<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta name="cp:revision" content="5">
<meta name="meta:word-count" content="63659">
<meta name="extended-properties:Application" content="Microsoft Office Word">
<meta name="meta:last-author" content="bjkaczmarski">
<meta name="dc:creator" content="Donald B Link">
<meta name="extended-properties:Company" content="USDA APHIS">
<meta name="meta:print-date" content="2010-06-24T13:25:00Z">
<meta name="xmpTPg:NPages" content="72">
<meta name="dcterms:created" content="2010-06-29T13:42:00Z">
<meta name="dcterms:modified" content="2011-02-03T20:02:00Z">
<meta name="meta:character-count" content="362860">
<meta name="extended-properties:Template" content="Normal.dotm">
<meta name="X-TIKA:Parsed-By" content="org.apache.tika.parser.DefaultParser">
<meta name="X-TIKA:Parsed-By" content="org.apache.tika.parser.microsoft.OfficeParser">
<meta name="extended-properties:TotalTime" content="102000000000">
<meta name="Content-Length" content="2755072">
<meta name="meta:page-count" content="72">
<meta name="Content-Type" content="application/msword">
<title></title>
</head>
<body><p><img src="embedded:image1.emf" alt="image1.emf"><img src="embedded:image15.wmf" alt="image15.wmf"><b>   

</b></p>
<p><b>APHIS Import Risk Analysis of the Republic of Slovenia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 
</b></p>
<p><b>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</b></p>
<p><b>Veterinary Services
</b></p>
<p><b>October 2007</b></p>
<p><b><u>Table of Contents______________________</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Executive Summary.................................................................................4</b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Hazard Identification...............................................................................5</b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">1.
Classical Swine Fever virus.................................................................5</p>
<p class="tOC_2">2.
Foot and Mouth Disease virus..............................................................5</p>
<p class="tOC_2">3.
Swine Vesicular Disease virus..............................................................6</p>
<p>    4.    Rinderpest Disease virus..............................................................................6</p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Release Assessment...................................................................................6</b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">1.
Authority, Organization, and Infrastructure of Slovenia’s Veterinary Services....6</p>
<p class="tOC_2">2.
History of CSF, FMD, SVD, and Rinderpest in Slovenia............................16</p>
<p class="tOC_2">3.
CSF, FMD, Rinderpest, and SVD Status of Adjacent Regions.......................16</p>
<p class="tOC_2">4.
Slovenia’s Active Disease Control Programs...........................................17</p>
<p class="tOC_2">5.
Vaccination Status of Slovenia............................................................18</p>
<p class="tOC_2">6.
Separation of Slovenia from Adjacent Regions.........................................18</p>
<p class="tOC_2">7.
Slovenia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity........................................18</p>
<p class="tOC_2">8.
Slovenia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices........................28</p>
<p class="tOC_2">9.
CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Slovenia..........................................35</p>
<p class="tOC_2">10.
Slovenia’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity.............................................43</p>
<p class="tOC_2">11.
Slovenia’s Emergency Response Capability............................................46</p>
<p class="tOC_2"><b>Release Assessment Conclusions... .............................................................55</b></p>
<p><b>Release Assessment Summary...................................................................58</b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Exposure Assessment..............................................................................58</b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">1.
Waste Feeding to Susceptible Swine.....................................................58</p>
<p class="tOC_2">2.
Imported Live Animals....................................................................59</p>
<p class="tOC_2">3.
Imported Genetic Material.................................................................60</p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Consequence Assessment..........................................................................60</b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">1.
Effects on Animal Health and Production...............................................61</p>
<p class="tOC_2">2.
Control and Eradication Costs............................................................61</p>
<p class="tOC_2">3.
Effect on the Environment................................................................63</p>
<p class="tOC_2">4.
Indirect Consequences.....................................................................63</p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Risk Estimation.....................................................................................63</b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>Annex 1: Import Data for the Republic of Slovenia, 2004-2006..........................65</b></p>
<p><b>Annex 2: Changes in Livestock Numbers in the Republic of Slovenia, and Summary of Animal Census..................................................................................68</b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>References...........................................................................................69</b></p>
<h1>Abbreviations__________________________</h1>
<p>APHIS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</p>
<p>BIP

Border Inspection Point
</p>
<p>BSL

Biosecurity Level 
</p>
<p>CFR

Code of Federal Regulations
</p>
<p>CRPA

Central Registry of Porcine Animals</p>
<p>CSF

Classical Swine Fever
</p>
<p>CVO

Chief Veterinary Officer
</p>
<p>EC

European Commission
</p>
<p>ELISA

Enzyme Linked ImmunoSorbent Assay
</p>
<p>EU-15

Fifteen EU Member States prior to the 1 May 2004 accession 
</p>
<p>FMD

Foot and Mouth Disease
</p>
<p>FVO

Food and Veterinary Organization</p>
<p>LDCC 

Local Disease Control Center</p>
<p>MAFF

Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry</p>
<p>NDCC

National Disease Control Center
</p>
<p>NVI

National Veterinary Institute</p>
<p>OIE

World Organization for Animal Health
</p>
<p>PCR

Polymerase Chain Reaction</p>
<p>RCAD

Rules on Contagious Animal Diseases</p>
<p>RO

Regional Office</p>
<p>RVO

Regional Veterinary Officer
</p>
<p>SVD

Swine Vesicular Disease</p>
<p>UL RS 
Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Official Gazette of Slovenia</p>
<p>VARS

Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia</p>
<p>VCCA

Veterinary Compliance Criteria Act</p>
<p>VPA

Veterinary Practice Act</p>
<h1>Executive Summary______________________</h1>
<p>
The Republic of Slovenia requested Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) evaluations for classical swine fever (CSF), foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), swine vesicular disease (SVD), and rinderpest.  The disease status evaluations culminated in the following import risk analysis, which APHIS based on supporting information supplied by Slovenia, a site visit to Slovenia conducted in November 2006, and other publically available information.  </p>
<p><i>Release assessment</i></p>
<p>
APHIS regards the 15 Member States comprising the European Union (EU) prior to the May 2004 accession (the EU-15) as low risk with respect to CSF.  Large regions of the EU are currently considered by APHIS to be free of SVD and FMD (and rinderpest), but are subject to certain import restrictions based on common land borders with and/or importation of live animals or commodities from regions that APHIS does not consider to be free of these diseases.  Because Slovenia has implemented European Commission (EC) control measures at a level equivalent to that of the EU-15, APHIS concludes that there is little substantive difference in the way trade is conducted among Slovenia and other EU Member States.  Applying the provisions of Title 9, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 94.11 (9 CFR 94.11, meat and meat products from ruminants and swine), 9 CFR 94.13 and 9 CFR 94.24 (pork, pork products, and breeding swine), and 9 CFR 98.38 (swine semen) to Slovenia would address the majority of the outstanding risk issues discussed in the release assessment and result in a level of risk that is equivalent to that portion of the EU that is authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh meat and meat products to the United States.  <b>Accordingly,</b> <b>APHIS considers the import risk from Slovenia as low risk for CSF (equivalent to that of the EU-15), and considers Slovenia free from SVD, FMD, and rinderpest</b>.  
</p>
<p>
Migrating wild animals and smuggled agricultural commodities present the greatest likelihood for disease introduction into Slovenia. Slovenia shares common land borders with regions that APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, FMD, rinderpest, and/or SVD.  Considerable local traffic occurs across these borders, and movement of wild boar can not be stringently controlled.  Introduction of CSF or SVD into Slovenia would only affect export risk to the United States if a susceptible domestic swine population – either breeding animals as in a semen collection center or production animals raised for slaughter – became infected and this infection was not detected prior to export.  Current EC import requirements reduce the likelihood of introducing CSF, FMD, or SVD, and Slovenian import practices have been protective against disease introduction via these pathways.  Also, commercial production and biosecurity practices mitigate the export risk to the United States.  APHIS concludes that additional mitigation measures currently applied to other Member States to restrict sourcing of swine, ruminants, and derived products should be applied to Slovenian commodities for export to the United States to prevent commingling of these commodities with commodities from regions that APHIS considers to be affected or has not evaluated for these diseases.  
</p>
<p><i>Exposure assessment</i></p>
<p>
APHIS assessed the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animal populations in the United States to CSF, FMD, or SVD viruses carried by meat or meat products, live animals, and genetic material imported from Slovenia. Although the potential for exposure to infective virus via live animals or genetic material exists, biosecurity measures and animal husbandry practices mitigate the risk of exposure via these routes.   Based on studies of the U.S. waste-feeding sector, APHIS concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to these viruses via waste feeding was low.  Overall, APHIS concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock via meat or meat products, live animals, or genetic material from Slovenia was low. 
</p>
<p><i>Consequence assessment
</i></p>
<p>
APHIS assessed the biologic and economic consequences of introducing CSF, FMD, rinderpest, or SVD viruses into the United States. APHIS concluded that CSF and FMD viruses have the potential to cause death and/or significant distress and suffering in affected animals; SVD infection is usually milder.  An extensive foreign animal disease outbreak would severely affect farmers and farming communities, the economic costs of control and eradication of any of these diseases would be substantial, and export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars. 
</p>
<p><i>Risk estimate</i></p>
<p>
Although a CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest outbreak in the United States would have extensive animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the risk of exposing U.S. livestock to these viruses via import of infected live swine, ruminants, or associated commodities from Slovenia to be low.   
</p>
<h1>Hazard identification__________________</h1>
<h2>1.  Classical Swine Fever virus- </h2>
<p>
CSF, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of domestic swine and wild boar with worldwide distribution.  Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, congenital, and mild manifestations [1, 2].  CSF can spread in an epidemic form as well as establish enzootic infections in domestic swine and wild boar populations.  Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but pork products (fresh, frozen, or cured) can remain infectious to other pigs via the oral route [3].  Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks [4].  Blood and all tissues, secretions and excretions of sick and dead animals are sources of virus [5].  The disease may also be introduced or spread via infected semen [6].  Wild boar are a virus reservoir and possible source of infection for domestic swine; epidemiological links between CSF virus infection in wild boar and domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years [7, 8]. In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are often started by feeding of infected human food waste [9]. 
</p>
<p><b>2.  Foot and Mouth Disease virus
</b></p>
<p>
FMD is a contagious and economically damaging disease of cloven-hoofed animals, including domestic ruminants and pigs, as well as over 70 wildlife species [10].  The disease is endemic in large areas of Africa, Asia, and South America, and outbreaks are not uncommon in previously free areas throughout the world [11].  Susceptible livestock may be infected with FMD virus as a result of direct or indirect contact with infected animals or an infected environment [11].  Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild or domestic animals, or inanimate objects (vehicles, farm implements, clothing), and long-range airborne transmission is also possible.  
</p>
<p>
The classical form of FMD is characterized by fever and vesicles with subsequent erosions in the mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats. However, serological field surveys and experimental investigations have shown that FMD in small ruminants may be clinically unapparent in a significant proportion of animals [12, 13], and certain strains of the virus may be of low virulence in some species [14]. Laboratory confirmation is essential during outbreak situations, since FMD cannot be distinguished from other vesicular disease such as SVD, vesicular stomatitis, and vesicular exanthema of swine on the basis of clinical findings [11].  The FMD virus is destroyed in muscle when the pH is less than 6.0 [5]. Pig meat does not consistently reach as low an ultimate pH during carcass maturation as does beef, so the inactivation of FMD virus in pig meat may not be as complete as that occurring in beef [15]. Virus inactivation has not been examined in detail in small ruminant meat [11]. </p>
<h2>3.  Swine Vesicular Disease virus</h2>
<p>
SVD is a contagious and economically damaging disease of domestic swine and wild boar. The disease has historically been recorded in Hong Kong, Japan, and several European countries; currently, the disease is primarily limited to Italy [5].  The clinical signs of SVD are easily confused with those of FMD and include fever, sudden lameness, and vesicles with subsequent erosions along the snout, feet, and teats.  SVD causes essentially no mortality, and recovery usually occurs within 1 week (up to 3 weeks).  SVD may be introduced into a herd by feeding garbage containing infected meat scraps, by introducing infected animals, or by contacting infected feces [16, 17].
</p>
<p><b>4.  Rinderpest Disease virus
</b></p>
<p>
Rinderpest is an infectious disease of cattle, domestic buffalo, and certain other species.  It is characterized by fever, oral erosions, diarrhea, lymphoid necrosis, and, in populations with low immunity, high mortality.  The OIE is prepared to issue a formal declaration of global eradication of the disease some time in 2011.</p>
<p><b><u>Release Assessment_____________________</u></b></p>
<p>
This document follows the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) format for an animal health risk analysis [18].  The OIE recommends that the analysis contain a release assessment, an exposure assessment, a consequence assessment, and a risk estimation.  The OIE code states that a release assessment describe the biological pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity to introduce pathogenic agents into a particular environment and estimates the probability of that occurring [18]. This release assessment addresses the 11 factors described under 9 CFR 92.2 for evaluation of foreign animal disease status. 
</p>
<h2>1.  Authority, Organization, and Infrastructure of Slovenia’s Veterinary Services</h2>
<p>
The Ministry of Health (MH), the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP), and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food (MAFF) are responsible for establishing an efficient food safety system (Figure 1).  As the involvement of the MH and MESP is secondary, unless otherwise noted, this evaluation will focus on the primary body responsible for oversight of animal health and welfare, the MAFF.  An organization chart of MAFF is shown in Figure 2.  
</p>
<p><b>Figure 1.  MH, MESP, and MAFF- providing food safety and animal health.</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image16.emf" alt="image16.emf"><img src="embedded:image19.png" alt="image19.png"></p>
<p>http://www.vlada.si/index.php?lng=eng&vie=cnt&gr1=prdVld&gr2=rgn
</p>
<p><b>Figure 2.  MAFF organization chart.</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image2.jpg" alt="image2.jpg"></p>
<p>http://www.mkgp.gov.si/en/about_the_ministry/</p>
<p><b>Central Authority-
</b></p>
<p>
Within MAFF, the Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia (VARS, http://www.vurs.gov.si) is the central competent authority for animal health.    VARS is headed by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO)/Director General, and its Main Office is in Ljubljana.  VARS has the general mandate of protecting and improving animal health (and public health) by preventing, detecting, and diagnosing disease (including zoonoses).  VARS prepares veterinary legislation (including contingency plans) and implements regulations/training, monitors contagious animal diseases in country and abroad, monitors disease programs, monitors residues in foodstuffs and animal feed, and maintains registration of transporters of animals.  VARS implements laws, regulations and administrative provisions and international agreements on veterinary practice in Slovenia, livestock breeding measures, animal welfare, and international trade.  VARS is responsible for licensing veterinarians, and authorizing tasks a licensed veterinarian can perform (and the area in which they can perform it).  Veterinarians that carry out public veterinary services report to VARS [19, 20].  
</p>
<p>
The Main Office of VARS has six technical sectors (see Figure 3).  The <b>International Affairs Sector</b> specifies the conditions of trade and prepares veterinary health certificates and other documents required for intra-community and third country trade, harmonizes export conditions with third countries, and prepares conditions for imports of non-harmonized animals and products.  The <b>Public Health Sector</b> prepares legislation governing the production and marketing of foodstuffs of animal origin, prepares instructions for VARS officers and veterinary organizations on protecting consumers of foodstuffs of animal origin, prepares surveillance programs in foodstuffs of animal origin, and manages the register of food production establishments.  The <b>Animal Health and Welfare Sector</b> prepares contingency plans for eradication of certain contagious animal diseases, monitors diseases and epizootiologic situations in country and abroad, ensures conditions for the movement of and trade in animals, monitors veterinary organizations involved in animal health protection, and monitors domestic animal reproductive health, including insemination centers and semen distribution.  The <b>Animal Feed, Diagnostic, and Veterinary Medicinal Products Sector</b> monitors and prepares legislation governing animal feed and veterinary medicinal products, including British Standards Institute (BSI) compliance and training.  The Diagnostics Section is responsible for compulsory national programs and manages the procedures of the national and reference laboratories in Slovenia, including carrying out diagnostic tests. <i>The <b>Internal Veterinary Inspection Sector</b> and the <b>International (Border) Veterinary Inspection Sector</b> (IVIS) are discussed at length in Section 7</i> [19].  </p>
<p><b>Figure 3: Organization of the VARS headquarters offices [21].</b></p>
<p>
<img src="embedded:image3" alt="image3"></p>
<p>
VARS interacts with other components of Slovenia’s veterinary infrastructure in the administration and delivery of animal health programs (Figure 4).  The Veterinary Chamber, consisting of veterinarians managed by an appointed director, is responsible for granting/recalling veterinary licenses (and maintaining a registry thereof); planning, monitoring, and organizing professional training for veterinarians; auditing and keeping a register of veterinary organizations; and setting prices (along with criteria/rationale) for user fees.  The Veterinary Chamber has several bodies, including a court of arbitration, all stipulated in an adopted statute outlining procedures, operations and organization.  The statute must be approved by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia.  The Chamber is financed from membership fees, budgetary funds, and other resources [19]. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 4.  Overview of veterinary service of Slovenia [21].</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image4.emf" alt="image4.emf"></p>
<p>
The Veterinary Council, a counseling body for the veterinary sector, is comprised of appointed members from VARS, the National Veterinary Institute (NVI), the Veterinary Faculty at the University of Ljubljana, the Veterinary Chamber, the Veterinary Service of Slovenian Armed Forces, and other recognized experts in veterinary medicine.  The Veterinary Council advises on animal health program strategies and oversees system or staff problems in the veterinary sector.  Another counseling body, the User’s Council, represents the interests of animal holders, and works with the Veterinary Chamber to set prices for veterinary services and regulations [19].     </p>
<p>
APHIS considers the central authority of Slovenia’s veterinary infrastructure to be well-organized with clearly established channels of command and communication.  The central authority is capable of overseeing Slovenia’s veterinary needs, and resolving animal health issues that arise.   </p>
<p><b>Legal Authority of VARS-
</b></p>
<p>
The Veterinary Compliance Criteria Act (VCCA) outlines the main competencies and responsibilities of VARS for food safety for food of animal origin, animal health, and animal welfare.  The VCCA (UL RS* 93/2005) was adopted on 21 October 2005 and divides veterinary legislation in Slovenia into national and Community sections.  Community veterinary legislation is governed by the VCCA, which provides authorization and details on veterinary compliance criteria on traceability and certification requirements applicable to animals, animal products and animal feed; veterinary compliance criteria and rules for marketing and use of veterinary medicinal products;  veterinary checks, veterinary inspection and control;  measures to be taken within the official veterinary controls, financing of veterinary checks and official veterinary controls; databases and IT system, and administrative procedures [22]. </p>
<p>
National legislation is governed by the Veterinary Practice Act (VPA, UL RS 33/01).  The VPA provides legal authority to VARS, the NVI, veterinary organizations, other designated laboratories, the Veterinary Chamber, and other licensed organizations to implement veterinary activities [19].  The VPA outlines the minimum animal health requirements and fees; veterinary activities and implementation thereof; public authorizations of the Veterinary Chamber; use of private practitioners under contract; training in the veterinary sector; registers, databases and the IT system; competence of the respective national authorities; inspection and control activities; and the rights and obligations of legal and natural persons under this Act [22].  This Act also gives authority to the Veterinary Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces to implement certain veterinary activities for the needs of the military so long as they comply with scientific/professional principles of the VPA.  The VPA confers legal authority for veterinary inspection and veterinary supervision, veterinary inspection and animal movement controls [19].  The VPA also transposes Council Directive 82/894/EEC, making CSF, SVD, and FMD internationally compulsorily notifiable diseases.  The VPA also classifies disease as Group A, B, C diseases and zoonoses, in accordance with OIE classification [21].  
</p>
<p>
Other relevant national legislation is summarized in tabular form and shown in Table 1.  Of significance are the Rule on measures for detection, prevention and eradication of CSF (UL RS 62/03) and the Instructions on measures for the detection, prevention, and suppression of foot-and-mouth disease (UL RS 59/99), which transpose the disease control measures laid down in 2001/89/EC and 2003/85/EC, respectively.  
</p>
<p><b>Table 1:  Summary of relevant national veterinary legislation [20, 21, 23]</b>.</p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>UL RS 33/01, 110/02-ZGO-1, 45/04-ZdZPKG,  62/04-odl.US</p>
</td>	<td><p>Veterinary Practice Act 
</p>
<p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 54/02, 63/03, 28/04, 142/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rule on contagious diseases of animals- provides requirements and guidelines on diseases, from compulsory notification to contingency plans to diagnostics</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 97/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the identification and registration of porcine animals</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 97/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the identification and registration of bovine animals </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 22/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the identification and registration of small ruminants </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 85/02, 62/03, and 33/05</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on conditions for assembly centers, transporters and dealers in animals and on registration procedures</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS x/x (example 8/04)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the carrying out of systematic monitoring of contagious animal diseases and vaccination- issued at the end of every year by the Minister of Ag, For, Food.  Example:  UL RS 8/04, for 2004.</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS no 62/03, 23/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the measures for the detection prevention, and suppression of classical swine fever- pestis suum- referred to herein as the ‘Rules on CSF’. </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 59/99</p>
</td>	<td><p>Instructions on measures for the detection, prevention, and suppression of foot-and-mouth disease- referred to herein as the ‘Rules on FMD’.  </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 30/99</p>
</td>	<td><p>Instructions on the measures for detection, prevention and suppression of certain contagious diseases</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 37/02</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on compensations in the veterinary sector </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 74/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on veterinary checks on products entering the territory of EU from third countries</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 93/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on veterinary checks on animals entering the territory of EU from third countries</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 86/00, 108/00, 64/01, 16/02, 3/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rules on the conditions and methods of transport of animals </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 64/94</p>
</td>	<td><p>Protection against natural and other disasters act </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>UL RS 9/96</p>
</td>	<td><p>Instructions on the documents required to file an application for compensation for animals, objects, and raw materials</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>
</b>APHIS concludes that all relevant EC legislation has been transposed appropriately into national legislation, and that national legislation confers all relevant legal authority to VARS to satisfactorily conduct veterinary activities and services.  </p>
<p><b>Regional veterinary services (administrative unit)-  
</b></p>
<p>
An administrative unit is considered by APHIS to be the smallest administrative jurisdiction that has effective oversight of normal animal movements into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, in association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally. This is the smallest unit to which APHIS can effectively regionalize for animal disease status under its current regulations.  APHIS considers the region to constitute the administrative unit for Slovenia [24, 25].
</p>
<p>
Exclusively for veterinary purposes, Slovenia has thirteen administrative regions (Figure 5).  The 13 administrative regions correspond to the 10 VARS Regional Offices (ROs; Celjě, Koper, Kranj, Ljubljana, Maribor, Murska Sobota, Nova Gorica, Novo Mesto, Postojna, and Ptuj) and 3 VARS branch offices (BOs; Kočevje, Dravograd, and Krško).  The branch offices were regional offices prior to accession, but now function as regional offices in the event of an outbreak [19].  Division in to regional units is reflected in the EU’s veterinary notification/communication systems, ADNS (Animal Disease Notification System) and TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System).  Each regional unit consists of several municipalities, and the border between regional units follows the boundaries of municipalities [21].  
</p>
<p>
The head of a Regional Office or EU-approved border inspection post (BIP) reports to the CVO of VARS.  The Regional Offices (RO) of VARS are responsible for implementing disease control measures and disease reporting within the administrative territory of the region covered by the office.  The RO issues and certifies veterinary health certificates used by authorized official veterinarians, and Regional personnel must issue and sign export certificates [20].  Regional offices ensure that each regional unit maintains Slovenia’s contingency plans; monitors holdings for disease issues; collects, updates, and stores data and information, including maps, holding lists, and slaughterhouse data;  stores and maintains veterinary equipment; remains up to date on training [19].  </p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia’s regional veterinary offices contribute significantly to the veterinary infrastructure.  Regional offices are well-established and clear channels of command and communication exist for interactions with the central authority.  ROs are capable of delivering Slovenia’s veterinary services at a local level, and resolving animal health issues that arise.   
</p>
<p><b>Figure 5:  Regional Offices of VARS, Republic of Slovenia [19].</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image5.png" alt="image5.png"></p>
<p><b>Staffing/ Budget (Official Veterinary Services)-</b>  
</p>
<p>
As per information provided in 2005, 258 of the 330 VARS employees are veterinarians.  There are 38 veterinarians and 17 staff members (lawyers, economists, computer specialist, administrative support staff, translator) at the Main Office [19, 23].    There are 254 employees in the Regional Offices (Table 2), and 21 employees in the BIPs [19, 20].  </p>
<p><b>Table 2:  Staffing, Regional Offices of VARS, Republic of Slovenia [26].</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Regional Office</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># Staff</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># DVMs</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Celjě</p>
</td>	<td><p>33</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Koper</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Kranj</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ljubljana (includes Branch Office Kočevje)</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td>	<td><p>33</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Maribor (includes Branch Office Dravograd)</p>
</td>	<td><p>32</p>
</td>	<td><p>25</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Murska Sobota</p>
</td>	<td><p>30</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Nova Gorica</p>
</td>	<td><p>18</p>
</td>	<td><p>16</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Novo Mesto (incl. Branch Office Krško)</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Postojna</p>
</td>	<td><p>18</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ptuj</p>
</td>	<td><p>26</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
Public veterinary service is financed primarily by user fees and the national budget.  Veterinary service user fees are determined by the Minister/Veterinary Chamber and are assessed for health certificates, health suitability and veterinary inspection, control and examinations.  Holders, importers, exporters, or forwarding agents are responsible for paying these expenses.  Within the government, funding comes solely from the MAFF [27]; incoming funds supply the Fund for the Development of Agriculture which is managed by MAFF and used to finance animal health protection by the public veterinary service.  Funds for veterinary services are earmarked by year [19].  The total veterinary budget for 2006 (in USD) was $38,793,504.05; of that, $10,995,413.70 was allocated to disease prevention measures (monitoring programs, eradication) for all diseases of interest to Slovenia, and $7,484,581.59 was allocated for the NVI [28].  In the case of CSF or FMD outbreaks, an emergency would be declared and the Act on national disasters is implemented, triggering reserve funding [27].  Furthermore, the EC provides funding for eradication of certain disease (including CSF) at 50%, along with 100,000 euros for CSF surveillance [27].  APHIS concludes that central and regional veterinary offices are appropriately staffed, with adequate financial support to fund national veterinary programs and emergency response procedures.  </p>
<p><b>Audits-
</b></p>
<p><b>
</b>In May 2005, VARS introduced an internal quality management auditing system based on the ISO 19011 standards for quality management set forth by the International Organization for Standardization.  The Internal Control Department was restructured into the Quality Control, Audit, and Internal Control Department.  Reporting directly to the CVO, the core audit unit has two full time members, one part time member, and one more staff member anticipated for summer 2006.  In addition, the CVO authorized 18 veterinarians at headquarters to participate in audits as experts (part-time basis).  The audit program for 2006 (March 2006) entailed 40 audits across 10 topics:  General Assessment, Animal Feed, Official Control of Feedstuffs, Animal Welfare, Animal Health, TSE, ABP, Veterinary Medicines, Trade/Certification, and Reproduction.  Each region was the subject of four audits, and all audits followed a standard operating procedure (SOP, adopted on 14 March 2006).  Under this procedure, a draft report of comments is provided to the audited region within 5 days, and the report is finalized after 5 additional days.  Reports are addressed to the CVO, and the audit unit requires an action plan to address any recommended corrective action, and implementation thereof.  Corrective actions are monitored by the audit unit, and presented in an annual summary [22].  Although Slovenia’s internal auditing system was recently reorganized, APHIS concludes that the auditing system is capable of recognizing and rectifying any deficiencies in Slovenian programs, including animal health and veterinary medicine.  </p>
<p>
The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) of the EC’s Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General conducts external audits of all Member States, including audits on sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal products with third countries. Under Commission Decision 98/139/EC, the audited Member State must investigate and correct any identified sources of noncompliance within a given timeframe or may face sanctions applied by the EC.  Prior to accession, the FVO conducted inspections in Slovenia for animal health, animal welfare, and food safety.  Commission Decision 98/139/EC provides authority for post-accession auditing actions necessary to ensure uniform compliance with the provisions of Community legislation.  Certain accession reports by the FVO were made public and were used in APHIS’ assessment. During the accession process, the FVO identified several minor deficiencies in Slovenia, but no major deficiencies were identified.  Slovenia either addressed or is in progress of addressing all FVO recommendations.  Furthermore, Slovenia’s internal auditing system is value adding, identifying and implementing improvements such as upgraded software capable of tracking sender and receiver confirmation of animal movements [27].  APHIS concludes that the external auditing authority and capacity of the FVO is capable of recognizing deficiencies in Slovenia’s animal health and veterinary sectors, and the FVO properly oversees the implementation of any necessary corrective actions by appropriate Slovenian authorities. </p>
<p><b>Private veterinary sector-
</b></p>
<p><b>
</b>The VCCA and VPA authorize the CVO to permit private veterinarians to perform certain tasks under the supervision of VARS (referred to as an “approved veterinarian”).  A 10 year contract between VARS and veterinary organizations was signed in 1999, authorizing 104 private veterinary practices to perform certain animal health measures and monitoring program functions.  VARS devises an annual plan for contracted veterinary work, permitting private veterinarians to evaluate animal health status; perform veterinary checks; tag and enter data for identification and registration; assist with disease eradication; perform basic diagnostics; conduct seminars on diseases; implement rules on monitoring vaccination; perform animal welfare checks.  Private veterinarians must file a report of their tasks and enter it into the VOLOS database  [22].  </p>
<p>
The VPA describes the requirements for licensing of veterinary organizations.  Organizations are categorized as veterinary dispensary, veterinary hospital, veterinary pharmacy, veterinary clinic, or veterinary dispensary within an insemination center.  The Veterinary Chamber monitors (including registration) veterinary organizations, verifies that they meet all necessary requirements, and authorizes the veterinary organization to operate.  Likewise, the Veterinary Chamber has authority to cancel veterinary organizations from the registry when the veterinary organization requests, or when the veterinary organization fails to comply with prescribed accreditation conditions, does not remedy identified deficiencies, or carries out veterinary procedures contrary to regulations.  Veterinarians and veterinary technicians undergo periodic training and must verify their knowledge through testing programs prepared by the Veterinary Faculty of the University of Ljubljana in consensus with VARS and the Veterinary Chamber [19].  </p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that the private veterinary sector is effectively organized, adequately trained, and duly licensed and accredited by VARS, and that the contributions of the private veterinary sector are value-adding to Slovenia’s veterinary services.   
</p>
<p><b>Summary-</b></p>
<p>
VARS, the competent authority for public veterinary services in Slovenia, in collaboration with the Veterinary Chamber, private veterinary organizations, and diagnostic laboratory system, effectively administers veterinary programs.  The VCCA and VPA, along with other relevant legislation, provide adequate legal authority and effectively outline the core of public veterinary services, including monitoring animal health, publishing veterinary certificates, animal identification, disease prevention measures, breeding/welfare issues, veterinary examinations, field and laboratory diagnostics, etc.  The veterinary infrastructure is capable of handling emergency situations and retains legal authority to carry out eradication measures and confiscate equipment, products, animals, means of transport, and temporary use of land or facilities to protect animal health.  Private veterinary services and other Ministries, including MH, MESP, Police, Customs Services, Civil Protection Units, and the military, provide effective support for the primary programs [19].  <b><i>NOTE:  Emergency response measures are discussed at length in Section 11.</i> </b> 
</p>
<h2>2.  History of CSF, FMD, SVD, and Rinderpest in Slovenia</h2>
<p>
Slovenia last reported a CSF outbreak in domestic swine in 1996, on a small farm in the region of Domžale.  The farm had 10 breeding pigs and 29 fattening pigs [19, 29].  CSF was suspected based on laboratory tests at Ljubljana, where CSF virus was detected in organs using immunoflourescence.  The disease was confirmed at the EU reference laboratory in Hanover.  Emergency control measures were implemented, and all the animals on the holding were euthanized and rendered [23].  </p>
<p>
SVD has never been reported in Slovenia [29].  FMD was last reported in Slovenia in 1968 [29].  Slovenia is classified by the OIE in the list of Member Countries recognized as FMD free where vaccination is not practiced [20].  Rinderpest was last reported in Slovenia in 1883 [29].  
</p>
<h2>3.  CSF, FMD, Rinderpest, and SVD Status of Adjacent Regions
</h2>
<p>
Slovenia is bordered by Austria to the north, Italy to the west, Hungary to the upper northeast, Croatia to the south and lower northeast and the Adriatic Sea to the southwest (Figure 6).  
</p>
<p><b>Figure 6: Map of the Republic of Slovenia and adjacent regions <img src="embedded:image6.jpg" alt="image6.jpg"></b></p>
<p>
APHIS considers Austria low risk for CSF and free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest.  APHIS considers Hungary free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest, and is currently evaluating Hungary for its CSF status.  APHIS considers Italy a low risk region for CSF and free of FMD and rinderpest.  APHIS considers certain regions of Italy free of SVD; details of SVD outbreaks in Italy are available through OIE.  
</p>
<p>
APHIS is in the process of evaluating Croatia for FMD, rinderpest, and SVD.  Croatia has experienced recent outbreaks of CSF, and ceased CSF vaccination in domestic pigs in January 2005.  Concerned about the risk this poses, Slovenia strengthened CSF surveillance in the bordering region (10 km zone) with Croatia (see Section 9), which APHIS considers a reasonable risk mitigation.  Hungary also has CSF in its wild boar population [19, 30].  However, the disease has not been transmitted to commercial swine, and there is no evidence available to APHIS that infected wild boar have migrated into Slovenia.  </p>
<p>
Croatia, Italy, Austria, and Hungary are classified by OIE as Member Countries recognized as FMD free without vaccination [20, 30].
</p>
<p>
Given that the EC has effective movement controls on domestic ruminants and swine, that feral swine have yet to be determined as a point of introduction for CSF, FMD, or SVD into Slovenia, and that EC control measures effectively mitigate the risk of CSF, FMD, or SVD spreading from wild to domestic swine, APHIS considers the risk of introduction of CSF, SVD or FMD into Slovenia from neighboring regions to be low.</p>
<h2>4.  Slovenia’s Active Disease Control Programs</h2>
<p>
The VPA provides legal authority to the Minister to enforce the minimum control measures against contagious diseases.  In accordance with national law, MAFF publishes a yearly strategy of preventative measures, to be implemented at the regional level.  Commission Decision 2005/873/EC approved the 2006 programs in Slovenia for eradication and/or monitoring of CSF and other diseases.  Control measures for CSF include active systematic monitoring, field investigations, laboratory investigations, and vaccination.  Vaccination has not been practiced since October 2000, but Slovenia has the authority to implement emergency vaccination in the event of a CSF outbreak (see section 5).  Other active measures include developing new laboratory methods for diagnostics; updating regulations, procedures, and/or methods of professional work; compulsory veterinary checks; conduct of risk analyses addressing importation of contagious animal diseases into Slovenia, including research on the economically optimal measures to prevent an importation event and assessing the financial consequences of measures prescribed during outbreaks.  Even in the absence of active disease surveillance for SVD, rinderpest, and FMD, Slovenia maintains an effective system of interlocking safeguards, including veterinary certificates; cleaning and disinfection; organized training of animal holders by veterinarians, and professional training of veterinarians and veterinary technicians; indemnity/compensation for animals, objects and raw materials as incentive for compliance with animal health regulations; and other means for prevention, detection and suppression of contagious animal diseases [19].  </p>
<p><b>Awareness/Outreach-
</b></p>
<p>
VARS is steadfast in its outreach programs.  The VPA requires persons having direct contact with animals, foodstuffs, raw materials, products or waste, to have a fundamental knowledge of contagious animal diseases.  The VPA also informs animal owners of compulsory measures to be carried out in the case of disease suspicions, including treatment of carcasses and other waste.  UL RS 28/04 fully transpose EC Regulation 1774/2002 and mandates that animal owners notify the NVI as soon as possible after every animal death [23].  CSF and FMD are notifiable disease, as mandated by UL RS 62/03 and 59/99, respectively.  Furthermore, in 2000 VARS generated a brochure intended for animal owners with general information on CSF (clinical signs, diagnostics, CSF in wild boar, preventative measures, outbreak procedures, etc) [23].  Posters and road signs are placed during outbreaks to inform the public, and rudimentary biosecurity instructions (footwear, clothing, and hygiene) are given to travelers leaving an infected zone.  In addition to contingency plans, VARS administers three training/informational documents, “Manual for Livestock Breeders”, Manual for Hunting Organizations”, and Contingency Plan for Laboratory” [19].  VARS conducted robust information campaigns, including advertising and article space in publications, and outreach programs at schools and hospitals, to raise awareness of the swill feeding ban.   
</p>
<p><b><u>5.  Vaccination Status of Slovenia</u></b></p>
<p>
Vaccination programs are defined each year in the “Rules on systematic monitoring of contagious animal diseases and vaccination”.  By government order, Slovenia ceased routine vaccination against CSF in October 2000; this vaccination policy was permanently implemented with UL RS 62/03, which fully transposed Commission Decision 2001/89/EC [19, 26].  Prior to the ban, 65% to 70% of pigs in Slovenia were vaccinated against CSF [27].  Slovenia retains the legal authority to introduce emergency vaccination of domestic pigs in the case of a CSF outbreak [19].  Routine vaccination against FMD is also prohibited in Slovenia, as per Slovenia’s Rules on FMD (fully transposing 2003/85/EC), but Slovenia retains legal authority to implement emergency vaccination in the case of an FMD outbreak.  If CSF or FMD vaccination is implemented, fresh meat produced from vaccinates is disposed of or further processed, and trade in pigs is prohibited except to slaughter.  Semen, ova, and embryos collected from the pigs to be vaccinated are destroyed, including breeding stock collected the 30 days prior to vaccination.  These measures will apply for a minimum of 6 months after vaccination [27].  Routine SVD vaccination is prohibited [20].  Cumulatively, these observations indicate that vaccination is legally authorized and properly implemented in Slovenia, and is not an issue with regard to false positive reactors and potential for masking clinical disease.  <b><i>NOTE:  Emergency vaccination procedures are discussed at length in Section 11.  
</i></b></p>
<h2>6.  Separation of Slovenia from Adjacent Regions
</h2>
<p>
Slovenia is bordered by Austria to the north, Italy to the west, Hungary to the upper northeast, and Croatia to the south and lower northeast.  The Adriatic Sea is on its southwestern border.  The Julian Alps provide a natural barrier between Austria and a majority of Italy in the northern part of the country, the natural separation between Italy becoming less as the Alps lead down to the Adriatic.  The less drastic Dinaric Alps and the Pannonian plain are in the south and east part of Slovenia, respectively, thus Slovenia is separated from Croatia and Hungary with a state border only [19, 20, 31].  Effective movement controls, border veterinary inspection, and enhanced disease surveillance in border regions mitigate disease risks on the state borders of Slovenia not augmented by natural barriers.  </p>
<h2>7.  Slovenia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity
</h2>
<p>
Trade in live animals and animal products within the EU is governed by a series of Council Directives.  Shipments of live animals to EU markets that cross Member State borders must originate from an assembly center and animals are required to remain on the assembly center premises for an observation period prior to trade.  As per Council Directive 90/425/EEC, spot checks are allowed at the point of origin and the destination to ensure that consignments are in compliance with the guarantees provided by the health certificates.  An approved veterinarian performs physical examination and any required sampling, and an official veterinarian completes and signs/certifies the required paperwork.  For welfare reasons, an official veterinarian supervises the loading and unloading of animals, which must appear healthy and be separated by gender.  The shipment is entered into TRACES (Trade Control and Expert System, the EU’s web-based service for intra-Community trade in live animals) and the server informs the point of destination as well as any border crossing points. An official veterinarian at the point of destination confirms the arrival.  Slaughterhouses, cutting plants, cold storage units, milk processing plants, and semen collection centers must be approved by the Member State in which they reside according to criteria equivalent to those for exporting establishments in third countries. The veterinary services of the pertinent Member State and the FVO conduct periodic audits to monitor compliance with approval criteria and certification requirements.   
</p>
<p>
As an EU Member State, Slovenia is free to engage in intra-Community trade with any other Member State as governed by the EC legislation.  Intra-Community trade in swine and swine products from CSF or SVD-affected regions is prohibited by various Community decisions.  Trade decisions and all subsequent movement of animals, foodstuffs, raw materials, products, waste, animal feed, veterinary medicinal products and medical devices is allowed, prohibited or restricted by the CVO, made public by an appropriate act published in the UL RS.  The CVO stipulates any corresponding requirements prior to the publication of the trade act, and those measures go into effect immediately [19].  APHIS concluded in previous EU-15 assessments that implementing these measures is sufficient to classify the region as low risk for CSF, and these control measures would be able to control FMD or SVD should they appear. </p>
<p><b>Veterinary Inspection-</b></p>
<p>
VARS includes the Internal Veterinary Inspection Sector (10 ROs and 3 BOs) and the Border Veterinary Inspection Sector [19].  The legal authority of the veterinary inspectorate is provided by EC regulations and the VPA, covering everything from the rights and duties of official veterinarians at border crossings to the authority of Police and Customs to detain shipments and prevent border crossings.  Slovenia is divided into regional units for veterinary inspection (Figure 7); the annual disease control program issued by VARS outlines the frequency and location of inspections for the ROs to undertake.  The control program is risk-based (assessments performed by VARS can identify and target repeat violators and other high risk facilities) and affords the RO flexibility to make decisions on the inspection program.  The regions report to the VARS every month, specifying the number of inspections, samples taken, measures taken, fines collected, etc [19, 22].  </p>
<p><b>Figure 7.  Slovenia regional units for veterinary inspection [19].</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image7.emf" alt="image7.emf"></p>
<p><b>Border veterinary inspection-</b>

</p>
<p>
The Border Veterinary Inspection Service (BVIS) has administrative and supervisory responsibility for 6 EU-approved Border Inspection Points (BIPs), built according to EU specifications and satisfying rigid requirements for approval [22].  Slovenia’s six BIPS are Obrežje (road), Jelšane (road), Dobova (rail), Brnik (airport), Koper (port), and Gruskovje (road).  Slovenia has a total of 21 border crossings capable of performing veterinary inspections: Austria (2 road, 3 rail), Hungary (1 road), Croatia (5 road, 4 rail), Italy (2 road, 2 rail), a port inspection point located at Koper, and an airport at Ljubljana [23] (Figure 8, over).  
</p>
<p><b>Figure 8:  Border crossings with veterinary inspection</b> [23].</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image17.png" alt="image17.png"></p>
<p><b>EU-approved BIPS-</b>

</p>
<p>
Commission Decision 2007/616/EC lists 6 BIPs in Slovenia (Table 3) [21, 23, 26].  BIPs (and quarantine centers) must meet specific geographical, spatial, equipment, and procedural requirements.  BIPs are open between 8 and 10 hours per day (except Dobova, which opens on request but only during the working hours of Obrežje BIP).  Veterinary inspectors at BIPs are not staffed 24 hours a day; veterinary checks on live animals outside normal working hours are possible only if previously arranged.  To help with this, import/export consignments must be announced 12 hours prior to arrival at the national border, live animals requiring 24 hour notice [26].  
</p>
<p><b>Table 3.  Description of Slovenia BIPS.
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>BIP</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Commodity</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># Staff (DVM/Tech/Admin)</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Obrežje (road)</p>
</td>	<td><p>approved for products HC and NHC and live animals (U, E, O)</p>
</td>	<td><p>6 (4/1/1)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Jelšane (road) </p>
</td>	<td><p>Products HC and NHC, live animals (O)</p>
</td>	<td><p>5 (3/1/1)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Koper (port)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products HC and NHC</p>
</td>	<td><p>5 (3/1/1)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ljublana/Brnik (airport)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products HC and NHC, live animals (O)</p>
</td>	<td><p>2 (2/0/0)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Dobova (rail)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products HC and NHC, live animals (U, E)</p>
</td>	<td><p>6 (4/1/1)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Gruškovje (road)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products HC and NHC, live animals (O)</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 (2/1/1)</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
Inspection and control by official veterinarians at BIPs is authorized by Council Directive 97/78/EC and 91/496/EEC.  These directives mandate that products and animals, respectively, from third countries cannot enter the territories of the EU without passing veterinary checks at the border.  Both Directives are transposed into national legislation via “rules on veterinary checks on products, and animals, entering the territory of EU from third countries (UL RS 74/03 and 93/03, respectively) [19]. Other Community and national legislation applies as well, such as 745/2004/EC (import of products of animal origin for personal consumption) and UL RS 98/99 (rules on conditions and methods of transport of animals [19, 23].  The VPA confirms that animals can only be transported through BIPs with appropriate animal inspection capability.  VPA also mandates that imports of foodstuffs, raw materials, products, animal feed, and waste are only authorized from establishments that comply with prescribed conditions, that are registered with the EU and that are inspected and controlled by the competent vet authority.  VARS may grant exceptions when equivalency in the exporting country can been established.  The CSF contingency plan specifies measures to be instituted at the border if a neighboring country has a disease outbreak, including contingencies in case there are communities in infected and endangered zones that border the neighboring countries [19].</p>
<p>
BIP port and airport authorities are responsible for supervising the collection and disposal of kitchen waste from international vessels.  The airport BIP of Ljubljana-Brnik is staffed outside of normal business hours; if necessary consignments can be retained by Customs authorities until the following work day [22].  BIPs are audited by a CVO-appointed Commission, which includes the head of the BVIS.  The BIP audit program for 2006 includes at least one on-the-spot inspection for each BIP.  Inspections follow a set protocol;  results are reported back to the BIP and the CVO [22, 23].  BIPs are audited for structure and function by VARS twice <i>per annum</i> [27].  APHIS considers EU-approved BIPs to be capable of performing appropriate inspections and veterinary checks on animals and animal products.  </p>
<p><b>Border Veterinary Inspection Tasks and Duties-
</b></p>
<p>
The Community requirements for veterinary inspection are described in Council Directives 91/496/EEC, 97/78/EC, and other regulations.  Community legislation has been fully transposed into Slovenian law by the VPA, UL RS 73/03 (products) and UL RS 93/03 (animals) and other national laws.  All consignments arriving to the BIP are submitted to the documentary and identification check.  For live animals, an official veterinarian must certify that the exporting region is free of FMD, CSF and/or SVD as appropriate, that the animals have remained in the region at least 3 months (slaughter animals) or 6 months (breeding or production animals) prior to export, and that they have not been exposed to any imported cloven-hoofed animals in the 30 days prior to export. The veterinarian must also certify that the animals have not been vaccinated, have remained at a designated holding or assembly center for 40 days prior to export, and that no outbreaks have occurred within a 20 km radius in the preceding 40 days.  An official veterinarian must certify similar statements regarding disease freedom for breeding animals and meat and meat products exported to the EU, although meat from ruminants may be accepted from some regions in which vaccination against FMD is practiced.  Certain regions must provide additional certification regarding disease testing for live animals, swill feeding to domestic swine, carcass maturation, pH testing, and deboning of fresh meat.  For bovine semen, an official veterinarian must certify that the exporting country has been free of FMD without vaccination during the 12 months prior to semen collection, and that the semen collection center is approved by the EC (Commission Decision 2004/639/EC).  Similarly, an official veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that swine semen originated from donor boars in an approved collection center, in a region free from FMD, CSF, and SVD for at least 12 months without vaccination (Commission Decision 2001/613/EC).  The veterinary inspections do not apply to family pets for non-commercial purposes, except for equidae.  Consignments cannot leave the BIP until all checks are completed, should any or all criteria not be met, the veterinarian in charge has authority to deny entry into Slovenia.
</p>
<p>  
Veterinary checks of consignments include document check, identification check, and physical inspection.  Document checks verify whether the country of origin is approved for export and in the case of products, whether the establishment is approved for export [23].  Physical checks are carried out according to 94/360/EC or equivalency agreements.  Higher levels of checks are permitted in certain circumstances (eg outbreak of disease in a third country).  If any disease control safeguards need to be implemented, they should be [19].  In case where the veterinary check at a BIP shows that the consignment does not meet the requirements for entry into the EU territory, legislation provides for re-dispatch to a destination outside the EU or destroyed in accordance with 1774/2002/EC [23].  APHIS considers the veterinary checks performed by VARS Border Veterinary Inspection Sector, and the tasks and duties performed by relevant personnel, consistent with the requirements of Community legislation and capable of accomplishing the objectives of border veterinary inspection.</p>
<p><b>Customs-
</b></p>
<p>
The Customs Administration of the Republic of Slovenia (CARS) is the competent authority for EC/745/2004 (imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption), EC/998/2003 (non-commercial movement of pet animals) and for the detection of illegal imports.  CARS, utilizing a combination of random searches, targeted searches, and scanning equipment such as sniffer dogs, collects seized products of animal origin from personal luggage at road border crossing points.  VHS is responsible for disposing of seized products. CARS produces posters, brochures, and website information to increase awareness in these areas.  Customs hours vary depending on the BIP, the range is from 8 to 24 hours per day [22].     
</p>
<p>
VARS works very closely with CARS.  Monthly meetings are held between the CCA and BIP staff to discuss problems and to take appropriate actions where necessary  [22].  VARS organizes training for CARS officials.  Seventy customs officials took part in such training in April 2005, additional training is scheduled for 2006.  VARS regularly informs CARS of any new developments in the relevant legislation.  VARS does not have direct access to the customs database for consignments, but the border veterinary inspectors can access this database.  Official veterinarians are not entitled to open means of transport in the absence of Customs, and depend on forwarding agents and Customs for identification and selection of consignments.  The forwarding agent must inform customs at least 10 minutes before consignments are presented to the veterinary control.  Imports of foodstuffs, animals and products not for human consumption cannot be released by customs without the prior approval of the relevant control body (in this case VARS).  The head of each BIP checks the customs database once per month to verify that all relevant consignments have been correctly routed for veterinary inspection.  Customs plays an active role in raising awareness by generating posters and brochures, and posting relevant information to the Customs website [23]. 
</p>
<p><b>Imports-
</b></p>
<p>
Import into Slovenia is only allowed from countries that are on the official approved EU list.  Slovenia does not require any import permits other than the official EU import permits.  A veterinary health certificate is required for import.  Personal imports of products on animal origin for personal consumption must be declared at the border and measures are implemented by CARS services as per EC regulation 745/2004/EC [19].  Imported animals for further rearing undergo veterinary inspection on import, and must be identified within 30 days or prior to movement [27].      
</p>
<p><b>Table 4:  Abbreviated Import Statistics*, 1999-2004 [19].  Bovine information [20].</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Year</p>
</td>	<td><p>No. of Live pigs</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products of pig origin (kg)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Pig Skins (kg)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Live bovines</p>
</td>	<td><p>Products (kg)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Bovine hides (kg)</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1999</p>
</td>	<td><p>63,523</p>
</td>	<td><p>13,730,937</p>
</td>	<td><p>9,103,069</p>
</td>	<td><p>51,790</p>
</td>	<td><p>954,659</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,630,126</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>26,320</p>
</td>	<td><p>22,570,365</p>
</td>	<td><p>15,601,999</p>
</td>	<td><p>69,870</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,108,165</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,0758,504</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>20,934,340</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,323,479</p>
</td>	<td><p>13,683</p>
</td>	<td><p>569,478</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,857,685</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,242</p>
</td>	<td><p>21,718,608</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,788,413</p>
</td>	<td><p>12,587</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,408,880</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,016,784</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,834</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,859,757</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,729,206</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,012</p>
</td>	<td><p>868,312</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,687,841</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,433,135</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,513,909</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>212,123</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,881,824</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>*See Appendix 1 For Detailed Trade Info. 
</p>
<p>
The requirements for import of live animals, meat, meat products, and genetic materials from third countries are standardized for all EU Member States.  Council Decision 79/542/EEC lists the third countries from which live animals and fresh meat may be imported into the EC.
 Fresh pork and pork products from domestic swine are permitted, as is fresh meat from wild boar.  Importation of live ruminants and meat and meat products from both domestic and wild ruminants is also permitted, with appropriate movement certificates.  Slaughter establishments, cutting plants, and cold storage units in third countries must be inspected and approved for export to the EC. The inspection process is stringent, although the EC may grant provisional approval prior to inspection if the exporting country provides sufficient guarantees that the required conditions are met. Other legislation specifies third countries from which milk, meat products, meat preparations, wild game meat, and genetic products may be imported.  
</p>
<p>
Commission Decision 2004/639/EC specifies the conditions for importation of bovine semen, including a list of authorized third countries, the veterinary requirements, and a list of approved semen collection centers. Bovine semen collection centers must be approved by the EC in accordance with Council Directive 88/407/EEC as amended. Animals must be isolated for 28 days prior to entry into the center and the isolation facility must be located in a region that has been free of FMD for 3 months with no outbreaks within a 20 km radius for at least 30 days.  Commission Decision 92/471/EEC permits importation of bovine embryos. Importation of bovine embryos is similarly controlled by EC legislation, including a list of authorized third countries, veterinary certification requirements, and a list of approved embryo collection teams. 
</p>
<p>
Commission Decision 2002/613/EC specifies the import conditions for swine semen, including a list of authorized third countries, the veterinary requirements, and a list of approved semen collection centers.  Swine semen collection centers must be approved by the EC in accordance with Council Directive 90/429/EEC, amended in 1999 in response to the 1996-97 CSF outbreaks in domestic swine involving two semen collection centers.  Swine semen collection centers must be inspected by official veterinarians of the exporting country at least twice per year.  Swine admitted to a semen collection center must originate from a herd that is not located in an area restricted due to disease in domestic swine and must be quarantined for at least 30 days prior to entry. Import of swine semen is permitted from Canada, New Zealand, United States, and Switzerland.  No third countries are currently listed under Commission Decision 94/63/EC as being authorized to export swine ova or embryos.</p>
<p><b>Summary of Import Requirements-
</b></p>
<p>
Harmonized EC legislation permits importation of live animals (swine and ruminants), products (pork, beef, and meat products from domestic and wild ruminants), and genetic stock (porcine and bovine) as well as fresh meat from wild boar, from third countries that APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, SVD, and/or FMD.  Intra-Community trade in most animal products is prohibited from regions affected by CSF or SVD, which mitigates the risk to the EU common market.  Mitigations currently in place include approval of establishments for export or trade, veterinary certification requirements, and veterinary spot-checks at the point of destination. Imported live animals and products must also originate from authorized third countries and undergo veterinary inspection at the point of entry. Although veterinary inspection of imported animal products at the port of entry is comprehensive, testing for CSF, SVD, or FMD is generally not required. Consequently, veterinary inspection would likely detect irregularities in documentation or identity, but the physical examination would not detect subclinical infection.  However, EC certification requirements for meat, meat products, and genetic material are generally comprehensive with regard to international standards and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin. The certificate used depends on the commodity for export and includes specific guarantees for products from certain countries. Approval of exporting establishments substantially limits exports from authorized third countries, particularly for genetic material.</p>
<p><b>Confiscations/Seizures/Rejections/Notification-
</b></p>
<p>
Control of illegal introduction of consignments of meat, milk, meat products and milk products is carried out by Customs.  All products of animal origin imported from third countries that fail to comply with veterinary requirements are either returned or collected by VHS for processing and incineration.  The same procedure is applicable for personal luggage/confiscated goods of animal origin at border inspection posts, as per 1774/2002/EC [23].  Slovenia uses the Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), the EC system for automating animal disease outbreak notifications between Member States.  VARS (including regional offices and BIPs) also communicates disease information to EC veterinary authorities via the TRACES network [19].  
</p>
<p>
In 2004, Slovenia had approximately 37 border crossing points for international and interstate traffic, and 20 border crossing points for frontier traffic.  Seventy four percent of detected consignments of illegal meat/milk were detected by random customs searches, 24% were detected by targeted searches, and 2% were detected by other means (scanning equipment, sniffer dogs, etc).  Overall in 2004, there were approximately 797 confiscations (9412 kg) of meat and meat products in personal luggage at Community entry points (with 327 confiscations (4525 kg) of milk and milk products).  The third countries from which the most passengers were found to be carrying illegal products were Croatia (456 confiscations), Bosnia and Herzegovina (261), Serbia and Montenegro (177), Bulgaria (83) and Macedonia (73).  However, the targeted approach focuses on Croatia (263 violations), Bosnia and Herzegovina (251), Serbia and Montenegro (135), Slovenia (85), Bulgaria (82), Italy (78), Macedonia (62), Turkey (61), Germany (44), and Albania (15) [26].  APHIS concludes that Slovenia’s risk-based targeting efforts are effective.</p>
<p><b>Movement certificates-
</b></p>
<p>
The transport of animals has to fulfill the Animal Welfare Act (UL RS no 98/99, 126/03) and the requirements of the Rules on the conditions and methods of transport of animals (UL RS 86/00, 108/00, 64/01, 16/02, 3/03), which transpose 91/628/EEC, 411/98/EC, and 1255/97 [20].  As of January 2006, Slovenia uses the EU system for live animal movements [27].  EC certification requirements for import of live animals and animal products from third countries are generally comprehensive with respect to OIE guidelines and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin. Commission Decision 2004/212/EC lays out models of veterinary certificates for live ruminants, swine, fresh meat from domestic ruminants and swine, and fresh meat from wild suidae and solipeds. Model veterinary certificates for embryos, semen, meat products, and related commodities are provided in other Commission Decisions.  The specific certificate used depends on the commodity for export, the exporting country and, in the case of live animals, the purpose for which they are exported (breeding, production, or direct slaughter).  The animal health certificate verifies the health condition of the animal and the disease status of the place of origin, and other requirements when applicable.  BIP inspectors can download country and commodity specific certificates from a website maintained by the EC (VetLex).    Animal transport must also satisfy the conditions of the Animal Welfare Act (UL RS 98/99, 126.03) [20].  </p>
<p>
A bovine passport is required for all cattle movements.  The farmer must send forms to the veterinary station or agricultural center, where movement data are entered into VOLOS.  This database is linked with several other databases in the public sector such as regional offices, collection centers for fallen stock, veterinary organizations, and certain slaughterhouses able to enter data on animal registration and movements.  Movement records are kept at the veterinary station for three years.  Movements are also reported by the receiver (eg, farm, VHS, slaughterhouse).  VARS and the Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Agriculture, Forestry and Food (IRSAFF, see below) perform farm checks during which animal movement records may be checked.  The ROs receive monthly reports from SIR, any discrepancies are investigated by the RVO [22].   </p>
<p>
Each animal movement has to be reported twice, as the sender and receiver must record movements [27].  In early 2006, Slovenia added a confirmation program to their database systems that will alert when a party has not entered a movement [27].  Movement and trade of pigs and insemination of sows born before the CSF vaccination ban is prohibited;  said animals can only be moved direct to slaughter [27].  Accordingly, APHIS considers Slovenia proactive in their efforts to accurately and effectively monitor animal movements, and concludes that Slovenia’s movement certificates comply with Community requirements.</p>
<p><b>Transit-
</b></p>
<p>
Transit of products between third countries is allowed under EC legislation, provided that there are no import restrictions on the source country. Seals are applied to the conveyance at the point of origin in the third country, Customs records the seal number and has authority to break the seal upon arrival at the BIP point of entry. The products in transit undergo document and identity checks, but no further unloading or alteration of the cargo is allowed.  Live animal transports from the East-European countries to Italy transit through Slovenia.  This involves 10,000 consignments of live animals on average per year.  VARS established a team of official veterinarians authorized to carry out animal welfare checks during transport, as these trips often exceed 8 hours.  This Mobile Unit includes three official veterinarians carrying out field work in a specially fitted field vehicle.  This unit undertakes between 300 and 400 animal welfare checks per year.  Vehicles carrying live animals are currently stopped by the police forces, Customs officers, and Transport Inspectorate officers.  In accordance with the VCCA, the Mobile Unit will be authorized to stop vehicles starting January 2007 [22].  </p>
<p><b>Internal veterinary inspection-</b>  
</p>
<p>
The Internal Veterinary Inspection Sector has oversight for internal inspections, as well as implementing any corresponding laws, regulations, and administrative provisions.  IVIS inspections help protect against contagious animal diseases and facilitate trade by ensuring health standards of foodstuffs, milk, breeder animals, and overall animal welfare [19].  Official veterinarians must pass an expert examination to conduct inspections and gain authority to enforce regulations.</p>
<p><b>Figure 9:  Organogram of Slovenia’s Internal Veterinary Inspection Service [21].</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image8.emf" alt="image8.emf"></p>
<p>
RVOs are responsible for the inspection and oversight of all establishments.  RVOs are permanently present in slaughterhouses throughout slaughtering and on a regular basis in other food processing establishments.   RVOs undergo performance evaluations by their superior twice per year.  An annual inspection program defining the minimum frequency of RVO visits to food establishments is prepared by VARS, with input from all sectors.  Official veterinarians in each RO ensure that the regional inspection program is in line with national plan.  For 2005, VARS undertook a total of 23,568 inspections.  There are monthly coordination meetings with the Public Health Sector, and since 1 January 2006, the heads of the public health departments within VARS regional offices supervise each RVO through visits to all controlled establishments at least once per year [22].
</p>
<p>
Certain inspections are the authority of IRSAFF rather than VARS.  This group is part of MAFF, and is the competent authority for all inspections not under VARS jurisdiction.  There are 8 regional units (plus branches) and the BIPs.  This group includes Agriculture Inspection Service (AIS, does agriculture, fertilizer, seedlings, feedstuffs, wine, land consolidation, etc), Phytosanitary Inspection Service (PIS), Forestry Inspection Service (FIS), Food Quality Inspection Service (ISQC), Feed Inspection Service (FeIS) [22].   
</p>
<p>
VARS does not have direct access to the Customs database on consignments (veterinary inspectors may access this database at any time), Slovenia’s system of data collection is unable to separate fresh pork from treated pork products, and veterinary inspectors are not present at BIPs on a 24 hour basis.  However, veterinary checks on live animals outside normal working hours are conducted on pre-notified consignments.  If veterinary inspection cannot be performed, the consignment is retained by Customs authorities until the following work day.  At the airport BIP in Ljubljana, inspection staff are available outside of standard working hours [23].  Consequently, APHIS considers the veterinary checks performed by VARS Internal Veterinary Inspection Sector, and the tasks and duties performed by relevant personnel, consistent with the requirements of Community legislation and capable of accomplishing the objectives of internal veterinary inspection.
</p>
<p><b>Summary of Movement Controls and Veterinary Inspection-
</b></p>
<p>
Harmonized EC legislation on veterinary inspection of animals and products, commingling of meat and meat products destined for export, sourcing from affected countries or regions, the approval process for exporting establishments in third countries, and other disease prevention measures limit the risk of disease incursions into Slovenia.  However, the viral agents assessed in this evaluation may remain viable through carcass maturation, transport, and storage; may be present in genetic material; and may cause subclinical infections.  Therefore, the potential exists for trade of undetected infected animals or products to introduce CSF, FMD, or SVD into Slovenia via imported or transiting animals or commodities.  Similarly, these viruses could potentially be imported on agricultural products for personal consumption (legally imported or smuggled), vehicle or passenger traffic, or by natural movements of feral populations.  However, the likelihood of such an event is low.  APHIS considers all relevant Community legislation to be transposed by the Republic of Slovenia, the organization and communication of the Veterinary Inspection Sectors satisfactory and capable of performing appropriate veterinary checks, and movement controls to be effective.  <b><i>NOTE:  A full discussion of risks and mitigations is available in the Release Assessment Conclusions section.</i></b>  
</p>
<p><b><u>8.  Slovenia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices
</u></b></p>
<p><b>Swine</b>- 
</p>
<p>
According to the census of pigs (calculated yearly by SIR using the CRPA) [19], Slovenia had 43,398 registered pig herds in 2004, with an estimated 608,000 pigs (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, SORS) on approximately 26,000 holdings [32].   The pig industry is located mostly in the Northeast and Eastern part of the country [19, 20].  There are 8 large scale swine holdings in the territory of Slovenia.  These are closed systems with ~500 to 5,700 sows, their own veterinarians, no direct contact to neighboring small farms [23], representing half of the pig production.  Pigs from large pig farms are mostly transported directly to the slaughterhouses.  Approximately 470,000 fattening pigs are slaughtered per year [33].  Pig slaughterhouse and CRP records are not cross-checked, nor does VHS report swine carcass collections to the CRP [23].  Slovenian information indicates that livestock markets and exhibitions are allowed; precautions and measures to be taken at these markets/fairs/exhibitions are outlined in the CSF contingency plan [19].  Movements between smaller holdings are limited to different seasons of the year [19]. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 10.  Pig density by county in Slovenia and potential exporting farms and facility (POMURKA, MI)</b> [28].</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image9.emf" alt="image9.emf"></p>
<p><b>Cattle, Sheep, and Goats-
</b></p>
<p>
Population information for cattle, sheep, and goats is presented in Table 5 and Figure 11.  There are nearly 500,000 cattle in Slovenia, a vast majority of which are on family farms.  Cattle on family farms are mostly for milk production; approximately 50% of farms have only 1 or 2 dairy animals.  Cattle breeding in Slovenia has traditionally taken place on small and medium sized family farms (averaging about 9 head of breeding cattle per farm).  According to the Slovenian Agricultural Census in 2002 [33], there are large commercial breeding operations in Slovenia, averaging ~600 head per holding, but most large commercial operations specialize in fattening and meat production.  </p>
<p><b>Table 5: Cattle, sheep, and goat census information</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># animals, 2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># animals, 2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># animals, 2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># herds, 2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b># animals, 2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>#holdings,</b></p>
<p><b>2006</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Cattle</p>
</td>	<td><p>474,718</p>
</td>	<td><p>449,853</p>
</td>	<td><p>470,807</p>
</td>	<td><p>46,041</p>
</td>	<td><p>480,000</p>
</td>	<td><p>44,000</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sheep</p>
</td>	<td><p>94,086</p>
</td>	<td><p>119,631</p>
</td>	<td><p>119,264</p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>144,000</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,600</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Goats</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,900</p>
</td>	<td><p>28,690</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,031</p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><i>Source:   Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia</i>, as tabulated in [20]<i> </i>and [23] and [22].  </p>
<p><b>Figure 11:  Cattle Density in the Republic of Slovenia [20]</b> <img src="embedded:image10.jpg" alt="image10.jpg"></p>
<p><b>Service for the Identification and Registration of Animals (SIR)-
</b></p>
<p>
Within MAFF, the SIR is the competent authority for animal identification and registration.  From issuing ear tags to movement documents to animal registry databases to publishing supporting documentation (e.g., “Instructions on the Identification and Registration of Pigs”) on the MAFF web page, the SIR oversees all aspects of animal identification and registration.  For swine, the registration system is the central register of porcine animals (CRPA), which contains the individual pig number and the herd number (GIN), records of animal movements from one holding to another, lists of persons that can access CRPA data, and any public service announcements.  The SIR submits monthly reports to VARS documenting any irregularities in animal registries  [19, 21]. 
</p>
<p>
The SIR also oversees the identification and registration of bovines, including the central register of bovine animals (CRG), registration of bovine holdings (RGG), and bovine passports.  The CRG contains animal information and inspection results, including births, IDs, imports, movements, deaths, slaughter (data are audited against the registry), and exports; ear tag and passport issuances; keeper/holding information; requested and allocated financial support; and trade stoppages [20].  There are 62 veterinary practices and agricultural centers, plus several hundred animal keepers, authorized to use the CRG.  Slaughterhouses and collection centers use the CRG to post slaughter data and intra-Community trade data, respectively.  RVOs, NVI labs, and veterinary practices have direct access to the central database.  </p>
<p>
Animal identification, applied by the keeper or an authorized service, must be permanent and identifiable throughout the lifespan of the animal.  Slovenia uses ear tags or tattoos.  Only registered ear tag suppliers can provide ear tags, and the SIR maintains a special registry of holdings that use tattoos.  Animals with missing or illegible marks must be remarked immediately [19, 21].  Veterinary and agricultural inspectors are responsible for ensuring animal identification and registration compliance.  Inspectors are afforded full authority to enter holdings and uninterrupted access to perform inspections, and can compel the assistance of animal keepers or staff.  Holdings are randomly selected for inspection, or chosen based on risk analysis or probable cause [22].   
</p>
<p>
Spot checks are conducted on pigs, cattle, sheep, and goats to ensure compliance with animal identification and registration guidelines.  Level of spot control in each species varies, for example 10 percent spot control is performed on cattle and 5 percent for sheep and goats [27].  APHIS concludes that SIR effectively oversees Slovenia’s animal ID system.   
</p>
<p><b>Swine Identification and Registration-</b></p>
<p>
Slovenia’s “Rules on the identification and registration of pigs”, along with the VPA and other secondary legislation (all of which collectively transpose EC Regulations 2000/15, 2000/678, 1760/2002 and 21/2004, as well as Directives 92/102/EC and 64/432/EC), outline the requirements and relevant documentation for identifying and registering pigs and monitoring pig movements.  All pigs in the Republic of Slovenia must be identified as soon as possible after birth and prior to movement to a different location and registered in the Livestock Owner’s Record (exception: single pig holdings).  The animal ID number includes a country code (SI), group identification number (GIN), and the KMG-MID (a unique and specific holding identification number).  Once pigs are identified, the holder must inform the SIR, which enters the information into the CRPA [19, 21].  Simultaneously, each pig-keeper must have an updated (ie. all events documented within 7 days) register of pigs on the holding (RPH) that includes individual animal and herd information.  Pig breeders must document breeding animals in a Record Keepers of Breeding Animals (RKBA).  These records are subject to inspection by veterinary authorities [19, 23].   
</p>
<p>
Every animal movement (to new holding, to slaughter, VHS carcass removal) must be disclosed to SIR with information sufficient to allow traceback of pigs to their original holding.  The SIR has seven days to update the CRPA [19, 21].  A veterinary certificate is required for animal movements, the certificate (with information on the holding of origin and destination, number of animals and their ID numbers, date of departure of animals and signature of person that sent them away) must accompany the animals in transit.  If the departing animals have different GINs, then the number of animals for each GIN must be listed.  If the destination holding is not yet assigned a KMG-MID, the name of the driver and transport vehicle information should be documented.  If a trader is involved in the transaction, the information of the trader and vehicle replaces the info of the KMG-MID of the destination [19].  Data is accessible for 5 years after final activity, and viewable by the SIR, MAFF, VARS, services vested by VARS, and other relevant Ministry personnel [27].  
</p>
<p>
Animals imported into Slovenia from other EU Member States must be identified in the country of origin.  Any imported breeding animals must be remarked with a Slovenia-specific ID within 30 days and prior to movement to another holding (unless to a slaughterhouse within 30 days of import).  In the case of imported animals, the RPH must be updated with relevant animal information plus the exporting country, code of the origin holding, date of import, and ID number of the animal(s).  Pig keepers must report within 7 days any consignment of animals that arrives in Slovenia, and imported animals are subject to the same movement requirements and 7-day CRPA update timelines [19]. </p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia implements an effective system for registering and identifying pigs, and recording animal movements.  Slovenia’s animal ID system will assist in tracebacks and traceforwards in the event of a disease outbreak; bovine movements, for example, can be traced from place of birth or entry to death or export from the country, and all holdings in between [27].  VARS retains legal authority to assess appropriate penalties for non-compliance with identification, registration, and movement rules, including a ban on all movements from a holding  [27].  </p>
<p><b>Identification and registration of bovines, sheep and goats-
</b></p>
<p><i>
</i>Slovenia’s “Regulation on the identification and registration of bovine animals”<i> </i>outlines the requirements and relevant documentation for identifying and registering cattle and monitoring cattle movements.  Bovines must be identified as soon as possible (no later than 20 days after birth) and prior to any movement with a ten character-ID number that includes Slovenia’s code (SI), a control number, and a serial number.  Cattle movements require a bovine passport (from the SIR) containing relevant animal information (ID#, date of birth, sex, breed, ID number of mother, country of origin if imported, ID of father if known, ID of keeper’s holding, ID of birth holding, date of any other movements, etc).  Bovine passports must be returned to the SIR within 7 days of movement, after which the SIR forwards the passport to the destination holding to confirm cattle movements (ie BVIS to confirm export, VHS to confirm destruction, slaughterhouse to confirm slaughter, etc).  Similar to pigs and the CRPA, bovine and bovine movement information is maintained on the RGG.  The deadline for database updating is seven days from the event, or prior to movement of bovines [20].  
</p>
<p>
Slovenia’s Rules on the identification and registration of small ruminants (UL RS 22/2004, fully transposing Council Regulation (EC) No 21/2004), went into effect in March 2004 and outlines the mandatory system for identification and registration of sheep and goats [34].  Sheep and goats must be tagged by individual ID number by nine months for extensive herds and six months for intensive herds, or before first movement [22], and an up-to-date on holding register must be maintained [34].  </p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia implements an effective system for registering and identifying cattle, sheep, and goats, and recording animal movements.
</p>
<p><b>Swill Feeding and Catering Waste-
</b></p>
<p>
EC Regulation 1774/2002 banned the swill feeding of farmed animals [20].  Although Slovenia requested farmers (via brochure) in 2000 to not feed pigs with non-heat treated waste, Slovenia’s ban on swill feeding ban did not go into effect until 2003 with the passing of the Rule on measures for the detection, prevention and eradication of CSF (UL RS 62/03 and 23/05, transposing 1774/2002 and 2001/89/EC) [19].  EC Regulation 1774/2002 also describes health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption, which includes catering waste.  In order to harmonize with EU requirements, VARS banned the feeding of catering waste in October 2003.  Definitions, requirements, and legal basis for this ban are provided in UL RS 62/03, 23/04, and the CSF CP, which fully transpose 1774/2002/EC and 2001/89/EC.  
</p>
<p>
As per 1774/2002, catering waste is a category 1 animal by-product (ABP) and as such must be transported to a category 1 (rendering) processing plant and incinerated [23].  The approval and supervision of ABP establishments and the collection, transport, processing, and disposal of ABPs of all categories is the direct responsibility of VARS.     International catering waste collection is performed solely by VARS port and airport authorities, whereas domestic catering waste collection (edible oils/fats, waste from premises producing food for direct consumption, e.g. restaurants, kitchens, catering facilities) is performed by the Health Inspectorate of Republic of Slovenia (HIRS).  The Inspectorate of Republic of Slovenia for Environment and Spatial Planning (IRSEP) is responsible for controlling landfills, composting, and biogas plants [23].
</p>
<p>
VARS has to submit annual data on enforcing waste feeding bans and relevant inspections to the EC (UL RS 62/03) [20, 26].  VARS headquarters prepares annual programs at the regional level, including checks at farms and backyard holdings.  In the year 2004, 135 checks were performed in Slovenia concerning the swill feeding ban.  In the annual work plan for 2005, 192 checks concerning catering waste were forecast, on farms and at places of origin for catering waste (public kitchens, restaurants, catering facilities, etc) in coordination with HIRS.  Similarly, VARS also supervises biogas and composting plants, and the annual plan outlines how frequently those establishments will be inspected by authorized veterinarians [26].  VARS also conducts inspections of large kitchens and other institutions to confirm contractual obligations with renders, verify proper product disposal of leftovers, and to verify that employees in these places do not own pigs [27].  
</p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia’s ban of swill feeding is effective and enforced.  Slovenia’s system for handling catering waste is comprehensive, and effective oversight contributes to compliance in ABP handling and disposal.   
</p>
<p><b>Food Processing Establishments and Animal By-Products-
</b></p>
<p>
Five different agencies (VARS, HIRS, IRSEP, CARS, and EARS, the Environmental Agency of the Republic of Slovenia, responsible for implementing waste management legislation and issuing permits for the operation of landfills, incinerators and co-incinerators, collectors/transporters, etc) regulate ABP identification, collection, processing, storage, and disposal.  These five agencies represent four Ministries, so a Decree intended to clarify responsibilities and eliminate overlapping areas of responsibility is planned for adoption in June 2006 [22].  
</p>
<p>
Currently there are 32 approved red meat slaughterhouses, 10 poultry slaughterhouses, 140 meat product establishments, 50 milk and milk product establishments, 34 cold stores and 4 game handling centers (this list is not exhaustive).    VARS maintains a list of approved establishments, and is the only entity that can alter the approved establishment list.  RVOs inspect and approve establishments based on an annual control program issued by VARS.  The annual program affords legal authority and also outlines the duties of the RO, including frequency and location of inspections.  ROs report their inspection results back to VARS each month, including any fines assessed for non-compliance.  As part of VARS approval, HIRS performs routine food hygiene inspections on food processing/ABP establishments.  Inspection frequency is risk based, with premises categorized as low, medium, or high risk.  High risk premises are inspected twice a year, medium risk facilities once a year, and low risk facilities once every two years.  Inspection procedures may include evaluation of waste management and reconciliation between slaughterhouse output and rendered quantities [22].</p>
<p>
VARS prepares the guidelines for approval of ABP processing establishments, and is responsible for approval of intermediate plants; storage plants; Category 1, 2, and 3 processing plants; petfood plants; and technical plants.  VARS also approves biogas and composting plants, after which they are authorized by EARS.   EARS must also authorize incineration and co-incineration plants and Category 2 and 3 Oleo-chemical plants if they will be used for ABPs, after which VARS adds them to the list of approved establishments.  VARS maintains the list of approved establishments on its website.  At the time of writing there are 9 approved intermediate plants, 12 storage plants, 3 incineration and co-incineration facilities, 2 Category 1 and 2 processing plants, 3 Category 3 processing plants, 4 biogas and composting plants, and 10 petfood and technical plants [22].   
</p>
<p>
All Category 1 and 2 ABPs are collected  by a single company and processed at Slovenia’s sole Category 1 processing plant (maximum daily rendering capacity of 250 tons for 7 days, currently operating at approximately 50% capacity).  There are 16 collection routes, certain of which involve five intermediate processing plants.  International catering waste can be processed directly or via one intermediate plant.  The end products, meat and bone meal and fat, are disposed of by co-incineration in one power plant and once cement kiln, respectively [22].  Category 2 and Category 3 material from slaughterhouses and cutting plants (except manure and digestive tract content, which are collected separately for disposal in landfill sites or spread on arable land) is collected and disposed of as Category 1 ABPs.  Collection of catering waste for processing in a Category 3 processing plant is carried out by two companies, the end product of Category 3 processing is disposed of in one biogas and two composting plants.  According to figures provided by the industry 36,000 tons of ABP was processed during 2004, using approximately 60% of the plant’s capacity and with a yield of approximately 40% (9700t MBM, 4340t fat) [22].  
</p>
<p>
In the event of a disease outbreak, the sole Category 1 ABP processing plant in Slovenia is contracted to dispose of all Category 1 and 2 materials.  In non-disease situations, the collection of fallen animals is undertaken by the NVI and VHS via five intermediary collection centers or by direct transport to the Category 1 processing plant.  VHS also has responsibility for collecting foodstuffs confiscated by the BIPs [22].
</p>
<p>
APHIS considers Slovenia’s slaughter and food-processing systems comprehensive and the likelihood of disease spread from commercial food processing plants and by animal by-products to be low.
</p>
<p><b>Carcass collection-
</b></p>
<p><b>
</b>The Veterinary Hygiene Service is responsible for collecting all on-farm mortality.  VHS is divided into six regions:  Celje, Nova Gorica/Koper, Ljubljana/Kranj, Maribor/Ptuj, Murska Sobota, and Novo Mesto [27].  Carcass removal is free; owners with livestock that die on their property simply call the collection center for removal and destruction.  As incentive for compliance, farmers can lose subsidies if they do not report dead animals.  VHS collects cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and horses, and keeps exhaustive records of owner, holding, and animal when it is collected.  Trucks can go to multiple farms for collection, provided that there is no suspicion of infectious disease.  Collectors do not enter stables or living areas; animals must be left outside of premises for collection.  Carcasses are transported to a collection center and entered into a database; renderers make daily pick-ups for proper disposal.  Necropsies are conducted at the collection center on request or on suspicion of disease (on-farm necropsy of animals other than poultry is not allowed).  The site visit team noted that VHS facility had good biosecurity measures, including fenced perimeter, locked entry gate, tire bath, and foot bath [27].  APHIS concludes that VHS efficiently provides a value-adding service, and that VHS’ good practices mitigate the risk of contagious animal diseases being spread in Slovenia.</p>
<p><b>Farm inspections-
</b></p>
<p>
Farm inspections within the context of EC Regulation 1082/2003 are performed by VARS and the Inspectorate of the Republic of Slovenia for Agriculture, Forestry, and Food (IRSAFF).  Farm visits include checks on animal registries, condition of animals, possible swill feeding violations, and familiarity with livestock owner regulations [27].  If there is non-compliance with veterinary legislation, approved veterinarians provide instructions (in writing) to the holding and the non-compliance must be remedied.  VARS officials are authorized to impose administrative sanctions for non-compliance.  VARS and IRSAFF inspection results are recorded directly into the central database (VOLOS), as are tasks performed by private veterinarians visiting the holding.  Data from the VOLOS web application is then used to develop a risk profile for each holding which determines further inspections and control measures applicable to the holding.  The risk profile also serves as the framework for devising the annual inspection plan.  For 2006, 5% of swine holdings were inspected, 10% of cattle holdings were inspected; and 5% of sheep/goat holdings were inspected [22].  APHIS considers Slovenia’s system of farm inspections to be adequate.</p>
<p><b><u>9.  CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Slovenia</u></b></p>
<p>
The Rules on contagious animal diseases (UL RS no. 54/02, 63/03, 28/04) afford legal authority and outline procedures for sampling, sample transport, and diagnostic tests [19].  The monitoring program includes CSF serum testing in wild boars.  Sampling can be risk-based, including increased surveillance on holdings near the border with Croatia (10 km zone, sero-surveyed every 6 months); on holdings with certain spatial relationships (clusters of large pig farms, proximity to land fills, etc); and on any wild boars found dead (including road-kill), upon which hunters take blood samples and NVI experts take other samples [19, 22, 32].  Samples include blood (with the addition of anticoagulant), tonsils, spleen, kidneys, lymph nodes and serum.  Samples are transported to the NVI at 4oC, where ELISA, virus isolation, immunoperoxidase, immunoflourescence, and histopathology diagnostic tests can be performed [19].  <b><i>NOTE: Diagnostic Laboratories are discussed at length in Section 10.</i></b><i>  </i></p>
<p><b>Classical swine fever surveillance-
</b></p>
<p>
CSF surveillance is conducted at three levels; passive monitoring, active monitoring in domestic pigs, and active monitoring in wild boars.  Slovenia has successively strengthened its CSF sampling strategy over the last years, leading to an increase in effectiveness.  From 1998 - 2002, CSF surveillance was random.  From 2001 – 2003, surveillance remained consistent:  on Slovenia’s 8 large pig farms, 10 samples were taken per month on fattening pigs, at the slaughterhouse.  On other fattening farms with more than 10 pigs, pigs were sampled once per year, at the slaughterhouse.  On fattening farms with more than 10 pigs near the border with Croatia, and on farms that swill feed, pigs were sampled twice per year, at the slaughterhouse, a risk mitigating measure.  Total samples taken for 2001 - 2003 were 1,073, 1,440, and 5,534, respectively [27].  
</p>
<p>
In 2004, Slovenia further adapted its surveillance strategy.  The 8 large pig farms were sampled the same, but on holdings with >10 pigs, 1 sample was taken for every 50 pigs, by a private vet, on the farm prior to animal movement.  On similar sized farms near the Croatian border, 2 samples were taken per 50 pigs, by private vet, on the farm.  A total of 5,311 samples were taken in 2004 [27].  In 2005, in an effort to understand the disease situation on all holdings, the sampling strategy was changed again (see Table 7) to a non-statistical method for blanket coverage.  
</p>
<p>
Table 6 shows surveillance data between 2001 and 2004; data (not included) is available that shows CSF surveillance at the regional level.  The 12 positive samples (domestic, 2002) were serological reactors.  All necessary control measures were implemented, and a full epidemiological investigation was carried out with no clinical signs of disease detected.  Additional blood samples were taken, and NVI carried out further lab investigations by serological testing, antigen ELISA, PCR and virus isolation. All test results were negative, and the suspicion was reversed.  The 39 positive samples (domestic, 2003) were breeding sows born before October 2000 (prior to Slovenia ceasing vaccination).  
</p>
<p><b>Table 6:  CSF surveillance data, domestic pigs and wild boar: 2001 – 09/2004 [21].</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Year</p>
</td>	<td><p>Tested</p>
</td>	<td><p>Positive</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Domestic</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild</p>
</td>	<td><p>Domestic</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,073</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,440</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,243</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>6 + 14</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,534</p>
</td>	<td><p>323</p>
</td>	<td><p>39</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,623</p>
</td>	<td><p>557</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
Regarding the positive cases in wild boars (2002), on March 7, 2002, NVI notified VARS that 6 of 14 samples taken from wild boars were positive for CSF antibodies.  Wild boars in two hunting areas in the south were monitored regularly, and no clinical signs of disease were detected, and no dead wild boars were found.  VARS assembled the NDCC, and it was decided that samples would be taken from all killed wild boars for serology and assayed by ELISA and virus isolation [19].  From March 25 to 13 May, 64 samples (spleen and coagulum) of wild boar were examined.  Fourteen of these samples tested positive for specific antibodies against CSF virus, however all samples (including the 14 positive on specific antibodies) were negative in antigen ELISA test.  Eight pooled spleen suspensions (5 spleens per pool) were also tested by PCR, all eight samples were negative for PCR [21].  There has been no detection of CSF in wild boars since 2002.  </p>
<p>
In 2005, CSF monitoring was amended in the Rules on carrying out of systematic monitoring of contagious animal diseases and vaccination in 2005 (UL RS 142/04, 4/05, 68/05).  For 8 large pig units and wild boar populations, the sampling system remained the same as approved in 2004 by the Commission (2004/840/EC).  The main change in the sampling plan was to do CSF antibody surveillance (Bomelli commercial AB-ELISA kit was used) on every holding that has breeding sows and every holding with more than 10 fattening pigs [28], with a prevalence of 5% and a 95% confidence [27].
</p>
<p><b>Table 7:  2005 CSF Sampling Scheme [28].</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p># Fatteners </p>
</td>	<td><p># Samples</p>
</td>	<td><p># Breeding sows </p>
</td>	<td><p># Samples </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10-20</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>1-19</p>
</td>	<td><p>All</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>21-30</p>
</td>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>20-25</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>31-60</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>26-100</p>
</td>	<td><p>25</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>61-200</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>101+</p>
</td>	<td><p>30</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>201+</p>
</td>	<td><p>14</p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
In 2005 there were 47,169 samples taken from 6,777 holdings tested with AB-ELISA.  A total of 562 samples (from 267) holdings were sero-positive, greater than half of which were due to vaccination (Table 8).  According to investigative protocols for disease suspicion (see schematic at the end of this section), additional tests were performed (Ag-ELISA, PCR) upon which the presence of live virus was excluded.  An official epidemiological investigation (including document checks and clinical exams) was conducted on all holdings with sero-positive results to confirm/rule out CSF.  Following these investigative protocols for positive reactors, CSF was ruled out in all 267 farms [28].  As per National Disease Control Center (NDCC) mandate, all positive reactors were culled.  A breakdown of 209 of the 562 sero-positive reactors, all detected in the first half of 2005, is shown in Table 9 [26].
</p>
<p><b>Table 8.  Summary of sero-positive reactors, 2005.</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Status</p>
</td>	<td><p># holdings</p>
</td>	<td><p># animals</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sero-positive due to vaccination</p>
</td>	<td><p>148</p>
</td>	<td><p>287</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sero-positive</p>
</td>	<td><p>119</p>
</td>	<td><p>275</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Total</p>
</td>	<td><p>267</p>
</td>	<td><p>562</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 9:  Summary of epidemiological investigations, first half of 2005 [26].</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Status/Action taken</p>
</td>	<td><p>No. of holdings</p>
</td>	<td><p>No. of animals</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ser. Reactors due to vaccination</p>
</td>	<td><p>73</p>
</td>	<td><p>131</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Re-tested with negative results</p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slaughtered</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Ser. Reactors (singleton, cross-reaction)</p>
</td>	<td><p>38</p>
</td>	<td><p>54</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>
For the 2006 CSF surveillance program, VARS and other experts designed a statistically based surveillance program for domestic pigs that would support the claim of CSF freedom.  In addition to the components described below, the following changes were made at a technical meeting and have been implemented in 2006:  re-testing irrespective of the age, use of virus neutralization (VN) assay, testing for differential diagnosis of Border Disease and bovine viral diarrhea (BVD), and rule outs in old animals only if there is evidence that the animal was vaccinated.  All laboratory tests (ELISA, BD serum neutralization, BVD serum neutralization, and PCR) must be completed for differential diagnoses [28].
</p>
<p>
The 2006 CSF surveillance plan called for 12,000 samples, with the following components:  a herd-based sampling scheme detecting a 0.2 % prevalence with 95% confidence limit in all breeding, fattening, and mixed holding pig farms, stratified according to herd size.  The number of farms (randomly selected) for this component was 1,497; the number of animals within each herd (randomly selected) was 7,744 pigs in breeding and mixed farms and 1,105 fattening pigs.  The focus of this component was on breeding animals; the sample ratio was 90% from breeding and mixed farms, 10% from fattening farms.  This component of the surveillance program did prescribe risk-based sampling in densely populated (pig or farm) areas.  
A second component of the 2006 surveillance program was investigation of fallen stock.  It was determined that 1% of fallen stock (28,000 pig carcasses collected by VHS per year on average, so approximately 300 samples) would be assayed using PCR (after standard post-mortem exam).  A random generator randomly selected the pigs for sampling from the CRPA.    Monitoring under the 2006 CSF surveillance program started in June, and continued to the end of November [28], after which Slovenia had collected over 6,500 routine samples for ELISA testing and had conducted 200+ confirmatory and differential diagnostic follow up tests [35].  </p>
<p>
For 2007, a similar sampling strategy for domestic swine was designed.  25 breeding sows and 10 fattening pigs were sampled from large farms, per quarter.  For smaller holdings, the sampling scheme was designed to detect a 1% level of sero-positive herds with 95% confidence.  For breeding herds, detection strategy was based on a within-herd prevalence of 5% with 95% confidence.  Risk based samples were also taken (e.g. purchased breeding pigs), and Slovenia provided information indicating that over 2,500 routine CSF samples were taken and over 150 confirmatory and differential diagnostic tests performed in 2007 [35].
</p>
<p>
APHIS concludes Slovenia’s past and current sampling schemes would effectively detect a CSF incursion into the domestic pig population.  
</p>
<p><b>CSF Monitoring in Wild Boar-  
</b></p>
<p>
CSF monitoring in wild boar from 1998 – 2001 was random and relatively limited;  61, 30, 52, and 50 samples were taken, respectively.  In 2003, VARS prepared a bolstered surveillance plan as part of a Twinning Light project with Germany;  the plan’s goal was to monitor the whole country, support the claim of CSF-freedom, maintain trade, and assess wild boar populations, emphasize early detection in wild boar populations, and minimize the risk of transfer to domestic swine populations [27].  The plan was based on hunting bags, the density of domestic and wild boars in certain areas, and the vicinity to the border.  A total of 595 samples were planned for 2003, but due to insufficient collaboration from hunters and Forest Service personnel and practical logistics problems, only 323 samples were taken [27].</p>
<p>
However, the template was set for Slovenia’s bolstered CSF surveillance programs in wild boar.  Since 2004, Slovenia has monitored the wild boar population using random sampling and risk-based sampling.  Random sampling strategies are used in Slovenia’s hunting areas when no spatial relationships dictate otherwise.  Under the random sampling component, an exact number (406) of samples suitable for lab testing should be taken nation-wide.  Twenty-nine samples are taken twice per year (total of 58) in densely populated areas, and 29 samples are taken per year in less populated areas.  The population density is defined as “less than 1.0 wild boar shot per 1 square kilometer of hunting area” (29 samples required), and “more than 1.0 wild boar shot per 1 square kilometer” (58 samples required).  These sample sizes are selected to detect CSF infections in wild boar population at 10% prevalence with 95% confidence [21, 26, 28].   </p>
<p>
In 2006 and 2007, Slovenia exceeded its planned CSF sampling scheme for wild boar.  In addition to the minimum required 406 random samples, 21 and 273 additional risk based samples were processed for 2006 and 2007, respectively.  The risk based samples were taken with particular emphasis in the border area with Croatia, in sub-regions where the density of wild boar is very high, in areas with habitat related migration routes, and in areas in close proximity to large pig holdings [35].  </p>
<p><b>Figure 12.  Density of wild boar in Slovenia [28]</b>.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image18.wmf" alt="image18.wmf"><img src="embedded:image11.emf" alt="image11.emf"></p>
<p>
Risk-based sampling is utilized when dictated by spatial relationships such as a cluster of large pig farms, proximity of wild boar to land fills, disease outbreaks in cross-border areas, etc.  In instances such as this, the sample size per hunting family is tailored for the situation.  For example, in 2004 the minimum required number of samples from the random sampling component was 406, but an additional 64 samples were processed under the risk-based component.  Perhaps the best illustration of the risk-based component is the fact that all wild boars shot or found dead (including road kill) in regions of Slovenia bordering Croatia are sampled under the risk-based surveillance component [26].  Utilizing the combined random and risk-based plan, 470 samples were taken on wild boar in 2004; all were negative.  110 samples were taken on wild boar in the first half of 2005; all were negative [27].  </p>
<p>
Hunting in Slovenia is organized by 427 hunting families which are aggregated into 18 hunting districts (other information indicates 13 hunting/rearing areas with 141 hunting societies).  There is a hunting association, under Department of Forestry oversight [27]; membership in the hunting association is dependent on passing a practical and theoretical exam, a portion of which covers disease symptoms, disease control, sampling, and transport of affected animals [27].  Most hunters are amateurs, although the Department of Forestry does employ professional hunters [27].  VARS organizes two training workshops and one training seminar for hunting associations (Hunters Association of Slovenia, regional associations, etc).  Further regional training is provided to hunters on their hunting territory, where they learn sampling techniques and proper documentation, etc.  Whereas sampling of shot wild boars is done by hunters, sampling of found dead wild boars is done by the NVI.  If the carcass is inaccessible for NVI personnel, hunters are permitted to sample (typically spleen) the carcass and deliver directly to nearest NVI.  The hunter must notify the regional office of VARS and indicate the location of the found dead wild boar [26].  Dead boar carcasses are disposed of immediately, whereas shot wild boars are processed at one of Slovenia’s 371 game collection centers [28].   There is an annual seminar with hunting families to review the results of CSF sampling program in wild boar for that year, to review upcoming sampling programs, and to garner feedback from the hunting groups [27].</p>
<p>
APHIS considers Slovenia’s CSF surveillance in wild boar to be well-devised, flexible, and capable of detecting disease in the wild boar population.  Furthermore, Slovenia implements targeted risk-based sampling as necessary, particularly along the border with Croatia. 
</p>
<p><b>SVD and FMD surveillance-
</b></p>
<p>
The Rules on contagious animal diseases (UL RS 54/02, 63/03, 28/04, 142/04) outline sampling procedures and laboratory methods for SVD and FMD.   According to those rules, samples for SVD diagnostic procedures are serum and vesicular fluid, which must be fresh and transported at 4oC, on which the NVI performs ELISA assays.  All other SVD diagnostic methods (virus isolation, SN, RVK), including any assays performed in the case of SVD suspicion, must be performed at Community Reference Laboratory (Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK) [20].  For FMD, the required samples for diagnostic procedures are serum, vesicular fluid, milk, Probang, and skin epithelium, all of which have to be fresh and transported at approx 4C [20].  If FMD is suspected or confirmed, procedures for sampling are outlined in Chapter C (Collection and submission of materials to National Veterinary Institute) of Annex VI (Instructions for veterinarians), of the Contingency Plan for Foot and Mouth Disease in Slovenia [20].  </p>
<p>
Due to the lack of SVD or FMD in Slovenia, Slovenia does not have aggressive active surveillance programs for these diseases [20].  Slovenia did assay 30 samples in 2004 to rule out SVD [23], and has implemented an SVD monitoring program for 2008 in which all breeding boars and a minimum number of fattening pigs and culled breeding sows (from farms with over 500 breeding sows) will be tested for SVD [35].  Although active surveillance results for SVD and FMD are not available, APHIS considers Slovenia’s passive surveillance for SVD and FMD and proposed 2008 sampling strategies to be adequate, and capable of detecting disease.    </p>
<p><b>Epidemiologic investigations of false positives-
</b></p>
<p> 
In each of the CSF suspicions discussed in the surveillance section above, the following procedures were implemented (represented schematically in Figure 13).  </p>
<p><b>Figure 13:  Slovenia’s investigative procedures for false positives [28].</b></p>
<p>
<img src="embedded:image12" alt="image12">
</p>
<p>Re-sampling is two blood samples (1 native, 1 with EDTA).</p>
<p>
An official investigation is launched which includes a clinical examination; document checks on all animal movements, vaccinations, mortalities, identification and registration; and an epidemiological investigation. Then, according to guidelines and procedures described in 2002/106/EC, the holding is classified as CSF-suspect and relevant sampling, diagnostic procedures, and laboratory tests to confirm CSF are performed.    All movements are subsequently banned, except for slaughter.  Additional tests (AG-ELISA, PCR, SN) are performed, including re-sampling the positive reactors and testing a representative sample from the same holding.  Confirmatory samples are sent to the EU CSF Reference Lab in Hanover.  After the investigation concludes, all positive reactors are culled.  In several cases the sero-positive CSF reactors lead to National Disease Control Center (NDCC) assembly.  APHIS considers Slovenia’s epidemiologic investigations in the case of a false positive to be thorough and effective at ruling out disease suspicions and confirming disease presence.  <b><i>NOTE: Emergency response capability (including NDCC assembly) is discussed at length in Section 11.  </i></b></p>
<p><b>Summary of CSF, SVD, and FMD surveillance-
</b></p>
<p>
Active serological surveillance for CSF in domestic swine is sufficient to detect the presence of the disease.  Serological surveillance for antibodies to CSF could miss an early infection, since antibodies occur relatively late (around 21 days). Passive surveillance could also overlook early infection with a moderate or low virulence strain, thereby delaying the time to detection.  However, training and national simulation exercises aid in passive surveillance for CSF, SVD, and FMD by developing and maintaining the ability to quickly detect these diseases.  CSF surveillance in wild boar is adequate; detection may be delayed, but serological surveillance should reveal the historical presence of CSF.  Slovenia conducts fewer serological surveys for SVD and FMD, relying more on passive surveillance to detect these diseases.  Detection may be delayed in the absence of overt clinical signs.  Overall, APHIS considers Slovenia’s disease surveillance for CSF, SVD, and FMD to be adequate.  </p>
<p><b><u>10.  Slovenia’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity
</u></b></p>
<p>
The National Veterinary Institute is part of the Veterinary Faculty of the University of Ljubljana and is contracted by VARS to perform public veterinary service work as the national laboratory.  The NVI was formed by reorganizing the existing Veterinary Institute of Slovenia into a special organizational unit licensed to carry out many of the veterinary activities [19].  The NVI has a central diagnostic laboratory (CDL), located in Ljubljana, that is organized into the following units:  Diagnostics of infectious and other diseases of animals, Food of animal origin, Reproduction and genetics, Pathology of animal nutrition and environmental hygiene, Control and testing of drugs.  The Diagnostics of infectious and other disease of animals is primary to this evaluation, as it is responsible for confirmatory testing of screening tests for animal infectious diseases performed at regional units.  The Diagnostics section also manages the procedures of the national and regional laboratories in Slovenia for official veterinary inspection and disease control, and assesses compliance of NVI laboratories in performing diagnostic tests.  The NVI also oversees any vaccination program monitoring tests [22].  The NVI has 197 employees, 70 of which work on contagious diseases.  It employs 60 veterinarians [23].  
</p>
<p>
The legal authority and description of laboratory tests and methods of the NVI is outlined in the VPA, the Rules on contagious animal diseases (UL RS nos. 54/02, 63/03, 28/04, 142/04), and the contingency plans (the latter specifying procedures for NVI laboratory processing during a disease outbreak).  The VPA authorizes the NVI and obliges it to perform VARS-approved diagnostic assays for disease prevention and control, including ELISAs, virus isolation, immunoperoxidase, immunoflourescence, pathoanatomy, and histopathology methods.  The NVI is responsible for a monthly report to the Office for Contagious Animal Diseases of VARS on the results of diagnostic investigations, and also must submit to VARS an annual report [23].  
</p>
<p>
The NVI is the national reference laboratory for a number of diseases, specified in the Accession Treaty, including CSF and FMD [22].  Overall throughput capacity of the lab is 5,000 – 10,000 serum samples for ELISA per week, 200 samples for virus isolation weekly, and 3,000 virus antigen ELISAs weekly, provided all other laboratory functions are suspended.  If additional volume is needed, Ljubljana can provide supplies to other NVI labs authorized to perform ELISAs [23].  VARS needs an updated contingency plan to reflect that NVI is capable of performing the following CSF diagnostic procedures as required: virus isolation in PK-15 cells, neutralizing antibody assay (also on PK-15 cells) to CSF reference strain Alfort/187, total Ab ELISA, CSF-specific ELISA, RT-PCR for virus nucleic acid, nucleotide sequencing of RT-PCR products (CSF virus typing) [23].  As of April 2005, the lab is not yet authorized to perform all tests, as the BL-3 containment center is not yet completed and does not meet the requirements recommended in the EC’s “Directorate-General for Agriculture VI/B/II.2 (VI/7888/97/AL/Kod): Annex 1:  Minimum requirements for national swine fever laboratories, pp. 63-66 [19].  Thus, it has not yet been accredited by VARS and the EU.  Similar restrictions apply to FMD testing.  </p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia’s NVI accurately and efficiently carries out appropriate diagnostic laboratory procedures.  NVI interacts with CRLs in a beneficial manner, and obtains similar laboratory results when ring tests are performed.  APHIS concludes that the NVI has throughput capacity to process the required amount of diagnostic assays on a yearly basis.      </p>
<p><b>Regional laboratories-
</b></p>
<p>
The NVI has 8 regional units, located in Ljubljana, Maribor, Novo mesto, Nova Gorica, Kranj, Celje, Ptuj, and Murska Sobota.  Screening tests for infectious animal diseases are performed at the regional labs and confirmed at the CDL [22], although regional laboratories do not do CSF testing as NVI is capable of satisfactorily processing all CSF testing relative to the number of pigs in Slovenia [23].  Regional laboratories are responsible for assessing all cattle, pigs, sheep, horses, goats that die within the territory [27].  APHIS concludes that the regional laboratories communicate well with the NVI, and adequately perform regional diagnostic testing.  </p>
<p><b>Figure 14:  Slovenia regional units of NVI [19].</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image13.png" alt="image13.png"></p>
<p><b>CSF Diagnostic Capability-
</b></p>
<p>
NVI can perform all diagnostic tests necessary to confirm CSF but must submit samples from the primary outbreak to the Community Reference laboratory in Hannover Germany for confirmation [23]. The full diagnostic procedures and diagnostic manual for CSF are outlined in Article 17 of the Rules on CSF (UL RS 62/03, 23/04) and the Rules on Contagious Animal Diseases (RCAD) [23].  For CSF, ELISA, virus isolation and IPT on cell culture, immunoflourescence of fixed tissue, pathoanatomy, histopathology, all of which are carried out by the NVI.  For CSF testing, their procedure has been accredited by Dutch and Slovenian authorities by ELISA.  Isolation of CSF virus is by PCR and Ag ELISA.  For CSF surveillance testing, samples are processed as they arrive.  In some cases, samples may be kept at the farm or slaughter facility until a certain number is obtained and then sent to a laboratory [23].
</p>
<p>
The capacity of CSF testing is 2000 per day, according to the CSF contingency plan the virology lab must be able at any time to do 50 assays [26].  For 2005 NVI receive 34,000 samples for CSF serological testing.  When CSF is suspected, field samples are delivered to NVI the same day (within 3 hours).  While the NVI is capable of performing all diagnostics, samples from the index case of an outbreak must be sent to the CRL-Hannover for definitive confirmation, results returned in 3-4 days.  If a sample yields a positive result, the laboratory must inform VARS immediately by fax and VARS begins an epidemiological investigation.  Part of the epidemiological investigation is making the necessary differential diagnosis, which are described in the RCAD, including post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome and porcine dermatitis and nephropathy syndrome; pathology is used as a rule out [23].
</p>
<p><b>SVD and FMD diagnostics-</b></p>
<p>
The RCAD stipulates the diagnostic tests for SVD are the ELISA, virus isolation, VN, and CF.  Of these assays, only the ELISA is carried out by NVI; the other diagnostic tests are performed by a reference laboratory [22].  In 2004 there were 30 samples tested to rule out SVD.  In the case of a positive ELISA result (i.e. disease suspicion), samples would be sent to CRL- Pirbright for confirmatory testing.  The NVI is capable of processing 500 samples by ELISA per day [23].  There are no swine vesicular disease tests done this year, but in the past, these were done in the serology laboratory [19].  
</p>
<p>
The diagnostic tests for FMD are outlined in the RCAD (54/02, 63/03, 28/04) [23].  The RCAD stipulates ELISA and virus isolation testing for FMD diagnostics, along with some molecular methods.  Although no samples have been received, the NVI can perform ELISA tests for FMD Type A, O, and C antigens with a weekly capacity of 5000 serum samples for one assay type.  The lab can perform 100 virus isolations and 500 virus antigen assays weekly.  However, NVI’s national laboratory is not permitted to work with live FMD virus at this time (BL-3 containment facility completed in 2004, failure to meet the requirements recommended by the FVO (“Security Standards for FMD Laboratories”), so an agreement was signed between the NVI and the CRL in Pirbright for virological testing for FMD.  Results are usually obtained within two days [19, 22, 23].  Slovenia is aware of and surveys for differential diagnoses; the NVI assists in rule outs by performing laboratory tests (peroxidase test) for Border disease virus and bovine viral diarrhea [23].       
</p>
<p><b>Auditing/Accreditation/Budget-
</b></p>
<p>
As evidence of their efforts to audit standardized laboratory tests, Slovenia provided full details on a series of CSF inter-laboratory comparison tests in 2003, 2004, 2005.  The supporting documentation for those tests came from Slovenia’s participation in the Annual Meetings of National Swine Fever Laboratories in 2004, 2005, and 2006.    The inter-laboratory comparison tests involved 43 total labs, including all NRLs of EU MS and Accession Countries, several Eastern European countries, two U.S. labs, and one commercial lab.  Labs tested panels of lyophilized porcine serum samples and aqueous cDNA.  Serum samples were analyzed using all routine lab methods (eg virus isolation, antigen ELISA, antibody ELISA, RT-PCR, VN assay); the cDNA samples were analyzed by PCR only.  Differential tests for BVDV and BDV were also performed.  Samples were processed as part of the lab’s daily routine sampling (results were due back within 3 weeks) [28].  The NVI is accredited to ISO 17025 (administered by Dutch and Slovenian accreditation bodies; updated scope of accreditation is available through http://www.vf.uni-lj.si/veterina/.) [22].  Funding for the NVI comes from a special sub-account for the Veterinary Faculty at Ljubljana [19];  the total budget for the Vet Faculty in 2006 was $38,793,504.05 USD, of which the NVI was appropriated $7,484,581.59 USD [28].
</p>
<p><b>Summary of laboratory capability-
</b></p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that between the NVI and regional laboratories, Slovenia can conduct the necessary diagnostic testing required to successfully recognize the country’s CSF, SVD, and FMD status.  Diagnostic tests performed by Slovenia’s laboratory system are relevant to the diseases under investigation, and samples are confirmed by the CRLs when necessary.  Slovenia’s laboratory system is capable of handling high volume throughput during times of outbreak.  
</p>
<h2>11.  Slovenia’s Emergency Response Capability
</h2>
<p><b>Activating Emergency Response Procedures-
</b></p>
<p>
According to the VPA, the holder of the animal that has been ill or died must immediately notify veterinary services, and a veterinarian must immediately visit the holding to begin examinations/sampling that will confirm or rule out disease.  As soon as the suspicion of CSF cannot be ruled out, the holding is placed under official surveillance and the official veterinarian bans the movement of pigs to and out of the holding.  Movement of people, vehicles, meat, products, semen, embryos, ova, feed, etc is allowed only with VARS approval.  Appropriate disinfection is used at the entrance and exit of holdings and pig buildings.  These measures apply until the suspicion is ruled out [19].  The relevant veterinary organization must immediately notify the Regional Office of VARS (VARS has a 24 hour, 365 day hotline) and the authorized laboratory to which further samples will be sent.  VARS must post this information within 24 hours to OIE, the EC, and the competent veterinary authorities of all neighboring countries.  Notification means all information provided, and the ADNS system updated [19].  When laboratory testing is completed, the laboratory must immediately notify the Regional Office of diagnostic results.  If CSF is not ruled out, the NDCC and Expert Group are summoned, relevant holdings and animals are evaluated, and all appropriate measures are taken [19].  </p>
<p>
Once a positive diagnosis has been confirmed by the NDCC, a decision is issued enacting the Rules on CSF.   MAFF, VARS, NVI, veterinary inspectors and private veterinarians  in the affected and neighboring areas are all notified, as are local communities, road network operators, animal haulers, farmers’ organizations, slaughterhouses, processing establishments, commercial operators, market organizers, subcontractors, disinfection companies, exterminators (bugs and rodents), feed producers, feed suppliers, hunting associations, and notification centers.  Police, public protection services, and Slovenian military forces can be enlisted if necessary.  The NDCC/Expert Group establish boundaries for the infected and endangered zones, and any necessary control measures.  The measures prescribed for the infected zone remain in force for at least 30 days after the disposal of animals and cleaning/disinfection of the last infected holding.  Measures instituted in the endangered zone remain in force until cleaning and disinfection of infected holdings is completed, and laboratory testing confirms the disease is not present.  If these measures have been implemented and the disease suspicion is then ruled out, a decision must be issued to withdraw all measures [19].
</p>
<p>
The legal bases for implementing emergency response procedures, including depopulation and indemnity, are sufficiently afforded in the VPA (UL RS 33/2001), the Rules on contagious animal diseases (UL RS 54/02, 63/03), and the Rules on measures for the detection, prevention and suppression of classical swine fever- Pestis suum (UL RS 62/03), and Instructions on measures for the detection, prevention and suppression of foot-and-mouth disease (UL RS 30/99, 59/99).  
</p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that the Republic of Slovenia has legal authority to enact necessary emergency response measures, and that the emergency response measures enacted are effective at containing disease outbreaks.  </p>
<p><b>Infrastructure/Chain of Command-
</b></p>
<p>
Emergency management infrastructure elements are thoroughly described in the CSF CP and in the Rules on the measures for detection, prevention and suppression of classical swine fever- pestis suum (UL RS no 62/03, 23/04)[19].  Disease Control Centers are operated at National and Local levels (NDCC and LDCC, respectively).  The NDCC coordinates the national strategy to control disease outbreaks by developing national disease control strategies, increasing disease awareness, implementing movement restrictions (including border crossings), and emergency vaccination, establishing infected and endangered zones, communicating with diagnostic labs, implementing budgetary/financial elements of disease control measures, providing training, and supervising the regional and local veterinary efforts.  The LDCC (3-5 vets, 3-5 vet techs, 5 admin), established by the RO and headquartered within an infected zone, directs and implements local strategies by performing epidemiological investigations, restricting of animal movements, depopulating holdings, improving awareness, providing training and equipment, communicating with the NVI, liaising with police, agriculture and trade organizations, and personnel from fairs, markets, and slaughterhouses [20, 22].  The following flow chart outlines the chain of command/operations during an outbreak situation.</p>
<p><b>Figure 15:  Chain of command for Slovenia’s emergency response system </b>[20].</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image14.emf" alt="image14.emf"></p>
<p>
The Expert Group is appointed by the NDCC and the NVI; members are chosen based on technical expertise and include one Specialist each of the Virological Lab, Department for Swine Disease, and Pathology of Domestic Animals (all three part of the NVI), the head of the VHS, a representative of the Veterinary Chamber, a representative of the disinfection service, a veterinary inspector specializing in animal health, and a supervisory veterinarian.  The Expert Group is coordinated by an appointed Head, and is responsible for conducting the epidemiological investigations of disease outbreaks.  They establish the scope of infection and gather information on possible sources of infection and date of introduction, and assess possible disease spread to surrounding areas.  This information is used to advise LDCC on sampling strategy and control measures [19, 20].  APHIS concludes that the infrastructure assembled during outbreaks is well-organized, communicates effectively, and has clear scope and domain in all issues relating to eradicating a disease outbreak.  </p>
<p><b>CSF Contingency Plan-
</b></p>
<p>
Slovenia’s CSF contingency plan was originally approved by Commission Decision 2004/431/EC and was most recently approved by Commission Decision 2001/89/EC (CPs must be reviewed every five years (ULRS 62/03, annex to 4/20/05).  The CSF contingency plan conforms closely to the provisions of EC legislation clearly outlines the chain of command of the NDCC, LDCC, and Expert Group [19].  All VARS ROs, NVI veterinarians in the laboratory and necropsy room, official slaughterhouse veterinarians, and private veterinarians have a copy of the current contingency plan [26].  The CSF contingency plan is available on the VARS website [22].
 
</p>
<p>
The contingency plan outlines stamping out procedures (depopulation and disposal), indemnity for animals slaughtered and equipment destroyed.  Instructions to and procedures for veterinarians are provided, as well as sampling methods, laboratory diagnostics, biosecurity and surveillance measures, establishing infected and endangered zones (3 and 10 km, respectively), contact holdings, emergency vaccination capability, and cleaning and disinfection procedures.  Contingency plan also contains templates of notices to the public, forms, etc.  The CSF contingency plan lays down emergency vaccination procedures for feral pig populations, and contains decision criteria for implementing emergency vaccination.  The contingency plan authorizes stamping out procedures and thoroughly describes procedures for depopulation, carcass disposal, and indemnification.  The CSF contingency plan provides an exhaustive list of tasks and duties for veterinarians, including surveillance schemes and sampling methods, appropriate laboratory diagnostic testing, biosecurity measures, proper establishing and maintenance of infected and endangered zones, emergency vaccination procedures, and cleaning and disinfection procedures.  The contingency plan offers guidance on public awareness and notification, and includes templates of public notices, relevant forms for a disease situation [19].  <i>NOTE:  Details on certain elements are provided below.</i>  
</p>
<p><b>SVD and FMD contingency plans-
</b></p>
<p>
Slovenia does not have a specific contingency plan for SVD.  However, SVD has never been detected in Slovenia, and APHIS recognizes Slovenia’s thorough contingency plans for CSF and FMD.  In particular, the FMD contingency plan should encourage the detection and reporting of vesicular diseases that could lead to an SVD diagnosis.  Although there is not a specific contingency plan for SVD, should a positive or inconclusive sample be obtained, the NDCC is convened and national legislation is implemented that outlines the response measures for an SVD event.  This national legislation, UL RS 122/07, fully transposes all of the SVD testing requirements and control measures of Commission Decision 2000/428/EC and Directive 92/119/EEC [35].  A summary of these SVD-specific measures was provided by Slovenia [35], and APHIS concludes that the control measures and response mechanisms are in accordance with Community standards, equivalent to those outlined in Slovenia’s CSF and FMD contingency plans, and adequate for SVD control and eradication.  
</p>
<p>
The FMD CP was originally approved by Commission Decision 2004/431/EC and was last updated in 2004 [22].  The FMD CP conforms closely to the provisions of EC legislation, and many of the features of the FMD contingency plan are similar to features of the CSF contingency plan described above.  The FMD contingency plan mandates disease reporting, a NDCC/LDCC/Expert Group infrastructure with similar duties and authority, infected and endangered zones with appropriate control measures (e.g. restricted access to holdings, animal movements), protective vaccination if deemed necessary.  In the case of FMD, Expert Group members are obviously appointed based on specialized training or technical expertise on FMD.  VHS (as per UL RS 13/98) or private companies remain responsible for removal and transport dead animal carcasses/animal waste.  The FMD contingency plan stipulates that the NVI (CDL in Ljubljana and the regional labs) prepares and dispatches materials required to take and transport samples, and remains on 24-hour alert during outbreaks.   As with the CSF contingency plan, copies of the FMD plan are accessible at relevant veterinary offices and publicly available on the VARS website [22].</p>
<p>
The FMD contingency plan is supplemented by three documents; the Manual for Livestock Breeders; the Manual for Milk Producers and Processors; and the Contingency Plan for the Laboratory.  The FMD contingency plan includes sample documents of veterinary reports, movement certificates, warning signs (eg restricted access, road closures), supply lists, etc.  Also included in the FMD contingency plan is a lengthy and detailed “Instructions for Veterinarians”, describing everything from the etiology of FMD virus to differential diagnosis to the cessation of restrictions, it even includes instructions on how to mark outbreak maps [20].
</p>
<p>
APHIS considers the contingency plans for CSF and FMD to be thorough and adequate, and indicative of Slovenia’s ability to effectively deal with SVD in the absence of an SVD-specific contingency plan.   
</p>
<p><b>Notification/Communication- 
</b></p>
<p>
The CSF contingency plan and UL RS 62/03 outline the procedures for official notification of CSF outbreaks, up to the Community level.  CSF and other animal diseases are reported via the ADNS notification system [21].  At the national level, the structure of the emergency response infrastructure (NDCC/LDCC/Expert Group) facilitates well organized and efficient communications.  The Head of the LDCC reports daily to the NDCC, relaying results of epidemiological investigations and overall situation in the field (eg, progress of disease spread, number of animals depopulated, inspection results, permit issuances, control measures instituted and/or withdrawn, staff involvement, etc).   Each veterinarian submits a daily report of their activities to the Head of the LDCC, and a daily report is generated on activities carried out at infected holding(s).  The Expert Group reports similarly to the NDCC, by phone and/or fax [19].  APHIS considers this notification system to be sufficient.</p>
<p><b>Infected/Endangered zones-
</b></p>
<p>
Upon confirmation of a disease outbreak, an infected and endangered zone must be established and applicable measures instituted within each zone.  With FMD, for example, measures in the infected zone may include daily clinical exam of all bi-ungulates; sampling for laboratory testing;  closed stabling of animals;  no conveyance of animals out of the infected zone; road and rail transport restrictions (animals may be moved through an infected zone by rail or by highway, if no stops/unloading are performed); movement restrictions of feed and bedding; disinfection stations for vehicle traffic (no vehicles access to infected holdings);  prohibition of assembly centers, fairs, markets, exhibitions; slaughter of feral companion animals, and indoor housing of pet animals; mandatory cleaning and disinfection at slaughterhouses; rendering of slaughter by-products; restrictions on hunting, fishing, and other outdoor recreation;  and prohibition of breeding practices, including natural mating, artificial insemination (AI), and embryo transfer.  In the endangered zone, control measures may include clinical exam of all bi-ungulates every 3 days (up to 9 days); animal movement restrictions, including no trade except to slaughter; roadway and railway restrictions (transit through the zone without stop is allowed); prohibited trade of foodstuffs, raw materials, waste, and feed; outlaw of assembly centers, markets, fairs, or exhibitions; outlaw of hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities.  Although natural mating is prohibited in the endangered zone, AI with semen of animals from a noninfected zone can be performed [19, 20].  All of these measures should be effective, if they are followed.  Because Slovenia has a training program for field personnel based on simulations (see below for a more complete description), APHIS considers it likely that the field personnel are familiar with provisions of the plan and can implement it appropriately.  
</p>
<p>
Slovenia’s contingency plans demonstrate flexibility in assigning infected and endangered zones, allowing for variations due to geography, environmental factors, meteorological conditions, presence and type of vectors, results of epidemiologic investigations or laboratory testing, and location of necessary facilities (such as slaughterhouse) [19].  This includes a scenario where an infected or endangered zone from another country might extend into Slovenia, upon which assembly centers, markets, fairs, exhibitions, competitions within 5 km of border are prohibited; personal protective equipment is required for all animal handlers; and common control measures and biosecurity principles such as access restrictions, quarantines, and daily clinical exams of susceptible animals are implemented [20].  
</p>
<p>
In the case of FMD, disease control measures in the infected and endangered zones are withdrawn after the maximum incubation period of the disease plus the following:  live animals cannot be introduced at an infected holding for an additional 90 days; stable manure cannot be used on arable land for at least 30 days in summer and at least 90 days in winter; and grain feed cannot be removed for 60 days [20].  These control measures reduce potential for disease spread.   </p>
<p><b>Sampling during an outbreak-
</b></p>
<p>
Specimen collection during CSF outbreaks is fully described in Chapter C (Collection and submission of materials to NVI) of Annex VII (Instructions for veterinarians) of the CP.  Samples for investigation (tissue samples from dead animals or blood samples of live suspect cases) must be submitted to a diagnostic laboratory, fresh and transported at 4oC.  Serum is collected sterile test tubes without anticoagulant, whole blood is collected sterile test tubes with the addition of EDTA anticoagulant.  Tissue samples are collected in a necropsy room (necropsy at the holding is not allowed) and placed in well sealed containers and transported at 4oC.  Tissues samples are harvested from spleen, lymph nodes, tonsils, kidneys, ileum/ileocecal valve, bone marrow, and brain.  Carcasses are then taken by the VHS (also responsible for transporting carcasses to lab for necropsy) to the rendering plant [19].  APHIS concludes that sampling schemes and sampling protocols during an outbreak are satisfactory to provide the laboratory with valid specimens.   </p>
<p>
Official veterinarians at the slaughterhouse carry out inspections and must separate suspect carcasses (including hides, skin, offal, hooves, claws, etc.) and suspect animals from other carcasses or animals until the Expert Group veterinarian and an official VARS veterinarian investigate.  Simultaneously, the entrances to and from the slaughterhouse are closed, and vehicles/staff are not allowed to leave [19].  As per the FMD contingency plan and UL RS 9/96, vesicular disease detected at slaughter facilities is considered FMD until proven otherwise, and effective on-site FMD measures (rapid depopulation of animals, movement restrictions, and cleaning and disinfection of the slaughterhouse with increased biosecurity) are applied.  </p>
<p><b>Movement restrictions-
</b></p>
<p>
The contingency plans demonstrate flexibility when outlining animal movement restrictions during an outbreak.  Upon confirmation of disease, no live animals can leave an infected zone without veterinary inspector approval, and trade in animals, animal products, embryos, ova, semen, in both the infected and endangered zones restricted.  Per the FMD contingency plan, restriction measures may apply to root and tuber crops, hay, straw, and cereals, as well milk and milk products (able to transmit FMD).  A specific contingency plan exists for milk production or processing facilities and dairies that outlines disease control measures from sampling strategies and movement restrictions to cleaning and disinfection of the establishment and indemnity for milk, skimmed milk, whey, butter milk, and cream [19, 20].  Slaughter processes are outlined in detail, and much detail is provided about suspicion and confirmation of disease at livestock markets and exhibitions.  The CSF contingency plan also addresses movements of milk, poultry, eggs, rabbits, hares, root and tuber crops, hay, straw and cereals from CSF infected holdings during CSF suspicions/outbreaks [19].</p>
<p>
If a fair or exhibition is in progress when an outbreak is confirmed, the movement of animals from the fair is prohibited.  If animals were released from a fair or exhibition just prior to a disease outbreak, they are traced and examined [19].  Thorough detail is provided on control measures for disease suspicion and confirmation at livestock markets and exhibitions (e.g. restricted access, movement controls, biosecurity measures, etc) in the FMD contingency plan [20]. </p>
<p>
Slovenia’s movement restrictions effectively reduce the spread of disease during an outbreak, provided disease is detected early enough.  
</p>
<p><b>Depopulation/Indemnity-
</b></p>
<p>
Once infected or suspect animals have been depopulated, removal of carcasses from an infected holding is prohibited [19].  In the infected zone, it is acceptable to slaughter pigs in an approved facility approved for export, but according to EU legislation, such meat has to be marked in accordance with EU legislation and can only be used for internal market [26].  When carcass destruction cannot be immediately performed, carcasses are disinfected and are kept under continual observation until they can be destroyed.  Rendering, incineration and burial are accepted disposal methods.  Incineration must take places remote to the public; burial sites must be distant from waterways.  When burying carcasses, national law affords VARS access and funds for heavy equipment and fuel [20].  Slovenia’s Category 1 ABP processing plant is contracted for carcass and infected product disposal in the event of a disease outbreak [22].  APHIS considers the disposal plan to be adequate.</p>
<p>
Value assessment and indemnity payouts are outlined in the VPA, the Rules on compensations in the veterinary sector (UL RS 37/02), and in the CSF and FMD contingency plans.  Animal owners are by law entitled to compensation for damage to or destruction of animals, objects, or raw materials during outbreak control measures.  Compensation is determined by the market value of the animals, objects, or raw materials, as assessed prior to destruction (in accordance with UL RS 9/96) by a commission of appraisers appointed by a veterinary inspector.  Indemnity applies to feed, semen, embryos, carcasses, equipment, and products destroyed in a slaughterhouse [19].  The animal owner initiates the disbursement procedure by filing for compensation (as per UL RS 9/96) at a regional office of VARS [21].  Should requestors disagree with VARS payout decisions, they have 30 days to appeal to the competent court in a non-legal, civil procedure.  The monetary value of the compensation cannot be legally or administratively challenged; proposals are made to the court in a non-litigious manner.  Indemnity is paid out tax-free, within the shortest time possible; if part of the indemnified entity(ies) are still usable, the compensation is decreased by the value of the usable portion [20, 21].  Compensation can be withheld from the animal owner if it is found that he did not immediately report a disease suspicion, of failed to comply with any other prescribed disease control measures [21].  Slovenia’s indemnity plan is sufficient to encourage disease reporting.  </p>
<p><b>Cleaning/Disinfection-
</b></p>
<p>
The contingency plans thoroughly describe principles and procedures of cleaning and disinfection (C/D).  Briefly, C/D consists of a primary disinfection, followed by mechanical cleaning (e.g. scraping or brushing), and lastly a final disinfection with hot sodium hydroxide.  An approved veterinarian must supervise all C/D procedures.  PPE is required during disinfection, including rubber boots, overalls, protective goggles, and headgear.  C/D measures apply to all surfaces, equipment, tools, commodities, manure, and liquid slurry on the premise [20].
</p>
<p><b>Repopulation-
</b></p>
<p><b>
</b>The contingency plans specify that repopulation of infected premises cannot take place until 30 days after final cleaning and disinfection.  Sentinel pigs are placed and sampled 40 days after placement.  If negative for antibodies, full repopulation may take place [19].</p>
<p><b>Penalties/Noncompliance-
</b></p>
<p>
The VPA provides an exhaustive list of penalties, including failure to keep proper records or provide relevant information, noncompliance with disease control measures, import/export violations, transport violations, etc.  The VPA specifies a monetary amount for each violation, with penalties ranging from 50,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT; please note that Slovenia adopted the euro as of Jan 1, 2007) to 10,000,000 SIT, depending on the offense.  Penalties can be applied to individuals and companies [19].  APHIS considers that imposition of these penalties should encourage disease reporting.  </p>
<p><b>Emergency Vaccination-
</b></p>
<p>
UL RS 62/03 describes emergency vaccination procedures for domestic swine and feral pigs (emergency vaccination for SVD is not allowed, emergency vaccination for CSF requires EC approval), and emergency vaccination procedures for FMD are outlined in the vaccine manual segment of the FMD contingency plan (emergency FMD vaccination is fully detailed in the “Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccination Manual”, part of the FMD contingency plan).  The Minister (based on the recommendations of the NVI and an Expert Group) may authorize emergency protective vaccination of animals if there is risk of uncontrolled disease spread.  The decision to vaccinate is communicated to the NDCC, then to the head of the LDCC, who disseminates the information to all other relevant veterinary personnel.  Roles during emergency vaccination are clearly defined for NDCC, LDCC, head of Vaccination Section, veterinary staff, etc.  Vaccine stocks are banked by a commercial company contracted by VARS, who distributes vaccines during an outbreak to the LDCC.  The LDCC must maintain accurate vaccine records [19, 20].
</p>
<p>
The type and application of the vaccine is decided by the NDCC.  Options include protective and suppressive vaccination, or the decision can be made to vaccinate major areas or even Slovenia as a whole.  Once the appropriate measure has been decided and corresponding zone established, vaccination is only performed in infected and endangered zones.  The zones may be changed to suit the disease situation, as recommended by the Expert Group.  Storage and transport of vaccines is well described in the CSF contingency plan, vaccination is supervised by the Vaccination Section of the LDCC.  After vaccination, animals are reexamined for possible clinical signs of the disease.  No animal movements can occur until 14 days post vaccination (except direct to slaughterhouse).  Any animal movements require approval and permit, issued by the head of the LDCC.  Surveillance strategies post-vaccination are clearly defined, yet adequately flexible [19].  In the case of FMD, trade restrictions on bi-ungulates apply for 14 days after vaccination (unless moved straight to slaughter), after which bi-ungulates can only be traded within the vaccination area [20].</p>
<p>
APHIS considers the emergency vaccination programs to be appropriate.
</p>
<p><b>Training/Simulation Exercises-
</b></p>
<p>
To supplement standard veterinary training, every year VARS prepares a real time alert exercise to evaluate emergency response procedures and assess the readiness of veterinary professionals and animal keepers for an outbreak of a notifiable disease [28].  Slovenian officials entered a cooperative training exercise with Germany on monitoring CSF in wild boar in 2003 and 2004; underwent CSF diagnostic training in 2004, and provide various lecture series on CSF for breeders and private/official veterinarians.  Slovenian officials trained with CSF experts from the Netherlands in 1999, and conducted contingency plan training/simulations in 2001 and 2004 [26].  The latest CSF simulation exercise (June 2004) was organized in conjunction with the Office of the European Commission’s Technical Assistance Information Exchange Unit (TAIEX).  Along with providing participants with relevant information on virological, epidemiological, and serological aspects of CSF, control and eradication measures, simulated outbreaks in 3 regions of Slovenia.  The simulation mimicked a primary CSF outbreak, a simulated period of secondary outbreaks (11 outbreaks in 3 different ROs), and then a simulated period of restocking depopulated holdings and withdrawing control measures [26].  There were no deficiencies found in the simulated emergency response.  Participants included staff members from VARS, and NVI, as well as private practitioners and representatives from the Slovene Army and Civil Service.  The CSF contingency plan was reviewed in 2006 [22, 28, 36].</p>
<p>
Similarly, the FMD contingency plan prescribes routine training in general veterinary procedures such notification and reporting disease, collecting and submitting samples, administering sedatives and euthanasia, indemnity assessments, C/D, map-marking, etc.  Technical staff receive a streamlined version on the same topics [20].  Training records for veterinarians, veterinary inspectors, and NVI operators are maintained at the regional level, including training records for simulation drills.  FMD training exercises were conducted in 1997, 1998, and in 2006; participants for 2006 included VARS animal health experts (representatives from all ROs), foreign FMD experts from TAIEX, private veterinary practitioners, and representatives of the Veterinary Chamber, Slovenian military forces, Police, and Civil Protection Service.  The training exercises lead to minor revisions of the FMD contingency plan [20, 28, 36].</p>
<p>
APHIS concludes that Slovenia’s training and simulation exercises increase staff awareness and hone the timeliness and effectiveness of emergency response procedures.
</p>
<p><b>Budget information</b>- 
</p>
<p>
During an eradication campaign, MAFF staff salaries, purchases of minor equipment and consumer goods, and costs of emergency vaccination, depopulation, diagnostic tests and indemnity compensations are covered by the national budget of Slovenia [20, 21].   Slovenia also has a National Plan of resource protection in case of massive outbreaks of contagious disease in the Republic of Slovenia.  UL RS 64/94 (Protection against natural and other disasters act) declares that contagious animal disease outbreaks shall be considered natural disasters, and as such, public protection units may be mobilized to help suppress them. Public protection units (local, regional, and national) are activated through the Information Centre of Republic of Slovenia and funded by the Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act [21].   </p>
<p>
Of the total veterinary budget for 2006 ($38,793,504.05 USD), funding for preventative veterinary measures (monitoring programs, eradication, etc) was $10,995,413.70 USD [28].  APHIS considers this effective for standing disease control measures.  </p>
<p><b>Disease Outbreaks in Feral Populations-</b></p>
<p>
Disease control measures in the event of a CSF outbreak in feral swine are outlined in Commission Decision 2001/89/EC and in Slovenia’s UL RS 62/03.  Hunters are added to the veterinarians, biologists, and epidemiologists of the Expert Group, the unit responsible for outbreak analysis and implementing control measures.  Upon confirmation of the index case of CSF in feral swine, the Expert Group has 90 days to present the EC with a comprehensive plan for eradicating CSF in feral pigs.  This is called the “Contingency Plan” for feral swine, and it must be approved by the EC (which also retains authority to amend the plan).  Thus, although there is not a standing SOP on disease eradication in feral swine, this approach allows control measures to be tailored for each outbreak in feral populations.  Each contingency plan must address cooperation between scientists and hunters/hunting associations, approximate populations of feral pigs in infected zone, control measures adopted to reduce the spread of disease such as enhanced biosecurity or movement restrictions, removal/destruction of shot carcasses, inspection/surveillance efforts, etc.  If disease persists, every six months VARS submits to EC and EU Member States a report concerning the disease situation.  Upon eradication of the last outbreak in feral pigs, monitoring measures must remain in place for at least 12 months (2001/89/EC, 62/03).  The FMD contingency plan identifies roe deer, red deer, chamois, and ibex as wild bi-ungulates within Slovenia that are susceptible to FMD.  APHIS concludes that the contingency plans effectively address disease outbreaks in feral populations.</p>
<h2>Release Assessment Conclusions_________</h2>
<p>
The preceding 11-factor assessment identifies four potential pathways by which CSF, SVD, and/or rinderpest or FMD could be introduced into Slovenia from other EU Member States or third countries.  However, introduction of these diseases into Slovenia by the identified pathways would only affect export risk to the United States if infected breeding animals, swine semen, or pork/pork products were not detected prior to export from Slovenia. </p>
<p><b>Natural movement of wild animals into Slovenia</b></p>
<p>
Because feral swine have yet to be determined a point of introduction for CSF, FMD, or SVD into Slovenia, APHIS considers the overall risk of disease incursion via feral populations to be low.  However, infected wild animals migrating from neighboring affected regions, either third countries or other Member States, could introduce CSF, SVD, Rinderpest or FMD virus into Slovenia, the likelihood of which depends primarily on the disease status of wild animals in neighboring regions and the extent to which natural barriers prevent movement of wild animals into Slovenia.  Due to the presence of CSF in neighboring region feral populations, APHIS considered the risk of introducing CSF into Slovenia via migration of wild boar and concludes that EC control measures effectively mitigate the risk of CSF spreading from wild to domestic swine.  Similarly, APHIS concludes the risk of introducing FMD, rinderpest, or SVD virus into Slovenia via susceptible wild animals to be low, and EC control measures effective at mitigating the risk of FMD or SVD spreading from wild to domestic swine.  
</p>
<p>
Although current surveillance practices in Slovenia may not rapidly detect low-level incursions of CSF in wild boar, strict management and biosecurity practices on swine confinement operations such as breeding farms, semen collection centers, and large production units limit the likelihood of direct or indirect exposure to wild boar.  Production and slaughter systems in Slovenia are such that large confinement operations are the most likely source of swine commodities for export, and commingling with swine from small holdings is unlikely. As a result, commercial production and biosecurity practices substantially mitigate the export risk to the United States. 
</p>
<p><b>Import, transit, or trade of infected live animals or animal products</b></p>
<p>
Infected live ruminants or swine could enter Slovenia legally through import from third countries or intra-Community trade, or illegally via smuggling from neighboring countries.  The likelihood of disease introduction via legal import or trade of live animals depends primarily on the provisions of the harmonized EC import legislation for ruminants and swine, the efficacy of limiting intra-Community trade from affected regions, and Slovenian import and trade practices. 
EC legislation imposes less stringent restrictions on the source of imported ruminants than does U.S. legislation.  The same is true to a lesser extent for imported swine, so the potential exists for trade on the internal common market to introduce FMD or CSF from undetected infected herds in unrestricted areas.  However, this risk is mitigated by EC and Slovenian measures (e.g. isolation, observation, and veterinary inspection of animals at the point of destination).  Additional APHIS mitigations applied to Member States in the EU-15 for CSF and to many FMD-free countries which restrict the sourcing of animals for export and prevent commingling of live animals with those from regions APHIS regards as affected with FMD or CSF further mitigate the risk of a Slovenian export event spreading these diseases to the U.S.  </p>
<p>
Infected bovine or swine products such as fresh meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova can enter Slovenia legally through import or trade, or illegally via smuggling.  The likelihood of introducing CSF, SVD, or FMD virus via infected animal products depends primarily on the provisions of the harmonized EC import legislation for ruminant and swine products, the efficacy of limiting intra-Community trade from affected regions, and Slovenian import and trade practices.  APHIS considers the risk of disease introduction via meat, meat products, and genetic material to be low.  Infected meat and meat products could be illegally fed as waste to wild boar or domestic swine, but an effective waste feeding ban mitigates that risk.  The strict biosecurity practices required of semen collection centers mitigate the risk of disease introduction from genetic material.  Thus APHIS considers the overall likelihood of illegal entry of infected live animals or animal products into Slovenia to be low, and mitigated by EC and Slovenian measures.  
</p>
<p><b>Incoming passenger or vehicle traffic-
</b></p>
<p>
CSF, FMD, or SVD could be introduced into Slovenia via incoming vehicular traffic.  Virus could be actively introduced by improper disinfection of live-haul trucks coming from affected Member States or third countries, or passively introduced by human traffic from affected regions through transmission of live virus on clothing.  
</p>
<p>
APHIS considered the risk of introducing CSF, FMD, or SVD virus via incoming vehicular or human traffic and concludes that the risk is low.  The ruminant populations with the greatest potential for exposure to humans or vehicles are generally commercial operations that are intensively managed, with effective biosecurity measures and rapid disease detection methodologies.  Thus the husbandry and production conditions in Slovenia’s commercial swine operations mitigate the risk of disease incursions via vehicular or passenger traffic. 
</p>
<p><b>Agricultural commodities for personal consumption
</b></p>
<p>
Infected meat or meat products carried into Slovenia by human traffic for personal consumption could introduce CSF, SVD, or FMD into the country.  Such products may be intentionally smuggled into the country or simply missed during Customs inspections at border crossings.
The likelihood of CSF, SVD, or FMD introduction via agricultural products for personal consumption depends primarily on EC policies regarding allowable commodities for personal consumption; the extent of passenger traffic from affected regions; and Customs Service inspection, confiscation, and disposal practices at the point of entry. 
</p>
<p>
Although EC legislation permits personal consignments of products that could carry CSF, SVD, or FMD virus from potentially affected countries, APHIS considers the risk from this quarter to be low. More importantly, the intensity of Customs Service inspection depends in large part on disease reporting of other countries, and the standard level of inspection is not sufficient to allow detection and confiscation of all illegal commodities that could carry live virus. </p>
<p>
Infective virus in agricultural commodities for personal consumption could result in direct exposure of susceptible wild boar or domestic swine populations via waste feeding.  Noncompliance with the waste-feeding ban and exposure of domestic swine to infected wild boar are most likely to occur on small swine holdings, which are unlikely to contribute products for export to the United States.  APHIS therefore considers the risk of CSF or FMD introduction into Slovenia via illegal imports and a subsequent export event to the United States to be mitigated by existing production and biosecurity measures.
</p>
<p><b><u>Release Assessment Summary_____________</u></b></p>
<p>
Based on this release assessment, APHIS has no evidence that CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest currently exists in Slovenia.  CSF has not been detected since 1996, FMD has not been detected since 1968.  SVD has never been reported, and rinderpest was last reported in 1883.  Slovenia’s surveillance and diagnostic measures are adequate to detect active outbreaks.  Slovenian veterinary services are well trained and equipped to contain and eliminate disease outbreaks.  Although there is the potential for CSF, SVD, and FMD to be introduced into Slovenia, APHIS’ has recognized in previous assessments that EC control measures are sufficient to detect and control any disease outbreaks that might occur.  <b>Accordingly, APHIS considers the CSF export risk from Slovenia to be low, and equivalent to that of the EU-15.</b>  <b>Furthermore, APHIS considers Slovenia to be SVD-, FMD-, and rinderpest-free.  Applying provisions of 9 CFR 94.11 for FMD, 94.13 for SVD, and 94.24 and 98.38 for CSF to Slovenia would mitigate risk and result in a level of CSF risk that is equivalent to that portion of the EU authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork to the United States.</b> The EU-15 is considered a low-risk region for CSF for the purposes of export to the United States.  FMD-free regions are subject to the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.11 for meat or meat products from ruminants or swine; SVD-free regions are subject to the import conditions in 9 CFR 94.13.  The low risk region of the EU is subject to the conditions in 9 CFR 94.24 for pork, pork products, and swine; and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen
.
</p>
<p><b><u>Exposure Assessment____________________</u></b></p>
<p>
An exposure assessment as defined by OIE describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates the probability of the exposure(s) occurring [18]. APHIS' regulatory authority is limited to animal health, however, so potential risks to animals are the primary focus of this evaluation.
</p>
<p>
APHIS considers that the most likely pathway of exposure of domestic livestock to CSF, SVD, and FMD viruses in meat (pork or beef) and meat products is through feeding of contaminated food waste to swine [37]. Other exposure pathways are more direct and include contact with imported infected live animals or contact with infected genetic material. 
</p>
<h2>Waste Feeding to Susceptible Swine-</h2>
<p>
The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to virus-infected meat was evaluated in previous APHIS studies. In 1995, APHIS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of exposing swine to infected waste [38]. The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to contaminated waste; namely, exposure associated with illegal household imports, and exposure associated with legal imports. The latter is the exposure pathway that would be applicable to importing meat or meat products from Slovenia.  With 95% confidence, APHIS estimated that 0.023% or less of plate and manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine (APHIS 1995).  Based on this fraction, APHIS estimates that less that 1 part in 4300 parts of imported beef that are fed to swine as plate or manufacturing waste is likely to be inadequately cooked.</p>
<p> 
APHIS conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar study done in 1994 [39]. Based on this survey, VS estimated that the proportion of plate and manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50% between 1994 and 2001 due to a significant decrease in the number of waste-feeding premises. The study also found that:
</p>
<p>1. Several more states prohibited feeding food wastes to swine;
</p>
<p>2. The number of waste-feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 40.5% from 1994-2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Rico decreased by 37.5% and 52.3%, respectively; and
</p>
<p>3. Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90% of all plate waste fed to swine.
</p>
<p>
APHIS considers that prohibiting the feeding of unprocessed plate waste to swine has further contributed to the reduction of waste-feeding to swine. Waste-feeder operations must be licensed and inspected regularly by USDA inspectors (9 CFR 166). The licensing process requires that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine using methods designed to destroy foreign animal disease agents.
</p>
<p>Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent years, APHIS concludes that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF, SVD, or FMD viruses through inadequately processed food waste is low. Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS further considers the probability of exposure of susceptible swine to these viruses through inadequately cooked infected meat from Slovenia to be low. </p>
<h2>Imported Live Animals-
</h2>
<p>
The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live animals was evaluated by briefly reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live swine and ruminants, as well as standard import requirements for these species. The exposure assessment focuses on breeding animals because transportation costs are prohibitive for export of other live animals (e.g. feeder pigs or cattle) to the United States from EU Member States. APHIS considers exposure of a susceptible U.S. animal population to illegally imported infected live animals from Slovenia to be highly unlikely.
</p>
<p>
The survival period of CSF virus within live swine ranges from 1 week to greater than 6 months depending on various host-pathogen factors. Similarly, up to 50% of ruminant animals may become carriers of FMD virus [11]. The maximum reported duration of the carrier state is 3.5 years in cattle, 9 months in sheep, and 4 months in goats. Carrier virus is fully infectious and consequently the carrier state is associated with at least a theoretical risk of introducing FMD into a susceptible population. Although SVD virus is not known to cause persistent infection, a large percentage of infections are subclinical and therefore may remain undetected without diagnostic testing prior to export. 
</p>
<p>
Consequently, APHIS considers this potential pathway for disease introduction to have high unmitigated risk. Current U.S. regulations require certification that ruminants and swine have been kept in a region entirely free of FMD for 60 days prior to export (9 CFR 93.405 and 93.505) and also require a minimum quarantine of 30 days for most imported ruminants (9 CFR 93.411) and 15 days for all imported swine (9 CFR 93.510). These requirements serve to mitigate the risk of exposure by increasing the likelihood of FMD detection in ruminants and detection of CSF and SVD in swine. 
</p>
<p>
Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the probability of exposure of susceptible animals to CSF virus via live animals from Slovenia to be low, and the probability of exposure to SVD, rinderpest, and FMD viruses via this pathway to be very low. With the mitigation measures for live swine described in 9 CFR 94.24, which further limit the sourcing of swine for export, the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. swine to CSF virus via infected swine from Slovenia is very low.
</p>
<h2>Imported Genetic Material-
</h2>
<p>
Genetic materials have been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal disease into susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable distances. For example, two semen collection centers became infected during the course of the 1997-1998 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands [40]. Potentially contaminated semen was distributed to 1,680 swine herds over the course of 5 weeks, during which the disease remained undetected in the donor boars. Although investigators concluded that only 36 farms had been infected through artificial insemination, all suspect farms were subject to quarantine and testing, resulting in a tremendous expenditure of resources. 
</p>
<p>
Survival of CSF virus in semen has been estimated in experimental studies to be 12-72 hours are 20oC but ranges from 1 month to several years at 4oC or below [41]. Survival in embryos and ova is unknown [41, 42]. Survival of SVD virus in genetic material is possible but is not considered to be a primary mode of transmission [5]. FMD virus may be present in semen up to 4 days before clinical signs become apparent [5].</p>
<p>
Based on the extended period of survival of CSF and FMD viruses in frozen semen, APHIS considers the unmitigated likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to these viruses in infected semen to be high. However, based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the probability of exposure of susceptible animals to CSF or FMD viruses via infected semen from Slovenia to be low. With the mitigation measures for swine semen described in 9 CFR 98.38, the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF or SVD virus via infected semen from Slovenia is very low.  
</p>
<h1>Consequence Assessment_________________</h1>
<p>
A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of introducing the hazards under consideration into the United States. This consequence assessment addresses both direct and indirect consequences as recommended by the OIE [18].  Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health and the subsequent production losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and public health consequences. Indirect consequences include impacts on international trade and associated domestic consequences.
</p>
<p>
The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of CSF, SVD, or FMD virus would depend on the location of the introduction; virulence of the strain; the rate of virus spread and whether other environmental conditions at the introduction site that might facilitate this spread; ability to detect the disease rapidly; livestock demographics and movement patterns; and the ease of employing eradication procedures [43]. In addition, depending on the extent of export of livestock and their products, trade restrictions imposed by trading partners may result in severe economic consequences.
</p>
<h2>Effects on Animal Health and Production-</h2>
<p>
Acute and chronic courses of CSF have been described. The severity of the disease depends largely on the age of the animal and virulence of the viral strain, with young animals usually more severely affected than older animals. In older breeding pigs the course of infection is often mild or even subclinical, whereas mortality rates may reach 90% in young pigs [44]. Low virulence strains may manifest primarily as poor reproductive performance and birth of piglets with neurologic defects.
</p>
<p>
SVD is typically a transient vesicular disease of pigs. The virus causes essentially no mortality, and infected pigs generally recover within one week (up to three weeks). Some strains produce only mild clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic [5]. Morbidity rates may be low throughout a whole herd but high in certain pens. </p>
<p>
FMD causes significant distress and suffering to animals regardless of the size and sophistication of their livestock unit. Very high mortality rates in young animals can occur, particularly among pigs and sheep [11, 45, 46].  Mortality in older animals occurs less frequently but may be significant with certain virus strains.  FMD also causes significant losses in the production capacity of affected animals. Productivity losses of 10-20% are reported in FMD-infected livestock if the disease is allowed to run its course [43]. In addition, FMD can cause a reduction in the growth rate of animals raised for meat [47]. The comparatively greater severity of FMD in pigs would imply at least similar losses to those described for cattle.</p>
<p>
Rinderpest causes fever, oral erosions, diarrhea, lymphoid necrosis, and, in populations with low immunity, high mortality.</p>
<h2>Control and Eradication Costs-</h2>
<p>
The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the mitigation or policy option chosen to control and eradicate the disease. Potential costs include disease control measures such as imposing quarantine measures and movement controls, direct costs related to stamping out of affected and other herds, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, surveillance and laboratory testing, etc. For disease-free countries like the United States that have a substantial export market for livestock and livestock products, the preferred option for control and eradication has traditionally been to stamp-out infected herds without the use of vaccine.  The U.S. policy for most significant foreign animal disease emergencies is to follow strict quarantine measures and stamping-out of infected and contact herds with ongoing assessment for the need for and implementation of strategic vaccination. Available data do not allow quantification of the number of herds/farms that would be infected if one of these diseases were introduced. Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication and compensation is likely to be significant. 
</p>
<p>
Since there have been no recent CSF outbreaks in the United States from which contemporary economic estimates can be derived, estimates of economic effects in other countries are provided as illustrations.  Saatkamp et al (2000) reviewed the economic aspects of control of small and large CSF outbreaks in the EU from 1990-1997. For the largest outbreak, involving 429 herds over 14 months, the cost of removal of affected swine was 426.9 million Euros, slaughter for welfare purposes cost 1.2 billion Euros, and program operational costs were 134.3 million Euros. Overall, the outbreak cost pig producers 712.4 million Euros, the national government 230.5 million Euros, and the EU 807.8 million Euros. Approximately 10 million pigs were destroyed during the course of the outbreak, primarily for welfare reasons (overcrowding or overweight) [48]. The total cost of smaller outbreaks ranged from 10.9 million Euros (8 affected herds over 2 months) to 208.7 million Euros (113 affected herds over 10 months) [49].  Garner et al (2001) estimated the potential economic impact of CSF on the pig industry of Australia using a stochastic modeling process. The model estimated a loss in gross income of 28-37% for the pig industry in the affected region, and a 9-11% loss in gross income for the national pig industry.  Little information exists on the cost of control and eradication of SVD in a previously free region. 
</p>
<p>
SVD virus generally does not spread as quickly as CSF virus; even on infected premises, spread from one pen to another may not occur in the absence of a common open drainage system or of frequent movement of pigs between pens [50]. However, a SVD outbreak may not be detected for weeks or even months due to the frequently mild nature of the disease, allowing ample time for spread to other swine establishments.  In addition, the virus is extraordinarily stable in the environment, which could lead to disease recurrence on previously infected farms.  In the absence of specific data on the cost of control and eradication, APHIS assumes a baseline cost similar to that of a small- to medium-sized CSF outbreaks (see above).
</p>
<p>
A few studies have estimated the potential consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States. Bates et al (2003) used results from a FMD simulation model to estimate the direct costs associated with indemnity, slaughter, cleaning and disinfecting livestock premises for various vaccination and eradication strategies to control transmission of FMDV in a cattle population of 2,238 herds and 5 sale yards located in 3 counties of California. The study found that mean herd indemnity payments were USD 2.6 million and USD 110,359 for dairy and non-dairy herds, respectively. Cleaning and disinfection costs ranged from USD 18,062 – 60,205 per herd. The mean vaccination cost was USD 2,960 per herd and the total eradication cost ranged from USD 61 million – 551 million depending on eradication strategy.  At the national level, McCauley et al (1979) conducted a comprehensive study to assess the potential economic impact of FMD in the whole of the United States. The study estimated the direct costs (control and eradication program costs) and increased costs borne by consumers of FMD introduction over a 15-year period (1976-1990). Using the Consumer Price Index to update to 2001, the estimated total cost of a strict quarantine and slaughter policy was USD 34.4 million. 
</p>
<h2>Effect on the Environment-</h2>
<p>
Environmental effects have been considered under all applicable environmental review laws in force in the United States. These are considered in a separate, but related, environmental assessment conducted for certain regions of the EU [51]. The environmental assessment complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations [52].
</p>
<h2>Indirect Consequences-</h2>
<p>
In addition to the direct costs of CSF, SVD, Rinderpest, or FMD introduction, impacts on international trade and related domestic consequences need to be considered. Export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars. The value of U.S. exports of pork and pork products, which would be immediately lost if an outbreak of one of these diseases occurred, was an estimated USD 1.3 billion in 2003 [53]. Similarly, the value of U.S. exports of beef products alone, which would also be lost in an FMD or rinderpest outbreak, was over USD 3 billion in 2001. Since the United States exports only small amounts of lamb and mutton, economic losses associated with these commodities are not likely to be significant compared to cattle and swine.  The impact of an outbreak of a foreign animal disease on the rural and regional economic viability, including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial. For example, Paarlberg et al. (2002) conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an FMD outbreak in the United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom in 2001. This study estimated the gross revenue losses for the animal sector as follows: live cattle (17%), beef (20%), milk (16%), live swine (34%), pork (24%), live sheep and lambs (14%), and sheep and lamb meat (10%). 
</p>
<p>
Indirect economic losses to U.S. firms that support export markets for live animals and animal products could also be substantial. For example, such firms would stand to lose at least USD 2.5 billion annually if ruminant export markets were lost [54]. More than 33 thousand full-time U.S. jobs, accounting for almost $1 billion in wages annually, could be jeopardized by loss of these three markets. In the longer term, if trade restrictions persisted and alternative export markets did not develop, the U.S. ruminant production sector could contract, allowing other supplying countries to establish trade relationships in the absence of U.S. supply. Losses due to restrictions on live swine, pork, and pork products are likely to be significant as well. </p>
<h1>Risk Estimation________________________</h1>
<p>
APHIS concludes from the release assessment that there is no evidence that CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest viruses currently exist in Slovenia.  APHIS concludes from the exposure assessment that the probability of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock to CSF, SVD, rinderpest or FMD viruses via meat or meat products, live animals, or genetic material from Slovenia is low.  Cumulatively, APHIS considers the risk potential for introduction of these hazards from Slovenia into the United States via export of swine and ruminant commodities, and subsequent infection in U.S. livestock, to be low.  
</p>
<p>
If mitigation measures for Slovenia are implemented that are equivalent to those specified for other EU Member States in 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38, and CSF risk mitigation measures similar to those described in 9 CFR 94.24 are applied for live swine, pork, and pork products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen, the low risk would be reduced even further.  Risk mitigation measures specified in these parts of the 9 CFR include country or region of origin restrictions for swine and swine products; processing and inspection requirements for some swine products; and requirements for quarantine and inspection of live swine at the port of entry into the United States. 
</p>
<p>
APHIS does recognize that the animal health and economic consequences of a CSF, SVD, or FMD outbreak in the United States would be severe. Although control and eradication measures would be costly, the major economic impact would likely result from export trade losses.  <b>In summary, although a CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest outbreak in the United States would be likely to have severe animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the risk of infected live swine and ruminants, or commodities derived from these species, entering the United States from Slovenia and exposing U.S. livestock to be low.</b> </p>
<p><b>Annex 1: Import Data for Slovenia, 2004-2006, Global Trade Atlas (www.gtis.com/gta).</b></p>
<h2>Live Swine, 2004 – 2006.</h2>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (#)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,596</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,550</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,764</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,415</p>
</td>	<td><p>17,357</p>
</td>	<td><p>13,426</p>
</td>	<td><p>96.06</p>
</td>	<td><p>73.70</p>
</td>	<td><p>67.93</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>100</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,977</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,645</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.18</p>
</td>	<td><p>12.64</p>
</td>	<td><p>23.50</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>812</p>
</td>	<td><p>857</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.07</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.45</p>
</td>	<td><p>4.34</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>250</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.26</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Albania</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>218</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.10</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Undetermined  Extra EU Trade</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>210</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.06</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>United Kingdom</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>118</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.60</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>54</p>
</td>	<td><p>43</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.17</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.18</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.20</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.52</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,361</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>10.03</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>Live Bovine Animals, 2004 – 2006.
</h2>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (#)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>34,021</p>
</td>	<td><p>25,633</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,414</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,614</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,102</p>
</td>	<td><p>10,107</p>
</td>	<td><p>25.32</p>
</td>	<td><p>43.31</p>
</td>	<td><p>43.17</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,310</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,920</p>
</td>	<td><p>6,699</p>
</td>	<td><p>21.49</p>
</td>	<td><p>30.90</p>
</td>	<td><p>28.61</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,409</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,536</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,427</p>
</td>	<td><p>4.14</p>
</td>	<td><p>5.99</p>
</td>	<td><p>10.37</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>15,019</p>
</td>	<td><p>171</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,630</p>
</td>	<td><p>44.15</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.67</p>
</td>	<td><p>6.96</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Slovakia</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,042</p>
</td>	<td><p>739</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,455</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.06</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.88</p>
</td>	<td><p>6.21</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Romania</p>
</td>	<td><p>53</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,917</p>
</td>	<td><p>593</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.16</p>
</td>	<td><p>15.28</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.53</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>430</p>
</td>	<td><p>164</p>
</td>	<td><p>329</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.26</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.64</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.41</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>95</p>
</td>	<td><p>51</p>
</td>	<td><p>103</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.28</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.20</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.44</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>64</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.02</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.27</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>Croatia</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.01</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.03</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.04</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>Switzerland</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.01</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>United Kingdom</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>14</p>
</td>	<td><p>Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>28</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.11</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>Finland</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>16</p>
</td>	<td><p>Luxembourg</p>
</td>	<td><p>27</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.08</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>17</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>Live Sheep And Goats, 2004 – 2006.
</h2>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (#)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p> </p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>Meat Of Swine, Fresh, Chilled Or Frozen, 2004 - 2006
</h2>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (T)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>22,527</p>
</td>	<td><p>31,254</p>
</td>	<td><p>33,277</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,511</p>
</td>	<td><p>9,287</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,525</p>
</td>	<td><p>24.46</p>
</td>	<td><p>29.72</p>
</td>	<td><p>34.63</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,455</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,156</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,453</p>
</td>	<td><p>15.34</p>
</td>	<td><p>13.30</p>
</td>	<td><p>16.39</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,924</p>
</td>	<td><p>6,011</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,891</p>
</td>	<td><p>12.98</p>
</td>	<td><p>19.23</p>
</td>	<td><p>14.70</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,059</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,987</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,191</p>
</td>	<td><p>13.58</p>
</td>	<td><p>12.76</p>
</td>	<td><p>9.59</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>834</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,221</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,780</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.70</p>
</td>	<td><p>10.31</p>
</td>	<td><p>8.35</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,574</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,562</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,749</p>
</td>	<td><p>20.30</p>
</td>	<td><p>11.40</p>
</td>	<td><p>8.26</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>459</p>
</td>	<td><p>47</p>
</td>	<td><p>554</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.04</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.15</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.67</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>479</p>
</td>	<td><p>294</p>
</td>	<td><p>511</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.13</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.94</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.53</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>760</p>
</td>	<td><p>275</p>
</td>	<td><p>503</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.37</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.88</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.51</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>440</p>
</td>	<td><p>332</p>
</td>	<td><p>421</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.95</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.06</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.26</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>369</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.05</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.11</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>Slovakia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>82</p>
</td>	<td><p>286</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.26</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.86</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>Estonia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>46</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.14</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>14</p>
</td>	<td><p>Cyprus</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.10</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Meat Of Bovine Animals, Fresh Or Chilled,</b> <b>2004 – 2006.</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (T)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,813</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,060</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,063</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria </p>
</td>	<td><p>1,410</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,140</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,518</p>
</td>	<td><p>77.75</p>
</td>	<td><p>37.27</p>
</td>	<td><p>49.57</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy </p>
</td>	<td><p>71</p>
</td>	<td><p>486</p>
</td>	<td><p>752</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.91</p>
</td>	<td><p>15.90</p>
</td>	<td><p>24.54</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>776</p>
</td>	<td><p>416</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>25.36</p>
</td>	<td><p>13.57</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands </p>
</td>	<td><p>72</p>
</td>	<td><p>194</p>
</td>	<td><p>154</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.95</p>
</td>	<td><p>6.35</p>
</td>	<td><p>5.03</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany </p>
</td>	<td><p>183</p>
</td>	<td><p>430</p>
</td>	<td><p>148</p>
</td>	<td><p>10.10</p>
</td>	<td><p>14.04</p>
</td>	<td><p>4.84</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary </p>
</td>	<td><p>65</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>65</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.58</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.12</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>Croatia </p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>33</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.69</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.08</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.33</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.01</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>France </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Meat Of Bovine Animals, Frozen,</b> <b>2004 – 2006.</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (T)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>545</p>
</td>	<td><p>599</p>
</td>	<td><p>663</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria </p>
</td>	<td><p>202</p>
</td>	<td><p>334</p>
</td>	<td><p>388</p>
</td>	<td><p>37.15</p>
</td>	<td><p>55.76</p>
</td>	<td><p>58.52</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy </p>
</td>	<td><p>129</p>
</td>	<td><p>74</p>
</td>	<td><p>191</p>
</td>	<td><p>23.76</p>
</td>	<td><p>12.39</p>
</td>	<td><p>28.78</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany </p>
</td>	<td><p>132</p>
</td>	<td><p>81</p>
</td>	<td><p>55</p>
</td>	<td><p>24.16</p>
</td>	<td><p>13.44</p>
</td>	<td><p>8.24</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary </p>
</td>	<td><p>61</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>16</p>
</td>	<td><p>11.27</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.38</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.85</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.98</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>33</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>5.53</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.09</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>France </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.02</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.02</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.02</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>Sweden </p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.31</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.52</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>Belgium </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>32</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>5.41</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>Brazil </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>2.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>19</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.09</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark </p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1.32</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h2>Meat Of Sheep Or Goats, Fresh Or Chilled Or Frozen, 2004 – 2006.
</h2>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>Rank</p>
</td>	<td><p>Partner Country</p>
</td>	<td><p>Quantity (T)</p>
</td>	<td><p>% Share</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p> </p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>51</p>
</td>	<td><p>25</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>100.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>3.76</p>
</td>	<td><p>39.59</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>8</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>5.74</p>
</td>	<td><p>31.43</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria </p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>7</p>
</td>	<td><p>6.51</p>
</td>	<td><p>4.36</p>
</td>	<td><p>28.98</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>France </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Iceland </p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>Macedonia </p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>93.49</p>
</td>	<td><p>86.14</p>
</td>	<td><p>0.00</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Annex 2:  Changes in Livestock Numbers in Slovenia, and Summary of Animal Census (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia).
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Pigs, alteration in livestock number</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p># animals, beginning of year</p>
</td>	<td><p>558,459</p>
</td>	<td><p>603,594</p>
</td>	<td><p>599,895</p>
</td>	<td><p>655,665</p>
</td>	<td><p>620,506</p>
</td>	<td><p>533,998</p>
</td>	<td><p>547,432</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Born</p>
</td>	<td><p>981,777</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,024,281</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,010,432</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,048,632</p>
</td>	<td><p>981,973</p>
</td>	<td><p>934,383</p>
</td>	<td><p>950,331</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Import</p>
</td>	<td><p>24,393</p>
</td>	<td><p>-</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,080</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,817</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,572</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,550</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,764</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Export</p>
</td>	<td><p>72</p>
</td>	<td><p>-</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,833</p>
</td>	<td><p>-</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,621</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,231</p>
</td>	<td><p>42,564</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slaughtered</p>
</td>	<td><p>729,640</p>
</td>	<td><p>801,009</p>
</td>	<td><p>731,007</p>
</td>	<td><p>856,242</p>
</td>	<td><p>852,837</p>
</td>	<td><p>730,217</p>
</td>	<td><p>689,263</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Losses</p>
</td>	<td><p>231,323</p>
</td>	<td><p>226,971</p>
</td>	<td><p>223,902</p>
</td>	<td><p>232,366</p>
</td>	<td><p>217,595</p>
</td>	<td><p>207,051</p>
</td>	<td><p>210,584</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p># animals, end of year</p>
</td>	<td><p>603,594</p>
</td>	<td><p>599,895</p>
</td>	<td><p>655,665</p>
</td>	<td><p>620,506</p>
</td>	<td><p>533,998</p>
</td>	<td><p>547,432</p>
</td>	<td><p>575,116</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Cattle, alteration in livestock number*</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p># animals, beginning of year</p>
</td>	<td><p>471,425</p>
</td>	<td><p>493,670</p>
</td>	<td><p>477,075</p>
</td>	<td><p>473,242</p>
</td>	<td><p>450,226</p>
</td>	<td><p>451,136</p>
</td>	<td><p>452,517</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Born</p>
</td>	<td><p>186,950</p>
</td>	<td><p>185,133</p>
</td>	<td><p>188,726</p>
</td>	<td><p>182,196</p>
</td>	<td><p>176,646</p>
</td>	<td><p>171,857</p>
</td>	<td><p>165,711</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Import</p>
</td>	<td><p>32,960</p>
</td>	<td><p>14,210</p>
</td>	<td><p>10,167</p>
</td>	<td><p>10,860</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,345</p>
</td>	<td><p>25,633</p>
</td>	<td><p>27,075</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Export</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,183</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,605</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,649</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,198</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,784</p>
</td>	<td><p>30,509</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Slaughtered</p>
</td>	<td><p>179,722</p>
</td>	<td><p>196,989</p>
</td>	<td><p>176,013</p>
</td>	<td><p>194,937</p>
</td>	<td><p>175,932</p>
</td>	<td><p>171,833</p>
</td>	<td><p>144,859</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Losses</p>
</td>	<td><p>17,940</p>
</td>	<td><p>17,766</p>
</td>	<td><p>18,110</p>
</td>	<td><p>17,484</p>
</td>	<td><p>16,951</p>
</td>	<td><p>16,492</p>
</td>	<td><p>15,902</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p># animals, end of year</p>
</td>	<td><p>493,670</p>
</td>	<td><p>477,075</p>
</td>	<td><p>473,242</p>
</td>	<td><p>450,226</p>
</td>	<td><p>451,136</p>
</td>	<td><p>452,517</p>
</td>	<td><p>454,033</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>Number of animals, Slovenia, annually</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Pigs</p>
</td>	<td><p>603,594</p>
</td>	<td><p>599,895</p>
</td>	<td><p>655,665</p>
</td>	<td><p>620,506</p>
</td>	<td><p>533,998</p>
</td>	<td><p>547,432</p>
</td>	<td><p>575,116</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Cattle</p>
</td>	<td><p>493,670</p>
</td>	<td><p>477,075</p>
</td>	<td><p>473,242</p>
</td>	<td><p>450,226</p>
</td>	<td><p>451,136</p>
</td>	<td><p>452,517</p>
</td>	<td><p>454,033</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sheep</p>
</td>	<td><p>96,227</p>
</td>	<td><p>94,068</p>
</td>	<td><p>107,400</p>
</td>	<td><p>105,660</p>
</td>	<td><p>119,264</p>
</td>	<td><p>129,352</p>
</td>	<td><p>131,528</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Goats</p>
</td>	<td><p>22,041</p>
</td>	<td><p>19,900</p>
</td>	<td><p>21,977</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,291</p>
</td>	<td><p>23,031</p>
</td>	<td><p>25,480</p>
</td>	<td><p>27,798</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>*The source for data on import and export for 2006 is Register of bovine animals</p>
<p><b>References
</b></p>
<p>1.
Moennig, V., G. Floegel-Niesmann et al. <i>Clinical signs and epidemiology of classical swine fever:  a review of new knowledge.</i> Vet Journal, 2003. <b>165</b>: p. 11-20.
</p>
<p>2.
Paton, D.J., and I. Greiser-Wilke. <i>Classical swine fever-- an update.</i> Res Vet Sci, 2003. <b>75</b>(3): p. 169-178.
</p>
<p>3.
Edwards, S. <i>Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>(2-3): p. 175-181.
</p>
<p>4.
Elbers, A.R., A. Stegeman, et al. <i>Factors associated with the introduction of classical swine fever virus into pig herds in the central area of the 1997/98 epidemic in The Netherlands.</i> Vet Record, 2001. <b>149</b>(13): p. 377-382.
</p>
<p>5.
OIE.  Animal diseases data. Animal diseases data. Accessed September 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int"><u>http://www.oie.int</u></a>.
</p>
<p>6.
Elbers, A.R., A. Stegeman, et al. <i>The classical swine fever epidemic 1997-1998 in The Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology.</i> Prev Vet Med, 1999. <b>42</b>(3-4): p. 157-184.
</p>
<p>7.
Biagetti, M., I. Greiser-Wilke, et al.  . <i>Molecular epidemiology of classical swine fever in Italy.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2001. <b>83</b>(3): p. 205-215.
</p>
<p>8.
Laddomada, A., C. Patta, et al. <i>Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Sardinia:  a serological survey of wild boar and comparison with African swine fever.</i> Vet Record, 1994. <b>134</b>(8): p. 183-187.
</p>
<p>9.
European Commission, <i>Classical Swine Fever in Wild Boar.</i>  Brussels, European Commission, Directorate General XXIV, Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare. 1999.
</p>
<p>10.
Coetzer, J.A.W., G.R. Thomsen, et al. <i>Foot-and-mouth disease.</i> In <i>Infectious Diseases of Livestock with Special Reference to Southern Africa.</i> J.A.W. Coetzer, G.R. Thomsen, et al., Editor. 1994, Oxford University Press, Cape Town. p. 825-852.
</p>
<p>11.
Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, et al. <i>The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease.</i> J Comp Pathol, 2003. <b>129</b>(1): p. 1-36.
</p>
<p>12.
Barnett, P.V., S.J. Cox. <i>The role of small ruminants in the epidemiology and transmission of foot-and-mouth disease.</i> Vet J, 1999. <b>158</b>(1): p. 6-13.
</p>
<p>13.
Donaldson, A.I., R.F. Sellers. <i>Foot-and-mouth disease.</i> In <i>Diseases of Sheep, 3rd edition.</i> W.B. Martin, I.D. Aitken, Editor. 2000, Blackwell Science, Oxford. p. 254-258.
</p>
<p>14.
Donaldson, A.I. <i>Experimental and natural adaptation of strains of foot-and-mouth disease virus to different species</i>. Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee, European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. p. 18-22.
</p>
<p>15.
Farez, S., and R.S. Morley. <i>Potential animal health hazards of pork and pork products.</i> Rev Sci Tech OIE, 1997. <b>16</b>: p. 65-78.
</p>
<p>16.
Hedger, R.S., M.A. Mann. <i>Swine Vesicular Disease.</i> In <i>Virus Infections of Porcines.</i> M.B. Pensaert, Editor. 1989, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam. p. 241-250.
</p>
<p>17.
USAHA. <i>Swine Vesicular Disease.</i> In <i>Foreign Animal Diseases.</i> W.W. Buisch, Hyde, J.J., and Mebus, C.A., Editor. 1998, Carter Printing Company, Richmond. p. 392-395.
</p>
<p>18.
OIE. <i>Risk Analysis.</i> In <i>Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 14th edition, Section 1.3.</i> 2005, World Organization for Animal Health, Paris.
</p>
<p>19.
VARS, <i>Full 11 Factor response for classical swine fever evaluation of the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. April 2005.
</p>
<p>20.
VARS, <i>Additional information for swine vesicular disease and foot-and-mouth disease evaluations for the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. September 2005.
</p>
<p>21.
VARS, <i>Regionalization request for classical swine fever evalution of the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. December 2004.
</p>
<p>22.
FVO, <i>Country Profile of Slovenia on Food and Feed Safety, Animal Health, Animal Welfare, and Plant Health.</i>  European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Food and Veterinary Office. 2006.
</p>
<p>23.
VARS, <i>Additional information for the ongoing disease evaluations of the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. October 2005.
</p>
<p>24.
APHIS, <i>Notice of availability of a document concerning the identification of EU administrative units [Docket No. 04-081-2].</i>  Federal Register, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.  Published July 29, 2005. p. 43838-43839.
</p>
<p>25.
VARS, <i>Letter to the European Commission Regarding EC/US Veterinary Agreement on EU Regionalization.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. July 7, 2004.
</p>
<p>26.
VARS, <i>Regionalization request for swine vesicular disease and foot-and-mouth disease evaluation of the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Adminstration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. July 2005.
</p>
<p>27.
APHIS, <i>Site visit to the Republic of Slovenia:  classical swine fever, swine vesicular disease, and foot-and-mouth disease evaluations.</i>  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services. November 2005.
</p>
<p>28.
VARS, <i>Additional information for the ongoing evaluations (CSF, SVD, FMD) of the Republic of Slovenia, letter and enclosures.</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. October 2006.
</p>
<p>29.
OIE Handistatus II. Handistatus II. Accessed 2006. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/hs2/report.asp?lang=en"><u>http://www.oie.int/hs2/report.asp?lang=en</u></a>.
</p>
<p>30.
OIE WAHID. World Animal Health Information Database. Accessed September 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=home"><u>http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=home</u></a>.
</p>
<p>31.
Wikipedia. Slovenia. Accessed September 2007. Available from: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia"><u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovenia</u></a>.
</p>
<p>32.
VARS, <i>CSF Powerpoint Presentation: APHIS site visit to Slovenia, November 14-16, 2005.</i> Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. Ljubljana, Slovenia. 2005.
</p>
<p>33.
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS). Accessed August 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.stat.si/eng/index.asp"><u>http://www.stat.si/eng/index.asp</u></a>.
</p>
<p>34.
MAFF, <i>Communication to Commission (Council regulation (EC) No 21/2004).</i>  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Food, Ljubljana, Slovenia. 2004.
</p>
<p>35.
VARS, <i>Update and clarification of previously submitted information for the assessment of the animal health status of Slovenia concerning classical swine fever (CSF), swine vesicular disease (SVD) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD).</i>  Veterinary Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana, Slovenia. April 2008.
</p>
<p>36.
OIE. Disease Emergency Preparedness/Simulation Exercises Accessed August 2007. Available from: <a href="http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_prepaurgence.htm#exercice"><u>http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_prepaurgence.htm#exercice</u></a>.
</p>
<p>37.
APHIS, <i>Pathway assessment of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) risk to the United States:  an evaluation in response to international FMD outbreaks in 2001.</i>  United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health. 2001.
</p>
<p>38.
APHIS, <i>Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated Swine in the U.S.</i>  United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health. 1995.
</p>
<p>39.
APHIS, <i>2001 waste-feeder survey (unpublished data).</i>  United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health. 2002.
</p>
<p>40.
Hennecken, M., J.A. Stegeman et al. <i>Transmission of classical swine fever virus by artificial insemination during the 1997-1998 epidemic in The Netherlands:  a descriptive epidemiological study.</i> Vet Q, 2000. <b>22</b>(4): p. 228-233.
</p>
<p>41.
Floegel, G., A. Wehrend. <i>Detection of classical swine fever virus in semen of infected boars.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>77</b>(1-2): p. 109-116.
</p>
<p>42.
Glossup, C.E., and R. Cameron. <i>Transmission of viruses through pigs and products of pig origin.</i> In <i>Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine.</i> K.Y.Y. A. Morilla, J.J. Zimmerman, Editor. 2002, Iowa State Press, Ames, Iowa. p. 3-11.
</p>
<p>43.
McCauley, E.H., et al., <i>Potential economic impact of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States.</i>  U.S. Government Printing Office, St. Paul, Minnesota. 1979.
</p>
<p>44.
Moennig, V. <i>Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>(2-3): p. 93-102.
</p>
<p>45.
Dunn, C.S., and A.I. Donaldson. <i>Natural adaptation to pigs of a Taiwanese isolate of foot-and-mouth disease virus.</i> Vet Record, 1997. <b>141</b>: p. 174-175.
</p>
<p>46.
Geering, W.A., A.J. Forman et al. <i>Foot and mouth disease.</i> In <i>Exotic diseases of animals:  a field guide for Australian veterinarians.</i> 1995, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
</p>
<p>47.
Doel, T.R. <i>FMD vaccines.</i> Virus Res, 2003. <b>91</b>(1): p. 81-99.
</p>
<p>48.
Stegeman, A., A. Elbers, et al. <i>The 1997-1998 epidemic of classical swine fever in the Netherlands.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 183-196.
</p>
<p>49.
Saatkamp, H.W., P.B.M. Berentsen et al. <i>Economic aspects of the control of classical swine fever outbreaks in the European Union.</i> Vet Microbiol, 2000. <b>73</b>: p. 221-237.
</p>
<p>50.
Lin, F., and R.P. Kitching. <i>Swine vesicular disease:  an overview.</i> Vet Journal, 2000. <b>160</b>: p. 192-201.
</p>
<p>51.
APHIS, <i>Proposed rule for importation of live swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products from certain regions within the European Union-  Environmental assessment.</i>  United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Policy and Program Development, Environmental Services. 2003.
</p>
<p>52.
NEPA, <i>National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (40 U.S.C.4321 et seq.) AND regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) AND USDA regulations implementing NEPA (7 CFR part 1b) AND APHIS' NEPA Implementing Procedures (7 CFR part 372).</i> 1969.
</p>
<p>53.
FAS. U.S. beef, pork, and poultry trade charts. Accessed 2003. U.S. beef, pork, and poultry trade charts]. Available from: <a href="http://www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/tradecharts/"><u>http://www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/tradecharts/</u></a>.
</p>
<p>54.
Green, J.W., J.L. Grannis. <i>Economic impact of alternative management strategies for regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports</i>.  United States Department of Agriculture, Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health. 2003.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>� EMBED CorelDRAW.Graphic.9  ���
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Veterinary Medicinal Products Section
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Diagnostics Section
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Animal Feed Section
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Animal Health Section
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Border Veterinary Inspection Sector
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Internal Veterinary Inspection Sector
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Sector of Diagnostics, Animal Feed and Veterinary Medicinal Products
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>International Affairs Sector
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Public Health Sector
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Animal Health and Welfare Section
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Legal and General Affairs Service
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Personnel Service
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Internal Control
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>IT Service
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Financial Service
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Translator
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>Chief Veterinary Officer
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>�
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>�CFR mitigations include (1) restricting the sourcing of swine and ruminants for live export or slaughter to regions free of the pertinent diseases; (2) prohibiting commingling of live animals, meat, or meat products for export with such commodities from regions not considered free of these diseases; (3) restricting the use of transportation equipment for live swine; and (4) requiring exporting slaughter establishments to be approved by the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). An official veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that these conditions have been met.  The CFR provisions do not directly address the risk of exporting infected live animals or animal commodities during the period between virus incursion and outbreak detection. However, 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 substantially mitigate this risk by prohibiting sourcing of swine from a restricted zone established because of detection of CSF in wild boar or a CSF outbreak in domestic swine, as well as for the 6 months following depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last infected premises in the zone. In addition, swine semen centers must be approved by the national government of the exporting country, which provides substantial risk mitigation under EC legislation.  
</p>
<p> 
</p>
<p>
</p>
<div class="footer"><p class="footer">PAGE  </p>
<p class="footer">6</p>
</div>
<div class="package-entry"><h1>_1066642013.unknown</h1>
</div>
</body></html>