# Democratic Republic of the Congo - United States Department of State

- The Minerals Security Partnership Welcomes New Deal in Minerals Offtake and Processing Between STL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Umicore in Belgium Office of the Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;The Minerals Security Partnership Welcomes New Deal in Minerals Offtake and Processing Between STL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Umicore in Belgium				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										The Minerals Security Partnership Welcomes New Deal in Minerals Offtake and Processing Between STL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Umicore in Belgium																																		Media Note																														May 8, 2024																																							The United States, as Chair of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), and MSP partners welcome the new deal finalized between STL, a subsidiary of La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Belgian company Umicore that advances cooperation on germanium offtake and processing.This collaboration among MSP partners and the private sector is a powerful demonstration of the MSP’s capacity to secure and diversify critical mineral supply chains, which bring economic benefits to local communities and source countries like the DRC. As noted by the leadership of Umicore and Gecamines, this deal will also support sustainable recycling and the circular economy, develop new technical skills and expertise in the DRC, and elevate Gecamines’ and the DRC’s role as an important player in the processing of critical minerals.&nbsp;This milestone agreement, forged through close collaboration with the 15 MSP partners, significantly increases the global supply of germanium, which is used in semiconductors, optical cables, solar cells, and more. The processed germanium will ultimately bolster supply chains to U.S., European, and Japanese markets.To learn more about agreement, visit: https://www.umicore.com/en/newsroom/umicore-and-stl-sign-partnership-related-to-germanium-recycling/  and https://www.gecamines.cd/communiques-de-presse/. For more information on the MSP, go to https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/. To stay up to date, follow Under Secretary Fernandez on X:  @State_E, LinkedIn:  @State-E, and Facebook:  @StateDeptE. For media inquiries, please contact E_Communications@state.gov.						Tags																													Africa																															Belgium																								Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Democratic Republic of the Congo																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Trade and Investment																															Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment
- Department Press Briefing – May 6, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – May 6, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – May 6, 2024																																																					May 6, 2024																																																								1:47 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR MILLER: Don’t have any opening comments, so to you, Matt.QUESTION: You have nothing to say?MR MILLER: I think I &#8212;QUESTION: Nothing is going on in the world?MR MILLER: I think I imagine what your first question is going to be, so –QUESTION: Well, I figure &#8212;MR MILLER: So go ahead.QUESTION: You know what? I’m going to surprise you, because I don’t want – before we get into the long back and forth about Rafah and the ceasefire, I want to ask you if you can just answer this straight and – simply and straight about the Israeli closure of Al Jazeera. What is – what is your response?MR MILLER: So we have seen the announcement from the Government of Israel about closing Al Jazeera. We have made quite clear that we support media freedom all around the world, including in Israel, and that we are quite concerned about this action.QUESTION: You’re quite concerned about this action? Are you – are you asking the Israelis to do anything?MR MILLER: So as the President said on May 3rd, journalists and media workers are an essential part of any democracy &#8212;QUESTION: I know.MR MILLER: &#8212; because well-informed dissent is critical to building stronger and more successful societies, and we will continue to support and advocate for free and independent media around the world. We think Al Jazeera ought to be able to operate in Israel, as they operate in other countries in the region.QUESTION: Okay. So you oppose?MR MILLER: We do.QUESTION: You oppose this?MR MILLER: We do.QUESTION: Okay. All right. Then getting on to – so you’ve seen these reports in the last hour about Hamas accepting a ceasefire, but also the Israelis ordering or telling people in Rafah to get out. What’s your take on that?MR MILLER: So I can confirm that Hamas has issued a response. We are reviewing that response now and discussing it with our partners in the region. As you know, Director Burns is in the region working on this in real time. We will be discussing this response with our partners over the coming hours. We continue to believe that a hostage deal is in the best interests of the Israeli people. It’s in the best interests of the Palestinian people. It would bring an immediate ceasefire. It would allow increased movement of humanitarian assistance. And so we’re going to continue to work to try to reach one.QUESTION: And so – but you haven’t made any – yet made any determination about whether this is – whether they’re accepting what is on the table or they’re accepting something that is different?MR MILLER: We have only received the response in the last hour, 90 minutes, and as I said, are going through it now and discussing with it – discussing it with partners in the region. So I don’t want to characterize the nature of that response just yet.QUESTION: Okay. Thanks.MR MILLER: Okay. Shannon.QUESTION: Can I follow up on Al Jazeera?MR MILLER: Wait. Shannon, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. There have been some reports that – from Israel that perhaps Hamas agreed to a proposal that was put together by Egypt and Qatar that was softer than the initial framework that was in the works last week. Is it possible that there has been a different proposal that the U.S. is not involved with tracking?MR MILLER: So I’ve seen those suggestions; I’ve seen some of those reports. And I think you’ll – I hope you’ll understand that because we are still reviewing the response that has come in and because we are working on this in real time and trying to reach an agreement, I’m just going to decline to comment in detail about any of those reports. We are going to be discussing this response with our partners in the region in the hours ahead. It remains our top priority to try to reach a ceasefire agreement that will lead to the release of hostages, that will allow a surge of humanitarian assistance both into Gaza and allow it to move around inside Gaza. But I don’t want to comment on any of the various reports about what they might have been responding to until we’ve been able to go through it in detail and come to a full understanding and discuss it with our partners.QUESTION: And can you say at this point – maybe you can’t – but Hamas’s political wing and their militant wing, are they on the same page here? Do you feel like this is a response that at least indicates where the entire group is?MR MILLER: I am just not going to – I am just not going to speak for Hamas at all. As we have said for some time, there has been a significant offer on the table. The ball has been in Hamas’s court. We have made clear that they should accept that offer, that Israel made significant compromises, showed that they wanted to reach an agreement that would lead to the release of hostages, that would bring an immediate ceasefire. And we have hoped that Hamas would take the deal that was on the table. Now, as to what’s in their response, what it looks like, we’re going to review that and withhold judgment until we’ve had a chance to conduct a full review.Shaun.QUESTION: Could I ask about the – this – the threatened Israeli offensive in Rafah? In the hours before this, there were lots of reports about evacuations – not just a report, but Israel is talking about evacuations from Rafah. How does this – what’s the U.S. message to this now? Do you think that Israel should hold off on the – on any operations in Rafah as we discuss this response from Hamas?MR MILLER: Of course we do. We’ve made quite clear our position on Rafah for some time, which is that we cannot support an operation in Rafah as it is currently envisioned. We have made clear – the Secretary made this clear in his conversations with Prime Minister Netanyahu and other members of the Israeli Government last week – that we have not seen a humanitarian plan that is credible and that is implementable. And we believe a military operation in Rafah right now would dramatically increase the suffering of the Palestinian people, would lead to an increase in loss of civilian life, would dramatically disrupt the delivery of humanitarian assistance, all of which is coming through – I shouldn’t say “all,” but the great majority of which is coming through Kerem Shalom or Rafah and is being distributed inside the Rafah area. If you think about what it would do when you have people moving north to places where internal distribution lines are not currently set up and you’re going to have to try to re-establish those in the middle of conflict in Rafah, we think that would be very difficult, if not impossible, to do.So even absent this latest response, we have made clear that we do not support Israel launching a full-scale military operation in Rafah.QUESTION: Sure. I mean, you just said that in terms of – that’s the standard U.S. position on this. But has there been any communication with the Israelis about – I mean, in the past hours or so – about the response from Hamas and how this affects the situation in Rafah? Is there a message &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just not going to get into our – those conversations. As I said, we just literally in the past hour, 90 minutes received that response from Hamas in the first place. Of course, we will be discussing it with Egypt, with Qatar, with Israel – the three countries with whom we have been working throughout this negotiation process. But I don’t want to get into the timing of those, but obviously, if we have – if those conversations had not already started, they will be ongoing in the next several hours.Humeyra.QUESTION: Matt, under the current circumstances, do you still think a ceasefire is achievable, based on what you know coming here?MR MILLER: I – what do you mean, is a ceasefire achievable?QUESTION: Like &#8212;MR MILLER: A ceasefire is what we are trying to achieve.QUESTION: Yes, but I mean, it has &#8212;MR MILLER: There is – there is &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; over the weekend there was, like, there was a quiet impasse, and right now Hamas has accepted it. But from Israel, we’re hearing that that’s not the proposal that we’ve sent; that’s a softened version. That throws into – the whole thing into doubt.MR MILLER: Yeah. And I think I answered &#8212;QUESTION: So I’m just wondering, like, what’s your sense here?MR MILLER: A ceasefire is absolutely achievable. There has been a deal on the table – a proposal on the table – that would achieve an immediate ceasefire and the release of hostages. Now, as for Hamas’s response, which I think gets to your question, again, I don’t want to characterize it in any sort of detail until we’ve had a chance to review it in depth and talk with our partners in the region about it.QUESTION: And one thing on the humanitarian aid. Last week, when the Secretary was in Israel, there was an increased emphasis on – in his – during his trip on the delivery of humanitarian aid. We visited Kerem Shalom, which got shut down over the weekend after the Hamas attack. But can you give us, like, a sense of what a Rafah offensive – how that would impact all of Gaza? Because there are issues with distribution in the north. If we have a Rafah offensive in the south, could there be any meaningful humanitarian aid delivery in the north?MR MILLER: So let me just speak broadly to all of Gaza first, and then I’ll come to the north. So certainly a Rafah operation in – a Rafah operation would make it incredibly difficult to sustain the increases in humanitarian assistance that we have been able to deliver over the past few weeks since the President’s call with Prime Minister Netanyahu on April 4th. You have seen an increase in the number of trucks going in through Kerem Shalom; you have seen an increase in the distribution inside of Gaza, including inside southern Gaza. All of that would be put in jeopardy by a Rafah offensive because obviously, just look at what happened in the past 24 hours when you saw Hamas rocket attacks on Kerem Shalom that led to the death of three IDF soldiers and led to the closure of Kerem Shalom.If you had an ongoing kinetic military operation, it doesn’t take a genius to figure out the impact that that would have on the delivery of humanitarian assistance – not just through Kerem Shalom, not just through Rafah gate, but of course inside all of Rafah and all of southern Gaza.Now, separate from that, we have been working on standing up additional delivery mechanisms to get aid directly in to northern Gaza without having to go through Kerem Shalom – not because we anticipated an upcoming Rafah operation, but because it’s so difficult to get aid through Kerem Shalom and then move it all the way to the north of Gaza. So that’s why you saw the opening of Erez crossing, which is something that the President insisted on and something that we achieved last week when the Secretary was there, first in Jordan and then in Israel. So you can have trucks move directly from Jordan, through Erez crossing in the north, not have to go all the way to Kerem Shalom and come back up north. You saw Ashdod Port opening so goods can come directly from Ashdod and go in through a northern crossing, and it’s why we’re standing up the maritime operation.So there will be ways to get humanitarian assistance in to northern Gaza directly; we have been working on those because it’s important to do so because we’ve seen how difficult it is to get aid from southern Gaza into northern Gaza. It’s hard to speculate what the impact of a Rafah operation would have on the delivery of that aid to northern Gaza, but certainly you can say without a doubt that it would dramatically impact the delivery of humanitarian assistance in southern Gaza.Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just going off of that for a second, you said earlier – reiterated that the U.S. doesn’t support a full-scale invasion into Rafah. What about a limited invasion into Rafah?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speculate on the types of military operation. We &#8212;QUESTION: It’s not speculating &#8212;MR MILLER: No – so – no, I’m &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; the Israeli Government has said limited &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m about to answer, Kylie. So there are proposals that we have put on the table – and this is why I’m not going to talk about some of this publicly &#8212; there are proposals that we have put on the table to the Israeli Government that we have discussed with them, that we think would be a much more limited, much more targeted, much more effective way of achieving their legitimate military – their legitimate military objectives, which is taking on the Hamas battalions that are remaining in Rafah. Those look very different than the types of operations that we have seen proposed publicly by the Israeli Government, and I think I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: So just to be clear, what you have proposed to them isn’t your understanding of what they are planning to go ahead with in the near future?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to what they might be planning to go ahead with; I’ll let them speak to that. We’ve seen the announcement they made today about evacuation orders for not the entire – not entire southern Gaza, not entire – the entire Rafah area, but for a significant portion of it, 100,000 people. And I – of course we have concerns that any evacuation at all in such a crowded area, if you see 100,000 people move, you’re going to see other people in the next area move as well – which, of course, is something that you want to see happen if there is a military operation. But the problem now is there’s such limited places for them to go inside Gaza, and there is no effective way to distribute them – distribute aid to them and make sure they have access to shelter, access to sanitation, in the places that they would go if, say, you had hundreds of thousands of people moving from Rafah.QUESTION: And then without characterizing the Hamas response, given you guys are still reviewing it, would you say it’s a hopeful sign that they have given a response here?MR MILLER: I think that would be characterizing it, so I’m going to decline to do so until we have completed that review.QUESTION: And when do you think you will be able to complete that review? When should we expect an assessment from the administration?MR MILLER: The – Director Burns, as I said, is in the region literally working on this right now. I don’t want to put a timetable on it, but it is something that is a top priority for everyone in this administration from the President on down. You saw that the President had a phone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu today. Achieving a ceasefire deal that would lead to the release of hostages was one of the top priorities of the Secretary’s trip when he was in the region last week. So everyone is focused on this. Everyone is trying to get a deal over the line.QUESTION: Thank you. Last week there was some reporting that the Biden administration had put a hold on a shipment of U.S.-made ammunition to Israel. Have you seen that report? Can you comment on its accuracy?MR MILLER: I have seen that report. As is usually the case, we don’t comment on specific cases of arms transfers, and I’m not going to do so here.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, Said.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just to clarify on the offer, the offer that you said was generous and on the table and what seems to be accepted now. Does that mean that the ball is no longer in Hamas’s court?MR MILLER: Said, it’s impossible for me to answer that question without characterizing the response that Hamas has given, which I’m not yet willing to do.QUESTION: Okay, all right. On Al Jazeera, now we know that Israel is accusing the correspondents of Al Jazeera, our colleagues who are Israeli citizens by the way, accusing them of incitement that goes back many years and all these things, a crime that is punishable by imprisonment. Are you worried that these correspondents might actually be imprisoned by the Israelis? And if they are, what would the Government of the United States do?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to those specific allegations. It’s not something that we’ve reviewed in detail. We would have to do that. I’m certainly not going to speculate about what we might do in response to an action that has not yet been taken. I will just reiterate that when it comes to the decision to shutter Al Jazeera’s operations in Israel, it’s something that we are concerned by. We support the work that journalists and media do.We have had – and I don’t think it’s any secret that we have had our differences with Al Jazeera &#8212;QUESTION: Right, of course.MR MILLER: &#8212; over the years, including in some of the ways in which they – that they cover this conflict. But we support the free media &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; conducting their operations everywhere in the world.QUESTION: Yeah, I think most countries have had an issue with Al Jazeera. Let me ask you about Rafah. Now the movement, 100,000 people and so on, now how many would need to move before Israel can go in and legitimately go after Hamas’s position? I mean, the area is so small – al-Mawasi, where they are moving and so on – just meters – kilometers away.MR MILLER: It’s not &#8212;QUESTION: What – would prevent, let’s say a Hamas fighter or Hamas leaders and so on to actually move to another place? They allegedly have a network of tunnels that would allow them to do that and so on. And then we have the same kind of situation. We see the Israelis saying we want to go after them in that area. I mean, how do you read this whole situation?MR MILLER: So that is not really a question I can answer. I will just make clear, as I have already and as others in the administration including the President, including the Secretary have on a number of occasions, that an operation – a major operation in Rafah – is not something that we can support.QUESTION: Yeah. And finally, I asked on Thursday about Dr. Adnan Al-Bursh. I was wrong. He wasn’t shot. He was – apparently he died and some say under torture and so on. I know that your colleague at the White House said what she said, that she was saddened and all these things, but have you followed up on this issue? How do you follow up on it? Because apparently they are keeping his corpse. I mean, they are not turning it to his family or others and so on for proper burial.MR MILLER: It is one that we have raised with the Government of Israel. I don’t have a response to read out. We have made clear with Israel, as we have made clear publicly, that they must treat all detainees humanely and with dignity in accordance with international humanitarian law and that they must respect detainees’ human rights and also that they must ensure accountability for any abuses or violations.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Hi, Matt. Since they took all the Al Jazeera questions, I’ll skip mine.MR MILLER: No problem.QUESTION: I just want to &#8212;MR MILLER: Alex, did you have something?QUESTION: No, no, no, no.QUESTION: I just want to – because I’m a little bit confused, if you can clarify. So the Hamas response is not on the general’s proposal? It’s not – it’s not accepting this proposal?MR MILLER: I think I made clear I am not going to characterize their response one way or the other until we’ve had a chance to fully review it, digest it, discuss it with our partners.QUESTION: All right. My second question is about the pier that the United States is conducting. We believe we have, in our reporting, that it is close to being operational. Can you just tell us how this pier will operate? I mean, who will have the upper hand in all – in making this &#8212;MR MILLER: So it is something that we have been trying to complete as soon as possible. And when I say we, I mean largely our colleagues at the Pentagon who are constructing the pier. We have been involved in liaising with humanitarian groups that will be involved in the distribution of humanitarian assistance once it comes in to Gaza, but with the actual timeline for the launch of the pier and its operation, any details I’m going to defer to the Pentagon to comment on those in any detail.QUESTION: By the way, on the pier itself, it was – it was said over the weekend that it was moved to (inaudible) because of some high winds and waves and so on. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: I’m going to defer to the Pentagon for any of those operational kind of details.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: They’re the ones that are responsible for constructing and moving it and ultimately launching it.Michel, go ahead, and we’ll do a few more in the Middle East before we &#8212;QUESTION: Did you ask Qatar to expel Hamas leaders from Doha – from Doha, and is it the time for these leaders to leave?MR MILLER: I am not going to speak to private diplomatic conversations. As we have said a number of times, the Secretary in his conversations has made clear with a number of partners in the region that any relationship they have with Hamas, any influence they have with Hamas, they should use to make clear to Hamas that it – to Hamas that it needs to accept a ceasefire deal that includes the release of hostages. And he has also made clear publicly that at the end of this process there can be – there can no longer be business as usual with Hamas, as existed in too many places before October 7th. And I think I’ll decline to comment for any further.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Any more on the region? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: In the region on &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. For World Press Freedom Day last week, the Secretary did put out a statement about that. I’m just curious as to why that was a decision not to mention the Gaza war, granted that many journalists have been affected by a lack of press freedom around the world and that – and also being killed in various conflicts, but there was a substantial number of journalists that were killed in Israel and Gaza at the end of last year. Was there a reason why that wasn’t mentioned?MR MILLER: No. The Secretary has spoken to that a number of times, including in the region, including speaking directly to the colleagues of journalists in some instances who have lost their life tragically. We mourn the death of every journalist. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to the fact that it is because of journalists in Gaza that we see what’s happening, that the world knows what’s happening. And so we support their work. We want to see it continued. And we mourn the loss of every journalist, and I’ve spoken to that many times since the outbreak of this conflict.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Well, just one more on the &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Or just on Kerem Shalom.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Is it your understanding that the Israelis have agreed to reopen it after the attack that happened on Sunday?MR MILLER: So, yes, that was a – if you looked at the readout from the President’s call &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, but &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; it noted that the prime minister had agreed to open it in that conversation.QUESTION: Okay. Because the Secretary was just there on Wednesday, and you believed that Kerem Shalom was critical &#8212;MR MILLER: It is &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; with or without a Rafah &#8212;MR MILLER: It is &#8212;QUESTION: operation.MR MILLER: Kerem Shalom is absolutely critical to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Gaza, especially in southern Gaza now that we’ve stood up operations in the north. But &#8212;QUESTION: Right. So is it open now, do you know?MR MILLER: I do not know if it’s been reopened. I’ll say it was an incredibly cynical act for Hamas to attack Kerem Shalom yesterday knowing that Kerem Shalom is the linchpin to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Gaza. It goes to this point we’ve made on a number of occasions that Hamas claims that they represent the interests of the Palestinian people, but when you see some of their actions – and we talk about them hiding behind humans, using them as human shields all the time. When you see them attacking the gate that serves as the delivery point – as we saw if you were there last week, as we saw with our own eyes – the delivery point for humanitarian assistance into Gaza, it really does undermine any claim that they have to acting on the people of Gaza’s behalf.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Can I switch regions?MR MILLER: Let me – I’ll come back to you. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. What action would the U.S. take if Israel were to invade Rafah?MR MILLER: We have made clear that we cannot support an operation, and I don’t want to speculate on what actions we might take if one should proceed.QUESTION: Okay. And what’s the department’s reaction to Türkiye suspending trade ties with Israel?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on that. They are both allies of ours, and we would encourage them to work through their differences, but I don’t have any specific comment.QUESTION: And finally, what is the department doing to hold the CCP accountable for continued Chinese assistance to Russia’s defense sector?MR MILLER: So you heard the Secretary speak to this when he was in China and made clear that China can’t have it both ways. They can’t claim to be a partner of Europe on the one hand and then continue to fund the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War on the other hand. He raised this directly with President Xi. He raised it with Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. And he made clear in those meetings that if China didn’t act, we would. And a couple of updates to that. You saw us roll out additional sanctions on Chinese entities who have supported Russia’s defense industrial base last week.And then I want to note that we’ve made clear that it is not just the United States that is concerned about China’s activities, but it is also our partners in – and allies in Europe. And you know President Xi is in Europe today meeting with President Macron, meeting with the president of the EU. And if you noted the comments from the Government of France, they very much intended to press this same case with President Xi and make clear what a threat they see – that they see it the way we see it, which is that it is a threat not just to Ukraine but is a threat to European security. And we think it’s important that our allies and partners stand strong in sending that message as well.QUESTION: And just one more?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: And what is the department’s message today given it’s Yom HaShoah, Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day, especially with Israel having suffered several months ago the largest single-day massacre of Jews since the Holocaust? And I note the Secretary’s step-father &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, the Secretary put out a statement on that yesterday &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, okay.MR MILLER: &#8212; where he reiterated what has been our continuing message, which is never again. And I think you’ll see this President speak to this further.QUESTION: Matt, can I piggyback off &#8212;MR MILLER: (Inaudible) go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, you said you (inaudible) &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: &#8212; for a limited – more limited operation in Rafah. And you’re working – you are working on a ceasefire with your partners. What comes first? I mean, you share the objective, you said, with the Israelis that they have to defeat Hamas in Rafah. But since you are working on a ceasefire, it’s a little bit confusing what you support. What’s the priority here?MR MILLER: Our immediate objective is to achieve a ceasefire that alleviates the suffering of Palestinian people, that secures the release of hostages, and then we want to build that ceasefire, as we have made clear, into something more sustained and something longer lasting. I’m – a little bit of a bind here because I can’t really speak to the options that we have proposed to Israel – you can see why we would want to keep those confidential – but we have proposed options that we believe are more effective and would be more effective in dealing with the threat that Hamas poses. And those are options that they could pursue, and I think I’ll leave it – I’m – unfortunately, I have to leave it at that.QUESTION: One more question. In case these negotiations fail, are you preparing for a worst-case scenario that the Israeli went into Rafah – goes into Rafah and this lasts until the fall?MR MILLER: Of course we are prepared for every scenario, but I don’t think I want to read out what actions we might take.QUESTION: For every scenario?MR MILLER: Well, that’s a fair point, Matt – every scenario that you can reasonably predict we prepare for.QUESTION: Well, what happens if, like, aliens come down?MR MILLER: That’s why I said every scenario you can reasonably predict.QUESTION: Are you prepared for that one too?MR MILLER: If that happens, I’ll run to the hills with – right behind you, probably.Nike, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. Are we ready to move on to different region?QUESTION: Could I just do one more?MR MILLER: Shaun – yeah, Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: I know you &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, Nike. I tried. Let the record reflect I called on you, and Shaun, the head of the State Department Correspondent Association, stepped on your question.QUESTION: Yes, I – exactly. Well, I’ll gladly defer to Nike – gladly defer to Nike after this, as – I figure you’re not – probably not going to answer this, but the – just &#8212;MR MILLER: For a question I’m not even going to answer, too.QUESTION: Exactly.MR MILLER: Sorry. Go ahead.QUESTION: But just a couple of – on a serious note – just a couple of moments ago, the Israeli army saying that the evacuation orders that it issued earlier – confirming that this is preparation for a ground invasion. I know they’ve been speaking about a ground invasion in – a ground operation in general for some time. Do you have any further comment on that? I mean the – this – whether – do you have signs that the Israelis are actually going ahead imminently with a ground operation?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak to their military activities. We have made quite clear that we oppose a military operation there and I’m going to leave it at that.Nike, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On Russia, Russia President Vladimir Putin will be set to start another six-year term on Tuesday. Do you have anything on that? I understand U.S. Ambassador Tracy is currently out of the country. My question is: Is anyone from the U.S. embassy attending his inauguration ceremony, or is the U.S. joining other countries to boycott?MR MILLER: No, we will not have a representative at his inauguration.QUESTION: U.S. is boycotting?MR MILLER: We will not have a representative there. You can draw your own conclusions.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Does that mean that you don’t consider Putin a legitimate president?MR MILLER: He – we certainly did not consider that election free and fair, but he is the president of Russia and is going to continue in that capacity.QUESTION: Let me get your immediate reaction to reports about Russia’s planned nuclear drills. How much it will complicate the situation, and what kind of response will that invite from the United States?MR MILLER: So Russia’s rhetoric – their nuclear rhetoric – has been reckless and irresponsible throughout this conflict. That said, we have not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture in response to these announcements, nor any indications that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.QUESTION: Thank you. I have two more on South Caucasus, if I may. On Georgia, we had a protest in front of this building on Saturday. Georgian Americans were asking the State Department to impose sanctions on Ivanishvili and the GD MPs – not for actions that they might or might not take, but the actions they have taken already. So are you considering any measure?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to make any sanctions announcements, whether that relates to what we might do or what we are considering, as is typically our practice here.QUESTION: We heard from senior officials, this building – it feels like you guys are – you guys expecting some U-turn in this case or some offramp by suggesting that Ivanishvili might be misinformed, so all the statements we have heard from him are not his or his – or reflecting his viewpoints. Is that a reflection of what we have heard from them?MR MILLER: I’m not going to characterize at all. We are going to keep pressing our case, which is we believe that the law that they are considering would put Georgia on a precarious trajectory. It would jeopardize Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic path and undermine the U.S.-Georgia relationship, and we will continue to make that clear, and they will make their own decisions.QUESTION: And thank you. On – finally, on Armenia-Azerbaijan, ambassador to Baku today for the first time visited Karabakh. Let me get your sense of significance of it and where in – this week there will be ministerial in Kazakhstan. What are your expectations &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on that or any expectations.Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you, Matt. A question on Iran. As you may be aware, the IKR president, Nechervan Barzani, he’s in Iran with an official visit with a purpose finding solutions to the disputes between Iraq, Iran, and Kurdistan region. How does the U.S. view this visit and efforts? Do you have any comments on that?MR MILLER: So we have consistently encouraged de-escalation in the region, but we don’t have any comment about the specifics of that trip. I would leave it to the Kurdistan Regional Government to comment more in detail on President Barzani’s travel.QUESTION: And one more question: Do you think that having these kinds of discussion with Iran could help and lift any impacts on the Iraqi stability? Because we witnessed they attacked the Iraqi Kurdistan and there were a lot of tensions between these two capitals.MR MILLER: So I don’t want to speak to these specific conversations, but of course we have always encouraged any conversations that would lead to de-escalation and would lead to further stability in the region, including vis-a-vis Iran, which of course has been one of the greatest contributors to instability in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.QUESTION: And last question, as we are speaking of Iran. Minutes ago, the Iranian foreign minister put a post on X and he said that we sent Hamas response to the plan proposed by Egypt and Qatar. What he says that – he said that to stop the attacks by Israel, and second, exchange prisoners, and thirdly, the human blockades. And now the ball in the opposite court, we are honest with – in our intentions. This is what he posted. So how do you see the Iranian role in bringing that Gaza the conflict into the end and &#8212;MR MILLER: Bringing a Gaza conflict to an end? I see no Iranian role in bringing a Gaza conflict to an end. You’ve seen Iran be one of the greatest instigators of this conflict in the first place, from financing Hamas and supporting Hamas to financing and supporting Hizballah and other groups that have contributed dramatically to instability, not just when it comes to attacks on Israel but when you look at the – their proxy, the Houthis, and attacking international shipping, and greatly destabilizing the region. So no, I don’t see Iran playing any kind of productive role.QUESTION: And they are not the &#8212;MR MILLER: That would be – that would be completely out of character for them.QUESTION: They are not honest with their intentions, what he said on his post?MR MILLER: They’re not what?QUESTION: Honest with their intentions?MR MILLER: With their – Iran’s honest with their intentions? No, I would not characterize them as honest with their intentions. When it comes to the specific comments that they made about Hamas’s response, I’m not going to comment on those, because as I said, we’re reviewing their response, so I don’t want to confirm what may or may not have been in it.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. So can I just get your reaction to this? Over the weekend, a Moscow court sentenced a Russian Falun Gong practitioner to two months in detention for her beliefs. It’s the only other country outside of communist China to incarcerate a citizen for the meditation practice. Jake Sullivan said that he wasn’t surprised by this, as China’s – Russia relies on China’s economic and technological support. So given these circumstances, what’s the State Department doing to address the broader implications of the spread of China’s persecution of Falun Gong into Russia, possibly in exchange for support?MR MILLER: Let me take that back and get you a specific response, since it relates to this one case that you mentioned.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: A little over a week ago, China held unification, unity talks between Hamas leaders and Fatah. Sir – and they – I think it resulted in them just saying that they’re agreeing to &#8212;MR MILLER: Keep talking, yeah.QUESTION: Keep talking? What’s your reaction to China being involved in unity talks between these &#8212;MR MILLER: So I don’t have any reaction to them playing a role in these talks. We saw previous talks take place between Hamas and Fatah in Moscow. They’ve held talks in other locations. Leaving that aside, we have long said that if China wanted to play a productive role in bringing this conflict to an end, that it’s something that we would welcome. If they wanted to play a productive role in helping prevent escalation in the region, that is something we would also welcome. The Secretary has spoken to his counterpart, Director Wang Yi, six times since October 7th to press this case, to press China to use all of its influence in the region. And we will continue to press them to do that.We think there certainly are countries that they have a relationship – with whom they have a relationship in the region, including countries, most notably Iran, with whom we don’t really have a relationship. So if China can bring its influence to bear, that would be a productive step for it – it would be a productive step that it could take that would benefit the region and benefit the entire world.QUESTION: One more on Saudi Arabia.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The other day, you had said that in order for normalization to take place between Saudi Arabia and Israel, that Saudi Arabia is looking for calm in Gaza &#8212;MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: &#8212; as well as a path to peace. That path to peace, is that the Oslo Accords? Is that something different than Oslo? Is that expanding on Oslo or &#8212;MR MILLER: So I don’t want to get into the details, because it’s something that we still continue to talk with Saudi Arabia about, but it is a path to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel. And the details of what that would look like is something that we’re continuing to discuss with them.QUESTION: So would that make Oslo irrelevant? MR MILLER: I just – I don’t want to – it’s a – it is a negotiation and a discussion that is ongoing right now; I don’t want to characterize it in any way with respect to how it would interact with past agreements.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: A ceasefire deal doesn’t end the war in Gaza. It means returning to fighting again and more Palestinian civilian victims, as it’s happened daily – ten of thousands have already murdered due to the bombing and the famine imposed by Israel, most of them children and women. My question: Why the U.S. doesn’t intervene to stop the war completely – I mean, permanent ceasefire – especially that the Palestinian civilian killed with the American weapon?MR MILLER: So we have been working incredibly hard – it has been the focus of most of this briefing – to achieve an immediate ceasefire that would stop the fighting in Gaza and would alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people, those who have died as a result of the conflict and also those who are suffering as a result of lack of humanitarian aid or inability to access humanitarian aid.Now, that’s the first step. We want to get an immediate ceasefire and then we do want to see it turn into something more durable. We’re going to try to work to bring this conflict to an end as soon as possible. That said – and I know I’ve – hammer on this – have hammered on this in the past and the Secretary hammers it on the past – has hammered it in the past – Hamas could achieve an immediate ceasefire right now. Hamas, the entity that started this conflict by murdering civilians – innocent civilians – could lay down their arms, could surrender and stop putting the Palestinian people in harm’s way.So it – when people ask questions about Israel that are legitimate questions, and when they ask questions about us that are legitimate questions, I hope people will also realize that Hamas plays – played the instigator role in beginning this conflict and could end it today if they wanted to.QUESTION: But it’s not permanent. It’s temporary.MR MILLER: We are – as I – I just spoke to that in my answer.QUESTION: Yes. Excuse me, I want a question.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: That IDF already requested the people in Rafah to evacuate. I wonder if the evacuation for Palestinian in Rafah across the Egyptian border is being considered.MR MILLER: So Egypt has made quite clear that they do not want to see the displacement of the Palestinian people. It’s not just Egypt. We have heard that from virtually every country in the region: that they do not want to see Palestinians displaced because of the very unfortunate history in that regard. And we have made clear to the Israeli Government that Palestinian – the Palestinian people shouldn’t be replaced – or displaced.Now, one of the major risks of a full-scale Rafah operation is that it would destabilize that border between Gaza and Egypt and would lead to that sort of displacement, which would destabilize the Sinai Peninsula, of course. It’s another reason why we believe such an operation is a bad idea in the first place.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead in the back.QUESTION: Thank you very much. U.S. House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries said on Sunday that the United States will have to send troops to Ukraine if Ukraine is defeated in conflict with Russia. Any chances that is a real option for &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just not going to comment on statements made by members of Congress. The President has made clear that he will not send U.S. troops to fight in Ukraine.QUESTION: Okay. And one more question. Can you explain why is it okay for the United States to have a law on foreign agents and it’s not okay for Georgia, Russia to have one?MR MILLER: So the difference is in the nature of those laws. When you see the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act, it is to people who are acting on behalf of a foreign government, not people who are doing legitimate nongovernment organization work, who are doing humanitarian work, who are doing civil society work. It’s a very different type of thing. I’ve seen those false equivalencies drawn in the past. And when you look at the text of the proposal in Georgia and the text of the proposal that has been passed due to Kremlin influence in other countries, they are very different than the type of law that we have on the books here in the United States.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much. Question is regarding the ministers’ priorities on the normalization talks regarding Saudi Arabia and Israel. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan mentioned, insisted, in an interview that the administration will enter in any defense pact with Saudi Arabia if only they normalize ties with Israel. So question is: Is it diplomacy of United States for integration of Israel in the Middle East or it’s another defense pact by the United States to counter Iranian-backed movements in future from the Middle East?MR MILLER: I’m not sure I completely understand the question. But I will say I don’t want to get too much into the details of our negotiations with Saudi Arabia and the ongoing discussions, but that we continue to work to finalize both the bilateral pieces of such an agreement as well as what the pathway to an independent Palestinian state would look like.QUESTION: Secondly, Canadian authorities arrested three individuals linked with the killing of Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar. The United States have many findings on the connections of Indian foreign operations at U.S. soil, as Wall Street Journal reported last week regarding the connection of Indian Government with some targets here in the United States. So with this recent development, what do United States have more to take up with the Indian administration?MR MILLER: So I would refer you to the Canadian authorities to speak to the details of the investigation there. With respect to the indictment that was returned in the United States, I’ll let the Department of Justice speak on behalf of that in detail. And then the only thing further I’d say: When it comes to the State Department, we made clear when these allegations were first made public that it’s something we think India should take very seriously and investigate. They opened a Committee of Enquiry to look into the matter, and that work is ongoing, and we’ll wait to see the results. But we made very clear that it’s something that we take seriously and we think it’s something they should take seriously as well. Hudson.QUESTION: Matt, apologies for not asking in the Israel section, but I have nosebleed seats today so I didn’t get it. But &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just – I’m just happy to see you here in the briefing.QUESTION: Great to be here. In response to the Axios report that the U.S. is withholding an ammunition shipment to Israel, the Biden administration has told several reporters around town that the U.S. has surged weapons into Israel since October 7th. I’m kind of curious about this response because for much of the conflict, the administration has downplayed reports about the near-constant approval and shipment of arms to Israel. I’m just wondering if you could clarify, what’s the case? Has the U.S. been surging weapons to Israel since October 7th or not?MR MILLER: So we have provided weapons to Israel since October 7th. We have always made clear that we are committed to Israel’s defense. That commitment to Israel’s security remains ironclad, and that includes providing security assistance to Israel since October 7th to ensure that the attacks of October 7th can never be repeated.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Kylie, and then I’ll come to Humeyra.QUESTION: Can you just provide us an update on the NSM-20 report and if it’ll go to Congress on time, when it’s due on Wednesday?MR MILLER: The only update I have is that we continue to work on it, and we’ll have more to say about it later in the week.QUESTION: You can’t say that it’s on track to be delivered on time?MR MILLER: It’s on track. We’re working on it. I just don’t have any updates. It is our intention to provide it on time, and we’ll have more updates as we get closer to the deadline.QUESTION: And just two quick questions on it. I know you don’t want to get into it, but I still have two questions. There are concerns among lawmakers that the Political-Military Bureau in this building is leading the drafting of the report, and I wonder how you respond to that.MR MILLER: So I’m not going to get into the internal mechanisms that we go through to develop such a report, but I will say that a broad spectrum of the department will contribute to this report. People will have a chance to make their views known. People will have a chance to offer their assessments of what they’ve seen. It’s important that different bureaus inside the department which bring different skills to bear and different points of view and different capabilities have the chance to review both of the section – both of the tasks that we were given in the report, both when it comes to compliance with international humanitarian law and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and we expect all of them to speak candidly about what they’ve seen and make their recommendations and make their honest assessments, and we’ll deliver a report that reflects that.QUESTION: And one more question. The memorandum requires all recipients of U.S. weaponry, including Israel, to make assurances that they’re using those weapons, quote, “in a manner consistent with all applicable international and domestic law and policy, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law.” Will U.S. officials at the department be probing those assurances that they get from Israeli officials if there’s reason to believe that they aren’t credible assurances?MR MILLER: So we are taking very seriously the task that we were giving – that was given to us in this national security memorandum, and it pertains not just with respect to Israel but with other countries as well that receive U.S.-provided security assistance. So the initial step was to get assurances from those seven countries that they were complying with international humanitarian law and that they were not impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance. We’ve received those assurances I think probably 43 days ago, somewhere around that, and now we are going through and looking at compliance with international humanitarian law and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I don’t want to get into – too much in detail because we are close to when a report will be delivered and I should wait and let the report speak for itself, but it is – I can tell you it is something that we take incredibly seriously and there is a lot of work going on at the department to make sure we fulfill that obligation and we fulfill it thoroughly.QUESTION: So you’re not taking those assurances on face value?MR MILLER: I – let me just let the report speak for itself when it comes out, but it is something that we are absolutely taking seriously, and we are looking at a whole host of activities and actions when it comes to any one of the governments – the relevant governments in this case, and we’ll be making our own assessments not just based on what those governments have told us but based on what we have seen in our review here at the State Department.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Just one thing on that, actually, Matt. So when the report is produced, we have reported that there are people – there are some U.S. officials at the State Department who have raised serious concerns about Israel’s possible noncompliance with international humanitarian law, and what they say is its arbitrary restrictions on humanitarian aid. So when you produce that report, you’re basically weighing in on whether the assurances are credible or not. Is there going to be a section where you address those countering, let’s say, opinions from different bureaus, or is it just going to be we found that credible or not?MR MILLER: You – this is going to be a very unsatisfying answer, but you are just going to have to wait until &#8212;QUESTION: I’m used to that.MR MILLER: Yeah, sorry about that – until the report is complete. But I will say that one of the strengths of this department is that we have people with a rich diversity of experiences, a rich diversity of expertise, and a rich diversity of views, and the Secretary takes all of those seriously. He takes all of their points of view seriously, and the entire senior leadership of the department looks at the entire landscape when compiling – when going through an exercise and compiling a report like the one we are doing here.QUESTION: Right. But really, from a format point of view, it’s just going to have, like, one assessment?MR MILLER: I know, and I’m just – that I’m not – and that I’m just not going to speak to today.QUESTION: Okay. And will there be a – because you said – in your answer to Kylie you said we collect recommendations. Can you confirm there is going to be a recommendation one way or the other from the legal department?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak to the internal mechanisms of a report that is still being compiled.QUESTION: Okay, thank you.QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that?MR MILLER: Go ahead, Said, and then Shaun, and then we’ll wrap for the day.QUESTION: Yeah, very quickly, but on breaking international law and so on, is the threatening of the ICC by Israel or even by members of Congress itself a violation of international law, the threat itself?MR MILLER: I am not enough of an expert in international humanitarian law to speak to that.QUESTION: Okay. But this department &#8212;MR MILLER: We have made clear that we do not believe the ICC has jurisdiction in this case and oppose their investigation.QUESTION: Yeah, yeah. I’m just saying the threatening of the ICC by Israel.MR MILLER: I see. You should take it up with an international humanitarian lawyer.Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Sure. On two things – two different topics. Rwanda – the Rwandan Government didn’t really like a statement that you issued last week saying that the Rwandan Defence Forces were involved in the attack near Goma on the east of the DRC, saying that the statement’s ridiculous and that the Rwandan forces weren’t involved in that. Do you stand by that? Has there been any communication with Rwanda?MR MILLER: We absolutely do. The attack in question came from the Rwandan Defence Forces and M23 positions on the Mugunga IDP camp. The Government of Rwanda must investigate this heinous act and hold all of those responsible accountable, and we have made that clear to them.QUESTION: Has there been any communication directly with the Rwandans themselves?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to diplomatic conversations, but we have made quite clear what we think about this act and the fact it ought to be investigated.QUESTION: Great. And then a completely different topic, Mexico. The three surfers who were killed, one of them an American – I don’t know if you – do you have any lines, any communications with the U.S. on that?MR MILLER: Yeah. So we can confirm the death of a U.S. citizen, Carter Rhoad, near Ensenada, Mexico, and are closely monitoring the situation. We offer our sincere condolences to the family on their loss. We are coordinating with local law enforcement on their investigation into the matter, and out of respect for the privacy of the family, we will decline to comment further at this time.And with that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:35 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Canada																								China																								Democratic Republic of the Congo																								Georgia																								India																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Mexico																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Rwanda																								Saudi Arabia																								Ukraine
- On Condemning the Attack on an Internally Displaced Persons Camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;On Condemning the Attack on an Internally Displaced Persons Camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										On Condemning the Attack on an Internally Displaced Persons Camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo																																		Press Statement																														May 3, 2024																																							The United States strongly condemns the attack today&nbsp;from Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) and M23 positions on the Mugunga camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).&nbsp; This attack has caused the deaths of at least nine persons and wounded at least 33 others, many of whom were women and children.&nbsp; We are gravely concerned about the recent RDF and M23 expansion in eastern DRC, which has contributed to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people, and call on both parties to respect human rights and adhere to applicable obligations under international humanitarian law.It is essential that all states respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and hold accountable all actors for human rights abuses in the conflict in eastern DRC. &nbsp;We continue to support regional diplomatic efforts, and call on all parties to take steps to de-escalate tensions, avoid endangering civilian populations, and participate constructively in dialogue to create conditions for a negotiated solution and lasting peace.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Democratic Republic of the Congo																								Office of the Spokesperson
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Democratic Republic of the Congo				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of the Congo																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by armed groups or the armed forces; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including under the state of siege in the eastern part of the country; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, and other forms of such violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic groups or Indigenous peoples; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.The government took some steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Armed nongovernmental forces continued to commit abuses in the eastern provinces.  Large-scale abuses by the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo, ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo, also known as Allied Democratic Forces, the March 23 Movement, and other groups persisted in parts of North Kivu and Ituri Provinces.  Abuses included unlawful killings, disappearances, physical abuse and other mistreatment, destruction of government and private property, and gender-based violence, widespread even in areas with no active hostilities, by members of armed groups.  Armed groups also reportedly unlawfully recruited, abducted, and retained child soldiers and subjected children and adults to forced labor.  The armed rebel group March 23 Movement continued attacks against the country’s security forces and as of September remained in control of large swaths of territory in North Kivu Province.  In December 2022, the United Nations Group of Experts provided evidence the Rwandan Defense Force gave material, operational, and logistical support to the March 23 Movement and was itself conducting operations on Congolese territory.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports during the year that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings.  The state security forces (SSF) were accused of, tried for, and convicted of arbitrary or unlawful killings throughout the first half of the year, mostly in conflict-affected provinces such as Maniema, South Kivu, Ituri, Tanganyika, and North Kivu, and in operations against armed groups.  Although the military justice system convicted some members of the SSF responsible for human rights abuses, impunity remained a serious problem.On August 30, in Goma, government security forces confronted a group of adherents of the Natural Jewish Messianic Faith to the Nations gathering for a banned protest against the presence of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the East African Community Regional Force.  Security forces employed deadly and disproportionate force, reportedly killing 56 demonstrators, injuring 75 more, and arresting a total of 158 persons, including the group’s leader, Ephraim Bishimwa.  At least one Congolese National Police (PNC) officer was killed.  As of September 7, a government investigation into the incident continued, multiple members of the security forces were arrested or suspended, and the military governor of North Kivu Province was relieved of his post.Marginalized racial and ethnic communities were both perpetrators and victims of arbitrary and unlawful killings.  Conflict with armed groups, tensions concerning land rights, and migration exacerbated long-standing divisions regarding ethnicity.  There were reports that the SSF perpetrated, threatened, and condoned violence against marginalized ethnic communities.Media reports of Rwanda’s support to the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group contributed to violence and discrimination against Rwandophones and those with a perceived sympathy for Rwanda or M23.  Rwandophone populations (both Kinyarwanda and Kirundi speakers) were also accused of perpetrating violence against other ethnic communities.Armed groups committed arbitrary and unlawful killings throughout the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were reports of disappearances during the year by or on behalf of government authorities.  Authorities often refused to acknowledge the detention of suspects and sometimes detained suspects in unofficial facilities, including on military bases and in detention facilities operated by the National Intelligence Agency (ANR).  The whereabouts of some civil society activists and civilians arrested by the SSF remained unknown for long periods.  Despite the president’s promise to grant the United Nations access to all detention facilities, some ANR prisons remained impossible for independent observers to access.Armed groups abducted numerous persons, generally for forced labor, military service, or sexual slavery.  Many of these victims disappeared.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.During the year, there were credible reports that the SSF subjected individuals, including minority groups and journalists, to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment.  Security forces also abused children who lived or worked on the streets.Security forces subjected individuals, including members of minority groups and journalists, to rape and sexual abuse.Impunity among the SSF for mistreatment was a problem, although the government made limited progress in holding security forces accountable for human rights abuses.  For example, on March 30, the High Military Court of Kinshasa convicted four PNC officers on the charge of torture leading to the death of detainee Olivier Mpunga in 2021.  The four officers were sentenced to life imprisonment.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in most prisons throughout the country were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.  Harsher conditions prevailed in small detention centers run by the ANR, Republican Guard, or other security forces, which often detained prisoners for lengthy pretrial periods.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Serious threats to life and health were widespread and included gross overcrowding, prisoner-on-prisoner violence (particularly rape), food shortages, and inadequate potable water, sanitation, ventilation, temperature control, lighting, and medical care.  Most prisons were understaffed, undersupplied, and poorly maintained, leading to poor control of the prison population.Central prison facilities were severely overcrowded, with an estimated occupancy rate of 200 percent of capacity; some prisons operated with an estimated occupancy rate more than 500 percent.Local media reported the Ministry of Justice, which oversaw prisons, often had insufficient funds to pay for food or medical care for inmates, who instead relied on relatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and church groups to provide them sustenance.  Because funds often did not reach prisons in the provinces in a timely manner, there were gaps in food distribution.Generally medical doctors at the prisons did not receive their salaries, leading them to work elsewhere to make money.  Prisons rarely had budgets for in-house pharmacies, and while prisoners sometimes obtained medication such as pain relievers, prescription medication was generally unavailable, meaning prisoners had to rely on their families.  Sick prisoners were sometimes held in small isolation cells for long periods without an opportunity for movement, exercise, or use of showers or sanitary facilities.Violence was a problem in certain prisons.  According to human rights observers, prisoners themselves were sometimes given the responsibility to maintain order and mistreated others.Administration:  Authorities rarely conducted investigations into credible allegations of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring:  The government regularly allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross, MONUSCO, and NGOs access to official detention facilities maintained by the Ministry of Justice, but it sometimes denied access to facilities run by the Republican Guard, the ANR, and military intelligence services.Improvements:  On April 8, the minister of justice opened the newly renovated seventh ward at Makala Central Prison, designed to house and care for approximately 700 sick inmates and to decongest other areas of the facility.  Renovations to the ward included updating hygiene facilities and providing additional mattresses.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest or detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government generally did not observe these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						By law, arrests for offenses punishable if convicted by more than six months’ imprisonment required warrants.  Detainees had to appear before a magistrate within 48 hours.  The law required authorities to inform those arrested of their rights and the reasons for their arrest, and they could not arrest a family member in lieu of the suspected individual.  Authorities had to allow arrested individuals to contact their families and consult with attorneys.  Security officials, however, routinely violated all these requirements.While the law provided for a bail system, it generally did not function.  Detainees who were unable to pay for a lawyer were rarely able to access legal counsel.  Authorities often held suspects incommunicado, including in unofficial detention centers run by the ANR, military intelligence, and the Republican Guard, and refused to acknowledge these detentions.Arbitrary Arrest:  Security personnel arrested and detained civil society activists, journalists, and opposition party members and sometimes denied them due process.  Security forces regularly held protesters and civil society activists incommunicado and without charge for extended periods.  Police sometimes arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without filing charges to extort money from family members.  Persons without national identification cards were sometimes arbitrarily arrested by the SSF.For example, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) reported that from December 16, 2022, to January 5, PNC officers in Maniema Province arbitrarily arrested three human rights defenders, including one Indigenous rights activist, for protesting mistreatment and human rights abuses against ethnic Twa community members.  The UNJHRO reported the chief prosecutor at Kasongo Prison eventually released the activists due to a lack of evidence for any charges.Pretrial Detention:  Prolonged pretrial detention, ranging from months to years, was a problem.  Those who were supposed to go before a magistrate were often detained locally in a clandestine holding facility and kept there for many months, leaving their families to presume they were dead.  Judicial inefficiency, administrative obstacles, corruption, and staff shortages also caused trial delays.  In many cases, the length of pretrial detention equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality.  Government officials and other influential individuals often subjected judges, prosecutors, or defense attorneys to coercion.Authorities routinely did not respect court orders.  Disciplinary boards created under the High Council of Magistrates continued to rule on cases of corruption and malpractice.  Rulings included the firing, suspension, or fining of judges and magistrates.Military magistrates were responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all crimes allegedly committed by SSF members, whether committed in the line of duty or not.  Civilians could be tried in military tribunals if charged with offenses involving firearms.  The military justice system often succumbed to political and command interference, and security arrangements for magistrates in conflict areas were inadequate.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.  Authorities were required to inform defendants promptly and in detail of the charges against them, with free interpretation as necessary, but this did not always occur.  Defendants had the right to a trial within 15 days of being charged, but judges could extend this period to a maximum of 45 days.  Authorities only occasionally abided by this requirement.  The government did not regularly provide free legal counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases, although lawyers often represented indigent defendants free of charge with the financial support of foreign governments and organizations.  Lawyers often did not have adequate access to their clients.  Defendants had the right to be present and to have a defense attorney represent them; authorities occasionally disregarded these rights.  Authorities generally allowed adequate time to prepare a defense, although there were few resources available.  Defendants had the right to confront witnesses against them and to present evidence and witnesses in their own defense, but witnesses often were reluctant to testify due to fear of retaliation.  Defendants had the right to appeal, except in cases involving national security, armed robbery, and smuggling, which the Court of State Security usually adjudicated.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of political prisoners or detainees during the year, consisting primarily of individuals arrested under defamation laws for criticizing the actions of government officials or during protests or demonstrations.Officials, particularly in the two provinces under the state of siege, commonly used the charges of contempt, defamation, spreading false rumors, and public insult against persons critical of the government.  As of September, a trial was underway in the case against Jean-Marc Kabund, the former head of the president’s political party, Union for Democracy and Social Progress, on charges of contempt of the head of state, defamation, and spreading false rumors for statements he made during a July 2022 press conference in which he called President Tshisekedi “irresponsible” and “a public danger” and accused government officials of lying, manipulation, embezzlement of public funds, and corruption.  As of September, Kabund remained at Makala Central Prison, despite an August 2022 Court of Cassation ruling that he be remanded to house arrest.Political prisoners generally faced similar prison conditions as the rest of the general population.  While the government permitted international human rights and humanitarian organizations and MONUSCO access to some prisoners, authorities denied access to detention facilities run by the Republican Guard, military intelligence, and the ANR.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										There were credible reports that the government evicted persons from their places of residence or seized their property without due process or adequate restitution.  In August, Radio France International (RFI) reported police had evicted some families from their homes to allow for expansion of cobalt mining exploitation in the city of Kolwezi (Lualaba Province).  RFI reported several houses were destroyed and inhabitants had not been notified or compensated.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but there were reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.  Without appropriate legal authority, the SSF harassed and robbed civilians, entered and searched homes and vehicles without warrants, and looted homes, businesses, and schools.  There were some reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority.  Family members were often punished for offenses allegedly committed by their relatives.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										There were credible reports that armed groups and the SSF perpetrated serious human rights abuses.  In the first half of the year, the UNJHRO documented a total of 2,564 human rights abuses across the country, with the majority occurring in conflict-affected provinces, particularly North Kivu and Ituri, but also South Kivu, Mai-Ndombe, Tanganyika, and Maniema.  Conflict-affected provinces accounted for more than 80 percent of all abuses throughout the country.  Local NGOs reported the SSF committed abuses under the cover of the state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces.The SSF continued fighting armed groups in the east of the country, and conflict among armed groups resulted in significant population displacement and human rights abuses, especially in Ituri and North Kivu Provinces.  A UN Group of Experts report released in June noted that M23’s territorial expansions and operations led to the displacement of more than one million civilians in North Kivu Province between October 2022 and April.  The Group of Experts also revealed evidence of sustained, direct intervention by the Rwanda Defense Force on Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) territory to reinforce and train M23 combatants and to plan and conduct military operations against the armed group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).There were credible reports that elements within the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) collaborated with some armed groups.  A UN Group of Experts report from June noted that some senior FARDC officers collaborated with the FDLR and a local network of armed groups called the Congolese Patriotic Resistance Network, providing these groups logistical and material support.  In December 2022, a judge in the High Military Court of Bunia (Ituri Province) sentenced four FARDC officials, including a lieutenant colonel, to death for misappropriation of wartime munitions intended for military operations.  The officials had appealed their original conviction in May 2022 on charges of providing ammunition to the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO).The government took steps to neutralize armed groups and fight impunity.  Operational cooperation between MONUSCO and the government continued in the east.  The MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade supported FARDC troops in North Kivu and southern Ituri Provinces.  MONUSCO forces deployed and conducted patrols to protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) from armed group attacks in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri Provinces.  In North Kivu, the FARDC continued joint operations with Ugandan military forces, the Uganda Peoples’ Defense Force, under Operation Shujaa.  Among the 15 major armed groups in the country, various Mai Mai factions, ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC, locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces), CODECO, and M23 perpetrated the most abuses, according to a UNJHRO report covering the first half of the year.  Rising tensions since 2021 between the armed groups CODECO and Zaire contributed to numerous crimes against civilians and displacement in Ituri Province, particularly in Djugu Territory but extending into Mahagi and Irumu Territories.  In South Kivu Province, there continued to be reports of cycles of retaliatory clashes between armed groups and attacks against civilians in the Hauts-Plateaux of Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi Territories.  Armed groups committed approximately 71 percent of documented cases in conflict-affected provinces in the first half of the year, according to the UNJHRO.  Combatants abducted victims for ransom, for forced labor, and in retaliation for suspected collaboration.  The UNJHRO reported armed groups used extrajudicial killings as a tactic to force populations to abandon their property, crops, or areas vital for agriculture and mining.Killings:  The UNJHRO reported at least 1,480 civilians were victims of summary or extrajudicial killings in the first six months of the year, the vast majority occurring in conflict-affected provinces and of which 154 were children.  The armed groups ISIS-DRC, CODECO, M23, and Mai Mai committed most of these killings and mutilations, while FARDC soldiers and PNC agents contributed to the abuses.As of September, a criminal investigation was underway in Tanzania in the case of Tanzanian MONUSCO officials who opened fire on civilians at a border crossing with Uganda near Kasindi, North Kivu Province, killing two persons and injuring 15 others in July 2022.  The suspected perpetrators were arrested and removed from their positions with MONUSCO and findings from an internal investigation were sent to UN headquarters.Abductions:  UN agencies and NGOs reported armed groups abducted noncombatants to perform forced labor or guide them, or to ransom them.  Armed groups also utilized abductions as reprisal for a victim’s alleged collaboration with security and defense forces or rival groups, or because of their refusal to pay illegal taxes or to participate in so-called community work.  The UNJHRO reported that from January through June, a total of 412 children were abducted from the provinces of North Kivu, Ituri, and South Kivu.  The armed groups ISIS-DRC, M23, CODECO, and Raia Mutomboki were responsible for most abductions.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  Gender-based violence was often used as a tactic of war, and armed groups, the FARDC, the PNC, and the ANR perpetrated widespread sexual violence.  From January through June, the UNJHRO documented 187 cases of conflict-related sexual violence affecting adult women.  Approximately 17 percent of these violent crimes were attributable to state agents, notably FARDC soldiers and PNC agents.  The UNJHRO documented that at least 134 children were victims of various types of sexual violence in the first half of the year, with at least 13 percent of these assaults attributable to state agents, primarily the FARDC, PNC, and ANR.  Most of the sexual violence attributable to state agents was committed in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri Provinces.According to the Conduct in UN Field Missions online portal, there were three allegations of sexual abuse or exploitation committed by MONUSCO personnel during the year.  As of September, the United Nations and the government were conducting 27 investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by non-Congolese MONUSCO forces deployed to the country.  In October, MONUSCO announced the arrest of eight South African peacekeepers and suspended one officer for “systematic and widespread violation” of UN rules against sexual exploitation and abuse.Child Soldiers:  The Secretary of State determined that elements of the Democratic Republic of the Congo armed forces provided support to armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023.  See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.Other Conflict-related Abuse:  Credible reports indicated that armed groups deliberately targeted health-care facilities and medical personnel and intentionally deprived civilian populations of food, water, and humanitarian aid.  Fighting between the FARDC and armed groups as well as among armed groups displaced populations and limited humanitarian access, particularly in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, Mai-Ndombe, Maniema, and Tanganyika Provinces.  The government took steps to assist displaced persons, including by coordinating with nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, and MONUSCO on IDP protection and humanitarian assistance.In North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Kasai-Oriental, and Haut-Katanga Provinces, armed groups and elements of the FARDC continued to illegally tax, exploit, and trade natural resources for revenue and power.  Clandestine trade in minerals and other natural resources facilitated the purchase of weapons and reduced government revenues.  Gold, cassiterite (tin ore), coltan (tantalum ore), and wolframite (tungsten ore) were the most exploited minerals, but wildlife products, timber, charcoal, and fish were also sought after.The illegal trade in minerals financed armed groups and individual elements of the SSF.  Both elements of the SSF and certain armed groups continued to control, extort, and threaten remote mining areas in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, and Haut Katanga Provinces and the Kasai region.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government did not always respect this right.  Public criticism of government officials and corruption sometimes resulted in intimidation, threats, or arrests.  Provincial governments also prevented journalists from filming or covering certain protests.The UNJHRO reported that journalists and human rights defenders were regularly targeted by arbitrary arrests.  Government officials, particularly in the state of siege provinces North Kivu and Ituri, used charges of contempt, defamation, spreading false rumors, and public insult to silence persons critical of the administration, including journalists and human rights defenders.  In the first six months of the year, the UNJHRO documented 26 abuses of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.  The PNC and FARDC were the main perpetrators of these abuses.Freedom of Expression:  The law prohibited insulting the head of state, the army, or government institutions and authorities, malicious and public slander, hate speech or speech to incite violence, and language presumed to threaten national security.  Authorities sometimes intimidated, harassed, and detained activists and politicians when they publicly criticized the government, president, or the SSF.  For example, on February 10, ANR agents arrested comedian Junior Nkole for allegedly inciting tribalism and insulting President Tshisekedi in a video published to Facebook a year prior.  In the video, Nkole (himself ethnically Luba) impersonated a Luba job recruiter who would only hire Luba applicants to job positions.  Nkole did not specifically mention President Tshisekedi in his video but was held without charges for a month at an ANR facility in Kinshasa before being released on March 9.Violence and Harassment:  Journalists were frequently subjected to violence, harassment, and intimidation, both online and offline, by the SSF due to their reporting.  Impunity for such abuses, due to corruption, remained a problem.  For example, in June a video posted to social media showed a military intelligence officer beating and arresting several journalists covering a land dispute in Kinshasa.  The journalists, including Jeff Ngoy (Radio Okapi), Malou Mbela (RTNC), and Giresse Nkelani (RTNC), were held in detention for several hours at military intelligence headquarters and later released without charges.  Sylvain Kenge, a spokesperson for the FARDC, later claimed that the journalists attacked the soldiers, precipitating their arrest.  As of November, no charges were filed against the officers and no disciplinary action was taken.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  On March 13, parliament ratified the law Establishing the Modalities for the Exercise of Press Freedom, Information, and Broadcasting by Radio and Television, Written Press, and Other Means of Communication.  The law placed new restrictions on the definition of a journalist and implemented new requirements to obtaining a professional identification card from the National Union of the Congolese Press, including a degree in journalism or communication, or a minimum qualifying experience.  The law also introduced a time limit on the authorization for operating a broadcast media outlet to two years and classified online media outlets, cable television operators, and personal mobile television as media companies.  The law introduced a “right of reply” as sufficient compensation for defamation charges but also continued to allow for sentences of between eight days and one year in prison for defamation convictions.On March 13, parliament also ratified the Digital Code.  The law created the National Digital Council and the Authority for the Protection of Personal Data as regulatory bodies for the digital sector.  The law also introduced a prison sentence of up to six months for disseminating or sharing false information on social media or electronic communications networks.The law mandated the High Council for Audiovisual and Communications to provide for freedom of the press and equal access to communications media and information for political parties, associations, and citizens.  While the High Council for Audiovisual and Communications was the only institution with legal authority to restrict broadcasts, the government, including the SSF and provincial officials, also de facto exercised this power.Many journalists exercised self-censorship due to concerns of harassment, intimidation, or arrest.  Media representatives reported they were pressured by provincial authorities not to cover certain events, including those organized by the opposition or local activists.  Journalists reported increased self-censorship following the arrest of Jeune Afrique correspondent Stanis Bujakera in October on six separate charges, including dissemination of false information and falsifying state seals, in relation to an unsigned August Jeune Afrique article that showed a purportedly official document and claimed that military intelligence might have played a role in the July 13 assassination of former Transport Minister Cherubin Okende.  Bujakera was the first journalist to be tried under the new Digital Code, which prohibited the intentional or unjustified dissemination of false information.  As of November, the trial in the case continued.Libel/Slander Laws:  Under the law, defamation, public insult, and contempt were criminal offenses subject to prison time and fines if convicted.  The law did not consider the veracity of reported facts in the case of a defamation complaint.  Instead, the judge was to consider only the damage to the accused from revelations in a journalist’s work.  The national and provincial governments used defamation laws to intimidate and punish critics, restrict public discussion, and retaliate against journalists and political opponents.National Security:  Authorities at times cited laws that prohibited anyone from making general defamatory accusations against the military to restrict free speech under the pretext of national security.  Authorities engaged in rhetoric that had the effect of limiting freedom of expression by members of the press.Nongovernmental Impact:  Armed groups and their political wings regularly restricted and sought to restrict freedom of expression, including for members of the press, in the areas where they operated.Actions to Expand Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media:  The international NGO Reporters Without Borders noted in May that the law on Establishing the Modalities for Press Freedom, “contains clearly positive elements but also suffers from significant flaws,” including the fact that defamation and insult remained punishable by imprisonment.  The law was the result of consultations among the government, civil society, and journalists during the 2022 General Conference on Media.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution provided for freedom of peaceful assembly, but government authorities restricted this right and prevented those critical of the government from exercising their right to peaceful assembly, especially in the eastern provinces.  The state of siege since May 2021 in Ituri and North Kivu Provinces resulted in further restrictions on peaceful assembly.  The law required organizers of public events to notify local authorities in advance of the event.  The government sometimes used this advance notification requirement to decline to authorize public meetings or protests organized by opposition parties or civil society groups critical of the government.The SSF at times responded to peaceful protests with deadly force.  From January to June, the UNJHRO documented 14 abuses of the freedom of demonstration and peaceful assembly.  For example, on May 20, the UNJHRO documented the arbitrary arrest and detention of approximately 20 demonstrators from opposition political parties and citizens’ movements, including the brief arrest of a provincial deputy, during a march organized by opposition party leaders to denounce high costs of living, continued insecurity in the eastern part of the country, and alleged irregularities in the voter registration process for the presidential elections on December 20.  During the same march, the UNJRHO documented four cases of mistreatment by PNC officers, including one boy who was beaten with a baton.  Three PNC officers were arrested in connection with the violence, including acts of violence against children.  As of September, the three officers were in detention and their trial remained pending at military court.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right.  Civil society organizations and NGOs were required to register with the government and could receive funds only through donations; they could not generate any revenue.  The registration process was burdensome and slow.  Some groups, particularly within the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) community, reported the government denied their registration requests.  Many NGOs reported that, even when carefully following the registration process, it often took years to receive certification.  Many interpreted registration difficulties as intentional government obstacles to impede NGO activity.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government sometimes restricted these rights.In-country Movement:  The SSF sometimes required travelers to present travel orders from an employer or government official, although the law did not require such documentation.  The SSF often detained and sometimes exacted bribes from individuals traveling without orders.For example, in May PNC officers physically blocked political party president Moise Katumbi from entering Kongo Central Province on foot for planned events with his political party, Together for the Republic.  The provincial governor alleged that the decision to prevent Katumbi from entering the province was taken for security reasons given Katumbi’s refusal to postpone a scheduled march in the province.  In June, General Directorate of Migration officials at Kinshasa’s N’Djili Airport prevented presidential candidate Matata Ponyo from boarding a flight bound for the city of Bunia (Ituri Province).  Media outlets reported that directorate officials prevented Ponyo from boarding his flight because he had arrived late at the airport and refused to follow the preboarding formalities.Armed groups engaged in analogous activity in areas under their control, routinely extorting civilians at checkpoints and holding them for ransom.Foreign Travel:  Due to inadequate administrative systems, passport issuance was irregular and at times prevented citizens from leaving the country.  Sitting and former senior government officials were required to seek authorization from the ANR for foreign travel.  In some instances, the ANR either did not respond in a timely fashion or initially denied requests for authorization, including of political figures viewed as critical of the government.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a rudimentary system for providing protection to refugees.  The law, which allowed for flexibility, provided most fundamental rights to refugees and citizens on an equal basis.  UNHCR worked with the government to bring its refugee status determination system up to international standards and increase its efficiency and effectiveness, although delays in adjudication of cases continued.  Because the Appeals Commission had not been convened in years, rejected asylum seekers remained in limbo.  UNHCR was assisting the government in scaling up its ability to undertake biometric registration of refugees and issue refugee identification cards.The government assisted in the safe, voluntary return of former Congolese refugees, and facilitating immigration processing.  In establishing security mechanisms, government authorities did not treat refugees differently from citizens.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers:  Continuing conflict in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Ituri, Bas Uele, and Tanganyika subjected refugees and IDPs to attacks, often resulting in deaths and further displacement.  UNHCR reported Rwandan refugees in the Masisi Territory, North Kivu, were subject to cyclical displacement as a result of FARDC and armed group operations and were forced to relocate to South Kivu Province.  As a result of conflict, refugees reported a range of human rights abuses and instances of forced displacement, according to UNHCR.  Because of a perception that Rwandan refugees were aligned with or supported the FDLR, an armed group whose original founders included some perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, they were discriminated against and harassed, and subject to arbitrary detention during military operations to a greater extent than the general population.  UNHCR also reported elements of the Imbonerakure, the Burundian ruling party youth group, harassed Burundian refugees in the country.Gender-based violence continued to be a problem for refugees and asylum seekers.  Incursions by South Sudanese forces into Aru Territory and Ituri Province continued during the year.  The incursions affected security for South Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees as well as local populations.Durable Solutions:  UNHCR worked with the government to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of some Rwandan refugees.  UNHCR reported 208,075 Rwandan refugees of the 209,304 residing in the country were registered by the government as of July 31.  On June 26 and 27, UNHCR facilitated a tripartite meeting in Nairobi between the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to discuss voluntary repatriation for refugees from both countries.UNHCR worked with the government to voluntarily repatriate 5,056 persons between January and July 31, including 987 Rwandan refugees, 2,477 Burundian refugees, and 1,591 refugees from the Central African Republic.Temporary Protection:  The government provided temporary protection to an undetermined number of individuals who might not qualify as refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, and the government estimated there were 6.24 million IDPs in the country, more than half of whom were children who had been displaced for longer than 12 months.  The government was unable to consistently protect or assist IDPs adequately but generally allowed domestic and international humanitarian organizations to assist.  The government was unable to consistently promote IDPs’ safe, voluntary, and dignified return to their homes, or local integration in areas of displacement.  Humanitarian access was difficult in some locations, due to weak civilian authority, insecurity, and poor infrastructure.  In most locations IDPs lived in poor conditions without adequate shelter or protection.  Intercommunal violence and fighting between groups in the east resulted in continued population displacement and increased humanitarian needs for IDPs and host communities.  Armed groups also attacked individuals and organizations providing humanitarian assistance.Combatants and other civilians abused IDPs.  Abuses included killings, rape and sexual exploitation of women and children, abduction, forced conscription, looting, illegal taxation, and general harassment.  Women and girls were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, including gang rape.  Humanitarian organizations reported increased rates of sexual exploitation and abuse among women and girls displaced by the conflict in North Kivu Province and noted that at least 124 brothels in Goma and around IDP sites were exploiting underage girls.  In June the United Nations announced a humanitarian systemwide scale-up to address the protection crisis in eastern DRC that was extended until the end of the year.  As of September, however, humanitarian organizations continued reporting high numbers of sexual violence and abuse cases among IDP populations, whose numbers surged as a result of M23’s actions and far exceeded the capacity of secured camps.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:   https://www.internal-displacement.org&nbsp;.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness, including through nationality laws and their administration.  The country had a population of de facto stateless residents and persons at risk of statelessness, including persons of South Sudanese origin living in the northeast, persons of Rwandan origin living in the east, Mbororo pastoralists in the far north, long-term migrants, forcibly returned migrants from Angola, former Angolan refugees, mixed-race persons who were denied naturalization, and citizens without civil documentation.  There were no national statistics on stateless persons because such data were linked with the general population census process, which was last completed in 1984.The law did not discriminate in granting citizenship on the grounds of gender, religion, or disability; however, the naturalization process was cumbersome and required parliamentary approval of individual citizenship applications.  Individuals lacking proof of citizenship were often denied identity documents, political rights, and employment.  There were reports that persons lacking proof of citizenship were also targets of violence and harassment.  Persons whose names were not spelled according to local custom were often denied citizenship, as were individuals with lighter-colored skin.Administrative practices for acquiring nationality through marriage, adoption, or naturalization were politicized and put more persons at risk of statelessness.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were widely reported to be fair but not free of abuses and irregularities.  As of December 31, provisional results of the December 20 presidential election were released by the National Independent Electoral Commission showing President Felix Tshisekedi leading by a large majority.  Authorities investigated concerns regarding failure to adhere to procedures in the electoral code and allegations of fraud and violence.Political Parties and Political Participation:  The law recognized opposition parties and rights and obligations were enshrined in the law.  Government authorities and the SSF, however, prevented opposition parties from holding public meetings, assemblies, and peaceful protests.  The government and the SSF also limited opposition leaders’ freedom of movement.  The SSF used force to prevent or disrupt opposition-organized events.State-run media, including television and radio stations, remained the largest sources of information for the public and government.  There were reports of government intimidation of political opponents, such as exercising political influence in the distribution of media content.In several districts, known as chefferies, traditional chiefs performed the role of a local government administrator.  They were unelected and instead were selected based on local tribal customs (generally based on family lineage) and if approved, were paid by the government.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Some ethnic groups in the eastern part of the country claimed discrimination in participating in politics.  A 2022 amendment to the electoral law aimed at increasing woman candidate participation by waiving candidate registration fees for political parties whose lists achieved gender parity.  According to officials of the Independent National Elections Commission, however, no political parties submitted candidate lists with 50 percent women for the 2023 elections.  Women faced obstacles to full participation in politics and leadership positions generally.  Women in leadership positions were often given portfolios focused on so-called women’s topics, such as those related to gender-based violence, cultural norms, and discrimination against women.  Women generally had less access to financial resources needed to participate in politics.  Furthermore, insecurity, particularly in the eastern provinces, presented a major obstacle for women who wished to run for office and campaign, because the risk of rape and other sexual violence forced them to limit activities and public exposure.  MONUSCO officials noted that harassment and derision of women candidates, even within their own parties, and failure to prevent or condemn violence against women candidates, was widespread.Some groups, including Indigenous persons and LGBTQI+ persons, claimed they had no representation in the Senate, National Assembly, or provincial assemblies.  Discrimination against Indigenous groups continued in some areas, such as Equateur, Kasai-Oriental, and Haut-Katanga Provinces, and such discrimination contributed to the lack of Indigenous group political participation.  The local NGO Congo Handicap reported that persons with disabilities frequently faced societal barriers to participating in politics.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.Corruption:  Corruption by officials at all levels as well as within state-owned enterprises continued to deprive state coffers of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.  The Supreme Audit Court was charged with investigating and prosecuting public financial mismanagement.The General Inspectorate of Finances accused several government officials of embezzlement throughout the year.  In an April press release, the general inspectorate reported phantom civil servant payments amounted to $60 million per month.  Lack of enforcement of court decisions in corruption cases contributed to impunity, as rulings were often overturned in appellate proceedings or dismissed due to procedural errors.Artisanal mining remained predominantly informal, illicit, and many types of artisanal mining were strongly linked to both armed groups and certain elements of the FARDC.  Government officials were often complicit in the smuggling of artisanal mining products, particularly gold, into Uganda and Rwanda.  The law prohibited the FARDC from engaging in mineral trade, but the government did not effectively enforce the law.  Criminal involvement by some FARDC units and armed groups included protection rackets, extortion, and theft.  The illegal trade in minerals financed armed groups and individual elements of the SSF and sometimes generated revenue for traditional authorities and local and provincial governments.  Individual FARDC commanders also sometimes appointed civilians to manage their interests at mining sites covertly.  A June report by the UN Group of Experts reported an increase in activity by a criminal network of Burundian and local civilians, economic actors, intermediaries, and Burundian uniformed personnel engaged in gold smuggling across the border between the country and Burundi.In conflict areas, armed groups and elements of the SSF regularly set up roadblocks and ran illegal taxation schemes.As in previous years, a significant portion of the country’s enacted budget included off-budget and special account allocations that were not fully published.  These accounts shielded receipts and disbursements from public scrutiny.  Eight parastatal organizations held special accounts and used them to circumvent the government’s tax collection authorities.  “Special accounts” were, in theory, subject to the same auditing procedures and oversight as other expenditures; however, due in large part to resource constraints, the Supreme Audit Authority did not always publish its internal audits, or in many cases published them significantly late.  Under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard of 2016, the government was required to disclose the allocation of revenues and expenditures from extractive companies.  On October 12, the EITI board gave the country a higher overall score in implementing the 2019 EITI standard (85.5 points), largely due to the country’s efforts to publish extractives sector contracts.The Agency for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption, a special service under the Office of the President, was responsible for coordinating all government entities charged with fighting corruption and money laundering, conducting investigations with the full authority of judicial police, and overseeing transfer of public corruption cases to appropriate judicial authorities.  The Platform for the Protection for Whistleblowers in Africa asserted in 2021 that the agency’s record was mixed, without visible results.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated with varying government restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.  Government officials, including representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Human Rights and the ANR, were somewhat cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Elements of the SSF continued to kill, harass, beat, intimidate, and arbitrarily arrest and detain domestic human rights advocates and domestic NGO workers, particularly when NGOs reported on or supported victims of abuses by the SSF, or reported on the illegal exploitation of natural resources.  Armed groups repeatedly targeted local human rights defenders for violent retribution when they spoke out against abuses, particularly in the eastern provinces of the country.  After receiving and reporting numerous threats against his life for his advocacy for land rights for citizens, human rights defender Obedi Karafulu was killed in his home in Rutshuru, North Kivu by unidentified men on July 19.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The government at times cooperated with and permitted visits by UN representatives and other international organizations but was not consistent in doing so.  For example, the government refused to grant the United Nations access to certain detention centers, particularly at military installations such as military intelligence headquarters.  The government and military prosecutors also provided nominal cooperation to the UN team supporting investigations and appellate proceedings during the year related to the 2017 killing of two UN experts, Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan, in Kasai Central Province.Government Human Rights Bodies:  During the year the National Commission on Human Rights published reports and made public statements on prison conditions and human rights abuses.  It also held human rights training sessions for magistrates, visited detention centers, conducted professional development workshops for human rights defense networks, and followed up on complaints of human rights abuses from civilians.  Both the National Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Ministry lacked full-time representation in all 26 provinces.  Observers and human rights NGOs generally assessed these entities operated with some independence but struggled with effectiveness.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law on sexual violence criminalized rape of all persons, but the law was not often enforced.  The legal definition of rape did not include spousal rape or intimate partner rape.  Rape and sexual mutilation were also common and used as tactics in areas of armed conflict, including by government agents.  International organizations and local NGOs reported that women rape survivors were sometimes forced to pay a fine to return to their families and to gain access to their children.  Persons with disabilities faced high rates of gender-based violence and suffered health consequences as a result.  LGBTQI+ persons were targeted with particular forms of gender-based violence, including so-called corrective rape.  Indigenous women who were survivors of rape or sexual assault were often stigmatized or rejected by their communities.  Most survivors of rape did not pursue formal legal action due to insufficient resources, lack of confidence in the justice system, family pressure, and fear of subjecting themselves to humiliation, reprisal, or both.The law allowed survivors of sexual violence to waive their appearance in court and permitted closed hearings to protect confidentiality.  The minimum penalty prescribed for conviction of rape was a prison sentence of five years, and courts sometimes imposed such sentences in rape convictions in the infrequent instances when these crimes came to trial.  The law also prohibited extrajudicial settlements (for example, a customary fine paid by the perpetrator to the family of the survivor), but such practices still occurred.  Some prosecutions occurred for rape and other types of sexual violence, but the government generally did not enforce the law effectively.Government agents raped and sexually abused women and girls during arrest and detention, as well as during military action, according to UNJHRO reporting.  While sexual violence was a problem throughout the country, most cases took place in areas affected by internal conflict.  Armed groups frequently used rape as a tactic of conflict.The PNC and FARDC continued their nationwide campaign, with support from MONUSCO, to eliminate gender-based violence by the SSF, including through the fight against impunity and the protection of survivors and witnesses.  Few activities took place under the campaign to operationalize the national action plan to combat gender-based violence.  Provincial ministers in some provinces maintained provincial action plans to combat gender-based violence.The law did not provide any specific penalty for domestic violence despite its prevalence.  Although the law considered assault a crime, police rarely intervened in perceived domestic disputes.  In limited instances, judicial authorities took action in cases of domestic or spousal abuse.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law prohibited sexual harassment and stipulated a minimum sentence of one year if convicted, but there was little or no effective enforcement of the law.  Widespread sexual harassment occurred throughout the country.  There were reports that SSF and government agents incited, perpetrated, or explicitly or implicitly condoned sexual harassment.Discrimination:  The constitution prohibited discrimination based on gender, but the law did not provide women the same rights as men.  The law permitted women to participate in economic domains without approval of male relatives, provided for maternity care, disallowed inequities linked to dowries, and specified fines and other sanctions for those who discriminate or engage in gender-based violence.  The government did not effectively enforce the law.  Women experienced economic discrimination, and there were legal restrictions on women in employment, including limitations on occupations considered dangerous, but no restrictions on women’s working hours.  According to the International Labor Organization, women often received less pay in the private sector than did men doing the same job and rarely occupied positions of authority or high responsibility.  Women who identified as LGBTQI+, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and persons of marginalized racial, ethnic, or religious groups at times faced discrimination when seeking employment, housing, or access to public services.According to UNICEF, many widows were unable to inherit their late husbands’ property because the law stated that in event of a death in which there was no will, the husband’s children, including those born out of wedlock (provided they were officially recognized by the father), rather than the widow, had precedence with regard to inheritance.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.  Problems affecting access to family planning and reproductive health services included an inadequate transportation infrastructure, inadequate quantities of contraceptives, and poor logistics and supply chain management leading to frequent stock shortages.  Cultural norms favoring large families, misinformation surrounding contraceptive use, including fear that contraception caused infertility, and especially the population’s general inability to pay for contraceptive services were also barriers.  Emergency contraception was not always available.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services, including to survivors of gender-based violence.  The provision of emergency contraception was included as part of clinical management of rape, but women could not always access contraception in time.  The services were free and intended to provide a postexposure prophylaxis kit within 72 hours to avoid unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.  Prominent human rights observers reported, however, that women who went to police to report rape were often asked to pay for actions needed to investigate and prosecute the crime.  The government established mobile clinics for gender-based violence survivors in remote areas.  LGBTQI+ survivors reported societal barriers to accessing emergency care.The Integrated African Health Observatory of the World Health Organization estimated the maternal mortality ratio at 547 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2020, despite sustained high usage of health facilities for deliveries.  Geographic barriers, lack of appropriate equipment, and low health professional capacity also hindered the provision of quality maternal and child health services and led to high maternal mortality and childbirth complications, such as obstetric fistula.Young women often did not have access to menstrual hygiene, which impacted their ability to attend schools, which often lacked bathrooms and running water.  Furthermore, unwed girls who became pregnant were pressured to drop out of school, and young women who become mothers often faced societal stigma.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution provided that no one could be discriminated against on the basis of race, ethnicity, tribe, or cultural or linguistic minority.  Nevertheless, long-standing ethnic tensions – often revolving around land rights – fueled some community violence.Violence and discrimination against Rwandophones and those with a perceived sympathy towards Rwanda or the M23 armed group continued and was exacerbated by credible reports of Rwandan government support to M23 rebels.  Hate speech against these populations also increased.  Rwandophone populations (both Kinyarwanda and Kirundi speakers) were also perpetrators of violence against other ethnic communities.  The UNJHRO reported that anti-Rwandophone hate speech and violence was most prevalent in the High Plateaus, including in the territories of Fizi, Uvira, and Mwenga in South Kivu Province.  In these areas, conflict often pitted the Banyamulenge community against the Bafuliiru, Bayindu-Banyindu, and Babembe communities and was characterized by the involvement of multiple armed groups and militias organized in ethnic and community-based alliances.  Media reported Rwandophone individuals in North and South Kivu were denied access to restaurants and shops and that some businesses owned by Rwandophone individuals were looted or destroyed.Intercommunal violence between the Teke and Yaka ethnic groups in Kwilu, Kwango, and Mai-Ndombe Provinces since February 2022 resulted in at least 300 deaths, the destruction of more than 200 homes, and the displacement of thousands of inhabitants, including into the Republic of Congo.  According to the Ministries of Human Rights and Interior, the conflict stemmed from disagreements concerning land rights and tax collection.  Violence continued despite the presence of FARDC reinforcements sent to reestablish security in the region and the steady efforts to reduce tensions from senior officials and prominent politicians.There were reports that government agents incited, perpetuated, condoned, and tolerated violence and abuse against racial and ethnic groups.  For example, the UNJHRO reported that on March 8, a PNC officer in Kinshasa called for the systematic killing of ethnic Yaka community members during a speech in front of a local district office building.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Societal discrimination against the country’s Indigenous population (Twa, Baka, Mbuti, Efe, Aka, and other peoples collectively called “pygmies” by many residents and believed to be the country’s original inhabitants) was widespread, and the government did not effectively protect their civil and political rights.  Most Indigenous persons took no part in the political process, and many lived in remote forested areas in hunter-gatherer societies.  Fighting in the east between armed groups and the SSF, expansion by farmers, and increased trading and excavation activities caused displacement of some Indigenous peoples.  Political, social, and economic discrimination and exclusion of Indigenous peoples drove conflict throughout the country, most notably in Tanganyika Province and in South Kivu Province.Indigenous peoples were subject to threats and violence from government forces.  There were also press and NGO reports that the SSF perpetrated abuses against Indigenous persons, including unlawful killings, looting, and rape.  Illegal loggers and miners, commercial bushmeat hunters, wildlife traffickers, and armed groups operating in forests and on or near Indigenous lands also committed abuses.  Rebel groups exploited Indigenous communities with forced labor, and perpetrated abuses, such as kidnapping and sexual violence.In some areas where Indigenous peoples lived, surrounding tribes kidnapped and forced Indigenous persons into slavery, sometimes resulting in ethnic conflict.  Indigenous populations also reported high instances of rape by members of outside groups, which contributed to HIV infections and other health complications.Indigenous communities were frequently unable to secure land and resource rights in and around forests and ancestral lands due to conflict, customary land rights matters, and exclusion from forest-management and other decision-making bodies.  While the law stipulated that Indigenous populations receive 10 percent of the profits gained from use of their land, this provision was not enforced.  As a result, many Indigenous communities lived in poverty.  Several Indigenous persons reported discrimination when trying to access to health-care facilities.  Maternal mortality rates among Indigenous communities remained high.  Discrimination and a lack of opportunities contributed to low levels of access to education among Indigenous populations.  The law recognized Indigenous peoples’ land tenure rights, the preservation of their cultural heritage and religious practices, and their rights to protection and to access basic services including free health care, primary and secondary education, as well as legal assistance; however, the government did not effectively enforce the law.																																				Children										Education:  Secondary school attendance rates for girls were lower than for boys due to financial, cultural, or security reasons, including early marriage and pregnancy for girls.  There were reports of teachers pressuring girls for sexual favors in return for higher grades.  Educational obstacles for children with disabilities included inaccessible infrastructure; exams provided in formats not accessible to everyone; and a lack of awareness among teachers, students, and staff in addition to the reluctance to include children with disabilities.Child Abuse:  Although the law prohibited all forms of child abuse, it regularly occurred.  The constitution prohibited parental abandonment of children accused of sorcery.  Nevertheless, parents or other care providers sometimes abandoned or abused such children, frequently invoking witchcraft as a rationale.  The law provided for the imprisonment of parents and other adults convicted of accusing children of witchcraft.  Authorities did not implement the law.Many churches conducted exorcisms of children accused of witchcraft.  These exorcisms involved isolation, beating and whipping, starvation, and forced ingestion of purgatives.  According to UNICEF, some communities labeled children with disabilities or speech impediments as witches.  This practice sometimes resulted in parents abandoning their children.  UNICEF and MONUSCO attributed some abuses of children, including sexual violence against young girls, to harmful traditional and religious practices.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  While the law required consent and prohibited marriage of persons younger than 18, it was not effectively enforced by the government; many marriages of underage children took place, in part due to continued social acceptance.  Provisions in the law did not clarify who had standing to report forced marriage as a crime or if a judge had the authority to do so.  The constitution criminalized forced marriage, along with a law promulgated in December 2022 criminalizing trafficking in persons.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The minimum age of consensual sex was 18, and the law prohibited the sale or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation.  The law prohibited child pornography, with imprisonment of 10 to 20 years for those convicted; however, authorities did not always enforce the law.  The law criminalized child sex trafficking, with conviction carrying penalties ranging from 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a heavy fine.  There were also reports that child soldiers, particularly girls, faced sexual exploitation.																																				Antisemitism										The country had a very small Jewish population.  There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents during the year.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No law specifically prohibited consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, but individuals who engaged in public displays of consensual same-sex conduct, such as kissing, were sometimes subject to prosecution under public indecency provisions, which were rarely applied to opposite-sex couples.  No law specifically prohibited so-called cross-dressing.Violence and Harassment:  There were reports that police or other government agents incited, perpetrated, condoned, or tolerated violence or harassment against LGBTQI+ individuals or those reporting such abuse.  Authorities rarely took steps to investigate, prosecute, or punish officials who committed abuses against LGBTQI+ persons, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government.  Local NGOs reported there was rarely condemnation when LGBTQI+ persons were attacked.  LGBTQI+ persons were subjected to harassment, stigmatization, and violence, including so-called corrective rape, by both state and nonstate actors.  In some cases, LGBTQI+ persons were forced by threats of violence to withdraw from schools and other public and community institutions.Discrimination:  No law specifically prohibited discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, but the law did provide for a right to employment, health care, and education for all persons.  Nonetheless, human rights defenders reported LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in all these areas throughout the year, as well as in finding or keeping housing and access to public services.Some religious leaders, radio broadcasts, and political organizations played a key role in promoting discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons.  For example, in August media sources reported that during a speech to a gathering of members of the Christian Family Community, Roman Catholic Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo called on attendees to reject homosexuality and reaffirm that “marriage is between men and women.”Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  There was no legal process by which the government allowed individuals to change their gender identity marker on legal identifying documents to bring them into alignment with their gender identity.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Local NGOs promoting LGBTQI+ rights reported that there were numerous cases where LGBTQI+ persons were forcibly subjected to psychiatric treatment or religious rituals to “change” the person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.  At times, LGBTQI+ persons suffered physical violence during these rituals or sessions.LGBTQI+ activists reported numerous cases of so-called corrective rape against both women and men during the year.  Local NGOs documented several cases of corrective rape, mostly against lesbian and transgender women from January to September.  Survivors were sometimes denied health-care services or faced pressure to “change” their LGBTQI+ status when attempting to access such services.Nonstate actors also attempted to coerce LGBTQI+ persons to change their sexual orientation through violence.  For example, in March a video circulated on social media showing two men beating another man with a machete in Bukavu (South Kivu Province) and threatening to decapitate him if he did not change his sexual orientation.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  Local LGBTQI+ rights organizations reported that LGBTQI+ persons who participated in Pride Month activities were subjected to harassment, physical violence, and threats, as in previous years.  Some LGBTQI+ activist groups reported the government denied their NGO registration requests.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  A 2022 law mandated that the state guarantee access to government buildings and public services for persons with disabilities, but access remained limited.  The law mandated that the state provide ramps and other reasonable accommodations, produce documents in braille, employ sign language, and provide access to public transportation for persons with disabilities at a reduced cost.  Government information and communication on disability concerns was not always provided in accessible formats.Violence against persons with disabilities was a serious problem.  Victims often did not report abuses, and when they did, they experienced financial, social, and cultural obstacles to accountability.  Often police and other officials who played a role in the judicial system asked victims for money before investigating.  Many persons with disabilities consequently resorted to begging.  Conflict in several areas of the country left many thousands of former military and civilians with significant disabilities.  Disability groups reported extensive social stigmatization, including children with disabilities being expelled from their homes and accused of witchcraft.  Families sometimes concealed their children with disabilities due to shame.Persons with disabilities were also frequently survivors of gender-based violence.  Many survivors reported unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections as a result.  Congo Handicap reported that perpetrators were not held to account for the alleged abuses.The constitution prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities and required the state to promote their participation in national, provincial, and local institutions.  The constitution stated all persons should have access to national education.  The law prohibited private, public, and semipublic companies from discriminating against qualified candidates based on disability.  The law also provided for protection of persons with disabilities against employment discrimination.  The government did not enforce these provisions effectively, and persons with disabilities often found it difficult to obtain employment, education, and other government services.While persons with disabilities could attend public primary and secondary schools and had access to higher education, no reasonable accommodations were required of educational facilities to support their full and equal inclusion.  Schools for children with hearing impairments, for example, were private and generally in poor condition.  According to the Ministry of People Living with Disabilities, fewer than 1 percent of children with disabilities attended school, although the ministry estimated that persons living with disabilities made up at least 13 percent of the country’s population.  The government continued a program to standardize sign language throughout the provinces due to differences among the signs used in different provinces.Persons with disabilities also encountered many difficulties in exercising their rights to participate in civic life.  For example, during the voter registration period for the presidential, legislative and provincial elections scheduled for December 20, persons with vision disabilities encountered difficulties finding accessible information about registration centers and persons with physical disabilities encountered inaccessible infrastructure.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Discrimination against persons with albinism was widespread and limited their ability to marry and obtain employment, health care, and education.  Families and communities frequently ostracized persons with albinism.  Civil society groups reported persons with albinism were killed and their bodies disinterred from their graves and cut up for use in rituals meant to grant special powers in any endeavor.The law prohibited discrimination based on HIV status, but social stigma continued.  A 2020 Ministry of Health study conducted in conjunction with the World Health Organization and other organizations surveyed persons with HIV regarding stigmatization and discrimination towards them.  Approximately 40 percent gave their HIV status as a reason to have moved during the previous 12 months.  Approximately 25 percent said they lost a job or source of revenue during the previous 12 months due to their HIV status.  During the year, the government continued to run its National Multi-sectoral Program for the Fight Against HIV/AIDS.  The program supported persons living with HIV and AIDS, reduced social stigmas, and improved testing, treatment, and care.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution and law provided all workers, including those in both the informal and formal sectors, except top government officials, judges, and SSF members, the right to form and join trade unions and to bargain collectively.  The law also provided for the right of most workers to conduct legal strikes.  It was against the law, however, for police, army, directors of public and private enterprises, and domestic workers to strike.  The law gave administrative authorities the right to dissolve, suspend, or deregister trade union organizations.  It granted unions the right to conduct activities without interference, although it did not define interference.  In the private sector, a minimum of 10 employees was required to form a union within a business, and a single business could include members of more than one union.  Foreigners could not hold union office unless they had lived in the country for at least 20 years.  Collective bargaining required a minimum of 10 union committee members and one employer representative; union committee members reported to the rest of the workforce.  In the public sector, the government set wages by decree after holding prior consultations with unions.Union committees were required to notify company management of a planned strike, but did not need authorization to strike.  The law stipulated that unions and employers should adhere to lengthy compulsory arbitration and appeal procedures before unions initiated strikes.  At times, however, workers did strike without adhering to these lengthy compulsory arbitration and appeal procedures, thus engaging in a “wildcat” strike.  Generally, the committee delivered a notice of strike to the employer.  If the employer did not reply within 48 hours, the union could strike immediately.  If the employer chose to reply, negotiations, which could take up to three months, began with a labor inspector and ultimately continued in the Peace Court.  At times, employees provided minimum services during negotiations, but this was not a requirement.  If negotiations were taking place, public-sector workers were required to continue to provide “vital services.”  Unless unions notified employers of a planned strike, the law prohibited striking workers from occupying the workplace during a strike, and an infraction of the rules on strikes could lead to incarceration of up to six months with compulsory prison labor.  This rule was not enforced.  Workers exercised their right to strike.  Workers in the public and private sectors held strikes regarding unpaid salaries.The law prohibited discrimination against union employees and required employers to reinstate workers dismissed for union activities, but the associated penalties were not adequate to deter violations.  Penalties were not commensurate with penalties for other civil rights violations.  Workers had access to a labor court for discrimination problems.  Judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals.  The law considered those who had worked for a minimum of three continuous months as “workers” and thereby protected by relevant labor law.  Unless they were part of a union, most workers in agricultural activities and artisanal mining, domestic and migrant workers, and workers in export-processing zones were unfamiliar with their labor rights and did not often seek redress when employers breached applicable labor laws.The government did not effectively enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike for workers.  In small and medium-sized businesses, workers could not properly exercise the right to strike.  Government and employers did not respect the right of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and penalties were rarely applied against violators.  Due to lax enforcement of labor regulations and lack of capacity for the General Labor Inspectorate, companies and shops could immediately replace any workers attempting to unionize, bargain collectively, or strike with contract workers to intimidate the workers and prevent them from exercising their rights, despite legal protections.  Antiunion discrimination was widespread, particularly in foreign-owned companies.  In many instances companies refused to negotiate with unions and negotiated individually with workers to undermine collective bargaining efforts.  Despite collective agreements on union dues, employers often did not remit union dues or did so irregularly.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at:   https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings&nbsp;/.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The government set regional minimum wages for all workers in private enterprise, with the highest minimum wages applied to the cities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi.  The minimum wages were above the poverty line.  In the public sector the government set wages annually by decree and permitted unions to act only in an advisory capacity.The law defined different standard workweeks, ranging from 45 hours per week to 72 hours every two weeks, for various jobs and prescribed rest periods and premium pay for overtime.  The law did not prohibit compulsory overtime.Occupational Safety and Health:  The labor code specified health and safety standards, but they had not been updated in many years.  Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were appropriate for some of the main industries in the country.  The government did not often proactively identify unsafe conditions or respond to workers’ OSH complaints.  Local and international NGOs regularly identified unsafe conditions, particularly in the artisanal mining sector.The Ministry of Mines’ validation process included criteria on minimal safety standards.  Nonetheless, the law did not allow workers to remove themselves from hazardous situations without putting their employment in jeopardy.  Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar violations.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws.  The General Inspectorate of Labor had the primary responsibility of enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws.  Labor inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate penalties.  In March the Ministry of Labor launched a recruitment process for 2,379 new hires, including labor inspectors, controllers (who assist inspectors), and administrative support staff.The law did not provide for a monitoring or enforcement mechanism for wage and hour rules, and employers in both the formal and informal sectors often did not respect these provisions.  Most businesses were not in compliance with this minimum wage but faced few penalties.Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar violations and were seldom applied.  The Ministry of Labor did not employ sufficient labor inspectors or comptrollers to enforce consistent compliance with labor regulations.  Workplaces in rural areas were almost never inspected.Labor laws applied to the informal sector but were rarely applied.  The country’s Trade Union Confederation estimated that the informal economy employed more than 97 percent of all workers, who worked in the informal sector in subsistence agriculture, informal commerce or mining, or other informal pursuits, where they often faced hazardous or exploitative working conditions.The EITI noted that the country had a very large artisanal and small-scale mining workforce, employing approximately two million persons.  Most mining accidents resulting in injuries and fatalities occurred in the informal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Online Briefing with Molly Phee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; Michael Hammer, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa; and John Godfrey, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan Johannesburg HubDownload or listen to the audio file here .MODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic of U.S. efforts with African partners to advance peace and security.  Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee; Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Michael Hammer; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan John Godfrey.  Our three speakers will discuss the recent African Union Summit in Addis Ababa and U.S. efforts in partnership with African institutions to promote peace and stability in eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from our speakers and we will then turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of your questions as we can during the briefing.With that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, Ambassador Godfrey, and Ambassador Hammer for their opening remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Hello, everyone.  Thanks to our hub team for pulling this together and to those journalists who can join us for this call.  We have a lot to cover today given that we did a lot during our travel last week to the African Union Summit in Addis as well as to Somalia.  I was joined by the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer and my USAID counterpart, Assistant Administrator Dr. Monde Muyangwa.  And of course I was able to see and work with our great team on the ground in Addis, which includes Ambassador Erv Massinga, our ambassador to the – to Ethiopia; Ambassador John Godfrey, who is our ambassador to Sudan; and our chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Mission to the African Union, Mika Cleverly.If you follow me on X, or formerly Twitter, you will have seen we had a very active week of diplomacy with our African partners, and so today we thought it would be useful to share more details with you as well as answer any questions.  You know we value your work as journalists, even when you’re critical, and we firmly stand for freedom of the press on the continent and around the globe.Let me begin with our visit to Addis, which reflects our strong partnership with African institutions and countries.  You have heard Secretary Blinken frequently emphasize in his speech announcing the U.S. strategy towards Africa and highlighted at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit that President Biden hosted in December 2022 that the United States is deeply committed to strengthening genuine partnerships on the continent to work to solve shared challenges and to deliver on the promises and the fundamental aspirations of the people of Africa and the people of the United States.This past week, the primary focus of our efforts were the ongoing crises in eastern DRC and Sudan as well as tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia resulting from the January 1st Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU.  We also held important discussions about the nature and scope of a follow-on mission to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, known as ATMIS, and bilaterally we had a chance to meet with many members of the Ethiopian Government as part of our work to advance peace, human rights, and stability in Ethiopia.First, let me share some of our efforts on eastern DRC as we try to de-escalate the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.  I had the opportunity to meet with President Tshisekedi, President Lourenço, and President Ruto, and President Hichilema in an effort to defuse the situation.  As many of you know, we’ve been actively engaged to prevent conflict between DRC and Rwanda for months.  This effort intensified last November with the visit of the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, and when she went to Kinshasa and to Kigali, and as you know, I and a few other team members were on that trip.As a result of that engagement, there have been intense, regular conversations between senior U.S. Government officials and the senior officials of the governments in Kigali and Kinshasa, including President Tshisekedi and President Kagame.  Our goal is to keep all the stakeholders engaged.  And I also want to remind folks that Secretary Blinken had a chance to talk with President Lourenço in person about this matter when he traveled to Luanda in January.Throughout this recent time period, we have been directly engaged with both governments as well as regional partners to develop and enact mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures that could de-escalate the situation and create room for the Luanda and Nairobi processes to resume.  Our engagement is designed to support these regional diplomatic efforts, especially the Luanda and Nairobi processes, as they are designed themselves to promote de-escalation and create the conditions for lasting peace in the DRC.It was agreed that our role would be to assess and be clear if either side is not honoring the confidence-building measures and commitments that were forged in our discussions.  Keeping the stakeholders engaged and responsive in this process is our goal.  As you know, we’re quite concerned about recent events, and you may have seen the statement that was issued last Saturday.On the other hand, we were also really delighted to see the serious engagement of regional leaders, and we stand ready to support their efforts to resolve this conflict.  And again, we call on all sides to participate constructively in reaching a negotiated solution.During the past week, I also visited Mogadishu with Ambassador Hammer.  That trip was planned as a follow-on to discussions that were organized at our request at the African Union in Addis on February 14th – I’m sorry, February 13th – with the Core Security Partners Group to maintain momentum to counter al-Shabaab after the ATMIS mission concludes at the end of this year.  As dedicated partners of Somalia, we are fully committed to strengthening the Somalia National Army and supporting their counterterrorism efforts, as you saw with the announcement of U.S. funding support for an additional five bases for the Danab Somali Brigade.  It is also important that an appropriately scoped multinational presence remains in Somalia to help maintain stability until Somalia security forces can fully take over.And in our meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, as we did in our meeting with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis, we urged a de-escalation of tensions based on respect for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – the same words you heard AU Chairperson Moussa Faki stress in his opening address at the summit.The issue of Ethiopia’s desire for increased commercial port access – a valid concern – should be resolved through talks with the federal Government of Somalia and neighboring states, or possibly as part of a regional approach that is based on cooperation and regional economic and security integration.The issue of Somaliland’s status should be resolved by the people of Somalia, including the people of Somaliland, not by external actors.  The region can ill afford more conflict.I also had a chance to discuss important efforts towards constitutional reform with the president and separately with the speaker of the parliament and several other MPs.And as I close my remarks at the top on Somalia, I’d like to express my admiration for the team on the ground – the State Department, USAID, and other interagency partners – for their stellar service in a very difficult environment.  And we also greatly appreciate the role of the U.S. military who are also deployed in Somalia.So I’m going to close off here and turn it over to John Godfrey to review our engagements with Sudan, as we remain deeply concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation and the continued fighting that is threatening to break up the country.  I spent a lot of time in Addis this past week with pro-democracy Sudanese civilians – women, representatives of grassroots organizations, and emergency response rooms, which are groups of young Sudanese trying to get humanitarian assistance out.  I also met with members of the Taqaddum front and others, all who are working tirelessly to advocate for the Sudanese people and prepare for post-conflict governance.  I want to underscore upfront that the United States does not support military governance and will continue, as we have done for decades, to support the Sudanese people against military oppression and in their goal of charting a democratic future.After John talks about Sudan, Mike will brief on our bilateral meetings with Ethiopia, and then we’ll turn to your questions.  Thank you very much for your time and attention.  Over to you, John.AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Phee.  As Assistant Secretary Phee said, we are deeply concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation and intensified fighting in Sudan, which threatens to divide the country and further destabilize the region.  And just for context, I wanted to highlight a UN OCHA report released last Saturday that estimated that there are more than 6.2 million Sudanese who have been internally displaced since the fighting began last April, and about 1.8 million further Sudanese who are refugees in neighboring countries, which makes this the largest displacement crisis anywhere in the world at the moment.  At the same time, acute food insecurity affects about 17.7 million Sudanese, 5 to 6 million of whom may face acute starvation as early as May.During her time here in Addis last week, Assistant Secretary Phee held an intensive series of meetings on Sudan, as she mentioned, and her meetings focused on three sets of issues: one, the urgent need to stop the fighting; two, facilitating humanitarian access, which is badly needed; and three, supporting Sudan’s civilians, who must determine the country’s post-conflict future.As Assistant Secretary Phee said at the top, she met with women civil society representatives, leaders of grassroots organizations, and resistance committee members, representatives of the emergency response rooms, and members of the Taqaddum pro-democracy front.  Her discussions with Sudanese civilians focused on increasing women’s participation in a political process and in post-conflict governance, on expanding international actors’ engagement with local actors providing humanitarian assistance – and that includes the ERRs that were mentioned – and further diversifying Taqaddum to be more broadly representative and able to speak with a unified voice to articulate civilians’ concerns and put pressure on the two warring parties.Throughout, she made it clear that the United States has long stood with the Sudanese people – that is, the Sudanese civilians – and that neither SAF nor RSF should play a role in post-conflict governance, and that ending the Sudan conflict and restoring civilian governance are high U.S. priorities.  In her many meetings with key stakeholders on multilateral efforts, Assistant Secretary Phee discussed the need for resumed ceasefire talks and coordination of regional initiatives; the urgent need to facilitate humanitarian assistance, which is becoming more urgent by the day, and that includes cross-border assistance from Chad and South Sudan ahead of the impending rainy season, which will make roads impassable; pressing for Sudan-related action in the UN Security Council; and insisting the belligerent parties fulfill their obligations under international humanitarian law as well as meet their commitments to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protect civilians as they agreed to do under the Jeddah Declaration, which neither have done.Thank you.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Thank you, John.  This is Mike Hammer.  Good afternoon, good morning, depending on where you are.  Regarding the meetings that we had with Assistant Secretary Phee and our Ambassador to Ethiopia Erv Massinga, I’d like to highlight those meetings that we had with Prime Minister Abiy, Foreign Minister Taye, Finance Minister Shide, civil society representatives, as well as the Interim Regional Administration President Getachew Reda of Tigray, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission Director Daniel Bekele.  And in all those meetings, we expressed U.S. support for the full implementation of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, which is known as COHA, as well as our willingness to facilitate dialogue with the Oromo Liberation Army and participate in possible talks with the Amhara Fano aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to ongoing violence, as there is no military solution.  We appreciate that the Government of Ethiopia has expressed its openness to dialogue.We also raised our rising concerns about the human rights situations in Amhara and Oromia and urged that the government ensure the protection of civilians and hold to account perpetrators of abuses.  While work remains, we acknowledge progress on transitional justice and advancing a national dialogue that is inclusive and credible.  Both are key to overcoming past grievances and setting Ethiopia on a better trajectory.Specifically to advance the COHA, Ambassador Molly Phee, of course Ambassador Massinga and I, participated in a meeting February 17th hosted by the National Reconciliation Committee headed by Ambassador Teshome with key donors in support of disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration program in Tigray that is essential to advancing a lasting peace.  The United States stands ready to disburse $15 million to support DDR activities, and we came away heartened by the considerable financial commitments made by international partners to enable the launch of the program soon.  And today I’m actually calling in from Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray region, where I’m following up with the IRA leadership and had a chance to meet with civil society organizations that our USAID is supporting, which provide assistance to survivors of gender-based violence from the horrific two-year war.I was also briefed by the African Union’s Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission.  And while there has been a dramatic decrease in human rights violations since the end of the war brought on by the Pretoria Agreement in November of 2022, we remain concerned by the lingering presence of Eritrean troops on Ethiopian territory.  It is also urgent that internally displaced people who have suffered so much be able to return to their homes.Allow me to make a final point.  We know from experience that following agreements to end hostilities, the really hard work is implementation.  That is what we are doing now.  Much remains to be done, but we are encouraged that 15 months after Pretoria, both the federal government in Addis and the Tigrayan Interim Regional Administration remain committed to peace.Now I believe the assistant secretary, John, and I are ready to take your questions.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Phee, Ambassador Godfrey, and Ambassador Hammer.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  For those of you who are listening in in Arabic and French, I believe we have had a technical problem with the Arabic interpretation, and I apologize for that.  You are nevertheless welcome to submit questions in the Q&amp;A tab in either French or Arabic, and we will address your questions at the very least, and we’re working on the interpretation issue.As for all journalists, please – if you would like to ask a question live, please indicate that by clicking on the raise hand button, and then also please make sure that we can see your name, your media outlet, your location, and preferably your question also in the Q&amp;A tab.  I just want you to understand that, from our side, we only see your Zoom logon, and we quite possibly might only see a telephone number.  So if we cannot tell who you are or what outlet you’re from, we will not call on you.So for all questions, we’d ask you that – ask that you limit yourself to one question only.  And again, the topic of today’s briefing is: U.S. Efforts with African Partners to Advance Peace and Security.So for our first question, I’d like to go to Mr. Steve Wembi of Infos Direct, Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The question is:  “The U.S.A. had called for a ceasefire in the armed conflict in the east of the country and asked the belligerents to resolve the conflict politically.  Unfortunately, this ceasefire was respected for only a few days, and today there is a full resumption of fighting.  What is your next approach to silence the weapons in the east?”Assistant Secretary Phee, if you would like to take that question.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Sure.  Thanks very much, Steve.  We remain committed to the idea and the principle that there is no military solution to the crisis in eastern DRC.  What I took away from our meetings in Addis about this discussion – and as you heard, we talked with the leadership of Angola and Kenya and Zambia, as well as President Tshisekedi.  We understand that everyone is ready to do their part to try and reduce tensions, reduce fighting, and provide relief to the people of eastern DRC who have suffered so much and for so long.  So again, we are trying to provide our unique resources and capabilities in monitoring actions in that part of the world to contribute towards confidence and legitimacy processes to resolve the tensions.So we’re committed, our partners are committed, the parties are committed to working with us, and we continue to work intensively to address the crisis.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  So for our second question, I’d like to go to Mr. Alula Birhanie of the Addis Media Network in Ethiopia.  And the question is:  “How extensive are the political measures taken by the U.S.A. to stabilize the region?”  Ambassador Hammer, would you like to address that one?AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Well, maybe I could defer first to Molly as the broader region, and then maybe dive deeper into Ethiopia.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  I’m not really sure I understand the question, Johann.  What was it again?  What measures we’re taking &#8212;AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Yeah, I can &#8212;MODERATOR:  How – yeah.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  &#8212; take a first crack at it.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Okay.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  Basically what this call reflects is the tremendous American engagement at senior levels – from the White House to Secretary Blinken to the travels that the assistant secretary has just done – in our effort to work with our African partners, to – as the question asked – to actually stabilize the region.  I think that it goes without question that the United States is focused on trying to alleviate the suffering that we’ve seen throughout the Horn, and that we are prepared to remain very much engaged, not only to end the conflicts but also to help Africans in the Horn of Africa build a better future for themselves.And really, it is important that it be recognized that we don’t do this alone, and we do it with our African partners.  The visit to the African Union Summit was an opportunity for all of us to engage on these issues, to think together on how we can partner and how we can be most effective in trying to, again, bring peace and stability to the region.  But perhaps, again, the assistant secretary would like to add something further.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  No, thanks, Mike.  I think you’ve covered it, and I believe it should be clear from the number and type of meetings that we described how deeply we value our engagement with our African partners to support them as they strive to bring peace and prosperity for their populations.  And where there are those who engage in disruptive activities, we are there to counsel otherwise and to encourage getting back on the path to peace and prosperity.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you very much.  I’d just like to remind all the participants today:  If you do have a question, please type that into the Q&amp;A box, not the chat, okay?  And again, if you wish to ask a question, please make sure that you have identified yourself and we know what outlet you’re from.Okay.  So next question comes from Aidan Lewis, Reuters, in the UK:  “How concerned are you about foreign states deepening Sudan’s war by supporting the rival sides or fighting proxy conflicts there?  And to what extent are the warring factions in Sudan impeding the delivery of humanitarian aid?”So Ambassador Godfrey?AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Great, thank you, Johann.  To answer the question, I would say that we are deeply concerned by external support to SAF and RSF, and have since the beginning of the conflict urged external actors to refrain from providing materiel support to the two belligerent parties, which has two principle consequences: one, it prolongs the fighting, extends the war; it also reduces the prospects for finding a negotiated exit from the conflict.  And I would just note here that the recent UN panel of experts report highlighted violations of the Darfur arms embargo.  In addition, there is – there are reports about resumed ties between Sudan and Iran that could include, reportedly include Iranian materiel support to SAF, which is also very troubling and a source of great concern for us.On the issue of humanitarian assistance, I think this is a really timely question, and unfortunately the answer to the query is that neither side has taken the steps that they have repeatedly committed to to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.  So just to remind:  Under the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Sudanese Civilians, both SAF and RSF signed on to allow and facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief.  And very candidly, that has not happened.In addition to that, there were a series of measures that they agreed to, confidence-building measures, in the second round of Jeddah talks, that included participation in a humanitarian forum under the auspices of UN OCHA, as well as specific steps to facilitate humanitarian assistance corridors and distribution of aid inside Khartoum itself.  Those have not been met either.And finally, there is the persistent issue of so-called bureaucratic impediments, which includes things like visas for humanitarian assistance workers, travel permits, and inspection of humanitarian cargoes.  Those remain persistent challenges for humanitarian actors.  And finally, I would highlight the confusing signals principally from the Sudanese Armed Forces about whether they would or would not facilitate cross-line assistance into areas under RSF control.The upshot of all of that is that humanitarian assistance since last April has not been able to flow in a rapid and unimpeded way that both sides have committed to, and that you now have a situation where 17.7 million Sudanese, approximately, are in a state of acute food insecurity, and 5 to 6 million of them may be in a situation of acute starvation as early as late May.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador Godfrey.  So I see a hand up and a submitted question from Sisay Sahlu.  Sisay, can we open your mic?  Please limit yourself to just one question, and keep it brief, if you don’t mind.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can hear you now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  My name is Sisay Sahlu; I’m a journalist in Ethiopia, media called The Reporter newspaper.  I would like to know just, Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee, regarding the resolution of the conflict between the two largest groups in Oromia and Amhara region, regarding the fight and the death of numerous civilians, the fight with the federal troop.  My argument here is, like, I want to make clear that is, like, the U.S. officials are trying to solve the – see the issue, like, as it was seen in the northern Ethiopia?These are – the ongoing conflict in Oromia and Amhara is tough, and it has never been seen by U.S. officials.  Is there any sanction?  Is there anything that the U.S. officials are looking to impose or to try to solve that’s happening in Oromia and Amhara region, especially with the Fano groups and with the (inaudible) groups?  Is there any sanction list for authorities who are, like, unwilling to resolve the dispute?  Thank you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Thank you, Sisay.  If you heard about the number of meetings we had in Ethiopia, we met with many members of the government as well as community and human rights activists, as well as Dr. Daniel Bekele.  So this has been a recurring theme in our discussions with our Ethiopian partners.  The prime minister says that he is committed to peaceful resolution of the challenges that Ethiopia is now facing in the Amhara and Oromia regions.  We encourage him to act on that commitment.We have expressed concern publicly and privately about the conduct of security services in responding to insurgent and criminal attacks.  We know that that’s a complicated security challenge, but more must be done to respect the rights of civilians.  And we remain postured through our ambassadors in the region to support the Ethiopian Government and other stakeholders as they try to restore calm to both regions.AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  If I may add – this is Mike Hammer – you may also recall that we were directly involved in a round of talks with the Oromo Liberation Army in Dar es Salaam last November, and remain ready, as we’ve offered to the government and the parties, to help facilitate a peaceful resolution to that conflict.  And we know that our Ambassador Massinga in Addis is also offered to the government, and if there’s an opportunity to engage with the Fano, we would welcome the opportunity to try to, again, advance peace.  And as we’ve said repeatedly, there is no military solution to these conflicts.  And in fact, the focus right now should be on dialogue and of course ensuring the protection of civilians.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  I’d like to invite Ange Kasongo, Reuters, in the DRC, to ask her question, which was posed in French.  Ange, you may pose your question in French or in English, as you like.  We do have interpretation.QUESTION:  (In French.)MODERATOR:  All right, thank you for the question.  Which of our panelists would like to address that?ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  You need to provide us with some guidance about where we can find the translation so we’re properly responding to the question.MODERATOR:  Ah.  Okay, apologies.  There is a translation tab, but I will – let me just read; we have a translation of it at any rate.  “So the efforts in Addis Ababa between Kigali and Kinshasa, under the auspices of Angola, have not succeeded in either a promise of dialogue or in a ceasefire.  Can you tell us a little bit about the blockage which has not permitted this conflict to arrive to a stage of dialogue?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Well, I can reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue to press both sides, as well as to work energetically with regional countries to try and address the current spike in conflict that we’re seeing in eastern DRC.  We have – we would prefer to use the channel that we’ve established between the two parties in which we’ve agreed together with them on a series of confidence-building measures that would restore calm and create a space for dialogue.  And when the parties don’t agree to those measures, we – or don’t follow through on their promised implementation, we will call them out.This conflict, as you know better than I, has been long running for decades.  So it is not a surprise that we haven’t reached immediate resolution, but we have had some success over the past few months.  Again, I was encouraged by my engagement in Addis, where it was clear to me that the regional partners are committed to trying to take additional steps to de-escalate the situation.  And we will just continue to try, because the consequences for the people of eastern DRC and for the security and stability of the region are too costly not to remain actively engaged and pressing forward.I would like to highlight that yesterday the UN Security Council adopted additional sanctions measures against the M23, and we will continue to look at all tools available to us to encourage resolution of the tensions.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you very much.  Our time is running short.  I think we might have time for one more question.  There’s a question in the Q&amp;A from Galami Ahmat Galami of Tchad Media in N’Djamena.  And the question is translated:  “Thank you for this press conference.  The situation in Sudan has consequences for Chad, and it’s important to address those consequences.  The United States has proposed several solutions to stop the war, including diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping initiatives.  It’s a complex issue, but an international cooperation and dialogue are crucial for finding a resolution.  Is – what is the United States approach to resolving the conflict and the spillover effects into Chad.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  John, do you want to address that first?AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Yeah, sure, happy to do so.  Thank you for the question.  First of all, I’d like to start by thanking Chad for hosting such a large number of Sudanese refugees, including but not only from the Darfur region, who have been displaced by the fighting.  Chad has been a very good host for those refugees, and we know that that puts a burden on the country.  You’re right that we have adopted a series of different measures to try to bring an end to the fighting, facilitate humanitarian access, and ensure that in a post-conflict environment there is civilian governance with no role for either of the military parties in governance.We have called on SAF and RSF to fulfill the commitments they both made to IGAD at the extraordinary summit on December 9th to meet face to face at the level of General Burhan and General Hemedti.  We’ve also called for them to implement what they agreed to in principle there, which is an unconditional and – ceasefire, and an immediate one.  We have worked actively from the beginning of the conflict, as I mentioned earlier, to urge external actors to refrain from providing materiel assistance.  We were actively involved in two rounds of talks in Jeddah that were designed to achieve ceasefires and facilitate humanitarian assistance.  And in the first round of Jeddah, we were able to effect some short-term ceasefires that enabled the delivery of about – of humanitarian assistance to about two and a half million people.We have used sanctions, and Assistant Secretary Phee has been very clear with both sides that we will continue to identify additional potential actions going forward for as long as the fighting continues and the two sides refuse to negotiate an exit to the fighting.  And just to remind – since the beginning of the conflict, we’ve sanctioned 14 individuals and entities to deny the belligerents the means to prosecute the war, and also to reduce and deter atrocities and other human rights violations, as well as to ensure that there’s a post-conflict civilian government, and again, not one that is dominated by either of the belligerents.  And the other measures have included the Secretary of State issuing an atrocities determination on December 6th that indicated that SAF has committed war crimes and that the RSF has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.But maybe just to get to what’s arguably the most important part of the question, we’ve now had several different efforts to reach a negotiated exit from the conflict, including the Jeddah talks, IGAD’s initiative in December and January, and more recently, talks in Manama.  We are open to the possibility of going back to talks, and frankly, I think we’re open in terms of what the venue is and what the format is.  We do think there needs to be participation by the external actors who have leverage to bring to bear against both parties so that we can find a negotiated exit to this terrible conflict.MODERATOR:  Okay.  Well, I think we might have time for one more question.  And there’s a question in here from Constance Daire for Africa Intelligence.  “Regarding the MOU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, are you worried it will affect the fight in Somalia against al-Shabaab, especially regarding the Ethiopian forces in ATMIS?  And has the official signing of the MOU been delayed after meetings with the Ethiopian authorities in the context of the AU Summit?”  And that will &#8212;ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Thanks for that question.  As I explained in my opening statement, we had always planned to travel to Mogadishu on the occasion of the African Union Summit, because now is the time for everyone to be focused on discussing the scope and shape of the future ATMIS mission, which is designed to end at the end of this year.  We were grateful that the African Union Commission hosted a meeting with all the stakeholders who are engaged in Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab, and that includes the troop-contributing countries from Africa, including Ethiopia.  Those were – that was an important discussion about how we can all work together on that project, and that’s where the focus needs to be.  That’s why I had agreed to travel to Somalia to highlight the American commitment to Somalia as they seek to liberate their country from al-Shabaab and be able to develop their country for their people.So that is the goal for all of us.  That’s what we shared with the Ethiopian Government, that while we recognize their legitimate concerns as a landlocked country, we needed to address those concerns in a way that didn’t disrupt the shared commitment among all partners in the region, on the continent, and internationally, to help Somalia through this difficult period.  So that’s where our focus is now, and that we’re encouraging all sides to de-escalate the tensions that were provoked by the MOU, to communicate better.  We’re contributing, hopefully, to improve communication, and we also consulted with other partners in the Horn about how to, again, focus on what we’re doing together to tighten up our effort to combat al-Shabaab and help Somalia develop.It was important to me to also have a conversation with Somali partners when I was in Mogadishu about their need to continue to focus on governance, to deprive al-Shabaab from any sort of weakness among their engagement among the member states that creates a vulnerability for the terrorists.  So that’s the focus of the parties, that’s our focus, and we will continue to contribute to, again, a reduction in tensions and an expansion in communication so there’s no room for misinterpretation or inadvertent miscommunication that could cause trouble.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So that does conclude the Q&amp;A portion of our briefing today.  And I’m glad we were able to get to so many of the questions.  There were a lot of journalists online and a lot of interest.  We were not able to get to everybody, but unfortunately our time is limited.  I’d like to find – I’d like to ask whether Assistant Secretary Phee, Ambassador Hammer, or Ambassador Godfrey have any final words and invite you to deliver any final thoughts you might have at this point.ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHEE:  Well, thanks for that opportunity.  And again, thanks to all for spending some time with us today.  I hope you walk away from this conversation with the knowledge that the United States remains deeply engaged with all of our partners across the continent in a support role to help them address these longstanding tensions and challenges.  Again, we’re acutely focused on the crises in Sudan and in eastern DRC given the damage they are doing both to the people of those regions and to stability on the continent.  And we continue to remain engaged with all partners in an effort to promote stability and create the conditions for peace and economic development.I know that Mike and John would much rather be working, as I would, on expanding trade and investment, but we need to see secure conditions to allow that focus on economic development.  So thanks to all of you for listening to us.  I hope you come away reassured that we’re deeply engaged and will remain deeply engaged across the continent.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  Ambassador Hammer, Ambassador Godfrey, any final words for us?AMBASSADOR HAMMER:  No, I think the Assistant Secretary covered it well.  Again, as always, we appreciate your interest and also your courage.  Oftentimes, as journalists working in very difficult and challenging environments, freedom of the press, as Molly said at the opening, is essential and is something that we as the United States support not only on the continent but around the world.  So thank you again for your time and the work that you do.AMBASSADOR GODFREY:  Just would echo Assistant Secretary Phee’s expression of appreciation for the chance to engage with everybody today on a really important set of challenging issues facing the region, and appreciate the interest and the thoughtful questions.MODERATOR:  All right, that concludes today’s briefing.  I want to thank Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Michael Hammer, and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan John Godfrey, for joining us.  Thank you to all the journalists for participating.  A recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them this evening.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  I would like – also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you.# # #
- Escalation of Hostilities in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States strongly condemns the worsening violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) caused by the actions of the Rwanda-backed, U.S.- and UN-sanctioned M23 armed group, including its recent incursions into the town of Sake.  This escalation has increased the risk to millions of people already exposed to human rights abuses including displacement, deprivation, and attacks.  We call on M23 to immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from its current positions around Sake and Goma and in accordance with the Luanda and Nairobi processes.  The United States condemns Rwanda’s support for the M23 armed group and calls on Rwanda to immediately withdraw all Rwanda Defense Force personnel from the DRC and remove its surface-to-air missile systems, which threaten the lives of civilians, UN and other regional peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, and commercial flights in eastern DRC.It is essential that all states respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and hold accountable all actors for human rights abuses in the conflict in eastern DRC.  We call on the government of the DRC to continue to support confidence building measures, including ceasing cooperation with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group named as a “negative force” by regional bodies and the government of the DRC, and which exposes the civilian population to risk.  We continue to support regional diplomatic efforts that promote de-escalation and create the conditions for lasting peace in DRC and we call on all sides to participate constructively in reaching a negotiated solution.
- Secretary Blinken’s Call with Democratic Republic of the Congo President Tshisekedi Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Félix Tshisekedi today to congratulate him on his re-election. The Secretary encouraged President Tshisekedi to address the concerns raised by election observation missions by taking steps to promote confidence in the democratic process going forward. The two leaders also discussed the ongoing crisis in eastern DRC and a path forward for a diplomatic solution.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Democratic Republic of the Congo																																Elections																															Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State
- Election Results in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States congratulates Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo on his re-election to a second term as President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  We also congratulate the Congolese people for their commitment to making their voices heard throughout the electoral process.  Now the important task of building national cohesion calls for leadership, accountability, and inclusivity at all levels.Regrettably, as noted by domestic and international observation missions, insecurity, logistical issues, and preparatory shortcomings created significant delays and barriers to voting on election day.  For many, incidents of fraud and corruption raised doubts about the integrity of the results.  We encourage the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) to ensure greater transparency regarding the tabulation of remaining results.  The United States also strongly urges Congolese authorities to launch a comprehensive review of the electoral process, investigate and hold accountable those who attempted to undermine the will of the people, and, in consultation with stakeholders, act on recommendations to improve future elections.The United States looks forward to expanding its partnership with the DRC government and working with Congolese people across the nation to advance our mutual interests.
- Department Press Briefing – January 3, 2024 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWashington, D.C.1:32 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon. Happy New Year to everyone.QUESTION: Happy New Year.QUESTION: Happy New Year to you.MR MILLER: I hope you all had an at least somewhat restful period. Matt, you want to start us off?QUESTION: Oh, you have nothing?MR MILLER: I have nothing but a little – I have a little echo. I have an echo, but nothing – nothing to start with.QUESTION: There is a bit of an echo.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Is that fixable?MR MILLER: Twice as nice today.QUESTION: All right. Well, let’s just start with the developments in – yesterday in Beirut and today in Iran, and whether that – or what you think of that and – those two developments and whether or not that is in line with your wish to prevent the conflict from spreading.MR MILLER: Let me take them in order. Number one, with respect to the development yesterday, I will say that al-Arouri was a brutal terrorist who was centrally responsible for the attacks of October 7th as well as other attacks against innocent civilians leading back to well before October 7th.With respect to the explosions in Iran today, what I’ll say: We have been following the reports rather closely. We don’t have any independent information to offer on them. We do express our sympathies to the victims and their loved ones who died in this horrific explosion. As I said, it’s too early, at least for us, to be able to say what might have caused it.But I do want to address some of the irresponsible claims that I have seen circulate and say that, number one, the United States was not involved in any way, and any suggestion to the contrary is ridiculous; and number two, we have no reason to believe that Israel was involved in this explosion.QUESTION: Why not?MR MILLER: We just do not have any information to believe that that’s the case.QUESTION: Did someone suggest that they were? I mean, other than the &#8212;MR MILLER: We have seen multiple accusations related to both supposed – fictional – United States involvement, and as I said, we have no reason to believe Israel was involved either.QUESTION: And what about on Beirut?MR MILLER: I don’t have an assessment to make about who was responsible for that incident. I’ll leave it to the Government of Israel to speak to their actions.QUESTION: Okay, but – so more broadly, though, are you concerned at all that either or both of these are going to turn this into the regional confrontation, the regional conflict that you had been publicly saying you wanted to avoid?MR MILLER: We remain incredibly concerned, as we have been from the outset of this conflict, about the risk of the conflict spreading into other fronts, both inside Israel, whether it be in the north or whether it be in the West Bank, or outside of Israel in other countries in the region, which is why you’ve seen the Secretary engage in intensive diplomacy to try to urge all of the relevant parties not to escalate the conflict and other countries and other groups in the region not to escalate as well.I wouldn’t say that our concern is any higher today than it has been from the beginning. It’s been something that we’ve been intensely focused on.QUESTION: Okay. Can I just &#8212;MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Just because I guess it’s the obvious question, you said it’s ridiculous to say that Israel or the U.S. are behind the Iran blasts. What – who could be behind it? I mean, presumably you’re not going to reveal intelligence here, but ISIS would be the obvious suspect. I mean, there are other suspicions and other parties, if you don’t think it’s Israel.MR MILLER: I just don’t have an assessment to offer. It’s too early, and we don’t have any independent information that I can offer from this podium at this time.QUESTION: And can you just – so, I mean, but – well, not (inaudible) in terms of what this means for the region more broadly. I mean, these – having these attacks, I mean, is there – is there concern about a larger – about larger tensions raising – rising, and what would be the message to the Lebanese Government in particular, but also to Iran in terms of how to respond to these?MR MILLER: So the message will be the same message that we have been delivering. Really, if you remember, if you go back to the immediate aftermath of October 7th, the President delivered a message that any adversaries of Israel who were thinking about taking advantage of this conflict should think twice about doing so and should reconsider. The Secretary has delivered that same message in his three trips to the region and he’s sent that same message in phone calls with his counterparts in the region in the months since.It is also a message that we have sent when we have engaged with countries who have relationships in the region, often with countries with whom we don’t have direct relationships. We have sent the – we have sent messages that they should – these countries should deliver the message that it is in no one’s interest. It’s not in the interest of any country in the region, it’s not in any country – in the interest of any country in the world to see this conflict escalated any further than it already is. And that’s the message we will continue to send.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just on the killing of the Hamas deputy leader, the head of Hizballah said today that it is a major dangerous crime about which we cannot be silent. Do you have any reaction to those comments? And how concerned are you about any reaction from Hizballah?MR MILLER: So we have seen Hizballah launching strikes across the border into Israel since – well, of course, since before October 7th, but certainly have seen them ramped up since October 7th. You’ve seen Israel respond, of course. There have been strikes back and forth across the blue line going back for months now. It is why we have sent this very direct message to Hizballah, to other entities in the region, that now is not the time to think of escalating further. And you’ve seen us take deterrent steps to deliver that message. You’ve seen us take diplomatic steps to deliver it. And we’ll continue to deliver it.I don’t want to respond specifically to every comment they make because they’ve made comments in the past of similar nature. But we continue to believe it is not in Hizballah’s interest, just as it is not in Israel’s interest, to escalate this conflict in any way.QUESTION: And then were you given any advance notice about this action?MR MILLER: We were not.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that, Matt? When did you – when were you informed about the strike in Beirut?MR MILLER: I’m not going to get into that specific detail, but we were not informed in advance.QUESTION: And then on the explosion today, you said you, quote, “don’t have any independent information”, but also you have no information that Israel is involved. So are you entertaining the fact that Israel could have been involved; you just don’t know yet?MR MILLER: We just do not have any information to &#8212;QUESTION: Have you spoken &#8212;MR MILLER: We have no information to suggest that they were.QUESTION: Have you spoken with Israeli officials since this morning’s call?MR MILLER: We speak to Israeli &#8212;QUESTION: They denied it?MR MILLER: We speak to – I will say we speak to Israeli officials multiple times every day, and I won’t get into those conversations, but as I said, we don’t have any information to believe they were involved.QUESTION: And then on the hostages, last week there was confirmation that one of American hostages had died in Hamas custody. Are there any updates on the other American hostages who are still being held there?MR MILLER: There are not. There are still six Americans who remain unaccounted for.QUESTION: Any updates on discussions over them?MR MILLER: No. We continue to work to try to bring all of them home, as we try to work to bring other hostages who are not American citizens home. It’s a top priority for everyone in this government and we will not rest until they are brought home. But I, as always, don’t want to comment on those negotiations or those discussions from here.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead, Said.QUESTION: Thank you. You said that Saleh al-Arouri was a brutal terrorist and so on. So do you think that Israel did the right thing by assassinating a leader of Hamas? I’m just asking you if &#8212;MR MILLER: I will say that he was a brutal – a brutal terrorist with civilian blood on his hands, and I will leave it at that.QUESTION: Right. So Israel was within its right to conduct this operation?MR MILLER: I will let my comments speak for themselves. You can let your comments speak for themselves.QUESTION: Okay. That’s fine. Since our last briefing – two weeks ago, I believe – there have been many Palestinian – or many thousands of Palestinians killed, injured, displaced, and so on. How do you see this thing ending? I mean, do you see that Israel is achieving its goals that – or its stated goals, which is to decapitate Hamas, change the leadership, go after them, and so on? Do you see them achieving those goals? Are we closer to an endgame, in your view &#8212;MR MILLER: So we are &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; than we were, let’s say, two weeks ago?MR MILLER: So we are still in the middle of this conflict. Israel has talked about the fact that they will continue to prosecute it. You’ve heard us talk about the fact that we have engaged in discussions with them about where the conflict is going and when they may shift to a lower-intensity combat operation. We will continue to engage in those conversations with them. They have killed a number of Hamas fighters. Obviously, the leadership of Hamas is still intact in Gaza, and they continue to pursue them and it continues to be a goal that we believe is a worthy one. When and how this will end is not something I’d want to speculate on from here.QUESTION: So you’re saying that Israel should prosecute this war until these goals are achieved?MR MILLER: I am going to say – where – I will answer that by referring to the principles that we’ve laid out for how we see the future of Gaza. And that is a Gaza that is under Palestinian governance but in – a Gaza that cannot exist as a launching pad for terrorists’ attacks against the innocent civilians of Israel.QUESTION: Can I have – I have a couple of questions on the West Bank, if you don’t mind.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Oh, yeah. Now you issued a statement yesterday on both Minister Smotrich and Ben Gvir, and their statements, and so on. You denounced what they said and so on. Will there – are we likely to see any kind of consequences or any kind of sanctions as a follow-up on your statement?MR MILLER: So I don’t – I never want to – and you should not interpret this to mean anything other than what it is, which is we never talk about any kind of sanctions designations before they take place. So you should – and you should – as I said, it’s a general rule that you should not over-interpret by my invoking it here. But we did think it was important to issue that statement because the rhetoric that we have seen from those two individuals was inflammatory, it was irresponsible, and it was in direct contradiction of the policy of the Government of Israel that has been repeatedly articulated to us, including by the prime minister himself.So we have been told that those statements do not reflect the policy of the Government of Israel. We believe that is the correct decision. The Secretary has made very clear on a number of occasions that there must be no forced resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza, that Gaza is Palestinian land and should remain so. And we will continue to make that clear to the Government of Israel and we expect them to make that clear as well.QUESTION: But with Gaza becoming an unlivable place in many ways, this is a heightened likelihood, isn’t it?MR MILLER: The humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire, which is why we are working – and were working over the holiday period – to try to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza and why we will continue to make that a top priority. But what we hear in our engagements with Palestinian leadership, with Palestinian civil society leaders, with Palestinians, is that they do not want to be forcibly removed from Gaza, that they want to remain in Gaza; and that is a choice that we support – that we support and that we fully endorse.QUESTION: And lastly on the West Bank, we have seen a great many incursions in the last few days. Almost every night, there is some sort of an Israeli army raid in some town. Yesterday there were like six or seven towns and so on. What is your position on this? What is your take? Are you counseling the Israelis not, let’s say, to raid places like the Jenin camp or Nablus or Hebron – the many places that they have done over the past few days?MR MILLER: So Israel certainly has a right to carry out legitimate counterterrorism operations, and we support their ability to do so and their right to do so. But as always, we urge them, in carrying out those legitimate operations – those legitimate counterterrorism operations – to do so in full compliance with international humanitarian law.Nike, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. A follow-up on hostage release. What is the U.S. assessment on the proposal by Egypt for the release of the remaining hostages after the Hamas leader said that those hostages can only be released on their term?And separately, if I may, how do U.S. – what is the U.S. read on Hamas saying that it is open to one Palestinian government for Gaza and West Bank?MR MILLER: So again, as it relates to hostages, I’m just not going to negotiate in public. I don’t think it’s productive or useful for the situation to do so. We are going to continue to engage in quiet conversations behind closed doors to try to achieve the release of hostages. The work that we’ve done to date has resulted in the release of more than a hundred hostages, and we will continue to pursue that work, but it’s work we will do in private, not in public.As opposed to – or as it pertains to the second question you asked, look, we have said very clearly that we believe at the end of this conflict what we ultimately want to see is Gaza and the West Bank reunited under Palestinian leadership. That said, Hamas is a terrorist organization, and we have made quite clear our position on Hamas, that – or I should say we have made quite clear our position that Gaza cannot once again serve as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against Israel. That’s not real security for the Israeli public, and ultimately that would not offer real security to the Palestinians in Gaza, if you see Gaza as a safe haven for terrorists that Israel feels compelled to respond to.So while we support a reunified government that includes – or I should say reunified Palestinian territories under Palestinian leadership that includes Gaza and the West Bank, certainly there is no role for Hamas in that.QUESTION: Can I also ask &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, sorry.QUESTION: &#8212; about the POWs swap between Russia and Ukraine? Or do you want to address that later?MR MILLER: No, I would leave it to those two countries to address.QUESTION: So nothing to say?MR MILLER: I – yeah, I would leave it to Ukraine to comment on that.Go ahead, Shannon.QUESTION: On hostage talks, has the U.S. assessed that a willingness to strike Hamas officials outside of Gaza might have a chilling effect on those talks, or on Hamas’s ability to communicate with important interlocutors like Qatar?MR MILLER: So Hamas has the ability to communicate with the Qataris. They have been able to communicate with them since the outset of this conflict. There are Hamas officials who are in Doha and they know very – they know quite well how to release – how to reach Qatari interlocutors as well as Egyptian interlocutors, which is how we were able to achieve the first pause that resulted in the release of more than a hundred hostages.As it pertains to a future hostage – the potential for future hostage releases, again, it’s just not something I ever want to comment on in public.QUESTION: So with Qatar, Egypt, you don’t think the strikes in Beirut will have any kind of effect on &#8212;MR MILLER: I would not want to speculate. But I will say Hamas knows the terms that are on the table. They’re the – there were terms on the table under the previous pause that they reneged on, stopped releasing hostages. They could begin to release hostages again. It would result in another pause that would make it easier to deliver humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza, and they have so far refused to do so. We of course hope that they will reconsider, but as it pertains to any specific points of negotiation, I don’t want to speak to those in public.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. And Happy New Year for you. And I have two &#8212;MR MILLER: Happy New Year to you.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. Two questions. First question: Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, pointed out that Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are areas at risk of conflict this year. What response is the United States preparing for this?MR MILLER: So I would just say that we don’t need to receive any lectures from Russian officials who launched their own war about other conflicts. We have been actively working to try to bring conflicts to an end around the globe, and Russia should spare its commentary on those matters, I think.QUESTION: On North Korea. North Korea’s Kim Jong-un recently declared at the Workers’ Party plenary meeting that he would pacify the entire Korean territory with nuclear force in case of emergency. At the same time, he ordered all communication channels to be eliminated. Even after this, would the United States still, I mean, expect dialogue with North Korea?MR MILLER: I wouldn’t say “expect.” We would still welcome dialogue with North Korea, because we think ultimately dialogue would be the most preferred route to achieve the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It’ll continue to be our policy to pursue it. But as we’ve said on a number of occasions, we have seen no indication that the North Korean Government is willing to engage in it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I have a question on Türkiye.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Can you provide us an update on the process regarding the sale of F-16s to Türkiye? As you might have followed, Turkish parliament’s &#8212;MR MILLER: I did follow it.QUESTION: &#8212; foreign affairs commission approved Sweden’s NATO bid and sent it to the floor for the full vote. Is the State Department planning to send a formal notification to the Congress soon?MR MILLER: Let me say it this way. We certainly welcome the vote, and I believe it was a committee, to advance Sweden’s accession to the full parliament. We look forward to a final vote and seeing Sweden’s accession ratified. We have made clear that we do not believe the sale of F-16 modernization kits to Türkiye should be linked with NATO’s – with Sweden’s NATO accession, but there are members of Congress who have a different opinion and they have linked the two.So I don’t want to comment about when we will be prepared to move forward. We have had obstacles in Congress because of the actions that Türkiye has taken that we have had to navigate and work through. We have been trying to work through those as diligently as possible. But I will say that I think the best thing that could happen to lead to progress on both of – on this issue would be for Türkiye to take action as soon as possible to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession.QUESTION: We know that State Department and Secretary has been engaging with the Congress on this matter. Do you have anything to share with us on these talks? Any progress on these talks with congressmembers?MR MILLER: Nothing other – nothing beyond what I just said in my previous comments.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. One question on the Iranian-backed groups and U.S. forces on – in Iraq, especially the recent attacks in Erbil. What the Iraqi Government tells you on these attacks, as you are there on their invitation, and they are responsible to protect the U.S. forces in Iraq? What the Iraqi Government tells you on these attacks?MR MILLER: What do they – what do they tell us?QUESTION: Yes.MR MILLER: So I will keep our private diplomatic – I will keep our diplomatic conversations private. I don’t want to – I don’t want to speak for the Iraqi Government. I will tell you what we say consistently to the Iraqi Government, which is that they have a responsibility to take action against any group that launches attacks against U.S. forces who are in Iraq at the invitation of the Government of Iraq to engage in a very important counterterrorism mission, and we expect them to fulfill that responsibility.QUESTION: I’m not expecting you to tell me any future attacks on these groups, but what are you going to do in any cases that the Iraqi Government could not stop these groups from attacking you?MR MILLER: Again – you’re right, I won’t comment. I like the way you said you don’t expect me to speak about future actions but then asked me to speak about future actions. I do respect the attempt. I am not – I am not going to do that. But I will reiterate what we have said before, which is, while we expect the Iraqi Government to take action against any organizations that target U.S. forces, we will not hesitate to defend ourselves when necessary, and you have seen us do that in the past.QUESTION: My last question: To date, some Iraqi officials, including chief of staff and also the acting speaker of the parliament, they step – they walk on the U.S. flags on the anniversary of Qasem Soleimani’s death. Do you have any comments on that?MR MILLER: No. I don’t have any comment on that – on those specific actions. As I said, our forces are there for an important mission at the invitation of the Government of Iraq to provide a counterterrorism mission that ultimately benefits the Iraqi people. And I think I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much. Happy New Years, Matt.MR MILLER: Happy New Year.QUESTION: I expect you to answer me good question about the United Nation new resolution about Afghanistan. Afghan women is not happy, and they don’t support it. Does the United States State Department has any comment about this resolution?MR MILLER: So we do support the resolution. The resolution has called for a UN special envoy for Afghanistan. It is our belief that a special envoy would be well-positioned to coordinate international engagement on Afghanistan to achieve the objectives laid out in the resolution. We also think the resolution sends a clear message to the Taliban, to the Afghan people, and to the world, and it shows that the United Nations Security Council supports a process by which Afghanistan is integrated into the international community only by meeting its international obligations.But I will say we, of course, remain – also remain concerned about the Taliban’s repressive edicts against women and girls and its unwillingness to foster inclusive governance. The decisions that it has made risk irreparable damage to Afghanistan’s society and move the Taliban further away from normalizing relations with the international community.So, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. Happy New Year.MR MILLER: Happy New Year.QUESTION: A few questions. Was the U.S. involved in the UAE-brokered prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine?MR MILLER: Again, I’m going to let Ukraine speak to that in detail.QUESTION: And reportedly, the U.S. wants Ukraine to shift its strategy from total victory to being in the strongest negotiating position. Is this true? Is this &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry. What was the – who wants? I missed the &#8212;QUESTION: The U.S.MR MILLER: No, what was the – who – maybe just start again.QUESTION: Wants Ukraine to shift its strategy from total victory against Russia &#8212;MR MILLER: No.QUESTION: &#8212; to being in a strong negotiating position?MR MILLER: No. That is not true.QUESTION: It’s not true. Okay. And finally, does the U.S. have any reaction to Israel’s supreme court striking down Israel’s judicial reform given the administration’s supposed – excuse me – opposition to that law?MR MILLER: So I don’t have any specific response to the decision by the supreme court, but as we’ve said before, we believe that fundamental changes to a democracy should have the broadest possible consensus, and an independent judiciary is a key part of a functioning democracy.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. A few months ago, at the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Antony Blinken called on Russia to stop using food as a weapon of war in Ukraine. However, today, he didn’t make the same demand of Israel regarding the use of water, food, and fuel in its war against Gaza, which impact the civilian. Isn’t that considered as a double standard?MR MILLER: So I will say that &#8212;QUESTION: What’s your comment, please?MR MILLER: I will say that the Secretary has been at the forefront of trying to get food, water, medical assistance into Gaza, and it was the Secretary’s leadership in some very intense meetings with the Government of Israel that eventually led to a deal to get humanitarian assistance flowing into Gaza in the first place. This is all the way back in October in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and it has been really U.S. effort to work with Israel, to work with our Egyptian partners, to work with other governments in the region to try to increase and sustain the flow of humanitarian assistance.So contrary to the sort of premise of the question, we have worked incredibly hard to get food and water in to the Palestinian people, and that includes not just through Rafah but that includes through advocating directly to the Government of Israel to open Kerem Shalom.Now, that said, the amount of food and water that is coming in right now is insufficient. There’s not enough of it coming in. It’s too inconsistent, and the number of trucks that get in every day, they need to go up; they need to go up dramatically and they need to stay up. And that continues to be the focus of our engagement, and some very direct, candid conversations with the Government of Israel as well as with other countries in the region that can play an important role.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Happy New Year.MR MILLER: Happy New Year. I like everyone’s – everyone starts the question with a – before you hammer me with something tough, you start with a slightly good vibe, so I appreciate it.QUESTION: I hope it’s not tough.MR MILLER: Go on.QUESTION: First question: Türkiye has denied passage through its waters for Royal Navy mine hunters the UK donated for Ukraine to help their sea operations. What is the U.S. response to that?MR MILLER: Let me take that one back.QUESTION: Okay. Another one – I hope you have the answer for this one. It’s an easy one, I promise. Would you provide a brief summary of Secretary Blinken’s priorities for the Western Balkans in 2024?MR MILLER: What a great question. So the Secretary will &#8212;QUESTION: All right, but remember we have a time limit.MR MILLER: (Laughter.) We don’t &#8212;QUESTION: So if you’re going to go on for 45 minutes, (inaudible).MR MILLER: We technically don’t have a time limit, Matt.QUESTION: Do the abridged version.MR MILLER: I – you may have somewhere you need to be. I can go – I can – I can go on for quite some time.So I will say, first of all, I won’t go on for that long because the Secretary did speak to this somewhat at his end-of-year news conference right before the holiday, where he talked about not only the work that we did in 2023 but how that work would carry over in 2024.I will say starting with the conflict in the Middle East that I have just spoken to, we will continue to try to work to protect Palestinian civilians, to minimize civilian harm, and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, and finding an ultimate end to this conflict that provides real security, durable security for the Palestinian people and for the Israeli people, while trying to bring hostages home and preventing the conflict from spreading.We will also work to continue to support Ukraine in resisting the brutal attacks that Russia continues to launch and that we saw Russia launch over the Christmas holiday. It’s why it’s so important that Congress take immediate action to – when they return to pass the President’s supplemental funding bill.We will also continue to work with our allies and partners to respond to coercive actions that we have seen China take with respect to its neighbors while trying to manage the relationship with China responsibly and appropriately. If you look back at the situation when the Secretary entered office I guess a little under three years ago – not quite three years ago at this point – we saw a world that was fractured, that was not able to respond in a united way to the role that China was playing in the world, and the increasingly disparate vision from the West that China was presenting. You have seen that completely reversed under our tenure.So I could go on, but I don’t want to suffer the withering glare of the Associated Press reporter, so I will leave it at those three. There are many others when it comes to countering fentanyl, working to address migration responsibly, but I will leave it at that and refer you back to the Secretary’s also quite lengthy remarks in December. So &#8212;QUESTION: My question is: What would be the U.S. response if Iran directly attack on Israel in view of the recent attack on Hizballah and today explosion in Iran that Iranian Government believes are associated with Israeli Government?MR MILLER: So I never want to speculate about things that have not happened, especially when there is no reason for Iran to launch such an attack. But I will say the President has been very clear, the Secretary has been very clear, that any country, any group in the region that at any time is considering taking advantage of the conflict and seeking to escalate with actions against Israel should think twice. And I will leave it at that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Happy New Year.MR MILLER: Happy New Year.QUESTION: Could you – could you share your response to the recent New Year’s Day verdict against Nobel laureate and Presidential Medal of Honor recipient Professor Muhammad Yunus, reportedly influenced by the Bangladesh labor court under the control of ruling Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina? How does the State Department perceive the challenge – challenges to the rule of law and judicial independence in Bangladesh, particularly in the context of comparable case such as the 10-year sentence of the country’s first woman prime minister and main opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, and the plight of numerous opposition leaders, workers, media, and rights activists facing similar situations, even in some cases more worse?MR MILLER: Muhammad Yunus has made significant contributions to the alleviation of poverty around the world, as reflected in his Nobel Peace Prize and numerous other international honors. We have been following the case against him closely. We’ve seen, of course, the widespread international criticism of the verdict. For our part, we have encouraged the Bangladeshi Government to ensure a fair and transparent legal process, and we will continue to follow any further developments closely.QUESTION: One more, Matt.MR MILLER: Of course.QUESTION: The next election will take place in just next – in this week – coming weekend. Given Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina public instruction for using dummy candidates in the upcoming election and the disregard for constructive suggestions from the international community for a free, fair election, will the U.S. Government legitimize such a dummy election? If not, what punitive measures is the Biden administration considering against the proposed regime? As reported by the BBC over the weekend title, “Bangladesh: The election that has turned into a one-woman show.”MR MILLER: I feel like I’ve answered this question before, but it’s a new year so I will answer it again. We support a free and fair election in Bangladesh. We have made that quite clear a number of times. We will watch the elections very closely, but of course I would never speculate in advance about what actions we may or may not take in response to any development.Yeah, Ryan, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. To pick up on your response to Smotrich and Ben-Gvir yesterday, you and Linda Thomas-Greenfield both had similar statements. You both said in your statements, quote, “There should be no mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza.” Given that you both had the same word-for-word statement, it seems like there was thought put into that. Why use the word “should” there, “There should be no mass displacement”? Would you be willing to make a more definitive comment like “there must”?MR MILLER: There must not be, yeah. No, there &#8212;QUESTION: And then to get to Ben-Gvir’s response, which I’m sure you saw – he posted on Twitter, “&#8230;with all due respect, we are not another star on the American flag. United States is our best friend, but first of all, we will do what is best for the state of Israel. The emigration of hundreds of thousands from Gaza will allow the residents of the enclave,” or the envelope, “to return home and live in safety and to protect the IDF soldiers.” Any response to Ben-Gvir’s public response to you?MR MILLER: So certainly, Israel is a sovereign country that does make its own decisions. There is no dispute about that. The point of our – of the statement that I made yesterday was that the comments that Ben-Gvir and Minister Smotrich have made are in direct contradiction of Israeli Government policy as has been represented to us by multiple Israeli Government officials, including the prime minister himself. So I’m not surprised that he continues to double down and make those statements, but they are not only in contradiction with United States policy and what we think is in the best interests of the Israeli people, the Palestinian people, the broader region, and ultimately stability in the world, but they are in direct contradiction of his own government’s policy. And we believe those statements should stop.QUESTION: And to follow up on Türkiye, I’m sure you’ve seen Türkiye has joined South Africa in its charging Israel with genocide before the International Court of Justice. Is there any concern within the State Department that State Department officials could be roped into this prosecution?MR MILLER: No. I will say that as it relates to the State Department, we have been committed to addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza and have made a priority of preventing, as we – I just said in your – in response to your question, the displacement of Palestinians. I will also say, though, that genocide is of course a heinous atrocity, one of the most heinous atrocities that any individual can commit. Those are allegations that should not be made lightly, and as it pertains to the United States, we are not seeing any acts that constitute genocide.QUESTION: And finally, over the break, top authorities in the Armenian Quarter expressed deep concern that the Israeli Government was using the conflict in Gaza to push out a lot of Armenian Christians from the Armenian Quarter. Any response to those concerns?MR MILLER: So no specific response to that. But as we have said on a number of occasions, we do not want to see the Government of Israel take any steps that would escalate tensions.Go ahead.QUESTION: According to Financial Times, Israel is putting more pressure on Egypt to accept refugees from Gaza. Since you’re against any displacement of Palestinian and Egypt is your partner, do you encourage or support Egypt not to accept refugee from Gaza?MR MILLER: So I will say that it is not just the Government of Egypt that has rejected displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. It is other countries in the region, who have all made clear, going back to the early – the immediate aftermath of October 7th, in the trip that the – in the – that the Secretary made to a number of countries in the region, that that displacement was a non-starter for reasons that relate to history that I think people in this room know all too well that I don’t need to go through again. And so we have made that clear to the Government of Israel, that it is a non-starter. We have made that clear publicly, that we don’t want to see any displacement of Palestinians from Israel, which is why, when we see statements to the contrary, we respond as we did in the statement that I issued yesterday.QUESTION: And you do support those countries &#8212;QUESTION: Sorry, wait, wait, wait, hold on.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: You don’t want to see any displacement of Palestinians from Israel?MR MILLER: Gaza. I meant to say Gaza. Thank you.QUESTION: And you do support those country who reject or – displacement?MR MILLER: They have made it clear for, I think, very understandable reasons of history that it’s a non-starter.QUESTION: So can I just &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just to follow up on that a little bit – and you might have answered this in response to Said’s – one of Said’s first questions. But isn’t what’s going on in Gaza now, in terms of the Israeli offensive, in terms of the Israeli operation – isn’t that displacing Gazans? Or are you making a distinction between internal displacement, even though it’s not a state, so I know they can’t be technically IDPs &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah. There’s &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; or them leaving the border and going into another country or a – going into a country, since they don’t have one of their own? Why is it – why is what is happening now not the forcible displacement of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians?MR MILLER: It is a good question. We don’t want to see any Palestinian forced from their home, but there – no, no, but there are military operations going on that put Palestinian people at risk. When you see the IDF coming into neighborhoods &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, exactly. Exactly my point – coming into neighborhoods and conducting legitimate military operations, it is appropriate, we believe, to ask people to leave their homes for a temporary period while the IDF carries out military operations. We also believe that it’s important that people be able to return to their homes, and if their homes have been destroyed, that there’s a process in place to rebuild and reconstruct Gaza. And that’s something you’ll see us pursuing in the weeks and months to come. That’s different than the idea of forcing them from their homes, from their land, and raising the fear among them and among other countries in the region that they would never be allowed to return.QUESTION: Yeah, but they have been displaced from their homes and their land.MR MILLER: They have been displaced &#8212;QUESTION: But you don’t regard that as displacement in the same way that you saw Smotrich and Ben-Gvir’s &#8212;MR MILLER: It – correct. Correct.QUESTION: Well, I – I’m sorry, I just find that hard to believe. If you’re – I don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: If you &#8212;QUESTION: They have been displaced, have they not?MR MILLER: They have been displaced. They are still inside Gaza. And if you see what Smotrich and Gaza are raising, they are raising the idea of resettling Palestinians from Gaza so Israelis can move in.QUESTION: I get that. I &#8212;MR MILLER: Which is a very different – that is the nature of the disagreement.QUESTION: So it’s okay with you that hundreds of thousands of people have been pushed into the south – into Rafah, out of their homes? That’s not – that doesn’t count as bad displacement?MR MILLER: We – we do not – we do not want to see anyone displaced from their home. We don’t – we also don’t want to see anyone in harm’s way. There is an obvious tension between those two. And when it comes to resolving that tension, I think the first priority needs to be to try to keep those people as safe as possible. But we want them to be able to ultimately return to their homes, not forced from their land and, as those two ministers have raised, with the specter of never being able to return.QUESTION: All right. And then secondly, in response to the questions about the blast – the explosion or explosions in Iran, you said that it was ridiculous to suggest or speculate that the United States had any involvement in this. I’m just curious as to why. The United States has a long history of doing things in Iran – go back to 1953, but since – before both of us were born, what – it took – and it took decades after 1953 for the U.S. to admit its role – and the Brits as well – to admit their role in the coup.But let’s go more recently. Just four years ago – and the reason that this explosion happened today is on the anniversary of Soleimani – his death, which was loudly and proudly claimed by the United States Government at the time. So why is it ridiculous for people to think or speculate that what happened today had nothing to do with the United States?MR MILLER: Look, people are always going to make all kinds of claims and all kinds of speculations. I think it’s ridiculous because it didn’t happen, and that’s what I can – I can say from this podium that we were not involved.QUESTION: So if you were involved, though, you would be out there saying, yes, we did it, right? Like what happened &#8212;MR MILLER: You are asking – we are getting into several levels of counterfactuals here. We were not involved. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Okay. But I – but I’m not sure I understand why you say that it’s ridiculous for people to think that or to speculate it or to speculate about it or to suggest it given the history of the United States in Iran.MR MILLER: I will say if the reports coming out of Iran are accurate, these are explosions that have killed dozens – by some reports over a hundred – civilians. The United States was not involved with those. And you can disagree; I think it’s ridiculous to suggest that we were.QUESTION: No, I’m not disagreeing. I just wonder &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, fair, fair, fair.QUESTION: I just want to know why you &#8212;MR MILLER: I shouldn’t have said that. Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; you come out and say it’s ridiculous. I mean, the U.S. also, I believe – I can’t remember the exact year – shot down an Iranian airliner.MR MILLER: We’re getting back into ancient history before – so not ancient. I was alive.QUESTION: Not ancient.MR MILLER: But certainly well before this administration was in office.QUESTION: Can I ask a quick question on journalists?QUESTION: Can I follow up (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So, yeah, go ahead – let me go to Daphne first, and then I’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Just on the genocide comment, you said you are not seeing any acts that constitute genocide. Has the State Department determined that acts of genocide are not taking place?MR MILLER: The statement that I just made is a – I’m not going to get into a – all of our formal legal processes, but we have not at this point seen acts that constitute genocide, no.QUESTION: So has there been a process that’s been completed to determine that?MR MILLER: That is a determination by the State Department that I just represented here at the podium.QUESTION: And are you seeing – sorry – crimes against humanity or war crimes taking place?MR MILLER: I don’t have any assessment to make on those. We continue to collect information and gather it, as we always do, but I don’t have an assessment to offer.QUESTION: Can I follow up briefly on &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: If you don’t mind – just based on South Africa, the ICJ complaint. Beyond saying that the United States doesn’t agree that there’s a genocide taking place or genocidal acts, has the U.S. had any dialogue with South Africa about this?MR MILLER: None that I have to report out at this time.QUESTION: Does it object to the fact that South Africa brought this?MR MILLER: We don’t think it’s a productive step at this step at this time.QUESTION: Could I just &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead. Oh, yeah, sorry. Go ahead, and I’ll come back to you, Shaun.QUESTION: Sorry. You want to go ahead?QUESTION: Go ahead. Different topic.QUESTION: A question on what the Secretary said what – during his press briefing a couple weeks ago. He noted that this has been a very difficult year for journalists. He noted the loss of journalists, but he said Ukraine and the Middle East. I mean, there has been a hundred Palestinian journalists killed. Why not say – why not say that a hundred Palestinian journalists have been killed? And we know basically who killed those journalists. Why not say that and name the country?MR MILLER: He has spoken specifically to the death of journalists in this conflict on more than one occasion.QUESTION: But he did not say that &#8212;MR MILLER: I mean, if you want to quibble with why he did it here, not there.QUESTION: No, I’m just asking.MR MILLER: But he has – I – he &#8212;QUESTION: I’m asking the question.MR MILLER: When he – I think, when he referred to the death of journalists in the Middle East, people knew what he was talking about. And he has specifically talked about the death of journalists as a result of this conflict, so I think you’re trying to draw a conclusion that the facts don’t merit, Said.QUESTION: Okay. Well, let me ask you directly. Do you know that there are a hundred Palestinian journalists killed by Israel and during this operation?MR MILLER: Yes, we have seen the reports by the Committee to Protect Journalists and other organizations about the very tragic loss of life by journalists in this conflict.Shaun, go ahead, and we’ll wrap there.QUESTION: Sure. Actually change topics to Africa.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: A couple of things. The – there was an agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland which – about port access, Ethiopia of course being landlocked. Does the U.S. have any comment on that? Particularly, the leaders, the de facto leaders in Somaliland, say that this will constitute formal recognition, which of course no country has given. Does the U.S. have something to say either about the deal itself or about the entire idea of recognizing Somaliland?MR MILLER: Yeah, we did see those reports. We were concerned by them. We join other partners in expressing our serious concern as well about the resulting spike in tensions in the Horn of Africa. We urge all stakeholders to engage in diplomatic dialogue, and the United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia within its 1960 borders.QUESTION: When you say you’re concerned by them, concerned by the deal between the Ethiopians and the Somaliland authorities?MR MILLER: And the resulting spike in tension.QUESTION: Do you think that the deal should be rescinded? Is that something you don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: We think all the stakeholders should engage in diplomatic dialogue to resolve the issue.QUESTION: Okay. Can I get to one other part of Africa?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The DRC, of course, had elections at the end of last year. Do you have anything, first, more broadly to say about the conduct of it, but also about Tshisekedi’s re-election? Does the United States believe that he was legitimately re-elected?MR MILLER: So I will say that we took note of the provisional election results that were published by the DRC’s National Independent Electoral Commission, which show president – the president leading by a large majority. We also note that the tallying is still underway for the national and local elections that were also held on December 20th. Those results are scheduled to be announced on January 12th, and I think we’ll withhold comment until that process is completed.With that, wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:16 p.m.)# # #Ben-Gvir ↑&nbsp;