Special Edition, “Surveys Show Public Worried, Not Panicked, 

After Anthrax Attacks,” 23 October 2001, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/terrorism/102301terror_pubopinion.htm. 

70. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Public Remains Steady 

in Face of Anthrax Scare,” On-line, Internet, available from http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=139. 

71. Ibid. 

72. Ibid. 

73. Ibid. 

74. Institute of Medicine, Preparing for Psychological Consequences, 92. 

75. Ibid. 
48 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

76. Government Accountability Office, Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to 

Anthrax Incidents of 2001, GAO-04-152, October 2003, 19. 

77. Pilch, The Worried Well, 12. 

78. Ibid. 

79. Daniel S. Shapiro, “Surge Capacity for Response to Bioterrorism in Hospital 

Clinical Microbiology Laboratories,” Journal of Clinical Microbiology, 41, no. 12 

(December 2003), 5373. 

80. Douglas Shaffer, George Armstrong, Karen Higgins, Peter Honig, Philip Coyne, 

Debra Boxwell, Julie Beitz, Brad Leissa, and Dianne Murphy, “Increased US prescription 

trends associated with the CDC Baccillus anthracis antimicrobial post exposure 

prophylaxis campaign,” Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety, 12, 2003, 177. 

81. Laura Snyder and Jason Pate, “Research Story of the Week: Tracking Anthrax 

Hoaxes and Attacks,” Centers for Nonproliferation Studies, On-line, Internet, available 

from http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020520.htm. 

82. Neely Tucker, “Emergency Rooms Overrun by the ‘Worried but Well,’ ” 

Washington Post, 1 November 2001, B01. 

83. Ibid. 

84. Lee Clarke, Caron Chess, Rachel Holmes, and Karen M. O’Neil, “Speaking 

with One Voice: Risk Communication Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks,” Journal of 

Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14, no. 3 (September, 2006), 166. 

85. Ibid. 

86. Justin Blum, “Postal Worker Vaccinations to Begin Today: Some Brentwood 

Employees Wary of Experimental Precaution against Anthrax,” The Washington Post, 27 

December 2001, B02. 

87. James M. Hughes and Julie L. Gerberdling, “Anthrax Bioterrorism: Lessons 

Learned and Future Directions,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8, no. 10 (October 2002), 

1014. 

88. International Atomic Energy Agency, Dosimetrics and the Medical Aspects, 1. 

89. Petterson, “Perception vs. Reality,” 84. 

90. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

116. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 49 

91. Marco Antonio Sperb Leite and L. David Roper, The Goiania Radiation 

Incident: A Failure of Science and Society, Unpublished Manuscript, 10. 

92. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

116. 

93. Carol S. North, David E. Pollio, Betty Pfefferbaum, Deborah Megivan, Meena 

Vythilingam, Elizabeth T. Westerhaus, Gregory J. Martin, and Barry A. Hong, “Concerns 

of Capitol Hill Staff Workers After Bioterrorism,” The Journal of Nervous and Mental 

Disease, 193, no. 8, (August 2005), 525. 

94. Stokes and Bandaret, “Psychological Aspects of Consequence,” 406. 

95. Ibid. 

96. Marco Antonio Sperb Leite and L. David Roper, The Goiania Radiation 

Incident: A Failure of Science and Society, Unpublished Manuscript, 9. 

97. Ibid. 

98. McIntyre and Venette, “Examining the CDCynergy Event Assessment Tool,” 

352. 

99. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 18. 

100. Ibid. 

101. Ibid., 17. 

102. North, et al., “Concerns of Capitol Hill Staff Workers after Bioterrorism: 

Focus Group Discussions of Authorities’ Response,” 524. 

103. Ibid. 

104. Ibid. 

105. Ibid., 525. 

106. One model that helps explain this behavior is the health belief model. It posits 

that people make rational choices based upon their “perceived susceptibility, severity, 

benefits, constraints, and self efficacy.” (Linda Aldoory, and Mark A. Van Dyke, “The 

Roles of Perceived ‘Shared’ Involvement and Information Overload in Understanding 

How Audiences Make Meaning of News About Bioterrorism,” Journalism & Mass 

Communication Quarterly 83, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 348.) In other words, people 

evaluate the available information and make health choices based upon their assessment. 

In all three cases, many people relying on government instructions or media 
50 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

recommendations obviously perceived the risk as serious enough to require outside 

assistance. 

American physician on a cable news network stated “...any time there is an 

environmental alert of radiation exposure, everyone who had the potential of exposure 

should follow through with proper screening and follow up medical visits.” (Manny 

Alvarez, “Radiation are you at risk?,” Fox News Online, 1 December 2006, On-line, 

Internet, available from http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,233457,00.html.) He 

probably would give this same advice to potential victims of chemical or biological 

agents, and thus, hearing the advice of a qualified expert, people would seek care. Are 

they the worried well or merely compliant patients? 

107. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo, 181. 

108. Yuji Nishiwaki, Kazuhiko Maekawa, Yasutaka Ogawa, Nozomu Asukai, 

Masayasu Minami, and Kazuyuki Omae, “Effects of Sarin on the Nervous System in 

Rescue Team Staff Members and Police Officers 3 Years after the Tokyo Subway Sarin 

Attack,” Environmental Health Perspectives, 109, no. 11, (November 2001), 1169. 

109. Tanja M. Korpi and Christopher Hemmer, Avoiding Panic and Keeping the 

Ports Open in a Chemical and Biological Threat Environment, (Maxwell AFB: USAF 

Counterproliferation Center No. 30, June 2005), 5. 

110. Centers for Disease and Prevention, “Facts about Sarin,” On-line, Internet, 23 

September 2006, available from http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp. 

111. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorder (4th Ed.), (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 395. 

112. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995, 31. 

113. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Acute Radiation Syndrome, CDC, 

On-line, Internet, available from http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/ars.asp. 

114. Debacker, “Hospital Preparedness in Incidents with Chemical Agents,” 44, 47. 

115. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 465. 

116. Ibid., 464. 

117. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiania, 

48. 

118. David Alexander and Susan Klein, “Biochemical Terrorism: Too awful to 

Contemplate, Too Serious to Ignore: Subjective Literature Review,” British Journal of 

Psychiatry, 45, 492.
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 51 

119. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995, 48. 

120. Mayumi Mayeda and Kozo Takase, “Need for enforcement of ethicolegal 

education – an analysis of the survey of postgraduate clinical trainees,” Department of 

Health Science Policies Division of Research Development, Graduate School, Tokyo 

Medical and Dental University, 1-5-45 Yushima, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8519, Japan, 

On-line, Internet, available from http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi? 

artid=1192799, abstract. 

121. Scott Shane, “Anthrax Survivors Find Life in Struggle,” Baltimore Sun, 18 

September 2003, On-line, Internet, available from http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/ 

anthraxsurvivors.html. 

122. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 473. 

123. Ibid., 429. 

124. Ibid., 426. 

125. Ibid., 430. 

126. Ferguson and Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, 308. 

127. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995, 440. 

128. Asian News Service, “20% of Gas Attack Victims Suffer Stress,” 20 June 

2001, On-line, Internet, available from http://www.intellihealth.com/IH/ihtPrint/ 

WSIHW000/333/8014/325908.html. 

129. Kawana Noriko, “Psycho-Physiological Effects of the Terrorist Sarin Attack 

on the Tokyo Subway System,” Military Medicine, 168, no. 12, 23-26. 

130. Melissa Welch and Mitchell D. Feldman, “Cross-Cultural Communication,” In 

Behavioral Medicine in Primary Care: A Practical Guide, Mitchell D. Feldman and John 

F. Christensen, Eds., (Stanford, CT: Appleton and Lange, 1997), 103. 

131. Noriko, “Psycho-Physiological Effects,” 25. 

132. Richard J. McNally, Richard A. Bryant, and Anke Ehlers, “Does Early 

Psychological Intervention Promote Recovery From Posttraumatic Stress?” 

Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4, no. 2, (November 2003), 69. 

133. John Leach, Survival Psychology, (New York: New York University Press, 

1994), 10-29. 

134. Leach, Survival Psychology, 30. 
52 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

135. Thomas A. Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People: 

How to Vaccinate a City against Panic,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34, (December 

2001), 220. 

136. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo, 161. 

137. Ibid., 33, 35. 

138. Roz D. Lasker, Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning through the Eyes of 

the Public, Centers for Advancement of Collaborative Studies in Health, 14 September 

2004, On-line, Internet, available from http://www.cacsh.org/rrstudy.html. 

139. Predictive statements based upon stated attitudes are problematic. It is very 

difficult to know what people would actually do in an actual CBRN event when 

compared to an imagined one. 

140. Jim Brasher, “Communication and Uncertainty Management,” Journal of 

Communication, September 2001, 479. 

141. Ibid., 482. 

142. Bradley D. Stein, Terri L. Tanielian, David P. Eisenman, Donna J. Keyser, M. 

Audrey Burnam, and Harold A. Pincus, “Emotional and Behavioral Consequences of 

Bioterrorism: Planning a Public Health Response,” The Milbank Quarterly, 82, no. 3 

(2004), 445. 

143. Clarke, “Speaking with One Voice,” 161. 

144. Jessica Stern, “Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons,” 

International Security, 27, no. 3, 102. 

145. Ibid. 

146. Smithson wrote about the Aum victims, “These psychogenic patients had no 

real chemical injuries, but they nonetheless clamored for medical attention.” Smithson, 

“Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo,” 95. 

147. Ronald M. Atlas, “Bioterrorism: From Threat to Reality,” Annual Review of 

Microbiology, 56, 2002, 182. 

148. David Alexander and Susan Klein, “The Challenge of Preparation for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorist Attack,” Journal of Post 

Graduate Medicine, 52, no. 2 (April 2006), 127. 

149. Molly J. Hall, Ann E. Norwood, Carol S. Fullerton, Robert Gifford, and Robert 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 53 

J. Ursano, “The Psychological Burden of Bioterrorism,” Journal of Aggression, 

Maltreatment, and Trauma, 9, no. 1/2 (2004), 299. 

150. Ibid. 

151. Michael T. Kindt, Building Population Resilience to Terror Attacks: 

Unlearned Lessons From Military and Civilian Experience, Air War College Research 

Paper, Unpublished. 

152. Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2000), 24. 

153. Hobbs, et al., “Communicating Health Information,” 69. 

154. Klein, 129. 

155. This author recently attended a national CBRN consequence management 

conference. One of the organizers proudly highlighted that the media was not present 

and received cheers from the audience. This negative view of the media is unfortunate 

considering their importance in consequence management. 

156. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. 

Joint Forces Command, Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communication 

Workshop—Final Report, March 2001, 47, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/human-behavior-wmd.pdf. 

157. Ibid. 

158. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, News Media’s Improved 

Image Proves Short-Lived, 4 August 2002, On-line, Internet, available from http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=629. 

159. Lacey Rose, “The Ten Most Trusted Celebrities,” 25 September 2006, On-line, 

Internet, available from http://www.forbes.com/technology/2006/09/25/trust-celebritypoliticians-tech_cx_lr_06trust_0925celeb.html. 

160. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Human Behavior and WMD Crisis, 47. 

161. Judith Courtney, Galen Cole, and Barbara Reynolds, “How the CDC is 

Meeting the Training Demands of Emergency Risk Communication,” Journal of Health 

Communication 8, (2003), 128. 

162. Hyams, et al., “Responding to Chemical, Biological, or Nuclear,” 283. 
54 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

163. It is important to note that Americans have experienced a steady eroding of 

confidence in science and scientists since the 1950s. See Jessica Stern, “Dreaded Risks 

and the Control of Biological Weapons,” International Security 27, no. 3, 89-123. 

Bolstering public opinion of science will be critical to building trusted agents. 

164. One potential problem with most communication plans is that they rely heavily 

upon electronic means to communicate. In the event of a nuclear event, the electronic 

magnetic pulse may wipe out communication. Planners and government officials must 

examine ways to communicate to the public via other means in this case. 

165. Courtney, et al., “How the CDC is Meeting,” 129. 

166. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Communicating the First Hours, 

On-line, Internet, available from http://www.bt.cdc.gov/firsthours/anthrax/messages.asp. 

167. Baruch Fischhoff, “The Psychological Perception of Risk,” in The McGrawHill Homeland Security Handbook, ed. David G. Kamien. (New York: McGraw Hill, 

2006), 463. 

168. Marc Seigal, False Alarm: The Truth about the Epidemic of Fear, Hoboken, 

NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005, 117. 

169. John Hobbs, Anne Kittler, Susanah Fox, Blackford Middleton, and David W. 

Bates, “Communicating Health Information to an Alarmed Public Facing a Threat Such 

as a Bioterrorist Attack,” Journal of Health Communication, 9, (2004), 69. 

170. Glass and Schoch-Spana, “Bioterrorism and the People,” 221. 

171. Anthony R. Mawson, “Understanding Mass Panic and Other Collective 

Responses to Threat and Disaster,” Psychiatric, 68, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 107. 

172. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995, 443. 

173. Pilch, The Worried Well, 19. 

174. Ibid. 

175. Betsy A. Gard and Josef I. Ruzek, “Community Mental Health Response to 

Crisis,” Journal of Clinical Psychology: In Session 8, vol. 62 (August 2006), 1030. 

176. National Child Traumatic Stress Network and National Center for PTSD, 

Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide, 2nd Edition, July 2006, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.nctsn.org and www.ncptsd.va.gov, 3. 

177. Ibid., 6. 
The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events . . . 55 

178. Ibid., 12. 

179. Kristene Qureshi, Robyn Gershon, Martin Sherman, T. Straub, E. Gebbie, M. 

McCollum, M.J. Erwin and S.S. Morse. “Health care workers’ ability and willingness to 

report to duty during catastrophic disasters,” Journal of Urban Health, 82, no 3 (2005), 

378-388. 

180. See Appendix B for a further discussion on the role of the military in a CBRN 

event. 

181. Matthew D. Sztajnkrycer, Bo Madsen, and Amado Baez. “Unstable Ethical 

Plateaus and Disaster Triage,” Emergency Medicine Clinics of North America, 24, 756. 

182. See http://www.ahrq.gov/research/devmodels/devmodap5c.htm for an example 

from the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. Also see 

http://www.jcrinc.com/2631/ from Joint Commission Resources for examples of an 

anthrax clinic protocol that identifies and separates the worried well in a clinical setting. 

183. Office of Legislative Policy and Analysis, On-line, Internet, 10 December 2006, 

available from http://olpa.od.nih.gov/legislation/108/pendinglegislation/natresact.asp. 

184. Hall, et al., “The Psychological Burden of Bioterrorism,” 295. 

185. Ibid. 

186. Ibid. 

187. Bradley D. Stein, Terri L. Tanielian, David P. Eisenman, Donna J. Keyser, M. 

Audrey Burnam, and Harold A. Pincus, “Emotional and Behavioral Consequences of 

Bioterrorism: Planning a Public Health Response,” The Milbank Quarterly, 82, no. 3 

(2004), 413-455. Stein, et al., wrote that there are “no empirically based articles 

documenting the emotional and behavioral reactions of direct victims of bioterrorist 

events, including populations exposed and treated during the anthrax attacks of the fall of 

2001 in the United States.” 

188. Stein, et al., “Emotional and Behavioral Consequences,” 425. 

189. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995, 30. 

190. Kaplan and Marshall, Cult at the End of the World, 251. 

191. They may have recovered on their own or sought care for the symptoms of 

exposure but were never identified as a sarin victim. 

192. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo, 47. 
56 . . . The “Worried Well” Response to CBRN Events

193. Ibid. 

194. Ibid., 168. 

195. Graham, “Victims of Radiation,” A025. 

196. Petterson, “Perception vs. Reality,” 84.

197. Cole, Anthrax Letters, 57. 

198. Tucker, “Emergency Rooms Overrun,” B01. 

199. The Government Accountability Office defines worried well as “patient’s who 

think they have been infected [in a biological event] but have not. See 

http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:fDS6iiM_YkoJ:www.gao.gov/new.items/d03924.p

df+percentage+of+worried+well+in+emergency+rooms&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4. 

200. Pangi, Consequence Management in Tokyo, 30. 

201. Department of Defense, “DoD Health Official Details Prep for WMD 

Response,” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, 25 October 2002. 

202. This point is arguable as many of these medical health care workers may not 

have taken vital signs or extensive health histories in many years. The providers, 

however, have extensive health care background, and they can be quickly retrained. 

203. There are current prohibitions against the U.S. military performing law 

enforcement duties domestically. This policy needs to be reviewed and revised in order 

to more effectively respond to serious CBRN events and other disasters.