# Norway - United States Department of State

- Norway HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Norway				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Norway																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Norway during the year.There were no credible reports of significant human rights abuses.The government had mechanisms in place to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, and there were no credible reports government officials employed them.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were good with high material standards. Prisoners had access to services and activities such as health care, education, job training, and physical exercise. The parliamentary ombud and equality and antidiscrimination ombud expressed concerns over conditions in two women’s prisons, Ullersmo and Bredtveit, involving the use of isolation and medical restraints.Administration: Authorities conducted proper investigations of credible allegations of mistreatment. There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns. The parliamentary ombud filed a pleading to the Borgarting Appellate Court expressing concerns over conditions at the Trandum detention center where asylum seekers whose asylum claims had been denied were detained prior to deportation. The ombud protested the detention of noncriminals and called practices at the center, which included routine and intrusive body searches, and the use of isolation for persons who were in crisis or with mental health challenges, as “ongoing human rights violations.” The criticism was echoed by nongovernmental organization (NGO) Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers (NOAS).Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits, including unannounced visits, by independent human rights observers.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Detainees needed to be informed of charges against them immediately after an arrest, and to detain suspects, the prosecutor needed to arraign them within three days after arrest. The arraigning judge determined whether the accused should be held in custody or released pending trial. There was a bail system, but it was rarely utilized. Officials routinely released defendants, including nonresident foreigners, accused of minor crimes pending trial. Defendants accused of serious or violent crimes usually remained in custody until trial.By law, authorities provided detainees access to a lawyer of their choice before interrogation or, if the requested lawyer was unavailable, to an attorney appointed by the government. The government paid the attorney fees in all cases. Criminal detainees benefited from legal aid if the period of police custody was expected to last more than 24 hours (for adults) or 12 hours (for juveniles). Consequently, because most questioning and detention took place within 24 hours, it was not uncommon for criminal suspects to be subjected to police questioning without a lawyer present.The law mandated detainees be transferred from temporary police holding cells to a regular prison cell within 48 hours. The law provided that a court needed to determine whether and for how long a detainee could be held in solitary confinement during pretrial detention. There were no reports these rights were not respected.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.																Trial Procedures						The constitution and the law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and an independent judiciary generally enforced this right.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, and there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, and there were no credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees.NOAS was critical of the perceived lack of openness and transparency in the Immigration Appeals Board, an entity under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. It noted the board’s strict criteria to hear cases that resulted in few hearings granted with the appeals board in 2022, particularly family reunification applicants. Applicants could not contest a final decision by the appeals board, but the appeals board could make a final decision based on an issue not originally in question, which removed the applicant’s opportunity to respond to the board’s grounds for rejecting the case. NOAS reported most asylum applicants were granted protection in the initial review.Access to Basic Services: NOAS criticized the lack of routine access to health care and other fundamental human rights for the approximately 50 paperless and irregular migrants present in the country. Such individuals included, for example, those who were not able to return to their home countries because their governments refused to accept them, issue travel documents, or both. These individuals could access the public health system only when they required acute medical attention.Durable Solutions: The government offered resettlement for refugees in cooperation with UNHCR. The government’s Directorate of Immigration had several programs to settle refugees permanently in the country. Through the International Organization for Migration, the government assisted the return of unsuccessful asylum seekers to their countries of origin through voluntary programs offering financial and logistical support for repatriation. Identity documents issued by either the Norwegian or the returnee’s government were required to use this program. The government routinely offered migrants cash support in addition to airfare to encourage persons with rejected asylum claims to leave the country voluntarily.Individuals granted refugee status could apply for citizenship when they met the legal requirements, which included a minimum length of residence of seven of the previous 10 years, completion of an integration course on Norwegian society, and successfully passing a language test.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary humanitarian protection to individuals who could not otherwise qualify as refugees. As of October 5, the government granted temporary protection to 56,980 Ukrainians. Permits for temporary protection were renewable and could become permanent.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion, an estimated 1,600 stateless persons lived in the country as of October; they were not counted as refugees. The Directorate of Immigration provided for stateless persons to apply for asylum. The birth register did not register the father of stateless persons born in the country on birth certificates. According to Norwegian law, a person automatically became a citizen by birth if one of the parents was a citizen. Children born to stateless persons were as such not recognized as Norwegian and were considered stateless persons. If the parents were granted permanent residency in the country, the stateless child could be granted citizenship within a year after birth.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: Observers considered the parliamentary elections held in September 2021 to be free and fair.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were reports of government corruption during the year.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Civil society and NGOs generally worked very closely with the government, shared similar agendas, received government grants, and in some cases managed government funds. Government officials and NGOs were mindful of their well-established relationships and took steps to ensure independence and avoid the appearance of government oversight.Government Human Rights Bodies: The country had ombuds for public administration (the parliamentary ombud); children, equality, and discrimination (the equality and antidiscrimination ombud); and health-care patients. All ombuds enjoyed the government’s cooperation and operated without government interference. Although the ombuds’ recommendations were not legally binding, authorities usually complied with them.The National Human Rights Institution, an independent body funded by parliament, submitted an annual report to parliament on human rights in the country.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal rape, and the government generally enforced the law effectively. The penalty for rape was up to 21 years in prison depending on the severity of the assault, age of the victim, and circumstances of the crime. Guidelines for rape cases without aggravating circumstances called for sentences of up to four years. The law provided penalties of up to six years in prison for domestic violence and up to 21 years for aggravated rape. There were instances of gender-based violence, including intimate partner violence.Public and private organizations operated 43 government-funded shelters and managed five 24-hour crisis hotlines. Government funding for shelters was managed through local municipalities. The Crisis Center Secretariat operated 22 of the 43 shelters and noted local municipalities routinely faced budget shortfalls and were unable to provide shelters with the resources needed.Discrimination: The law provided for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including under family, religious, personal status, and nationality laws, as well as laws related to labor, property, inheritance, employment, access to credit, and owning or managing businesses or property. The government enforced the law effectively. Publicly listed companies, including those with as few as 20 employees, largely complied with the law requiring 40 percent of the members of boards of directors to be women.Although women had the same legal status as men, they experienced discrimination in terms of gaining employment, as well as discrimination in the workplace itself.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors, including postexposure prophylaxis and emergency contraception.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Racial profiling and violence and discrimination against members of racial or ethnic minority groups were against the law, but the government did not always enforce these laws effectively. Members of the Nordic Resistance Movement, members of Stop the Islamization of Norway, and neo-Nazis interrupted the release of a report on racism by the Center against Racism during the August 14-18 Arendalsuka conference, despite the Center against Racism asking police to prevent their attendance. The center reported police only searched the protesters after the center insisted, and protesters entered the conference with weapons even after the search. Police also failed to investigate violent online threats against a representative of the Center against Racism. Authorities did not keep records relating to the stop and search of members of vulnerable groups. NGOs reported complaints of police profiling of members of ethnic and racial minority groups, particularly young men. Discrimination against immigrants, including asylum seekers and irregular migrants, and ethnic minorities was a problem. As of October, the Antidiscrimination Tribunal received 91 reports of ethnic discrimination. Ethnic discrimination occurred in employment and housing.NGOs and research institutes, including the Center against Racism, reported a rise in hate speech on the internet against ethnic minorities. In addition to the Sami Indigenous persons, five ethnically non-Norwegian groups with long-standing attachment to the country had a special protected status under the law: Kvens/Norwegian Finns, Jews, Forest Finns, Roma, and the Romani/Tater community (a distinct group of travelers who emigrated to Norway and Sweden in the 1500s).																																				Indigenous Peoples										There was no official registry of Sami in the country. In addition to participating freely in the national political process, the Sami elected their own parliament, the Samediggi, which exercised certain administrative and financial powers according to the law. Members of the Sami parliament represented their constituents in international fora and organizations, including the Arctic Council and the United Nations. The constitution provided a right for the Sami to safeguard and develop their language, culture, and community. NGOs and Sami officials expressed concern over Sami children’s lack of access to Sami language education due to a dearth of qualified teachers.In 2021 the Supreme Court ruled the government violated the rights of the Sami community under the 2005 Consultations Agreement by permitting the construction of wind farms on Sami land. In February and October, demonstrators and Sami activists protested the government’s failure to address the Supreme Court’s ruling, blocked access to several ministries, and conducted a sit-in at parliament.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law criminalized child abuse, and the government generally enforced the law.In September, the European Court of Human Rights completed review of and found against the government in three child protection cases involving nine families, one for separating children from their parents and two for forced adoption.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal age for marriage in the country was 18 for both women and men, and the government effectively enforced this law.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Commercial sexual exploitation, sale, grooming, or using children younger than 18 for commercial exploitation, including child sex trafficking, was illegal, both in the country and abroad when committed by a citizen of the country. In both cases the punishment was either a fine or a prison sentence of up to two years. Child pornography was also illegal and punishable by a fine or a prison sentence of up to three years. The government generally enforced the law. The minimum age for consensual sex was 16.																																				Antisemitism										At least 1,500 Jews lived in the country, 741 of whom belonged to Jewish congregations, according to Statistics Norway. The government did not keep statistics requiring citizens to report their religion.Jewish community leaders reported the public and government generally supported the community, although they acknowledged incidents of antisemitism. According to NGOs and research institutes, including the National Human Rights Institution and Jewish community leaders, hate speech on the internet against ethnic minorities and religious groups increased. The government funded initiatives to combat antisemitism through the national budget guided by its national action plan. The action plan provided programmatic support and coordination for addressing antisemitism by integrating targeted education programs into all schools, supporting Jewish museums and cultural institutions, funding research on antisemitism and Jewish life, and funding public advocacy programs to combat antisemitism. The government provided funding to the Dembra Program to train teachers to increase awareness and prevent and combat antisemitism, prejudice, discrimination, and harassment of minorities in schools. The Dembra Program was coordinated by the Holocaust Center.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behavior. Seemingly neutral laws were not disproportionately applied to target lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons to justify arbitrary arrest.Violence and Harassment: There were reports of violence and harassment by nonstate actors. Hate speech on the internet against LGBTQI+ persons was a problem. Police received 281 reports of hate crimes against LGBTQI+ persons in 2022, the latest numbers available, including instances of hate speech, violence, and property damage.Following the 2022 shooting attack at the LGBTQI+ bar, the London Pub in Oslo, authorities acknowledged deficiencies and initiated an action plan to address information sharing between law enforcement agencies, and communication between police services and the LGBTQI+ community.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in housing, employment, citizenship law, and access to government services such as health care and recognized LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families. The government enforced these laws. Violence motivated by discriminatory attitudes towards transgender persons was not considered a hate crime.According to NGOs and researchers, including the Norwegian Organization for Sexual and Gender Diversity (FRI), access to health services for transgender individuals was the biggest challenge facing the LGBTQI+ community. The Health Directorate developed standards for treatment and health services for transgender individuals based on World Health Organization guidelines, but the National Treatment Center – the only organization permitted to administer gender affirming health care in the country – rejected those guidelines. The National Treatment Center treated gender dysphoria as a mental health issue and required a psychiatric diagnosis prior to treatment.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The Gender Recognition Act of 2016 permitted citizens age 16 and older to change their legal gender by submitting an electronic form to the National Population Register. Children younger than 16 required the consent of all legal guardians to change their legal gender.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports conversion therapy was practiced in recent years. In an FRI survey of LGBTQI+ individuals, 25 percent responded that in their lifetime they had experienced intolerant actions that could be interpreted as a rejection of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Most respondents expressed the belief that a ban on so-called conversion therapy would lessen that intolerance.There were no reports of surgeries on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons. Medical treatment on children was regulated by law and required parental or legal guardian consent.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws or other restrictions on individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations, or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The constitution and law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, and the government provided information and communications in accessible formats. The government effectively enforced and implemented these provisions. The law mandated access to public buildings, information, and communications for persons with disabilities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Media and the Norwegian Center against Racism reported anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment in society. Stop the Islamization of Norway held multiple protests throughout the year that were attended by known neo-Nazis.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers, including migrant workers (those who had a work permit in the country), to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.The right to strike excluded members of the military and senior civil servants. With the approval of parliament, the government could compel arbitration in any industrial sector if it determined a strike threatened public safety.The government effectively enforced applicable laws. The penalties were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all of the worst forms of child labor. Children between ages 13 and 15 could be employed up to 12 hours per week in light work that did not adversely affect their health, development, or schooling, such as assistant work in offices or stores. Children age 14 and younger needed parental permission to work, and those 15 and older could work as part of vocational training, if supervised. Between ages 15 and 18, children not in school could work up to 40 hours per week and a maximum eight hours per day. The government effectively enforced these laws, and both civil and criminal penalties were commensurate with those for other analogous serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law did not mandate an official minimum wage. Instead, minimum wages were set in collective bargaining agreements. An estimated 10 percent of the population had an income below the relative poverty limit, which Statistics Norway set at 60 percent of the median household income after tax. The law provided for premium pay of 40 percent of salary for overtime and prohibited compulsory overtime in excess of 10 hours per week. Violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were not common.Occupational Safety and Health: The law provided for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed persons. The occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were appropriate for the main industries in the country. Workers could remove themselves from situations endangering health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, and authorities effectively protected employees in this situation.The Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority (NLIA) could close an enterprise immediately if the life or health of employees was in imminent danger and could report enterprises to police for serious breaches of the law.The Norwegian Working Environment Act required employers to prevent work-related accidents and maintain a safe and healthy working environment for all employees. The law required employers with 50 or more workers to establish environment committees composed of management, workers, and health-care personnel. Employers with 10 or more workers needed to have safety delegates elected by their employees.The country’s Transparency Act compelled companies to respect human rights and decent working conditions in connection with the production of goods and services and ensured the public had access to information on how companies handled negative consequences on human rights and decent working conditions.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The NLIA was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws, and in consultation with nongovernment experts, it set OSH standards and effectively enforced laws and standards in the formal sector. Penalties were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence, and were regularly applied against violators. The law provided the same benefits for citizens and foreign workers with residency permits but forbade employment of foreign workers without residency permits. The number of labor inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance. Inspectors could conduct unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. The NLIA and the Norwegian Tax Directorate carried out inspections to ensure employers upheld their responsibilities and to combat potential informal markets. The size of the informal sector was negligible due to a high level of digitalization, monitoring and enforcement, and strong welfare support.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. 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- Joint Statement on South Sudan Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom on South Sudan.Begin Text:Following recent senior-level visits from our capitals to Juba, the Governments of Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirm our call for South Sudan’s leaders urgently to take steps necessary to ensure genuine and peaceful elections in December. This process should address the ten questions posed by the trilateral mechanism (UN, AU and IGAD). Not taking these critical steps and so not allowing elections would be a collective failure on the part of South Sudan’s leaders.We further urge the transitional government to use public revenue in a transparent manner to address public needs, including funding and operationalization of electoral institutions.Our relationship with South Sudan remains based on our conviction that the South Sudanese people deserve peace, human rights, democracy, and a government that is responsive to the needs of its citizens. We look to South Sudan’s leaders to demonstrate that they share these values by honoring their own commitments to their people.End Text.
- Online Press Briefing with Major General Robert B. Sofge Jr. MODERATOR:  Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub.  I’d like to welcome everyone joining for today’s virtual press briefing.  Today, we’re very honored to be joined by Major General Robert Sofge, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, to talk about exercise Nordic Response.Finally, a reminder that today’s briefing is on the record.  With that, let’s get started.  Major General Sofge, thank you so much for joining us today.  I’d like to turn it over to you for your opening remarks.MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Well, thank you, Dan.  I appreciated the opportunity to be here today, and I’d like to thank everybody for the opportunity to showcase the great work taking place now between the United States, Norway, and our NATO Allies and partners during exercise Nordic Response ’24.  As you said, I’m Major General Bob Sofge, the Commander of U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa, and I’m honored to represent both U.S. European Command and U.S. participation in the Nordic Response exercise.I want to begin this morning by underscoring the importance of our relationship between the United States and the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark.  Our Marine Corps’ longstanding relationship in particular with the Nordic militaries continues to develop Marine Corps lethality with the numerous annual exercises across the High North that we participate in.We’ve learned a lot from our friends, and we’re proud of our contributions to Arctic security and the excellent relationships we have here, and with our friends from the other 14 militaries participating in Nordic Response.Nordic Response, Archipelago Endeavor, and Freezing Winds are just some of the exercises that we participate in between our great countries, and we’re stronger together because of it.  I want to emphasize that the military exercises are more than just moving people and equipment; it’s more than training together; it’s more than working together on shared tactics and procedures or even enduring shared hardship.  The military exercises are a powerful venue to share and celebrate our respective cultures, and appreciate them.I specifically would like to thank the local communities of Norway, Sweden, and Finland.  You’re always warm and welcoming, and I know that all U.S. servicemembers – specifically Marines – greatly appreciate your legendary hospitality.  So on behalf of all of us, thank you.With diplomatic relations in Norway forged nearly 120 years ago, our two nations and our militaries remain operationally and tactically balanced and synchronized.  In addition to the various opportunities for U.S. servicemembers to train here in the High North each year, a significant number of Norwegian servicemembers travel to the United States for joint training and education.  The robust security relationship between the United States and Norway with our combined exercises, bilateral exchanges, shared investments, and the combined planning that we exercise makes our forces stronger together and ready for future security challenges.  I’m proud of the long-running military exchange partnership we have.Exercise Nordic Response ’24 is hosted by Norway, of course, and supported by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe together with other services and Allied and partner nations.  Our exercise here will allow us to continue to hone our skills, finetune our interoperability, nurture key relationships, and acclimate to the challenges posed by fighting in the extreme cold weather and rugged mountainous terrain.Nordic Response differs from past exercises – Cold Response, as it was formerly known – and that includes participants from across the Nordic countries working together to ensure we can effectively cooperate across all warfighting domains.The exercise kicked off a few days ago and will take place until March 15th.  The U.S. is represented by servicemembers from the United States Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, and the United States Air Force, among others, who are operating out of Norwegian and Swedish bases and training areas, to include Finnmark regions.Like all Allied nations, the United States has collective defense responsibilities tied to our NATO membership.  There is a long list of exercises taking place in the High North region that are designed to secure the collective defense of Norway and the Alliance.  Our ability to respond quickly to crisis to assure Allies and partners rests upon the fact that we are here in Europe, forward and ready.This year, Nordic Response involves a total of 14 Allied and partner nations and falls under the umbrella of NATO exercise Steadfast Defender, as the Alliance celebrates NATO’s 75th anniversary.  Throughout the exercise, we are committed to ensuring our collective leaders and teams, understand the synergy of the air, sea, cyberspace, and land power domains in a joint coalition environment.Our greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region is a network of Allies and partners committed to Arctic security, and more importantly, peace and prosperity.  Nordic Response stresses that now is the time to get our systems connected, our doctrine aligned, and to share our tactics to ensure we can sense and make sense in a complex battlefield, in the harshest of conditions, against a capable opponent.Thanks and I’d like to open the floor up to any – for any of your questions you may have about the exercise or anywhere else you’d like to go.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  Now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion.  Okay, the first question will be one of the written ones, and our first question goes to Marek Świerczyński from Polityka Insight in Poland, and the question is:  “What specific roles do you envision – do you envisage for the U.S. Marine Corps in a scenario of defending the Baltic States or the Baltic Sea region against Russian aggression?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Thank you for the question.  I think specifically the U.S. Marine Corps, in conjunction with our Allies and partners both jointly and in the combined force, would work hard in the littoral regions.  As you know, we’re a littoral force.   Much of our force design and transformation recently has reinforced that position and greatly improved our lethality.  I think you could expect us to – at the unclassified level to use our expertise in the littoral regions to reinforce the defense of Norway and other NATO Allies.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you, sir.  So the next question is from Alfonso Bianchi from Europa Today based in Italy, and the question is:  “In the hypothetical case of a real attack on a NATO country by Russia or anyone else, and a subsequent war with that attacking country, how would the chain of command work in the NATO forces?  Who would be in charge?  Which role would each member-state have?  And is there a standard set of rules for a situation like that, or does NATO decide when it actually happens how to do that?  And in that case, how would it be?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Thank you, Alfonso, for that question.  I think the – well, of course in – for NATO, SACEUR is in charge, but everyone would have a role to play in the Alliance.  From – it sounds like you’re asking a little bit in an Article 5 situation that the – if something like that were triggered, how would that work?  Well, of course, much of that’s classified.  Know that we have forces that are ready, and Nordic Response is exercising many of those relationships against any threat, right, against – and what that would look like.So I think the – everyone would have to play their role and contribute robustly to the defense of NATO in the event of an attack, right.  So the – I think that’s how it would work.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  All right.  Our next question is from Alexandra Brzozowski from Euractiv based in Belgium:  “With NATO&#8217;s expansion towards Finland, and soon Sweden, what is practically changing with the Alliance’s posture in the region, especially in regards to the defendability of the Suwalki Gap and the Arctic?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  The – well, we’re getting better.  We’re getting stronger.  The accession of Finland and hopefully Sweden here in the days ahead, the – NATO is – was strong before and it’s stronger now.  It’s better.  So I think the – that’s what I think has practically changed, and in the High North in particular I think it allows for a synergy perhaps that we didn’t have previously amongst – from a collective defense perspective that I think is just great news for all involved.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you, sir.  Now, the next question is from Frank Cadamarteri from the outlet Adresseavisen from Norway, and the question is:  “With the U.S. and the U.S. armed forces turning more attention towards Asia and China especially, do you see a possibility for further reduction in numbers of Marines and other U.S. military personnel in Europe in the coming years?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Thanks, Frank, for the question.  I would note that today, right now, there are more Marines in Europe than there have been in almost anyone’s memory.  It is – so I – the Marines are a global force that respond to crisis, that respond to conflict, and are prepared to go to any clime and place, right, to do our nation’s business and our nation’s – and contribute to what the United States is doing in NATO.So I don’t think that you’ll see a reduction, per se, in U.S. Marine forces or U.S. forces in general in Europe.  (Inaudible.)MODERATOR:  Okay, this is the moderator just coming in.  I think we may have lost the connection temporarily, so I’m going to see if we can test that line.  Just one moment.  Apologize for the technical difficulties here.  Major General Sofge, if you are still with us, could you please give us a line just so that we know you’re still connected?MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  It’s General Sofge; I dropped off there for a moment.  I think I ended with, or I intended to end with, we’re – the Marines are forward and ready, and I don’t see a – we’ll go where we’re needed, wherever we’re needed in the world.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir, and glad we restored the line there.  Okay, here is our next question, and this question comes from Tim Stickings of The National:  “As the exercise effectively simulates a Russian attack, does it incorporate any intelligence on Russia’s battlefield tactics observed in Ukraine?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Thanks for the question.  I don’t think it would be appropriate to comment on that, just for levels of classification.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  I’m going to ask our journalists who are on the line if anyone has an additional question.  We have gotten through all of the submitted questions so far, but we do have the opportunity – okay, we have a new question.  And we have a new question now from Jacopo Barigazzi from Politico Europe.  And the question is:  “How easy is it” – excuse me – “How easy is it to integrate Finland and Sweden into NATO from the point of view of interoperability, and what do you think of the EU plans to boost their defense industry from the point of standards?”  I’m not sure exactly that last part, but anyway, what do you think of the EU plans to boost their defense industry in general?MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Okay, I’ll take those in order.  First on the ease of bringing Finland and Sweden into NATO from an interoperability perspective, as you know, even before their accession into NATO, we’ve had robust exchanges for years, and I think the – from Freezing Winds and some other exercises, Archipelago Endeavor and some others, the – we’ve been working on interoperability for many years.  So I think from a technical perspective, it’s pretty easy.  Those are professional militaries, professional people, and greatly skilled in the craft right there of fighting in the High North.  So I think the – there’s a lot there.  I mean, it’s more people, there’s more opportunity.  So I think it’s all – it’s all good news there in terms of accession into NATO and how all that works.I think we’re exercising together significantly here in Norway for the first time all together, like we are in Nordic Response ’24, to kind of sand off any corners that might exist, right, when we bring – when we bring some forces together for the first time and figure out what works best in terms of best practices and tactics, procedures, techniques, things of that nature.  So I don’t think – it’s all good news and opportunities to learn from each other.The – in terms of the defense industry, I think it’s critical that we recognize what each nation brings to our collective defense and that we make the appropriate investments in that.  All of us need to do that, and I would offer that more is better.  And when it comes to defense, and I’ve seen – I think we’ve seen even at the Munich Security Conference some – a collective commitment, right, to renewed efforts in defense spending among many nations, how each nation chooses to do it.  So I think that’s – I think it’s all good news there as well.I’d note that the Nordic countries already – from an industrial perspective already contribute pretty significantly to a lot of things.  In fact, my own service uses some equipment that is manufactured here.  Over.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you, sir.  I am looking at some questions that are rolling in – rolling in now.  So let us go to a question from Marco Giannangeli, and I don’t have the list of his outlet, but he’s one of our journalists on the line:  “How soon does NATO forecast potential conflict in the High North?  Or maybe rephrasing that a bit, what is the NATO evaluation of potential in the High North for possible conflict?”MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  Well, I think if our purpose is to assure and deter, if our deterrence works, then never.MODERATOR:  A very good, very clear answer.  All right.  Major General, I would like to ask a question of my own here, and we have a little bit of time remaining.  And we’d like to call on your deep experience with the United States Marine Corps.  And perhaps you could talk a little bit about what the Marine Corps specifically brings both for this exercise that’s happening right now but just – but also more generally in terms of its profile in Europe and contributing to the defense of Europe.MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  That’s – thanks for the question, Dan.  I think specifically what the Marine Corps brings with the naval force – or there’s two layers really I’d like to talk about.  First, the Marines as part of the naval force in the U.S. offering to security here in Europe and Africa – recall I’m also U.S. Marine Forces Africa.  So the – to the two continents, I think what we bring is a crisis response force that is able to quickly, on behalf of the United States or Allies, bring force to bear to give senior leadership time and options to think about what to do next.   So the – uniquely the Marine Corps brings that capability from a naval perspective.  So I think the – it’s important to remember that, and that’s true not just here but globally, right.  The U.S. Marine Corps has global reach.  So I think we contribute that here.We of course bring a few skillsets to the collective effort.  I think our expertise in amphibious operations is something that’s particularly useful in the High North, and the nature of the geography and topography here supports something that the United States Marine Corps is particularly good at.  And I think we also bring this relationship we’ve had with Norway specifically is – we’re on fertile ground, I should say, with the accession of Finland and Sweden hopefully here very soon.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you for that.  Well, unfortunately, that is all the time we have for today’s call.  Thank you to all of our journalists for the questions, and a very big thank you to Major General Robert Sofge for joining us.  But before we end, I would like to turn to the Major General and ask him if he has final remarks or final thoughts that he’d like to share.MAJOR GENERAL SOFGE:  I think the – thanks, Dan.  And thanks, everybody, for taking the time to join.  I think my closing comment would be to just say thank you to all the participants in this, not just Nordic Response but the entire Steadfast Defender effort that really demonstrates the power of likeminded nations, the NATO Alliance, and what we’re able to do when we set our minds to it.  So thanks to everyone for their hospitality, their – and their contribution to all of our security.  It matters.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you very much, sir.  Okay, shortly, the Brussels Hub will send the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists and provide a transcript as soon as it’s available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us anytime at the email address TheBrusselsHub@state.gov.  That’s TheBrusselsHub – one word – @state.gov Thanks again for your participation, thank you very much to our speaker today, and we hope you can join us for another press briefing soon.  And this ends today’s press briefing.
- Under Secretary Fernandez’s Travel to Canada Office of the SpokespersonUnder Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose W. Fernandez will travel to Toronto, Canada, March 3-4. Under Secretary Fernandez will lead a third consecutive annual delegation of U.S. government officials who will participate in the “Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention (PDAC)” and related side-events to advance the Biden Administration’s international efforts to increase the security of critical minerals supply chains.On March 4th, the Under Secretary will deliver remarks during Greenland Day, hosted by the Government of Greenland and the Greenland Business Association.  The Under Secretary will then co-host a high-level roundtable discussion for officials from countries that are part of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the private sector, alongside our Minerals Investment Network for Vital Energy Security and Transition (MINVEST) partner, SAFE.During his time in Toronto, he will also conduct bilateral discussions with Canadian and third country government and industry officials, and with MSP representatives. The Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) aims to accelerate the development of diverse and sustainable critical energy minerals supply chains through working with host governments and industry to facilitate targeted financial and diplomatic support for strategic projects along the value chain. MSP partners include Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union (represented by the European Commission).Learn more about the MSP at the webpage: https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/, and our MINVEST partnership at: https://www.state.gov/minvest.To stay up to date, follow Under Secretary Fernandez on X: @State_E , LinkedIn: @State-E , and Facebook: @StateDeptE .For further media information, please contact E_Communications@state.gov.
- Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry’s Travel to UAE, France, Norway, and Germany Office of the SpokespersonSpecial Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry will travel February 10-19 to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Paris, France; Oslo, Norway; and Munich, Germany to advance shared objectives on climate and clean energy.In Abu Dhabi, Secretary Kerry will hold meetings with UAE leaders to discuss climate diplomacy following COP28 and in advance of COP29. In Paris, he will hold meetings with President Emmanuel Macron, Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné, Minister for Ecological Transition and Cohesion of the Territories Christophe Béchu, and others to discuss climate finance and other priorities. He will also participate in the International Energy Agency’s 50th Anniversary and 2024 Ministerial Meeting, where he will highlight the key challenges and opportunities for scaling up clean energy to achieve global net-zero emissions by 2050.In Oslo, Secretary Kerry will participate in the Oslo Energy Forum, where he will highlight clean energy solutions alongside Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre of Norway, including progress made through the Green Shipping Challenge to encourage action that will put the shipping sector on a 1.5-degree-aligned pathway. In Munich, he will attend the Munich Security Conference, where he will underscore the need to address the climate crisis as a pressing security challenge with global leaders from government, private sector, and civil society.For media inquiries, please contact ClimateComms@state.gov.
- Norway (23-620) – Agreement on Enhancing Cooperation in Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Office of Treaty AffairsLaw EnforcementSigned at Washington May 8, 2012; entered into force June 20, 2023.With Exchange of Notes.
- Progress in Repatriations: How Foreign Assistance Is Addressing the Humanitarian and Security Crises in Northeast Syria: Part 1 of 2 Bureau of CounterterrorismChristine AsettaAs a result of intense United States diplomatic engagements, between 2022 and 2023, almost 30 countries repatriated nearly 7,000 family members associated with foreign terrorist fighters from northeast Syria, reducing the population in al-Hol displaced persons camp to fewer than 48,000 people.If we work together, we can not only mitigate the risk each country faces individually in bringing its nationals home but also reduce the risk of an ISIS resurgence that threatens us all.Between 2011 and 2019, tens of thousands of men, women, and children left their homes to fight for the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and its al-Qa’ida affiliate predecessor.  Following the global Coalition’s territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, our local partners detained ISIS fighters, and relocated associated family members to displaced persons camps in northeast Syria.  Roughly 50 percent of al-Hol camp residents are under 12 years of age and unless action is taken, they will remain vulnerable to ISIS recruitment.  Children and families of ISIS fighters require basic life support services and advanced rehabilitation and reintegration support, which the de facto NES authorities cannot effectively provide.  The situation in northeast Syria presents grave humanitarian concerns and local, regional, and international security risks.  Conditions in the camps limit the provision of humanitarian aid and leave individuals susceptible to violence and radicalization to violence.  The Bureau of Counterterrorism leads efforts to encourage, facilitate, and support repatriations of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated family members from northeast Syria.In 2022, we made significant progress repatriating more than 3,000 individuals to several countries, including Albania, Barbados, Canada, France, Iraq, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Netherlands, Norway, Sudan, Spain, and Slovakia.  Already in 2023, 14 countries have repatriated more than 3,500 of their nationals. With nearly 9,000 FTFs in custody, the Coalition’s D-ISIS partner, the Syrian Democratic Forces, manages the largest concentration of detained terrorists in the world.  The Bureau of Counterterrorism partners in Kazakhstan, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Iraq have demonstrated success in repatriating and prosecuting FTFs, but efforts to encourage other countries of origin to repatriate their nationals among this population have been less successful.  There are a variety of reasons for this, including a lack of political will and domestic support, along with concerns over threats returnees may pose.  The alternative to repatriation, however, is a possible resurgence of ISIS. Deputy Coordinator for the Bureau of Counterterrorism Ian Moss speaks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.The United States is supporting partners to address this challenge in a way which reduces risks posed by returning FTFs.  “If we work together... we can not only mitigate the risk each country faces individually in bringing its nationals home but also reduce the risk of an ISIS resurgence that threatens us all,” said Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ian Moss, in his remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Deputy Coordinator for the Bureau of Counterterrorism Ian Moss speaks at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. &nbsp;In part 2, I will outline foreign assistance programming aimed at supporting countries of origin in investigating, prosecuting, incarcerating, rehabilitating, and reintegrating their FTFs.For more information, read Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ian Moss&#8217;s Fireside Chat with Matthew Levitt.About the Author: Christine Asetta is a Program Manager in the Bureau of Counterterrorism, Office of Programs.
- Norway HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Norway				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Norway																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Norway																																												Norway				Overview:  Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) raised the annual threat assessment to High (Level 4 of its five-tier threat scale), following a June 25 attack during Oslo Pride festivities, then lowered it to Moderate (Level 3) in September.  The University of Oslo’s Center for Research on Extremism (or C-REX) reported greater organization among jihadi groups representing an increased threat of attacks.  Lone-actor attacks continued to be the greatest threat driven by online recruitment and radicalization to violence.  Norway’s law enforcement capacity for proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in its territory remained strong, despite underfunding in some areas.  Norway is postured to prevent acts of terrorism, and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the United States is strong.  Operational cooperation is high.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no terrorist charges raised in connection with incidents in Norway.PST is investigating a potential terror link in connection with the June 25 mass shooting attack in Oslo.  Police arrested, in addition to the perpetrator, members of the group Profetens Ummah (Prophet’s Community) and issued an arrest warrant for “known Islamist” Arfan Bhatti, but to date no terrorism charges have been filed.Legislation Law Enforcement and Border Security:  There were no significant updates to the legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism in 2022.Norway issued new passports with enhanced security features in 2020.  Norwegian passports are immediately canceled when they are reported lost or stolen, to prevent misuse.  The adjudication process for new passports includes automatic biometric comparisons and more training for adjudicators at 79 passport and ID offices around the country, including at Oslo Gardermoen Airport.  Biometric emergency passports issued at Gardermoen are valid for one exit and one entry to Norway and must be surrendered upon the traveler’s return.Legislation to establish a national system for the collection and use of passenger name records for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime came into effect on May 1.  Parliament passed legislation that was required to implement the European Travel Information and Authorization System and Entry/Exit System Schengen border control systems.Oslo Police opened an investigation into the June 25 mass shooting attack as a suspected terrorist attack.  A 16-year-old Syrian boy was found guilty of planning an act of terrorism in June 2021 and was sentenced to five years in prison, three years of which were suspended.  The Supreme Court reviewed the three-year, May 2021, prison sentence of a Norwegian-Pakistani woman who traveled to Syria to be with her husband, a member of the al-Nusra Front and ISIL, and reduced her sentence to 1 year and 4 months.Authorities arrested 35 members of the Nordic Resistance Movement at an October 29 neo-Nazi rally in Oslo for not complying with police orders, following physical confrontations with counter-demonstrators.  Only four of those arrested were Norwegian citizens; the remaining were foreign citizens, primarily from Sweden and Denmark, who traveled to Oslo for the rally.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Norway is a member of FATF, and its FIU, Financial Intelligence Unit Norway, is a member of the Egmont Group.  In November the government updated the National Risk Assessment on money laundering and terrorist financing.Countering Violent Extremism:  The government launched an update of the national CT strategy in November, with a keener focus on the potential of violence from seriously mentally ill individuals.  The strategy also sought to address counterterrorism challenges through enhanced regulatory and technology development, threat communication, knowledge and expertise development, and cooperation.  Norway continues to implement its Action Plan Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism. The government established an Extremism Commission in June, charged with evaluating the sharing of information among the health sector, security services, and the police.  The commission also evaluates the drivers of violent extremism and how to follow up with persons at risk of radicalization to violence.  The commission will present recommendations at the end of 2023.Four Norwegian women known to have traveled from Norway to Syria to join ISIS remained in displaced persons camps in Syria, along with their four children.  PST charged the women with participating in a terrorist organization in absentia.  No Norwegian nationals were repatriated from displaced persons camps in Syria in 2022.  PST estimated that 20 out of at least 140 Norwegian nationals who traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight on behalf of ISIS remain in those countries.International and Regional Cooperation:  Norway’s 2022 global security funding, which covers counterterror collaboration, dropped by $2.9 million (29 million Norwegian kroner) down to $7.5 million (75.1 million Norwegian kroner) in a revised state budget for 2022 because of across-the-board cuts made necessary by redirected funds for relief and assistance efforts related to Russia’s war against Ukraine.  Norway subsequently dropped several planned initiatives, including contributions to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and counterthreat measures under the revised budget.Norway continued to support multilateral organizations, such as the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, to ensure they play a continued role in global CT prevention efforts.  Norway supported the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and has contributed $3.75 million to the UN Trust Fund for Counterterrorism since its inception in 2009.  Kristiansand and Oslo are members of the Strong Cities Network.  Ten Norwegian cities are part of the Nordic Safe Cities Network.																												    							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- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Barth Eide Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide met today in Brussels on the margins of the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting. Secretary Blinken congratulated Foreign Minister Barth Eide on his appointment. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reiterated their shared commitment to NATO and transatlantic security and discussed additional measures to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression. They consulted on the conflict in Gaza and highlighted the need to continue to expand humanitarian aid to civilians. Finally, Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Barth Eide discussed other topics of mutual interest, including the Arctic and global food security.
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide Before Their Meeting Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateBrussels, BelgiumNATO HeadquartersSECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, good morning, everyone.  Espen, it’s great to be with you.  I am truly pleased for this opportunity to consult with one of our closest partners, closest Allies, a founding member of NATO, at a time of significant challenge but also incredible solidarity for our Alliance.  I know that we’ll be speaking together about our shared commitment to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself against Russian aggression.  We have a crisis in the Middle East where Norway historically and currently plays a very, very important role, the Arctic Council where Norway is in the chair, and a variety of other issues as we track together toward the summit next year, the Washington summit, the 75th anniversary of our Alliance.  So I couldn’t be more pleased to have this opportunity and look forward to our conversation.FOREIGN MINISTER EIDE:  Thank you, Antony.  And Norway and the U.S. sees eye to eye on all these questions.  We are in it for the long haul for Ukraine.  It’s strategic important for all of us, and particularly for us who are neighbors with Russia, that Ukraine prevails in this conflict and it comes out of that a sovereign, independent, democratic nation with a full opportunity to make its own choices, and that we need to be with them as long as it takes.  We will be talking about the Middle East, as the Secretary mentioned.  We’ve been working for many, many years – decades actually – on the Middle East peace process, and in the middle of this dark, horrible situation I think there is also a small glimmer of hope, which is that more people are reminded that there is only one lasting solution to be found, which is the two-state solution – one for the Israelis to live in peace, and one for the Palestinians to live in peace with each other and with its Israeli neighbors.  And I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken on those issues.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you.  Thanks, everyone.