alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### W. R. Livingston, as father, and next friend of Matthew Livingston, a minor v. Harvey J. Fuel

4724

433 S.W. 2d 380

Opinion Delivered November 11, 1968

*Bernard Whetstone*for appellant.

*619
      *John F. Gibson*and *Wm. K. Ball*for appellee.

Conley Byrd, Justice.

W. R. Livingston, as father and next friend of Matthew Livingston, a minor, and on behalf of himself individually, appeals from a $15,000 judgment in favor of appellee Harvey J. Fuel. This suit began as an action by Livingston in behalf of his son to recover the value of a horse Fuel had killed while driving his personal ear. Fuel, alleging that he collided with the horse while exercising his duties as Chief of Police, counterclaimed and cross complained against Livingston individually and in his capacity as next friend. The appellant, for reversal, relies upon the following points:

> “1. The court committed fatal error in allowing evidence that appellant had repaired and improved the pasture fence after the horse was killed.

> *“2.*The court committed fatal error in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine appellee Fuel about his visits to the Chicot Club.

> “3. The court committed fatal error in refusing to allow appellant to cross-examine appellee Fuel about his failure to claim Workmen’s Compensation from his employer.”

In *Johns*v. Pomtree, *Adm’r.,*240 Ark. 234, 398 S.W. 2d 674 (1966), we held that subsequent precautions taken to prevent a recurrence of an injury cannot be proved to establish negligence in the first place. We hold that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony of repairs made subsequent to the injury for the purposes of showing that the pasture fence holding the horse was inadequate.

It was the appellant’s theory at the trial that Fuel was not acting in the scope of his employment with the city, but that in fact, he was on a personal mission of *620his own — i.e., that he was speeding to the Chicot Club rather than chasing law violators as Fuel contended. On cross-examination appellant sought to interrogate Fuel relative to his frequent visits to the club and about use of intoxicants and the gambling that had existed at the club. Appellant also sought to show that Fuel had never claimed any Workmen’s Compensation benefits for injuries resulting in the collision with the horse.

Since Fuel was driving his personal car within the city limits of Lake Village at a speed of 65 miles per hour and in a direction which would have taken him away from his home and office toward the Chicot Club, we hold that the trial court erred in sustaining the objections to the proffered testimony. Likewise, we hold that the trial court erred in not permitting appellant to show that Fuel failed to claim Workmen’s Compensation benefits. These matters were circumstances to be considered on the issue of whether Fuel was acting in the scope of his employment as Chief of Police and, of course, were material on the issue of whether Fuel was negligently speeding in his personal car.

Reversed and remanded.
#### Merritt D. Walcott, Appellant, *v.*Frank Hilman, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

May, 1898.)

Actions — Bight of-assignee to sue> where the transfer is legal.

Where a cause of action has been duly transferred, the assignee hap a right to sue and the fact that the assignor testifies, upon the trial, that he expects to receive the amount of any recovery isl immaterial and does not justify a dismissal of the complaint.

Appeal from judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of Yew York, borough of Manhattan, eighth district, dismissing the complaint.

H. B. Bradbury, for appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

Beekman, P. J.

The justice below dismissed the complaint solely on the ground as stated by him “that the assignment as sworn to by witness shows collusion with assignee,” plaintiff’s assignor having testified that he expected to receive fromj the plaintiff the amount of any recovery that might be obtained in the action. This was error for which the judgment must be reversed. As between the assignor and the assignee there was a legal transfer of the cause of action, and this was sufficient to make the plaintiff the real party in interest for the purpose of maintaining the action. The question has been well settled by authority and requires no further discussion from us. Sheridan v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 30, 32; Hecht v. Mothner, 4 Misc. Rep. 536; Curran v. Weiss; 6 id. 138, 139.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Gildersleeve and Giegeeich, J J., concur.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
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#### § 596.502 Exclusion from licenses and authorizations.

The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control reserves the right to exclude any person, property, or transaction from the operation of any license, or from the privileges therein conferred, or to restrict the applicability thereof with respect to particular persons, property, transactions, or classes thereof. Such action is binding upon all persons receiving actual or constructive notice of such exclusion or restriction.
#### PACIFIC NATIONAL EQUITY COMPANY, a California Limited Partnership, Appellant, v. James M. MONTGOMERY, Consulting Engineers, Inc., a California Corporation, and Ralph Torello, Appellees.

No. 77-2126.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 21, 1979.

Sherwin Gross of Courshon & Berk, Miami, for appellant.

Craig W. Lekach of Law Offices of James J. Belcher, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is affirmed with the exception of the award of $809.99 described as “job connected expenses.”

The contract between the parties provided for payment by one of two methods:

(1) Cost, plus 125%, plus job connected expenses or, if less

(2) $15,000.00 total.

The trial court in this case found the second method to be applicable and with this we have no quarrel. However, the lower court also included $809.99 of job related expenses. This was error.

The cause is remanded with direction to the trial court to modify the final judgment by eliminating the award of $809.99 for job connected expenses and as so modified the final judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

DOWNEY, C. J., and DAUKSCH and LETTS, JJ., concur.
#### § 802.207 Contingent equity interest.

The term *contingent equity interest* means a financial instrument that currently does not constitute an equity interest but is convertible into, or provides the right to acquire, an equity interest upon the occurrence of a contingency or defined event.
§ 800.701 Finality of actions under section 721. ( a ) All authority available to the President or the Committee under section 721(d), including divestment authority, shall remain available at the discretion of the President with respect to: ( 1 ) Covered control transactions proposed or pending on or after August 23, 1988;
( 2 ) Transactions that, between November 10, 2018, and February 12, 2020, fell within the scope of part 801 of this title; and
( 3 ) Covered investments proposed or pending after February 13, 2020.
( b ) Subject to § 800.501(c)(1)(ii), such authority shall not be exercised if: ( 1 ) Subject to § 800.219(d), the Committee, through its Staff Chairperson, has advised a party (or the parties) in writing that a particular transaction with respect to which a voluntary notice or a declaration has been filed is not a covered transaction;
( 2 ) The parties to the transaction have been advised in writing under § 800.407(a)(4), § 800.506, or § 800.508(d) that the Committee has concluded all action under section 721 with respect to the covered transaction; or
( 3 ) The President has previously announced, under section 721(d), his or her decision not to exercise his or her authority under section 721 with respect to the covered transaction.
( c ) Divestment or other relief under section 721 shall not be available with respect to transactions that were completed prior to August 23, 1988.
# Algeria

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        -    Report  		2021 Fiscal Transparency Report: Algeria	  June 25, 2021 
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        -    Direct Line Event  		Opportunities in Algeria’s Renewable Energy Sector	  May 18, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Algeria	  May 12, 2021 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2021	  Jalina PorterApril 30, 2021 
        -    Readout  		Secretary Blinken’s Call with Algerian Foreign Minister Boukadoum	  April 29, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Algeria	  March 30, 2021 

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#### Cary HAWKINS v. STATE.

6 Div. 109.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 19, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1980.

*1130Ferris S. Ritchey, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G. L. Marston, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles M. Allen, II, Montgomery, for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and convicted for a violation of the state statute prohibiting the sale of any obscene work. Alabama Code § 13-7-181 (1975). The obscene matter was an issue of the magazine “Cie-Lav-ie”. The jury imposed a fine of one thousand dollars to which the trial judge added a prison term of one year.

I

In *Holderfield*v. *City of Birmingham,*380 So.2d 990 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 994 (Ala.1980), this Court held that the statute requiring that all cases in municipal courts shall be tried by a judge without a jury is not unconstitutional as it applies to an obscenity prosecution in the municipal court. *Holderfield,*380 So.2d at 993.

II

The defendant also contends that he was entitled *to*a trial by jury in the District Court because the maximum authorized penalty for a violation of Alabama Code § 13-7-181 (1975) is a ten thousand dollar fine and one year imprisonment. We need not determine whether this offense is “serious” or “petty” within the meaning of *Duncan v. Louisiana,*391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). *Ludwig v. Massachusetts,*427 U.S. 618, 96 S.Ct. 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976), held that even where the Constitution guarantees an accused a jury trial, it does not also require that he be permitted to exercise that right at the first trial in the lower tier of a two-tier system of trial courts, where under the system a person accused of a crime is tried without a jury in the first instance in the lower tier and then may take timely “appeal” to the second tier, and if he so desires have a trial de novo by jury.

Ill

The defendant’s allegations of unconstitutional discriminatory enforcement were answered by this Court in *Starley v. City of Birmingham,*377 So.2d 1131 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 377 So.2d 1134 (Ala.1979).

We have searched the record for error and found none. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All Judges concur.
Opinion issued July 1, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-20-00632-CV

———————————

TONY LONG AND/OR ALL OCCUPANTS OF 426 W. SUNNYSIDE ST., 

Appellants

V.

QUALITY PROPERTY SOLUTIONS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1156993

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Tony Long and/or All Occupants of 426 W. Sunnyside St., have 

failed to timely file a brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a) (governing time to file brief), 

38.8(a) (governing failure of appellant to file brief). After being notified that this 

appeal was subject to dismissal, appellants did not respond. See TEX. R. APP. P. 
2

42.3(b) (allowing involuntary dismissal of case). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal 

for want of prosecution for failure to timely file a brief. We dismiss any pending 

motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Landau and Countiss.
§ 582.507 Payments for legal services from funds originating outside the United States. ( a ) *Professional fees and incurred expenses.* ( 1 ) Receipt of payment of professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses for the provision of legal services authorized pursuant to § 582.506(a) to or on behalf of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 582.201 or any further Executive orders relating to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13851, of November 27, 2018 is authorized from funds originating outside the United States, provided that the funds do not originate from: ( i ) A source within the United States;
( ii ) Any source, wherever located, within the possession or control of a U.S. person; or
( iii ) Any individual or entity, other than the person on whose behalf the legal services authorized pursuant to § 582.506(a) are to be provided, whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to any part of this chapter or any Executive order or statute.
( 2 ) Nothing in this paragraph (a) authorizes payments for legal services using funds in which any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 582.201, any other part of this chapter, or any Executive order has an interest.
( b ) *Reports.* ( 1 ) U.S. persons who receive payments pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section must submit annual reports no later than 30 days following the end of the calendar year during which the payments were received providing information on the funds received. Such reports shall specify: ( i ) The individual or entity from whom the funds originated and the amount of funds received; and
( ii ) If applicable: ( A ) The names of any individuals or entities providing related services to the U.S. person receiving payment in connection with authorized legal services, such as private investigators or expert witnesses;
( B ) A general description of the services provided; and
( C ) The amount of funds paid in connection with such services.
( 2 ) The reports, which must reference this section, are to be submitted to OFAC using one of the following methods: ( i ) Email (preferred method): OFAC.Regulations.Reports@treasury.gov; or
( ii ) *U.S. mail:* OFAC Regulations Reports, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Freedman's Bank Building, Washington, DC 20220.
HomeBureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs...Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs  Releases

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        -    Media Note  		Senior Coordinator for Atlantic Cooperation Lapenn’s Travel to Spain and UN Ocean Decade Conference	  April 8, 2024 
        -    Media Note  		Joint Statement of the Second Meeting of the U.S.-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space	  March 26, 2024 
        -    Press Statement  		U.S. Support for the Philippines in the South China Sea	  Matthew MillerMarch 23, 2024 
        -    Other Release  		Seeking Private Sector Advisors for the U.S. Delegation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee	  March 13, 2024 
        -    Media Note  		Announcement of the 2024 Cohort of U.S. Science Envoys	  March 13, 2024 
        -    DipNote  		My Time as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate	  My Time as Special Presidential Envoy for ClimateMarch 12, 2024 
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        -    Other Release  		Job Posting: Executive Director, United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Secretariat for Environmental Enforcement Matters	  March 8, 2024 

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§ 903.5 Discharge of indebtedness; reporting requirements. ( a ) Before discharging a delinquent debt (also referred to as a close out of the debt), agencies shall take all appropriate steps to collect the debt in accordance with 31 U.S.C. 3711(g), including, as applicable, administrative offset, tax refund offset, Federal salary offset, referral to Treasury, Treasury-designated debt collection centers or private collection contractors, credit bureau reporting, wage garnishment, litigation, and foreclosure. Discharge of indebtedness is distinct from termination or suspension of collection activity under part 903 of this title and is governed by the Internal Revenue Code. When collection action on a debt is suspended or terminated, the debt remains delinquent and further collection action may be pursued at a later date in accordance with the standards set forth in this chapter. When an agency discharges a debt in full or in part, further collection action is prohibited. Therefore, agencies should make the determination that collection action is no longer warranted before discharging a debt. Before discharging a debt, agencies must terminate debt collection action.
( b ) Section 3711(i), title 31, United States Code, requires agencies to sell a delinquent nontax debt upon termination of collection action if the Secretary determines such a sale is in the best interests of the United States. Since the discharge of a debt precludes any further collection action (including the sale of a delinquent debt), agencies may not discharge a debt until the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 3711(i) have been met.
( c ) Upon discharge of an indebtedness, agencies must report the discharge to the IRS in accordance with the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 6050P and 26 CFR 1.6050P-1. An agency may request Treasury or Treasury-designated debt collection centers to file such a discharge report to the IRS on the agency's behalf.
( d ) When discharging a debt, agencies must request that litigation counsel release any liens of record securing the debt.
#### Dilip K. SHAW, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Respondent.

No. 00-3355.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Feb. 9, 2001.

Before MAYER, Chief:Judge, MICHEL and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Dilip K Shaw seeks review of the April 28, 2000, decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, MSPB Docket No. DA0432000004-I-1, denying his petition for review of an initial decision, which dismissed his appeal as settled, and forwarding his allegations of noncompliance with the settlement agreement to the regional office for adjudication as a petition for enforcement. We *affirm.*

Our review is limited to setting aside any action that is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994).

“Those who employ the judicial appellate process to attack a settlement through which controversy has been sent to rest bear a properly heavy burden.” *Asberry v. United States Postal Service,*692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1982). Shaw must therefore show that “the contract he has made is tainted with invalidity, either by *909fraud practiced upon him or by a mutual mistake under which both parties acted.” *Id.*Shaw has alleged neither fraud nor mutual mistake. Instead, he argues that “[g]ranted that I agreed to the settlement agreement but things happened very fast over the phone in a very short period of time with no time for logical thinking.” Shaw was represented by counsel when he accepted the terms of the settlement agreement and the administrative judge specifically found that “the agreement appears lawful on its face, the parties freely entered into it, and they understand its terms.” *Shaw v. Department of the Navy,*MSPB Docket No. DA0432000004-I-1, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 1, 1999) (Initial Decision). There is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise.

Shaw also argues that the agency breached the settlement agreement by disclosing its terms. The board has forwarded Shaw’s arguments to the regional office for consideration as a petition for enforcement in the first instance. These arguments are therefore not properly before us on this petition for review.
#### Saul v. Saul et al.

(No. 1)

*John Patrick Walsh,*for plaintiff.

*James Conwell Welsh,*for defendants.

November 16, 1954.

Reimel, J.,

Plaintiff has filed a motion for a protective order under Rule 4012 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure requesting that each of the parties and witnesses in the case be submitted to questioning on depositions with no one else present except counsel for the parties.

The action is one in equity wherein plaintiff avers that she is the wife of Richard F. Saul, defendant; that defendant, being liable to pay a certain order of the municipal court for the support of herself and two minor children, has by various schemes and devices *487attempted to divest himself of all his real estate and the value of a $50,000 annuity policy on his life, by falsely and fraudulently conspiring with defendant Irwin E. Saul, his father, and defendant Elsie M. Saul, wife of his father, to the end that plaintiff will be deprived of all security for the payment of -the order and also of her dower right and interest in the real estate.

Plaintiff contends that by reason of the averments of fraud and conspiracy the rule does not afford sufficient protection to plaintiff in seeking the discovery she requires in order to prepare sufficiently for trial; that if defendants, Richard F. Saul, Irwin E. Saul and Elsie M. Saul, who are the participants in the conspiracy, would be present at the same time that the depositions of any one of them were being taken, plaintiff’s efforts to obtain such discovery would be frustrated.

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4012(a) (5) (6) authorizes the court to forbid the presence, at the examination, of any persons except the parties and counsel. This rule gives sanction to the doctrine of sequestration of witnesses that has received sanction at early common law. It prevents successful perjury, conscious or unconscious collusion and is test of truth: Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), vol. VI, §1838. It has been held that a judge may, in his discretion, exclude from the courtroom any witness in the case until he or she is called to testify. This right cannot be held to apply to the parties who have a constitutional right to be present.

We, therefore, dismiss the motion for a protective order which would sequester the parties to this action.

*Order*

And now, November 16, 1954, the motion of Gladys B. Saul for a protective order which would forbid the *488presence at the examination on depositions of the parties to the action is dismissed.

As to that portion of the motion for a protective order for sequestration of witnesses it is ordered that the examination of witnesses on depositions shall take place with no one present during such examination of each 'witness except the parties and their counsel. These depositions shall be taken upon due notice to counsel for defendants.

It is further ordered that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to compel the parties and witnesses to produce such books, records and other written data as may be required.