# Mali - United States Department of State

- Terrorist and Hostage-Taking Related Designations of JNIM and al-Murabitoun Leaders Office of the SpokespersonThe United States remains committed to bringing American hostages home and to deterring future hostage-takings.  Today, the Department of State is designating a total of seven individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and E.O. 14078.The Department is designating four leaders of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and al-Murabitoun as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.Messaoud Belhireche, also known as Usama Abu-‘Abd-al-Wahid al-Jaza’iri, is a senior JNIM leader and the head of JNIM finances.Talha al-Libi, also known as Sidi Mohamed Ould Mohamed Salem, is the JNIM emir of Timbuktu and leader of the al-Furqan Battalion.  Al-Libi has ordered JNIM attacks against Malian, French, and MINUSMA forces in Mali.Hamama Ould Khouier, also known as Hamza Tabankort, is the emir of al-Murabitoun and was involved in JNIM hostage negotiations, including negotiations related to Western hostages.Hussein Ould Hammada, also known as Zakaria Tabankort, is the deputy leader of al-Murabitoun.  Hammada worked closely with Khouier and was involved in several attacks and kidnappings of Westerners.The Department is designating the following for being leaders of JNIM, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, the hostage-taking of at least one U.S. national abroad, pursuant to E.O. 14078.Iyad ag Ghali, also known as Iyad Ag Ghaly, is a leader and founder of both JNIM and Ansar al-Dine (AAD).Amadou Kouffa, also known as Hammadoun Kouffa, is a senior member of JNIM and has been involved in numerous attacks and kidnappings in Mali and Burkina Faso.Salem Ould Breihmatt, also known as Abu Hamza al-Shanqiti and Hamza al-Mauritani, is a JNIM senior leader and emir of Arbinda and Serma in the Mopti Region of Mali.Hamama Ould Khouier also known as Hamza Tabankort, is the emir of al-Murabitoun, which merged with other groups to form JNIM in 2017, and was involved in JNIM hostage negotiations, including negotiations related to Western hostages.Hussein Ould Hammada also known as Zakaria Tabankort, is the deputy leader of al-Murabitoun.  Hammada worked closely with Khouier and was involved in several attacks and kidnappings of Westerners.AAD is an organization operating in Mali which cooperates closely with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Al-Murabitoun was originally formed after it split from AQIM in 2012.  Al-Murabitoun joined the Sahara Branch of AQIM, AAD, and the Macina Liberation Front to form JNIM, which became al-Qa’ida’s largest and most lethal affiliate in West Africa and the Sahel.  JNIM has claimed responsibility for numerous kidnappings and attacks since its formation in 2017.  In addition to ransom from kidnapping, JNIM receives funding from extortion, from smugglers, and from traffickers.  The State Department designated JNIM and al-Murabitoun as SDGTs in 2018 and 2013, respectively.As a result of our actions, all property and interests in property of those designated today that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and all U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them.Petitions for removal from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov.  Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.
- Mali HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Mali				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Mali during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government forces; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances and abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by the armed forces and nonstate armed groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests of journalists, censorship, and enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national and ethnic groups; laws used to criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although not enforced; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.With occasional notable exceptions, the transition government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Nonstate armed groups, including several signatories to the 2015 Algiers Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Algiers Accord), committed serious human rights abuses, including summary executions, physical abuse, and the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. Russia’s Wagner Group forces, often operating in close coordination with the Malian Armed Forces, allegedly committed unlawful killings, rapes, and other abuses. Terrorist groups kidnapped and killed civilians, including humanitarian workers. Ethnic militias, formed to defend one ethnic group from other ethnic groups or other armed groups, committed serious human rights abuses, including summary executions and destroying homes and food stores. Authorities generally did not investigate these abuses, many of which occurred in areas outside the government’s control.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous and increasing reports the transition government or its agents, including associated Wagner Group forces, committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, such as extrajudicial killings, as military operations intensified in central and northern areas of the country. The gendarmerie and the Ministries of Justice and Defense conducted investigations of some of these killings, but few resulted in punishment of offenders.On August 9, police shot and wounded a man in the Bandiagara region during a protest asking for more security in the region. On August 10, the man subsequently died from his injuries in Sevaré, Mopti region.Killings by extremist groups and criminal elements of civilians occurred in all regions of the country. According to a June UN secretary-general report, extremist and self-defense groups were the main perpetrators of killings, including 89 persons killed between April 1 and May 31. According to the UN Mine Action Service, as of September 6, 110 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) killed 77 individuals, including 39 civilians and 38 military personnel.On September 7, militants with suspected ties to the JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin) attacked a passenger boat on the Niger River near the village of Abakoira in the Gao region. The assailants fired at least three rockets at the boat, resulting in the deaths of 49 persons. Many of the victims either drowned in the river or perished in the resulting fire onboard the boat.																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of disappearances carried out by government security forces in the central and northern regions of the country.Human rights observers reported they were unable to verify the whereabouts of dozens of prisoners purportedly detained in connection with the northern conflict. The limited capacity of the Penitentiary Administration to keep accurate records made it difficult to locate individuals within the country’s penal system. Human rights organizations estimated the intelligence service, the National Agency for State Security (ANSE), held approximately 100 unacknowledged detainees. These organizations noted they could not verify the estimates because they did not have access to the ANSE’s facilities or to the gendarmerie facilities in Sevare, which sometimes transferred prisoners to the ANSE.Witnesses provided Human Rights Watch (HRW) with the names of nine men arrested on February 3 during military patrols and operations in the Segou region who subsequently disappeared.Extremist groups also committed numerous enforced disappearances. These abductions were allegedly perpetrated by various actors, some of whom allegedly collaborated with the JNIM and other armed groups. For example, in April, unknown persons in Koutiala abducted Abdou Agouzer Maiga, a former member of the parliament.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, but reports indicated the armed forces employed these tactics against individuals with suspected links to extremist groups, including groups affiliated with the JNIM.In June, the UN secretary-general reported instances of violence and human rights abuses by armed groups, militias, violent extremists, and unidentified armed actors. Victims of hereditary slavery and formerly enslaved persons were frequently subjected to abuse by former slaveholders and community members; the transition government charged several former slaveholders and perpetrators of torture with crimes against formerly enslaved persons.There were also reports of terrorist groups abusing civilians. For example, on July 9, local press reported terrorists affiliated with Islamic State in the Sahel (ISIS-Sahel) cut off the hands and feet of two young men accused of falsely collecting taxes on behalf of ISIS-Sahel in the Ansongo area.Impunity was a significant problem in the security forces, including the armed forces, according to allegations from Amnesty International, the Human Rights and Protection Division of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life-threatening due to overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions, and inadequate medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: As of August 4, Bamako Central Prison held 4,594 prisoners in a facility designed to hold 400, more than a thousand more prisoners than in 2022. There was also significant overcrowding at other prisons. Gendarmerie and police detention centers were at maximum capacity at year’s end.The combination of the general security situation and overloaded, inefficient courts worsened already poor prison conditions by increasing the number of pretrial detainees and preventing the release of prisoners who completed their sentences.Lack of sanitation posed the most significant threat to prisoners’ health. Buckets were used as toilets in some prisons. Not all prisoners had access to potable water.Authorities exhibited a limited ability to control prisons, including prisoner-on-prisoner violence.Administration: Prosecutors and high-level magistrates visited prisons to review treatment of prisoners. The National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), the Office of the Ombudsman of the Republic, and judicial authorities sometimes investigated complaints through referral to the Penitentiary Administration.Independent Monitoring: The transition government permitted some visits by human rights monitors and organizations.The transition government required NGOs and other monitors to submit a request to the prison director, who then forwarded it to the Ministry of Justice. The Malian Association for Human Rights visited prisons in Kati, where a military detention center was located. Human rights observers with MINUSMA and the International Committee of the Red Cross regularly visited detention centers operated by Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) in Kidal. International human rights and humanitarian organizations had access to most of these centers but not to detainees held in facilities operated by the ANSE. International organizations reported they could access detention centers in Bamako but had little to no access to prisons in the center of the country.The CNDH visited prisons to review conditions. The law allowed the CNDH to visit prisons without seeking prior permission from prison authorities, although its last visit to a military detention center monitored by the ANSE occurred in 2012 despite several subsequent requests to visit.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law generally prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention. Nevertheless, government security forces arbitrarily arrested and unlawfully detained numerous individuals. Platform of Movements (Platform), the CMA, and other armed groups unlawfully detained individuals in connection with the continued conflict in the northern and central regions.The law allowed detainees to challenge the legal basis or the arbitrary nature of their detention in court. Individuals were generally released promptly if their detention was determined to have been arbitrary. According to UN reporting, the right to due process of individuals arrested or detained in connection with alleged terrorism-related offenses “remained under significant strain.”																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required judicial warrants for arrest. It also required police charge suspects or release them within 48 hours of arrest. Although police usually secured warrants based on sufficient evidence and through issuance by a duly authorized official, these procedures were not always followed. The law provided for the transfer of detainees from police stations to the prosecutor’s office within 72 hours of arrest, but authorities sometimes held detainees longer in police stations. Detainees had a limited right to bail, but authorities often granted conditional release for minor crimes and civil matters. Authorities occasionally released defendants on their own recognizance. While an accused person could request conditional release, lawyers stated conditional release for more serious crimes was often not granted even when legal requirements were met. Moreover, even when a court decided to grant conditional release or acquitted an accused person, the prosecutor could appeal the decision, automatically suspending the court’s orders.Detainees had the right to a lawyer of their choice or, if they could not afford one, to a state-provided lawyer. Detainees were typically granted prompt access to their lawyers. Nevertheless, a shortage of private attorneys, particularly outside Bamako and Mopti, often prevented access to legal representation.In many cases gendarmes detained suspects on ANSE orders and then transferred them for questioning to the ANSE, which generally held suspects for hours or days. Due to the country’s size, long travel times, and poor road conditions, the transfer process itself sometimes took more than a week, during which security services did not inform detainees of the charges against them. Authorities did not provide released detainees with transport back to the location of their arrest, and these return trips often required several days.Arbitrary Arrest: Human rights organizations reported widespread allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention by transition government security forces, armed groups, and terrorist groups. Detentions often occurred in the wake of attacks by bandits or terrorists and were targeted against members of the ethnic group suspected of carrying out the attacks.According to these organizations, authorities inappropriately detained some children for alleged affiliation with signatory and nonsignatory armed groups. Security forces detained at least 23 children for periods ranging from one day to four months.In March, authorities arrested radio announcer and journalist Mohamed Youssouf Bathily and journalist Rokiatou Doumbia following comments they made on the death of former Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga. In July, a Bamako court declared Bathily not guilty, but he remained in detention under other charges. Bathily filed a complaint for arbitrary arrest against the prosecutor supervising his case. In August, authorities sentenced Rokiatou Doumbia to a year’s imprisonment and a fine of one million CFA francs ($1,650) for inciting a revolt and disturbing public order.According to an international organization, having gradually replaced the national government as the de facto authority in the north of the country, the CMA illegally detained and pardoned individuals being held at the Kidal remand center.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the executive branch exerted influence over the judicial system. Corruption affected the fairness of trials. According to domestic human rights groups, bribery and influence peddling were widespread in the courts. There were problems enforcing court orders. In the northern and central regions, due to insecurity, judges were sometimes absent from their assigned areas for months at a time. Village chiefs and justices of the peace appointed by the government decided most disputes in rural areas; justices of the peace had investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial functions. In parts of Kidal and Timbuktu, Islamic judges settled local disputes. Traditional systems did not provide the same rights as civil and criminal courts.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair trial, and the judiciary generally tried to enforce this right. Undigitized records and case management systems, security concerns, and political pressure sometimes interfered with or hampered trial processes.Administrative backlogs and an insufficient number of private attorneys, particularly in rural areas, often prevented prompt access to attorneys.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There was one reported political prisoner. On September 4, authorities arrested Adama Ben Diarra, member of the National Transition Council and leader of a protransition government activist group, Yerewolo Standing on the Rampart, after he called on the transition government to respect the transition timeline. A court later sentenced him to one year in prison and a one-year suspended sentence. On September 15, the transition president removed Diarra from the National Transition Council, the country’s legislative body.Unlike for other prisoners, medical treatment for political prisoners was sometimes delayed or denied. Human rights and humanitarian organizations had inconsistent access to political prisoners relative to other detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, and there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The military, Wagner Group forces, and several armed groups committed serious human rights abuses in the northern and central parts of the country. In addition to increased attacks in the center of the country, reports of targeted and indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population in other parts of the country, notably in the north, significantly increased following the withdrawal of international forces, such as France’s Operation Barkhane in 2022 and MINUSMA during the year. These armed groups included forces such as the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad, High Council for the Unity of Azawad, and the Arab Movement of Azawad; northern militias aligned with the government, such as the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad and the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA); and terrorist and violent extremist organizations such as ISIS-Sahel, JNIM, Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoun.Most human rights abuses committed by the military appeared to target Fulani, Tuareg, and Arab individuals and were believed to be either retaliation for attacks attributed to armed groups associated with those ethnicities or the result of increased counterterrorism operations. For example, HRW’s July report stated Fulani made up the majority of the victims of the February abuses in Séguéla attributable to Wagner Group forces. The government failed to pursue and investigate human rights abuses in the center and north, which were widely controlled by the JNIM, ISIS-Sahel terrorist organizations, the CMA, and Movement for the Salvation of Azawad armed groups.Killings: The military, former rebel groups, militias whose interests aligned with the government, and terrorist organizations unlawfully killed persons throughout the country, especially in the central and, to a lesser extent, northern regions. Terrorist groups and unidentified individuals or groups carried out many attacks resulting in the deaths of members of the security forces, members of signatory armed groups, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. The UN secretary-general reported 1,002 civilians killed by all parties, from July 2022 to May 22, due to armed conflict and criminal acts (a decrease from 1,556 killings between July 2021 and June 2022).According to the Armed Conflict Locator and Event Data Project, the Wagner Group and the military engaged in multiple deadly attacks targeting civilians amid military operations. The Wagner Group targeted civilians in Mopti, Segou, Tombouctou, and Koulikoro regions, core areas of JNIM occupation.In July, HRW reported the armed forces and “associated foreign soldiers,” identified by several sources as Russians, summarily executed between February 3 and 21 at least eight civilian men, some of them suspected Islamist fighters, in the central town of Séguéla in the Segou region.Also in July, the armed forces reported killing at least 72 individuals they believed to be terrorists, including 50 in Farabougou, Segou region, and 20 near Konna in the Mopti region.As of September, the transition government had not released the results of its investigation into the 2022 Moura killings. In May, the United Nations had released its own report, alleging soldiers and foreign fighters killed more than 500 civilians during a military operation.According to a June UN secretary-general report, two signatory armed groups to the Algiers Accord, Platform, and the CMA, as well as other armed groups, were allegedly responsible for numerous killings.According to MINUSMA, on March 8, the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad of the Dawsahak reported ISIS-Sahel killed at least 12 civilians and four of its combatants in the commune of Tamalelt in the Menaka region.Between January and June, HRW reported hundreds of civilians killed by terrorist organizations in the Gao and Menaka regions.Also in June, the UN secretary-general reported that on April 22, the JNIM attacked military bases, including the Air Force base in the town of Sevaré, resulting in the death of at least 10 civilians. The transition government subsequently opened an investigation into the incident at its military tribunal in Mopti.According to local press, on September 16, ISIS-Sahel reportedly killed at least nine civilians, injured several others, and destroyed property in the locality of Boya, Gao region.In February, unidentified armed individuals killed at least 12 civilians in the village of Kanibonzon in the Bandiagara region. On February 21, unidentified armed individuals used IEDs to attack a MINUSMA convoy near the town of Songobia, Bandiagara region. The attack killed three Senegalese peacekeepers and wounded five others.On July 21, armed men entered the town of Djankoin in the Bandiagara region and killed at least 10 civilians. On August 4, unidentified armed individuals believed to belong to the JNIM reportedly killed a dozen civilians in Bodiè in the Bandiaga region.Abductions: Jihadist groups, armed groups associated with the CMA alliance, Platform-associated militias, such as GATIA, and ethnic self-defense militia groups reportedly held hostages. In the central region, the ethnic self-defense militia Dan Na Ambassagou carried out abductions of civilians from Dogon villages. In January, unidentified terrorist groups abducted six travelers in the Bandiagara region, then released them on January 26. On September 19, local press reported the signatory armed group Coordination of Azawad Movements abducted and detained an army officer following an attack on a military base.As of September, dozens of Dogon travelers abducted in 2021 by jihadist groups in the vicinity of Bankass remained in captivity.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Human rights NGOs reported instances of conflict-related physical abuse, torture, rape, and punishment perpetrated by security forces, armed groups, ethnic self-defense groups, and terrorist organizations. For example, in July, HRW reported severe abuses including wounds and torture inflicted in March by government security forces and Wagner Group military personnel in the village of Ouenkoro and at the army camp of Sofara in the Mopti region.Child Soldiers: The Secretary of State determined Mali had government security armed forces, police, or other security forces that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period from April 2022 to March 2023. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.The United Nations reported numerous armed groups recruited or used child soldiers.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government occasionally restricted this right. Independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of views with some restrictions.Freedom of Expression: Individuals could criticize the government, but only within prescribed limits.The CNDH and local human rights organizations expressed serious concern regarding the narrowing of civic space and democratic debate.On November 17, authorities arrested high-profile anti-corruption activist Clement Dembele for allegedly making death threats against Transition President Assimi Goita and his family during a telephone conversation. On November 20, a court indicted him.Violence and Harassment: In Bamako and the rest of the south there were sporadic reports of threats against journalists, including those who criticized transition authorities, and authorities sometimes arrested journalists, bloggers, and radio announcers. Reporting on the situation in the north and the fight against terrorism were dangerous topics due to the presence of active armed groups.On April 6, journalist Aliou Touré, founder of the newspaper Le Démocrate and member of the Collective for the Defense of the Republic association, disappeared after a press conference calling for the release of journalists Mohamed Youssouf Bathily and Rokia Doumbia. Organizations of press editors and umbrella press organization Maison de la Presse immediately put in place a crisis cell to monitor his case. On April 9, unknown parties believed to be associated with the government released Touré, and he returned home.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: International human rights organizations, UN experts, and civil society organizations expressed concerns regarding media censorship. Press organizations deplored the censorship and self-censorship of media.Libel/Slander Laws: The law mandated fines and prison sentences for defamation.Nongovernmental Impact: On April 28, unidentified armed individuals in Bamako abducted Idriss Martinez Konipo, owner of the online media Mediatik TV; they released him several days later. On March 20, unknown parties in Niger released French journalist Olivier Dubois, abducted in Mali in 2021. As of August local journalists Hamadoun Nialibouly and Moussa M’Bana Dicko, abducted in 2021 by unknown assailants likely associated with the JNIM, remained in captivity.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government limited freedom of peaceful assembly. Although it generally respected freedom of association, the government restricted it for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government did not always respect this freedom. In October, for example, the transition government denied authorization for the Collective of Muslim Associations to conduct a pro-Palestine protest, citing security concerns.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for freedom of association, although the law prohibited associations deemed immoral. The government generally respected freedom of association, but not for LGBTQI+ persons. LGBTQI+ organizations were vulnerable to marginalization and harassment.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution and law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.In-country Movement: In September, regional authorities issued a 30-day renewable curfew in the Gao and Timbuktu regions, and the transition government limited travel at night on highways across the country, following a series of deadly attacks. Some international organizations reported humanitarian access grew more difficult in the center and north of the country where the armed forces conducted military operations. The unstable security situation, armed groups’ targeting of infrastructure such as bridges, and embargos by armed groups on cities such as Boni and Marebougou also limited freedom of movement. The inhabitants of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, and parts of Mopti feared leaving the cities for security reasons, including the threat from IEDs.In August, there were reports terrorist groups once again prevented public and private transport vehicles from travelling on the main Sevare-to-Gao national road and reimposed an embargo on the town of Boni. The groups lifted the ban the same month following negotiations between terrorist groups and the Boni population. Also in August the JNIM reportedly imposed a blockade on the city of Timbuktu. NGOs noted impromptu checkpoints by various militias and armed groups often hindered them from carrying out humanitarian missions.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. Insecurity affected the delivery of humanitarian assistance.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees. A national committee in charge of refugees operated with assistance from UNHCR. Large refugee flows strained already scarce resources dedicated to protecting and caring for refugees.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Refugees and migrants regularly transited through contested territory where there was often little government control or oversight, and abuses and violence occurred regularly.Durable Solutions: The government offered naturalization to Mauritanian refugees and supported the voluntary return of refugees from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Mauritania.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										The United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, and human rights organizations reported persistent and growing insecurity in the center of the country, which progressively spread south, adversely affected vulnerable populations, and resulted in population displacement with harmful effects on access to basic social services and social safety nets. Insecurity, banditry, ethnic conflict, and intercommunal violence in northern and central regions of the country forced many persons to flee their homes. As of August 31, UNHCR reported 422,620 IDPs in the country.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the  Internal Displacement Monitoring Center: https://www.internal-displacement.org. 																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to not be fair or free of abuses and irregularities. Following a military coup in 2020, the transition government held a constitutional referendum on June 18. Restricted freedom of movement, logistical challenges, and financial limitations prevented many opposition groups from campaigning in much of the center and north of the country against adoption of the new constitution. In legislative elections in 2020, restricted freedom of movement, logistical challenges, financial limitations, and allegations of voter intimidation and election tampering also prevented many opposition candidates from campaigning in much of the central and northern parts of the country. International observers considered the 2018 presidential elections to be minimally credible, with some irregularities and violence.Political Parties and Political Participation: Authorities increasingly imposed restrictions on political parties, including the suspension of legally required financial aid to political parties. On multiple occasions, authorities prevented opposition parties from organizing demonstrations or using conference halls.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Cultural or religious factors sometimes limited women’s political participation in formal and informal roles due to a perception it was taboo or improper to have women in such roles. LGBTQI+ persons did not openly participate in political parties or public services organizations. The Algiers Accord, meant to address the political demands of historically disadvantaged groups in the north of the country, was in effect but far from fully implemented.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption: Corruption in all sectors of the administration was widespread. Authorities did not hold police accountable for corruption. Officials, police, and gendarmes frequently extorted bribes.On August 9, authorities arrested former National Assembly President Issiaka Sidibé and four other former members of the national assembly financial management committee for misappropriation of public funds.At year’s end, corruption cases continued against a number of former senior officials, including General Moussa M’Bemba Keita, General Moustapha Drabo, former Prime Minister Boubou Cisse, former Minister of Defense Tieman Hubert Coulibaly, former Minister of Economy and Finance Mamadou Igor Diarra, former Chairman of the Malian Bank for Habitat Babaly Bah, former Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga, and former Economy and Finance Minister Bouare Fily Sissoko.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. According to human rights organizations, government and military officials were generally not transparent, cooperative, or responsive to calls for investigations and prosecutions of alleged human rights abuses by security forces.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The transition government occasionally did not cooperate with or permit visits by UN representatives and often did not cooperate with UN investigations. Authorities repeatedly denied requests for MINUSMA human rights investigators to visit Moura, Hombori, and other sites of alleged human rights abuses attributed to the armed forces, and in some cases, to Wagner Group forces. In August, the UN Panel of Experts reported none of its eight communications sent to the transition government, including those requesting permission to gain access to the country, had received a response.In February, the transition government accused Guillaume Ngefa-Atondoko Andali, head of the MINUSMA Human Rights and Protection Division, of conducting destabilizing and subversive activities and declared him persona non grata.In June, the transition government requested the UN Security Council withdraw MINUSMA, and the council terminated the peacekeeping mission. Human rights organizations widely believed the transition government made the request to end MINUSMA’s human rights mandate and prevent documentation of abuses.Government Human Rights Bodies: In February, the government created the National Directorate for Human Rights by decree. As of August, the directorate was not fully functional, nor effective or independent.The CNDH, an independent entity receiving administrative and budgetary assistance from the Ministry of Justice, included civil society representatives, with budget support, office space, and staff provided by the transition government. It issued statements on several cases of human rights abuses, including the June 23 killings in the San and Nara regions, and the August attack on civilians in the village of Bodjè, Bandigara region. Observers considered the CNDH to be relatively independent and effective.The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission ended in December 2022. It took testimony from witnesses to human rights abuses and from experts on justice and reconciliation challenges and offered recommendations for transitional justice measures and improvements in government responses.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of women and men, with a penalty of five to 20 years’ imprisonment, but the transition government did not enforce the law effectively. Rape was a widespread problem. Authorities prosecuted only a small percentage of rape cases. Survivors seldom reported rapes due to societal pressure, particularly because attackers were frequently close relatives, and due to the risk of retaliation. No law explicitly prohibited spousal rape, but law enforcement officials stated laws against rape could apply to spousal rape. Police and judicial authorities investigated rape cases but allowed parties to reach private settlements prior to trial. This promoted an environment where survivors might be pressured by family to accept monetary compensation instead of seeking justice through the legal system.Spousal abuse was a crime, but the law did not specifically prohibit domestic violence. Assault was punishable by prison terms of one to five years and substantial fines. The sentence could be increased up to 10 years’ imprisonment if the assault was found to be premeditated. Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, was prevalent. According to human rights organizations, most cases went unreported because of cultural taboos and a lack of understanding regarding legal recourse. Police were often reluctant to intervene in cases of domestic violence. Many women were reluctant to file complaints against their husbands due to financial dependence concerns, or to avoid social stigma, retaliation, or ostracism. The Planning and Statistics Unit in the Ministry of Justice, established to track prosecutions, did not produce reliable statistics.UNHCR and NGOs serving refugees and asylum seekers reported incidents of gender-based violence against refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs, which they attributed to the deterioration of the protective environment for women and girls.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): FGM/C was legal in the country, and except in certain northern areas, all religious and ethnic groups practiced it widely, particularly in rural areas. Authorities prohibited the practice in government-funded health centers.Parents generally had FGM/C performed on girls between ages six months and nine years. According to UNICEF, 89 percent of women ages 15 to 49 were circumcised, but this varied widely by geographic location, with rates ranging from 1 percent in Gao and Kidal to more than 96 percent in Sikasso. Most circumcisions occurred prior to age five, and circumcision was almost always performed by a traditional practitioner. Nearly three-quarters of girls younger than age 15 had been circumcised. The prevalence of FGM/C among girls increased substantially with age; while 56 percent of girls younger than age five had undergone FGM/C, 86 percent of girls ages 10 to 14 had undergone the procedure.Government information campaigns regarding the dangers of FGM/C reached citizens where security allowed, and human rights organizations reported decreased incidence of FGM/C among children of educated parents.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Gender-based violence and sexual harassment were prevalent in the workplace.Discrimination: The law did not provide the same legal status and rights for women as for men, particularly concerning divorce and inheritance. Women were legally obligated to obey their husbands and were particularly vulnerable in cases of divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Women had very limited access to legal services due to their lack of education, lack of information, and the prohibitive cost. Despite the discriminatory nature of the law, the transition government effectively enforced it.While the law provided for equal property rights, traditional practices and ignorance of the law prevented women from taking full advantage of their rights. Marriage contracts had to specify if the couple wished to share estate rights. If marriage certificates of Muslim couples did not specify the type of marriage, judges presumed the marriages to be polygynous.There were legal restrictions on women holding employment in the same occupations, tasks, and industries as men. The government was the major formal-sector employer and ostensibly paid women the same as men for similar work, but differences in job descriptions permitted pay inequality. There were legal restrictions on women’s employment in dangerous occupations and tasks, and in industries such as mining, construction, and factories. Women were legally prohibited from working on the creation or sale of writing and images considered contrary to good morals.According to MINUSMA, extremist groups were responsible for intimidating, threatening, and forcing women in the regions of Timbuktu and Mopti to wear veils.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of transition government authorities.Women and girls faced cultural and social barriers, such as needing the consent of their husbands and influential members of the household to manage their reproductive health.Distant health-care facilities and flooded roadways during the rainy season negatively affected the ability of those living in rural areas to easily access adequate health care.In accessing information and services regarding their reproductive health, women with disabilities faced distinct barriers, such as physical barriers to entry into health-care facilities, communication barriers, discriminatory and disrespectful treatment from health-care providers, and the lack of reproductive health information in accessible formats.While government sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception, were available to survivors of sexual violence, including survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, the services were rarely specialized, and survivors often sought care from general health facilities. The government provided specialized assistance to survivors of gender-based violence, including family planning counseling, at the referral health-center level via 14 one-stop centers in Bamako, Gao, Mopti, Timbuktu, Kayes, and Koulikoro.The maternal mortality rate was estimated at 317 per 100,000 live births, and 67 percent of women delivered in health centers assisted by skilled health workers. The key drivers of maternal mortality included poor access to and poor use of quality prenatal, delivery, and postnatal care services. The primary direct obstetric causes of maternal mortality were hemorrhage (37 percent), eclampsia (11 percent), and sepsis (11 percent). FGM/C was a significant public-health problem contributing to maternal morbidity. According to the UN Population Fund, the adolescent birth rate was 164 births per 1,000 girls. Causes of high rates included early child marriage, lack of sexual and reproductive health and education, and low rates of school attendance.Regarding menstruation or access to menstruation hygiene, sociocultural barriers impeded equal participation of women and girls in society in certain instances. Educational materials on menstrual hygiene management were scarce, and teachers often lacked knowledge on puberty and menstrual hygiene management. In a 2020 NGO study, more than a quarter of girls reported developing an infection related to improper menstrual hygiene, and 14 percent of girls missed classes due to pain during a menstrual cycle. According to the same study, more than half of girls attending school had problems concentrating in class due to managing menstrual periods, and menstruation caused three-quarters of girls to miss school due to the need to go home to change menstrual products to avoid embarrassment.No law impeded adolescent girls’ access to education due to pregnancy or motherhood status. The law allowed for the deferment, upon request, of education in secondary school for pregnant students. Many girls and their families were not informed of their rights, and social stigma prevented pregnant girls from attending school. Additionally, if they were mothers, a lack of childcare was a barrier to girls’ access to education.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law protected members of racial or ethnic minorities from violence and discrimination, with limited exceptions. With tenuous government control over large areas of the country, authorities struggled to enforce the law effectively. There were cases where employers from southern ethnic groups discriminated against individuals from northern ethnic groups.Societal discrimination existed against Black Tuaregs, often referred to as Bellah. Some Tuareg groups deprived Black Tuaregs of basic civil liberties due to hereditary slavery-like practices and hereditary servitude relationships.There were reports of slaveholders kidnapping the children of their Bellah slavery victims. Slaveholders considered slavery victims and their children as property and reportedly took children of slavery victims to raise them elsewhere without permission from their parents. The antislavery organization Temedt organized workshops in the Kayes region to convince communities to abandon the practice of slavery.The Court of Assizes held its first special session focused on hereditary slavery in February, and it found traffickers guilty of murder, assault and battery, and arson. In March, a court heard hereditary slavery cases in the Kayes region and sentenced perpetrators to the death penalty, imprisonment, or fines. As of September 7, authorities held approximately a dozen persons in prison in the Kayes region for crimes related to hereditary slavery.In July 2022, residents killed Diogou Sidibe in the village of Lany Mody in the Kayes region for her rejection of her status as a slave, after she won a case at a Kayes tribunal court stating she was not a slave. In August, an investigative judge arrested 29 suspects for murder and other charges. Among the imprisoned were the village chief and the village imam. As of September, authorities continued the investigation, with the defendants provisionally released pending trial.Members of the Fulani (or Peul) ethnic group frequently clashed with members of the Dogon community and, separately, with Bambara communities regarding alleged Fulani support of armed Islamists linked to al-Qa’ida. According to HRW, this tension caused a rise in ethnic self-defense groups, drove thousands from their homes, diminished livelihoods, and induced widespread hunger. Groups representing these communities were reportedly involved in several communal attacks, and retaliatory attacks were common.In the central region, violence across community lines escalated. Clashes between the Dogon and Fulani communities were exacerbated by the presence of extremist groups and resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths.Intercommunal violence related to seasonal migration of cattle and grazing occurred among Dogon, Bambara, and Fulani communities in the Mopti region, between Bambara and Fulani groups in the Segou region, and among various Tuareg and Arab groups in the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal.																																				Children										Education: Girls’ enrollment was lower than boys’ at all levels due to poverty, a cultural preference to educate boys, the early marriage of girls, sexual harassment of girls, lack of access to menstruation hygiene materials, and pregnancy and motherhood status.Child Abuse: The law prohibited child abuse. Most child abuse cases went unreported, and authorities did not enforce the law effectively. Police and the social services department in the Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action investigated and intervened in some reported cases of child abuse or neglect, but the transition government provided few services for such children.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age to marry without parental consent was 16 for girls and 18 for boys. A girl age 15 could marry with parental consent and with approval of a civil judge. Authorities did not effectively enforce the law, particularly in rural areas, and child, early, and forced marriage was widespread throughout the country. Girls were also forced into marriage with combatants and leaders of armed groups.In some regions, especially Kayes and Koulikoro, girls married as young as age 10. It was common practice in those regions for a girl age 14 to marry a man twice her age. According to local human rights organizations, officials frequently accepted false birth certificates or other documents indicating girls were old enough to marry.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the sexual exploitation of children, including commercial sexual exploitation, although it did not specifically address the sale, grooming, or using of children for commercial exploitation, including sex trafficking. A statutory rape law defined 18 as the minimum age for consensual sex. The law, which was inconsistent with the legal minimum marriage age for girls, was not enforced. The law prohibited child pornography, but authorities took limited steps to enforce it. Sexual exploitation of children occurred.																																				Antisemitism										There were fewer than 50 Jews in the country, and there were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law prohibited conduct considered “attacks on morality.” This vague language was employed to criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. The transition government disproportionately applied this law to LGBTQI+ persons. Although there were no known cases of individuals prosecuted under the law, authorities made arrests.Violence and Harassment: Police frequently did not intervene when violence occurred and often condoned or tolerated violence and harassment against LGBTQI+ persons. According to local NGOs focused on human rights, LGBTQI+ persons experienced physical, psychological, and sexual violence, which society viewed as “corrective” punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggested LGBTQI+ persons were at risk of violence if their status became known.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ persons, couples, or their families, or grant them rights equal to the rights of other persons. Most LGBTQI+ persons were believed to isolate themselves and kept their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression hidden. An NGO reported LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in education, employment, and health care, and thus sought to hide their identities and avoid social stigmatization.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: NGOs reported physical, psychological, and sexual violence, including “corrective” rape; police frequently refused to intervene in these circumstances. No known medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries were performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws or other restrictions on individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters. The transition government did not register groups specifically designated as LGBTQI+. Organizations working on LGBTQI+ matters feared convening public events due to harassment and threats of violence. LGBTQI+ individuals feared to assemble in public or private, or to form associations.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, employment, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. Persons with disabilities had access to basic health care. The law did not protect the rights of persons with disabilities to access education, employment, public buildings, transportation, or health care. The transition government did not regularly provide official information and communications in accessible formats.Persons with mental disabilities faced social stigmatization in public institutions. Many individuals with disabilities relied on begging.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Killing, violence, and discrimination occurred against persons with albinism. The transition government struggled to implement plans to protect the rights of these persons. Discrimination also impeded their access to sunblock, without which they were highly susceptible to skin cancer.Societal discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS occurred. HIV positivity was often locally perceived to be synonymous with LGBTQI+ identity. The transition government implemented campaigns to increase awareness of the condition and reduce discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for workers, except members of the armed forces, to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination. There were restrictions limiting these rights, such as the requirement workers had to be employed in the relevant profession before they could form a union. Members responsible for the administration or management of a union had to reside in the country and be free of any criminal convictions that could suspend their right to vote in national elections. The process to register a union was cumbersome and time consuming, and the transition government sometimes denied trade union registration on arbitrary or ambiguous grounds.The minister of labor and public service had the sole authority to approve sectoral collective agreements and to decide which unions participated in sectoral collective bargaining. Employers had the discretion to refuse to bargain with representatives of trade unions. The law prohibited retribution against strikers. Unions had to exhaust mandatory conciliation and arbitration procedures in the labor code before they could strike legally. Regulations required civil servants and workers in state-owned enterprises to give two weeks’ notice of a planned strike and to conduct mediation and negotiations with the employer and a third party, usually the Ministry of Labor and Public Service.The law did not allow workers in essential services sectors to strike, and the minister of labor could order compulsory arbitration for such workers. The law defined essential services more broadly than international labor guidelines, to include services whose interruption would endanger the lives, personal safety, or health of persons; affect the normal operation of the national economy; or affect a vital industrial sector. For example, the law required striking police to maintain a minimum presence in headquarters and on the street. The transition government, however, did not maintain a list of essential services.Participation in an illegal strike was punishable by harsh penalties, including dismissal and loss of other rights except wages and leave.Authorities did not consistently enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, but workers generally exercised these rights. The transition government did not always respect unions’ right to conduct their activities without interference.Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike were not commensurate with analogous crimes such as civil rights violations. Penalties were sometimes enforced.Although unions and worker organizations were independent of the transition government and political parties, they were closely aligned with various political parties or coalitions.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a national minimum wage in all sectors of the formal economy. The minimum wage was above the World Bank’s poverty line for the country. Minimum wage requirements did not apply to workers in the informal and subsistence sectors, which included most workers.The legal workweek was 40 hours, except in the agricultural sector, where the legal workweek ranged from 42 to 48 hours, depending on the season. Alleged violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were common in the banking, agriculture, transport, private security, and mining sectors.Occupational Safety and Health: The law provided for a broad range of occupational safety and health (OSH) standards in the workplace, appropriate for the main industries in the country. The government did not actively identify unsafe conditions. Workers had the right to remove themselves from work situations endangering health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. Authorities, however, did not effectively protect employees in these situations. Workers often were reluctant to report violations of occupational safety regulations due to the risk of losing their jobs.Labor organizations reported employers used cyanide and mercury in gold mines, posing a public-health risk to workers exposed to them.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The transition government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. Penalties for violations were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud and negligence. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. The law applied to all workers, including migrants and domestics, but it was routinely ignored in the informal sector. The Ministry of Labor and Public Service enforced wage, hour, and OSH laws, but the number of labor inspectors was not sufficient to enforce compliance. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.Approximately 93 percent of workers worked in the informal sector. The transition government did not enforce labor laws in this sector.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											The Bahamas											Tonga											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Mali
- Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 11, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024																																																					April 11, 2024																																																								2:16 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. We have a couple of guests today. Run of show: Our Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield is here along with our Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is going to kick it off with some open remarks. They’ll take a few questions about the conflict in Sudan, and then I will return for the remainder of the briefing.So, Ambassador.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you very much and good afternoon everyone. Let me just start by welcoming Special Envoy Tom Perriello back from Chad just last week but also welcome him back to the State Department. Last week, Tom traveled to Adré Refugee Camp right along the border of Sudan. It’s a trip that I know quite well. I was at that same refugee camp just a few months ago in September. I also visited the camp 20 years ago.Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees had fled for this camp in the months prior – 90 percent of them women and children. And among those refugees was a six-month-old baby, born only days before the fighting broke out in Sudan. When I saw her, she was suffering from acute malnutrition – so small, so fragile, I thought she was a newborn. There is so much about her story that I don’t know: how she arrived at the MSF hospital, whether she ever left the hospital. But I think about her today as the world nears a grim milestone: one year of horrific civil war in Sudan; how she was born as her country spiraled into conflict; how she was carried into Chad, her protectors walking miles and miles to reach a semblance of safety; how she spent those formative few months in a hospital too small and weak to even cry as doctors tried desperately to nurse her back to health; and how now she reaches her first birthday having only known violence, hunger, and displacement.April 11th should be a historic occasion as we mark the five-year anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Omar al-Bashir’s regime, 30 – his 30-year reign. Five years ago, you could practically taste the spirit of freedom, peace, and democracy in the air as women and young people took to the streets demanding change. And yet that baby I met in September is not growing up in a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan. Instead, she’s one of millions whose lives have been upended and forever altered by this war.Today, nearly 25 million Sudanese people live in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection; three-quarters of them face acute food insecurity. Nearly 8 million have had to flee their homes in what has become the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. We’ve seen reports of gang rape, mass murder at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces militia, of girls sold into sexual slavery, boys being made into child soldiers, of urban areas destroyed by arial weapons, and entire villages burned to the ground. And yet, as communities barrel toward famine, as cholera and measles spread, as violence continues to claim countless lives, the world has largely remained silent. And that must change and it has to change now. The international community must give more, it must do more, and it has to care more.And let’s start with the funding piece because that’s critical. To date, just 5 percent – 5 percent – of the UN’s humanitarian appeal for Sudan has been met. Already, the World Food Program has had to cut assistance to over 7 million people in Chad and South Sudan, and that includes 1.2 million refugees like the ones I met in Adré, people who were already struggling to feed themselves and their families.This is a matter of life and death. Experts warn that the coming weeks and months, over 200,000 more children could die of starvation. The United States, for our part, plans on significantly increasing our funding in the days to come.More than just lacking aid, however, humanitarian workers have been systematically obstructed from delivering aid to those in need. From the beginning, brave people have been on the ground, often putting their lives at risk, to save people in Sudan. But at every turn, combatants on both sides of the war have undermined their work. That includes the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has impeded the major humanitarian aid crossings from Chad into Darfur.And that’s where doing more comes in. Should the SAF not reverse course immediately, the Security Council must intervene to ensure lifesaving aid is delivered and distributed, including, if necessary, through a cross-border mechanism. What’s more, we must continue urging the warring parties to stop the fighting and get back to the negotiating table, as well as urge those outside supporters prolonging this conflict and enabling these atrocities to stop sending weapons to Sudan.Finally, I want to talk about the lack of care, the lack of attention, the world has paid to Sudan. Just five years after a revolution that offered a glimpse at a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan, people are losing hope. Aid workers have begun calling this conflict the forgotten war. Sudanese children are asking why the world has forgotten them. And let’s be clear: I don’t believe the dearth of attention is because people are ignorant or unfeeling. In fact, I believe it’s the opposite. I believe it’s because there are so many terrible crises, so much violence and pain, that people don’t quite know which way to turn.And this is where I need the help of all of you – the members of the press who join me in this briefing. As we mark one year of this conflict, please don’t let it go uncovered. Don’t let stories like the ones I heard in Chad go unheard. Don’t let perpetrators of this horrific violence go unexposed, from the generals who started the war to the backers who continue to fuel it. Don’t let the feeling that we have forgotten Sudan become a reality, because we need – we need to reignite that spirit of revolution, the hope and promise that characterized this day five years ago. I’m counting on you, and the people of Sudan are counting on you as well.So thank you, and Special Envoy Perriello and I will now take a few questions.MR MILLER: Matt, do you want to – do you have anything?QUESTION: I don’t really have anything.MR MILLER: Shaun.QUESTION: Sure, thanks. Thanks, Ambassador and Special Envoy. Could I ask you two things?Tom, you’ve said before that you’re hopeful with the end of Ramadan that the talks could resume. Do you think that that’s on the cards now? Do you see an interest – a strategic decision by both sides – to resume talks?And Ambassador, you mentioned a cross-border mechanism. I know you’ve spoken about that before. How close do you think we are to that becoming reality? Do you see that as realistically something that the Security Council with the vetoes there can push through?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: You want to come first?MR PERRIELLO: First. We do sense a great deal of urgency to resume talks. And in fact, talks are already ongoing in the sense that we are negotiating every day and trying to align key actors inside and outside with a plan that would end this war. We appreciate that Saudi Arabia has committed to hosting a new round of talks and that those will be inclusive talks. We hope that that will be a date that we can be able to announce soon and build momentum coming out of the gatherings in Paris and start to have a sense of when that date will be. But in the meantime, we are not waiting to continue to try to put pressure on the parties to come to the table, and we do think that there are some signs – while many, many signs point to the war getting even worse, in some ways it’s gotten so bad and it’s starting to have such regional implications that it’s also increased, I think, some of the diplomatic appetite to try to find an end to this war. And we’re going to try to use every lever we have to build that into enough political momentum and political will to end this war.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Look, on the cross-border concept, we know that it is a concept that can work. It worked in Syria. We hope we don’t have to go there. We hope we don’t have to push for a resolution to go there. And for that reason, we’re engaging very actively with the SAF as well as the RSF and other parties on the ground to see how we can work with all of them to facilitate getting needed humanitarian assistance into these areas that is so desperately needed.But if we’re not able to work with them, if we’re not able to get their cooperation, then we have to find another way. We can’t sit back and not look for other opportunities to see – to get humanitarian assistance to people who are in desperate need.MR MILLER: Michele Kelemen in the back.QUESTION: Hi, thanks for taking my question. You talked about other countries fueling the conflict. I wonder if you can name them. What are you telling them? Because I think some of them are U.S. partners.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Yeah, we &#8212;QUESTION: And what more can the U.S. do to put pressure on the political players in terms of sanctions?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: With all of the countries who have been identified as possibly fueling this conflict, we have had direct conversations with every single one of them to press them to cease their support and fueling of this war. They’ve been named in the press. We’ve seen the Emiratis be named in the press. We’ve seen Egypt be named in the press. There are others who have been identified in the press as well. And with all of them we have constant engagements, and I know that Tom has had those engagements as well.MR MILLER: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Thank you. Just to elaborate a little bit more on that, to what extent is the UAE – can you talk about them helping the RSF and refusing to listen to U.S. messages to stop its weapons shipments? Can you speak about that at all?MR PERRIELLO: I think we’ve been making very clear to all partners across the region that escalating the war at this time is something that is going to not only have increasing humanitarian costs but actually risks destabilization of the entire region. We see a conflict that in some ways has been between two sides that shows signs of being increasingly factionalized in ways that brings in some of the tribal militias that have stayed neutral and affects the ability of some of the neighboring countries to – that have tried to stay – be constructive and not get more involved to get pulled in. And right now is a time that every arms shipment, every bit fueling this conflict, is something that pushes us closer to not only famine, but to a failed state. And the flip side is this is a situation in which everyone in the region can benefit from a peaceful and stable Sudan. The Sudanese people are extremely clear about what they want. They want a return to the constitutional transition begun with great courage just a few years ago. They want to see a unified professional military that is accountable to the people. They want to see not a return of extremists and former corrupt officials. And they want that full humanitarian access.And I think they’re going to be looking across the region at who stood with the Sudanese people at this time of great crisis, and who was pouring fuel on the fire. And those consequences for those that are making the situation worse need to increase, and I think we are seeing particularly around this anniversary on the 15th that finally some attention is being paid to this issue, and we need those actors to know that the world is watching. And we need that not to just be one day, but that people continue to cover the sheer scale of this – this tragedy, but also cover the inspiring stories. If you look at the emergency response rooms, you see young Sudanese who’ve created cash apps in local kitchens to completely disrupt the kind of barriers being set up by the belligerent actors to get food into some of the hardest-hit areas. These are stories of courage and of innovation, and ones that are literally a lifeline for many of the Sudanese left behind.MR MILLER: We have time for one more. Simon.QUESTION: Just to follow up on this point about the direct conversations with countries fueling the conflict, does that include Iran? And we’ve reported that Iranian-made armed drones have had a big impact on the course of the war. Is – so is that something that you’re – you’ve communicated directly with Iran on? Are they included in those countries? And what would be the message &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: We’ve had numerous discussions with countries in the region. And in those discussions with countries in the region, we’ve encouraged them to encourage other countries like Iran not to engage. I won’t get into what discussions we may or may not have had with Iran, but in our discussions with other countries in the region we’ve also asked for their assistance in pressing each other as well as others to stop fueling this war.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PERRIELLO: And the one thing I would just – sorry – add on that is I think this speaks to the idea that for people in the region, there are many, many reasons to become pro-peace right now. The continuation of this conflict and the introduction of additional actors and additional negative elements only takes the situation into a more destabilizing direction in addition to the human costs of this. And we think it’s very important for people to notice those trend lines and see that this is an opportunity and a moment to switch from either not paying attention, or playing a not-constructive role, to realizing we all benefit, everyone in the region will benefit from finding a path to peace.MR MILLER: Thank you &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; to you both.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Okay, thank you.MR MILLER: Ambassador.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. So before we get to questions, I have just a couple opening comments about the situation in the Middle East.We continue to be concerned about the risk of escalation in the Middle East – it’s something we have been working to mitigate and contain since the attacks of October 7th – and specifically about the threats made in recent days by Iran against the State of Israel and the Israeli people. You saw the President make clear yesterday that we stand in strong support of Israel’s security against these threats. Secretary Blinken has been engaged in diplomacy over the past 24 hours through a series of calls to foreign counterparts, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to make clear that escalation is not in anyone’s interest, and that countries should urge Iran not to escalate. We have also engaged with European allies and partners over the past few days and urged them as well to send a clear message to Iran that escalation is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in the region’s interest, and it’s not in the world’s interest.Separately, the Secretary spoke yesterday to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to reiterate our strong support for Israel against these threats. On that call, the Secretary also emphasized the importance of Israel meeting the commitments that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to President Biden last week to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to put in place enhanced deconfliction and coordination measures. Our teams, including our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues David Satterfield, have been meeting with Israeli, UN, and private relief organizations this week to push forward on all of those fronts. And while we have seen progress, it is critical that that initial progress continue and that it be sustained. And that is the message we have been delivering consistently to the Government of Israel.And with that, Matt.QUESTION: Right. Thanks, Matt. Just to – logistically, the calls that you just mentioned with the Turk, the Chinese, and the Saudi foreign ministers were all today?MR MILLER: He talked to the Turkish foreign minister last night, he talked to Wang Yi this morning, and then – early this morning, and then talked to the Saudi foreign minister later this morning.QUESTION: Okay. Are there others planned as well?MR MILLER: I don’t have any calls to announce, but we have been engaged in a series of contacts – not just at his level, but at other levels too – to talk to foreign counterparts to send this very clear message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict.QUESTION: All right. I didn’t want to raise this with the previous two speakers, because obviously the Sudan situation is a situation in and of itself. But so much of what they said very powerfully about the conflict in Sudan could also – or does also apply to what’s happening in Gaza. And when they say – when the ambassador and special envoy talk about how every arms shipment leads us closer to famine and a failed state, do you not think that that same logic applies in Gaza?MR MILLER: I would &#8212;QUESTION: Just because it’s you who are supplying the weapons as opposed to whoever it is – the Iranians, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, whoever it is that’s supplying the weapons in Sudan – doesn’t the same thing apply?MR MILLER: I would say that we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and that’s why you’ve seen the United States Government working to get more humanitarian assistance in and it’s why we’ve been pushing the Israeli Government so hard to let more humanitarian assistance in and to improve their deconfliction and coordination measures so there isn’t such a loss of political life.And then on the political front, it’s why we have been pushing with partners in the region to develop a plan for post-conflict governance in Gaza so we don’t see a failed state, so we don’t see anarchy in Gaza, so we see a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. That is very much the policy that we are trying to pursue and that we have been engaged in in this administration from the President on down.QUESTION: But is it correct then, though, that the administration believes that every arms shipment to Sudan leads us closer to famine and a failed state – that that does not apply &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in Gaza?MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: I get that, but &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very – it is – they’re – it is a very different situation in Sudan, where you have a brutal civil war, two warring parties trying to seize control of the government; and in Israel, where you have Israel responding to a terrorist attack against its people and trying to achieve a legitimate counterterrorism and military purpose. That does not change at all the severity of the humanitarian situation, which is why we have been working so hard to improve that humanitarian situation for the people in Gaza.QUESTION: So you don’t think that arms shipment to Israel leads us closer to famine and &#8212;MR MILLER: We have continued to support Israel’s right to &#8212;QUESTION: Is that correct?MR MILLER: We have &#8212;QUESTION: I just – I don’t know.MR MILLER: Let me say &#8212;QUESTION: It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other what you say, but &#8212;MR MILLER: They are different conflicts, but the – I’d say &#8212;QUESTION: I know they are, but I’m just asking you &#8212;MR MILLER: I would say &#8212;QUESTION: They made the point in Sudan &#8212;MR MILLER: And I’m answering the &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I just want to know if you have – if you feel the same way about Gaza.MR MILLER: They are very different conflicts, but the humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire, and that is why we are working so hard from the President on down to get more humanitarian assistance in, and it’s why we are working to improve deconfliction and coordination so we don’t see such a high number of civilian casualties as we have seen over the past six months.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just press you briefly on the – what – on the opening comments on calling Wang Yi and others? I realize you’re probably not going to give a full readout, but how successful was that? I mean, do you think there’s an interest from these other countries as well to see Iran not escalate?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak for any of those other countries. I will let them speak for themselves. But the point that the Secretary has been making to each of these counterparts – foreign counterparts, both those in the region and foreign counterparts outside of the region – is that further escalation of this conflict doesn’t just hurt Israel, doesn’t just hurt Iran, doesn’t just hurt the countries in the region, but that it harms every country in the world. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional conflict. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional war, both economically, diplomatically. And so the Secretary has been making clear to every country that has any semblance of a relationship with Iran that it is in their interest to use that relationship to send a message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict. But I will let those countries speak for themselves about what action they may or may not take.QUESTION: And I have to ask – I know this has been asked before – but Iran, of course, argues that a diplomatic facility was struck in Damascus. Has there been an assessment at this point from the United States whether this was indeed a strike on a diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: We do not have a final determination. It’s something we’re still assessing.QUESTION: Is it – do you think there will be an assessment at some point from the U.S. on that?MR MILLER: I do, but it’s something we’re continuing to work through.QUESTION: Matt, on this.MR MILLER: Yeah, Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Reports say today that Iran delayed or changed plans to attack Israel at the last moment due to U.S. warnings. Can you confirm that? And do you still expect an Iranian reaction to the attack on Damascus?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to what Iran may or may not do, or what our assessments are. You don’t need an Intelligence Community assessment to see the threats that Iran has been making. They’ve been making those threats quite publicly and quite loudly over the past few days. So we will continue to send the message to them that it is not in their interest to escalate this conflict and it’s not in the region’s broader interest, and we hope other partners will send that same message.QUESTION: Can I follow on Iran?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: Sure. I wanted to ask this question actually to the ambassador, but the Iranian mission at the UN said that basically if the U.S. – or the Security Council, rather, condemn the attack on the consulate in Damascus, this could – any retaliation could’ve been avoided. So is this your understanding, that actually you don’t condemn it because you cannot verify whether it is a diplomatic mission or not? And also, do you think that Israel can go and attack any other diplomatic mission if this is proved to be actually a diplomatic mission, and you don’t expect any country to retaliate? Just explain those points.MR MILLER: So a few – a few things in order. First of all, I think that’s a pretty flimsy excuse from the Iranian Government. If they don’t want to widen this conflict and they don’t want to attack Israel, they don’t need permission from anyone else either at the United Nations or – they just have to make the decision not to do that, and that’s the decision that they should make.Now, with respect to your second question, no, we do not want to see attacks on diplomatic facilities. We oppose attacks on diplomatic facilities. We continue to assess the exact status of that facility in Damascus, and don’t have a final determination on that question.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I do a follow-up on Iran?MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I – yeah. I – not Iran, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Like Matt, I was struck with what the ambassador said, the similarity. You could change the word “Sudan” for “the Palestinians” or “Gaza” and it’d be exactly the same, with one difference. I mean, you don’t have any control over the conflict in Sudan, but you certainly have control &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, that’s – let me just say &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just finish my question? I have not asked my question.MR MILLER: Fine, fair enough. Go ahead.QUESTION: So my question to you is: Why has the United States not taken its – the moral high ground and its ability and its leverage to end this conflict, as it can? We have seen this happen in the past. We’ve seen it happen in 1982. We’ve seen it happen with this administration in May – in 2021. So my question to you: Why has not this administration taken that step to end this conflict now?MR MILLER: So first of all, Said, they are very different conflicts and very different situations, and that’s incredibly important. The conflict in Sudan is two warring military factions, following a coup that overthrew a democratic government, who are fighting for control of Sudan. That is a different question than the conflict in Gaza that was started not by Israel, but by Hamas – Hamas launching a brutal terrorist attack that killed over 1,200 Israelis and citizens of other foreign countries. And Israel has the right to hold Hamas accountable for those attacks, as the United States would, as other countries in the region would, as any country in the world if it were the victim of such a brutal terrorist attack.That said, we are trying to bring this conflict to an end. You have seen us work to try to achieve a ceasefire, an immediate ceasefire of at least six weeks that would bring the hostages home and that we have said consistently we would like to see widen into a broader end to the conflict. You have seen us work on post-conflict governance to try to find a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. And you have seen us work to address the very, very severe needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza. So we are working to try and do exactly that.QUESTION: Okay, let let me just follow up.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Please don’t interrupt.QUESTION: Let me just follow up.MR MILLER: Just let me go – I’ll go through the questions and get to who I get to.QUESTION: If I may, I just want to follow up. I mean, you talked about Palestinian legitimate aspirations and so on, but insisting that this conflict began on October 7th does not recognize that, does it? Does it recognize that this – that the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that go back 75 years, not just to October 7th?MR MILLER: So they do have legitimate political aspirations that go back decades. It has been the policy of the United States for decades to try to achieve two states. But, Said, I don’t want to – not only I don’t want to, I fundamentally degree – or disagree that October 7th had anything to do with trying to answer the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. It was a terrorist attack targeting civilians, that killed civilians, by a terrorist group that does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. So when you look at trying to achieve a peaceful resolution to the decades of violence and the decades of political conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, it is Hamas that has firmly rejected a political solution to that decades-long dispute.QUESTION: Yeah, but do you – do you acknowledge that Gaza was under siege for basically 17 years and &#8212;MR MILLER: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; every other year there would be an attack and a war by Israel, time after time after time, killing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians?MR MILLER: Said, there – there have been incidents going back in this dispute, in this conflict for decades. Nothing that happened in – on either side justifies the attacks of October 7th.QUESTION: Can I just have a quick question on Iran before we &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just one, there are reports of the Iranian foreign minister coming to New York City next week to visit the UN. I’m wondering how the U.S. assesses the likelihood of an Iranian attack happening during that period of time, if it would have any attack – any impact at all?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to a timeframe. We’re obviously very concerned about the threat of an Iranian attack. We’ve made that clear from the President on down, but I don’t want to put any kind of timeframe on it. We were hoping, of course, to avoid such an attack in the first place.QUESTION: Do you think it’s moving in the direction of avoiding one?MR MILLER: I don’t want to give any type of assessment. As I said, it is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in anyone’s in the region – anyone the region’s interest for Iran to escalate this conflict. And that’s the message we are sending to them.QUESTION: Wait, you were hoping to avoid an attack in the first place? Has one happened?MR MILLER: An attack by Iran. Yeah, we’re – no, one has not happened. We are &#8212;QUESTION: Well, weren’t you hoping to avoid the Israelis attacking an Iranian diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: I – her question – her question was – her – hold on.QUESTION: I know, but you – but you made it &#8212;MR MILLER: No, hold on, let me just answer the question.QUESTION: Your answer to her seemed to suggest &#8212;MR MILLER: My &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that you thought the Iranians had already retaliated.MR MILLER: No, my – well, that’s not what I was suggesting.QUESTION: Okay. All right.MR MILLER: My answer was in the context of the question she asked me, which was about an attack coming next week.QUESTION: Fair enough.MR MILLER: So let’s go – let me – just in – yeah.QUESTION: On that call, just – the call with the Turkish foreign minister, was it purely Iran call or did they have a chance to discuss Ukraine, the Caucasus, President Erdogan’s upcoming trip? And why Türkiye? Do you guys believe that Türkiye has enough leverage to move the needle on Iran – they have Iran’s ear?MR MILLER: It’s not just Türkiye; it’s a number of countries. It’s other countries as well that have relationships with Iran – Saudi Arabia, China. And we have made other – have had other diplomatic engagements with countries in Europe and other countries in the world because we want to send a very unified message. With respect to the call itself, the primary purpose of the call was to discuss Iran’s threats against Israel. There were other issues discussed, but I don’t want to get into those any further.QUESTION: Last thing, because we have a statement from Khamenei last night saying that any Islamic countries supporting Israel or not supporting their narratives, they’re engaged in treason.MR MILLER: Any countries that what?QUESTION: Any Islamic countries that do not fall in line with their narratives, they are engaged – they’re engaged with treason. I’m just wondering how much this – your calculation of calling Türkiye in this case is part of &#8212;MR MILLER: So it doesn’t &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; fits into this &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; have anything to do with the with those comments. Obviously, his comments are not – are ones that wouldn’t be – just be rejected by the United States but would be rejected by other countries in the region.QUESTION: I have different coverage of questions. Please come back to me.MR MILLER: Let me stay in the region and then we’ll – yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. On the hostage talks, can you give any update on whether there’s been a response from Hamas? And also, is there a level of concern in the U.S. Government about the Israeli strike that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh’s family members and how that might affect the talks?MR MILLER: I’m not going to give any update on the talk – excuse me – the talks themselves, other than that we continue to engage in them and try to pursue a successful resolution.With respect to those strikes, I certainly hope that it will not, but I wouldn’t want to make any kind of assessments.Stay – want to stay in the region? Nadia, go ahead. And then we’ll come back.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: There is a record number of land that has been confiscated in the West Bank that came out today. It’s like between 2018 and 2023 is 5,900 acres have been confiscated. The administration has always talked about this two-state solution, and the major – one of the major obstacles is settlements. So if this land has been taken and there’s – just like condemnation from the administration but actually there is nothing practical that we see that will stop this land from being taken, that will undermine the President’s vision. So what – or how can you go forward when actually there’s not even base for to have a state in the future?MR MILLER: So two things. First, we have made consistently clear that we oppose further settlement activity in the West Bank. We think they are a barrier to peace; we think they are inconsistent with international humanitarian law.And I will just say, to put those actions in the larger context, there have been a number of things that the Government of Israel has done over time that we have said are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security. Obviously, settlements in the West Bank are one of them. There are other actions that it has taken in Gaza that we think are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security.So what fundamentally it comes down to is we are working, as you know, with partners in the region to develop a path forward for Israel and the Palestinian people that we would present to them, that would provide for post-conflict governance in Gaza, that would have a component to reconstruct Gaza, that would provide further assurances for Israel’s security by its partners in the region, and there are other countries ready to step up.And so I’m making this a broader answer, because all of this relates to that very question. It’s not just about settlements; it’s about what kind of future the Israeli people see for them in the region. And ultimately – and we’re not there yet, because we’ve not finished this plan and we’ve not presented it to the people of Israel and the Government of Israel – but ultimately, this is a choice that Israel’s going to have to make.QUESTION: Okay, just very quickly, the ambassador made a passionate appeal to us, the press corps, to cover Sudan, not to forget civilians, rightly so. But we haven’t hear from any senior officials the same appeal about Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Number one, we have many journalists who’ve been killed, including our colleagues. We don’t hear any – apart from condemnation, nothing is being done to protect them. And second, why can’t the United States allow independent journalists to go to Gaza, since you don’t have anybody on the ground, so they will have access and tell us what’s happening there?MR MILLER: So a few things. First of all, the reason you heard the ambassador make that appeal with respect to Sudan – and this is not for me to play editor or segment producer – but it is that we don’t see as much coverage about atrocities in Sudan. We don’t see as much coverage about the plight of the Sudanese people. We do see a lot of coverage of the Palestinians in Gaza, appropriately so, but I think her point was that we would welcome seeing coverage of this very difficult conflict that we are trying to resolve in Sudan.When it comes to journalists in Gaza, we have made clear on a number of occasions that we want to see journalists protected. And the coordination and deconfliction measures that we have been pushing the Government of Israel on so hard, that the President pushed the Government of Israel on in his call on Friday, would ultimately help with journalism and make it safer for journalists to operate inside Gaza.And I’ll just make it very clear that we have pressed the Government of Israel directly to allow journalists to go into Gaza. It’s not something that we control, but we have made clear that we all benefit from seeing what’s happening on the ground, that we know what’s happening there – not because we have U.S. officials there, many other countries don’t have officials there, but because of journalists who are putting their lives on the line to bring us those stories. And we’ve made clear to the Government of Israel that we think they ought to let more journalists in.QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. And then I’ll come to you, and then we’ll start taking other ones. I’m going to come to you, Janne, but I know – I doubt it’s an Israel question, so that’s why I’m moving around the room first.QUESTION: There’s some &#8212;MR MILLER: You may surprise me, so I’ll just &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, yes. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. America has a number of allies. What message do they receive when America harangues one its closest allies, Israel, and their democratically elected leader Benjamin Netanyahu? And a follow-up.MR MILLER: I think the message they should see is that we want Israel to live up to its values, that we want to see Israel live up to the same standards that we expect every country in the world, including ourselves, to live up to.QUESTION: Thank you. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Clearly a majority of Israelis agree with his policies, since the majority of voters keep re-electing him. How does this mesh with what President Biden seems to be calling for, which is essentially a rejection of Israeli democracy?MR MILLER: So first, I think that is a vast conflation of two very different things. So it is up to the Israeli people to choose their leaders. We strongly support their right to choose their leaders, as we do for the people of every country in the world. But we are going to engage with the governments that they choose to talk with them about what we think are the policies that are in our interest, what are the policies that are in their interest.And you have heard – the President himself spoke to this in the week right after October 7th, when he made the point – these aren’t the exact words, but it’s the general gist – that sometimes in the aftermath of a horrific event your vision can be clouded, and you can make mistakes. And we are there to offer them our very best advice as a country that’s made mistakes in the aftermath of horrific events and try to keep them from making some of those same mistakes.QUESTION: Well, it seems like there is an attempt to demonize the current Israeli Government, there are efforts to support the overthrow of the Israeli Government with a lot of protests and so forth.MR MILLER: So that is not – and that is not what you’ve seen from this administration. We’ve traveled to Israel – the Secretary has been there – eight times I believe since October 7th meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. The President has been there and talks to Prime Minister Netanyahu all the time. The Secretary just talked to the defense minister yesterday. We fully support the right of the Israeli people to decide who their leaders are.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. As Secretary Blinken spoke with the regional leaders about sending a message to Iran, were there any connections with Iraqi leaders to send any message to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any – I don’t have any engagements to read out today.QUESTION: Okay. And have you received any signals from the Iranian Government that they taking these messages into their consideration?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak for the Iranian Government at all.QUESTION: And in the past few times the Iranian use it to – use its baseless accusation to attack the Erbil and also Kurdistan region in their response to the threats from Israel. Is there something that you’re concerned maybe Iran this time use the same justification and to attack the U.S. allies and U.S. friends in the region in their retaliation for that attack?MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear to them that they shouldn’t escalate this conflict in any way – with respect to Israel, with respect to others in the region, with respect to U.S. forces. One of the first messages we sent to them when the Iranians were making these baseless claims that the U.S. was involved in the strike in Damascus is that that is not true, we weren’t involved, we didn’t know about it, and you should not use this as a pretext to strike U.S. forces in the region, including in Iraq, as we have seen their proxy groups do over the past few months and the past few years.QUESTION: And last thing. Have you granted visa for the Iranian foreign minister to attend the Security Council?MR MILLER: We never speak to visa records. They’re confidential by law, and so I can’t speak to visa records from here. But as has long been the case, we take our obligations as the host of the United Nations very seriously.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Janne.QUESTION: So when he shows up in New York, we can just assume that that’s confirmation that he got a visa?MR MILLER: Well, you can’t travel here without one. So I can’t speak to it, but you can’t travel here without one. But I would note that Iranian foreign ministers have traveled to New York &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, they have.MR MILLER: &#8212; under administrations of both parties, including the last one.QUESTION: Yes. No, I’m not suggesting that there’s anything inappropriate or untoward about it. It’s just that I just – I mean, it’s ridiculous. The guy shows up in New York, if he shows up in New York, it’s pretty damn clear that he got a visa.MR MILLER: I would welcome your advocacy to the United States Congress to change the law and allow me to speak more about any number of things from here, not just visa records.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I didn’t surprise you today that I had to ask this. (Laughter.) Yeah, I had to ask Ambassador Greenfield and I hope you can answer this, all right?MR MILLER: I’ll do my best.QUESTION: Okay, are you ready? Ambassador Greenfield will be visit South Korea this weekend. What agenda will she discuss with the South Korea? Also she will visit to Panmunjom this time?MR MILLER: So I said I’d do my best. I’m afraid I’m going to disappoint you. I am not in a position to preview her trip. She does have a press office in New York, and I would urge you to send the inquiry there. Go ahead.QUESTION: That’s why you didn’t give me any chance to ask it?MR MILLER: She had a limited time. Sorry.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I would have loved her to stay longer. The more questions she takes, the fewer I have to – not that I don’t enjoy our lengthy engagements.QUESTION: She can take – all right, second question quick. The United Nations Security Council’s expert panel on sanctions against North Korea was disconnected. Will the U.S. submit a report together with the other countries, and do you expect to discuss with the South Korea or Japan about the continuation of this report?MR MILLER: So as I’ve said in the past from this podium, we are incredibly disappointed that Russia chose to block that panel from going forward. And I don’t have any specific actions to preview today, but we are engaged with our allies and partners in other ways to continue to monitor North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.QUESTION: Have you any discussion when the – I mean, Prime Minister Kishida was here? Do you have any chance to discuss it?MR MILLER: I would defer to the White House to speak to those engagements.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Hey, Matt. I’m going to ask you about your new Diversity and Inclusion Chief Zakiya Carr Johnson. She’s drawing new criticism for past comments. In a 2019 piece she claimed America’s organizations and institutions were, quote, “riddled with racism, patriarchy, and exclusion,” that they refused to reconcile with the colonizing past, and called them a, quote, “failed historic model.” Do you find those comments problematic?MR MILLER: So I would say that, first of all, our new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer Zakiya Carr Johnson is one of the most qualified experts in this field. She has 20 years of experience working to expand diversity, and it’s something that we see as important here at the State Department that the Secretary has put a premium on because he believes that when our workforce looks like America and reflects the full diversity of America, our workforce is stronger and our ability to protect America’s national security is improved and enhanced. And that’s why he selected her to do this incredibly important job.Second of all, with respect to her quote, I have seen that people have used excerpts, have not used the full context of it. But I would say a lot of this criticism seems to be from individuals. I saw former officials tweeting about this.QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo took the hardest &#8212;MR MILLER: Certain former officials who don’t seem – for whatever reason – to support our work to expand diversity inside the State Department. And that’s just where we have an honest agreement – disagreement where we think that’s work that we ought to do and we ought to hire experts who have experience in doing that. And that’s what we’re going to continue to do, and I think we’re just going to have to disagree with some of those critics.QUESTION: Can I just lastly read you – Secretary Pompeo obviously worked here in the building. He said, quote, “The State Department should be staffed by individuals who love America and believe in our core principles, not ideologues who think that America represents a ‘failed historic model.’” Do you want to respond to that?MR MILLER: Well, apparently, he believes there are different ways to love America, because one of the ways we believe you can best love America is to love its full diversity and build a workforce that reflects that full diversity.Alex. I’ll come to you next. Alex, sorry.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you so much. Turning to Ukraine &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, I should not mumble my &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Thank so much. Let’s turn to Ukraine if I may. Going back to last night’s strikes, which Ukraine believes that was designed to maximize attacks on infrastructure, what is your reaction and what is your take of the state of play on the battlefield? And do you still believe that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to retaliate?MR MILLER: So we have seen Russia, unfortunately, continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. That’s something they’ve done not just overnight but over the past couple of years. And I would say for us it comes back to the need for Congress to fully fund, fully pass the President’s supplemental request. And it goes directly to this question you asked me about the situation on the battlefield where we have seen Ukrainian armed forces having to ration artillery shells, having to ration ammunition. And of course that has an effect on their ability to fight the war and an effect on their ability to repel Russian troops, and it’s why it is so urgent for Congress to act.QUESTION: Is any active restrictions on Ukraine imposed from the U.S., by the U.S., to prevent them from retaliating &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; this obvious steps will take it back to Russia.MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear that we do not encourage strikes outside of Ukraine, and we do not enable those strikes with U.S.-provided weapons and that we don’t want to see U.S.-provided weapons used for strikes outside Ukraine. Ultimately, when it comes to deciding how to prosecute this war, those are Ukrainian decisions, but we do not encourage or enable such strikes.QUESTION: Can I have one more if may on Georgia? So what – as you have learned during the past couple of days since Georgia – Georgia Government – moved forward and submitted the Russian law, I’m just curious, like, what – you made it clear this is taking Georgia away from European path. Do you witness democratic backsliding in Georgia? Is that your analysis?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make any broader assessment than the assessment I made the other day that pertains to this specific law that we believe would harm civil society organizations working to improve the lives of Georgian citizens and would derail Georgia from its European path. It’s still draft legislation, and I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Has anyone from this building reached out to Georgia or &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me move on just because we’re running short of time.Michel.QUESTION: On Bahrain, Matt, do you have any comments on the release of more than 1,500 prisoners?MR MILLER: We did see that step by the Government of Bahrain. We welcome very much the decision by the king to pardon over 1,500 prisoners along with the government’s announcement April 9th that they will work to help the recently released find employment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.Shaun, I’m sorry – well, go ahead, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: That’s all right.MR MILLER: This time I promise I’ll come back to you.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. In meeting alongside President Biden with President Kishida, did the pending deal between U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel come up?MR MILLER: I will let the White House speak to those comments. In fact, I believe the President addressed them yesterday. Or speak to that question, I should say.QUESTION: And on Wednesday, President Xi held a meeting with former president of Taiwan Ma, who supports closer ties with China. Does the department have any reaction to this meeting?MR MILLER: No, I do not.Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Two things, one going back to Ukraine. The Swiss have announced a conference on Ukraine. This is in light of Zelenskyy’s visit in Davos and the peace formula he has. Russia has had some strong words about it, saying that it was part of – it’s part of the Biden re-election campaign, I think; that the U.S. is behind it. Does the U.S have any comment on this – on whether the U.S. will participate or whether it sees utility in the conference?MR MILLER: So I don’t speak to campaign matters &#8212;QUESTION: I realize &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; but that doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the Swiss Government’s ability to conduct their own foreign policy matters. I would say obviously that is an absurd allegation by the Russian Government. I can’t preview – I believe that conference is still several weeks away. I can’t preview what the U.S. participation would be, but we have supported Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts. We have supported Ukraine’s peace formula. We have support President Zelenskyy making his case to other countries in the world, and we will – that will continue to be our policy. But we have seen consistently that Russia has not been willing to engage in real diplomacy about a path forward for Ukraine. Ukraine has made clear that at the right time they would welcome that, and they have not had a willing partner in Russia.QUESTION: And just briefly – I mean, do you generally speaking think it’s useful for the Swiss to hold this – your support of – regardless of the participation of &#8212;MR MILLER: Look, so our policy on this has always been nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. If this is a diplomatic meeting that the Ukrainian Government supports and wants to engage in, we certainly support their right to do so. I don’t have any further comment on the conference itself as it – or how it’s going to shape up.QUESTION: Sure. Just one completely separate issue briefly, Mali. I don’t know if you’ve followed the latest developments there – a ban on activities of political parties and then the ban on media coverage of political parties.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Anything to say about that?MR MILLER: We are deeply concerned about the Malian transition government’s decree suspending all political activities until further notice. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are critical to an open society. The transition government has already made a decision not to hold an election in February 2024 to return to a civilian-led, democratic government despite the commitment that it made publicly in 2022 to do so. We call on Mali’s transition government to honor its commitments to its citizens and hold free and fair elections. In Mali and elsewhere, democracy remains the best foundation for stability and prosperity.Simon.QUESTION: I want to ask about another conflict which is often getting forgotten, which is in Myanmar – Myanmar or Burma. The rebel – alliance of rebel forces have taken one of the – well, the main border crossing with Thailand recently. The situation is very fluid in this conflict. Wondering – this is right up against, obviously, a U.S. ally. Are you having any – is there any diplomacy going on from the U.S. with Thailand about how they should be dealing with this? They’ve got refugees coming across the border, the junta forces reportedly trying to sort of use Thailand as a – taking flights into Thailand to try to sort of push back the rebels in this case. So I’m wondering if – if the U.S. has any new sort of actions that you’ve been taking as this has been developing.MR MILLER: So we have been incredibly concerned about potential spillover this – of this conflict. It’s something that we have been focused on. With respect to any engagements with Thailand, let me take that back and get you an answer. I don’t have anything to read out.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Due to situation in Gaza, there is too much hate spreading all around the world, even here in U.S. as well. Is it a concern?MR MILLER: It’s absolutely a concern. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this on a number of occasions, including in Israel, when he said that we – the worst thing that can happen is people dehumanizing each other, and that once you see people on either side of this conflict dehumanizing each other, it gives license – not actual license, but gives them – they give themselves license to do any sorts of things that we would oppose and that are not in anyone’s interests. So it’s absolutely one of our concerns.We have unfortunately seen a rise in antisemitism. We have seen a rise in anti-Muslim summit, and the President has spoken to this. It’s something we’ve been incredibly concerned about both here at home and around the world.QUESTION: Sir, many religious scholars and others trying to portray this situation as a war between Muslims and Jews, while many others believe it is just a territorial conflict. What is your position on this? And what are we going to say to those spreading hate in our communities?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – we would – obviously don’t want to see anyone spreading hate in any form, and I would just say that we are trying to bring an end to this conflict as soon as possible and find a durable solution to this conflict, because it is in the interests of Muslims and Jews and Christians, Israelis, other countries in the region alike. It is in the interest of all parties to see this conflict end, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Sir, one last question, if I may. Sir, you always talk about two-state solution, but whatever is happening right now, it seems impossible. So is United States, partners, and mediators trying to explore other options to bring peace in the region?MR MILLER: So I spoke to this a little bit in response to an earlier question. We think ultimately that is the path forward, and I know it’s incredibly difficult and it looks incredibly bleak, but it is our assessment that at the end of this conflict – it is going to end – that if there is not a path forward, Israel is going to be back with the same security risks it has had since before October 7th. It is going to be in the same position with respect to a lack of relationships with all of its neighbors. And it is in Israel’s broader security interests to find a path forward for reconciliation with the Palestinian people, as difficult as that seems, and so that’s why we’re going to continue to pursue it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just three questions. One is – come on, it’s my sixth briefing. Three questions is not too bad.MR MILLER: Oh, just go ahead.QUESTION: So with regard to Iran, please correct me if I am wrong that this administration has basically made Iran more stronger in these past few years till now, this threatening that has started. But can you confirm whether Pakistan and Iran – you have information that Iran is supporting the ISIS in Pakistan right now, these recent terrorist activities? Do you have any information that it’s the Iranian regime that is doing this or no?MR MILLER: So I would obviously disagree with your characterization. I’m not going to get into a long rebuttal about something we’ve spoken to a number of times, but no, I do not have information to suggest that.QUESTION: Okay, sir. My second question is about ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who is – was prime minister from this ruling family where Shehbaz Sharif is prime minister. He said himself just last week that this current regime has stolen the mandate. Basically, Shehbaz Sharif should not be a prime minister of Pakistan. Do you agree with him on that or no?MR MILLER: Ultimately, as you’ve heard me say once or twice from this podium, decisions about the Pakistani Government are for the Pakistani people to make.QUESTION: Just last one: A few days ago, U.S. officials from Islamabad embassy went to meet this gentleman named Zahir Jaffer, who was convicted on a – murdering his wife. He’s a U.S. citizen. He’s on death row now. The U.S. official went to Adiala Jail to meet him. Just a few blocks down there was Imran Khan in jail as well. Thousands of American – Pakistani Americans have asked to go and meet him as well. Why is the U.S. not going to meet the guy in jail?MR MILLER: I would defer to the – our embassy in Pakistan for – answer that question.Go ahead, Shannon. I’ll come to you next, Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. On the State Department’s latest Travel Alert for the U.S. embassy in Israel, it details how American personnel have now been limited from traveling within the country. It says it’s been done out of a, quote, “abundance of caution.” Just wondering if you can say definitively whether this is linked to the threat to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: So obviously, there – we have seen Iran making public threats against Israel in the past few days. Israel’s in a very tough neighborhood, and we have been monitoring the security situation. You saw us slightly adjust our travel warnings at the beginning of this conflict, and we conduct ongoing assessments all the time about the situation on the ground.So I’m not going to speak to the specific assessments that led to us to restrict our families – employees and family members’ personal travel, but clearly we are monitoring the threat environment in the Middle East, and specifically in Israel, and we – that’s what led us to make – give that warning to our employees and their family members, and to make it public so all U.S. citizens who either live in Israel or are traveling there are aware of it.Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. President Biden said this week that the U.S. is considering Australia’s request that it drop its extradition attempt against Julian Assange and instead allow him to go back to Australia. Normally when we ask about Assange you say “refer you to the Department of Justice,” but now that the President has said that there’s a – there are diplomatic talks going on, that seems like it would be squarely in the State Department. So are – is the State Department involved in these conversations with Australia, and what can you tell us about these talks?MR MILLER: That is a good way to try to get me to violate that rule about not commenting on extradition matters, but I am going to refrain from doing so. I don’t have any comment. I would refer to the Justice Department for comment on this.QUESTION: Does it broadly raise concerns for you about free speech and free press? Because you often will see dictators say, why is the U.S. lecturing us about press freedoms when they are trying to extradite a foreign citizen to their own maximum security prison?MR MILLER: So I will let the Justice Department largely speak to this issue. But as you’ve heard me say here before, one of the crimes that Julian Assange is charged with is helping Chelsea Manning hack into government systems – not receiving classified information, but helping her actually break into government systems to retrieve classified information, which as far as I’m aware has never been considered a legitimate journalistic practice, and is not the kind of practice that journalistic organizations typically engage in.QUESTION: Well, technically he offered to help her cloak her identity so that she wouldn’t be discovered. We as journalists do that all the time with sources –MR MILLER: I – you – so &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; talk with them on Signal and other devices to try to make sure that sources are protected. Is that considered helping steal information?MR MILLER: So I am now a little bit probably further than I ought to go about facts that still are contained, or alleged facts that are contained in a pending indictment.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Two questions. Saudi Arabia joined Pakistan in addressing Jammu and Kashmir dispute while engaging with India to dialogue. Will United States encourage any mediation from Saudi Arabia between Pakistan and India? Because from very recent past, we see – we observed that United States encouraged all those engagements that goes according to the regional interest of U.S., including the Houthis and Saudis talks. After October 7th, U.S. stressed Saudi Arabia to halt their talks; before October 7th, U.S. was encouraging that. At first &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me take you that – that one back and get a complete answer.QUESTION: And number second &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: National Security Advisor had scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia for talks on Israel normalization. Is it rescheduled, or with the ongoing circumstances in Middle East, there is some policy change expected from United States?MR MILLER: So I will let the White House speak to the National Security Advisor’s travel, but I did see him at the White House podium two days ago saying that he does intend to reschedule that trip.Go ahead, and then we’ll go here, and then wrap up for the day.QUESTION: Thank you. What is the State Department’s position regarding Israel possibly conducting an offensive attack on Iran or Iranian interests, as Netanyahu today – he said they’re ready for a defensive or offensive attacks. Wouldn’t an offensive attack be part of that escalation that you say that we’re trying to prevent?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to hypotheticals, other than to say we don’t want to see this conflict escalated in any way.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, said that he will recognize the state of Palestine before this summer, and that he wants other European countries to join him. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: Every country has to make its own decision with respect to when and where it recognizes entities in this regard. I will say on behalf of the United States, we have always believed – we have always strongly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but we believe that that’s something that is best achieved through dialogue and negotiation between the two parties, as well as other countries in the region, and that’s something we’re actively pursuing.And with that, wrap for &#8212;QUESTION: And on &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have one more? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, also Mexico asked today to suspend Ecuador’s membership of the United State after their raid on the Mexican embassy. Do you have any answer?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything, other than what we’ve said previously, which is we have asked Ecuador to work with Mexico to find a resolution to this dispute.And with that, wrap for today.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Bahrain																								Burma																								Ecuador																								Iran																								Israel																								Mali																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Sudan																								Ukraine
- On the Elections Delay in Mali Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is deeply concerned that the Malian transition government chose not to hold an election to restore democracy in February 2024, despite its stated commitment in 2022 to do so. The transition government announced a delay to elections in September 2023 but has since failed to provide an updated electoral calendar, an essential step to reach a new era of civilian-led democratic governance.The United States calls on Mali’s transition government to honor its commitments to its citizens and hold free and fair elections. In Mali and elsewhere, democracy remains the best foundation for stability and prosperity.
- Les atrocités commises par le groupe Wagner en Afrique : mensonges et vérité Global Engagement CenterAprès avoir démenti  pendant des années tout lien entre le gouvernement russe et le groupe Wagner, le président Poutine a admis  en juin 2023 que le Kremlin avait fourni un soutien financier au groupe à hauteur de 86 milliards de roubles (l’équivalent de quelque 940 millions de dollars au mois d’octobre 2023) entre mai 2022 et mai 2023. La mort du patron du groupe Wagner, Evgueni Prigojine, le 23 août 2023, offre l’occasion de revenir sur certains des mensonges les plus flagrants du gouvernement russe concernant le rôle, les objectifs et les prétendus succès du groupe Wagner. Le présent rapport analyse et réfute les fausses déclarations que la Russie continue de propager sur les activités du groupe Wagner en République centrafricaine (RCA), au Mali, au Soudan et en Libye, et lève le voile sur ce qu’il est réellement, à savoir un groupe de criminels motivés par la cupidité plutôt qu’une force antiterrorisme efficace.L’exploitation des ressources africaines, notamment l’or, les diamants et le bois, par le groupe Wagner ne représente qu’un aspect de l’influence déstabilisatrice de cette organisation criminelle transnationale en Afrique. Les forces du groupe auraient  rasé des villages entiers et assassiné des civils en République centrafricaine (RCA) pour faire avancer leurs intérêts économiques dans le secteur minier ; pris part à des exécutions illégales au Mali ; pillé des mines d’or artisanales au Soudan ; et porté atteinte aux institutions démocratiques dans chaque pays où elles ont opéré. Elles ont également été accusées d’avoir réglé leurs factures avec de la monnaie contrefaite. Ce comportement criminel et prédateur envers les Africains, ne s’arrêtera pas avec la mort d’Evgueni Prigojine.Partout où le groupe Wagner se déploie s’ensuit une forte hausse du nombre de décès parmi les civils. Selon The Economist  et des données récentes publiées par l’Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) , la violence perpétrée par le groupe Wagner à l’encontre des civils au Mali et en République centrafricaine (RCA) est non seulement fréquente, mais aussi bien plus meurtrière  pour les non-combattants que les attaques menées par l’État ou les forces rebelles. The Economist rapporte qu’en date du mois d’août 2023, le groupe avait tué au moins 1 800 civils africains. Wagner justifie  sa présence brutale en Afrique en affirmant que c’est un « soutien à la paix et à la stabilité ». Pourtant, rien qu’au Mali, la violence terroriste contre les civils a bondi de 278 %  depuis 2021.Les mensonges de la Russie en République centrafricaineL’écosystème de désinformation et de propagande de la Russie présente une image faussée d’un groupe Wagner qui jouerait un rôle positif dans des nations comme la République centrafricaine (RCA). Bien que le groupe Wagner soit déployé en RCA depuis 2018, les responsables russes continuent d’appeler les forces de Wagner des « instructeurs russes » lorsqu’ils discutent des activités du groupe, un narratif qui a continué après la mort de Prigojine en août 2023. Des responsables  russes cités dans des médias  financés par l’État russe prétendent que ces instructeurs russes ont « sauvé » la RCA et qu’ils y « renforcent la paix et la stabilité » afin d’y apporter  une « paix durable ». La Communauté des Officiers pour la Sécurité internationale (COSI) , qui a été sanctionnée par les États-Unis, sert de société écran aux opérations du groupe Wagner en RCA. Son directeur, Aleksandr Ivanov, sanctionné lui aussi par les États-Unis, justifie la présence de Wagner en RCA en affirmant  : « Les combattants du groupe Wagner restent en RCA et permettent ainsi aux habitants de la République de dormir en paix ! (&#8230;) La République est devenue un endroit sûr pour la vie et le développement de la population locale. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner en République centrafricaineDes rapports des Nations unies et de médias indépendants documentent la vérité sur les activités du groupe Wagner et sa brutalité envers la population de la RCA.CBS a rapporté en mai 2023 que les forces de Wagner  s’étaient livrées à des tueries, à des enlèvements et à des viols systématiques en vue de prendre le contrôle d’une zone minière de premier plan située près de la ville de Bambari. Les survivants ont décrit en détail les attaques : « Parler de tuerie, c’est un euphémisme. C’était un carnage total. On aurait dit l’Armaguédon (&#8230;) Ils parlaient russe. Même tchétchène. Certains portaient des masques et avaient de longues barbes. »Des personnes en République centrafricaine, notamment des journalistes, des travailleurs humanitaires et des membres de minorités, ainsi que des forces de maintien de la paix internationales, ont été violemment harcelées et menacées par les soi-disant « instructeurs russes » du groupe Wagner, ont rapporté  des experts de l’ONU en octobre 2021.Malgré les affirmations de la Russie et de Wagner selon lesquelles il apporte la stabilité dans les zones où il intervient, le groupe — qui opère depuis la République centrafricaine et soi-disant à l’insu du gouvernement hôte — a monté un complot visant à renverser le gouvernement du Tchad  au début de 2023, une action qui aurait pu aggraver une situation humanitaire déjà difficile pour les femmes, les enfants et d’autres civils.Les mensonges de la Russie au MaliLes responsables russes, les médias financés par l’État russe et les chaînes Telegram liées au Kremlin continuent de diffuser des messages sur le rôle prétendument « positif » du groupe Wagner au Mali depuis son déploiement  en 2021. Malgré ces publications, le gouvernement de transition du Mali n’a toujours pas reconnu publiquement la présence du groupe sur son territoire. Des vidéos  de propagande présentant les forces du groupe Wagner comme des sauveurs et des « anges guerriers  » circulent toujours en ligne. Avant le déploiement du groupe au Mali, la Russie mettait en avant des narratifs mensongers semblables à ceux utilisés en République centrafricaine, répétant le mythe selon lequel des « instructeurs russes » apporteraient la paix, la stabilité et poseraient un nouveau jalon dans la lutte antiterroriste dans le pays. Aleksandr Ivanov, le directeur de la COSI sanctionné par les États-Unis, a salué  le groupe Wagner dans des sites d’actualité maliens, déclarant qu’il faisait « un travail excellent partout dans le monde », et affirmant qu’il allait « combattre le terrorisme partout ». Une vidéo  de propagande liée à la Russie et diffusée après le déploiement du groupe Wagner au Mali à la fin de 2021 suggérait à tort que les États-Unis et la France soutenaient les extrémistes religieux violents au Mali.La vérité sur le groupe Wagner au MaliLes faits révèlent une tout autre réalité.Contrairement à ce qu’affirme la Russie, le groupe Wagner n’a pas mené de lutte efficace contre le terrorisme au Mali depuis son premier déploiement en décembre 2021. Le Groupe d’experts de l’ONU sur le Mali a signalé  en août 2023 que la surface du territoire malien contrôlé par Daech au Sahel avait presque doublé en moins d’un an. Le groupe Wagner n’a pas réussi à améliorer la sécurité du Mali, 2022 ayant été l’année la plus meurtrière pour les civils dans ce pays depuis le début du conflit en 2012.Les forces du groupe Wagner ont été filmées  en avril 2022 en train d’enterrer une dizaine de cadavres dans une fosse commune près de la base militaire de Gossi au Mali. Le groupe Wagner a ensuite produit des vidéos modifiées et trompeuses afin d’essayer de faire porter la responsabilité de cette affaire à l’armée française et d’attiser ainsi le sentiment anti-français et anti-occidental au Mali.Les mensonges de la Russie au SoudanLes responsables russes et les représentants du groupe Wagner ont affirmé à de multiples reprises que Wagner n’avait pas de présence militaire au Soudan et que la Russie n’était pas impliquée dans la guerre civile sanglante qui oppose les forces armées soudanaises aux forces de soutien rapide (RSF) dirigées par le général Dagalo. Le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères a déclaré que la Russie ne souhaitait rien de plus  qu’une « résolution pacifique  » du conflit. Dans une déclaration  datant d’avril 2023, Prigojine a ajouté  : « Le groupe PMC  Wagner n’est nullement impliqué dans le conflit soudanais. » En outre, la Russie se présente systématiquement comme un acteur désintéressé au Soudan, qui cherche simplement à aider le pays à renforcer sa sécurité, sa stabilité et son développement économique. Lors d’une réunion en juin 2023 avec le vice-président du Conseil de souveraineté de transition du Soudan, le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov, a exprimé  sa « profonde inquiétude » face à la crise. « La Russie, a-t-il ajouté, observe avec inquiétude ce qui se passe au Soudan et souhaite contribuer à créer les conditions d’une normalisation de la situation. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner au SoudanLes civils soudanais et les victimes des activités de Wagner ne sont pas de cet avis.Des mercenaires du groupe Wagner ont tué des dizaines de mineurs soudanais travaillant dans des mines d’or artisanales le long de la frontière entre le Soudan et la République centrafricaine (RCA) au cours de leur pillage des riches mines d’or du Soudan, selon  ceux qui ont survécu à de telles attaques.D’autres survivants rapportent que des mercenaires de Wagner ont attaqué de grands campements de travailleurs migrants et de mineurs le long de la frontière entre le Soudan et la RCA, ouvrant le feu à l’aveuglette. Un témoin qui a perdu son frère et six membres de sa famille aux mains des soldats de Wagner a déclaré  que plus de 70 personnes avaient été tuées lors d’une seule attaque.Les mensonges de la Russie en LibyeLes médias d’État russes accusent régulièrement les forces de l’OTAN de détruire  l’État libyen et d’être à l’origine de l’instabilité qui y règne actuellement, en vue de servir les intérêts des États membres de l’Alliance. Ces organes de propagande soutiennent le narratif mensonger de la Russie, qui se présente comme une puissance altruiste et anticoloniale cherchant uniquement à venir en aide aux pays africains. Pendant des années, le gouvernement russe a rejeté  toute allégation de présence de mercenaires ou de militaires russes en Libye, la porte-parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, Maria Zakharova, ayant affirmé  en 2020 qu’il n’y avait « aucune présence russe en Libye » et que « les CMP ne sont pas autorisées par le droit russe ». Des représentants du gouvernement russe ont affirmé à plusieurs reprises  que les accusations selon lesquelles la Russie avait pris parti dans le conflit libyen étaient des « mensonges » et qu’elle s’efforçait de parvenir « à un cessez-le-feu et à un règlement politique du conflit ». En 2020, l’envoyé de la Russie auprès des Nations unies, Vassily Nebenzya, a condamné  les accusations d’implication de mercenaires russes en Libye : « Cette information (...) est en grande partie fondée sur des données non vérifiées ou fallacieuses et elle vise à discréditer la politique de la Russie à l’égard de la Libye. Il s’agit manifestement d’histoires inventées. »La vérité sur le groupe Wagner en LibyeIl existe des preuves sans équivoque montrant que le groupe Wagner s’est introduit en Libye à des fins politiques et financières, qu’il a commis des violations des droits de la personne contre le peuple libyen et qu’il intensifie l’instabilité actuelle.Le groupe Wagner, que le gouvernement russe a reconnu avoir soutenu , aurait agi en violation de la résolution 1970 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et d’autres résolutions pertinentes en fournissant des équipements militaires et des mercenaires  sur les lignes de front du conflit libyen, notamment des avions de chasse, des véhicules blindés et des systèmes de défense antiaérienne. Selon le Commandement des États-Unis pour l’Afrique (AFRICOM) , au moins 14 Mig-29 et Su-24 ont été repeints pour dissimuler leurs marquages russes d’origine et ont ensuite été transportés par avion vers la Libye depuis des bases russes en Syrie. Le groupe Wagner « prolonge un conflit responsable de souffrances inutiles et de la mort de civils innocents », a déclaré  l’AFRICOM.Le groupe Wagner a placé  des mines terrestres et des pièges lors de son retrait de Tripoli en 2020, selon des informations publiques. Les mines et autres engins explosifs auraient  tué ou blessé plus de 300 personnes en Libye entre mai 2020 et mars 2022, notamment dans des zones précédemment contrôlées par les forces du groupe Wagner. Le rapport final  de la Mission d’établissement des faits en Libye (FFM), relevant de l’ONU, indique que les forces de Wagner ont placé « des explosifs militaires dans des logements, à l’intérieur de canapés et d’équipements de salles de bain, et dans d’autres zones où se trouvent des civils, ce qui a fait des morts et des blessés dans la population ». La FFM a déterminé que le personnel de Wagner « pourrait avoir violé le principe de proportionnalité du droit international et l’obligation de réduire les effets indiscriminés des mines et autres explosifs » et qu’il a également « violé le droit  à la vie » en s’abstenant d’éliminer les munitions pour assurer la sécurité des civils.Selon le Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, le groupe Wagner a mené  des campagnes de désinformation en Libye pour tenter de renforcer le soutien aux personnalités alliées à la Russie qui s’opposent au gouvernement reconnu par l’ONU à Tripoli. Le groupe Wagner a mis en place un appareil de médias sociaux en Libye qui a pour objet de promouvoir Haftar, Saif al-Islam Kadhafi et d’autres personnalités politiques dont le Kremlin pensait qu’elles pourraient devenir de futurs clients de la Russie, et ce, en utilisant des méthodes qui rappellent celles qu’employait Prigojine pour s’immiscer dans d’autres élections étrangères, selon  le Stanford Internet Observatory. Wagner a créé au moins 12 groupes Facebook pour manipuler l’opinion publique libyenne, et ces pages ont été consultées par plus de deux millions d’utilisateurs chaque semaine. Le groupe a également acheté 50 % de l’ancienne société de radiodiffusion publique libyenne, A1 Jamahiriya TV , dont il a transféré les studios à l’étranger avant de renouveler ses émissions en Libye.La Russie est responsableL’écosystème russe de désinformation et de propagande continue de déployer des narratifs mensongers tels que ceux décrits ci-dessus pour détourner l’attention des violations des droits de la personne et des atrocités commises par le groupe Wagner et le soustraire à ses responsabilités. Le groupe Wagner, soutenu par le Kremlin, exploite l’insécurité pour étendre la présence de la Russie en Afrique à des fins d’influence politique et de gain financier. Ce faisant, il menace la stabilité et les droits de la personne sur le continent. En janvier 2023, le département du Trésor des États-Unis a désigné  le groupe Wagner comme une organisation criminelle transnationale pour avoir commis, parmi d’autres faits scandaleux, « des actes criminels graves, notamment des exécutions de masse, des viols, des enlèvements d’enfants et des violences physiques en République centrafricaine (RCA) et au Mali ».&nbsp;
- The Wagner Group’s Atrocities in Africa: Lies and Truth Global Engagement CenterThis report is also available in French.After years of denying the Russian government’s links to the Wagner Group, President Putin admitted in June 2023 that the Kremlin provided 86 billion rubles (approximately $940 million in October 2023) in financial support to the group from May 2022 to May 2023. The death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin on August 23, 2023, provides an opportunity to review some of the most egregious ways in which the Russian government has lied about the role, purposes, and so-called successes of the Wagner Group. This report analyzes and counters the false claims Russia continues to spread about the Wagner Group’s activities in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Sudan, and Libya – and reveals them for what they are &#8211; criminals motivated by greed rather than an effective counterterrorism force.The transnational criminal organization Wagner Group’s exploitation of African resources, notably gold, diamonds, and timber, is only one node of its destabilizing influence across Africa. Wagner Group forces have reportedly razed entire villages and murdered civilians in the Central African Republic (CAR) to advance their economic interests in the mining sector, participated in the unlawful execution of people in Mali, raided artisanal gold mines in Sudan, and undermined democratic institutions in every country where they have worked. They have also been accused of paying their bills in counterfeit currency. This pattern of criminal behavior – and of preying on Africans – is not going to end with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death.Wherever Wagner deploys a stark rise in civilian deaths follows. According to the Economist and recent Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) data, violence perpetrated against civilians by Wagner Group in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) is not only frequent, but far more deadly to non-combatants than state-led or rebel force attacks. According to The Economist, Wagner killed at least 1,800 African civilians as of August 2023. Wagner justifies its brutal presence in Africa as “supporting peace and stability.” However, in Mali alone, terrorist violence against civilians since 2021 has surged by 278 percent.Russia’s Lies in the Central African RepublicRussia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem falsely portrays the Wagner Group as playing a positive role in nations such as CAR. Although the Wagner Group has been deployed in CAR since 2018, Russian officials still refer to the group’s forces as “Russian instructors” when discussing the group’s activities, a narrative that continued after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. Russian officials quoted in Russian state-funded media claim that Russian instructors have “saved” CAR and are “strengthening peace and stability” to bring a “lasting peace.” The U.S.-sanctioned Officer’s Union of International Security (OUIS or “COSI”) serves as a front company for Wagner Group operations in CAR. Its U.S.-sanctioned director, Aleksandr Ivanov, justifies Wagner’s presence in CAR, saying “The fighters of the Wagner Group remain in CAR, so the inhabitants of the Republic can sleep peacefully! ...the Republic has become a safe place for the life and development of the local population.” The Truth about the Wagner Group in Central African RepublicReports from the United Nations and independent media document the truth about the Wagner Group and its brutal treatment of the people of CAR.CBS reported in May 2023 that Wagner forces used indiscriminate killing, abductions, and rape to gain control of a key mining area near the city of Bambari, with survivors describing the attacks in detail: &#8220;To say &#8216;killing&#8217; is an understatement. It was total carnage. Like Armageddon&#8230; They spoke Russian. Even Chechen. Some wore masks and had long beards.&#8221;People in CAR, including journalists, aid workers and minorities, as well as international peacekeepers, have been violently harassed and threatened by so-called “Russian instructors” from the Wagner Group, UN experts reported in October 2021.Despite Russia and Wagner’s claims that it brings stability to the areas it operates in, the group – operating from CAR and allegedly outside of the host government’s awareness – plotted to overthrow the government of Chad in early 2023, an action that could have exacerbated an already challenging humanitarian situation for women, children, and other civilians.Russia’s Lies in MaliRussian officials, Russian state-funded media, and Kremlin-linked Telegram channels continuously message on the Wagner Group’s allegedly “positive” role in Mali since the group’s deployment in 2021. Despite these posts, Mali’s transition government has yet to publicly acknowledge that Wagner Group is in Mali. Propaganda videos continue to circulate online portraying Wagner Group forces as saviors and “warrior angels.” Before Wagner’s deployment to Mali, Russia highlighted false narratives like those it deployed about CAR, repeating the myth that “Russian instructors” would bring peace, stability, and would also have new success at fighting counterterrorism in the country. Aleksandr Ivanov, the U.S.-sanctioned director of the OUIS, boasted to Malian news sites that the Wagner Group was “doing excellent work all over the world,” claiming it “will fight terrorism everywhere.” A Russia-linked propaganda video circulating after Wagner’s deployment to Mali, at the end of 2021, falsely suggested that the United States and France are supporting violent religious extremists in Mali.The Truth about the Wagner Group in MaliThe facts tell a different story.Contrary to Russia’s claim, the Wagner Group has not been effective in countering terrorism in Mali since first deploying in December 2021. The UN Panel of Experts for Mali reported in August 2023 that ISIS-Sahel almost doubled its territorial control in Mali in less than a year. Wagner Group has failed to make Mali safer, with 2022 being the deadliest year for civilians in Mali since the current conflict broke out in 2012.Wagner Group forces were captured on video in April 2022 burying a dozen bodies in a mass grave near the Gossi military base in Mali. Wagner Group then produced misleadingly edited videos and attempted to falsely blame the French military for the incident, in order to increase anti-French and anti-Western sentiment in Mali.Russia’s Lies in SudanRussian officials and Wagner Group representatives have repeatedly claimed that Wagner has no military presence in Sudan and that Russia is not involved in the country’s bloody civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Dagalo. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that Russia only desires a “peaceful resolution” to the conflict. In an April 2023 statement, Prigozhin added: “Wagner PMC is in no way involved in the Sudanese conflict.” Russia also consistently portrays itself as a disinterested actor in Sudan, merely seeking to assist the country in strengthening its security, stability, and economic development. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, in a June 2023 meeting with Sudan’s Deputy Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, expressed “deep concern” over the crisis. Lavrov added that “Russia is watching with concern what is happening in Sudan and is interested in helping to create the conditions for normalizing the situation.”The Truth about the Wagner Group in SudanSudanese civilians and victims of Wagner activities say otherwise.Wagner Group mercenaries have killed scores of Sudanese miners working in artisanal gold mines along the border between Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), according to survivors of these attacks, while they loot Sudan’s rich gold mines.Other survivors report that Wagner mercenaries have attacked encampments full of migrant workers and miners along the Sudanese/CAR border, shooting indiscriminately. A witness who lost his brother and six relatives at the hands of Wagner soldiers said more than 70 people were killed in a single attack. Russia’s Lies in LibyaRussia’s state-sponsored media outlets regularly accuse NATO forces of destroying the Libyan state and of initiating the ongoing instability there in pursuit of its member states’ own interests. These propaganda outlets support Russia’s false narrative, portraying itself as an altruistic, anti-colonial power seeking only to help African countries. For years, the Russian Government rejected any claims of a Russian mercenary or military presence in Libya, with Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova in 2020 asserting that there was “no Russian presence in Libya,” and that “PMCs are not allowed under Russian law.” Russian Government representatives repeatedly argued that accusations it had taken sides in the Libyan conflict were “lies,” and that it strove for a “ceasefire and political settlement of the conflict.” In 2020, Russian Envoy to the UN, Vassily Nebenzya, condemned accusations of Russian mercenary involvement in Libya as “largely based on unverified or spurious data and aimed at discrediting Russia&#8217;s policy on Libya. These are obviously planted stories.”The Truth about Wagner Group in LibyaThere is clear evidence that Wagner Group has inserted itself in Libya for political and financial gain, committing human rights abuses against the Libyan people and intensifying ongoing instability.Wagner Group, as an admitted Russian Government-backed entity, reportedly has acted contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1970 and other relevant resolutions by providing military equipment and mercenaries to the front lines of the Libya conflict, including fighter aircraft, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. According to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), at least 14 Mig-29s and Su-24s were painted over to disguise their Russian marks of origin and then flown from Russia’s bases in Syria to Libya. Wagner Group is “prolonging conflict responsible for the needless suffering and the deaths of innocent civilians,” AFRICOM has stated.The Wagner Group placed landmines and boobytraps while withdrawing from Tripoli in 2020, according to public reporting. Mines and other explosive ordnance reportedly killed or wounded more than 300 people in Libya between May 2020 and March 2022, including in areas formerly controlled by Wagner Group forces. The UN Fact-Finding Mission in Libya’s (FFM’s) final report indicates that Wagner forces placed “military explosives in homes, inside sofas and bathroom fixtures, and other civilian areas, which led to death and injury of civilians.” The FFM determined that Wagner personnel “may have violated the international law principle of proportionality and the obligation to minimize the indiscriminate effects of mines and other explosives” as well as “violating the right to life” of Libyans by not clearing the ordnance for the safety of civilians.Wagner conducted disinformation campaigns in Libya in an attempt to boost support for Russian-allied figures who oppose the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, according to the African Center for Strategic Studies. Wagner built a social media apparatus in Libya to promote Haftar, Saif al-Islam Gaddhafi, and other political figures whom the Kremlin believed could become future clients of Russia, using methods reminiscent of previous Prigozhin-led interference in other foreign elections, according to the Stanford Internet Observatory. Wagner created at least 12 different Facebook groups to manipulate Libyan public opinion, and these pages were viewed by over two million users each week. Wagner also purchased 50% of the former Libyan state-run broadcasting company, A1 Jamahiriya TV, transferring its studios to a location overseas and renewing its broadcasts into Libya.Russia is ResponsibleRussia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem continues to deploy false narratives such as those outlined above to deflect attention from and avoid responsibility for the Wagner Group’s human rights abuses and atrocities.The Kremlin-backed Wagner Group exploits insecurity to expand Russia’s presence in Africa for political influence and financial gain. In doing so, they threaten stability and human rights on the continent. In January 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization for committing, among other egregious acts, “an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity, including mass executions, rape, child abductions, and physical abuse in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali.”
- Department Press Briefing – February 1, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – February 1, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – February 1, 2024																																																					February 1, 2024																																																								2:05 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: I wanted to wait for you to get &#8212;QUESTION: Sorry.MR MILLER: I wanted to wait for you to get &#8212;QUESTION: I won’t – I just &#8212;MR MILLER: I would like to blame the uncomfortable pause for my waiting for you, but in fact I was just trying to pull up my opening comments.QUESTION: Apologize for being – for being late. I had to take a call.MR MILLER: It’s quite all right.QUESTION: But I will defer.MR MILLER: Well, good because I have something to start with. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have been clear that the levels of violence we have seen in the West Bank over the past few months are unacceptable. Violence in the West Bank surged to alarming levels in 2023. This includes unprecedented levels of violence by Israeli extremist settlers targeting Palestinians and their property, as well as violence by Palestinian extremist militants against Israeli civilians.Earlier today, the President issued a new executive order establishing U.S. authority to impose financial sanctions against foreign persons engaged in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank. Under the authority granted by that order, the State Department is today imposing financial sanctions on four Israeli nationals for their destabilizing acts in the West Bank.Today’s action follows on the step we took in December to impose visa restrictions on dozens of individuals for contributing to violence and instability in the West Bank. There is no justification for extremist violence against civilians, whatever their national origin, ethnicity, or religion.The President and the Secretary have both raised our concerns with their Israeli and Palestinian counterparts about the level of violence in the West Bank and stressed that Israel must do more to stop violence against civilians and hold accountable those responsible for it. We continue to make clear that expectation to the Government of Israel, and as we do, the United States will also continue to take actions to advance the safety, security, and dignity of Israelis and Palestinians alike.Matt.QUESTION: So – well, I said I would defer, but actually now I won’t.MR MILLER: No, I thought you meant you were deferring to me, not deferring to a colleague.QUESTION: No, no, no, I was going to defer to colleagues.MR MILLER: I was even more surprised. That’s even more surprising.QUESTION: But just – but just on this, I mean, do you have any indication that any of these four people have any assets that could actually be targeted?MR MILLER: So I will defer to the Treasury Department to speak to the specific flow of assets. But I will say that when we impose financial sanctions of this nature it is not just a question of assets that can be frozen. It’s also a question of transactions that individuals and organizations take that may flow through or in some way interact with the U.S. financial system, which, as you know, a good deal of transactions that take place all over the world tend to do.QUESTION: Yes, I do because I was just on the phone with a bank. (Laughter.) Not about this.MR MILLER: Fair enough.QUESTION: But yes. So, but – so you do think it will have an actual impact on these people?MR MILLER: We do think it will have an impact on these four individuals, and our expectation is that the activities we have taken both raising this with the Government of Israel and making clear our expectation that they do more to hold accountable those responsible for settler violence. The visa restrictions that we imposed in December and the actions we imposed today will all have an impact, and we remain willing to impose additional actions if necessary.QUESTION: Okay, and then last one. Just the four today, and are they also hit with the travel ban, the visa restrictions?MR MILLER: We – so we are not – we have the same – we’re back to the place we were before with the travel ban, which is we are not by law allowed to announce the impositions of visa restrictions.QUESTION: Well, how many people have been affected by both the – your order in December on the travel ban and today.MR MILLER: So dozens of the visa restrictions – and I can’t give you &#8212;QUESTION: Dozens is &#8212;MR MILLER: Dozens. Dozens. I can’t get any more specific than that. And then four &#8212;QUESTION: Three dozen? Four dozen?MR MILLER: Dozens. And then four, four individuals today.QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Dozens plus four. Try to try that math.QUESTION: Dozens plus four. So it could be 28?MR MILLER: It’s dozens. I can’t get any more specific than that.QUESTION: So Matt, while this is one of the most significant actions by the administration, I’m wondering – a lot of people point out that many of these settlers do have U.S. citizenship. So I wonder what tools, if any, does the United States have if it wants to take actions against these settlers with U.S. citizenship.MR MILLER: So I would say that the first responsibility here for policing destabilizing action, for policing violence in the West Bank, is with the Government of Israel, and the Government of Israel that is on the ground that we have been very clear needs to do more to arrest extremist settlers engaged in violence and prosecute extremist settlers engaged in violence, and that we have made that clear to them.We have seen them take some additional steps since we began these interventions, both the Secretary in his trips to the region and the President in his various phone calls with Prime Minister Netanyahu.That’s the first – like, the first line of responsibility is with the Israeli Government, and we continue to hope that they will do more. But then we are willing and, as we have shown through our actions both with the visa bans and the actions we take today, committed to taking further actions within our ability to police settler violence, extremist settler violence, and we’ll continue to take additional steps as necessary. But I don’t have anything else to preview.QUESTION: And when you say we’re willing to take further action, do you mean against Israeli settlers with dual citizenship, or just U.S. citizenship? Do you mean the &#8212;MR MILLER: I just don’t have any further actions to preview today. But we think it’s important that extremist settler violence be – that those involved in it be held accountable for their actions, whatever their citizenship.QUESTION: Okay. And there is also another criticism out there, that this reduces the problem just to individuals, whereas there seems to be a targeted institutionalized effort to expand the settlements in the West Bank. You guys have been raising this issue with the Israelis for a while. But I mean, how do you go about solving that problem, really? Because I mean – and again, attached to that I want to ask: What exact answer is the Secretary and U.S. officials in this building are getting from Israeli Government when they raise this issue? It’s – because it’s clear that you don’t seem to be satisfied with the actions that they’re taking.MR MILLER: So what – without betraying too much of our private diplomatic conversations, I will say we have had some very frank conversations with them about extremist settler violence. And that includes some very detailed conversations where we have presented cases to the Israeli Government, cases of settler violence that – where we have seen reports, and where we have seen documented settler violence, and asked them to take action. And we have seen them take some action. And so we’ve engaged in a back and forth with them, both at the – at the Secretary’s level and through our embassy.What we have seen – and I should say we have seen since those interventions over the past month, six weeks, two months, we have seen the level of extremist settler violence come down somewhat. Not come down enough; we want to see more. But the interventions that we’ve made have, we believe, made a difference. But we want to see it continue to come down, which is why we have taken the actions today.With respect to your questions about settlements, we have made clear that we think the expansion of settlements in the West Bank undermine peace, undermine stability, threaten an ultimate – the ultimate establishment of a Palestinian – independent Palestinian state, make it more difficult. And so we will continue to engage with the Israeli Government on that matter as well.QUESTION: Could I follow up?QUESTION: Just a follow-up.MR MILLER: Let me go to Shaun first. Let me go to Shaun first, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: Just a – just on the Israeli response to this. You’ve probably seen Netanyahu’s office is saying, hey, look, Israel – I mean, I’m paraphrasing – Israel has laws, we punish people who break the law; we don’t need the U.S. to do this. What’s – is there a response to that? I mean, is that – is – why haven’t they done it, then? Is that – I mean, is there a – do you think that’s a valid argument in itself?MR MILLER: So they do have laws against violence, obviously, and we have seen them, as I said, take some steps to rein in settler violence. But we don’t think those steps have been sufficient, which is why you’ve seen us take a series of actions, starting in December and continuing with the President’s executive order and the sanctions we imposed today.QUESTION: Sure. I have some peripherally related, but if you want to, please.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: I just want to clarify the point that Humeyra raised on both regarding your citizens, U.S. citizens. If they have, like, assets and properties and so on, could they – or is that a Justice Department issue? Could they be seized or frozen, something like this?MR MILLER: This executive order is targeted at foreign persons.QUESTION: Okay. All right. And on the issue of the settlements, you have – obviously, you have leveraged sanctioning the settlers, extremist settlers, and so on. But you are not leveraging the settlement expansions, and so on. So I know Humeyra asked, but I didn’t really quite understand what you tried to say.MR MILLER: My answer was that we have been quite clear that we oppose &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; the expansion of settlements. We believe that they undermine prospects for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, they threaten peace and security and stability in the West Bank, and we have made that clear with the Government of Israel. We’ll continue to make it clear with them.QUESTION: Is that including efforts to reverse some of the settlement – the illegal settlements back?MR MILLER: We have made clear that we oppose the expansion of settlements. Obviously, the issue of settlements has been a topic of dispute for some time, something that we have said needs to be resolved in final negotiations over the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. But we oppose the expansion of settlements.QUESTION: I have a couple more, but – if I may.MR MILLER: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah. One, have you – have you heard about the H.R. 6679 that was passed today in the House?MR MILLER: I have.QUESTION: About restricting visas of Hamas but also the PLO. I mean, the PLO is someone that you interlocute with. They have come – they have – they come to New York. They come to other places, and so on. How is that going to affect them? Why is that?MR MILLER: Well, it’s not &#8212;QUESTION: And of course, with the congressional approval &#8212;MR MILLER: Right now it has no effect, because it’s draft legislation. We don’t have – we – I don’t have any comment on a draft legislation.QUESTION: All right. Okay, that’s fine. On – just a couple more things. The chief of – the chiefs of WHO, UNICEF, and several other organizations, NGOs &#8212;MR MILLER: The chief of who? Sorry.QUESTION: They &#8212;MR MILLER: Bad – you’re old enough to – you’re old enough to remember.QUESTION: “Who’s on first?”MR MILLER: You’re old enough to get the joke. The WHO, I think you mean? Yeah. Right. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Yeah. WHO. Okay.MR MILLER: I thought first, “Who’s on first?” Yeah, who’s on second?QUESTION: Yeah, who’s on second. Exactly.QUESTION: What’s on second.QUESTION: What’s on second. All right.QUESTION: I don’t know is on third.QUESTION: We know that one. Okay, all right.MR MILLER: There are a lot of people in this room who have no idea what we’re talking about right now. (Laughter.) Sorry, go ahead.QUESTION: Us old-timers know it.MR MILLER: Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: So the chiefs of these organizations have warned that suspending financial aid is going to result in a total disaster. I mean, there are reports about just looming famine and so on, and I know I asked about this yesterday, but it seems to have gained more urgency, especially that Lazzarini said that without the aid they can operate – they cannot possibly operate beyond the end of this month.MR MILLER: So I don’t really have anything to add to what I said yesterday, which is that, number one, there is an urgent humanitarian crisis in Gaza. It’s why – it’s what has animated all of the efforts from the Secretary and others in the U.S. Government to try to get humanitarian assistance in. Number two, UNRWA plays a critical role. You have heard us say that dating back to before Friday when these allegations were announced publicly and we temporarily paused our aid. You’ve seen us say it since then. And number three, that is why we think it is so important that the United Nations conduct a prompt, thorough investigation to make sure that there is accountability and make sure that any reforms that need to be instituted are put in place. It is, as I said yesterday, precisely because the need is so dire that it’s important that the United Nations conduct a prompt and thorough investigation.QUESTION: Can I just ask you one thing on this?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The – related to the conflict. The Qataris today are saying that they had, I think the phrase they used is “initial positive confirmation” from Hamas about the proposal that CIA Chief Burns has been involved in regarding a temporary truce for the hostage release. Do you have any latest assessment about where things are going and whether there’s any more optimism about this?MR MILLER: I just don’t think I should offer any – either an assessment from this podium or a kind of detailed play-by-play of the back and forth, other than to say that as you heard the Secretary say earlier this week, we think the proposal that was on the table was a strong, constructive one, and for now I should leave it at that.QUESTION: Maybe not a detailed play-by-play but a general play-by-play. Have there been calls or anything &#8212;MR MILLER: Neither a detailed nor a general play-by-play, I don’t think, would be helpful for me to offer from here.QUESTION: Matt, the Secretary met with some Palestinian Americans today for a roundtable. A number of people have said they refused the invitation in protest of the administration’s policies toward Gaza. Do you have any comment?MR MILLER: So the Secretary did meet today with a number of leaders of the Palestinian American community. It was the latest in a series of meetings that the Secretary has had with individuals and organizations both within the department and from outside the department that hold a wide range of views across the ideological and political spectrum, and he has held these meetings because he thinks it’s important to hear directly from individuals, as I said, both inside the State Department and outside the State Department. He finds that process to be constructive. It informs his thinking. It helps him, he believes, shape policy in the best way possible, and he’ll continue to hold such meetings.QUESTION: Has it shaped policy – any of these meetings, though? I mean, we haven’t really seen &#8212;MR MILLER: I can say that every interaction that we have enters into the Secretary’s thinking and enters into other policymakers’ thinking in the administration. That doesn’t mean, obviously, that we agree with every person that we meet with. It doesn’t mean that we expect them to agree with everything that we say. Of course that’s not true. But we find the give and take valuable and yes, it very much does inform his thinking and informs the decisions that he makes.QUESTION: Can you say how many people attended the roundtable today?MR MILLER: I don’t. The meeting was ongoing when I came down here for the podium, so I don’t have a detailed readout.Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple questions, as we will not see you next couple of days. Can you speak to the EU’s today’s decision of a 50 billions package to Ukraine, its significance, and how much do you think it should hold a mirror up to the U.S. Congress?MR MILLER: So we welcome the continued support of our European allies and partners for Ukraine as it depends – defends itself from Russia’s aggression. And I would say, as you have heard multiple people from inside the administration say, it is important that the U.S. Congress act as soon as possible to advance our national security interests by helping Ukraine defend itself and secure its future.And I think the decision by the EU today just highlights something that you have heard the Secretary say over and over again, which is it is not just the United States that is supporting Ukraine; it is a broad coalition of allies and partners in Europe and around the world who are doing so. And in fact, when you look at the financial contribution that has been made to support Ukraine, the European nations have contributed more. The United States has contributed somewhere around $75 billion in assistance. The European nations collectively have contributed around $110 billion. So this is very much a collective effort, and we believe it is in the national security interests of the United States that the Congress do its part and step up and pass the supplemental request that the President has put forward.QUESTION: Thank you. And separately, staying on the region, Russia today has extended its detention of RFE/RL reporter Alsu Kurmasheva. Firstly, your reaction to it. And secondly, some European countries sent their representatives to the – to the processing. Why weren’t the Americans in the room?MR MILLER: So we are aware of the extension of her detention in Russia. We remain deeply concerned about this matter. We have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens.And I will say with respect to – with respect to her detention, or her hearing today, because of Russian Government-imposed staffing and travel restrictions, Embassy Moscow was unable to attend the hearing in Kazan where she is being held. We continue to see consular access to Ms. Kurmasheva and insist that Russia allow consistent, timely consular access to all U.S. citizens.And I will say because – although we were not able to attend the hearing because of these Russian Government-imposed staffing and travel restrictions, we are in close touch with her legal team about the matter.QUESTION: Thank you. A final one on Azerbaijan. Yesterday, I asked you about the snap elections in Azerbaijan. The OSCE overnight came up with its initial report, highlighted some concerns, particularly the candidates previously supporting the current president. Where are you standing on this?MR MILLER: I just don’t have any comment on the internal elections inside Azerbaijan.QUESTION: Is that because it’s not significant enough or is that because &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry? I just don’t have any comment on it.QUESTION: Are you also aware &#8212;QUESTION: Can we go back &#8212;QUESTION: Are you also following the events in Georgia? The prime minister stepped down and got replaced – actually is being replaced with another ruling party leader. What are you – what’s your reading about that?MR MILLER: So we’re obviously aware of the formation of a new government and the discussions coming up in parliament. Our embassy works closely with the Georgian Government, and we look forward to continuing that relationship.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Abbie.QUESTION: I just had one follow-up on the line of questioning earlier with Humeyra about the individuals who had been sanctioned earlier today. Senior administration officials had said some of those individuals had already been prosecuted under the Israeli system. How many of the four had already been prosecuted?MR MILLER: Three of those four had been prosecuted; one had not.QUESTION: So actions had already been taken. Are – did you feel that those actions didn’t go far enough that the Israelis took?MR MILLER: We thought it was appropriate to take additional U.S. Government action, and we will continue to monitor the levels of extremist settler violence and will not hesitate to take additional actions as necessary.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR MILLER: Sorry, Michel. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: No, no.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. My question is about U.S.-India diplomacy or diplomatic relations between the two countries. India’s top diplomat to the U.S., Ambassador Taranjit Singh Sandhu – he’s ending his tenure today after almost four years, or one of the longest-serving U.S. – India’s diplomat to Washington. What he said, that he had been thanking the State Department, the media, and also people of the United States for cooperating with him in his tenure in Washington. During the last few weeks at the farewells, he said that diplomatic relations between the two countries have gone up between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi.But also at the same time, because when he arrived in Washington, the very next month COVID started and he was stuck two years in the embassy or the in the residence. But at that time, thousands of students and Indians were stuck in Washington because colleges, universities, and schools were closed, and with the help of the State Department and – he was able to send them back to India a while earlier. My question is that – also he met with the Secretary of State also quite a few times, and he was also, of course, instrumental bringing Prime Minister Modi last year in June in Washington, and finally G20 visits also he – so where his general stance as far as State Department’s concerned or Secretary of State is concerned? Where do we go, where we stand today, after – well, he’s leaving today – Washington.MR MILLER: So I would say that our partnership with India is one of most consequential relationships. We work closely with India on our most vital priorities. We have had a close working relationship with the ambassador, have been able to work with him on a number of those shared priorities, including the crucial role India plays in ensuring a free, open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. We wish him well in his future endeavors and look forward to welcoming his replacement.QUESTION: And finally, do ambassadors play different role, different ambassadors, when they come to Washington here? Let’s say many other Indian diplomats were here, ambassadors, and many will be coming back or new will be coming back and replacing him.MR MILLER: So I think every ambassador approaches their tenure differently, both inside countries from ambassador to ambassador and, in my experience, among different countries represented here in Washington.QUESTION: And finally – sorry.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Finally, how do you put relations between Secretary of State Blinken and India’s defense – foreign minister Dr. Jaishankar?MR MILLER: They have a close working relationship, where they are able to engage on some of our most urgent and important priorities. Obviously the Secretary has traveled to India to meet with the foreign minister on a number of occasions. He’s welcomed him here, he’s met with him in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly, and we look forward to continuing to work with him.Michel.QUESTION: Thank you very much, sir.QUESTION: Mali military authority has ended the 2015 peace deal with Tuareg separatist rebels due to other signatories not sticking to their commitments and hostile acts by chief mediator, Algeria, as they said. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: So we regret the transition government’s withdrawal from the Algiers Accord, which if fully implemented would have provided more stability for all Malians and the whole region. We remain concerned by the resumption of hostilities and the risk of returning to civil war among the signatory armed groups to the Algiers Accord and the transition government, including its Wagner Group partners.QUESTION: And Algerian media points finger to – or at Morocco for Mali’s withdrawal from the peace agreement. Do you think that Morocco played any role in this regard?MR MILLER: I wouldn’t want to comment on that, other than to say that we do believe that the withdrawal from the accord was unfortunate, and we regret that the transition government made that decision.QUESTION: And no role that Morocco has played?MR MILLER: I don&#8217;t have any comment on that.QUESTION: Thanks.QUESTION: Can we stay in Africa?MR MILLER: Sure. Yeah.QUESTION: Kenya. I know the meeting I believe is this afternoon &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; as – but the Secretary meeting the – Kenya’s top diplomat about Haiti, obviously. I know there was a statement that was issued over the weekend, but is the U.S. still hopeful that Kenya can lead this mission in Haiti, or is there a look now for a plan B? It’s been well over a year since the U.S. started talking about this.MR MILLER: We are still hopeful. Obviously we saw the decision by the Kenyan Supreme Court last week. We noted that the executive branch in Kenya declared that they would appeal that ruling. We will be watching that matter closely. We do think that the multinational force is important to go forward as soon as possible. We continue to work with international partners, both Kenya and other international partners, about funding for that multinational police force and want to see it implemented as soon as possible.Go ahead. Start over here.QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to Gaza, the UN Secretary-General Guterres today warned that the humanitarian system in Gaza is collapsing, saying that everyone is hungry and 1.7 million have been displaced. Do you have anything on that, any updates on your efforts to address the humanitarian situation and hunger in Gaza?MR MILLER: So we continue to work to try to increase the flow of humanitarian assistance in, and I think one of the ways I would address that is so the – we have seen a number of problems, right, with delivering humanitarian assistance to – actually not just into Gaza but to the people in Gaza, and chief among those problems is not just the ability to get aid into Gaza but then to actually deliver it to the people who need it inside Gaza because of the intense nature of fighting in an ongoing conflict.So what we saw during the last humanitarian pause, the one that was implemented in late November, was a surge in humanitarian assistance into Gaza and an increase in the distribution of that humanitarian assistance once it got inside Gaza for the reasons I just articulated. So one of the reasons we think another hostage – another pause would be so important is not just to secure the release of the hostages who are still being held by Hamas, but also because it would enable the sustained increase in distribution of humanitarian assistance. So I think what we – we would say that we have pursued this pause intensively, and we have made clear it’s a priority of the United States. Other countries in the region have made clear it’s a priority for all of these same reasons, and we are hopeful that – and it’s why we hope that Hamas, which continues to hold hostages and continues to hide behind human shields and continues to take activities that makes it so difficult to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza – we hope that they will agree to a pause.QUESTION: And do you have any updates on the possibility of another pause in Gaza?MR MILLER: I don’t. As I said earlier to I think it was Shaun’s question, I just don’t think it’s productive for me to give a play-by-play about what are intense private negotiations from here.Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. After the attack on – in Jordan, the Iraqi Government took some steps, and they mentioned these groups – to put statements and suspend their attacks. So as you are seeking to retaliate and responding these groups, especially KH in Iraq, how do you get engaged with the Iraqi Government? How do you notify the Iraqi Government that you are responding these groups who were responsible for the attack in Jordan?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to any one particular communication with the Government of Iraq, but we have made clear to the Government of Iraq for months, going well back – well before this attack over the weekend – that we wanted to see the Government of Iraq do more to police attacks on our forces, to hold accountable those responsible for attacks on our forces, and that if – that we would not hesitate to take action to defend ourselves. And that continues to be our message to the Government of Iraq. It was our message before the horrific attacks of last weekend; it will continue to be our message.QUESTION: For the last attacks, the Iraqi Government put statements and they condemned your attacks on the militia groups inside Iraq, and so they said this is a violation to the Iraqi sovereignty. As you have a good relations with the Iraqi Government, is there any concern that if you do another attack in Iraqi land or – that will make the Iraqi Government upset of you and something like that?MR MILLER: So I am not going to – it’s difficult to answer that question without commenting on the location, let alone the timing, of future attacks, which I am not – or future responses that the United States might take, which I am not going to do, as we consistently have not done from this podium. But as a general matter, we have made quite clear to the Iraqi Government, as I’ve just said before, that we will not hesitate to defend U.S. forces. We have taken action to defend U.S. forces inside Iraq. That is – it is our responsibility to do so, and we will continue to do that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Recently the House Foreign Affairs Committee was holding a meeting on the former Afghan security forces and the U.S. allies in Afghanistan who left behind by the Biden administration. They are killing and torturing systematically by Taliban. What does the Biden administration is doing to protect them, the U.S. – the former U.S. allies in Afghanistan?MR MILLER: So again, I am – I was not following that hearing. I’m not familiar with all the testimony that’s given that – so I’m reluctant to comment in detail, but we continue to call on the Taliban to take steps to gain international legitimacy, to stop the crackdown on the legitimate expression by its own people, and that’s what we’ve done and what we’ll continue to do.QUESTION: What about &#8212;MR MILLER: One more and then I’ve got to go &#8212;QUESTION: More than two years have passed since collapse of Taliban by – collapse of Kabul by Taliban, but based on the CNN report, more than 80,000 SIV cases are still pending. Don’t you think by considering the situation in Afghanistan, the U.S. Biden administration should be accelerate those cases?MR MILLER: We have been working very hard to accelerate those cases and work through the backlog, and we’ll continue to do so.All the way in the back, because I’ve – I apologize yesterday for missing you, so let me make sure I get to you today.QUESTION: Thank you. I have three quick questions, the first one related to &#8212;MR MILLER: I didn’t say you get three questions. (Laughter.)QUESTION: One for today and – one for today, two for yesterday.MR MILLER: Fair enough. I did miss you yesterday.QUESTION: Yeah, okay. The first question is, like, related – Russia and Ukraine. President Putin suggested creating a buffer zone – demilitarized, like, buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine. Do you support this idea or not? And this is the first question, if you support – if you support a buffer zone, demilitarized, between Russia and Ukraine.MR MILLER: So I’m struggling to understand how a demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine would be implemented when Russian forces are currently inside Ukraine. Kind of tough to have a demilitarized zone when Russian forces continue to operate on the Ukrainian side of the border and have made – and President Putin has made clear over and over again that he has not changed his aims to conquer and subjugate Ukraine.So as to – so I think if the – if Russia really wanted to show interest in a demilitarized zone, the thing they could do is start by demilitarizing the parts of Ukraine where there are currently Russian forces.QUESTION: Okay. So a second question: Do you accept any roles for China or Russia, and specifically China, in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? As we saw, like, China played roles between Saudi Arabia and Iran; they looked like a peacemaker in the area, like they don’t have any criticizing toward the bias. You have a lot of criticizing that you are – have a bias toward Israel, providing them military aid, supporting their back in the United Nations, et cetera. So do you accept any roles for China, Russia, like, for playing any peacemaking roles between Palestinian and the Israelis or not?Last question: What &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, well, let me just – let me do that one first. Let me take them – and let me take them in order. So with respect to China, we have made quite clear, including in direct conversations between the – Secretary Blinken and his Chinese counterpart, that we would welcome constructive Chinese engagement in the region, both to urge de-escalation – China has a number of relationships with countries in the region where we think they could use those relationships to a positive end – and if it wanted to play a constructive role in helping resolve the ongoing conflict and ensuring lasting peace and stability, that is very much something we would welcome.With – as it pertains to Russia, we have not seen Russia really play a stabilizing role in the Middle East. In fact, if you look at Russia’s actions in Syria, it has played a destabilizing role, so I think it’s very hard to contemplate Russia playing anything of a constructive role in helping to end this conflict.QUESTION: Okay, last question.MR MILLER: Last question.QUESTION: Yeah, last question. Do you think that it’s a tangible goal that you can really destroy Hamas 100 percent even as a military militia or as a political party in Palestine? Because now it’s like over three months, almost four months, and according to The Wall Street Journal and many other mainstream medias, Hamas is still strong, like, by 70 or 80 percent. Or we are going to see, like, Taliban scenario, like strong statements about terrorist group, blah, blah, blah, and then see you or Israel sitting in the same table and Qatar sign a deal?MR MILLER: Sure. Let me – I got the – I got it. So there are – we do believe there are military objectives pertaining to the defeat of Hamas that can be accomplished, and you have seen Israel accomplish some of those objectives. They have taken out a number of Hamas leaders. They have dismantled, through their military actions, a number of Hamas battalions. There are other objectives that they have not yet met. But just as a strict military &#8212;QUESTION: How long – how long can they stay?MR MILLER: Let me – let me finish. Just as a strict military matter, there are objectives that can be met. But – and you have heard the Secretary speak to this – we also have to put forward a better idea as a political question to speak directly to the Palestinian people, and – that there is a better idea than the terrorism and death and destruction that Hamas offers. And that very much has to be part of what the United States Government and other countries in the region and Israel are putting forward. And as you have heard us say, we believe that ultimately the better idea is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that gives answer to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people &#8212;QUESTION: Demilarized? Demilarized, like independent states?MR MILLER: I don’t – I just don’t have any comment on that.Go ahead.QUESTION: So going back to the package adopted today by the EU, that was a financial support package. Meanwhile, some lawmakers at the Capitol Hill are pushing to remove at least some of the financial aid from the supplemental. Do you think – do you still think this is vital to adopt the economic aid part of the package? And I have another one, somewhat relatedly, maybe.MR MILLER: Yeah. Let me just answer that question.QUESTION: Okay. Yeah.MR MILLER: We absolutely do think that both the economic and security assistance components of the supplemental request the President made are vital.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: And so Assistant Secretary O’Brien tweeted today – X’ed – about the &#8212;MR MILLER: X’ed. (Laughter.) Which is – which assistant secretary?QUESTION: O’Brien.MR MILLER: Oh, yeah.QUESTION: About the meeting between Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Pressman, and saying that they discussed – for a discussion at the key moment in the U.S.-Hungary relationship. I wonder if you could elaborate why is – why is it a key moment?MR MILLER: What I would say is that Ambassador Pressman was here in Washington – our ambassadors regularly come home for consultations – met with the Secretary as part of that meeting. And every time that the Secretary meets with an ambassador, obviously they’re discussing the ongoing bilateral relationships between the United States and the country where that ambassador serves.QUESTION: But so there’s no, like – any breakthrough or change, any – “key moment,” it sounds like – yeah.MR MILLER: Ryan, yeah.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Can you shed a little light on the timeline around the UNRWA decision? The Israeli Government has since shared that intelligence dossier with some members of the press. They said they shared the dossier, I believe, on – on that Friday.MR MILLER: On – that’s correct.QUESTION: The decision was also announced that Friday, the same day the court ruling came out. How – how was State able to – how were you able to make such a fast decision?MR MILLER: It’s a good question. So I think there has been some confusion about this. This matter was not first brought to us by the Government of Israel; it was brought to us by UNRWA itself. UNRWA brought this matter to the Government of the United States – the State Department – on Wednesday of last week and said that they had – were aware of allegations by the Government of Israel and they had conducted their own initial assessment and found those allegations to be credible and were taking disciplinary action against a number of people.So they contacted us on Wednesday. We spent Thursday looking into the matter. We contacted the Government of Israel on Thursday, engaged in initial consultations with them. We’re continuing to talk with the United Nations. The Secretary spoke to the secretary-general on Thursday. And then on Friday we announced that decision and were briefed by Israel. But I should make very clear our decision to temporarily pause funding was not just based on the strength of Israeli evidence, but it was based on UNRWA’s own conclusion that those allegations were credible.QUESTION: Was there any concern internally that releasing the announcement within about an hour or so of the ICJ court ruling, which – which one thing it did was instruct Israel to make sure that humanitarian aid was flowing – that it would – that announcing it so close together would seem like a repudiation in some ways?MR MILLER: No, I – there was no concern, but also the United Nations has – had made its announcement. And we thought it was important that – that given that the United Nations had made that announcement – and that’s not a – that’s not timing we control. They made that announcement Friday morning. We thought that it was important that we respond as quickly as possible to make clear the position the United States. It was in no way in our mind related to the ICJ decision.QUESTION: Matt, just tangentially related to the ICJ, there was a lawsuit that was brought in a California federal court against the President, the Secretary, and Secretary of Defense Austin. It was dismissed yesterday by the judge because of a – on jurisdictional grounds. But in his ruling dismissing the case, he said that there was – the ICJ’s ruling that there was plausible grounds to believe that genocide may be being committed was fair. He noted – I don’t know if “fair” is the right word, but that there was at least as – a case to be made in court. Do you have any comment about this lawsuit and the judge’s dismissal?MR MILLER: So I don’t have any comment on the lawsuit, and one thing that I learned in my time at the Justice Department is that it is unwise to comment on remarks or decisions by federal judges. And I’ll – so I won’t do that here. But I will say it remains our conclusion that the allegations of genocide are unfounded.Go ahead.QUESTION: One more follow-up on the previous questioning.MR MILLER: Follow-up on your follow-up?QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: Your first one was a follow-up to somebody else.QUESTION: Yeah. So the message of this EO and these sanctions is to try to say that the Israelis need to take further action against the perpetrators of violence in the West Bank. If that’s the case, why would you sanction people Israel had already taken action against? Wouldn’t it have sent a stronger message to sanction those who had not yet been prosecuted?MR MILLER: So a few things. Number one, it is very much to send the message that we think more needs to be done by the Government of Israel; number two, that we will also take action on behalf of the United States, both against those who engage in settler violence and – extremist settler violence that have been prosecuted by governments and others who have not – there was one today who had – was not – part of that message is not just to the Government of Israel, but also to people who – themselves who might be considering engaging in acts of violence, to let them know that the United States Government is watching and will take action.And I also think you should not conclude that we are done with our action through our actions today. The executive order was just promulgated today, gives the State Department and the Treasury Department new sanctions authorities that we did not previously have. We will not hesitate to use those sanctions authorities if it’s appropriate to do so.Yeah.QUESTION: Could I go back to the – and it might be for your Justice Department – this was last week, but I don’t think it’s been addressed here. Alabama carried out an execution last week, which was criticized by the UN. The UN human rights commissioner is saying this might amount to torture. It’s nitrogen gas – he was supposedly thrashing on the floor for four minutes. I believe the White House commented on it. But on the international aspect, the EU condemned it, the United Nations. Is there a response that the State Department has? I realize the State Department isn’t carrying out executions.MR MILLER: I think as a – as that’s a domestic matter, I will absolutely defer to the White House and their comment on it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much, Matt. I have only one question. As I found on your last press note on Bangladesh, the United States is interested in working with Bangladesh in various security areas. These areas include counterterrorism, border security, cyber security, maritime security, and regional stability. How is it possible to work in a larger context with the new government in Bangladesh without welcoming the prime minister?MR MILLER: So I would say that we have relationships of this sort all around the world. We expressed our concerns about the Bangladeshi election. We’ve expressed our concerns about crackdowns in Bangladesh, but that doesn’t mean that we don’t have the responsibility to work with the government – both on areas where we have concern and also areas where we believe we can cooperate on shared priorities.QUESTION: Can I ask about Myanmar?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: You know that in Myanmar now, the junta and other party – this is a war zone. And more Rohingyas about to enter to Bangladesh, and also some military personnel with helicopters. Do you have any comments on the situation there?MR MILLER: On – with respect to that specific question, let me take it back. And then I’m going to go to the back of the room, and then we’ll wrap for today.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.QUESTION: Now, earlier today, we saw the readout about the certification – the certification notifying Congress of the possible drone deal between the U.S. and India. Can you sketch out the timeline or the next steps and how important this deal would be?MR MILLER: I cannot give you a timeline. This was the initial step today, notifying Congress. The exact timeline of the delivery is something that we will explore with the Government of India over the coming months.I will say with respect to the deal itself, the $3.99 – almost 4 – billion sale of 31 MQ-9B SkyGuardian aircraft will provide India with an enhanced maritime security and maritime domain awareness capability. It offers India outright ownership and a 16-fold increase in the number of aircraft, as compared to their current lease of two MQ-9A aircraft.And with that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 2:47 p.m.)# # # 						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Bangladesh																								China																								Georgia																								Haiti																								India																								Iraq																								Israel																								Kenya																								Mali																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Qatar																								Russia																								Ukraine
- Mali HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Mali				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Mali																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Mali																																												Mali				Overview:  Terrorist activities increased in number and lethality throughout the country, and terrorists continued to attack civilians, Mali’s Armed Forces (FAMa), international Peacekeepers, and international military forces.  Terrorist groups active in Mali included ISIS-Sahel (formerly ISIS-GS), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).  ISIS-Sahel’s actions over the reporting period demonstrated its intention to establish territorial control in the Sahel.  Mali’s longstanding counterterrorism partnerships with foreign forces were disrupted significantly in 2022.  Notably, France’s Operation Barkhane completed a full withdrawal from Mali, with the last of the French troops departing Mali on August 15.  Meanwhile, the FAMa moved to occupy the vacated bases along with Kremlin-backed Wagner Group forces.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  Available data indicated 2022 was the deadliest year in Mali’s history resulting both from terrorist attacks and FAMa’s counterterrorism efforts alongside Wagner forces.  JNIM and ISIS-Sahel clashed in the eastern part of the country and continued to conduct terrorist attacks, primarily attacking Malian and international peacekeeping and military forces.  While attacks principally occurred in the central area of Mali, terrorist groups continued to press farther south along the Burkinabe border into the Sikasso Region.  Additionally, attacks occurred along Mali’s borders with Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, further enveloping Bamako and other population centers.  Methods included IEDs, vehicle borne IEDs, ambushes, and kidnappings.In 2022 there were hundreds of terrorist attacks, including the following significant incidents:During June 18-19, JNIM-affiliated Katiba Macina killed 132 civilians in multiple attacks in central Mali.On July 22, JNIM conducted a complex attack against the Malian military base in Kati — 15 kilometers from Bamako — killing one soldier.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  There were no changes to Mali’s counterterrorism legal framework in 2022.  However, draft amendments to the penal code and the criminal code of procedure would further criminalize association with acts of terrorism, concealment of terrorists, and recruitment of terrorists.  Mali’s vast and porous borders extend some 4,500 miles and touch seven neighboring countries.  The Gendarmerie, the National Border Police, and the Special Intervention Brigade (BIS) all provide security and law enforcement support to prevent and deter criminal activity.  The BIS has demonstrated a continuing willingness to exchange information on individuals accused of international terrorism with U.S. law enforcement partners, including the FBI, and is actively seeking additional assistance.  However, all agencies are understaffed, are poorly trained, and lack essential equipment and resources as well as access to terrorism-related crime scenes.In late March, FAMa reported it had “neutralized” more than 200 jihadists in a major operation in Moura (in Mopti region).  NGO Human Rights Watch reported the operation as an alleged massacre committed by FAMa and Wagner forces of up to 300 civilians.  The transition government of Mali and the United Nations have yet to release a report of their investigation on the incident after nearly one year.Exit and entry stamps used by border officials have inconsistent size and shape, undermining efforts to authenticate travel documents.  The government receives Public Key Infrastructure certificates for passport security information from the International Civil Aviation Organization; however, the information sharing is done manually and inconsistently.  Security features for Malian passports remain unchanged.  Imposters obtain fraudulent documents, such as birth and marriage certificates, with relative ease, undermining the veracity of Malian identification documents.The transition government has shown willingness to honor extradition requests from the United States for individuals accused of acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests.  Fawaz Ould Ahmed Ould Ahemeid, a Mauritanian national previously in Malian custody, was extradited to the United States in December after being indicted on multiple terrorism offenses in the Eastern District of New York.The transition government has made little progress toward implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2396 regarding border security.  Mali previously implemented biometric fingerprint and facial recognition screening at established ports of entry.  However, Mali has little or no control over its many and vast territorial borders, allowing terrorists to move across borders with ease.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Mali is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa.  Its FIU, the National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CENTIF-Mali), is a member of the Egmont Group.  Mali remained on the FATF “gray list” in 2022.  In 2022, FATF reported that Mali took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, including by adopting its national risk assessment, conducting AML/CFT trainings for financial institutions and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions, and enhancing the FIU and law enforcement agency cooperation mechanisms on the use of financial intelligence.Countering Violent Extremism:  Despite the inclusion of armed group representatives in the transition government, progress on the implementation of the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the Algiers Accord) remains stalled.  This lack of progress is due to disagreements between transition government officials and signatory groups on meeting participation; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants stalling; and to signatory armed groups’ lacking authority to implement local governance.  The transition government finalized a 2021-25 national action plan to counter and prevent violent extremism.  FAMa reports of widespread success against terrorist organizations remained difficult to verify.  ISIS-Sahel’s growing sophistication and capability over the reporting period demonstrated its intent to establish a caliphate in the Sahel.International and Regional Cooperation:  The transition government has grown increasingly insular since the May 2021 consolidation of military power.  It continues to build its relationship with Russia and other non-Western partners.  Following the 2020 military coup, U.S. foreign assistance for the Government of Mali has been restricted pursuant to section 7008 of the annual appropriations act and because of Child Soldiers Prevention Act restrictions.  Mali is currently suspended from the Economic Community of West African States and the AU.  In April the European Union announced the full suspension of the EU Capacity Building Mission and the EU Training Mission in Mali.  In May, Mali withdrew from the G-5 Sahel.																												    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Argentina											Australia											Austria											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Belgium											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Brazil											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Cameroon											Canada											Chad											Colombia											Côte d’Ivoire											Cyprus											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Egypt											Ethiopia											France											Georgia											Germany											Greece											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Israel, West Bank, and Gaza											Italy											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kingdom of Saudi Arabia											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Lebanon											Libya											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Mauritania											Mexico											Morocco											Mozambique											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Panama											Paraguay											People&#8217;s Republic of China (Hong Kong and Macau)											Peru											Philippines											Qatar											Russia											Senegal											Serbia											Singapore											Somalia											South Africa											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Sweden											Sweden											Sweden											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Netherlands											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											Turkmenistan											Uganda											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)											Uzbekistan											Venezuela											Yemen																										On This Page				search													>																										Mali																	Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Counterterrorism																																														Countering Terrorism																																							Countering Violent Extremism																																							Counterterrorism																															Mali																																Terrorism
- Mali National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Mali on the 63rd anniversary of your independence.The coming year will be momentous as Malians go to the polls to vote for a new president in February. We welcome the return of a civilian democratic government chosen through free and fair elections. As the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian and development assistance, the United States remains a stalwart partner of the Malian people as we work together to improve prosperity, ensure peace, and achieve lasting stability. Today we reflect on our many years of partnership and look forward to a new era of cooperation underpinned by shared democratic values.
- Department Press Briefing – September 13, 2023 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWashington, D.C.													HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; September 13, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; September 13, 2023																																																					September 13, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									IRANDPRK/RUSSIA/REGIONBAHRAINEGYPTBAHRAINIRANRUSSIADEPARTMENTIRAQPAKISTAN/AFGHANISTANISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIESMOROCCOMALIUKRAINE/RUSSIA/NATO/REGIONJAPANCHINARUSSIA																													1:41 p.m. EDTQUESTION: I want to go back to the Iran stuff that you were talking about yesterday, and the assertion from the administration that billions of dollars in escrow accounts had been sent back or withdrawn by Iran during the previous administration without any restrictions at all. Do you have any more &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah. What I’ll say is so after the previous administration withdrew from the JCPOA and re-established or reactivated these accounts, they did not set up any procedures to give the U.S. Government either visibility or oversight into how the money was being spent. Now, look, that wasn’t required by law. But we have decided &#8212;QUESTION: Well, it’s not – it was, wasn’t it? Or &#8212;MR MILLER: No. It wasn’t required by law that they set up – that they set up &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah. But it was required by U.S. law, by law that was signed by the President, several presidents, that, I mean, money in these accounts be spent on – for only humanitarian purposes.MR MILLER: It’s not – well, no. That’s not quite accurate. It could be humanitarian or other nonsanctionable activity. So there are two &#8212;QUESTION: Well, okay.MR MILLER: Two points. So they could – two points. One, the Iranians could &#8212;QUESTION: So they could buy some Snickers bars, okay? Not humanitarian, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Nonhumanitarian, other nonsanctionable activities. But I think the larger point I was making, without direct visibility and without a mechanism for oversight, you are largely asking to trust the Iranians, which is not something that we are willing to do for a number of reasons, which is why, when we were setting up these accounts or setting up the regime for these accounts in Qatar, we were setting up visibility and oversight mechanisms so we have clear visibility into how the money is being spent and have the ability to oversee it and take action if it’s being spent for nonhumanitarian measures.QUESTION: Yeah, but – okay. So I’m still pressing for details about how many billions were taken out of India and Türkiye and Japan and South Korea that the Iranians were able to spend on – willy-nilly.MR MILLER: So we don’t have perfect visibility into this question because of the situation I just outlined, which is we don’t have visibility into the accounts and how they were being used.QUESTION: So you don’t know.MR MILLER: We do – well, let me just say we do have information that has led us to conclude that they were spent down by billions of dollars, in some cases all the way to zero. But we do not have perfect visibility about it.QUESTION: In which cases were they spent all the way down to zero?MR MILLER: I don’t have specific details on that.QUESTION: Okay. It’s my understanding that, in fact, these countries, particularly India, South Korea, and Japan, were well aware of OFAC restrictions on the escrow funds, on the funds that they were holding in escrow, and would not give the Iranians anything unless it was specifically approved and sent through either the failed European INSTEX exchange or then the almost-failed Swiss humanitarian channel.MR MILLER: Two things.QUESTION: Is that – is that incorrect?MR MILLER: First of all, those aren’t the only countries. China is another country that had one of these accounts. I – but it was &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you know what? When was the last time the Chinese, like, obeyed U.S. sanctions or respected them?MR MILLER: That’s my point.QUESTION: No. I’m talking about countries &#8212;MR MILLER: I know. And I’m about to &#8212;QUESTION: India had the largest amount with the exception of maybe China.MR MILLER: And I’m about to get to that.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I can’t speak to the other countries’ procedures. But what I can say is from our perspective, we think it’s important that the United States Government itself have direct visibility and direct oversight of these transactions, which is why we insisted on it as part of these negotiations.QUESTION: Okay. And so your direct transparency, your direct visibility into the accounts that still are in South Korea, Japan, India, Türkiye – how much are left in those?MR MILLER: (Inaudible) we do not have direct visibility. We do not know with any sort of fidelity.QUESTION: Well, the idea – you just said your whole point was that they – you want to have &#8212;MR MILLER: With the account that’s being – that we want to have with the account that’s being set up in Qatar.QUESTION: That what you did when you came in was to get direct visibility, and now you’re telling me &#8212;MR MILLER: We are getting – no, no. We are getting direct &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that you don’t have any visibility.MR MILLER: No, that’s not what I said. I’m saying we are able to get – set up this new account in Qatar. We are able to set it up under rules that allow us to have direct visibility into how the transactions are being – how the money’s being spent.QUESTION: Yeah. Well, I’m talking about – but the claim that was made on Monday and Tuesday was that when this administration came in, you set up these specific rules and restrictions on what – on how these funds being held in escrow could be used so that you would have direct visibility into it. And now you’re saying that the previous administration allowed billions of dollars to go to Iran without any restrictions on them, but the visibility that you say that you got three years ago you don’t have &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; because you can’t tell me or Treasury can’t say how much or – I guess we could go to India, Japan, China, and Türkiye and ask them. I don’t know that they’ll tell us. But if you don’t know how much is left in these accounts for sure, you’re just guessing, aren’t you? And saying that they’ve all been depleted?MR MILLER: It is not just – it is – in some cases we have very low visibility. In some of the cases we have better visibility, which leads us to believe that billions have been spent, and in some cases we believe down &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Well, where’s the better visibility and how much is left in those accounts?MR MILLER: Down – that’s what I said. I’m not &#8212;QUESTION: And how much did the Iranians get out &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s what I said.QUESTION: &#8212; during the previous administration? Well, if you can’t say that, how can you make the – I don’t understand how you can &#8212;MR MILLER: Because there is some information that we have available to us with good fidelity, and that’s what I’ve been able to provide, and others that we don’t.QUESTION: Well, with good fidelity – what does that mean? That you suspect that someone emptied the bank account?MR MILLER: No. It means that – the statement I &#8212;QUESTION: Like, I could have a bank account &#8212;MR MILLER: We can see that they’ve spent down billions.QUESTION: &#8212; at M&amp;T Bank, right, and draw it down to zero. And you should be able to tell, or someone should be able to tell, if it was at zero or not, right? Why can’t you tell – I don’t understand.MR MILLER: These are not accounts held in the United States.QUESTION: I know, but &#8212;MR MILLER: We do not have perfect – so we do not have perfect visibility into them.QUESTION: What – India is a partner. Japan and South Korea are treaty allies of the United States. How do you not know how much is left in these accounts?MR MILLER: And I said with respect to some accounts, we are able to see. Not – I do not have all of those details available. With some accounts we do not have perfect visibility. What we can see is that billions of dollars were spent down without any U.S. Government visibility or oversight at the time that money was being spent.QUESTION: Well, I don’t understand how you can say that without knowing how much is in the accounts.MR MILLER: We have a variety of ways to gather information.QUESTION: So do – so do I. (Laughter.) And one of them is talking to former administration officials who say this never – one of them is talking to former people who were in office during the time that what you say happening – was happening, and they say it didn’t happen. And they say there was only a very small amount that was sent to Iran, and it was for humanitarian purposes, and it was through mainly the Swiss humanitarian channel, which only succeeded in apparently one or two small, very small, transactions in the tens of thousands of dollars. And then there was also INSTEX, which completely failed and didn’t do anything. So I don’t – I’ll drop it, but &#8212;MR MILLER: I’d take their claims, but that is just not the information that we have.Go ahead.QUESTION: Just (inaudible) Iran, or could I switch topics?QUESTION: If I may &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Switching to North Korea, actually, with Putin and Kim Jong-un meeting. I know there have been comments on that previously, but can you say particularly if there’s – the Russians are talking about satellite cooperation, what would that mean? How much of a concern is that in terms of the implications for North Korea’s program and for Russia’s military?MR MILLER: I would say it is troubling when you see the Russians talking about cooperating with North Korea on programs that would violate UN Security Council resolutions that Russia itself voted for. Now, we obviously don’t – we haven’t seen the full manifestation of this meeting yet or what the full outcomes of this meeting will be, but when you see the two – when you see Kim Jong-un vowing to provide full, unconditional support for Russia’s so-called “sacred fight” to defend its security interests, which of course is not what it’s doing with respect to the war in Ukraine, that of course is troubling. When you see what looks to be increased cooperation and probably military transfers – as we’ve said for some time, we have reason to believe they were going to discuss military transfers – that is quite troubling and would potentially be in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.QUESTION: When you say “potentially,” I mean, one of the things that they mentioned is on the satellites specifically. I know you said you don’t have the full manifests of what’s going on.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: But in terms of what – I mean, the United States has said that the satellite program that North Korea has is used to develop ballistic missiles.MR MILLER: Ballistic missiles, exactly.QUESTION: Is that a concern, that Russia could be actively promoting, improving the North Korean ballistic missile &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah. Absolutely. That’s why I – that’s why – that was what I was referring to in my reference to the multiple UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea’s ballistic missile program which Russia itself voted for and now could potentially be violating.QUESTION: Could I just – one more.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, just in terms of the consequences, I think Jake Sullivan himself has said that there is a potential for – just to put words into – a potential for sanctions, for further actions on this. What is the United States looking at? I mean, is there the potential for some action on the basis of this?MR MILLER: So we’re going to watch very closely what comes out of this. I spoke to this somewhat the other day. We’re looking at – I will say there are two different – there are possibilities of weapons flowing two different ways here, right? So with respect to either direction, we would watch very closely and be concerned, and will not hesitate to impose sanctions if and when it’s appropriate.And then I want to speak specifically for a second about the idea of North Korea providing weapons to Russia, which I spoke to the other day but I don’t think you were here. One, just the overall context, and one thing it’s important to restate again, that a year and a half ago Vladimir Putin launched this war thinking he was going to restore the glory of the Russian empire, failed in all of his maximalist, imperialist aims, and now a year and a half later, after losing tens of thousands of Russian soldiers and spending billions and billions of dollars, here he is begging Kim Jong-un for help. So it says something about the overall context of how this war is going for Russia. And with respect to what any outcomes might be, we have taken a number of entity – actions already to sanction entities that have brokered arms sales between North Korea and Russia, and we won’t hesitate to impose additional actions if appropriate.QUESTION: Thank you. I &#8212;QUESTION: May I just follow up on &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me – she raised her hand. Go ahead. We’ll get to you, Said.QUESTION: Thanks. Has there – has there been any interaction between U.S. officials and Chinese officials on this matter, given it would likely be a concern of Beijing if Russia were to provide nuclear technology to &#8212;MR MILLER: Not that I’m aware of. Not aware of any specific interaction. But the meeting just happened today, so I wouldn’t rule it out. And we are – we do have somewhat regular engagements with Chinese officials going forward. We have – I will say that Secretary Blinken raised North Korea’s nuclear program and North Korea’s ballistic missile program in his engagements with Chinese officials when we were in Beijing, and we’ve regularly raised that in our conversations with Chinese officials because – we think because of the close relationship that China has had with North Korea, that if they’re willing to play a productive role, they’re able to and they have some influence with the regime in North Korea. So I would anticipate we would raise it, but I’m not aware of any specific interactions that have taken place.QUESTION: And will Blinken meet with whoever the Chinese delegation leader is at UNGA next week?MR MILLER: I don’t have any specific meetings to announce yet, but stay tuned over the course of the next couple days.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions on North Korea. North Korea launched two ballistic missiles into the Eastern Sea yesterday ahead of the North Korea-Russia summit. What do you think is the intention behind this?MR MILLER: So I won’t speak to their intentions – always tough getting in the mind of that regime in particular – but I will say that the United States condemns the DPRK’s recent ballistic missile launches, as we have condemned their previous ballistic missile launches. The launches are in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions and are the latest in a series of launches that pose a direct threat to the DPRK’s neighbors. They undermine regional security. And our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad.QUESTION: President Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un are further strengthening their military cooperation at the talks. How will the United States choose a diplomatic or military approach to resolve the North Korean nuclear and missile issues in the future?MR MILLER: We have always made clear that we are ready for diplomacy, are open to diplomacy, would welcome diplomacy with North Korea to address our concerns about its nuclear weapons program. And to date, as I believe you’re well aware, they have shown no interest in such diplomacy.QUESTION: So you still expect to dialogue with North Korea? Dialogue is still open?MR MILLER: I – did you say I expect it?QUESTION: Yeah, expect.MR MILLER: I do not – based on their behavior over the last two and a half years, no, I would not expect them to engage in diplomacy with us, just based on how they’ve reacted for the first two and a half years – over two and a half years now – of this administration. But the door always remains open from our side.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: I was just curious as to why you guys insist on using the term “begging,” like he’s going cap in hand, while in fact it is the North Korean leader who is visiting Russia. Russia’s a vast country; he’s invited him and so on. And according to what we know, most of North Korea’s equipment – I mean military equipment – is basically Russian-made. But why the term?MR MILLER: I don’t think that, at the beginning of this war, Vladimir Putin would have anticipated that a year and a half in he would having to be scrounge – he would have to be scrounging around &#8212;QUESTION: But he &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, let me finish – he would have to be scrounging around the world, including with international pariahs like Kim Jong-un, asking for assistance and potentially in return having to provide assistance to the DPRK that would violate UN Security Council resolutions that Russia itself voted for. So, I mean, you can use whatever word you want to characterize it, but I will stand by the words I used.QUESTION: It could be scratch my back, I’ll scratch your back kind of thing. That’s not begging, is it?MR MILLER: I stand by my characterization.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Michele.QUESTION: On Bahrain, on the meetings that you just had, this human rights activist Maryam al-Khawaja – I’m sorry; I’m butchering her name – is heading back there to raise the profile of her father’s case. I wonder if the Secretary raised that in his meetings today.MR MILLER: The meeting is ongoing right now as we speak, so I can’t speak to, obviously, what happened in a meeting that is ongoing. But we do regularly raise human rights concerns with countries around the world, including specific human rights cases. The Secretary regularly does that as part of his engagements, but, again, I don’t know what’s happened in a meeting that’s going on right now.QUESTION: And one other human rights – human rights question. Has the administration decided what’s going to do with aid to Egypt?MR MILLER: We have not made a formal determination as of yet, but I think, as you know, the deadline for that is approaching relatively soon.QUESTION: Could we just follow up on Bahrain?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know you said it’s ongoing, but in terms of what was signed today, what in substantive terms will change with the U.S. relationship Bahrain? I mean, the Fifth Fleet is already there. The Secretary spoke about intelligence cooperation. What changes after today (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So two things – one – or three things: First, as you note, we already have a substantial security relationship with Bahrain. What we believe this agreement represents first – or second, I guess, if I made the first background point – a new framework to enhance cooperation across a wide range of areas, from defense and security to emerging technology, trade, and investment. We believe it’s the latest manifestation of that enduring commitment that we’ve shown to Bahrain and to the region in support of peace. And then I think the last point I would make about it is that this is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Bahrain, but we see it as potentially the cornerstone for cooperation among a broader group of countries that share mutual interests and a common vision with respect to deterrence, diplomacy, and escalation.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. I have a Ukraine-related question, but before that I want to go back to Iran, if I may. We discussed in this room yesterday – also today, Kirby also mentioned that if Iran violates the – let’s say the deal – we will just lock it down, so we will not send that funding. It goes back to Matt’s question. Do you – can you please give us the timetable, the transaction process? What’s it going to look like? How many tranches will be sent – 6 billion will be divided. And at what point you will be able to weigh in? And do you have established mechanism to lock it down?MR MILLER: I am not going to get into the exact details of the transactions as they move from South Korea, through banks in Europe, ultimately to these end accounts in Qatar. But we expect in the coming days or so that the – that that money will move ultimately to the final destination in Qatar. With respect to the mechanisms that are available to us, we have complete visibility into these accounts and have the ability to lock them down if we see Iran attempting to take actions that are in violation of this agreement and in violation of our sanctions. I’m not going to get into what the exact technical details are, but we have the full agreement to stop their access to this account going forward.QUESTION: Thank you. While we’re on Iran, MAHSA Act just passed Congress yesterday. As you know, it demands the administration to sanction Iran’s human rights violators, particularly leaders of Iran. Do you find it appropriate that – I know that it’s not a law yet so (inaudible) Senate side and the presidential signatures necessary. But Congress already have expressed its will. Do you find it appropriate that right when Iranian people are going through this painful process, this first anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s murder – do you find it appropriate the butcher of Iran will not only be allowed to enter – to enter the United States territory, but also will be welcomed by local human rights – local NGOs such as Council of Foreign Relations, led by former administration officials? How appropriate is that?MR MILLER: So I will just say that, as has been longstanding precedent, has happened under – going back really since the UN was founded and based in New York, we have an obligation as the host country to admit representatives of other countries no matter what we think of those countries’ policies. And that has long been the case as our obligation of the United Nations.With respect to the president of Iran being hosted at a thinktank in New York, I won’t speak to that in particular. They’re obviously an independent organization that can make their own decisions. But I would say that when any organization hosts such a figure with a long history of spreading mistruths and saying the things that are – that – making claims that are not accurate, we would just urge them to watch very carefully what he says, make sure they hold him accountable, make sure that their members have full access to truthful, accurate information. And I would expect that they would do that.QUESTION: And the fact the &#8212;MR MILLER: Go – one more, and then I’m going to move around.QUESTION: Thanks so much. The fact the bill passed the House, will that change your calculus on your end in terms of sanctioning Iran’s supreme leader before it becomes a law?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to preview any specific sanctions designations.QUESTION: Please come back to me later on Ukraine.MR MILLER: What – let me go to Olivia &#8212;QUESTION: The previous – the answer that you gave just prior to that was about Raisi speaking at CFR?MR MILLER: CFR. Yeah.QUESTION: So back in the previous administration, there had been restrictions placed on Iranian diplomats going to New York, which limited their movements to between their mission or residence and the UN itself. Now, recognizing that Manhattan is not exactly a huge area, still CFR is outside of what the range – what the perimeter had been for them before. I recognize that shortly after this administration took office, you guys rescinded those restrictions. But there are people who are saying that they should be re-enacted, particularly since the election of Raisi, which happened after that. Is there any consideration being given to going back to the previous administration’s restrictions on Iranian diplomatic movements?MR MILLER: Not that I’m aware of. Not &#8212;QUESTION: No? And then secondly on Iran, at the UN, I believe it’s October 8th that the – under the JCPOA, which is on life support – if it still can be said to be on life support – the UN arms embargo will be lifted. And there’s a growing call – bipartisan call – in Congress for there to be a snapback of sanctions, something that the administration has opposed. Are you prepared now to change your position, or are you still thinking it would be okay for the arms embargo to be – to disappear?MR MILLER: Matt, let me look into that. I’m not focused on – with things that have still a month to go before we get there. It’s a fair question, and I’ll just have to look into an answer.QUESTION: Okay. Well, maybe you should be focused on it because &#8212;MR MILLER: I – a number of topics I deal with every day at this briefing. And typically &#8212;QUESTION: I know. I know. Well, so &#8212;MR MILLER: My time horizon can typically be shorter than a month on things I’m preparing for.QUESTION: So do all of us. We have – we (inaudible).MR MILLER: Yeah, I understand. Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. What can you tell us about the purpose and circumstances of Ambassador Tracy’s visit with Paul Whelan? Has that meeting already happened? Was it at our request? Is there a readout of the visit overall?MR MILLER: Sure. So Ambassador Tracy did meet with Paul Whelan earlier today. It was a consular visit. We believe Paul continues to show tremendous courage in the face of his wrongful detention. Ambassador Tracy reiterated to him that President Biden and Secretary Blinken are committed to bring him home. You may recall Secretary Blinken had a phone call with Paul Whelan around a month ago – a little under a month ago – where he delivered that same message to him that we are working very hard to bring him home and we will continue to do so.QUESTION: Separately, but maybe relatedly, can you confirm these reports that have emerged that Russian interlocutors have specifically raised the case of Vadim Krasikov in potential prisoner swap negotiations?MR MILLER: I cannot. And I will say, as we have said a number of times, we have found that when it comes to our efforts to bring home these wrongfully detained Americans, the substance of negotiations and what we’re trying to do to bring them home and any specifics, it’s oftentimes not helpful to our effort to speak to those publicly, so I can’t do so here.QUESTION: Absent from concrete conversations about his case, is his case something that the U.S. would consider in a potential swap? And if so, have you raised it with the (inaudible)?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to – I’m not going to speak – obviously, we have shown that we are willing to make tough decisions, because we believe it is so important to bring Americans home. But that is a general statement. I don’t want to speak to any specific individual that might be detained in the U.S. or in another country. So.Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. Well, I wanted to ask about – regarding Mexico. What can President Biden do to stop the sex trafficking of children coming across our border from Mexico, especially in the state of California? And I have a follow-up.MR MILLER: Well, we have obviously – let me try to speak to what this department’s work is, which is to counter human trafficking. And we have taken a number of steps to do that. But with respect to specific border operations, I would refer you to the Department of Homeland Security.QUESTION: Okay. And finally, what is the Biden administration response to the Sound of Freedom movie that highlights the international child sex trafficking problem? It’s a horrific problem.MR MILLER: I’m not familiar with that specific movie. Obviously, as I said, we’ve taken a number of actions to counter child trafficking around the world, but I wouldn’t want to comment on that specific movie.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. The Kurdistan Regional Government in a letter has appealed to President Biden and this administration to intervene in a deepening crisis between Erbil and Baghdad. They also urged the administration to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad for their disputes. How do you (inaudible) request and letter? And will you mediate or increase your engagement between Erbil and Baghdad to overcome these disputes?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to discuss diplomatic correspondence between the President and the KRG. But I will reiterate, as we did in the February U.S.-Iraq Higher Coordinating Committee in Washington, that we continue to urge the Government of Iraq and KRG officials to resolve their budget disputes in a manner that benefits the Iraqi citizens, as the Iraqi constitution requires.QUESTION: Thank you very much. You had told me to ask the ambassador of the U.S. in Islamabad, so I asked him about his meeting with the election commission chief. He did not answer. He just sent me the press release back, which he had issued in August, that U.S. wants to see fair elections being held and stuff like that. But what hurt me Matt – and you are in the position to answer that – but when I asked him that: Mr. Ambassador, do you think since last one year the relationship between human-to-human relations of America, and Pakistan towards America – do you think it has improved or it has decreased? If I can’t even get an answer for this much question, then what is diplomacy about?MR MILLER: I will answer the question this way, as I have said, I believe, before in answer – in response to similar questions, that Pakistan is an important partner of ours. And we greatly value the relationship between our countries, both between our two governments and the people-to-people connections.QUESTION: Matt, one question about Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan are having border issues on Torkham since last few days. Thousands of people are stranded. What is the U.S. position on that?MR MILLER: Obviously, we would encourage those two governments to work together to resolve that issue.Go ahead.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Let me – I’ve got to – I’ve got to get to other people in the room.QUESTION: Thank you very much. Jahanzaib Ali from ARY News. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul has requested testimony from three Biden administration spokesperson, including our dear friend Ned Price, on the chaotic troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Will state encourage Price testimony before the House Committee?MR MILLER: So we obviously are in receipt of that request. Chairman McCaul has asked for interviews with a number of officials from the State Department and has asked for a number of documents. We have been – we have provided hundreds and hundreds, if not thousands of pages of documents with respect to his inquiries in this regard. We will continue to push to cooperate with his committee to provide the information that it needs. We have already provided interviews with a number of officials and will continue to so as appropriate and when appropriate, balancing the House’s need to get information that it needs to do its job with our ability to protect certain privileges that the Executive Branch holds. But I wouldn’t want to speak to any potential interview other than to say that we’ll continue to work through these questions with the committee.QUESTION: Sir, the chairman committee also claimed that these administration spokesperson misled the American people during the run-up to the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, painting a far rosier picture than the reality on the ground. So my question is, are these spokesperson or you are responsible for these statements that he’s referring? Because, I mean, are you just doing your job or – or somebody else is responsible for these kind of statements?MR MILLER: I don’t want to get into that in detail other than to say I was not here inside the government at the time. But I do believe what the government has said at a number of occasions is that the situation changed very rapidly in a way that that could not be anticipated.QUESTION: Sir, one last question. Sir – president of Pakistan &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: So – go – go – hold – everyone chill. Go ahead.QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: One more, and then we’ll &#8212;QUESTION: The president of Pakistan proposes November 6th as election day, as according with the constitution, elections should be held in 90 days. But election commission of Pakistan said it is not able to hold elections in that short notice. Looks like another constitutional crisis in Pakistan. Your thoughts on that?MR MILLER: As we do with countries around the world, we urge Pakistan to hold a free and fair – free and fair and timely elections, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. And we urge Pakistani authorities to move forward with the electoral process in a manner consistent with Pakistan’s laws, as we do with countries around the world.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Today marks the 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accord that was so famously signed on the White House lawn. It called for a Palestinian state by 1998. Of course, that date has gone. The situation is a lot worse today. Settlements spreading – now, you’re fully aware of what’s going on. And I’m wondering whether the time has come to really pull the plug on these accords, and perhaps pursue something entirely different, maybe less loftier goals or something that can – the United States can lead.MR MILLER: So we don’t believe so. We continue to focus on our efforts on affirmative and practical steps that could promote a negotiated two-state solution, but at the same time we believe it’s important to advance equal measures of freedom and dignity as a means to advance further a negotiated two-state solution.QUESTION: Do you believe that the elements or the components for a two-state solution are there, are still there? It can be done?MR MILLER: I believe that it is important to – let me refer to something the Secretary said when he was asked – or when he spoke to this in a speech in December of 2022. He spoke to this exact when he said, “We know&#8230;at this moment the prospects of a two-state solution feel remote, and that may be an understatement to some,” as I believe you would agree with those remarks based on what you said. “But we are committed to” providing – or “to preserving a horizon of hope... that means holding firm to the values that have anchored the friendship between the United States and Israel across countless transitions in government in both of our countries.”So the two-state solution has long been United States policy, and it continues to be our policy that we will push for, and we believe it’s important to do so.QUESTION: So why not, if you’re still committed to the two-state solution ultimately, why not recognize a state of Palestine saying that we would like to see this state of Palestine on such and such land, this land that was occupied or a portion thereof, and so on, and in the meantime, these things ought to be negotiated among the parties?MR MILLER: We don’t believe that would be a productive step at this time.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: So just &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: You talked about the Secretary saying that in December 2022. Since – since he made those comments, children who were not even conceived yet have been born. Do you think you’re further away or closer today to a two-state solution?MR MILLER: I don’t think I want to make a judgment about further or closer, other than to say, again, it remains our policy and something we regularly push for in dialogue with officials from the governments.QUESTION: And then secondly, and I don’t think you’ll have a lot on this, but the case of Elizabeth Tsurkov, who is this Israeli Russian citizen who’s been being held in Iraq but who has connections to the U.S. – do you have anything more on that?MR MILLER: I don’t. I’m happy to look into it further and see if there’s more.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: Just a quick question on the visa waiver. May I just &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up. Is the U.S. still committed to ensuring Israeli adherence to the principle of blue is blue prior to admission of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program?MR MILLER: I will say that we are – if by blue – you’re referring to blue passports? Is that what you mean? We are &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, blue is blue. I mean, that’s what they call – you guys call it.MR MILLER: We are committed to the principle that all American citizens be treated equally, yes.Can we work some of the – go ahead, Shannon.QUESTION: Is it still the case that Morocco has not put forward a formal request for U.S. assistance in the wake of the earthquake?MR MILLER: I do have an update on conversations with the Government of Morocco and our actions with respect to relief efforts in Morocco. One is that the United States Agency for International Development has deployed a small assessment team to Morocco to liaise with local responders assessing the situation and identifying humanitarian needs; and second, that we are exchanging specialized technical expertise through the United States Geological Survey and we continue to be further in close consultation with the Moroccan Government on how the U.S. can best support their efforts to provide a humanitarian response to this tragedy.QUESTION: Have they rejected any U.S. offers of assistance at this point?MR MILLER: I wouldn’t frame it that way. I would frame it that we are in discussions with them about what we can best provide to support their efforts.QUESTION: So can I get a quick follow-up?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The USAID statement is talking about $1 million in support. Does that mean, like, to local groups or to people on – there? It won’t be Americans?MR MILLER: I would refer to USAID for the specifics on how that money will be used.QUESTION: Could I stay in Africa?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Mali. There was an attack today purportedly by Tuareg separatists. Generally speaking, I mean, what’s the concern level about the – a new flare-up of violence in Mali? And the departure of the UN peacekeepers and the presence of Wagner there, to what extent are those factors?MR MILLER: We continue to be concerned both with the situation on the ground in Mali and with the presence of Wagner, or whatever you call the remnants of Wagner after the death of Yevgeniy Prighozin. We believe that they’re a destabilizing force in a country that did not need further destabilization.I’ll go – go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. So last weekend, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made some comments on kind of what precipitated the war in Ukraine, and I’ll just quote him here: “President Putin declared in ... autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent to us. And  was a precondition  not invade Ukraine. Of course we didn’t sign that.”So I’m just wondering – there were also some remarks by counselor Blinken last year that the U.S. &#8212;MR MILLER: Secretary Blinken?QUESTION: Sorry, Secretary Blinken.MR MILLER: I didn’t know if you meant Counselor Chollet or – but I misspeak enough that I am not faulting you for having done so, trust me. (Laughter.)QUESTION: So, but Blinken apparently expressed a similar sentiment. So I’m just wondering, in hindsight of what has transpired in the war, whether that decision was worth it, and maybe what was behind that decision.MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to what were private diplomatic conversations. I will reiterate what we said at the time, which was NATO has an “Open Door” policy and we are not – we were not willing to compromise NATO’s “Open Door” policy, nor do we believe it is appropriate to compromise the NATO “Open Door” policy, nor is NATO in any way a threat to Russia. NATO was a – is, was then and is now – a defensive Alliance. We always made clear in the run-up to that war that we were willing to engage in diplomacy with Russia. The Ukrainians made clear that they were willing to engage in diplomacy with Russia about legitimate regional security concerns. But we were not going to compromise one of NATO’s founding principles, and I certainly don’t believe NATO was – or that Ukraine – or I won’t speak for them – NATO – Ukraine did not want to seem to want to compromise their own right to determine their future as a country.QUESTION: And could I just get one quick follow-up?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So when you weigh that, one is weighing that “Open Door” policy with the horrible consequences of the war, which Stoltenberg – Stoltenberg cites as one of Russia’s primary negotiating points. And then two is: Do you not see any security concern, even if it is a defensive Alliance, a security concern with NATO has a – NATO members often hold U.S. military assets on their territory? So is there not a concern from not wanting that on your border if you’re kind of one of our adversaries like China or Russia?MR MILLER: I will just say I think you might be being – with all due respect – a little too incredulous with respect to your treatment of statements reported and offers reported to be made by Vladimir Putin. What we believe and what we believe has borne out – and some of the reason we believe this is because what – it’s what Vladimir Putin said himself – is that he has never believed Ukraine was a legitimate country and he always wanted to restore Ukraine – not restore, he wanted to make Ukraine a part of Russia. He’s said that openly. His actions indicated that’s what he’s – he believed. And that’s what his actions today continue to show he still believes.Go ahead. No, go on. I’m going to work around. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just real quickly, do you have any comment on the appointment of Ms. Kamikawa as the new foreign minister of Japan, and are there any plans set for Secretary Blinken to speak with her?MR MILLER: I’m sure he will speak with her in the coming days, as he regularly does when new foreign ministers are appointed. The U.S.-Japan relationship has never been stronger. It is a – our alliance is a cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and across the world. Our government has had an excellent working relationship with the previous cabinet, and we fully expect close coordination on bilateral, regional, and global issues to continue with the new cabinet.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. China yesterday appointed a new ambassador to Afghanistan and the Talibans’ regime. I would like to ask you what’s your reaction and whether the United States will take such a step in the near future or not.MR MILLER: I don’t have any reaction to the Chinese – the Chinese Government’s decision to do that, and I don’t have any announcements to make with respect to what we will do.Alex, go ahead, and then we’ll finish off.QUESTION: Thank you. I have two questions on Russia’s annexation policy you just were talking about. G7 today came up with a statement on sham elections, condemned the action of President Putin.MR MILLER: The Secretary put one out last week as well.QUESTION: The Secretary also put it prior to the election, and he also pledged that there will be sanctions against individuals who take part of it, which raised high expectations. Are they too high at this point?MR MILLER: No.QUESTION: When should we expect sanctions?MR MILLER: I never preview those, but those elections only close I think on Friday, and today’s Wednesday. So it takes some time to put these things into effect.QUESTION: So G7 statement is not enough, so – I mean it’s not your, let’s say a final &#8212;MR MILLER: I am not going to announce or preview any sanctions – you’ve probably gotten used to hearing me say this – any – preview or announce any sanctions decision determinations before they are made.QUESTION: Fair enough. Now that sham election is over, we have seen Russia is stepping up more with its annexation strategy, bullying other countries – in this case Azerbaijan – for not recognizing Russia’s, quote/unquote, “territorial integrity” by condemning – or not respecting, let’s say, the elections. Do you have any reaction?MR MILLER: Look, Russia has proved through a number of actions in recent years that it is not a neighbor you can really trust on to be a peaceful, tranquil, stable neighbor that respects territorial integrity and sovereignty, and I would think every country in the region should be aware of that.QUESTION: The fact that they are going out and talking about their territorial integrity by pitching Ukrainian territory to other countries, that’s what I’m talking about.MR MILLER: Yeah, I did, and I stand by the comment I made. Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:24 p.m.)&nbsp;						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Bahrain																								China																								Egypt																								Iran																								Israel																								Japan																								Mali																								Morocco																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Ukraine