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Streck, Inc., a Nebraska corporation, appellee, v. 

Ryan Family, L.L.C., appellee, and Stacy Ryan, 

individually and derivatively on behalf of

Ryan Family, L.L.C., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 15, 2017. No. S-16-664.

1. Interventions: Appeal and Error. Whether a party has the right to 

intervene in a proceeding is a question of law. On a question of law, 

an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the 

determination reached by the court below.

2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues 

presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine 

whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

3. Interventions: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An order denying 

intervention is a final order for purposes of appeal.

4. Interventions: Final Orders. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016) 

does not modify Nebraska’s final order jurisprudence as it regards orders 

denying intervention.

5. Interventions. As a prerequisite to intervention under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-328 (Reissue 2016), the intervenor must have a direct and legal 

interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the 

direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered 

in the action.

6. ____. An indirect, remote, or conjectural interest in the result of a suit 

is not enough to establish intervention as a matter of right. Simply having a claim that arises out of the same facts as the claims at issue in 

the litigation does not constitute having a sufficient interest to support 

intervention.

7. Interventions: Pleadings. A person seeking to intervene must allege 

facts showing that he or she possesses the requisite legal interest in the 

subject matter of the action.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/29/2017 08:10 AM CDT
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8. ____: ____. For purposes of ruling on a motion for leave to intervene, 

a court must assume that the intervenor’s factual allegations set forth in 

the complaint are true.

9. ____: ____. A prospective intervenor can raise his or her claims or 

defenses, but those claims or defenses must involve the same core issue 

as the claims between the existing parties. Intervenors can raise only 

issues that sustain or oppose the respective contentions of the original parties.

10. Interventions. An intervenor is bound by any determinations that were 

made before he or she intervened in the action. In other words, an intervenor must take the suit as he or she finds it.

11. Corporations: Contracts. The Nebraska Uniform Limited Liability 

Company Act is a default statute; subject to certain enumerated exceptions, the act governs only when the operating agreement is silent.

12. ____: ____. Under the Nebraska Uniform Limited Liability Company 

Act, a member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to the 

operating agreement.

13. Corporations. Under the Nebraska Uniform Limited Liability Company 

Act, in a manager-managed limited liability company, matters relating 

to the activities of the company are decided exclusively by the managers 

unless otherwise expressly provided in the act.

14. Corporations: Actions: Interventions. The fact that a member of 

a limited liability company might experience reduced distributions, 

depending on the outcome of a lawsuit against the company, does not 

give the member a direct and legal interest in the lawsuit sufficient to 

support intervention.

15. ____: ____: ____. For purposes of determining the right to intervene, a 

court generally treats actions by a member of a limited liability company 

in the same manner as actions by a shareholder of a corporation.

16. Corporations: Actions: Parties. As a general rule, a shareholder may 

not bring an action in his or her own name to recover for wrongs done 

to the corporation or its property. Such a cause of action is in the corporation and not the shareholders. The right of a shareholder to sue is 

derivative in nature and normally can be brought only in a representative 

capacity for the corporation.

17. Corporations: Actions: Parties: Interventions. When a corporation 

cannot or will not protect the interests of the stockholders, a stockholder may intervene in an action on behalf of the corporation for the 

shareholder’s own protection. However, this is a very limited exception to the general rule that a shareholder may not bring an action in 

his or her own name to recover for wrongs done to the corporation or 

its property.
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18. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Sarpy County: William

B. Zastera, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul Heimann, Bonnie M. Boryca, and Karen M. Keeler, of 

Erickson & Sederstrom, P.C., for appellant.

John D. Stalnaker and Aimee K. Cizek, of Stalnaker, Becker 

& Buresh, P.C., for appellee Ryan Family, L.L.C.

Thomas H. Dahlk and Victoria H. Buter, of Kutak Rock, 

L.L.P., and Ronald E. Reagan, of Reagan, Melton & Delaney, 

L.L.P., for appellee Streck, Inc.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Cassel, Stacy, and Funke, JJ.

Per Curiam.

In January 2016, Streck, Inc., filed a complaint against 

the Ryan Family, L.L.C. (L.L.C.), in the district court for 

Sarpy County. Streck’s complaint alleged the L.L.C. breached a 

lease agreement containing an option to purchase real property 

and sought specific performance. The L.L.C. responded and 

defended the action. In June, a member of the L.L.C. moved 

to intervene in her own behalf and on behalf of the L.L.C. 

She appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion. 

We affirm.

I. FACTS

1. Parties

Streck is a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of 

business in La Vista, Sarpy County, Nebraska. The L.L.C. is 

a Nebraska limited liability company composed of six members of the Ryan family, including Stacy Ryan (Ryan). The 

L.L.C.’s only asset is real property located in La Vista, which 
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it leases to Streck, and the cash generated from the rental of 

that property.

2. Lease Agreement

The L.L.C. leased the property to Streck pursuant to an 

agreement dated December 1999 and subsequently amended. 

The lease gave Streck an option to purchase the property from 

the L.L.C. based on certain conditions. Streck claims it met 

the conditions and properly exercised the option. Based on the 

date Streck exercised the option, closing should have occurred 

no later than January 3, 2016. When no closing occurred, 

Streck filed suit against the L.L.C.

3. Lawsuit Between Streck

and L.L.C.

Streck filed its complaint January 13, 2016, in the district 

court. It sought an order declaring the L.L.C. in breach of 

the lease and ordering specific performance of the option to 

purchase.

The L.L.C. operating agreement vests all management duties 

in a management board consisting of comanagers Wayne Ryan 

and Connie Ryan. After being served with the complaint, the 

comanagers of the L.L.C. filed an application for appointment 

of a receiver to represent the L.L.C., citing a conflict which 

they described as follows:

Co-Manager Dr. Wayne Ryan believes the [L.L.C.] must 

oppose Streck’s Complaint as he believes Streck does not 

hold a valid Option to Purchase the Property due in part 

to an Event of Default pursuant to the Lease Agreement. 

Co-Manager Connie Ryan disagrees with Dr. Ryan, and 

the Co-Managers have been unable to agree on the management of the [L.L.C.]

. . . Co-Manager Connie Ryan has declined Dr. Ryan’s 

request to recuse herself from the management of the 

[L.L.C.], and Dr. Ryan has similarly declined to allow 

Connie Ryan to serve as sole Manager of the [L.L.C.] As 
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a result of the Co-Managers’ disagreements, the [L.L.C.] 

is unable to retain legal counsel to respond to Streck’s 

Complaint in the above-captioned case.

. . . In light of their disagreement, the Co-Managers 

believe that appointment of [a] Receiver for the [L.L.C.] 

is necessary and appropriate to respond to Streck’s 

Complaint and avoid default for failure to Answer.

No party opposed the comanagers’ request, and the court 

appointed a receiver to represent the L.L.C.’s interest in the 

lawsuit.

On March 3, 2016, the receiver, on behalf of the L.L.C., 

filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged 

that Streck was in default of the lease agreement when it 

attempted to exercise the option and that the default voided 

Streck’s right to exercise the option.

On June 15, 2016, Streck moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to find as a matter of law that it was 

not in default at the time it exercised the option to purchase. 

At the hearing on the partial summary judgment motion, the 

parties offered a joint stipulation, which the court received. 

Posthearing briefing was permitted, and the matter was set for 

further proceedings on July 5.

4. Complaint in Intervention

On June 22, 2016, Ryan filed a “Complaint in Intervention” 

seeking to intervene “on her own behalf and derivatively on 

behalf of the [L.L.C.]” On June 27, she moved to continue 

the summary judgment hearing scheduled for July 5. On June 

29, Ryan filed a “Motion for Order Permitting Complaint in 

Intervention” asking for “an order permitting her to intervene 

[and] allowing her Complaint in Intervention, filed and served 

on June 22, 2016.”

All of Ryan’s motions were taken up at a hearing on July 

1, 2016. On July 5, the court entered two orders. One order 

overruled Ryan’s motion to intervene, and the other overruled her motion to continue the summary judgment hearing. 
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Neither order set forth the court’s reasoning. Ryan appeals 

from both orders. We moved the appeal to our docket on our 

own motion.1

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Ryan assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) 

disallowing her complaint in intervention; (2) denying her 

motion to intervene, including her request for access to the 

parties’ prior discovery and her request to conduct additional 

discovery; and (3) failing to continue the hearing on Streck’s 

motion for summary judgment or to reopen the summary 

judgment record to allow her an opportunity to conduct necessary discovery and to participate in the summary judgment 

proceedings.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Whether a party has the right to intervene in a proceeding is a question of law.2

 On a question of law, an appellate 

court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the 

determination reached by the court below.3

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdiction

[2,3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, 

it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction over the matter before it.4 Since at least 1985, we 

have held that an order denying intervention is a final order for 

purposes of appeal.5 Streck acknowledges this, but contends 

that our final order jurisprudence has failed to consider the 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2016).

2 Ruzicka v. Ruzicka, 262 Neb. 824, 635 N.W.2d 528 (2001).

3 Id.

4 Trainum v. Sutherland Assocs., 263 Neb. 778, 642 N.W.2d 816 (2002).

5 Basin Elec. Power Co-op v. Little Blue N.R.D., 219 Neb. 372, 363 N.W.2d 

500 (1985).
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effect of the Legislature’s adoption in 2000 of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1315 (Reissue 2016). Section 25-1315(1) provides:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 

third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, 

the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 

one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 

only upon an express determination that there is no just 

reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 

entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 

however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all 

the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 

the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 

claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 

judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 

liabilities of all the parties.

Streck argues that the order denying Ryan’s motion to intervene 

did not meet the requirements of § 25-1315, because it did not 

contain an express determination that there was no just reason 

for delay and it did not expressly direct entry of judgment.

[4] We conclude § 25-1315 does not modify our final order 

jurisprudence as it regards orders denying intervention. The 

plain language of the statute references claims, counterclaims, 

cross-claims, and third-party claims, but does not mention 

complaints in intervention. Moreover, even after § 25-1315 

was enacted, we continued to apply our existing final order 

jurisprudence to orders denying intervention,6 and we see no 

principled basis to depart from that precedent. For these reasons, we conclude that our final order jurisprudence regarding 

orders denying intervention was not superseded by § 25-1315 

6 See, Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, 271 Neb. 578, 713 N.W.2d 489 (2006); 

Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001 v. Johanns, 269 Neb. 664, 694 N.W.2d 668 

(2005). 
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and that the order denying Ryan’s motion to intervene is a 

final, appealable order. We have jurisdiction over this appeal, 

and Streck’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.

2. Intervention

(a) Legal Framework

The right to intervene is granted by statute in Nebraska. 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328 (Reissue 2016) provides:

Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to 

an action, or against both, in any action pending or to be 

brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska, may 

become a party to an action between any other persons 

or corporations, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming 

what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the 

defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by 

demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and 

defendant, either before or after issue has been joined in 

the action, and before the trial commences.

Ryan bases her intervention rights solely on § 25-328, so we 

begin by reviewing the legal propositions governing such 

intervention.

[5-8] As a prerequisite to intervention under § 25-328, the 

intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation 

and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in 

the action.7 An indirect, remote, or conjectural interest in the 

result of a suit is not enough to establish intervention as a matter of right.8

 Simply having a claim that arises out of the same 

facts as the claims at issue in the litigation does not constitute 

having a sufficient interest to support intervention.9 Therefore, 

a person seeking to intervene must allege facts showing that 

7 Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, supra note 6.

8 Id.

9 See Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
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he or she possesses the requisite legal interest in the subject 

matter of the action.10 For purposes of ruling on a motion for 

leave to intervene, a court must assume that the intervenor’s 

factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true.11

[9,10] Our jurisprudence also recognizes some practical 

limitations on the right to intervene. A prospective intervenor can raise his or her claims or defenses, but those claims 

or defenses must involve the same core issue as the claims 

between the existing parties.12 Intervenors can raise only issues 

that “sustain or oppose the respective contentions of the [original parties].”13 The intervenor is bound by any determinations 

that were made before he or she intervened in the action.14 In 

other words, “‘[a]n interven[o]r must take the suit as he finds 

it . . . .’”15

With these principles in mind, we review Ryan’s complaint 

in intervention to determine whether she has alleged a direct 

and legal interest sufficient to support intervention.

(b) Ryan’s Complaint to Intervene

Ryan alleges she has a nearly 20-percent interest in the 

L.L.C. as a member thereof. She further alleges the interests 

of the L.L.C. are not being “fully protected” by the receiver, 

and she alleges the receiver should have asserted additional 

claims and defenses on behalf of the L.L.C. She also seeks by 

intervention to challenge the appointment of the receiver and to 

present a claim that the comanagers of the L.L.C. breached the 

operating agreement by requesting appointment of a receiver.

10 Spear T Ranch v. Knaub, supra note 6.

11 Id.

12 See Ruzicka v. Ruzicka, supra note 2.

13 State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 650, 17 N.W.2d 683, 691 

(1945).

14 See School Dist. of Gering v. Stannard, 196 Neb. 367, 242 N.W.2d 889 

(1976).

15 Drainage District v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb. 530, 538, 300 N.W. 

582, 587 (1941).
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Before we address whether Ryan has shown a direct and 

legal interest sufficient to allow her to intervene, we note 

that to the extent Ryan seeks by intervention to challenge the 

appointment of the receiver or allege the L.L.C. managers have 

breached the operating agreement, she is attempting improperly to expand the scope of the litigation. As stated earlier, 

the claims or defenses of an intervenor must involve the same 

core issues as the claims between the existing parties,16 and 

intervenors can raise only issues that “sustain or oppose the 

respective contentions of the [original parties].”17 Here, the 

dispute between the original parties is over whether there was a 

breach of the lease agreement. The suit does not involve either 

the validity of the appointment of the receiver or any potential 

breach of the operating agreement. Thus, Ryan’s claims challenging the appointment of the receiver or the comanagers’ 

breach of the operating agreement cannot provide a basis for 

her right to intervene in this action, and we will not address 

those claims further.

(i) No Right to Intervene 

in Ryan’s Own Behalf

To support her claim of a direct and legal interest sufficient 

to support the right to intervene in her own behalf, Ryan argues 

she is a 20-percent member of the L.L.C. and stands to lose 

or gain financially depending on how the court resolves the 

dispute between the L.L.C. and Streck. Before addressing this 

argument, we clarify the nature of Ryan’s rights as a member 

of the L.L.C.

[11] Ryan’s rights in that regard are governed by the 

Nebraska Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act)18

and the terms of the L.L.C.’s operating agreement. Subject to 

certain enumerated exceptions not relevant here, most matters 

16 See Ruzicka v. Ruzicka, supra note 2.

17 State ex rel. Nelson v. Butler, supra note 13, 145 Neb. at 650, 17 N.W.2d 

at 691.

18 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-101 et seq. (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
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are governed by the operating agreement entered into by the 

members of the L.L.C., and the LLC Act governs only when 

the operating agreement is silent.19

[12,13] As pertinent here, the LLC Act provides that a 

member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to 

the operating agreement.20 And, specifically, “[i]n a managermanaged limited liability company, . . . [e]xcept as otherwise 

expressly provided in the [LLC Act], any matter relating to 

the activities of the company is decided exclusively by the 

managers.”21

The L.L.C. operating agreement, a copy of which was 

attached to Ryan’s complaint in intervention, provides: 

“The Members of the Company vest the management of the 

Company in a Management Board, which shall have sole

power and authority to conduct the affairs of the Company . . 

. .” The operating agreement also gives the managers the right 

“[t]o employ . . . managing agents or other experts to perform 

services for the Company and . . . [t]o enter into any and all 

other agreements on behalf of the Company, with any other 

Person for any purpose, in such forms as the Managers may 

approve.” Based on the provisions of the LLC Act and the 

operating agreement, Ryan has no legal authority to conduct 

the affairs of the L.L.C.

Ryan contends that despite being a nonmanaging member 

of the L.L.C., she nevertheless has a direct and legal interest 

in the suit which entitles her to intervene, because she stands 

to lose or gain financially depending on how the court resolves 

the dispute between the L.L.C. and Streck. We considered, and 

rejected, a similar argument in Steinhausen v. HomeServices 

of Neb.22

19 See § 21-110.

20 § 21-111(b).

21 § 21-136(c)(1) (emphasis supplied).

22 Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Neb., 289 Neb. 927, 857 N.W.2d 816 

(2015).
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There, the sole member of a limited liability company 

(LLC) filed a complaint on behalf of himself and the LLC, 

alleging a third party had engaged in tortious interference with 

the business relationships or expectancies of the LLC. We held 

that members of an LLC cannot, in their own behalf, maintain 

a claim for tortious interference with the business relationships 

or expectancies of an LLC, because such a claim can be maintained only by the parties to the business relationship.23 We 

specifically reasoned that even though a member of an LLC 

might experience reduced distributions from the LLC if the 

LLC’s relationships are interfered with, it did not convert the 

claim into one in behalf of the member personally.24

[14] Here, neither the operating agreement nor the LLC 

Act gives Ryan the authority to speak for, or make decisions 

for, the L.L.C., even in matters that may indirectly affect her 

financial interests. That power is vested exclusively with the 

managers of the L.L.C. and anyone they appoint pursuant to 

their power to employ others to perform services for the L.L.C. 

The fact that Ryan, as a member of the L.L.C., may experience reduced distributions, depending on the outcome of the 

lawsuit against the L.L.C., does not give her a direct and legal 

interest in the lawsuit sufficient to support intervention in her 

own behalf.

Moreover, Ryan does not allege she was owed a special 

duty by the receiver separate and distinct from the duty owed 

to the L.L.C.25 Nor does she allege any financial injury or 

damage sustained in her individual capacity that would be 

distinct from that sustained by other L.L.C. members.26 Under 

these circumstances, Ryan’s membership interest in the L.L.C. 

does not give her a direct and legal interest sufficient to allow 

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 See Freedom Fin. Group v. Woolley, 280 Neb. 825, 792 N.W.2d 134 

(2010).

26 See id.
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her to intervene in her own behalf in the action. We reject her 

arguments to the contrary.

(ii) No Right to Intervene 

on L.L.C.’s Behalf

Ryan also argues she has the right to intervene on behalf of 

the L.L.C. She asserts that Streck is seeking to buy the L.L.C.’s 

only asset and alleges that the interests of the L.L.C. have not 

been “fully protected” by the comanagers and receiver.

[15] To determine whether Ryan has a direct and legal interest sufficient to allow her to intervene on behalf of the L.L.C., 

we find guidance in the law governing whether and when a 

shareholder of a corporation may intervene on behalf of the 

corporation. This is so because we have generally treated 

actions by a member of an LLC in the same manner as actions 

by a shareholder of a corporation.27

[16] As a general rule, a shareholder may not bring an action 

in his or her own name to recover for wrongs done to the corporation or its property.28 Such a cause of action is in the corporation and not the shareholders.29 The right of a shareholder 

to sue is derivative in nature and normally can be brought only 

in a representative capacity for the corporation.30

The LLC Act provides a means to bring a derivative action. 

Section 21-165 states:

A member may maintain a derivative action to enforce a 

right of [an LLC] if:

(1) the member first makes a demand on the other 

members in a member-managed [LLC], or the managers 

of a manager-managed [LLC], requesting that they cause 

the company to bring an action to enforce the right, and 

the managers or other members do not bring the action 

within a reasonable time; or

27 See id.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id.
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(2) a demand under subdivision (1) of this section 

would be futile.

Ryan’s complaint in intervention alleges that she “made 

demand upon the receiver” to assert the additional claims 

and defenses she wished to raise in this litigation, but that 

the receiver refused to do so. Alternatively, Ryan alleges that 

demand upon the managers and receiver would have been 

futile, because the managers admitted they could not agree to 

a course of action and the receiver refused to assert the claims 

and defenses Ryan wished to raise in this litigation. But Ryan 

has not filed a derivative action, nor does she argue that she 

has met the requirements for bringing such an action here.

[17] Instead, Ryan primarily relies on this court’s decision in State v. Holmes31 to support her motion to intervene 

on behalf of the L.L.C. In Holmes, a receiver had been 

appointed to represent an insolvent corporation. A shareholder 

sought to intervene to protect the interests of the corporation, 

alleging that the corporation was “not represented” in the 

action, that the corporate officers “refuse[d] to act,” and that 

“the rights of stockholders [were], therefore, unprotected.”32

The shareholder alleged that although a receiver had been 

appointed, it was done at the request of and for the benefit of 

the insolvent corporation’s creditors. The shareholder further 

alleged that the receiver had handled the insolvent corporation’s assets in a “reckless and improvident manner, and that, 

if his actions are permitted to go unchallenged, he will waste 

and dissipate a large amount of valuable property belonging to the [corporation].”33 On those unique facts, this court 

observed that the rights of the shareholders were completely 

unprotected, and we held that the shareholder could intervene 

on behalf of the corporation, reasoning that “[w]here the 

corporation can not, or will not, protect the interests of the 

31 State v. Holmes, 60 Neb. 39, 82 N.W. 109 (1900).

32 Id. at 41, 82 N.W. at 109.

33 Id.
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stockholders, the [stockholders] may intervene for their own 

protection.”34 As such, our decision in Holmes recognized a 

very limited exception to the general rule that a shareholder 

may not bring an action in his or her own name to recover for 

wrongs done to the corporation or its property.35 But Ryan has 

not alleged anything which suggests the exception applies here 

to support her intervention.

Unlike the facts in Holmes, Ryan has not alleged the receiver 

is completely failing to protect the interests of the L.L.C. and 

its members, nor would the record support such an inference. 

The record shows the receiver was appointed at the joint 

request of the comanagers to “address, answer, and/or defend 

the Complaint filed . . . by Streck” and has been doing so. 

Ryan’s briefing argues that the receiver could or should be 

managing the litigation differently, but she has not alleged 

that the receiver cannot or will not protect the interests of the 

L.L.C. or its members. On these facts, Holmes is inapplicable, 

and Ryan has argued no other basis for claiming a direct and 

legal interest sufficient to authorize her intervention on behalf 

of the L.L.C.

[18] On this record, we conclude Ryan has not alleged a 

direct and legal interest sufficient to support intervention in the 

litigation between the L.L.C. and Streck. As such, we do not 

address her remaining assignments of error. An appellate court 

is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary 

to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.36

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court.

Affirmed.

Miller-Lerman and Kelch, JJ., not participating.

34 Id. at 43, 82 N.W. at 110.

35 See Freedom Fin. Group v. Woolley, supra note 25.

36 Johnson v. Nelson, 290 Neb. 703, 861 N.W.2d 705 (2015).