Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45143 

published in paragraph 6005 in FAA 

Order 7400.9S, Airspace Designations 

and Reporting Points, signed October 3, 

2008, and effective October 31, 2008, 

which is incorporated by reference in 14 

CFR 71.1. The Class E airspace 

designations listed in this document 

would be subsequently published in the 

Order. 

The FAA has determined that this 

proposed regulation only involves an 

established body of technical 

regulations for which frequent and 

routine amendments are necessary to 

keep them operationally current. It, 

therefore—(1) Is not a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ under Executive 

Order 12866; (2) is not a ‘‘significant 

rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies 

and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 

26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant 

preparation of a regulatory evaluation as 

the anticipated impact is so minimal. 

Since this is a routine matter that will 

only affect air traffic procedures and air 

navigation, it is certified that this rule, 

when promulgated, will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the United States Code. 

Subtitle 1, Section 106 describes the 

authority of the FAA Administrator. 

Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 

describes in more detail the scope of the 

agency’s authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart 1, Section 

40103, Sovereignty and use of airspace. 

Under that section, the FAA is charged 

with prescribing regulations to ensure 

the safe and efficient use of the 

navigable airspace. This regulation is 

within the scope of that authority 

because it proposes to revise Class E 

airspace at Manokotak Airport, 

Manokotak, AK, and represents the 

FAA’s continuing effort to safely and 

efficiently use the navigable airspace. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 71 

Airspace, Incorporation by reference, 

Navigation (air). 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as 

follows: 

PART 71—DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, 

CLASS B, CLASS C, CLASS D, AND 

CLASS E AIRSPACE AREAS; 

AIRWAYS; ROUTES; AND REPORTING 

POINTS 

1. The authority citation for 14 CFR 

part 71 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 

40120; E.O. 10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959– 

1963 Comp., p. 389. 

§ 71.1 [Amended] 

2. The incorporation by reference in 

14 CFR 71.1 of Federal Aviation 

Administration Order 7400.9S, Airspace 

Designations and Reporting Points, 

signed October 3, 2008, and effective 

October 31, 2008, is to be amended as 

follows: 

* * * * * 

Paragraph 6005 Class E Airspace Extending 

Upward from 700 Feet or More Above the 

Surface of the Earth. 

* * * * * 

AAL AK E5 Manokotak, AK [Revised] 

Manokotak Airport, Manokotak, AK 

(Lat. 58°55′55′′ N., long. 158°54′07′′ W.) 

That airspace extending upward from 700 

feet above the surface within a 6.4-mile 

radius of the Manokotak Airport, AK; and 

that airspace extending upward from 1,200 

feet above the surface within a 74-mile radius 

of the Manokotak Airport, AK. 

* * * * * 

Issued in Anchorage, AK, on August 20, 

2009. 

Anthony M. Wylie, 

Manager, Alaska Flight Services Information 

Area Group. 

[FR Doc. E9–21055 Filed 8–31–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

49 CFR Part 571 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2009–0154] 

RIN 2127–AK52 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards; Power-Operated Window, 

Partition, and Roof Panel Systems 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The Cameron Gulbransen 

Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 

(the ‘‘K.T. Safety Act of 2007’’) directs 

NHTSA to consider amending the 

Federal motor vehicle safety standard 

aimed at minimizing the likelihood of 

death or injury from the accidental 

operation of power window systems. 

The amendment would require power 

windows and panels on motor vehicles 

to automatically reverse direction when 

such power windows and panels detect 

an obstruction to prevent children and 

others from being trapped, injured, or 

killed. In the event that NHTSA chooses 

not to require power windows and 

panels on motor vehicles to 

automatically reverse direction when 

such power windows and panels detect 

an obstruction, the Act requires that the 

agency submit a report to Congress 

describing why such standards were not 

prescribed and publish a list of vehicles 

that are or are not equipped with power 

windows and panels that automatically 

reverse direction when an obstruction is 

detected. 

In this document, NHTSA 

summarizes its most recent rulemakings 

related to power window hazards and 

the types of injuries and fatalities they 

were aimed at mitigating; discusses its 

current assessment of the number and 

causes of the remaining deaths and 

injuries related to power windows; and 

analyzes the means of mitigating those 

remaining injuries and fatalities. While 

the agency analyzed and considered the 

benefits of installing automatic reversal 

systems in all types of vehicle windows, 

including front and rear main windows, 

sunroofs, and small ‘‘vent’’ windows, 

NHTSA is proposing to require 

automatic reversal systems on ‘‘expressup’’ or ‘‘one-touch closing’’ windows, 

i.e., those windows that close without 

continuous actuation of the window 

switch by the window operator. We 

believe that this is an efficient, targeted 

rule that would close this gap in our 

power window safety requirements. We 

are also seeking comments on a broader 

requirement for automatic reversal 

systems, and could include such a 

requirement in a final rule. 

Additionally, we will be providing 

consumers with information regarding 

which vehicles are equipped with 

automatic reversal systems at http:// 

www.safercar.gov by October 2009. 

DATES: You should submit your 

comments early enough to ensure that 

Docket Management receives them not 

later than November 2, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

to the docket number identified in the 

heading of this document by any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45144 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

1 49 CFR 571.118. 

2Pub. L. 100–189, February 28, 2008, 122 Stat 

639. 

3We note that these incidents typically occurred 

when children were left in vehicles with the 

ignition on. In these cases, removal of the ignition 

key would have disabled the power windows, as 

required by a longstanding FMVSS No. 118 

criterion. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility: 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

Instructions: For detailed instructions 

on submitting comments and additional 

information on the rulemaking process, 

see the Public Participation heading of 

the Supplementary Information section 

of this document. Note that all 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. Please 

see the Privacy Act heading below. 

Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search 

the electronic form of all comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

comment (or signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78) or you may visit http:// 

DocketInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received, go to http:// 

www.regulations.gov or the street 

address listed above. Follow the online 

instructions for accessing the dockets. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical issues, you may contact Mr. 

Michael Pyne, Office of Rulemaking 

(E-mail: mike.pyne@dot.gov) 

(Telephone: 202–366–2720) (Fax: 202– 

493–2739). For legal issues, you may 

contact Mr. Ari Scott, Office of Chief 

Counsel (E-mail: ari.scott@dot.gov) 

(Telephone: 202–366–2992) (Fax: 202– 

366–3820). You may send mail to these 

officials at National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation 

Safety Act of 2007 

III. Background 

a. Power Window Related Injuries and Past 

Efforts To Combat Them 

b. Information on Automatic Reversal 

Systems (ARS) 

IV. Safety Issues Addressed in This 

Rulemaking 

a. Fatalities and Severe Injuries 

b. Less Severe Injuries 

V. Current Regulatory Requirements for ARS 

a. Key Requirements of S4 

b. ARS Requirements of S5 

c. Safer Switches Requirements 

d. Requirements of ECE R21 

VI. Current Implementation of ARS and 

Compliance With FMVSS No. 118 in the 

United States 

a. Differences in FMVSS and ECE 

Performance Specifications 

b. Implementation of ARS in the U.S. and 

Other Countries 

VII. Expanding ARS To Various Subsets of 

Windows 

a. Windows Equipped With ‘‘Express-Up’’ 

b. Main Windows Not Equipped With 

Express-Up 

c. Sunroofs and Power Vent Windows 

d. Lockout Switch Considerations 

VIII. Proposal To Mandate That Main 

Windows With Express-Up Be Equipped 

With ARS 

a. Costs and Benefits 

b. Listing of Power Windows Without ARS 

IX. Public Participation 

X. Regulatory Analyses 

XI. Proposed Regulatory Text 

I. Executive Summary 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard (FMVSS) No. 118, Poweroperated window, partition, and roof 

panel systems 1 specifies requirements 

for power operated window, partition, 

and roof panel systems to minimize the 

likelihood of death or injury from the 

accidental operation. The National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA) has reevaluated the safety 

concerns inherent in the operation of 

power windows and is proposing an 

amendment to ensure that the 

requirements of the standard address a 

safety problem that is not addressed by 

the current requirements. This 

rulemaking is being undertaken in 

response to the Cameron Gulbransen 

Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 

(the ‘‘K.T. Safety Act of 2007’’),2 in 

which Congress required NHTSA to 

consider requiring automatic reversal 

systems (ARS) on all power windows 

for light passenger vehicles. 

While the K.T. Safety Act of 2007 

required that NHTSA consider requiring 

ARS on all power windows in vehicles, 

the agency has tentatively determined 

that the scope of the power window 

safety issue can be effectively addressed 

without mandating ARS on all 

windows. In large part, this is because 

NHTSA has recently addressed the 

majority of the safety problem 

associated with power windows by 

establishing new ‘‘safer switch’’ 

requirements. Under these new 

requirements, as of October 1, 2008, 

vehicles with power windows must 

have switches designed to prevent 

inadvertent actuation. In promulgating 

that earlier rule, we believed that the 

fatalities associated with power 

windows were largely due to this type 

of incident.3 We continue to believe that 

the ‘‘safer switch’’ rule will have the 

effect of eliminating the majority of the 

most severe power window-related 

incidents. Thus, in evaluating the 

remaining safety issues that an 

automatic reversal system could 

address, the data indicate that there are 

few if any fatalities and serious injuries 

remaining. 

Despite the small relative size of the 

problem, NHTSA’s assessment did show 

one area in which it may be possible to 

improve safety. This is with regard to 

windows that close with one touch of 

the switch (referred to as ‘‘express-up’’ 

functionality). Because closing these 

windows does not require the 

continuous engagement of a human 

operator, we believe there is a potential 

risk of injury to persons in or around the 

vehicle. We are accordingly proposing 

to require automatic reversal systems on 

those windows that close without 

continuous actuation of the window 

switch by the window operator. We are 

also seeking comments on a broader 

requirement for automatic reversal 

systems, and could include such a 

requirement in a final rule. 

Additionally, in order to provide 

comprehensive information on the 

subject and per the direction of the K.T. 

Safety Act of 2007, we will be providing 

consumers with information regarding 

which vehicles are equipped with ARS. 

We expect to provide this information 

on http://www.safercar.gov by October 

2009. 

II. Cameron Gulbransen Kids 

Transportation Safety Act of 2007 

Subsection (b) of the Cameron 

Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety 

Act, directs the Secretary of 

Transportation to initiate a rulemaking 

to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard (FMVSS) No. 118, Poweroperated window, partition, and roof 

panel systems, to consider requiring 

power windows and panels on motor 

vehicles to automatically reverse 

direction when they detect an 

obstruction. 

The relevant provisions in subsection 

(a) are as follows: 

(a) Power Window Safety.— 

(1) Consideration of Rule.—Not later than 

18 months after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the Secretary of Transportation 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45145 

4 69 FR 55517, September 15, 2004. 

5Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

(SAFETEA–LU), Pub. L. 109–59, § 1109, 119 Stat. 

1114, 1168 (2005). 

(referred to in this Act as the ‘‘Secretary’’) 

shall initiate a rulemaking to consider 

prescribing or amending Federal motor 

vehicle safety standards to require power 

windows and panels on motor vehicles to 

automatically reverse direction when such 

power windows and panels detect an 

obstruction to prevent children and others 

from being trapped, injured, or killed. 

(2) Deadline for Decision.—If the Secretary 

determines such safety standards are 

reasonable, practicable, and appropriate, the 

Secretary shall prescribe, under section 

30111 of title 49, United States Code, the 

safety standards described in paragraph (1) 

not later than 30 months after the date of 

enactment of this Act. If the Secretary 

determines that no additional safety 

standards are reasonable, practicable, and 

appropriate, the Secretary shall— 

(A) not later than 30 months after the date 

of enactment of this Act, transmit a report to 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 

the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the Senate describing the 

reasons such standards were not prescribed; 

and 

(B) publish and otherwise make available 

to the public through the Internet and other 

means (such as the ‘‘Buying a Safer Car’’ 

brochure) information regarding which 

vehicles are or are not equipped with power 

windows and panels that automatically 

reverse direction when an obstruction is 

detected. 

(c) Phase-In Period— 

(1) Phase-In Period Required—The safety 

standards prescribed pursuant to subsections 

(a) and (b) shall establish a phase-in period 

for compliance, as determined by the 

Secretary, and require full compliance with 

the safety standards not later than 48 months 

after the date on which the final rule is 

issued. 

Applicability 

With regard to the scope of vehicles 

covered by the mandate, the Act refers 

to all motor vehicles less than 10,000 

pounds (except motorcycles and 

trailers) in gross vehicular weight. This 

language means that the revised 

regulation would apply to passenger 

cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, 

buses, and trucks with a Gross Vehicle 

Weight Rating (GVWR) less than 10,000 

lbs (4,536 kg). 

Statutory Deadline 

The Cameron Gulbransen Kids 

Transportation Safety Act of 2007 

specified a rapid timeline for 

development and implementation of 

this rulemaking. Specifically, the 

Secretary is required to publish a final 

rule within 30 months of the passage of 

the Act (August 28, 2010). Moreover, the 

agency must initiate rulemaking within 

18 months of the Act (August 28, 2009). 

However, it should be noted that under 

Section 4 of the Act, if the Secretary 

determines that the deadlines applicable 

under this Act cannot be met, the 

Secretary shall establish new deadlines, 

and notify the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce of the House of 

Representatives and the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

of the Senate of the new deadlines and 

describe the reasons the deadlines 

specified under the Act could not be 

met. 

III. Background 

a. Power Window Related Injuries and 

Past Efforts To Combat Them 

The matter of preventing injuries and 

fatalities that occur through the 

operation of power window systems is 

one that has been considered numerous 

times by NHTSA. These kinds of 

injuries fall into two predominant 

categories. Most severe, but most 

infrequent, are cases in which 

occupants, usually young children, are 

killed through strangulation or 

compression when trapped by a closing 

power window system. Even when no 

fatality occurs, serious brain or bodily 

injury can result when the neck, body, 

or a limb is trapped in a closing power 

window for a prolonged period of time. 

Much more common, although less 

severe, are injuries that occur when a 

power window closes on a person’s 

hand or finger. Unlike the more severe 

types of incidents involving power 

windows, which usually involve 

occupants, these types of injuries also 

frequently involve non-occupants, such 

as those who are grasping the window 

or door frame from the outside of the 

vehicle, such as to open a vehicle door. 

Due to the nature of power windowrelated injuries and fatalities, many of 

which occur off of public roadways, or 

otherwise may not be reported to 

authorities as automobile-related 

incidents specifically, it has been 

difficult to quantify the exact extent of 

this problem. However, based on 

analysis described below and in the 

accompanying Preliminary Regulatory 

Evaluation (PRE), included in the 

docket with this notice, we estimate that 

approximately 6 fatalities and 1,955 

injuries result every year from the 

operation of vehicle power window 

systems. 

In order to prevent deaths and injuries 

that can occur from the operation of 

powered vehicle windows, there are 

several technical design features that 

can be implemented. These include 

modification of the window switch to 

prevent inadvertent actuation, 

additional window-closing safeguards 

such as lockout switches that prevent 

children from operating the windows, or 

installation of an automatic reversal 

system (ARS), which would cause the 

window to stop and reverse direction 

when it senses an obstruction in the 

window-closing path. 

NHTSA has addressed the problem of 

power window safety through two prior 

rulemakings dealing with the switch 

design. Both of these rulemakings 

essentially addressed the same problem, 

which is what we call an ‘‘inadvertent 

actuation’’ of the window switch. 

Inadvertent actuation had been the root 

cause of the most serious and tragic 

power window safety incidents. In these 

events, an occupant, typically a toddler, 

would kneel, stand or lean on the door 

panel or armrest with his or her head or 

body outside an open window. Then the 

child occupant would inadvertently 

activate a ‘‘toggle’’ or ‘‘rocker’’ switch 

located in the armrest or door panel 

with his/her foot or knee, thereby 

closing the window. The result could be 

death or serious injury to the child. 

NHTSA’s response was to create a 

performance requirement for the power 

window switch, which mandated that 

the switch not be able to be activated by 

application of a metal sphere with the 

approximate diameter of a child’s knee 

(this procedure is commonly known as 

the ‘‘ball test’’).4 Following passage of 

SAFETEA–LU,5 NHTSA further 

amended the standard to permit only 

‘‘pull-to-close’’ window switch designs, 

which require that the user physically 

pull upward or outward on the switch 

in order to close the window. 

In the K.T. Safety Act of 2007, 

Congress again addressed the issue of 

power window safety. This time, 

instead of focusing on the switches, 

Congress required the agency to 

consider the possibility of requiring 

automatic reversal systems (ARS) on all 

windows in passenger vehicles. Unlike 

safer switches, ARS can be effective in 

cases not only of inadvertent actuation, 

but also instances where the operator of 

a window is closing the window, but is 

unaware that another person’s body may 

be obstructing the window. In this 

document, we are referring to this type 

of incident, generally, as an ‘‘obstructed 

closing.’’ 

While incidents involving inadvertent 

actuation of the window switch account 

for a large proportion of severe injuries 

and fatalities, incidents involving 

obstructed closings are more common, 

but also generally less severe than 

inadvertent actuations. Based on our 

analysis of the data, the overwhelming 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45146 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

6 In the September 15, 2004 Final Rule (69 FR 

55517), NHTSA denied three petitions, from 

Michael Garth Moore, David W. Little, and a 

coalition of auto safety advocates including Kids 

and Cars, requesting that the agency require ARS as 

a standard safety feature for power windows. 7 69 FR 55517, September 15, 2004. 

8An ARS equipment supplier, Nartron, stated 

that another reason is to allow a customer the 

convenience of wedging something between the 

window glass and the seal or the hypothetical 

scenario where an intruder is trying to gain access 

into an occupied vehicle through an open window. 

majority of these types of incidents 

involve injuries to fingers, hands, and 

arms that were caught in the path of a 

closing window as the occupant or 

driver closed a window. These injuries 

generally translate to the AIS 1 level on 

the Abbreviated Injury System (AIS) 

scale, the lowest classification available. 

However, there were still some 

instances in which obstructed closings 

led to more severe injuries, especially 

when a person’s body, neck, or head 

was in the path of a window being 

closed. Other injuries were due to cases 

such as a piece of clothing or jewelry, 

such as an earring, becoming ensnared 

on a power window. 

Prior to the K.T. Safety Act of 2007, 

in response to petitions, NHTSA had 

evaluated the possibility of mandating 

ARS on all vehicle windows. However, 

in response to each petition, NHTSA 

declined to do so, because the 

requirements to prevent inadvertent 

actuation had addressed nearly all the 

safety risk from power windows. Most 

recently, in the rulemaking requiring 

safer switch designs, NHTSA again 

analyzed the possibility of requiring 

ARS, but concluded that the safer 

switch requirement would prevent a 

large proportion of the injuries 

associated with power windows.6

Despite NHTSA’s past position, in 

this document we are taking a new look 

at ARS and attempting to determine 

whether it would be an effective means 

of enhancing safety at this time. In 

doing so, we conducted more detailed 

investigations into the number of 

incidents involving power windows, the 

percentage of those that could have been 

prevented by ARS, and the cost of 

installing ARS. We have further broken 

down the analysis to examine scenarios 

where ARS is installed on three 

different window groups, namely, those 

equipped with an express-up feature, 

main (front and rear) power windows 

not equipped with express-up, as well 

as the possibility of installing ARS on 

sunroofs and power vent windows. 

b. Information on Automatic Reversal 

Systems (ARS) 

Since the early 1990s when ARS was 

first introduced as a feature on a few 

luxury cars in the U.S., there have been 

a variety of technologies considered as 

the basis for ARS. These technologies 

fall into two main categories. The first 

category is contact-based or ‘‘forcesensing’’ systems which require contact 

between the window and an 

obstruction, i.e., they sense the build-up 

of resistive force that occurs when an 

object like a person’s hand or arm is 

trapped between the frame and glass of 

a closing window. The second category 

is non-contact systems. Among the 

concepts in the latter category are light 

beam interruption (‘‘electric eye’’) 

systems, infrared and ultrasonic 

scanning systems, and capacitive 

sensing systems. (There is also a type of 

system that is integrated into window 

seals (seal-based) that requires 

incidental contact with the window 

perimeter to close an electric circuit. 

Since it does not rely on a build up of 

pinch force, it is included in the noncontact category.) 

In a 2004 final rule,7 NHTSA 

amended the FMVSS No. 118 automatic 

reversal requirements. These 

requirements, set forth is paragraph S5 

of the standard, permit the windows to 

close in unsupervised situations, but 

require a higher level of reversal 

performance than many ARS in use 

today that are installed in S4-compliant 

(supervised closing only) vehicles. This 

amendment was made to accommodate 

an infrared ARS which was then under 

development by an automotive supplier. 

The amendment added to the standard 

new test rod specifications intended to 

facilitate testing of systems that sense 

obstructions by infrared reflection. 

However, to the best of our knowledge, 

no such system was ever put into 

production for use in U.S. vehicles. 

It has been our observation that 

contact-based and force-sensing ARSs 

are the prevailing types of technology 

that have been broadly applied in light 

vehicles. They are designed to monitor 

electric current to the window drive 

motor and to reverse the motor by 

recognizing current spikes that exceed 

pre-determined limits. Force-sensing 

systems have also been designed to 

function by counting rotations of the 

window drive motor. Through a logic 

circuit, they are able to identify the 

window position relative to fully closed 

and can reverse the motor if there is a 

sudden change in the rotations per unit 

time prior to the window reaching the 

fully closed position. Our 

understanding is that this latter 

technology is favored in contemporary 

automatic reversal systems. 

Over time, the technology has been 

improved where contact-based ARSs 

appear to have become sophisticated 

enough to differentiate between 

entrapments and other sources of 

window resistance and to have 

minimized some of the shortcomings 

that were characteristic of older forcesensing systems. At one time, the 

available ARS technology was 

somewhat unreliable when the presence 

of snow or ice, or even window seals 

that had become un-pliable in very cold 

conditions, resulting in high closing 

resistance and the likelihood of false 

reversals. Additionally, some current 

generation ARSs have been designed to 

be inactive during the normal closure 

mode (i.e., when the power window 

switch was continuously held in the 

window closing position), or they have 

an override feature. Although newer 

ARS operate more reliably under 

adverse conditions, they still provide 

this override feature.8

Despite the continual improvement in 

force-sensing ARS technology, no 

current systems are certified as meeting 

the requirements of S5. 

We have considered whether it may 

be possible for manufacturers to 

produce effective ARS systems that are 

less costly. We note that most current 

ARS are installed on a window-bywindow basis, rather than using a 

centralized processor for the directional 

control of all of the windows. Therefore, 

each ARS-equipped window contains a 

motor, sensor, and processor to control 

the motor for ARS functionality 

(although the sensor and motor can be 

integrated into one unit). Because of this 

segmentation, the cost of installing ARS 

generally scales up with the number of 

windows it is installed on (e.g., the cost 

of installing ARS on four windows is 

approximately twice the cost of 

installing it on two windows). 

The agency considered whether 

centralized processors could be used to 

consolidate the costs of ARS 

applications in multiple windows 

(thereby only requiring the motor and 

sensor to be installed in the individual 

windows). However, our current 

information indicates that this would 

not be a way of reducing costs compared 

to putting an independent ARS in each 

equipped window, for reasons described 

below. 

There are several problems with 

installing centralized ARS processors 

that can lead to increased costs or 

degraded system performance. These 

problems include power/signal 

degradation through the wires 

connecting the window motors to the 

centralized processor, the need for ARS 

suppliers to have ‘‘full system 

understanding,’’ and the high cost of the 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45147 

9As shown below and in the accompanying 

regulatory evaluation, most of the vehicles 

examined were built prior to 2006. 

centralized processor itself, compared to 

the costs of individual processors for 

each window’s ARS. Based on our 

understanding of various systems, these 

factors have the effect of increasing the 

costs of a centralized system beyond the 

costs of individualized sensors. 

However, NHTSA welcomes comments 

relating to centrally-controlled ARS, its 

costs, and its relative benefits or 

drawbacks. 

IV. Safety Issues Addressed in This 

Rulemaking 

In two previous rulemakings relating 

to power window switches, we had 

estimated an average of only two 

fatalities occurred per year due to the 

operation of power windows. Those 

rulemakings, which mandated safer 

window switches designs in order to 

prevent inadvertent power window 

actuation, were estimated to have 

prevented half of all power windowrelated fatalities, on the order of one per 

year. 

In accordance with the mandate in the 

K.T. Safety Act of 2007, we have closely 

reexamined the fatalities and injuries 

associated with the functioning of 

power windows. We used a variety of 

surveys and case studies to obtain a 

more recent determination of fatalities 

and serious injuries relating to this 

issue. Additionally, we analyzed data 

taken from a sample of hospital 

emergency room records to compile a 

more comprehensive picture of the 

injuries associated with power 

windows. These studies presented a 

more comprehensive picture of the 

safety problem. 

We note that the initial iteration of the 

safer switches rule (mandating the ball 

test) only came into effect on September 

1, 2008, and the second iteration (the 

‘‘pull-to-close’’ requirement) is not fully 

effective until October 1, 2010. 

Therefore, given the overall population 

of vehicles and the dates of the data 

collected, the vast majority of injuries 

and fatalities captured by our studies 

occurred in vehicles that were not 

subject to these safer switch 

requirements.9 Based on the availability 

of information on more cases, the 

agency now estimates that safer 

switches are likely to prevent 50 to 75 

percent of all power window-related 

fatalities. Therefore, in determining the 

likely benefits of mandating ARS 

technology, NHTSA is estimating that 

62.5 percent (the mid-point of this 

range) of the serious injuries and 

fatalities captured in our studies would 

have been prevented by safer switches 

(had they been installed fleet-wide), and 

therefore cannot be factored in when 

determining the benefits of mandatory 

ARS. This is a little higher than our 

earlier estimates for the benefits of the 

safer switches rulemaking. 

In order to develop an up-to-date and 

more comprehensive tabulation of the 

data on fatalities and severe injuries 

associated with power windows, 

NHTSA acquired data from a variety of 

sources. NHTSA obtained mortality data 

from the Center for Health Statistics’ 

National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) 

for 2003 and 2004, using death 

certificates. We also used Special Crash 

Investigation (SCI) data to further 

develop our understanding of power 

window related incidents. While the 

SCI case reviews are not a 

comprehensive sample of all incidents, 

they provide detailed information about 

how the incidents occurred, and the 

data also can be also used to extrapolate 

the relative ratio of those incidents that 

would have been prevented by safer 

switches, and those that would have 

been mitigated if a vehicle had an ARS. 

Finally we searched for severe injuries 

in the Consumer Product Safety 

Commission’s National Electronic Injury 

Surveillance System All Injury Program 

(NEISS–AIP) statistical sample of 

emergency department records from 

2004 through 2007. The results of our 

searches are summarized in the 

following table: 

Data source Fatalities Severe injuries 

NVSS 2003–2004 .................................................................................................................................................... 12 ........................

SCI Oct. 2006–Mar. 2009 ........................................................................................................................................ 2 1 

NEISS–AIP 2004–2007 ........................................................................................................................................... ........................ 3 

To better analyze the remaining safety 

problem associated with power 

windows, NHTSA wanted to focus on 

the injuries and fatalities that ARS 

could address. As such, for the purposes 

of this analysis, we have made a 

distinction between two broad types of 

injuries and fatalities. This is because 

they can occur for different reasons and 

require different preventative measures 

to mitigate them. The first type includes 

fatalities and severe injuries resulting 

from asphyxia when a power window is 

closed on the chest or neck of a victim. 

The second type includes the type of 

injuries that occur when fingers, hands, 

or limbs are trapped in power windows, 

which can result in bruises, broken 

bones, and more severe injuries. 

a. Fatalities and Severe Injuries 

The most serious aspect of the safety 

concern is the fatalities and severe 

injuries that can result from 

asphyxiation when a child is trapped in 

a power window. There are several 

scenarios where this can occur. The 

most common is a situation that NHTSA 

has attempted to address in the past, 

which are inadvertent actuation 

scenarios where a child inadvertently 

activates the power window (typically, 

using his or her foot or knee), while 

leaning out the window. This problem, 

we believe, will largely be alleviated by 

the safer switches rulemakings, which 

prevent this sort of actuation by 

requiring that a switch require a pullingout motion to close the window. All 

vehicles already are required to meet the 

performance specifications of the ball 

test, and will need to meet the pull-toclose specifications beginning October 

1, 2010. Therefore, when calculating the 

benefits of the installation of ARS, we 

exclude those injuries and fatalities that 

would have already been prevented had 

the vehicles been equipped with safer 

switches. 

However, asphyxiation can also occur 

when a driver closes another occupant’s 

window from the driver controls, 

without knowing that a passenger is 

entrapped in the closing window. Given 

that this type of actuation has nothing 

to do with the switch design, we would 

not expect the safer switch regulations 

to have any effect on this type of 

incident. Nor would lockout switches 

have any effect, as the window is being 

operated by the driver, and not the 

occupant in the seat. Incidents like 

these may only be prevented by an ARS 

having appropriate override safeguards 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45148 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

10The term ‘‘power window’’ is used in the 

preamble of this final rule to refer to poweroperated windows, interior partitions, and roof 

panels, all of which are covered by FMVSS No. 118. 

Power roof panels and partitions are similar to 

power windows in their operation. However, any 

distinctions in applicability among the three types 

of systems will be delineated clearly in both the 

preamble and the amended regulatory text. 

that function in such a way that they do 

not prevent an ARS from engaging when 

the window is operated by a single, 

continuous activation of the window 

switch. 

Our search of the mortality data 

uncovered 12 fatalities over a two-yearperiod that were likely related to power 

windows, all of which were caused by 

asphyxiation. Close examination of the 

death certificate records, however, 

provided only three cases where enough 

information was provided to determine 

what could have prevented the incident. 

Of those three, we believe that all three 

would have been prevented by safer 

switches. 

SCI investigations to date have 

produced three reports detailing severe 

injuries and fatalities relating to power 

windows. Of those, one appeared to be 

an inadvertent closing cause by a child 

and could have been prevented by safer 

switches. A second case involved an 

injury caused by a driver using her 

window controls to close a rear 

window, unaware that a child had 

become entrapped in the process, and 

may have been preventable with an ARS 

(assuming that the driver was not 

engaging an ARS override feature). In 

the third case, it is not clear whether the 

driver or the child caused the fatal 

window closure incident. It is our belief 

that ARS, with appropriate override 

safeguards, may be the only effective 

current technology that could prevent 

cases like the one in which the driver 

unknowingly closed the window on an 

adult rear seat occupant or unrestrained 

child rear seat occupant. 

An SCI case ultimately involving no 

serious injury has also been reported. In 

that case, an unattended child closed a 

rear window on herself and was 

strangled, but was discovered and 

released from the window in time to be 

revived via CPR. In that case, we believe 

safer switches would have prevented 

the entrapment. 

Finally, the search of the NEISS–AIP 

sample identified three cases of severe 

injuries (Maximum Abbreviated Injury 

Scale (MAIS) 5). In two of the cases, the 

child was left unsupervised or 

unattended inside the vehicle, and we 

believe that these cases would have 

been preventable with safer switches. 

The third case did not provide enough 

information to make a determination. 

In summary, the agency estimates that 

there are 6 fatalities and 12 AIS 5 

critical level non-fatal injuries annually 

due to power windows. 

b. Less Severe Injuries 

In addition to the MAIS 5 (critical 

injuries) and fatalities, NHTSA’s 

examination of the data indicated that 

there were a substantial number of less 

severe injuries related to the operation 

of power windows. For purposes of this 

document, we classified as ‘‘finger’’ 

injuries those that could be translated to 

MAIS 1–3 injuries, which typically 

included bruises, broken bones, and 

severed fingers. Based on our data, we 

estimate that there are approximately 

1,943 injuries of this type per year. This 

is broken down to 1,726 MAIS 1, 196 

MAIS 2, and 21 MAIS 3 injuries. We 

also realize that this may be a low 

estimate, because our analysis was 

based primarily on narratives taken 

from emergency rooms. We do not 

believe that every injury caused by a 

power window entrapment of a limb 

would have resulted in immediate 

medical treatment, so we are reasonably 

confident that our analysis depicts a 

floor, rather than a ceiling, in terms of 

the overall number of finger injuries. We 

have detailed how we arrived at the 

estimate in the companion PRE. 

V. Current Regulatory Requirements for 

ARS 

FMVSS No. 118 currently specifies 

requirements for power-operated 

window, partition, and roof panel 

systems 10 in motor vehicles to 

minimize the risk of injury or death 

from their inadvertent operation. These 

requirements apply to passenger cars, 

multipurpose passenger vehicles, and 

trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating 

of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 lbs.) or less, 

and provide a substantial degree of 

protection from injuries that can result 

from the operation of power windows, 

especially in relation to children. 

FMVSS No. 118 offers manufacturers 

several means of compliance, depending 

on design preferences. Among the 

provisions at issue, FMVSS No. 118 

provides different means of protection 

to prevent unintentional window 

injuries, the ignition key requirements 

of paragraph S4 and the ARS 

requirements of S5. Paragraph S4 relies 

on the presence of the vehicle operator 

or ignition key holder to ensure safety, 

whereas paragraph S5 is a more 

technology-centric solution that allows 

greater design flexibility, although is 

costlier to comply with. 

Additionally, the agency has recently 

amended the standard to include a 

requirement (reflected in paragraph S6) 

that window switches be resistant to 

inadvertent actuation, a major 

contributor to power window related 

injuries to children. This requirement 

mandates that all power window 

switches be designed as ‘‘pull-to-close’’ 

switches. This type of switch can help 

to prevent a large percentage of the 

injuries that result when an object (e.g., 

a child’s foot, knee, pet, or other object) 

might otherwise cause the power 

window to close at a time when the 

occupant does not intend to cause it to 

do so. This is a switch level of 

protection above the ‘‘ball test’’ effective 

September 1, 2008. 

a. Key Requirements of S4 

The first level of protection, for 

windows that can only be activated 

when the ignition key is in (or near) the 

ignition, is enumerated in paragraph S4 

of the standard. The provisions of S4 

include the fundamental requirement 

that power windows must not be 

operable unless the vehicle’s ignition 

switch is in the ‘‘On,’’ ‘‘Start,’’ or 

‘‘Accessory’’ position. In this way, the 

standard provides a simple means (i.e., 

ignition key removal) by which a 

vehicle’s windows can be disabled and 

thus safeguarded from inadvertent 

closure. Paragraph S4 specifies several 

exceptions where power windows may 

close without the vehicle’s ignition 

being turned on (e.g., by use of a 

limited-range remote control), but each 

exception is specified in such a way that 

safety can still be assured by the 

presence of a responsible operator. 

The underlying rationale for the 

requirements in paragraph S4 is that, 

under its strictures, the windows of a 

vehicle cannot be operated outside of 

the presence of the vehicle operator. By 

simple ignition key removal from the 

vehicle, it ensures that children in a 

vehicle will not be able to operate the 

windows. In situations where the key is 

still in the ignition in the ‘‘On,’’ ‘‘Start,’’ 

or ‘‘Accessory’’ position, the driver or 

other responsible party is presumed to 

be in the vehicle, and can thus react to 

potential incidents involving the 

operation of the windows. Paragraph S4 

also allows design flexibility, such as 

permitting a limited-range remote 

control to operate the vehicle windows, 

which allow users additional control 

over their systems, while limiting that 

control to situations where the vehicle 

operator is present to ensure that there 

is no danger from unattended, 

operational power windows. 

b. ARS Requirements of S5 

Paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 118 

allows an alternative means of 

compliance through the use of power 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45149 

11Assuming a window closing speed of 100 mm/ 

sec, and the test rod requirements of S8.1. 

12See, e.g., 58 FR 16782, at 16783, March 31, 

1993. In that notice, NHTSA rejected the 

petitioner’s 10 N/mm value for the test rod stiffness 

due to the estimated 10 mm of compression that 

would occur before reversal, instead using a test rod 

with a stiffness of 65 N/mm, which would permit 

only 1.5 mm of compression before reversing. The 

agency stated that ‘‘[a] child’s finger placed in a 10 

mm opening could be severely injured in such a 

situation.’’ 

13We note that the agency estimated there are 

approximately two fatalities and four serious 

injuries per year that will not be prevented by safer 

switches. Either ECE R21-compliant or S5- 

compliant ARS, however, would prevent these 

injuries and fatalities. 

14The agency simply stated that, ‘‘[t]he available 

crush space for small openings must be limited; 

fingers placed in a small opening can be injured 

even if the [window] opening is reduced by only 

a few millimeters.’’ 58 FR 17683, March 31, 1993. 

window automatic reversal systems. If 

such a system is used in a vehicle and 

it meets the specified performance 

requirements of the standard, then the 

vehicle is not required to meet the 

window operating restrictions of 

paragraph S4. The ARS requirements set 

forth in this paragraph allow power 

windows to be operated safely in 

circumstances where no supervision is 

present. For example, vehicles equipped 

with S5-compliant ARSs can have the 

windows close in the event that the 

vehicle detects precipitation or the 

windows are controlled remotely 

without being observed. In these 

situations, while there is the distinct 

possibility that an unattended child may 

be positioned in an otherwise dangerous 

manner with regard to the closing 

window, the ARS system assures that no 

injuries will result. 

The ARS performance requirements of 

paragraph S5 have the effect of requiring 

that a closing window stop and reverse 

direction in 0.015 seconds.11

Additionally, the test procedure 

specifies the use of a rod that is not 

perpendicularly oriented (with respect 

to the window), which requires 

additional refinement of the ARS by the 

manufacturer due to the fact that an 

angled test rod, placed in the corner of 

a window, can cause the window to 

‘‘scissor’’ rather than reverse, thereby 

failing the performance requirements of 

FMVSS No. 118. Most vehicle 

manufacturers (even those with an 

ARS), have certified compliance with 

the ignition key requirements of 

paragraph S4. We note that this does not 

necessarily mean that the windows 

would not have met the more stringent 

S5 requirements. Because ARS helps to 

ensure protection even when no 

supervision is present, they give vehicle 

manufacturers a compliance option with 

maximum design freedom compared to 

the relatively limited operating 

conditions allowed under section S4. 

One option that is currently under 

consideration by NHTSA, although not 

in the proposed regulatory text in this 

document, is replacing the performance 

specification currently in paragraph S5 

with the specifications listed in United 

Nations Economic Commission for 

Europe (ECE) R21. NHTSA is 

considering this as a possibility and 

notes that this might be included in the 

text of a final rule. As we have stated 

above and implied in previous notices, 

the primary difference, in terms of 

safety considerations, between the two 

specifications is the potential effect on 

very small fingers.12 NHTSA believes 

that the S5 specification will prevent 

injury, with approximately a 98 percent 

success rate, to even a single child’s 

finger entrapped in a closing window. 

Conversely, because the ECE 

specification does not require that the 

window reverse in the same timeframe, 

and tests the reversal feature only with 

a perpendicular-oriented test rod, there 

may be a greater possibility that 

children’s fingers could be injured if an 

ARS were designed to meet only the 

ECE R21 specifications. 

NHTSA is requesting comment on the 

idea of replacing the ARS specification 

in paragraph S5 with the ECE 

specifications. By specifying a very 

ambitious S5 ARS requirement in order 

to prevent injuries to fingers, the 

difficulty and expense of meeting the S5 

requirement may have discouraged the 

implementation of perhaps only slightly 

less robust systems that could have 

prevented fatalities and serious injuries 

involving asphyxiation of young 

children.13 We also note that, unlike 

today, at the time of the development of 

the current performance requirements, 

the alternative requirements now 

specified in ECE R21 were not in 

widespread use. We request comment 

on whether there have been significant 

number of injuries to extremities caused 

by power windows equipped with ECE 

R21-compliant ARS. 

No vehicle manufacturer to date has 

certified a vehicle to comply with the S5 

specification for ARS. Instead, all 

vehicles currently sold in the U.S. with 

power windows have been certified to 

comply with the key requirements of S4. 

This, by definition, prohibits the 

installation of original equipment 

‘‘smart windows,’’ long-range remote 

controls, or other conveniences that are 

available only to vehicles certified to 

comply with S5. The agency believes 

there is a possibility, if the technical 

requirements for ARS were made to be 

more achievable and less expensive, 

that it would encourage manufacturers 

to install more of these advanced power 

window features. As such, we are 

requesting comment on replacing the 

specification for ARS currently 

contained in FMVSS No. 118 with the 

specification and test procedure for ARS 

in ECE R21. We are interested in 

receiving input from manufacturers and 

other interested parties as to whether 

such a change would encourage the 

installation of additional power 

windows with ARS and certification to 

the requirements of (a revised) 

paragraph S5. 

In requesting this information, 

NHTSA is also concerned that any 

reduction in the ARS performance 

specifications could result in increased 

finger injuries. In designing the S5 

specification, NHTSA made a judgment 

that there was a risk that the German 

specification (that would ultimately 

form the basis for that part of ECE R21) 

might not prevent all injuries to 

children’s fingers. Specifically, the 

agency was concerned that because the 

German specification permitted more 

compression (approximately 10 mm of 

compression before reversal) prior to 

reversal than the current S5 

specification in FMVSS No. 118 does 

(1.5 mm of compression before 

reversing), permitting it in windows that 

can close when unsupervised by an 

operator could permit injuries to fingers 

and hands that are caught in the 

windows that do not occur with the 

current regulatory provisions.14

However, we believe that there are good 

reasons to revisit those assumptions. 

First, we are aware that many installed 

ARSs in fact exceed the minimumspecified reversal requirements, so the 

danger to children’s fingers and hands 

may be even less than originally 

considered. Second, ECE R21-compliant 

ARS windows have, since the 1993 final 

rule, been installed in numerous 

vehicles worldwide. This affords the 

opportunity for more data to have been 

accumulated than was available at the 

time the original S5 specification was 

written, and we request comment on the 

number of estimated finger injuries, 

especially to children, that can be 

attributed to windows equipped with an 

ECE R21-compliant ARS. 

c. Safer Switches Requirements 

NHTSA amended FMVSS No. 118 in 

2004 to safeguard the switches that 

operate power windows in vehicles. In 

that amendment, NHTSA introduced a 

switch test requirement, referred to as 

the ‘‘ball test,’’ adding a new section S6 

to the safety standard. According to the 

new test procedure, a 1.5 inch diameter 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45150 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

15Overhead switches are exempted, as are 

switches for S5-compliant windows, although these 

switches are not exempted from the ‘‘pull-to-close’’ 

requirements. 

rigid ball is applied with a specified 

force and direction to each switch 

which controls the closing of a power 

window or sunroof.15 This test 

methodology was conceived of as 

simulating the action of a small child’s 

knee on a switch. To pass the test, a 

switch has to be adequately recessed, 

shrouded, or otherwise configured so as 

to resist actuation by the test ball, and 

the window must be prevented from 

closing when contacted by the ball, thus 

preventing window closure. 

The requirements of the new section 

S6 took effect on October 1, 2008, 

meaning that the power window 

switches in all vehicles manufactured 

on or after that date subject to FMVSS 

No. 118 must comply with the ball test. 

Later in 2004, Congress enacted the 

SAFETEA–LU legislation which 

included a mandate for NHTSA. Acting 

on this mandate, the agency again 

issued an amendment of FMVSS No. 

118 affecting power window switches. 

SAFETEA–LU mandated that NHTSA 

limit power window switches to a pullto-close type, thereby prohibiting other 

types of switches which may have 

complied with the ball test, such as 

recessed toggle or rocker switches. 

Between the two rulemakings, the 

agency believes that it has eliminated all 

of the injuries and fatalities that were 

caused by inadvertent actuation of 

power windows. 

d. Requirements of ECE R21 

The European safety requirements for 

power windows are included in an 

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 

regulation. That regulation, ECE No. 21, 

is titled Uniform Provisions Concerning 

the Approval of Vehicles with Regard to 

Their Interior Fittings. It covers the 

safety and other regulated aspects of 

numerous parts in the passenger 

compartments of vehicles, including, 

among others, controls, fittings, seat 

backs, and also power-operated 

windows. 

The power window requirements are 

set forth in section 5.8 of ECE R21. 

There are two main sections, section 

5.8.2 which deals with normal power 

window operating requirements, and 

section 5.8.3 which deals with 

automatic-reversing requirements. 

Section 5.8.2 of ECE R21 specifies that 

windows can operate only under certain 

limited conditions, primarily with the 

ignition key in the ignition. It also 

allows window operation by a key lock 

on the exterior of the vehicle, by limited 

range remote controls, and during the 

time interval between removal of the 

ignition key and opening of a front door. 

Section 5.8.3 states that power 

windows equipped with auto-reversing 

capability do not have to meet section 

5.8.2 if the auto-reversing feature meets 

a certain minimum level of 

performance. Section 5.8.3 specifies the 

necessary performance, including the 

allowable pinch-force level and 

procedures for measuring it. 

Additionally, ECE R21 includes 

section 5.8.4 which limits the locations 

allowed for power window switches 

and also requires a driver-controlled 

lock-out switch for any windows for use 

by rear seat occupants. Other power 

window requirements are enumerated 

in sections 5.8.5 through 5.8.7 of ECE 

R21 to cover overload protection, 

owner’s manual instructions, and 

alternative approval requirements. 

VI. Current Implementation of ARS and 

Compliance With FMVSS No. 118 in the 

United States 

Currently, in certifying compliance 

with FMVSS No. 118, manufacturers 

have the option to certify that their 

vehicles comply with the requirements 

of paragraph S4 or S5. Although a 

variety of current vehicles are equipped 

with automatic reversal capability on 

one or more of their windows, we are 

not aware of any systems that are 

certified as complying with paragraph 

S5 of FMVSS No. 118. Instead, all 

current vehicles are certified to 

paragraph S4, even if they are equipped 

with ARS. 

a. Differences in FMVSS and ECE 

Performance Specifications 

Like FMVSS No. 118, ECE R21 

permits design flexibility in terms of 

power windows if ARS is installed. 

Both ECE R21 and FMVSS No. 118 

allow power windows to be safeguarded 

by means other than auto-reversal 

capability—mainly by ignition key 

removal and related strictures. However, 

the ECE specification for ARS is slightly 

different from the specification 

contained in paragraph S5 of FMVSS 

No. 118. This section describes the 

similarities between the two standards, 

as well as crucial differences in 

stopping speed and testing procedures. 

To begin, ECE R21 Section 5.8.2 is 

analogous to FMVSS No. 118 section S4 

in that it enumerates the specific 

conditions under which window 

closure is allowable. Like the FMVSS, 

the ECE regulation makes ignition key 

insertion in the vehicle’s ignition the 

primary restriction on power window 

operation. Other allowable conditions 

listed in ECE section 5.8.2 correspond 

closely with those listed in section S4 

of FMVSS No. 118. For example, both 

standards specify that windows may be 

closed by remote control with a range of 

no greater than 6 meters, or 11 meters 

for remote controls requiring direct lineof-sight, and both standards allow the 

windows to operate after ignition key 

removal up until the time either of the 

vehicle’s front doors is opened to allow 

egress of the driver. 

With respect to ARS requirements, the 

U.S. and European standards are also 

highly similar. Like FMVSS No. 118, 

ECE R21 does not mandate the use of 

ARS. Instead, it allows power windows 

to close under conditions other than the 

listed ones, i.e., without any ignition 

key restrictions, as long as the windows 

are ARS-equipped and the automatic 

reversal functions according to a certain 

level of performance. The automatic 

reversal compliance option appears in 

section 5.8.3 of ECE R21 along with the 

performance characteristics for that 

reversal capability. ECE R21 section 

5.8.3 and FMVSS No. 118 section S5 are 

analogous in this respect. Both 

standards require that ARSs be tested by 

using rigid test rods that are placed 

within window openings while the 

power windows are closed on them. The 

rods can be any size within a prescribed 

range to simulate the various body parts 

of occupants which are most likely to be 

entrapped by power windows. The 

range is from a minimum of 4 mm (0.16 

inches), equivalent to a small child’s 

finger, to a maximum of 200 mm (about 

eight inches), equivalent to the greatest 

width of the head of a 95th percentile 

adult male. 

Both standards set a limit of 100 

Newtons of pinch force over the entire 

range of window openings from 4 mm 

to 200 mm, and they both specify three 

alternative positions to which the 

window must open after reversal. 

However, there are two key differences 

between the two standards, both of 

which arise with respect to the 

procedure for measuring ARS pinch 

force. 

First, while both standards stipulate 

the use of cylindrical test rods ranging 

from 4 mm to 200 mm in diameter to 

evaluate ARS performance, ECE R21 

specifies that the test rods used must 

have a stiffness, i.e., force-deflection 

ratio, of 10 Newtons per millimeter (N/ 

mm) for any size test rod in the range, 

which equates to a 10 mm maximum 

compression at the maximum allowed 

100 Newton force. This contrasts with 

the requirements in FMVSS No. 118, 

where a rod stiffness of 20 N/mm 

(allowing up to 5 mm compression) is 

specified for larger test rods (between 25 

mm and 200 mm diameter) to represent 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45151 

larger body parts like arms or heads, and 

65 N/mm (allowing a mere 1.5 mm of 

compression) for smaller test rods (25 

mm diameter or less), the latter used to 

simulate fingers. 

Inclusion of these stiffness 

specifications is essential because it is 

impossible for a power window that is 

in motion to instantaneously stop and 

reverse itself. Instead, a window must 

have some finite time interval and 

distance of travel over which it 

decelerates to a stop and then begins to 

accelerate in the reverse direction. 

Minimizing this reaction time is a 

fundamental challenge in the design of 

an ARS, especially given that there are 

many other important design factors to 

be considered. 

The different test rod specification 

means that an S5-compliant ARS must 

be designed to stop and reverse a 

closing window more quickly than an 

ECE R21-compliant ARS. Under S5, a 

closing window must decelerate and 

stop over a distance of no more than 1.5 

mm, corresponding to 0.015 seconds of 

reaction time at a typical closing speed 

of 100 mm/sec, after contacting a test 

rod before reversal is initiated; for 

obstructions larger than 25 mm, as 

much as 5 mm of window movement, 

corresponding to 0.05 seconds, could 

occur before reversal. Under ECE R21, a 

window could continue closing by as 

much as 10 mm after initial contact with 

a test rod, equating to a reaction time of 

0.1 seconds before reversal is triggered. 

The significance of this difference is 

that small parts of the body like fingers 

could be less protected under ECE R21 

than they are under FMVSS No. 118, 

and even larger body parts would be 

subject to as much as twice the 

compression under the ECE standard 

before reversal is triggered. This is 

especially relevant with regard to finger 

injuries. If a small finger is caught 

between the window and the frame, a 

window traveling an additional 10 mm 

(between initial contact and the time 

when it stops) before reversing could 

still do substantial damage to the finger, 

yet a larger body part, such as an arm, 

is likely to suffer far less damage from 

being momentarily compressed the 

same 10 mm distance. 

However, the actual design of an ARS 

is such that this difference in required 

reversal sensitivity between the U.S. 

and European standards may not be 

important in all instances. For one 

thing, the analysis above assumes that 

an ECE R21-compliant ARS performs 

exactly at the limits of the specification, 

whereas an actual ARS is likely to 

outperform those limits. Furthermore, 

either type of system would be effective 

in preventing the most catastrophic 

events, i.e., strangulation or amputation 

of limbs which, from a safety 

standpoint, are the types of incidents 

which are of the greatest importance. 

Because there have been no certified 

S5-compliant ARSs in the vehicle fleet, 

there are no data to compare its 

effectiveness to that of ECE R21- 

compliant systems. To the best of our 

knowledge, there has never been a 

significant injury caused by any of the 

many ARS-equipped power windows 

that have been in service in a variety of 

U.S. vehicles over many model years. 

This is true even though existing 

automatic reversal systems, while 

mostly ECE R21-compliant, include 

systems that do not even necessarily 

meet ECE R21. This fact attests to the 

relative effectiveness of ARS in general, 

at least with regard to severe injuries 

and fatalities, regardless of the exact 

specifications in terms of force 

deflection and reversal speed, that it 

may meet. 

A second key difference between U.S. 

and European ARS test procedures 

relates to the orientation of test rods 

when they are placed in window 

openings. Unlike FMVSS No. 118, ECE 

R21 indicates that rods must remain 

perpendicular to the window during 

testing. This distinction can, under 

certain circumstances, make ECE R21 

easier to meet from a design standpoint. 

However, this is very much dependent 

on particulars of the window design 

such as the shape of the mating surface 

of the frame where the window glass 

seats upon closure and the contour and 

density of weather stripping. These 

factors can vary substantially from one 

vehicle model to another. 

A third, less significant, difference 

between the U.S. and European 

standards involves the positions that a 

window must open to after an automatic 

reversal takes place. ECE R21 and 

FMVSS No. 118 both specify three 

possible opening positions, and two of 

those are identical in both standards. 

However, for the third optional opening 

position, ECE R21 specifies that the 

window be ‘‘at least 50 mm more open 

than the position when reversal was 

initiated.’’ The corresponding option in 

FMVSS No. 118 specifies a position of 

at least ‘‘125 mm more open than when 

reversal was initiated.’’ The 

consequence of this difference is that, 

for an ECE R21-compliant ARS designed 

to meet this option, a window which 

has reversed automatically upon contact 

with a person’s neck would re-open 

sufficiently to relieve all pinching force 

on the person but not necessarily far 

enough to allow the person to 

completely extract his head from the 

window opening. Under the 

corresponding FMVSS No. 118 

specification, a person would have 

plenty of clearance to easily extract his 

or her head from the window opening 

after window reversal. 

b. Implementation of ARS in the U.S. 

and Other Countries 

As stated above, NHTSA is not aware 

of any vehicles that are certified to 

comply with the requirements of 

paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 118. 

Instead, discussions with vehicle 

manufacturers and ARS suppliers 

appear to indicate that most if not all 

current automatic reversal systems 

installed in power windows in the U.S. 

(usually, in conjunction with an 

express-up feature) meet the European 

reversal test procedural requirements 

contained within ECE R21. Further it is 

noted that we are unaware of any 

manufacturers that utilize any 

technologies for ARS other than 

physical contact systems, although we 

are aware of some proximity detection 

systems, such as those based on 

capacitive or infrared technologies that 

may be used in the future. 

Based on NHTSA’s sampling of a MY 

2010 fleet with an estimated 13 million 

passenger cars and light trucks, ECEcompliant ARS already exists in 

approximately 39 percent of the total 

population of power windows; that is, 

approximately 19.2 million of the 49.0 

million power windows in vehicles 

produced annually (not counting roof 

panels, or power vent windows), are 

equipped with an ARS. Another 4.9 

million windows have ARS that are not 

claimed to be ECE-compliant. In all of 

these cases, the ARS is installed as a 

supplemental safety system for a design 

that complies with the requirements of 

paragraph S4 of FMVSS No. 118. The 

distribution of ARS windows by seating 

position are 9.1 million driver’s side 

front windows, 6.2 million passenger 

side front windows, and 8.8 million rear 

windows. Almost all of these windows 

are equipped with express-up systems, 

for which ARS acts as a supplemental 

safety system. NHTSA is aware of 

several estimates for the number of 

makes and models equipped with ARS 

in Europe and Japan. Since around 

2000, the estimates purported have 

hovered around 80 percent. However, 

during the development of this NPRM, 

NHTSA was not able to confirm these 

estimates. 

VII. Expanding ARS to Various Subsets 

of Windows 

In accordance with the mandate in the 

K.T. Safety Act of 2007, NHTSA has 

closely re-examined the issue of 

fatalities and injuries related to the 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45152 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

16According to NHTSA compliance data received 

from vehicle manufacturers, approximately 31 

percent of the fleet have all main windows with an 

express-up feature. 

operation of power windows. We have 

tentatively determined two things. First, 

if we require that ARS should be 

mandated on windows, we believe that 

the ARSs should conform to the force 

specifications laid out in ECE R21, 

rather than those in S5 of FMVSS No. 

118 (we note, of course, that this would 

not preclude the ARSs from complying 

with both specifications), as our primary 

goal is to prevent serious injuries 

resulting from window entrapment. 

Additionally, we have examined the 

feasibility of requiring ARS on a variety 

of power windows. Because the costs 

and benefits of equipping each window 

group with an ARS system appear to be 

different, we have broken down our 

analysis by window category. We have 

divided the vehicle windows into three 

different categories, based on the 

estimated cost of adding an ARS to 

those windows, and the types of injuries 

that can reasonably be anticipated to be 

prevented by installing ARS in them. 

These categories are: (1) Windows 

equipped with the ‘‘express-up’’ feature; 

(2) the four main windows; (3) sunroofs 

or moonroofs (we use these terms 

interchangeably) and power vent 

windows and other panels (such as 

power rear windows on pickup trucks 

or SUVs). 

a. Windows Equipped With ‘‘ExpressUp’’ 

As discussed previously in this 

notice, one-touch closing of power 

windows, also called ‘‘express-up,’’ is a 

convenience feature that has become 

commonplace in modern vehicles. This 

feature allows a user to close a window 

by momentarily actuating the window 

switch. Whereas a conventional window 

will stop moving unless pressure is 

applied to the switch, an express-up 

window continues to fully close after 

the switch is released. At this time, the 

agency knows of no injuries associated 

with these sorts of windows in the U.S. 

Most often, only the driver’s window 

in a vehicle has this feature. Logically, 

the driver’s window is the one most 

often operated, and it would appear that 

manufacturers recognize that this 

frequent operation, for example at toll 

booths or restaurant ‘‘drive through 

windows,’’ is made more convenient by 

one-touch operation capability. What 

might be deemed ‘‘express down’’ 

capability, i.e., one-touch opening of a 

window, is typically also present on 

windows equipped with an express-up 

feature (and many without it), but there 

are no safety ramifications of express 

down, so it is not included in this 

discussion. 

There are also a number of vehicle 

models that have express-up on the 

front outboard (front passenger’s) 

window as well as the driver’s. Less 

common, but still well represented,16

are vehicles with express-up capability 

on all of their main windows, i.e., all 

four outboard windows including those 

in the rear of four-door vehicles. 

It is also common for power sunroofs 

to have express-close capability. 

Conversely, we are not aware of any 

power vent windows that currently have 

this feature. However, due to the nature 

and infrequency of incidents involving 

these types of windows, they are 

discussed separately, below. 

To the best of our knowledge, in all 

vehicles sold to date in the U.S., each 

power window equipped with an 

express-up feature also is voluntarily 

equipped with automatic reversal 

capability. These ARSs typically comply 

with the ECE R21 performance 

specification, instead of the 

performance specification in FMVSS 

No. 118, paragraph S5. However, 

because every U.S. vehicle is certified as 

compliant with section S4 of FMVSS 

No. 118 (which safeguards window 

operation by necessitating the use or 

presence of the vehicle ignition key), 

they do not certify to any ARS 

specifications, including those of ECE 

R21 or section S5 of FMVSS No. 118. 

In summary, in the current fleet of 

U.S. vehicles, automatic reversal 

systems are installed voluntarily on 

windows with express-up capability. 

Furthermore, since the ARS are not 

relied upon for certification, their 

performance does not have to meet any 

safety standard. However, because 

suppliers generally design one type of 

system for use in multiple vehicles sold 

in markets around the world, most 

vehicles with ARS have one that is ECEcompliant, despite there being no 

requirement in the U.S. that this be so. 

The likelihood that many vehicles in 

the U.S. are equipped with the less 

stringent ECE-compliant ARS, as 

opposed to the more stringent 

requirements of FMVSS No. 118, affords 

this agency an opportunity to discuss 

the safety differences between the two 

specifications. As stated above, FMVSS 

No. 118’s specification in paragraph S5 

is a more difficult design to conform to 

than ECE R21, mainly because of the 

orientation of the test rods and the 

resultant force on the object. 

Nonetheless, despite this difference in 

design specifications, NHTSA has found 

no evidence that express-up windows, 

which we believe are uniformly 

protected by an ECE-compliant ARS, 

have caused significant numbers of 

injuries. This raises the issue of what 

the specific safety benefits and 

rationales are for the two different 

specifications, which is discussed 

below. 

The practical difference in terms of 

safety is that, in our opinion, the 

requirement of FMVSS No. 118 will 

protect ‘‘pinching’’ injuries to children’s 

fingers, whereas the ECE specification 

may allow some of those finger injuries 

to occur. Both specifications, however, 

will protect against the more severe 

entrapment or compression injuries, 

such as can occur when a child’s body 

or neck becomes entrapped in a power 

window, because that part of the body 

is able to withstand substantially more 

compression than a finger can before 

severe damage is done, assuming the 

window retracts in time to prevent an 

injury resulting from an obstructed 

airway or blood vessel. 

b. Main Windows Not Equipped With 

Express-Up 

We believe from our analysis of power 

window injuries that outboard main 

windows (in this rulemaking, we refer 

to generally as ‘‘side’’ windows), which 

means those in the front doors of 

virtually all passenger cars and light 

trucks and the rear doors of four-door 

versions of those vehicles, account for 

almost all of those injuries. This is not 

a surprising result since side windows, 

being by far the most numerous, account 

for the vast majority of occupant 

exposure to power window operation. 

Furthermore, as would be expected, 

most of the harm associated with side 

windows comes in the form of pinching 

of hands, fingers, wrists and forearms, 

which reflects the proximity and 

disposition of occupants’ bodies to side 

windows. 

Among side windows, we surmise 

from the data that front side windows 

appear to be most often involved in 

injuries. Again, this is predictable based 

solely on exposure—the front seats 

being the most frequently occupied in a 

vehicle. Unfortunately, the data are not 

codified in a way that allows us to 

consistently determine which side 

window (i.e., front or rear) in a vehicle 

was responsible for an injury, and the 

associated narratives are inconsistent in 

providing that information. From the 

narratives, however, we can see that a 

typical scenario is a driver using the 

central power window controls located 

by the driver’s seat unintentionally 

closing the passenger side window on 

the hand or arm of an occupant in that 

seating position. Despite the probable 

higher frequency of this scenario for 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45153 

front passengers, the risk is essentially 

the same for rear seat passengers, since 

front and rear windows operate 

identically. The only significant 

difference for rear windows is that they 

are further outside of the driver’s fieldof-view than front windows, and so it is 

possible that the driver may be less 

likely to curtail window closing in time 

to avoid or mitigate an entrapment. 

c. Sunroofs and Power Vent Windows 

Injuries from vent-type windows are 

not discernible in our data, which is 

expected since exposure should be 

comparatively very low. Vent windows 

are usually located at the far rear sides 

of a vehicle, and occupants are not often 

seated adjacent to them. In addition, 

vent windows create openings too small 

to accommodate larger appendages, 

particularly occupants’ heads. 

Incidents involving sunroofs are 

easier to pick out in the data, but are 

still uncommon. Again, exposure would 

be the most prominent reason. Harm 

from sunroofs is undeniably lower than 

from windows since the proportion of 

vehicles equipped with sunroofs is a 

fraction of the total power-windowequipped vehicle population. In a given 

vehicle, there is only one sunroof 

(exceptions do exist for vehicles having 

multiple sunroofs) as opposed to from 

two to upwards of six operable windows 

in a given vehicle. Additionally, 

occupants, especially young children, 

are far less prone to place their bodies 

or limbs out of sunroofs than they are 

for side windows. 

d. Lockout Switch and Override 

Function Considerations 

The agency has considered whether 

proposing requirements for ARS 

override and lockout switches, two 

components that are closely related to 

the performance of power windows, is 

justified based on the information we 

have. Lockout switches are common 

features on many vehicles, which allow 

a driver to control whether the 

passengers can operate their windows. 

Many vehicles have lockout switches 

that can prevent all non-driving 

occupants from operating the windows, 

or at least the rear windows. Lockout 

switches can also serve a safety purpose. 

For example, it is our understanding 

that one design consideration for these 

switches is to prevent children from 

opening a window. However, when the 

windows are locked out, injuries from 

inadvertent actuation and obstructed 

closings caused by the occupant’s 

deliberate actions are also prevented. 

Under ECE R21, vehicles that are not 

equipped with ARS are required to have 

lockout switches that can be used to 

deactivate the rear window switches. 

Furthermore, virtually all vehicles sold 

with power windows already have a 

lockout switch installed and as such, 

there would be little benefit in requiring 

them. Given these facts, after careful 

consideration, the agency has decided 

not to propose requirements for lockout 

switches at this time, since we are 

unable to determine that there would be 

any safety benefits at all from such a 

rule. 

Override functions are generally 

provided as convenience features in 

windows with ARS. These allow a user 

to close the window in situations where 

an ARS either falsely detects an 

obstruction or the user does not want 

the ARS to stop at the obstruction. An 

example of the former is when the 

window motor encounters resistance 

caused by ice or cold weather causing 

the window liner to contract, which 

could have the effect of triggering the 

ARS. Alternatively, a user may wish the 

window to close on an object as a way 

to have the window hold that item in 

place. 

We are aware that override strategies 

for ARSs do not work in a standardized 

way across all vehicles. While some 

overrides require that a user release and 

then quickly reactivate the window 

switch, others do not. Instead, they may 

allow continuous activation of the 

window switch to engage the override, 

even if the operator is not aware that 

there may be an ongoing entrapment 

situation. However, we are not aware of 

any studies or analysis to support one 

design iteration over another. Therefore, 

after careful consideration, the agency 

has decided not to propose 

requirements for override capabilities at 

this time, since we are unable to 

determine the benefits of doing so. 

VIII. Proposal To Mandate That Main 

Windows With Express-Up Be 

Equipped With ARS 

Given the available estimates of the 

effectiveness of ARS, the scope of the 

safety problem that ARS effectively 

addresses, and the Congressional 

mandate, NHTSA is proposing in this 

document to require that all main 

windows (that is, all windows except 

vent windows and sunroofs/moonroofs) 

equipped with an express-up feature, 

and certified to comply with the 

requirements of S4 be required to have 

an ARS that complies with the test 

specifications of section 5.8.3 of ECE 

R21. We are not including a broader 

requirement as part of our primary 

proposal, given the scope of the 

remaining safety problem that could be 

addressed by ARS after factoring in the 

benefits attributable to the two prior 

safer switches rulemakings. 

Instead of requiring the most 

expensive safety equipment for all 

situations, NHTSA has tentatively 

decided to adjust for three different 

levels of risk. These levels, in 

descending order, are: (1) The risk 

posed by power windows when they 

close in an environment entirely 

unattended by an adult operator; (2) the 

risk posed by power windows when 

they close in the presence of the 

operator, but without his or her active 

control; and (3) the risk posed by power 

windows when they close while the 

operator is actively controlling the 

window switch. We have tentatively 

determined that these three situations 

warrant different safety measurements. 

For the first situation, where power 

windows operate in an unattended 

environment, the highest level of safety 

may be necessary. Unlike situations 

where a driver or adult occupant is 

likely to be present (and the key is in 

the ignition), unattended closing power 

windows can pose a serious risk to the 

safety of children. NHTSA’s 

requirements in FMVSS No. 118, 

paragraph S5 are designed such that 

windows will only compress a test rod 

about 1.5 mm before reversing, which 

requires an extremely fast reaction time 

on the automatic-reversing mechanism. 

The agency established these stringent 

requirements specifically in order to 

protect the fingers of children. 

We have stated that incidents where 

the windows raise unexpectedly, as 

would be the case when the windows 

raise without any occupant activation, 

present particularly high dangers of 

window entrapment. The agency would 

expect that a larger proportion of these 

closings would result in a potential 

injury, and that therefore, the highest 

degree of protection is required. While 

we have requested comment regarding 

the possibility of adopting the ECE R21 

force requirements for ARS, without 

additional data we did not specifically 

include it in the proposed regulatory 

text. However, it is under consideration 

and may be included in a final rule. 

With regard to situations where the 

windows are closing in the presence of 

the vehicle operator, but without his or 

her personal manipulation of the switch 

(i.e., windows with express-up), NHTSA 

believes that there is justification for 

proposing to increase the protection 

surrounding windows with express-up 

that currently are certified to conform to 

the requirements in paragraph S4. 

Unlike all other windows that conform 

to the key requirements of paragraph S4, 

windows with express-up do not require 

continued action by the window 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45154 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

17For example, the distance of a typical 3 year 

old child’s tip of their longest finger to the center 

of shoulder is 369 mm, with an additional 68 mm 

distance to the midpoint of the neck, which is not 

enough to reach most switches with one’s neck 

entrapped in the window, even if the arm was fully 

extended. 

18We note, however, that these incidents would 

have been prevented had the child been properly 

restrained in a child safety seat. 

operator or driver in order to close 

them. This means that if the closing 

path is obstructed, the operator’s hand 

is likely to not be on the switch at the 

time of entrapment. This creates a 

crucial delay between the time when the 

obstruction is detected and the time that 

the operator can manually stop the 

motion of the window (in a normallyactivated power window, all the 

operator needs to do is to remove his/ 

her finger from the window switch). 

We are also aware of the relatively 

limited circumstances in which a 

person could be injured by a window 

equipped with express-up. Unlike 

windows that close automatically 

without driver supervision (and as such, 

are required to have ARS subject to the 

paragraph S5 requirements), express-up 

windows will always be operated with 

some degree of supervision, because the 

key must be in the ‘‘Accessory,’’ ‘‘On,’’ 

or ‘‘Start’’ position. While this does not 

ensure that an unsupervised child will 

not be left alone with such a window 

active, the supervision requirement does 

significantly, in the agency’s opinion, 

lessen the risk. 

Nonetheless, by virtue of the fact that 

these windows can close without the 

operator of the window physically 

maintaining contact with the switch 

after initial activation, we tentatively 

believe that there is an increased risk of 

injury if ARS were not present. To 

begin, while safer switches will prevent 

inadvertent actuation of a window 

switch by a child’s knee or foot, there 

is still the possibility that a playing 

child will manipulate the switches by 

hand and activate the power window, 

which could lead to entrapment if the 

child’s head or neck is in the path of the 

closing window. With regard to 

windows without an express-up feature, 

this is generally not a problem. As the 

window rises, it is likely that the child 

would reflexively move his/her hand 

from the switch, thereby stopping 

operation of the window. For some 

children, given their small stature, it is 

doubtful that they could even continue 

to reach the switch with their hand if 

their neck were entrapped in a window 

raised nearly to the top of its travel 

path.17

The third situation, where the main 

windows close while the operator is 

actively using the switch, is one where 

NHTSA does not, at this time, believe 

that the danger warrants the 

requirement of ARS. If the closing path 

is obstructed, then the window operator 

should be able to quickly remove his/ 

her hand from the switch, thereby 

preventing further injury. As shown 

above in section IV, due to the relatively 

low number of severe injuries and 

fatalities that result from the operation 

of power windows (excluding those 

incidents that would have been 

prevented by the safer switch 

requirements), we tentatively believe 

that they remain safe. 

While the scenarios involving severe 

injuries or fatalities for power windows 

equipped with safer switches are 

extremely rare, we have found one case 

where such incidence did occur. In this 

documented case, it appears that the 

driver operated the driver’s window 

controls to close a rear-seat window, 

while not realizing that a child was 

entrapped in the window being closed. 

The window that entrapped the child 

was not equipped with an express-up 

feature. Because the child was not 

activating the switch, these incidents 

could not have been prevented by safer 

switches or by a lockout feature.18 ARS, 

however, may have prevented these 

injuries. Given the available information 

about ARS, described above, we believe 

it would be nearly 100 percent effective 

in preventing serious injuries such as 

these. 

While an ARS requirement for all 

main windows would prevent some 

injuries to fingers and hands, we are not 

including such a requirement as part of 

our primary proposal given the scope of 

the remaining safety problem that could 

be addressed by ARS after factoring in 

the benefits attributable to the two prior 

safer switches rulemakings. 

The purpose of the K.T. Safety Act of 

2007 is to prevent deaths and serious 

injuries to children, so we have focused 

our safety analysis on the severe injuries 

and fatalities that have occurred due to 

power window entrapment, rather than 

the more commonplace, but less severe, 

injuries involving bruised and pinched 

fingers that occur to adults and children 

alike. 

NHTSA also conducted an analysis of 

requiring ARS at all main window 

positions. The estimates, described at 

length in NHTSA’s Preliminary 

Regulatory Evaluation, show that the 

injuries prevented by ARS in all main 

window positions consist primarily of 

low-level injuries to fingers and hands, 

and there would be substantial costs to 

install ARS in tens of millions of 

windows. 

Therefore, we are not including in our 

primary proposal a requirement that 

windows that conform to the current 

requirements of paragraph S4 and do 

not have the express-up feature, which 

currently constitute a majority of all 

windows, should be required to have 

ARS as standard equipment. Instead, we 

believe that the S4 ignition key 

requirement remains the most effective 

means to prevent unattended children 

from suffering power window related 

injuries in vehicles. We believe that 

careful child supervision by adults is a 

crucial factor in preventing a variety of 

vehicle-related injuries to children, 

whether related to power windows or 

any other attendant dangers, such as 

incidents of hyperthermia and vehicle 

rollaways (addressed in other portions 

of the K.T. Safety Act of 2007), which 

can result when children are left 

unsupervised in a vehicle. We believe 

that these factors along with safer 

window switches together should 

eliminate virtually all serious injuries 

and fatalities associated with power 

windows. However, we request 

comments as to whether there is 

additional information that could lead 

us to require ARS on a broader group of 

power windows. 

Costs and Benefits 

Overall, we do not believe that our 

primary proposal would impose 

significant costs. To our knowledge, 

virtually every power window that is 

equipped with an express-up feature is 

also equipped with an ARS. 

Furthermore, we believe that most of 

these windows are built in accordance 

with the specifications in ECE R21. 

Therefore, this proposal would only 

require manufacturers to take the 

precautions with express-up windows 

that, as far as the agency is aware, they 

have already been taking in most cases. 

Furthermore, we tentatively believe 

that this proposal will promote the 

development of ECE-compliant ARS for 

those manufacturers who are currently 

producing ARS that does not adhere to 

this specification (or the specifications 

currently in FMVSS No. 118). Given 

these facts, we do not believe that this 

proposal would impose any significant 

costs on vehicle manufacturers or ARS 

suppliers. 

The agency is placing in the Docket a 

Preliminary Regulation Evaluation 

(PRE) that analyzes costs and benefits. 

That document can be summarized as 

follows: 

The PRE analyzes the cost, benefits, 

and cost-effectiveness of installing 

automatic reversal systems in the 

vehicle windows. While the agency 

considers the benefits of installing 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45155 

19The proposed ARS requirements are from ECE 

Regulation 21. 20There are some vehicles that have ARS for 

express up windows, but do not meet the ECE 

Regulation 21 requirements. The costs and benefits 

of bringing these vehicles into compliance with ECE 

Regulation 21 are believed to be small. If, for 

example, these manufacturers that do not meet the 

ECE Regulation 21 achieved 88 percent 

effectiveness, instead of 90 percent effectiveness 

assumed for those manufacturers that do meet ECE 

Regulation 21, then having these vehicles comply 

with ECE Regulation 21 would result in an 

estimated annual benefit of 4 AIS–1 injuries. 

reversal systems in all types of vehicle 

windows, including front and rear main 

windows, sunroofs, as well as small 

‘‘vent’’ windows, NHTSA proposes 

requiring automatic reversal systems 

(ARS) 19 in those windows equipped 

with ‘‘one-touch closing’’ or ‘‘expressup’’ operation, in which a window 

closes without continuous actuation 

from the window operator. As discussed 

above, we are also seeking comments on 

a broader requirement for automatic 

reversal systems, and could include 

such a requirement in a final rule. 

Five alternatives are analyzed by the 

PRE. The primary proposal would 

require ARS for windows with the 

express-up operation. This analysis 

assumes that this alternative has no 

costs or benefits, because, as far as we 

know, the difference in costs and 

benefits between power windows with 

the express-up operation that meet the 

United Nations Economic Commission 

for Europe Regulation 21 (ECE R21) 

requirements and that have ARS already 

and that don’t quite meet ECE R21 is 

minimal. Comments are requested on 

costs of improving those systems that 

don’t comply to meet the requirements 

of ECE R21. The second alternative 

considers requiring ARS that meets the 

ECE Regulation 21 requirements for all 

power side windows. The PRE also 

analyzed a third alternative: the costs 

and benefits of requiring power 

windows to meet the requirements of S5 

of FMVSS 118. A fourth alternative, 

requiring that power windows with 

express-up be equipped with S5- 

compliant ARS, is included for 

comparative purposes. Similarly, a fifth 

alternative, which is to require ECEcompliant ARS at rear side windows 

only, was analyzed, considering that 

most children sit in rear seats. The 

agency did not analyze an alternative to 

require ARS for all power windows, sun 

roofs, etc., since we could find very few 

cases of injuries involving sun roofs or 

moon roofs, or power vent windows. 

The following table shows the 

estimated costs, benefits, and cost per 

equivalent life saved for the five 

alternatives. 

Cost per window 

(2007 economics) 

Total incremental 

cost 

Annual 

fatality benefits 

Annual 

injury benefits 

Cost per equivalent 

life saved** 

Alternative 1 Requiring ARS at expressup windows to meet ECE 21.Near $0 ................. Near $0 ................. 0 Near 0 20 ............... N/A. 

Alternative 2 Requiring ARS at all 

power side windows to meet ECE 21.

$6 .......................... $149.4 million ........ 2 850 ........................ $18.0–$22.6 million. 

Alternative 3 Requiring all power side 

windows to meet S5 of FMVSS No. 

118.

$12 ........................ $588.1 million ........ 2 997 ........................ $63.7–$80.0 million. 

Alternative 4 Requiring ARS at expressup windows to meet S5 of FMVSS 

No. 118.

$6 .......................... $144.6 million ........ 0 40 .......................... $438.3–550.3 million. 

Alternative 5 Requiring ARS at all rear 

power side windows to meet ECE 21.

$6 .......................... $91.8 million .......... 2 unknown ................ N/A. 

** Note: The range in cost per equivalent life saved is from a 3% discount rate to a 7% discount rate. 

a. Listing of Vehicles Having Power 

Windows With or Without ARS 

One additional aspect of the K.T. 

Safety Act of 2007 requires that NHTSA 

make information available to the public 

regarding the availability of power 

window ARS on new vehicles. 

Specifically, section 2 of the Act states, 

in part, that the secretary shall: 

Publish and otherwise make available to 

the public through the Internet and other 

means (such as the ‘Buying a Safer Car’ 

brochure) information regarding which 

vehicles are or are not equipped with power 

windows and panels that automatically 

reverse direction when an obstruction is 

detected. 

While we have not reached any 

conclusions regarding whether and how 

to mandate ARS in passenger vehicles, 

we do believe that there is value in 

informing consumers on which vehicles 

are already equipped with this safety 

feature. For that reason, we are 

providing this information as early as 

possible. 

Furthermore, in order to provide the 

most relevant information regarding the 

existence of power windows, we are not 

limiting the information to only those 

windows that conform to the 

specifications currently in FMVSS No. 

118. Instead, we will provide 

information about ARS installed in any 

window position, which comply with 

either the current FMVSS No. 118 

specifications or the alternative 

specifications given in ECE R21. We 

expect to report this information on a 

vehicle make and model basis at the 

http://www.safercar.gov Web site by 

October 2009. 

b. Proposed Effective Date 

The K. T. Safety Act of 2007 specified 

that full compliance with the safety 

standards specified in this regulation 

shall be required not later than 48 

months after the date on which the final 

rule is issued. In accordance with this 

requirement, NHTSA is proposing a 

period of 24 months of lead time for this 

requirement to take effect, due to the 

fact that nearly all manufacturers would 

already comply with the proposed 

requirement. Based on information 

submitted by the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers and the 

Association of International Automobile 

Manufacturers, ECE-compliant ARS 

already exists in approximately 30 

percent of the total population of power 

windows. The agency found that 

approximately 24.1 million of the 49.0 

million power windows in light 

vehicles produced annually (not 

counting roof panels, or power vent 

windows), are equipped with the 

express-up feature and an ARS. 

Furthermore, fleet compliance 

information submitted to NHTSA by 

vehicle manufacturers indicates that 

19.2 million of the 24.1 million vehicle 

windows having the express-up feature 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45156 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

and an ARS meet the ECE ARS 

requirements. Given this existing level 

of penetration into the fleet, NHTSA 

believes that relatively little time would 

be needed to certify compliance. Thus, 

NHTSA proposes that the amendments 

outlined here be effective 24 months 

after publication of the final rule in the 

Federal Register, which we believe will 

provide an adequate period to certify 

compliance, or make design changes if 

necessary. 

As indicated earlier, the K.T. Safety 

Act contemplated a phase-in of 

requirements for ARS. We believe that 

such a phase-in would be relevant to a 

rule that required the addition of ARS 

to a large number of vehicles. Since, for 

our primary proposal, we believe nearly 

all manufacturers already meet the 

proposed requirements, we believe that 

two years would provide ample lead 

time to minimize any burdens of 

compliance. 

IX. Public Participation 

How do I prepare and submit 

comments? 

Your comments must be written and 

in English. To ensure that your 

comments are correctly filed in the 

Docket, please include the docket 

number of this document in your 

comments. 

Your comments must not be more 

than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). We 

established this limit to encourage you 

to write your primary comments in a 

concise fashion. However, you may 

attach necessary additional documents 

to your comments. There is no limit on 

the length of the attachments. 

Comments may be submitted to the 

docket electronically by logging onto the 

Docket Management System Web site at 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. 

You may also submit two copies of 

your comments, including the 

attachments, to Docket Management at 

the address given above under 

ADDRESSES. 

Please note that pursuant to the Data 

Quality Act, in order for substantive 

data to be relied upon and used by the 

agency, it must meet the information 

quality standards set forth in the OMB 

and DOT Data Quality Act guidelines. 

Accordingly, we encourage you to 

consult the guidelines in preparing your 

comments. OMB’s guidelines may be 

accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

omb/fedreg/reproducible.html. DOT’s 

guidelines may be accessed at http:// 

dms.dot.gov. 

How can I be sure that my comments 

were received? 

If you wish Docket Management to 

notify you upon its receipt of your 

comments, enclose a self-addressed, 

stamped postcard in the envelope 

containing your comments. Upon 

receiving your comments, Docket 

Management will return the postcard by 

mail. 

How do I submit confidential business 

information? 

If you wish to submit any information 

under a claim of confidentiality, you 

should submit three copies of your 

complete submission, including the 

information you claim to be confidential 

business information, to the Chief 

Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given 

above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. In addition, you should 

submit two copies, from which you 

have deleted the claimed confidential 

business information, to Docket 

Management at the address given above 

under ADDRESSES. When you send a 

comment containing information 

claimed to be confidential business 

information, you should include a cover 

letter setting forth the information 

specified in our confidential business 

information regulation (49 CFR part 

512). 

Will the agency consider late 

comments? 

We will consider all comments that 

Docket Management receives before the 

close of business on the comment 

closing date indicated above under 

DATES. To the extent possible, we will 

also consider comments that Docket 

Management receives after that date. If 

Docket Management receives a comment 

too late for us to consider in developing 

a final rule (assuming that one is 

issued), we will consider that comment 

as an informal suggestion for future 

rulemaking action. 

How can I read the comments submitted 

by other people? 

You may read the comments received 

by Docket Management at the address 

given above under ADDRESSES. The 

hours of the Docket are indicated above 

in the same location. You may also see 

the comments on the Internet. To read 

the comments on the Internet, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for accessing the 

dockets. 

Please note that even after the 

comment closing date, we will continue 

to file relevant information in the 

Docket as it becomes available. Further, 

some people may submit late comments. 

Accordingly, we recommend that you 

periodically check the Docket for new 

material. 

X. Regulatory Analyses 

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory 

Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735, 

October 4, 1993), provides for making 

determinations whether a regulatory 

action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore 

subject to OMB review and to the 

requirements of the Executive Order. 

The Order defines a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as one that is likely 

to result in a rule that may: 

(1) Have an annual effect on the 

economy of $100 million or more or 

adversely affect in a material way the 

economy, a sector of the economy, 

productivity, competition, jobs, the 

environment, public health or safety, or 

State, local, or Tribal governments or 

communities; 

(2) Create a serious inconsistency or 

otherwise interfere with an action taken 

or planned by another agency; 

(3) Materially alter the budgetary 

impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, 

or loan programs or the rights and 

obligations of recipients thereof; or 

(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues 

arising out of legal mandates, the 

President’s priorities, or the principles 

set forth in the Executive Order. 

The agency has considered the impact 

of this rulemaking action under 

Executive Order 12866 and the 

Department of Transportation’s 

regulatory policies and procedures. This 

rulemaking document was reviewed by 

the Office of Management and Budget 

under E.O. 12866 The agency has 

considered the impact of this action 

under the Department of 

Transportation’s regulatory policies and 

procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 

1979), and has determined that it is 

‘‘significant’’ under them. 

This document proposes to amend 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 

No. 118 to require that ‘‘express-up’’ or 

‘‘one-touch closing’’ windows be 

equipped with ARS. We are placing in 

the Docket a Preliminary Regulatory 

Evaluation which analyzes the costs and 

benefits of this rulemaking. The costs 

and benefits are summarized in section 

VIIIa of this preamble, supra. The costs 

and benefits for our primary proposal 

are expected to be very small because all 

power windows with express-up 

operation are believed to have ARS 

already. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility 

Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 45157 

the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996), whenever an agency is required 

to publish a notice of proposed 

rulemaking or final rule, it must prepare 

and make available for public comment 

a regulatory flexibility analysis that 

describes the effect of the rule on small 

entities (i.e., small businesses, small 

organizations, and small governmental 

jurisdictions). The Small Business 

Administration’s regulations at 13 CFR 

part 121 define a small business, in part, 

as a business entity ‘‘which operates 

primarily within the United States.’’ (13 

CFR 121.105(a)). No regulatory 

flexibility analysis is required if the 

head of an agency certifies the proposal 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. SBREFA amended the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act to require 

Federal agencies to provide a statement 

of the factual basis for certifying that a 

proposal will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

NHTSA has considered the effects of 

this proposed rule under the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. This proposed rule 

would impose few if any additional cost 

burdens on vehicle manufacturers. 

Furthermore, we do not anticipate that 

the proposed rule would result in 

significant expenditures by ARS 

suppliers, as most already manufacture 

ARS in accordance with the 

specifications given in this proposal. We 

also do not anticipate that the proposed 

rule would result in expenditures by 

small governmental jurisdictions or 

other small organizations. I certify that 

this proposed rule would not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

C. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) 

NHTSA has examined today’s NPRM 

pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 

FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and 

concluded that no additional 

consultation with States, local 

governments or their representatives is 

mandated beyond the rulemaking 

process. The agency has concluded that 

the proposal does not have federalism 

implications because the proposal does 

not have ‘‘substantial direct effects on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government.’’ 

Further, no consultation is needed to 

discuss the issue of preemption in 

connection with today’s proposed rule. 

The issue of preemption can arise in 

connection with NHTSA rules in at least 

two ways. First, the National Traffic and 

Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an 

express preemption provision: ‘‘When a 

motor vehicle safety standard is in effect 

under this chapter, a State or a political 

subdivision of a State may prescribe or 

continue in effect a standard applicable 

to the same aspect of performance of a 

motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment only if the standard is 

identical to the standard prescribed 

under this chapter.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command 

that unavoidably preempts State 

legislative and administrative law, not 

today’s rulemaking, so consultation 

would be unnecessary. 

Second, the Supreme Court has 

recognized the possibility of implied 

preemption: in some instances, State 

requirements imposed on motor vehicle 

manufacturers, including sanctions 

imposed by State tort law, can stand as 

an obstacle to the accomplishment and 

execution of a NHTSA safety standard. 

When such a conflict is discerned, the 

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 

makes the State requirements 

unenforceable. See Geier v. American 

Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 

However, NHTSA has considered the 

nature and purpose of today’s proposal 

and does not currently foresee any 

potential State requirements that might 

conflict with it. Without any conflict, 

there could not be any implied 

preemption. 

D. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice 

Reform) 

When promulgating a regulation, 

Executive Order 12988 specifically 

requires that the agency must make 

every reasonable effort to ensure that the 

regulation, as appropriate: (1) Specifies 

in clear language the preemptive effect; 

(2) specifies in clear language the effect 

on existing Federal law or regulation, 

including all provisions repealed, 

circumscribed, displaced, impaired, or 

modified; (3) provides a clear legal 

standard for affected conduct rather 

than a general standard, while 

promoting simplification and burden 

reduction; (4) specifies in clear language 

the retroactive effect; (5) specifies 

whether administrative proceedings are 

to be required before parties may file 

suit in court; (6) explicitly or implicitly 

defines key terms; and (7) addresses 

other important issues affecting clarity 

and general draftsmanship of 

regulations. 

Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes 

as follows. The issue of preemption is 

discussed above in connection with E.O. 

13132. NHTSA notes further that there 

is no requirement that individuals 

submit a petition for reconsideration or 

pursue other administrative proceeding 

before they may file suit in court. 

E. National Technology Transfer and 

Advancement Act 

Under the National Technology 

Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 

(NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104–113), ‘‘all Federal 

agencies and departments shall use 

technical standards that are developed 

or adopted by voluntary consensus 

standards bodies, using such technical 

standards as a means to carry out policy 

objectives or activities determined by 

the agencies and departments.’’ 

Voluntary consensus standards are 

technical standards (e.g., materials 

specifications, test methods, sampling 

procedures, and business practices) that 

are developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies, such as the 

Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). 

The NTTAA directs us to provide 

Congress, through OMB, explanations 

when we decide not to use available and 

applicable voluntary consensus 

standards. The agency is not aware of 

any applicable voluntary consensus 

standards that apply to ARS. 

F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

more than $100 million annually 

(adjusted for inflation with base year of 

1995). This proposed rule would not 

result in expenditures by State, local or 

tribal governments, in the aggregate, or 

by the private sector in excess of $100 

million annually. 

G. National Environmental Policy Act 

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking 

action for the purposes of the National 

Environmental Policy Act. The agency 

has determined that implementation of 

this action would not have any 

significant impact on the quality of the 

human environment. 

H. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1995 (PRA), a person is not required 

to respond to a collection of information 

by a Federal agency unless the 

collection displays a valid OMB control 

number. This proposal does not contain 

any new reporting requirements or 

requests for information. 

I. Plain Language 

Executive Order 12866 requires each 

agency to write all rules in plain 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS

45158 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 168 / Tuesday, September 1, 2009 / Proposed Rules 

language. Application of the principles 

of plain language includes consideration 

of the following questions: 

• Have we organized the material to 

suit the public’s needs? 

• Are the requirements in the rule 

clearly stated? 

• Does the rule contain technical 

language or jargon that isn’t clear? 

• Would a different format (grouping 

and order of sections, use of headings, 

paragraphing) make the rule easier to 

understand? 

• Would more (but shorter) sections 

be better? 

• Could we improve clarity by adding 

tables, lists, or diagrams? 

• What else could we do to make the 

rule easier to understand? 

If you have any responses to these 

questions, please include them in your 

comments on this proposal. 

J. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 

The Department of Transportation 

assigns a regulation identifier number 

(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in 

the Unified Agenda of Federal 

Regulations. The Regulatory Information 

Service Center publishes the Unified 

Agenda in April and October of each 

year. You may use the RIN contained in 

the heading at the beginning of this 

document to find this action in the 

Unified Agenda. 

XI. Proposed Regulatory Text 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571 

Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Tires. 

In consideration of the foregoing, 

NHTSA proposes to amend 49 CFR part 

571 as follows: 

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR 

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 

1. The authority citation for Part 571 

of Title 49 continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at 

49 CFR 1.50. 

2. Section 571.118 is amended by 

adding in alphabetical order the 

following definition to S3, revising S4, 

and adding S4.1 and S4.2 to read as 

follows: 

§ 571.118 Standard No. 118; Poweroperated window, partition, and roof panel 

systems. 

* * * * * 

S3. Definitions. 

* * * 

One-touch closing (or ‘‘express-up’’) 

means any power window, partition or 

roof panel closing operation whereby 

the window, partition or roof panel 

continues in motion in the closing 

direction after release of the switch used 

to initiate the closure. 

* * * * * 

S4. Operating requirements. 

S4.1 Except as provided in S5, 

power-operated window, partition, or 

roof panel systems may be closed only 

in the following circumstances: 

(a) When the key that controls 

activation of the vehicle’s engine is in 

the ‘‘ON’’, ‘‘START’’, or ‘‘ACCESSORY’’ 

position; 

(b) By muscular force unassisted by 

vehicle supplied power; 

(c) Upon continuous activation by a 

locking system on the exterior of the 

vehicle; 

(d) Upon continuous activation of a 

remote actuation device, provided that 

the remote actuation device shall be 

incapable of closing the power window, 

partition or roof panel from a distance 

of more than 6 meters from the vehicle; 

(e) During the interval between the 

time the locking device which controls 

the activation of the vehicle’s engine is 

turned off and the opening of either of 

a two-door vehicle’s doors or, in the 

case of a vehicle with more than two 

doors, the opening of either of its front 

doors; 

(f) If the window, partition, or roof 

panel is in a static position before 

starting to close and in that position 

creates an opening so small that a 4mm 

diameter semi-rigid cylindrical rod 

cannot be placed through the opening at 

any location around its edge in the 

manner described in S5(b); or 

(g) Upon continuous activation of a 

remote actuation device, provided that 

the remote actuation device shall be 

incapable of closing the power window, 

partition or roof panel if the device and 

the vehicle are separated by an opaque 

surface and provided that the remote 

actuation device shall be incapable of 

closing the power window, partition or 

roof panel from a distance of more than 

11 meters from the vehicle. 

S4.2 During any one-touch closing 

operation as defined in S3 above, a 

power window must reverse direction 

before it exerts a squeezing force of 

more than 100N within any opening 

from 4mm to 200mm between the 

leading edge of the window and the 

window frame or mating surface, on a 

cylindrical test rod, maintained in a 

perpendicular orientation to the 

window surface, and having a forcedeflection ratio of 10 ± 0.5 N/mm. Upon 

reversal, the window must open to a 

position that meets at least one of the 

following criteria: 

(a) A position which is at least as 

open as the initial position before 

closing commenced; 

(b) A position which is at least 50 

millimeters more open than the position 

at the time reversing was initiated; 

(c) A position which permits a semirigid cylindrical rod of 200 millimeters 

diameter to be placed through the 

opening at the same contact points at 

which the squeezing force was 

measured. 

* * * * * 

Issued: August 27, 2009. 

Stephen R. Kratzke, 

Associate Administrator for Rulemaking. 

[FR Doc. E9–21042 Filed 8–28–09; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with PROPOSALS