# Mongolia - United States Department of State

- Mongolia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Mongolia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mongolia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Mongolia during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  enforcement of criminal libel and similar laws that constituted a serious restriction on freedom of expression and political speech; serious government corruption; and extensive gender-based violence.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices.  Nevertheless, the quasigovernmental National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported some prisoners and detainees were subjected to unnecessary force and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, particularly to obtain confessions.Responsibility for investigating allegations of torture and abuse was assigned to either local police or the Independent Authority Against Corruption, with the anti-corruption authority generally responsible for crimes committed while on duty.  The prosecutor’s office oversaw such investigations.The NHRC reported that to coerce or intimidate detainees, authorities sometimes made access to legal counsel difficult.  Human rights NGOs and attorneys reported obstacles to gathering evidence of torture or abuse.  For example, although many prisons and detention facilities had cameras for monitoring prisoner interrogations, authorities often reported the equipment was inoperable at the time of reported abuses.Under the criminal code, all public officials were subject to prosecution for abuse or torture, including both physical and psychological abuse.  The maximum punishment for torture was a five-year prison sentence, or life in prison if the victim died as a result of torture.  Although officials were liable for intentional infliction of severe bodily injury, prosecutions of this crime were rare.  The law stated that prohibited acts did not constitute a crime when committed in accordance with an order given by a superior in the course of official duties and without knowledge the act was prohibited.  A person who knowingly enforced an illegal order was considered an accomplice to the crime.  The law provided that the person giving an illegal order was criminally liable for the harm caused, but prosecutions were rare.Impunity was sometimes a problem in the security forces.  As of September, the National Police Agency reported investigating nine complaints of rape, 32 complaints of causing intentional injury to others’ health, and one complaint of torture perpetrated by public officials.  The NHRC, lawyers, human rights activists, and NGOs noted that investigations of criminal acts committed by security forces and law enforcement personnel were frequently handled internally, with the most serious penalty being termination of employment rather than criminal conviction.In April cases against two individuals found guilty of S. Zorig’s 1998 assassination and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, were dismissed by a judge on the grounds of insufficient evidence.  In 2016, four members of the security services were found guilty of torturing the two individuals.  The Ministry of Justice stated the case against the two seriously violated human rights.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Some reports regarding prison or detention center conditions raised human rights concerns.Abusive Physical Conditions:  In July the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’s (WGAD) final report on prison conditions in the country raised concerns about poor provision of food across prison facilities, individuals serving life sentences being held in solitary confinement for 15 years, and prisoners being subjected to a “very strict behavioral regime.”Administration:  The Prosecutor General’s Office monitored conditions in prisons, arrest centers, and detention centers; it and the NHRC conducted multiple scheduled, surprise, and complaint-based inspections of prisons, pretrial detention centers, arrest centers, and police-run detoxification centers.  The NHRC also investigated credible reports of human rights abuses.Independent Monitoring:  The government allowed access by independent nongovernmental observers and the NHRC.  The WGAD visited 21 prison and other detention facilities in 2022 and reported unimpeded access to facilities.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law provided that no person shall be arrested, detained, or deprived of liberty except by specified procedures and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  Government agencies generally observed these requirements.  The General Intelligence Agency sometimes detained suspects for questioning without charge, but the criminal code required that a prosecutor supervise all detentions.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						An evidence-based, prosecutor-approved warrant was generally required to arrest a suspect on criminal grounds.  Within 24 hours of an arrest, a prosecutor had to present a request stating the grounds and reasons for the arrest to a judge, who was required to decide within 48 hours whether to prolong the detention or release the suspect.  The arresting authority had to notify a suspect’s family within six hours of an arrest.  A “pressing circumstances” exception in the law allowed police to arrest suspects without a warrant.  Examples of exceptions included murder or grave bodily injury, serious property damage, hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and suspicion that destruction of evidence would occur.  In such cases a prosecutor had to approve the arrest within 24 hours, and a judge had to approve the arrest within the normal 48-hour period.  If 72 hours passed after an arrest and a judge had not made a decision, police were required to release the suspect.  Upon release, authorities had to inform the suspect of the reasons for the arrest and detention.  There was a bail system that tied the amount to be charged to the severity of the crime and the personal situation of the defendant.Authorities generally charged and informed detainees of the charges promptly and advised them of their right to counsel; however, authorities routinely ignored the requirement for judicial review within 48 hours of arrest, a problem noted by the WGAD.  For example, authorities would change the place of detention from a detoxification unit to a police station, to reset the 48-hour clock.  In addition, individuals were summoned to police stations as witnesses, made to wait all day, and then subjected to questioning that made it apparent they were considered suspects.Maximum pretrial detention with a court order was 18 months.  Detainees generally had prompt access to family members, although repeated transfers or detention in remote locations sometimes undermined this right.A detainee had the right to an attorney during pretrial detention and all subsequent stages of the legal process, including after sentencing.  If a defendant did not engage an attorney, the government had to appoint one if the defendant had a physical or mental disability that would hinder self-defense, was a child, or was not proficient in the Mongolian language.  The law allowed the government to provide a lawyer upon request for an indigent defendant.  Detainees were generally aware of their right to legal counsel, but misperceptions limited their use of this right.  For example, detainees were frequently unaware they could exercise this right from the start of the legal process and frequently did not assert it unless and until their cases reached trial.  The NHRC also reported authorities sometimes made obtaining legal counsel difficult.Arbitrary Arrest:  The NHRC reported that when conducting investigations, investigative agencies occasionally detained suspects without judicial authorization, sometimes secretly, and police employed such practices despite the availability of other methods of restraint, including bail and another person’s personal guarantee.  According to the WGAD, data provided by the government showed arrests were often performed without warrants.  The personal guarantee system allowed relatives to vouch for an accused family member.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary.  Investigators, prosecutors, and judges faced heavy caseloads, resulting in frequent failure to adhere to time limits and other adverse impacts on cases.  Some NGOs and private businesses reported continuing judicial corruption and third-party influence.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right.The law required all trials to be open to the public and the press, except for cases involving state secrets, underage defendants, or underage victims.  In some cases, the WGAD stated suspects were coerced to confess based on statements taken while the suspect believed themself to be a witness or by authorities promising an expedited review of the case.  Many confessions occurred prior to receiving legal assistance.  Of 12,000 to 13,000 cases yearly, 40 percent reportedly involved confessions.Although the number of government-provided defense lawyers was adequate given the limited circumstances in which they were provided, their quality and experience were inconsistent, and many defendants lacked adequate legal representation.  While the law gave defense lawyers full access to prosecutors’ case files, defense lawyers were often given limited time to review those files and were precluded from photocopying or taking photographs of prosecution evidence.  Judges often relied on confessions with little corroborating evidence.  Furthermore, NGOs reported witness intimidation by government authorities and police and a lack of transparency in courts’ decision-making processes.NGOs and observers highlighted chronic procedural inefficiency and delays.  In some cases, they suspected that nepotism and bribery of judges, prosecutors, and expert witnesses contributed to unwarranted convictions, dismissals, or reductions of sentences.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										According to NGOs, the government sometimes forced residents to move from land designated for redevelopment without adequate compensation and with little opportunity to contest the order administratively or judicially.  After severe floods, then Ulaanbaatar Mayor D. Sumyabazar directed that an apartment building and water park complex still under construction (widely believed to have received permits through corruption) be demolished without mention of compensation to improve water flow and prevent future flooding.  The mayor claimed the complex did not meet regulations, but the construction company’s CEO and apartment owners protested the mayoral decision, noting they had been granted a building permit.  The case was ongoing as of November.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, and there were no reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for media members, but the government did not always respect this right.  The government enforced criminal penalties for “spreading false information” and there was reported harassment of journalists.Freedom of Expression:  NGOs and journalists reported the government used a clause in the criminal code on the dissemination of false information to intimidate critics of the government.In April after the government built an iron fence around the presidential residence, an individual named O. Banzragch used a meme to criticize the president for closing the state palace to the public.  Banzragch was convicted for disseminating defamatory information after pleading guilty in a criminal case and was fined 450,000 tugrik ($130).Violence and Harassment:  The Globe International Center reported continued pressure on media from police, politicians, and large business entities.  In a survey released in May of 284 journalists on safety concerns, 38 percent reported summonses from courts, the police, or prosecutors, an increase from 20 percent in 2022; 17 percent reported confiscation of work equipment and belongings; and 14 percent reported threats by email and telephone, a decrease from 18 percent in 2022.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The law set forth the principle that the state should not control or censor public information.  Media organizations and NGOs representing journalists, however, reported pressure from the government, which penalized media organizations for publishing disfavored items by limiting advertising and denying some outlets access to information.  Individual journalists reported self-censorship due to fears of being summoned by police, courts, or prosecutors, or of losing employment due to the political affiliations of managers within their media organizations.Libel/Slander Laws:  The law treated libel and slander as petty offenses, except during an election campaign period (typically 18 days), when they were treated as crimes.  Libel and slander, when prosecuted as petty offenses, were punishable by moderate fines.  When prosecuted as crimes, they were punishable by more substantial fines or imprisonment from one month to one year.  If a media organization was found guilty of libel or slander during an election campaign period, its license could be suspended for six months.The law also made spreading “evidently false information thereby causing damage to others’ honor, dignity, or the business reputation of legal entities” (an offense distinct from libel or slander) a crime punishable by a fine, 240 to 720 hours of community service, revocation of the right to travel for one to three months, or some combination of these.  The Globe International Center noted the broad definition of what constituted “evidently false information” and “the spread of false information” allowed those in power to use the law arbitrarily.In July after floods in Ulaanbaatar, a youth aged 19 created a meme of the president that blamed the government for mismanagement.  The individual received threatening telephone calls and was questioned by the police for several hours.  Police publicly confirmed initiating an investigation for defamation, although no charges were filed.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content, except in rare circumstances involving illegal content such as copyright violations or child pornography.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to UNHCR-recognized refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of concern.  In most cases asylum seekers were protected from deportation.Access to Asylum:  Although the law provided for granting asylum, the process was slow and seldom implemented.  Rather, the government provided limited protections to foreign nationals in the country while UNHCR adjudicated their refugee claims.Employment:  The law did not afford specific legal status to asylum seekers or UNHCR-recognized refugees, and they were not entitled to work permits.Access to Basic Services:  Because legal provisions for granting refugee status were effectively in abeyance, asylum seekers generally did not have access to government-provided basic services such as health care and education.  Refugees and asylum seekers could access private medical facilities with UNHCR support.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses.  Presidential elections were held in 2021 and parliamentary elections in 2020.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government sometimes implemented the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption:  Corruption at all levels of government remained widespread.  Some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.  The criminal code contained liability provisions for corruption and corruption-related offenses for public servants and government officials.  The BTI Transformation Index report noted the widespread suspicion in the country that corruption investigations were politically motivated and failed to prosecute high-profile and political corruption.In late 2022, media reports revealed secret offtake agreements and the theft of 44 trillion tugrik ($12.9 billion) worth of coal from state-owned coal mine Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi.  Members of parliament, mine operators, customs officials, and other public officials were implicated in the scandal.  Preliminary hearings for 11 persons began in September.In another case, several members of parliament, government officials, and private individuals were accused of improper issuance and misuse of Development Bank of Mongolia loans.  In June four legal entities and 32 individuals were found guilty.In response to these high-profile cases, the government launched an anti-corruption campaign in February, including measures to protect whistleblowers, identify corrupt politicians, extradite corrupt officials from overseas, repatriate stolen funds hidden offshore, and increase transparency in the government.  Parliament adopted a “National Action Plan for Combating Corruption, 2023-2030” and amended the law to prohibit high-ranking officials and their close associates from:  1) benefiting from government funded programs, scholarships, concessional loans, and grants; and 2) holding management positions in public service entities or executive management positions in state-owned companies while in office.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, monitoring or investigating human rights conditions or cases and publicizing their findings.  Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views.  The law established a mechanism for recognizing, promoting, and protecting human rights defenders.Progovernment actors sometimes characterized such NGOs as “undesirables,” “troublemakers,” “foreign agents,” or “opponents of the state.”Government Human Rights Bodies:  The NHRC was responsible for monitoring human rights abuses, initiating and reviewing policy changes, and coordinating with human rights NGOs.  The NHRC’s six commissioners were selected on a competitive basis and appointed by parliament for six-year terms.  Officials reported government funding for the NHRC, provided by parliament, remained inadequate, and inspection, training, and public awareness activities were entirely dependent on external funding sources.  The NHRC supported politically contentious human rights issues, such as the rights of human rights defenders, persons with disabilities, and ethnic and religious minorities.  In its annual report on human rights, the NHRC recommended amendments to the law to better protect press and media independence after noting the public perception that the media was “used for politics,” influenced through economic pressure, and dependent on the government financially.There was some collaboration between the government and civil society in discussing human rights problems.  In contrast to previous years, after the NHRC presented its report to parliament, the Legal Standing Committee discussed the report and its recommendations with civil society representatives and the media.The National Committee for Human Rights was established in September 2022, under the Cabinet Secretariat.  It was responsible for coordinating human rights work across all levels of the national and local government.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The criminal code criminalized forced or nonconsensual sexual intercourse or sexual acts that involved the use or threat of physical violence, abuse of a position of authority (financial or official), and taking advantage of a person’s incapacity to protect themself; the code provided for prison sentences of from one year to life, depending on the circumstances.  The criminal code criminalized spousal rape.  Domestic violence was also a crime, for which perpetrators could be punished administratively or criminally, in the latter case by a maximum of two years’ imprisonment.  The government maintained a nationwide database of domestic violence offenders, and those who committed a second domestic violence offense were automatically charged under criminal law.  The government did not enforce laws against rape and domestic violence effectively.Despite continued attention, domestic violence remained a serious and widespread problem.A special national police unit was dedicated to combating domestic violence.  There were 20 shelters and 17 one-stop service centers for domestic violence survivors run by police, NGOs, local government agencies, and hospitals.  All shelters followed standard operating procedures developed by the NGO National Center against Violence.  The one-stop service centers, located primarily at hospitals, provided emergency shelter for a maximum of 72 hours.  The relatively small number of shelters located in rural areas presented a problem for domestic violence victims in those areas.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence and Harassment:  NGOs stated that laws on sexual harassment were inadequate and noted there was a lack of awareness and consensus within society of what constituted inappropriate behavior, making it difficult to gauge the extent of harassment.  The criminal code for petty offenses included fines or compulsory training in cases of sexual harassment.  The labor law charged employers with taking steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, including by establishing internal rules about sexual harassment and the redress of complaints.  Upon receiving a complaint of sexual harassment, the NHRC could investigate, after which it could send a letter to the employer recommending administrative sanctions be levied against the accused party.Discrimination:  The law provided the same legal status and rights to women and men, including equal pay for equal work and equal access to education.  These rights were generally observed, although women faced discrimination in employment.  The law prohibited women from working in occupations that required heavy labor or exposure to chemicals that could affect infant and maternal health.In most cases, a divorced wife retained custody of children, but women were rarely able to collect court-ordered child support and divorced husbands were rarely penalized for failing to pay.  Women’s rights activists stated that because family businesses and properties usually were registered under the husband’s name, ownership transferred automatically to the former husband in divorce cases and women were rarely able to enforce a claim on assets.The National Committee on Gender Equality, chaired by the prime minister and overseen by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, coordinated policy on women’s interests among ministries, NGOs, and gender councils at the provincial and local levels.According to 2020 data (latest available) from the National Statistical Office, average pay for men was 20 percent greater than for women.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Women had unimpeded access to affordable sexual and reproductive health services, but women in rural areas often had to travel long distances to doctors and health facilities, resulting in poorer health outcomes.  The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence.  Emergency contraception for rape survivors was offered within five days.  Postexposure prophylaxis was provided if requested by a survivor.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law protected the rights of members of racial or ethnic minorities or groups from violence and discrimination.  The government enforced the laws effectively.The country was 96 percent ethnic Mongolian.  NGOs from the country’s small Kazakh minority, concentrated in the far west, sometimes expressed concerns regarding employment discrimination.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Failure to register could result in denial of public services.Child Abuse:  The criminal code included a specific chapter on crimes against children, including abandonment, inducing addiction, engaging children in criminal activity or hazardous labor, forced begging, and engaging them in pornography.Child abuse was a significant problem and consisted principally of domestic violence and sexual abuse.  The Family, Child, and Youth Development Authority operated a hotline to report child abuse, an emergency service center, and a shelter for child victims of abuse.  The government-run shelter served child victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse, neglect, and abandonment, but due to limited space it did not provide separate accommodation for especially vulnerable children.  The authority provided funding to an NGO in Ulaanbaatar to run additional shelters to which it referred child victims of abuse.  According to NGOs, shelter space was inadequate for the number of child abuse victims referred for long-term care.Child abandonment was also a problem.  Some children were orphaned or ran away from home because of neglect or parental abuse.  Police sent children of abusive parents to shelters, but some observers indicated many were returned to abusive parents.  Every province and all of Ulaanbaatar’s district police offices had a specialized police officer appointed to investigate crimes against, or committed by, juveniles.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage was 18, with court-approved exceptions for children ages 16 to 18 with the consent of parents or guardians.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  Although illegal, commercial sexual exploitation of children was a problem.  The minimum age for consensual sex was 16.  Violators of the statutory rape law (defined as sexual intercourse with a person younger than 16 not involving physical violence or the threat of violence) were subject to a maximum penalty of five years in prison.  Those who subjected children to sex trafficking or sexual exploitation were subject to a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, or life imprisonment if aggravating circumstances were present.  The law prohibited child pornography; authorities enforced the law.  The maximum penalty for engaging children in pornography was eight years’ imprisonment.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish population was very small, and there were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  There were no laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.Violence and Harassment:  The NGO LGBT Center received reports of threats and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons, most involving young persons disclosing their LGBTQI+ status to their families or whose families discovered they were LGBTQI+.  Activists reported police often failed to investigate reports of violence, harassment, or abuse of LGBTQI+ persons.Discrimination:  The law prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, but related cases were rarely registered with police or the prosecutor’s office.  The law did not recognize same-sex unions or grant LGBTQI+ couples and their families rights equal to the rights of other persons.  Although public attitudes toward LGBTQI+ persons were improving in central Ulaanbaatar, LGBTQI+ individuals faced discrimination in public and at home and reported a fear of homelessness and domestic violence, especially in rural areas.  There were reports of discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in employment.  NGOs, the NHRC, and members of local LGBTQI+ communities reported companies rarely hired LGBTQI+ persons who were open about their sexual orientation or gender identity, and LGBTQI+ persons who revealed their status in the workplace frequently faced discrimination, including the possibility of dismissal.Reports from LGBTQI+ community members suggested a lack of understanding of LGBTQI+ persons among health-care providers, as well as a lack of understanding of the unique physical and psychological challenges members of the LGBTQI+ community faced.  A survey of transgender youth conducted by All for Education and the LGBT Center found transgender youth in schools faced discrimination from teachers and other students.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Legal gender recognition was available but required individuals to provide documentation from a doctor of gender-affirming surgery.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  LGBTQI+ NGOs reported that there were individual cases of so-called conversion therapy practices including coercive psychological treatment and religious rituals targeting teens and young adults that attempted to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity.  Advocates reported that use of so-called gender normalization surgery and hormone treatments on very young intersex children was standard medical practice.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There were no formal restrictions on these freedoms.  The LGBT Center submitted a request to hold a peaceful demonstration in Ulaanbaatar’s main square for Equality and Pride Days but was refused.  The center filed a complaint, but the court ruled in favor of the government authorities.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law required equal access to education, health services, public buildings, and education for persons with disabilities but they did not have such access.  The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities.  Most government buildings remained inaccessible to wheelchairs, and only a few intersections in Ulaanbaatar were equipped with auditory crosswalks to aid pedestrians with visual impairments.Although the law mandated standards for physical access to new public buildings, most new buildings were not constructed in compliance with the law.  Public transport remained largely inaccessible to persons with disabilities.  According to the Mongolian National Association of Wheelchair Users (MNAWU), most public buses in Ulaanbaatar were not equipped for wheelchair users.  Emergency services were often inaccessible to blind and deaf persons because service providers lacked trained personnel and appropriate technologies.The law required workplaces with more than 25 employees to employ a minimum of 4 percent of persons with disabilities or pay a fine.  NGOs reported reluctance to hire persons with disabilities, noted the government itself failed to meet the quota, and stated that many employers still preferred to pay fines rather than employ persons with disabilities.  According to joint research conducted by the MNAWU and Mirim Institute in 2022, 67 percent of 1,017 legal entities surveyed employed persons with disabilities.  Only 32 percent of them hired enough persons with disabilities to meet the quota and those not meeting the quota did not usually pay a fine.There was no explicit prohibition of discrimination in education and the law charged the government with creating conditions to provide students with disabilities with an education.  Children with disabilities were allowed to attend preschools and mainstream schools but faced significant barriers.  Schools often lacked trained staff and the infrastructure to accommodate children with disabilities.  An inspection conducted by the NHRC in April at the only state-funded public school for children with hearing impairments found teachers not adequately trained in sign language, harsh treatment by teachers, poor conditions in a student dormitory, and reports of verbal abuse and staff restricting communication between students and families.Although increasing numbers of mainstream schools accepted children with disabilities, some schools reportedly rejected such children.  The Down Syndrome Association of Mongolia reported that students moving from mainstream to specialized schools faced barriers to registration.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The law prohibited employers from refusing employment to or dismissing an individual diagnosed with HIV or AIDS unless the condition made it difficult to perform job duties.  NGOs reported the law was not always enforced.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The revised labor law entered into force in 2022.  The law provided for the right of workers to form or join independent unions and professional organizations of their choosing without previous authorization or excessive requirements.  The law provided for the rights of all workers except those employed in essential services to participate in union activities without discrimination, conduct strikes, and bargain collectively.  The law required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.The right to strike had several constraints.  The law prohibited third parties from organizing strikes.  The decision to strike had to be supported by a majority of trade union members and a notice of the date, duration, and number of strikers should be delivered to management at least five days before the intended date of strike.  The law prohibited strikes unrelated to matters regulated by a collective agreement.The government inconsistently enforced laws providing for the rights of collective bargaining and freedom of association.  Penalties, largely fines, were not commensurate with those for similar violations of civil rights but were sometimes applied against violators.  Labor dispute settlement committees resolved most disputes between individual workers and management.  These committees comprised representatives of the local government, the employer, and the employee, joined by a representative of the Confederation of Mongolian Trade Unions (CMTU).  The CMTU reported the court process was so lengthy many workers abandoned their cases due to time and expense.  The CMTU reported some union organizers did not feel thoroughly protected by the law.Although foreign migrant workers enjoyed the same rights as citizens according to the law, they reported they did not receive the same level of protection against labor law violations as the general population.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The National Tripartite Committee, which comprised government, CMTU, and Federation of Employers representatives, established an annual national minimum wage that was above the poverty line.  The law provided for a standard workweek of 40 hours and the payment of overtime, but payment of overtime was rarely enforced.Occupational Safety and Health:  Laws on labor, cooperatives, and enterprises established occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, which applied equally to local and foreign workers.  OSH experts noted many standards were outdated and no longer appropriate for the main industries in the country.  It was not reported whether OSH experts proactively identified unsafe conditions or responded to workers’ complaints.  Workers had the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered safety without jeopardy to their employment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws.  The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection enforced the law in the public sector, but the CMTU reported many workers in the private sector received less than the wage promised by their employers, particularly at smaller companies in rural areas.  Workers in the construction sector, in which work was constrained to a few months each year due to extreme winters, were sometimes pressured to work long hours, increasing the risk of accidents and injuries.Officials acknowledged that fines imposed on companies for not complying with labor standards or for concealing accidents were not commensurate with those for similar violations and did not compel management compliance.  Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.Labor inspectors assigned to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection’s regional and local offices were responsible for enforcement of all labor regulations and had the authority to compel immediate compliance.  The ministry reported its inspectors, faced with large investigative workloads, needed better training on investigative techniques and evidence collection.  As of September, there were a total of 81 labor inspectors in the country, a number insufficient to enforce compliance.  While unannounced inspections were allowed under the labor law, a competing law on inspections required notification to employers at least 48 hours before an inspection.  As a result, inspections were usually done after advance notification, although some preventative assessments were completed without prenotification.  Inspectors had the power to impose sanctions.According to 2022 statistics from the National Statistics Office, the informal sector employed more than 500,000 persons, or 42 percent of all employed workers.  The revised labor law covered workers in the informal sector, although it was inconsistently enforced.  The law on pensions allowed small family businesses and workers in the informal economy, such as herders, to participate in pension and social benefit programs.  These categories of workers were able to access health care, education, social entitlements, and an optional form of social security.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Mongolia
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene																																		Readout																														March 25, 2024																																							The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai in Ulaanbaatar on March 22 to discuss cooperation on bilateral, regional, and global issues.&nbsp; The Deputy Secretary highlighted deepening U.S.-Mongolia political, economic, and people-to-people ties, and the enduring values that bind our two countries as Indo-Pacific democracies.&nbsp; The United States is investing in the relationship through development projects such as the joint $462 million Millennium Challenge Corporation water compact; assistance programs like USAID’s $900,000 support to Mongolian communities negatively affected by severe winter weather; and our partnerships on space, critical minerals supply chains, and renewable energy solutions.&nbsp; The Deputy Secretary further underscored robust U.S. support for English-language instruction and capacity building in Mongolia.In Ulaanbaatar, the Deputy Secretary also met with Foreign Minister Battsetseg and Ministry of Foreign Affairs State Secretary Ankhbayar, held a roundtable with space and technology executives, and visited a woman-owned cashmere factory supported by a $5 million loan from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.The Deputy Secretary’s visit to Ulaanbaatar, part of his first overseas trip since assuming office, highlighted the Strategic Third Neighbor Partnership between the United States and Mongolia and the enduring friendship between the American and Mongolian people.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Deputy Secretary of State																																														Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																							Humanitarian Aid																																							Indo-Pacific																																							Millennium Challenge																															Mongolia																								Office of the Spokesperson																																U.S. Agency for International Development
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Trip to Japan and Mongolia Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell will travel to Japan and Mongolia, March 19-23.  This will be Dr. Campbell’s first overseas trip as Deputy Secretary and will underscore the United States’ deep commitment to advancing freedom and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.In Tokyo, the Deputy Secretary will meet with senior government officials to discuss preparations for next month’s official visit to Washington by Prime Minister Kishida.  The Deputy Secretary will also meet with his Japanese and Philippine counterparts to deepen trilateral cooperation towards a free and open, connected, prosperous, resilient, and secure Indo-Pacific.In Ulaanbaatar, Deputy Secretary Campbell will meet with senior Mongolian officials.  The Deputy will highlight the Strategic Third Neighbor Partnership between the United States and Mongolia and the enduring friendship between the American and Mongolian people.
- On Mongolian Tsagaan Sar Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateTo all those observing Tsagaan Sar, the Mongolian celebration of the start of the lunisolar new year, I send you my best wishes.The United States and Mongolia are close democratic partners, and the bonds of friendship between our peoples are strong.  As this new year begins, I am excited about the possibility for even deeper partnership between our countries.Whether you are celebrating in Mongolia, the United States, or elsewhere in the world, I hope the Year of the Dragon will bring you joy, peace, and prosperity.Happy Tsagaan Sar!  Сар шинэдээ сайхан шинэлээрэй!
- Joint Statement on The United States-Mongolia Annual Bilateral Consultations Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and Mongolia on the occasion of the Annual Bilateral ConsultationsBegin Text:To continue positive momentum in the United States-Mongolia Strategic&nbsp;Third Neighbor&nbsp;Partnership, representatives of the two governments held the 16th Annual Bilateral Consultations on&nbsp;December 12 in Washington.&nbsp; In this&nbsp;Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. and Mongolian sides discussed&nbsp;the current state of bilateral relations, regional and global challenges, and shared accomplishments.The dialogue was co-chaired by Daniel J. Kritenbrink,&nbsp;U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Ankhbayar Nyamdorj, State Secretary of the&nbsp;Ministry of Foreign Affairs&nbsp;of Mongolia.&nbsp; It was&nbsp;attended by&nbsp;Richard Buangan,&nbsp;Ambassador&nbsp;of the United States of America&nbsp;to Mongolia,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Batbayar Ulziidelger,&nbsp;Ambassador&nbsp;of Mongolia&nbsp;to the United States&nbsp;of America; by&nbsp;representatives from the Office of the Vice President of the United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, U.S. Agency for International Development, Millennium Challenge Corporation, International Development Finance Corporation, Office of the United States Trade Representative, NASA; and by officials&nbsp;from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia.In this 36th year of bilateral diplomatic relations, the U.S. and Mongolian sides noted with satisfaction the meeting between Vice President Kamala Harris and Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai in Washington in August&nbsp;2023&nbsp;and underscored the intent of both nations to continue&nbsp;strengthening&nbsp;official dialogue and concrete cooperation for the benefit of their peoples.The two sides shared&nbsp;their respective visions for democracy and regional development, including&nbsp;in the Indo-Pacific,&nbsp;and&nbsp;exchanged views on cooperating to ensure a prosperous and peaceful future.&nbsp;&nbsp;They underscored&nbsp;that&nbsp;the international community should work toward security and peace, including through UN peacekeeping efforts. &nbsp;The U.S. side commended Mongolia’s commitment to further strengthening&nbsp;the&nbsp;role of women in peacekeeping. &nbsp;The two sides noted with concern the urgent security situation in Haiti.&nbsp;&nbsp;Mongolia and the United States emphasized the importance of international law, including the United Nations Charter and the principles of sovereign equality, respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of states, and prohibition of the threat or use of force. &nbsp;To this end, the two sides expressed deep concern over the humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine. &nbsp;Both&nbsp;sides reiterated their commitment to diplomacy with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the only viable means of achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and called on the DPRK to&nbsp;fully comply with its obligations under relevant&nbsp;UN Security Council Resolutions.The two sides&nbsp;noted the significance of the&nbsp;Economic Cooperation Roadmap for the Strategic&nbsp;Third Neighbor&nbsp;Partnership, signed in August 2023,&nbsp;and further discussed opportunities to&nbsp;advance&nbsp;economic cooperation, including through capacity building, trade&nbsp;facilitation and&nbsp;promotion, and improving the investment climate. &nbsp;Both sides noted the importance of investment in climate resilience, agriculture, supply chain security, small and medium enterprise development. They highlighted critical minerals and&nbsp;clean&nbsp;energy as areas of high potential and importance. Both sides expressed a desire to enhance&nbsp;collaboration&nbsp;in the digital domain to strengthen connectivity, prosperity, and cybersecurity. &nbsp;They emphasized that increased space cooperation can contribute to the scientific and commercial interests of both nations. &nbsp;They further noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the bilateral Air Transport Agreement,&nbsp;signed in August&nbsp;2023&nbsp;during Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene’s visit,&nbsp;and underscored their mutual intent to&nbsp;diligently support the&nbsp;required processes to launch direct flights between the United States and Mongolia as soon as possible.The two nations highlighted their shared commitment to democratic values and individual freedoms, as well as to strengthening the rule of law, promoting good governance, fighting corruption,&nbsp;and&nbsp;protecting human rights, including freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and religion or belief.&nbsp;&nbsp;The two nations expressed their mutual intent to continue collaboration in these areas and to encourage people-to-people ties through educational exchanges, tourism, and cultural channels.&nbsp;&nbsp;They expressed readiness to support the promotion of English language learning and teaching in Mongolia.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;The United States and Mongolia decided to maintain the exchange of high-level bilateral visits and hold the next Annual Bilateral Consultations in 2024 in&nbsp;Ulaanbaatar.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Mongolia																								Office of the Spokesperson
- The United States Joins Multinational Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050 to Support Global Climate and Energy Security Goals Office of the SpokespersonToday, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry joined leaders and ministers from four continents to announce the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (COP28).  The Declaration recognizes the key role of nuclear energy in achieving global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and keeping the 1.5-degree Celsius goal within reach.  The Declaration also highlights the need for secure supply chains and encourages shareholders of the World Bank, international financial institutions, and regional development banks to include nuclear energy in their lending policies. Endorsing countries include Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Ghana, Hungary, Jamaica, Japan, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, The Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States.See the full text of the Declaration in the link .
- U.S.-Mongolia Air Transport Agreement _____________AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTBETWEENTHE GOVERNMENT OFTHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAANDTHE GOVERNMENT OFMONGOLIA_____________The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Mongolia (hereinafter, &#8220;the Parties&#8221;);Desiring to promote an international aviation system based on competition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interference and regulation;Desiring to make it possible for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public a variety of service options, and wishing to encourage individual airlines to develop and implement innovative and competitive prices;Desiring to facilitate the expansion of international air transport opportunities;Desiring to ensure the highest degree of safety and security in international air transport and reaffirming their grave concern about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which jeopardize the safety of persons or property, adversely affect the operation of air transportation, and undermine public confidence in the safety of civil aviation; andBeing Parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago December 7, 1944;Have agreed as follows:Article 1DefinitionsFor the purposes of this Agreement, unless otherwise stated, the term:1.  “Aeronautical authorities” means, in the case of the United States, the Department of Transportation and in the case of Mongolia, the Ministry of Road and Transport Development and any person or agency authorized to perform functions exercised by the Department of Transportation or the Ministry of Road and Transport Development.2.  “Agreement” means this Agreement and any amendments thereto;3.  “Air transportation” means the public carriage by aircraft of passengers, baggage, cargo, and mail, separately or in combination, scheduled or charter, for remuneration or hire;4.   “Airline of a Party” means an airline that has received its Air Operator&#8217;s Certificate (AOC) from and has its principal place of business in the territory of that Party;5.  “Convention” means the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago December 7, 1944, and includes: a.  any amendment that has entered into force under Article 94(a) of the Convention and has been ratified by both Parties, and b.  any Annex or any amendment thereto adopted under Article 90 of the Convention, insofar as such Annex or amendment is at any given time effective for both Parties;6.  “Full cost” means the cost of providing service plus a reasonable charge for administrative overhead;7.  “International air transportation” means air transportation that passes through the airspace over the territory of more than one State;8.  “Price” means any fare, rate, or charge for the carriage of passengers, baggage, or cargo (excluding mail) in air transportation, including surface transportation in connection with international air transportation, charged by airlines, including their agents, and the conditions governing the availability of such fare, rate, or charge;9.  “Stop for non-traffic purposes” means a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, baggage, cargo, or mail in air transportation;10.  “Territory” means the land areas, internal waters, and territorial sea under the sovereignty of a Party; and11.  “User charge” means a charge imposed on airlines for the provision of airport, airport environmental, air navigation, or aviation security facilities or services including related services and facilities.Article 2Grant of Rights1. Each Party grants to the other Party the following rights for the conduct of international air transportation by the airlines of the other Party:a. the right to fly across its territory without landing;b. the right to make stops in its territory for non-traffic purposes;c. the right to perform international air transportation between points on the following routes:(i) for airlines of the United States, from points behind the United States via the United States and intermediate points to any point or points in Mongolia and beyond; and for all-cargo service, between Mongolia and any point or points;(ii) for airlines of Mongolia, from points behind Mongolia via Mongolia and intermediate points to any point or points in the United States and beyond; and for all-cargo service, between the United States and any point or points; andd. the rights otherwise specified in this Agreement.2. Each airline of a Party may, on any or all flights and at its option:a. operate flights in either or both directions;b. combine different flight numbers within one aircraft operation; c. serve behind, intermediate, and beyond points and points in the territories of the Parties in any combination and in any order;d. omit stops at any point or points; e. transfer traffic from any of its aircraft to any of its other aircraft at any point; f. serve points behind any point in its territory with or without change of aircraft or flight number and hold out and advertise such services to the public as through services; g. make stopovers at any points whether within or outside the territory of either Party; h. carry transit traffic through the other Party’s territory; and i. combine traffic on the same aircraft regardless of where such traffic originates;without directional or geographic limitation and without loss of any right to carry traffic otherwise permissible under this Agreement, provided that, with the exception of all-cargo services, the transportation is part of a service that serves a point in the homeland of the airline.3. On any segment or segments of the routes above, any airline of a Party may perform international air transportation without any limitation as to change, at any point on the route, in type or number of aircraft operated, provided that, with the exception of all-cargo services, in the outbound direction, the transportation beyond such point is a continuation of the transportation from the homeland of the airline and, in the inbound direction, the transportation to the homeland of the airline is a continuation of the transportation from beyond such point.4.  Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to confer on the airline or airlines of one Party the rights to take on board, in the territory of the other Party, passengers, baggage, cargo, or mail carried for compensation and destined for another point in the territory of that other Party.5. Any airline of a Party performing charter international air transportation originating in the territory of either Party, whether on a one-way or round-trip basis, shall have the option of complying with the charter laws, regulations, and rules either of its homeland or of the other Party.  If a Party applies different rules, regulations, terms, conditions, or limitations to one or more of its airlines, or to airlines of different countries, each airline of the other Party shall be subject to the least restrictive of such criteria.  Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the rights of a Party to require airlines of both Parties to adhere to requirements relating to the protection of passenger funds and passenger cancellation and refund rights.  Except with respect to the consumer protection rules referred to in this paragraph, neither Party shall require an airline of the other Party, in respect of the carriage of traffic from the territory of that other Party or of a third country on a one-way or round-trip basis, to submit more than a notice that it is complying with the applicable laws, regulations, and rules referred to in this paragraph or of a waiver of these laws, regulations, or rules granted by the applicable aeronautical authorities.Article 3AuthorizationEach Party, on receipt of applications from an airline of the other Party, in the form and manner prescribed for operating authorizations and technical permissions, shall grant appropriate authorizations and permissions with minimum procedural delay, provided: a.  substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are vested in the other Party, nationals of that Party, or both; b.  the airline is qualified to meet the conditions prescribed under the laws and regulations normally applied to the operation of international air transportation by the Party considering the application or applications; and c.  the other Party is maintaining and administering the provisions set forth in Article 6 (Safety) and Article 7 (Aviation Security).Article 4Revocation of Authorization1.   Either Party may revoke, suspend, limit, or impose conditions on the operating authorizations or technical permissions of an airline where: a.  that airline is not an airline of the other Party under Article 1(4); b.  substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are not vested in the other Party, the other Party&#8217;s nationals, or both; or c.  that airline has failed to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article 5 (Application of Laws) of this Agreement.2.   Unless immediate action is essential to prevent further noncompliance with subparagraph 1c of this Article, the rights established by this Article shall be exercised only after consultation with the other Party.3.   This Article does not limit the rights of either Party to withhold, revoke, suspend, limit, or impose conditions on the operating authorization or technical permission of an airline or airlines of the other Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 (Safety) or Article 7 (Aviation Security).Article 5Application of Laws1.   The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering, when departing from, or while within the territory of that Party.2.   While entering, within, or leaving the territory of one Party, its laws and regulations relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo on aircraft (including regulations relating to entry, clearance, aviation security, immigration, passports, customs and quarantine or, in the case of mail, postal regulations) shall be complied with by, or on behalf of, such passengers, crew or cargo of the other Party&#8217;s airlines.Article 6Safety1.   Each Party shall recognize as valid, for the purpose of operating the air transportation provided for in this Agreement, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licenses issued or validated by the other Party and still in force, provided that the requirements for such certificates or licenses at least equal the minimum standards that may be established pursuant to the Convention.  Each Party may, however, refuse to recognize as valid for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to or validated for its own nationals by the other Party.2.   Either Party may request consultations concerning the safety standards maintained by the other Party relating to aeronautical facilities, aircrews, aircraft, and operation of airlines of that other Party.  If, following such consultations, one Party finds that the other Party does not effectively maintain and administer safety standards and requirements in these areas that at least equal the minimum standards that may be established pursuant to the Convention, the other Party shall be notified of such findings and the steps considered necessary to conform with these minimum standards, and the other Party shall take appropriate corrective action.  Each Party reserves the right to withhold, revoke, suspend, limit, or impose conditions on the operating authorization or technical permission of an airline or airlines of the other Party in the event the other Party does not take such appropriate corrective action within a reasonable time and to take immediate action, prior to consultations, as to such airline or airlines if the other Party is not maintaining and administering the aforementioned standards and immediate action is essential to prevent further noncompliance.Article 7Aviation Security1.   The Parties affirm that their obligation to each other to protect the security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference forms an integral part of this Agreement.  Without limiting the generality of their rights and obligations under international law, the Parties shall in particular act in conformity with the provisions of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at Tokyo September 14, 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague December 16, 1970, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal September 23, 1971, and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal February 24, 1988.2.   The Parties shall provide upon request all necessary assistance to each other to prevent acts of unlawful seizure of civil aircraft and other unlawful acts against the safety of such aircraft, of their passengers and crew, and of airports and air navigation facilities, and to address any other threat to the security of civil air navigation.3.   The Parties shall, in their mutual relations, act in conformity with the aviation security standards and appropriate recommended practices established by the International Civil Aviation Organization and designated as Annexes to the Convention; they shall require that operators of aircraft of their registry, operators of aircraft that have their principal place of business or permanent residence in their territory, and the operators of airports in their territory act in conformity with such aviation security provisions.4.   Each Party agrees to observe the security provisions required by the other Party for entry into, for departure from, and while within the territory of that other Party and to take adequate measures to protect aircraft and to inspect passengers, crew, and their baggage and carry-on items, as well as cargo and aircraft stores, prior to and during boarding or loading.  Each Party shall also give positive consideration to any request from the other Party for special security measures to meet a particular threat.5.   When an incident or threat of an incident of unlawful seizure of aircraft or other unlawful acts against the safety of passengers, crew, aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities occurs, the Parties shall assist each other by facilitating communications and other appropriate measures intended to terminate rapidly and safely such incident or threat.6.   When a Party has reasonable grounds to believe that the other Party has departed from the aviation security provisions of this Article, the aeronautical authorities of that Party may request immediate consultations with the aeronautical authorities of the other Party.  Failure to reach a satisfactory agreement within 15 days from the date of such request shall constitute grounds to withhold, revoke, suspend, limit, or impose conditions on the operating authorization and technical permissions of an airline or airlines of that Party.  When required by an emergency, a Party may take interim action prior to the expiry of 15 days.Article 8Commercial Opportunities1.   The airlines of each Party shall have the right to establish offices in the territory of the other Party for the promotion and sale of air transportation.2.   The airlines of each Party shall be entitled, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Party relating to entry, residence, and employment, to bring in and maintain in the territory of the other Party managerial, sales, technical, operational, and other specialist staff required for the provision of air transportation.3.   Each airline shall have the right to perform its own ground-handling in the territory of the other Party (“self-handling”) or, at the airline’s option, select among competing agents for such services in whole or in part.  The rights shall be subject only to physical constraints resulting from considerations of airport safety.  Where such considerations preclude self-handling, ground services shall be available on an equal basis to all airlines; charges shall be based on the costs of services provided; and such services shall be comparable to the kind and quality of services as if self-handling were possible.4.   An airline of a Party may engage in the sale of air transportation in the territory of the other Party directly and, at the airline&#8217;s discretion, through its agents, except as may be specifically provided by the charter regulations of the country in which the charter originates that relate to the protection of passenger funds, and passenger cancellation and refund rights.  Each airline shall have the right to sell such transportation, and any person shall be free to purchase such transportation, in the currency of that territory or in freely convertible currencies.5.   Each airline shall have the right to convert and remit to its country and, except where inconsistent with generally applicable law or regulation, any other country or countries of its choice, on demand, local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed.  Conversion and remittance shall be permitted promptly without restrictions or taxation in respect thereof at the rate of exchange applicable to current transactions and remittance on the date the airline makes the initial application for remittance.6.   The airlines of each Party shall be permitted to pay for local expenses, including purchases of fuel, in the territory of the other Party in local currency.  At their discretion, the airlines of each Party may pay for such expenses in the territory of the other Party in freely convertible currencies according to local currency regulation.7. In operating or holding out the authorized services under this Agreement, any airline of one Party may enter into cooperative marketing arrangements such as blocked-space, code-sharing, or leasing arrangements, witha.  an airline or airlines of either Party;b.  an airline or airlines of a third country; andc.  a surface transportation provider of any country;provided that all participants in such arrangements (i) hold the appropriate authority and (ii) meet the requirements normally applied to such arrangements.8.   Airlines and indirect providers of cargo transportation of both Parties shall be permitted, without restriction, to employ in connection with international air transportation any surface transportation for cargo to or from any points in the territories of the Parties or in third countries, including to and from all airports with customs facilities, and to transport cargo in bond under applicable laws and regulations.  Such cargo, whether moving by surface or by air, shall have access to airport customs processing and facilities.  Airlines may elect to perform their own surface transportation or to provide it through arrangements with other surface carriers, including surface transportation operated by other airlines and indirect providers of cargo air transportation.  Such intermodal cargo services may be offered at a single, through price for the air and surface transportation combined, provided that shippers are not misled as to the facts concerning such transportation.Article 9Customs Duties and Charges1. On arriving in the territory of one Party, aircraft operated in international air transportation by the airlines of the other Party, their regular equipment, ground equipment, fuel, lubricants, consumable technical supplies, spare parts (including engines), aircraft stores (including but not limited to such items of food, beverages and liquor, tobacco, and other products destined for sale to or use by passengers in limited quantities during flight), and other items intended for or used solely in connection with the operation or servicing of aircraft engaged in international air transportation shall be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity, from all import restrictions, property taxes and capital levies, customs duties, excise taxes, and similar fees and charges that are (a) imposed by the national authorities, and (b) not based on the cost of services provided, provided that such equipment and supplies remain on board the aircraft.2. There shall also be exempt, on the basis of reciprocity, from the taxes, levies, duties, fees, and charges referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, with the exception of charges based on the cost of the service provided: a.  aircraft stores introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party and taken on board, within reasonable limits, for use on outbound aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air transportation, even when these stores are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board; b.  ground equipment and spare parts (including engines) introduced into the territory of a Party for the servicing, maintenance, or repair of aircraft of an airline of the other Party used in international air transportation; c.  fuel, lubricants, and consumable technical supplies introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party for use in an aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air transportation, even when these supplies are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board; and d.  promotional and advertising materials introduced into or supplied in the territory of one Party and taken on board, within reasonable limits, for use on outbound aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air transportation, even when these materials are to be used on a part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board.3.   Equipment and supplies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may be required to be kept under the supervision or control of the appropriate authorities.4.   The exemptions provided by this Article shall also be available where the airlines of one Party have contracted with another airline, which similarly enjoys such exemptions from the other Party, for the loan or transfer in the territory of the other Party of the items specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.Article 10User Charges1.   User charges that may be imposed by the competent charging authorities or bodies of each Party on the airlines of the other Party shall be just, reasonable, not unjustly discriminatory, and equitably apportioned among categories of users.  In any event, any such user charges shall be assessed on the airlines of the other Party on terms not less favorable than the most favorable terms available to any other airline at the time the charges are assessed.2.   User charges imposed on the airlines of the other Party may reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost to the competent charging authorities or bodies of providing the appropriate airport, airport environmental, air navigation, and aviation security facilities and services at the airport or within the airport system.  Such charges may include a reasonable return on assets after depreciation.  Facilities and services for which charges are made shall be provided on an efficient and economic basis.3.   Each Party shall encourage consultations between the competent charging authorities or bodies in its territory and the airlines using the services and facilities and shall encourage the competent charging authorities or bodies and the airlines to exchange such information as may be necessary to permit an accurate review of the reasonableness of the charges in accordance with the principles of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.  Each Party shall encourage the competent charging authorities to provide users with reasonable notice of any proposal for changes in user charges to enable users to express their views before changes are made.4.   Neither Party shall be held, in dispute resolution procedures pursuant to Article 14, to be in breach of a provision of this Article, unless (a) it fails to undertake a review of the charge or practice that is the subject of complaint by the other Party within a reasonable amount of time; or (b) following such a review it fails to take all steps within its power to remedy any charge or practice that is inconsistent with this Article.Article 11Fair Competition1.   Each Party shall allow a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to compete in providing the international air transportation governed by this Agreement.2.   Each Party shall allow each airline to determine the frequency and capacity of the international air transportation it offers based upon commercial considerations in the marketplace.  Consistent with this right, neither Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, frequency, or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types operated by the airlines of the other Party, except as may be required for customs, technical, operational, or environmental reasons under uniform conditions consistent with Article 15 of the Convention.3.   Neither Party shall impose on the other Party&#8217;s airlines a first-refusal requirement, uplift ratio, no-objection fee, or any other requirement with respect to capacity, frequency, or traffic that would be inconsistent with the purposes of this Agreement.4.   Neither Party shall require the filing of schedules, programs for charter flights, or operational plans by airlines of the other Party for approval, except as may be required on a non-discriminatory basis to enforce the uniform conditions foreseen by paragraph 2 of this Article or as may be specifically authorized in this Agreement.  If a Party requires filings for information purposes, it shall minimize the administrative burdens of filing requirements and procedures on air transportation intermediaries and on airlines of the other Party.Article 12Pricing1.   Each Party shall allow prices for air transportation to be established by airlines of both Parties based upon commercial considerations in the marketplace.2.   Prices for international air transportation between the territories of the Parties shall not be required to be filed.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the airlines of the Parties shall provide immediate access, on request, to information on historical, existing, and proposed prices to the aeronautical authorities of the Parties in a manner and format acceptable to those aeronautical authorities.Article 13ConsultationsEither Party may, at any time, request consultations relating to this Agreement.  Such consultations shall begin at the earliest possible date, but not later than 60 days from the date the other Party receives the request unless otherwise agreed.Article 14Settlement of Disputes1.   Any dispute arising under this Agreement, except those that may arise under Article 12 (Pricing), that is not resolved within 30 days of the date established for consultations pursuant to a request for consultations under Article 13 may be referred, by agreement of the Parties, for decision to some person or body.  If the Parties do not so agree, either Party may give written notice to the other Party through diplomatic channels that it is requesting that the dispute be submitted to arbitration.2.   Arbitration shall be by a tribunal of three arbitrators to be constituted as follows: a.  Within 30 days after the receipt of a request for arbitration, each Party shall name one arbitrator.  Within 60 days after these two arbitrators have been named, they shall by agreement appoint a third arbitrator, who shall act as President of the arbitral tribunal; b.  If either Party fails to name an arbitrator, or if the third arbitrator is not appointed, in accordance with subparagraph a of this paragraph, either Party may request the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization to appoint the necessary arbitrator or arbitrators within 30 days.  If the President of the Council is of the same nationality as one of the Parties, the most senior Vice President who is not disqualified on that ground shall make the appointment.3.   The arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to decide the extent of its jurisdiction under this Agreement and, except as otherwise agreed, shall establish its own procedural rules.  The tribunal, once formed, may at the request of either Party recommend interim relief measures pending its final determination.  If either of the Parties requests it or the tribunal deems it appropriate, a conference to determine the precise issues to be arbitrated and the specific procedures to be followed shall be held not later than 15 days after the tribunal is fully constituted.4.   Except as otherwise agreed or as directed by the tribunal, the statement of claim shall be submitted within 45 days of the time the tribunal is fully constituted, and the statement of defense shall be submitted 60 days thereafter.  Any reply by the claimant shall be submitted within 30 days of the submission of the statement of defense.  Any reply by the respondent shall be submitted within 30 days thereafter.  If either Party requests it or the tribunal deems it appropriate, the tribunal shall hold a hearing within 45 days after the last pleading is due.5.   The tribunal shall attempt to render a written decision within 30 days after completion of the hearing or, if no hearing is held, after the last pleading is submitted.  The decision of the majority of the tribunal shall prevail.6.   The Parties may submit requests for interpretation of the decision within 15 days after it is rendered and any interpretation given shall be issued within 15 days of such request.7.   Each Party shall, to the degree consistent with its national law, give full effect to any decision or award of the arbitral tribunal.8.   The expenses of the arbitral tribunal, including the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, shall be shared equally by the Parties.  Any expenses incurred by the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization in connection with the procedures of paragraph 2b of this Article shall be considered to be part of the expenses of the arbitral tribunal.Article 15Amendment The Agreement may be amended through written agreement of the Parties.Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later note in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Parties confirming that all internal procedures necessary for entry into force of the amendments have been completed.Article 16TerminationEither Party may, at any time, give notice in writing to the other Party of its decision to terminate this Agreement.  Such notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization.  This Agreement shall terminate at midnight (at the place of receipt of the notice to the other Party) at the end of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) traffic season in effect one year following the date of written notification of termination, unless the notice is withdrawn by agreement of the Parties before the end of this period.Article 17Registration with ICAOThis Agreement and all amendments thereto shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.Article 18Entry into Force1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the later note in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Parties confirming that all necessary internal procedures for entry into force of the Agreement have been completed.2 From the date of its entry into force, this Agreement shall, as between the Parties, supersede all other agreements and arrangements governing international air services between the Parties including the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation of 2001.IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.DONE at Washington on the third and fourth days of August 2023, in two originals, in the English and Mongolian languages, both texts being equally authentic.  For the United States, the date of the last of its two signatures shall be the date of the United States’ signature of the Agreement.FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA:Antony J. BlinkenSecretary of StateSandag ByambatsogtMinister of Road and Transport DevelopmentPete ButtigiegSecretary of Transportation&nbsp;
- Under Secretary Elizabeth Allen Attends Signing of New Agreement to Increase Mongolian Participation in the Fulbright Program Office of the SpokespersonOn September 21, the Government of Mongolia committed to increasing its annual contribution to the Fulbright Program. Mongolia signed a renewed agreement with the Institute of International Education (IIE), an implementing partner of the U.S. Department of State for the Fulbright Program. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Liz Allen met with Mongolian Minister of Education and Science L. Enkh-Amgalan before the signing at the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations in New York, NY. IIE Vice President Edward Monks signed the agreement on behalf of IIE.Under the updated terms, Mongolia will double its yearly contribution to $1.2 million, which will increase the number of Mongolian Fulbright Foreign Students studying in the United States each year.In her remarks at the signing, Under Secretary Allen emphasized the United States’ commitment to deepening partnership with Mongolia on education and continuing support for Mongolia’s democratic and economic development.The Fulbright Program is the U.S. Government’s flagship international academic exchange program that has provided more than 400,000 students, scholars, artists, and teachers the opportunity to study, teach, and conduct research both in the United States and abroad. The Fulbright Program in Mongolia began in 1993, and since 2010 the country has contributed $600,000 annually to fund Mongolian graduate students to attend U.S. universities on a yearly basis.Individuals and U.S. host institutions may go online to learn more about the Fulbright Program.  Interested media may contact the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at ECA-Press@state.gov.
- Department Press Briefing – September 12, 2023 Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWashington, D.C. 													HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; September 12, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; September 12, 2023																																																					September 12, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									IRAN/REGION/DEPARTMENTLEBANONNORTH KOREA/RUSSIA/CHINA/REGIONBANGLADESH/RUSSIA/REGIONSYRIACHINA/DEPARTMENTISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIESMEXICOCHINA/MONGOLIA/REGIONUKRAINE/REGIONARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN/REGIONMOROCCO																													1:20 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. Nice to see a smile. I don’t have anything. Matt, you want to start us off?QUESTION: All right, sure. Can you explain exactly what the waivers the Secretary signed on Friday &#8212;MR MILLER: Sure. So the waivers that the Secretary signed on Friday that were notified to Congress yesterday were to effectuate the transfer of funds from accounts in South Korea, Iranian funds that had been held in accounts in South Korea, through accounts in Europe, ultimately to accounts in Qatar, where they will be available for use for humanitarian transactions with strict Treasury Department oversight, and ultimately they’re to, as we said before, effectuate the release and bring home five American citizens who have been wrongfully imprisoned in Iran.QUESTION: Okay. Can you explain why these waivers were necessary? Because it’s my understanding that the administration did not believe, and had told the European banks even though they were extremely leery of being involved in any kind of conversion of money or transfer of money, and they didn’t want to do it. So is that why the waivers were finally granted and why it took so long? This deal was announced back in – over a month ago.MR MILLER: It’s a good question; let me explain it with a little background context, which is that – I think you’re aware of all of this, but some others may not be, which is the 6 billion –QUESTION: I am aware of it, and I know the answer.MR MILLER: I know.QUESTION: But the fact of the matter is that no one in the administration has spoken to the record on this – we’ve got &#8212;MR MILLER: Exactly, which is why I want to explain it at length.QUESTION: And I want to get into the NSC comments from last night too.MR MILLER: That there were $6 billion that were held in these funds; the previous administration set up these accounts or allowed these accounts to be set up so countries could purchase Iranian oil. The money would then go into these accounts. Iran has always been able under the regime set up by the previous administration to access the funds in these accounts. And in other places, we saw them spend down the funds in these accounts, funds that – accounts that were set up for purchases of oil, for example, from – in India or Brazil, and under the previous administration were spent down with no restrictions at all.When this administration took office, we put restrictions on these accounts to ensure that they could only be used for humanitarian purposes. However, a number of banks, despite the assurances we had given, did not want to allow – did not want to participate in transactions related to these accounts. So it was necessary to – for the Secretary to make these waivers to allow the transfer of money from these accounts, through bank accounts in Europe, ultimately to Qatar (inaudible).QUESTION: So why did – why did it take so long, then, for you guys to come around to deciding that, okay, this isn’t going to happen unless we actually do the waivers?MR MILLER: I would just say this has been a complicated process from the beginning, as you can imagine, dealing with all of the moving pieces and dealing with this – dealing with moving this money from accounts in Korea where it had to be converted into euros, ultimately to a supervised account in Qatar.QUESTION: Right. But if, as you say, under the previous administration – and I’m going to take a little bit of issue with that momentarily – but if, as you say, Iran was able to spend down money in similar accounts that have been in – set up in Brazil and India, why were there not the same concerns by – from banks?MR MILLER: In the previous – so I’m not going to speak to why banks were willing to participate in the previous administration. We did make a change at the outset of this administration where we made clear that these funds – the funds in these accounts could only be used for humanitarian purposes.QUESTION: Okay. And are you suggesting that the previous administration allowed Iran to spend down money in these restricted accounts for nefarious purposes, or for purposes other than humanitarian assistance?MR MILLER: I will say that we don’t know what they were used for, because we can find no record of how these funds were spent down. Certainly not that they were required to be – what we can – what we can say is that they were not required to be spent only for humanitarian purposes, and we can’t tell what they were used for.QUESTION: Okay. And once this money gets to the bank in Qatar, even though you say that it’s restricted for use for humanitarian goods, items only, does that not allow – or does that not free up $6 billion from Iran’s treasury, from its internal accounts, that they might otherwise have to spend on the same humanitarian items and now they can spend it on, I don’t know, arming the Houthis or supplying Assad with stuff, or even with sending drones to Russia?MR MILLER: No, and here’s why. I think it’s important to remember that our sanctions regimes – with respect to Iran, and with respect to the country – to all of the countries where we impose sanctions – have always contained exceptions for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian purposes. That has always been the case, that was the case with these accounts. It was difficult to transfer these accounts for the reasons – the money from these accounts for the reasons that we just went into. But it has always been Iranian money in accounts that were – was available to them for humanitarian purposes if they could be able to use it.QUESTION: I don’t &#8212;MR MILLER: But let me just say one other thing, which is I do recognize that there are tough choices involved here, and the Secretary has been forthright about this. He’s been upfront about this; the President has been upfront about this. There are always tough choices involved in bringing home American citizens, but we – the President and the Secretary have decided that their first priority is to bring these American citizens home, and that’s why we agreed to this arrangement to do that.QUESTION: Okay. So you’re not suggesting that somehow these restrictions impact fungibility of these funds.MR MILLER: No.QUESTION: You’re not. So &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t – wait, I don’t know what you – say that again. The &#8212;QUESTION: So if I have – if I have one dollar &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, I – they &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I give it to you, and that means that you have another – that a dollar that you have in your wallet you can use to spend on anything you want and you don’t have to worry about the dollar that I gave you, right?MR MILLER: So where that analogy breaks down: No one has given Iran a dollar here. These are Iran’s funds. These are Iranian money.QUESTION: I’m not suggesting that they’re not.MR MILLER: But you just said “if I give you a dollar.” I’m saying &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I mean, if I give you a dollar out of an Iranian account that I have stashed aside someplace, then they’re able to spend the dollar on something else other than humanitarian funds, correct? And the other thing that I would take issue with – and especially these White House talking points, which are just disingenuous to the extreme; I mean, they must be intended for people who did not follow the whole JCPOA negotiation – is that the – if you give – let me start again.There is no suggestion by anyone, even the critics, unless they’re completely uninformed critics, that this is U.S. taxpayer money, and that is one – no one has said that that I’m aware of, and if they have, then it’s wrong. No one is saying that. So that is like a straw man argument that you guys knock down all the time, saying this isn’t U.S. taxpayer money, it’s not coming out of the account. But the other thing is – is that when you say that they drew down &#8212;MR MILLER: Can I interrupt? I hesitate to ask to interrupt because you interrupt me all the time –QUESTION: No, go ahead.MR MILLER: I don’t really mind it.QUESTION: No?MR MILLER: It is not a straw man argument only in that if you perused Twitter last night, you will find a number of elected officials who talk about how the United States is giving Iran money, which we are not doing; it is Iran’s money. So there are people who are – claim that we are giving money, and we cannot give something that is not ours.QUESTION: Well, yeah, but you’re making it easier for them to get it.MR MILLER: I’m taking issue with the specific words. You referred to it as a straw man. There are people who have made that &#8212;QUESTION: Well (inaudible) suggested that it’s U.S. taxpayer money, but anyway, neither here nor there.And then secondly on this one, when you say that the previous administration allowed Iran to spend down these accounts, you don’t know what it was spent on and you can’t account for any of it, so how do you know that they did?MR MILLER: The – we can see that the accounts have been spent – other account, not these South Korean accounts, but the accounts in – for money that was purchased by other countries have been spent down. They were spent down without restrictions requiring them to only be used for humanitarian purposes, and we cannot see what they were spent for.QUESTION: But do you know – how much was that?MR MILLER: I don’t know off the top of my head. We may have that number. I’d be happy to look into it.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Abbie.QUESTION: In an interview with NBC this morning, President Raisi suggested that Iran – this is – these are Iran’s funds, that they can decide how the money’s spent, whether that be on humanitarian goods or whatever it is that the Iranian people need. Why do you think that he’s under that impression?MR MILLER: Well – so, follow up a little bit what I just said to Matt, that may have been the policy under the previous administration, where these accounts were allowed to be spent for purposes that we cannot track. It is not the policy of this administration and it is not the arrangement that will be in place here. I understand why the foreign minister may need to say – may need to make those remarks, but the facts of this arrangement are when this money arrives in these accounts in Qatar, it will be held there under strict oversight by the United States Treasury Department and the money can only be used for humanitarian purposes, and we will remain vigilant in watching the spending of those funds and have the ability to freeze them again if we need to.QUESTION: But what do you say to critics who are looking at this and saying this is a pretty clear, direct payment for the release of hostages? Is there any change in policy as far as willing to pay a ransom?MR MILLER: So I will say two things about that. Number one, again, when you refer to it as a payment – again, this was Iran’s money in accounts in South Korea that has always been – they have always been legally allowed to use for humanitarian purposes. So the United States is not giving Iran anything or is not paying Iran any amount of money.But the second thing I will say is I see a lot of what I will call kind of false choices and maybe wishful thinking – is probably – “wishful thinking” is probably too benevolent a way to describe it – by some of the critics of our work to bring American citizens home. I see people all the time that will say, “Of course I want to bring these American citizens home, but I don’t think that the United States should allow this transaction to go forward.” Iran is not going to release these American citizens out of the goodness of their heart. That is not real life. That is not how this works. That was never going to happen. We have to make tough choices and engage in tough negotiations to bring these American citizens home. There were five American citizens who have been jailed under brutal conditions, one of them for more than eight years, and the Secretary and the President decided that we need to do everything we can to bring them home, and that’s what we’re doing.QUESTION: Appreciating all of that, does it remain U.S. policy that you will not pay ransom for hostages?MR MILLER: It does.QUESTION: Let me follow up on that.MR MILLER: Yeah, let me – Humeyra had her hand up, if you &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just want to ask an update on where we are on the unfreezing of the funds. I mean, is it 80 percent complete, almost complete? Just trying to get a sense of the timeline that was said weeks – like, weeks ago.MR MILLER: The – I’m not going to get into specific details, other than to say that the funds are in the process of being transferred to their ultimate destination, which is – are these accounts in Qatar. They are not there yet, but we are in the process of transferring them there.QUESTION: Okay. And based on that &#8212;QUESTION: Well, not “we.”MR MILLER: That we – that we – you’re right. Thank you for the correction. They are in the process of being transferred there.QUESTION: And based on that, when would you expect the swap, the actual swap, to take place?MR MILLER: I don’t have any announcements to make about when that will occur.QUESTION: Right. And I just want to sort of follow up on something that you just said. You said the U.S. will have the ability to freeze Iranian funds, transfer to Qatar, if necessary? Is that &#8212;MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: Is there going to be some sort of a criteria for that? And &#8212;MR MILLER: The &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; you’re going to be monitoring it throughout what period? Can you talk a little &#8212;MR MILLER: The criteria is that these funds, when they are deposited in these accounts, can only be spent for humanitarian purposes, so the purchase of food, the purchase of medicine, the purchase of other humanitarian products. The Treasury Department has strict oversight over the use of those funds. We have visibility into how they are used, and we have the ability to police their use.QUESTION: Right. And one more thing. I know you guys have kept saying these are two separate tracks, like we’re not – we’re not in a place with – to revive JCPOA and all that. But if this all goes just fine, what is next for U.S.? Are you going to – are you thinking about trying to revive the nuclear talk, one way or the other?MR MILLER: I think what’s next ultimately depends on Iran and what it’s willing to do. These are separate matters. This has been a policy we have pursued or an action we have pursued to free these five wrongfully imprisoned American citizens. Separately, we do remain focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program, constraining its destabilizing behavior. We remain committed to ensuring it never obtains a nuclear weapon.And the reason I said it’s up to – to some extent to the actions by the Iranians, you just saw the remarks from the director general of the IAEA yesterday, who said that Iran is not cooperating with the IAEA in a satisfactory way. So if Iran wants to – I mean, we have always said that we welcome diplomacy and would be open to diplomacy to seek a resolution to Iran’s nuclear program. But if you just look at their actions and the fact that they are not fully cooperating with the IAEA, that’s a sign that they are not taking those steps they need to at this point.QUESTION: How many nuclear weapons does Israel have?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Follow-up on that? Can you – would that explain from what you just said why the – apparently the U.S. would not support a resolution in front of the IAEA condemning the non-cooperation of Iran?MR MILLER: I think I said we don’t have any specific action to preview today about what the IAEA may do. But you should expect us to coordinate with other members of the board of likeminded nations who share our concern with Iran’s nuclear program to once again call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.QUESTION: Yeah, but it’s our understanding that you would support some sort of common declaration or what have you, but not a resolution per se, as the &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to what exact form or actions with the IAEA or what actions the IAEA may take other than just what I said, which is you should expect to see us working with other members who share our priorities to clearly express that Iran should cooperate fully with the IAEA.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Follow up. Going back to this question on Raisi, when he said that we will be spending the $6 billion, quote/unquote, “Wherever we need it.” Do we understand it correct that he was lying? Somebody’s lying.MR MILLER: I’m not going to characterize his remarks that way, other than to say what I said before, which is the funds that are in those accounts in Qatar can only be spent with strict oversight by the Treasury Department and only for humanitarian purposes.QUESTION: What if we find out that they did sponsor – we have been talking about how Iran being destructive in the region, how they have been sponsoring Russian war in Ukraine. If you find out that Iran has been continuing by using $6 billion that you said is not yours, but is Iranian people’s money, not the Iranian Government’s money, what are you doing to do?MR MILLER: I don’t want to try to get into hypotheticals. I mean, again, I don’t think you should take this action as anything other than the United States doing everything it can to bring home five wrongfully imprisoned Americans. We will continue to take all the steps that we have taken, that we continue to take, to constrain Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region. We have hundreds, if not thousands, of existing sanctions on the Iranian Government and on various entities inside Iran. We will continue to impose sanctions when events warrant that.Bless you.But in this instance, we decided it was important to bring these American citizens home, and if we see Iran acting in ways that do not comply with the arrangements that are agreed to in this transaction, we will take actions to ensure that those funds cannot be spent for anything but humanitarian purposes.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: And my last – my last question on this &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, sorry, Alex.QUESTION: Yeah, of course. Just &#8212;MR MILLER: One more, Alex.QUESTION: Just to clarify, five Americans you mentioned – can you assure us that you have done – since the agreement was announced – everything you could not to – let’s say to extend this number from five to seven? As you know, there are two American persons left behind, and there have been back-and-forth negotiations going on. There was a meeting in this building. You tried everything but you failed. Is that the case?MR MILLER: I – I won’t go where I was going to go. This was a deal to bring home these five American citizens, and we are proud of the actions we have taken. And we look forward to seeing their release; we look forward to seeing them reunited with their families, their loved ones. We, again, do note that there are others who are detained in Iran whose release we worked to secure. That is an ongoing priority for the State Department.Abbie, go ahead. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: One more on Iran. In advance of the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death, President Raisi also issued a threat to protestors, warning that they would pay a big cost for sowing instability in the country. Does the State Department have any response? And given these discussions over the prisoner release, what are you doing right now to help protestors on the ground there?MR MILLER: I will say those comments are particularly offensive coming when they do, the week of the anniversary of the protests last year, the one-year anniversary. And I will say that we will continue to support the Iranian people. During the – at the height of the protest last year, when we were providing internet access to the Iranian people when it had been shut down by the Iranian Government, as many as one in three Iranians used U.S.-supported anticensorship and digital security tools. We held accountable those responsible for Mahsa Amini’s death, and we will continue to do so. And I would call on the Iranian Government to respect the rights and wishes of its citizens and not stifle their voices.QUESTION: Coming back to the transfer of the money, can you say that all of the funds are out of the South Korean bank accounts and are in Qatar? Are they in process? Realistically, how long will it take for the money to get to this custodial bank account?MR MILLER: They are not all in Qatar yet. I don&#8217;t want to speak to where along the process they are, other than that they are in the process of being transferred, and I wouldn’t want to put a timetable on it. I would say, just for your planning purposes, you should not expect to see any movement in terms of the American citizens being released this week.QUESTION: In terms of once the money is verified to be in the custodial bank account, what is the timeline then for Iran to release the five Americans? What is the process for the U.S. to release the five Iranians reportedly going to be sent back? What’s the process here?MR MILLER: Again, I don&#8217;t want to get into exact timetables, other than to say it is our top priority that those Americans not spend any extra day or minute or hour than is necessary – no time is – they shouldn’t have been imprisoned in the first place – but we want to get them home as soon as possible. So as soon as we can effectuate their release, we will do so.QUESTION: Do you – are you prepared to say that the Iranians being held here in the U.S. are not going to be put on a plane until the U.S. knows that its citizens are on a plane to Doha?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak to the exact logistics of it at this point.QUESTION: And then my final question: How worried is the U.S. Government about this deal – about this whole process falling apart?MR MILLER: I will say this is not a country with whom we have the most trusting relationship to understate matters. So it’s a process we are monitoring very carefully. It’s why you have seen us always be measured in the way (inaudible) described this, since it was first reported several weeks ago. Nothing is final here until we see those Americans having left Iran. But we are hopeful that that will happen, and we continue to work to make it so.Matt, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just say – just one more and it’s very – it’s your contention that this money that was frozen and – or that was being held in South Korea could always have been used by Iran for humanitarian purposes. Is that correct?MR MILLER: That is true under sanctions now. It has – it was difficult to do so. It’s hard to find banks to conduct those transactions in a number of cases. But under the rules, the law, the legality of our sanctions, that’s true.QUESTION: Well then why didn’t it happen before?MR MILLER: Well, the point I just made is that it’s difficult to find banks that are willing to engage in those transactions.QUESTION: Okay. So when you have – when you – unless you guys grant a wavier?MR MILLER: Correct. Correct.QUESTION: So this whole thing about we’re not giving it, we’re not – I mean, you’re doing every – you are unblocking it, basically. You’re telling international banks in these European countries and in Asia and in the Middle East that you’re fine, go ahead and do it. So the idea that you don’t have anything to do with it is &#8212;MR MILLER: I did not say that and would not say that. We are, of course, taking steps to effectuate the transfer of these funds, these Iranian funds. However, the point I take issue with – to give something it must be something that’s yours, and this is not our money. This is Iranian money.QUESTION: Yeah, but if you didn’t give the waiver – sorry, grant the waivers – then they wouldn’t get the money.MR MILLER: I’m not disagreeing with that. Although it’s their money in the first place, they wouldn’t have access to it for – they wouldn’t be able to effectively &#8212;QUESTION: All right. Well, we had the same argument back – we had the same argument back in 2016, so &#8212;MR MILLER: History repeats itself.QUESTION: One question.MR MILLER: Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Do you have any guarantees from Iran that it won’t detain any U.S. citizen in the future?MR MILLER: I would say that guarantees from Iran about how it will behave in the future is not something that we typically put a lot of stock in. This is a deal to secure the release of these five American citizens. We continue to have concerns about all of Iran’s destabilizing activities, and we will continue to monitor and take action to constrain those activities in the coming months and in the coming years.QUESTION: Also Iran. Israel accused Iran on Monday of building an airport in southern Lebanon to be used as launchpad for attacks against Israelis across the border. Any comment on this matter?MR MILLER: We have seen the reports and are monitoring them, but I don&#8217;t have anything to add.QUESTION: One more question. Has there been instances where the U.S. Government has mistakenly placed individuals on sanctions list? And would the U.S. Government be willing to publicly acknowledge and rectify a mistake if it were to – like, to reverse the sanction on individuals that were in error?MR MILLER: I don’t know how to answer a blanket question like that. Obviously, if we make mistakes, we try to correct those. If you have a specific case you want to bring up, I’d be happy to take a question on that. But with a broad question like that, it’s hard to know how to answer. But &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible) have U.S. urged the Lebanese Government to elect a president? We’re over 11 month now. There is no &#8212;MR MILLER: We have.QUESTION: &#8212; president in Lebanon. Give me an example. What have you done to pressure Lebanese Government to elect &#8212;MR MILLER: I have spoke – you’re not someone that’s at the briefing every day, but I will say I have spoken to this on a number of occasions and have spoken about the fact that senior members of this department have made phone calls to members of the Lebanese Government and have traveled to the region to press that exact case.Anything else on Iran before we move on to other stuff?QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Just – let me just &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: You’ve already had a chance. I’ll go – Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. I have two questions, one on North Korea, one on China. First question is: It is reported that the lifting of sanctions against North Korea will be discussed at the talks between Kim Jong-un and Putin. Can &#8212;MR MILLER: The lifting &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: &#8212; of which sanctions?QUESTION: I mean just &#8212;MR MILLER: Sanctions &#8212;QUESTION: I was told the sanctions against North Korea.MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah, yeah, I just didn’t know &#8212;QUESTION: Yes.MR MILLER: I just didn’t know if it was a report about which specific sanctions imposed by whom.QUESTION: (Inaudible) said that can Russia unilaterally lift UN Security Council sanctions by themselves?MR MILLER: No, Russia cannot. No, Russia cannot take – Russia cannot take unilateral actions relating to the United Nations Security Council.QUESTION: Okay. And second question is: Chinese Government said that it would not interfere with arms deals between North Korea and Russia. What can you say about China’s neglect?MR MILLER: I’m not going to speak to China’s reaction other than to say we have been very clear about what our position is, which is that any transfer between – of arms from North Korea to Russia would violate multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. It would be a sign of the desperate state in which the Russian Government finds itself a year and a half into this war that it has been prosecuting unsuccessfully against Ukraine. And we will monitor what happens and won’t be – will not hesitate to take action to hold those accountable if necessary.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Follow-up on China?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just before the G20, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Bangladesh, and in Dhaka he said Moscow would prevent any attempt to establish dictates and interference by the U.S. in this region, and ruling Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed accused U.S. as she said that U.S. in the name of Indo-Pacific Strategy, they wants to come here and gain control over the region. So what is your response and what is your position on the Indo-Pacific Strategy?MR MILLER: I would say with respect to Russia, a country that has invaded two of its neighbors, is prosecuting an aggressive war where it bombs schools and hospitals and apartment buildings on a daily basis, should not be talking about any other country imposing dictates. It’s a fairly – it’s not the most self-aware comment that Sergey Lavrov has ever made. But I would say that with respect to United States policy, that the United States and Bangladesh share a vision to ensure the Indo-Pacific region is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. That’s the intent of our Indo-Pacific strategy and that is our position.QUESTION: Can we – can I please confer in the G20 summit, any meeting – sideline meeting between the Bangladesh prime minister and the President Biden as foreign minister told the reporters that Biden had a – and Prime Minister Hasina had a good conversation, though we did not see any readout or anything from the White House or from the State Department?MR MILLER: I believe the White House did make public the meetings that the President had with other leaders.QUESTION: If I may, for press freedom, very quick: Bangladesh government-controlled court sentenced seven years two senior journalists, and 90 years old who used to work for the BBC, Shafik Rehman and Mahmudur Rahman, including three American citizens and one journalist who is exiled in New York. Government ordered seized his property. Journalist name: Eleas Hossain. So what is your comment? The government is harassing journalists and reporters and the senior editors?MR MILLER: We believe, as we’ve said on a number of occasions, that journalists play an essential role in any democracy. Their work uncovers corruption, safeguards the public’s right to know information that affects their lives. They need to be able to make the public aware of the issues that they face in their daily lives. They need to ensure accountability for elected officials the way that you all show up and ensure accountability for what I say here every day. They must be able to do their jobs without fear of harassment, violence, or intimidation. And we are concerned with the Government of Bangladesh’s systematic and pervasive oppression of journalists and media personalities who attempt to hold the government accountable.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions on Syria. Are you working to repatriate an American family of 10 in northeast Syria? Then if you give me an update on &#8212;MR MILLER: An – I’m sorry?QUESTION: An American family of 10 in northeast Syria that have been held in the ISIS families detention centers in northeast Syria. And is there any other American citizens being held in these detention facilities?MR MILLER: Yes, we – I – if it’s the family I believe you’re referring to, yes, we are working to repatriate that family. Repatriation is the only durable, long-term solution to the humanitarian and security situation in northeast Syria. We urge every country of origin to repatriate, rehabilitate, reintegrate, and, when appropriate, prosecute their nationals from detention facilities and displaced person camps in northeast Syria in a manner consistent with their obligations under international human rights law and international refugee law. I don’t have an update on the number of U.S. citizens who might be there.QUESTION: And one more question: What do you say about the Syrian accusation to the United States that – they are saying that the United States occupied the oil fields in northeast Syria and they are operating illegally. The Syrian ministry – foreign ministry, they sent a letter to UN general-secretary and also to the international body and they are asking the international body to hold the U.S. accountable. What do you say for this accusation?And then are you – is there any U.S. company – oil company operating &#8212;MR MILLER: You’re getting to, like, question number four here, so – (laughter) &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah. Is there any U.S. – is there any U.S. oil company operating in northeast Syria?MR MILLER: You should ask the U.S. oil companies that question. I would say with respect to that allegation, it’s not accurate.Go ahead, in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. As everyone is aware, of course, the COVID pandemic took millions of lives, cost trillions of dollars. As you may be aware, the BMJ, the prestigious British Medical Journal, just had a lengthy piece about how USAID just terminated a controversial 1.5 million wildlife virus hunting program amid safety fears. That is, USAID has had a series of programs to collect viruses; it started as the PREDICT program and then it took on different names. Lots of people have claimed that this as well as NIH funding to &#8212;MR MILLER: Who are the people that have claimed that?QUESTION: That have claimed?MR MILLER: Yeah. You said lots of people. Who in particular?QUESTION: Have claimed what aspect?MR MILLER: The point you were just making. You were – said lots of people have claimed that the – I’d like to know who those people were that I’m going to be responding to in a minute.QUESTION: Oh, okay. I have claimed.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Richard Ebright &#8212;MR MILLER: This is usually a place for questions, not claims, but go ahead.QUESTION: No, no, no, no. Well, I mean, this is an overdue subject, don’t you think? Richard Ebright, other prestigious scientists have stated that it could well be the case that the COVID – U.S. intelligence services have put out statements that it could have come out of a lab in Wuhan. Now we know that NIH funding went from EcoHealth Alliance to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. USAID – you find this very tiresome.MR MILLER: Go ahead. I just – it’s – get to the question if you don’t &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you asked me.MR MILLER: Get to the question if you don’t mind.QUESTION: You asked me.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So how much money went from USAID to this – to the work at Wuhan and to their collaborator, Ralph Baric, at the University of North Carolina to create – to collect and make coronaviruses that are weaponized, that are more deadly?MR MILLER: So I, first of all, reject the implicit accusation in that question and I do not have at my finger &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: I do not have at my fingertips the particular details of USAID funding.QUESTION: Question &#8212;QUESTION: Are you saying for certain &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Are you saying for certain that no USAID money went to the Wuhan Institute of Virology?MR MILLER: I’ve answered the question. Go ahead.QUESTION: No, please tell me. Do you – are you stating that no USAID money went &#8212;MR MILLER: I have – I will say I am happy to take questions from those in this audience. I’m happy to answer them. I appreciate that they treat every person in this room, including myself, respectfully.QUESTION: I am giving you respect.MR MILLER: I called on you. I’m now calling on someone else. Go ahead.QUESTION: I’m asking you treat me respectfully. Please tell me, what are you denying?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: What is your denial?QUESTION: I had a question (inaudible).QUESTION: It’s a non-denial denial.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Excuse me. I have a question about Israel. Thank you, Matt. Okay. In light of Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s invitation to the White House, will President Biden be requesting Prime Minister Netanyahu to adopt his two-state policy that divides Israel despite the Jewish scripture Joel 3:2 warning of doing that? And I have a follow-up question.MR MILLER: We have been very clear that we strongly support the two-state policy. We make that clear in all of our conversations with leaders of the Government of Israel.QUESTION: Okay. And then finally, will the U.S. demand the repeal of Palestinian Authority Chairman Abbas’s law which provides a salary for life for anyone who murders a Jew? And this is a concern that Israel Behind The News has.MR MILLER: Let me take that one back to give you a precise answer.Shannon, go &#8212;QUESTION: Are you just – are you accepting the premise of the question that Prime Minister Netanyahu has been invited to the White House?MR MILLER: The – no, I’m not. The White House has made clear they expect the President to have a meeting with prime minister, but no, I’m &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, but you’re not &#8212;MR MILLER: Sometimes I make clear I’m not accepting the premise of the question, but not always.QUESTION: You’re not saying – you’re not saying it’s at the White House?MR MILLER: I am not. I &#8212;QUESTION: You’re not agreeing with the &#8212;MR MILLER: I have made clear a number of times from this podium I do not speak to the President’s schedule. Shannon, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much. I want to ask about the case of James Frisvold, the American citizen who was held in Mexican prison for 13 years before he was ultimately found not guilty. Advocates who worked to free him have been critical of the State Department for what they claim is a lack of involvement in the case. Matt, do you have a response to that criticism? And can you speak to if the department was providing consular assistance to Frisvold while he was in custody and tracking the serious issues in his trial?MR MILLER: Yeah. We are aware of the release of that U.S. citizen from detention in Mexico. I will say, as is often the case unfortunately where there are places I’d like to speak in detail, due to privacy considerations – I think you’re familiar with the law that restricts us from saying more unless we have a waiver – I’m not able to speak in detail to this case, but of course, any time a U.S. citizen is detained abroad, consular officials seek to aid him or her with all appropriate assistance.QUESTION: One follow-up if I can, just more broadly, can you speak to the department’s view of these outside entities like the Richard – Richardson Center, rather, that practice unofficial diplomacy? Do you see their role in – their involvement with detained Americans, is it a helpful or a harmful role they play?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak – I don’t want to give a blanket statement because there are a number of organizations that do a number of different things, but it is our priority to secure the release of – first of all, to ensure the safety and security of Americans overseas; and second of all, to secure their release when they’re wrongfully detained, and we do work with a number of organizations in that capacity.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Se Hoon Kim, Global Strat View. So coming back to China, how much knowledge does the State Department has about the Chinese authorities’ training program in Southern Mongolia, or – also known as Inner Mongolia, called the Training for the Firm Inculcation of Chinese Nationality Common Identity, targeting the entire Mongolian population in Southern Mongolia or Inner Mongolia?And also at the same time, the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center has raised several high-profile cases of China’s transnational repression of Mongolians from both Southern Mongolia or Inner Mongolia and the independent country of Mongolia to the State Department multiple times. What actions have the State Department taken on the cases, including the case of Mr. Lhamjab Borjigin and Mr. Munkhbayar Chuluundorj?MR MILLER: I don’t – I’m not going to speak to specific cases, other than to say that we always put human rights at the forefront of our foreign policy. We always raise human rights issues with other countries and we’ll continue to do so.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Moving to Ukraine, if I may.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: German foreign minister was visiting Ukraine, as you know. She appealed to international partners to boost Ukraine’s air defense. I know that he – she is planning to visit Washington. There are multiple reports about that. Is Secretary open to that conversation?MR MILLER: To &#8212;QUESTION: To boost Ukraine’s air defenses.MR MILLER: I’m – I will say that boosting Ukraine’s air defense has been something that the Secretary as well as Secretary Austin and the National Security Advisor and the President himself have worked on since even before the beginning of this war, working to provide air defense systems to Ukraine. We’ve transferred a number of U.S. air defense systems to Ukraine. In this last set of military assistance that the Secretary announced when he was in Ukraine, it included components of air defense systems that we have previously provided, and we have worked with other countries to – for them to provide air defense systems. So we will continue to do that. I’m sure it’s a matter that he will speak with his German counterpart later this week.QUESTION: Thank you. I have another one. One &#8212;MR MILLER: One more and then we’ll go and finish up.QUESTION: My final question, I promise, is different topic, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Putin today made multiple statements about the conflict. He is into blame game, blaming Pashinyan over everything is going on right now in the region. There’s conventional wisdom that he is trying to use the conflict to topple Armenia’s democratically elected president. As you know, there have been some reports about Wagner mercenaries being sent to Armenia to engage in that kind of activity. Do you have any concern about &#8212;MR MILLER:  I will just say that we continue to work – I’m not going to respond to that comment.  I’ll just say that we continue to work to resolve the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  As I spoke to yesterday, the Secretary has been personally involved in this, with multiple conversations just in the past week.  We did note – I will say – you brought up the topic – that in the last 24 hours one shipment of humanitarian supplies passed through the Aghdam route into Nagorno-Karabakh, and so we will reiterate our call on the specific question about the importance of opening both corridors into  and as a more – as a short-term matter, and as a more long-term matter, the two countries coming to an ultimate agreement.Go ahead, and then we’ll wrap up.QUESTION: Thanks. Can you just give us an update on the conversations with Morocco about potential U.S. assistance in the earthquake recovery?MR MILLER: The conversations are ongoing. We’re in close counterparts – or close conversations with our counterparts. USAID has been in conversation with them about what assistance that we can provide. We have yet to receive an official request, but we are standing ready to provide all the assistance we can when we get that request.Okay. Thanks everyone. Thanks.(The briefing was concluded at 1:59 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Bangladesh																								China																								Iran																								Israel																								Lebanon																								Mexico																								Mongolia																								Morocco																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Syria																								Ukraine
- United States – Mongolia Memorandum of Understanding on Mineral Resources Office of the SpokespersonThe U.S. Department of State, represented by Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose W. Fernandez, and the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry of Mongolia, represented by Minister Ganbaatar Jambal, signed on June 27, 2023 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning cooperation on Mineral Resource Sector Development and Governance.Under this MOU, the United States and Mongolia intend to cooperate to strengthen sound practices in mineral resource sector development in both nations, and to jointly advance secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region.The United States and Mongolia share a common interest in developing mineral resources for mutual economic and resource security and in supporting economic development.  Both countries possess technical, operational, and sector management expertise that can be leveraged through close cooperation.The United States intends to collaborate with Mongolia on the sustainable exploration and development of its mineral resource potential.  This collaboration could be through joint geoscience-related field work, workshops, peer exchanges, training, and engagement on investment and regulatory frameworks.  Potential joint activities under the MOU may include cooperation between government agencies, academic institutions, and private sector entities.For further information, please contact ENR-PD-Clearances@state.gov.