# Kosovo - United States Department of State

- Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Elizabeth M. Allen’s Travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Elizabeth M. Allen’s Travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Elizabeth M. Allen’s Travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia																																		Media Note																														May 13, 2024																																							Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Liz Allen will travel to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, and North Macedonia May 12-20 to deepen partnerships with Western Balkan countries and advance our shared goals of regional cooperation and European integration. Under Secretary Allen will emphasize the fundamental democratic values we share with the people of the Western Balkans and the importance of working together to protect free and open societies from malign influence.In Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Under Secretary Allen will meet with students participating in the embassy’s Leadership, English, and American Democracy (LEAD) program to discuss their experiences learning English and developing community service projects that promote shared values and people-to-people ties. &nbsp;While in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Under Secretary Allen will also visit the Srebrenica Memorial Center, where she will honor the victims of genocide and meet with family members.&nbsp; Her trip will highlight how the United States is working with Bosnia and Herzegovina to secure a democratic, inclusive, and prosperous future for all citizens.Under Secretary Allen will then travel to Belgrade, Serbia, where she will discuss opportunities to expand the U.S.-Serbia relationship and our shared goal of accelerating Serbia’s path to EU membership with Foreign Minister Marko Djuric and senior government officials.&nbsp; To highlight the critical importance of media freedom in democratic societies, Under Secretary Allen will participate in a panel discussion and present the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia’s annual awards for investigative journalism. &nbsp;She and Speaker of the National Assembly Ana Brnabic will visit the site of the future American Resource Center (American Space) at Ložionica, which will expand access to U.S. arts, culture, education, and entrepreneurship resources for Serbian youth.&nbsp; She will also speak at the annual conference of the English Language Teachers’ Association, the largest national network of English language teachers in Serbia, and present the Access Impact Award honoring the 2024 winner. &nbsp;Before departing Serbia, Under Secretary Allen will travel to Sjenica to address participants of the first Balkan Youth Leadership Program (BOLD) Summit, a regional network of young people working on civic engagement and economic development projects to make a difference in their communities.&nbsp;In Pristina, Kosovo, Under Secretary Allen will meet with Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani and Prime Minister Albin Kurti to discuss U.S. support for Kosovo’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration and&nbsp;our partnership with Kosovo to counter foreign disinformation and malign influence. &nbsp;While in Kosovo, Under Secretary Allen will visit U.S. service members deployed as part of the NATO Kosovo Force Peacekeeping Mission (KFOR) at Camp Nothing Hill, underscoring the United States’ commitment to the region’s stability and security.&nbsp;&nbsp;Under Secretary Allen will also hold discussions with diverse Kosovan students engaged in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics classes at Rochester Institute of Technology &#8211; Kosovo.&nbsp; She will travel to Dresnik to uncover Roman-era mosaics archeologists are restoring thanks to support from the State Department’s Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. &nbsp;Finally, Under Secretary Allen will travel to Skopje, North Macedonia, where she will meet with experts on foreign malign influence.&nbsp; In respect for cultural diversity and North Macedonia’s rich heritage, Under Secretary Allen will visit an ancient Roman forum in Stobi, where U.S. government support through the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation helps preserve one of North Macedonia’s most treasured archeological sites.&nbsp; While there, she will discuss with local partners the project’s potential to further expand economic development, tourism, and people-to-people ties.						Tags																					Bosnia and Herzegovina																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Kosovo																								North Macedonia																								Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Serbia																								Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
- Case Studies in Success: West Africa Trade and Investment Hub and EMPOWER Private Sector -->			HomeKosovo						hide			 -->	$( document ).ready(function() {		if ($(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {			$(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){				$("#bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");				$(".bc_middle").toggle();				$(".bc_ellipse").toggle();				$(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");			});			$("#bc_hide").click(function(){				$("#bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");				$(".bc_middle").toggle();				$(".bc_ellipse").toggle();				$(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");			});		} else {			$(".bc_ellipse").hide();		}	}); -->Case Studies in Success: West Africa Trade and Investment Hub and EMPOWER Private SectorSeptember 2023The Department of State conducted a case study analysis of successful foreign assistance programs between 2014 and 2019. The team identified the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub and EMPOWER Private Sector in Kosovo as particularly successful projects. The report outlines factors contributing to the programs’ success.BackgroundIn Fiscal Year 2022, approximately 11 billion USD in foreign assistance (FA) programs was used to increase economic growth. This case study determined what types of U.S. FA have had a sustainable impact in a country&#8217;s economic development. The report examines two projects: West Africa Trade and Investment Hub (WATIH) and EMPOWER Private Sector (EMPOWER). WATIH, spanning from 2014 to 2018, is a flagship project of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), covering all countries under the USAID West Africa Mission. EMPOWER, which operated from 2014 to 2020, was a USAID project dedicated to fostering job creation and economic growth in Kosovo.FindingsWATIH and EMPOWER were successful in achieving goals in exports, sales, job creation, and other outcomes of interest.Participant countries benefited from preferential trade agreements that offered access to potentially lucrative export markets.The case study highlights the importance of active trade associations as project partners, which can facilitate private sector buy-in and local project ownership.RecommendationsUse export growth strategies that take advantage of preferential trade agreements and regional trading blocs.To increase success of programs, support regional trading blocs to harmonize export rules and regulations.Empower trade associations to facilitate stakeholder buy-in while ensuring they can be sustained without foreign funding.Take advantage of diaspora communities in encouraging new business opportunities.Encourage beneficiary firms to participate in international trade shows to establish new business linkages.Evaluation QuestionsWhat foreign assistance projects between 2014 and 2019 were particularly successful?What outcome indicators demonstrate the success of these projects relative to others?What were the economic contexts under which these programs were implemented?What does a comparison between the two projects suggest about the factors that contribute to the success of a foreign assistance project?Approach, Methods, &amp; DataMethodology: Case studies can be used to identify testable hypotheses, trace the evolution of an intervention, and – among other possibilities – explore notable cases. The case study focused on especially impactful examples of successful development assistance projects or programs.Data Collection: The analysis used 913 programs/projects from the FACTS Evaluation Registry that fit the study parameters. A multistage filtering process was then employed to reduce the sample to 43 records about growth-related programs or projects. In reviewing these 43 records, a total of 15 unique outcome types across all records on the list were identified. Among the 15 unique outcome types, three were prioritized: increases in business revenue; increases in investment; and new jobs created.These outcomes were prioritized because of their proximate impact on economic growth. Both WATIH and EMPOWER stood out as particularly successful on these outcomes. In addition to reviewing the midterm evaluations, final reports, and other supporting documents for WATIH and EMPOWER, the team conducted interviews with the Contract Officer’s Representatives (CORs) to gain insights into the key lessons learned from each program.Countries in the West Africa region and Kosovo all presented economic conditions that were not obviously conducive to project success. WATIH countries experienced a slight decline in exports (as a share of Gross Domestic Product) over the life of the project, giving greater weight to the export successes the project achieved. In contrast, for EMPOWER, Kosovo experienced a 3.73% increase in exports as a share of GDP every year. The new business contributions of EMPOWER, by themselves, constituted 0.73% of Kosovo&#8217;s total GDP from 2014-2019.Detailed FindingsBy project completion in 2018, WATIH met or exceeded most of the target indicators for exports, sales, investment, job creation, policy reforms, and more self-sufficient businesses. Programming created a total of $389.2 million in new sales, $236.8 million USD in new exports, and 20,475 new jobs &#8211; 124 percent of the initial target. EMPOWER also exceeded several of its original targets. EMPOWER’s co-financing strategy helped beneficiary firms unlock loans worth five times what they first received as grants. Because of EMPOWER, 4,367 Kosovans received training and 5,109 secured new jobs. In comparing WATIH and EMPOWER, a few key similarities can be noted. Both projects benefited from recipient countries’ access to potentially lucrative export markets. The renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act part way through WATIH ensured continued preferential access to the U.S. market. Furthermore, several WATIH countries’ membership in the Economic Community of West African States contributed to the project’s accomplishments in the regional value chains. EMPOWER saw significant gains in trade indicators as well, which were in part facilitated by Kosovo’s potential membership in the European Union (E.U.). The process of E.U. integration was accelerated by the 2015 signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, which allowed Kosovo free trade with the E.U. and provided the country with resources to incorporate E.U. standards into its economic and export regulations. The comparison also highlights the importance of organized and active trade associations as project partners. Both programs worked closely with various trade associations to advocate for policy reforms and improve export competitiveness. These partnerships facilitated private sector buy-in and local project ownership so that project goals aligned with the needs of intended beneficiaries. A key challenge going forward will be to ensure that the gains made in trade association organization and advocacy can be sustained once foreign support has ended.Ribbon cutting ceremony of fourth edition of Green Festival October 30, 2019.EMPOWER and the Kosovan Diaspora Access to additional markets in Europe also helped facilitate a partnership between EMPOWER and the Kosovo diaspora. Concretely, the Albanian Diaspora Business Network (ADBN) co-organized three conventions to connect businesses in Kosovo with ADBN’s European Chapters across the diaspora to explore new export opportunities. These three conventions alone resulted in 1.3 million USD in new sales contracts.The U.S.-Ghana joint venture Dignity/DTRT (“Do the Right Thing”) expanded its sales in the U.S. market, launched an additional product line, and hired and trained 180 new staff thanks to WATIH assistance. One of the USAID CORs for WATIH noted that the growth of Dignity/DTRT has singlehandedly changed the landscape of the apparel sector in West Africa.Impact by the Numbers136 million USD in exports and 174 million USD in total sales across WATIH countries.Created 20,475 new jobs across 4 global value chains and 2 West African regional value chains.More than 100 million USD in aggregate exports and 215 million USD increase in aggregate sales for 613 EMPOWER firms.Created 5,109 new jobs for Kosovans, of which 1,870 were jobs for women and 1,532 were jobs for youth.Learning SummaryThis case study facilitated interagency collaboration. The research products that resulted from this work benefited from the shared perspective and combined efforts of representatives from both the Department of State and USAID.Dissemination of the findings will help raise awareness of US government efforts to support economic growth-related activities. In addition to providing successful examples of where growth-related programming has had meaningful impact, it also warns of potential pitfalls associated with growth-related development. For example, there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to programming, and an intervention that succeeded in one context may not achieve the same results in another. As such, activities should be adapted to reflect the unique circumstances and conditions facing each country.As part of this case study, the Department of State and USAID staff developed a technique to review hundreds of foreign assistance project and program reports. The technique is guided by three principles: transparency, efficiency, and intentionality. The technique can be applied again in the future to identify relevant projects that warrant closer examination.
- Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO): DRL Addressing Gender Based Violence in Kosovo Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborUnited States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO): DRL Addressing Gender Based Violence in KosovoThis is the announcement of funding opportunity number SFOP0010331Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number: 19.345Type of Solicitation: Open CompetitionApplication Deadline:  11:59 PM EST on Thursday, June 6, 2024Total Funding Floor: $850,000 FY23 HRDFTotal Funding Ceiling: $850,000 FY23 HRDFAnticipated Number of Awards: 1Type of Award: GrantPeriod of Performance: At least 24 monthsAnticipated Time to Award, Pending Availability of Funds: 4 monthsA. Project DescriptionThe U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) announces an open competition for organizations interested in submitting applications for projects that increase protections against gender-based violence for marginalized communities in Kosovo.Gender-based violence (GBV) is a global issue that affects one in three women in their lifetime. According to the 2022 U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights Report for Kosovo, a significant human rights issue in Kosovo included the lack of investigation of and accountability for GBV, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and other forms of such violence. Another issue of concern was crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting ethnic minorities or other marginalized communities. There are also critical gaps in the systematic documentation and monitoring of the prevalence of GBV in the country. Furthermore, GBV survivors often lack awareness of their rights and access to support services. There are also social stigmas in reporting GBV coupled with cultural norms that try to keep partners together.To respond to these challenges, DRL is seeking proposals that work towards the Bureau’s goal of providing access to justice for individuals experiencing GBV, abuse, and exploitation in Kosovo. The program should take an intersectional approach by considering particular issues facing LGBTQI+ women, women with disabilities, low-income women, women in public-facing positions, women from racial, religious, and ethnic minority communities, and other intersections are differently impacted by GBV.The program objectives are: 1) increasing public awareness of the various forms of GBV (i.e. psychological, physical, emotional, economic, etc.) as well as relevant laws and available protections; 2) strengthening collaboration among diverse stakeholders in all communities on rights-based, trauma-informed, and survivor-centered approaches to prevent and address GBV; and 3) providing survivor-centered support, including the provision of direct service assistance.Program activities may include but are not limited to:Developing and implementing targeted awareness campaigns and community engagement initiatives regarding the different forms of GBV and available protections under current laws;Strengthening the financial, technical and/or organizational capacity of local organizations in providing effective and survivor-centered support services, including, but not limited to, legal, psycho-social, and/or medical assistance;Enhancing coordination among relevant stakeholders, including law enforcement, healthcare providers, and social services to improve GBV response mechanisms, including training direct service providers on how to engage with survivors; andConducting research and assessments to better understand the prevalence and dynamics of GBV in the country and inform evidence-based interventions.Outcomes may include but are not limited to:Women and girls have improved access to aid and protection from GBV, abuse, and exploitation;Communities coordinate and collaborate on developing and implementing common solutions to GBV across all identities and divides;Women and girls from marginalized communities know how to distinguish between different forms of GBV, access services, and feel confident to safely engage with local reporting mechanisms to address GBV and access justice, health, and psycho-social support;Direct service providers have increased awareness of the importance of providing non-judgmental survivor-centered care, regardless of an individual&#8217;s identity;Civil society creatively addresses norms change and other forms of GBV prevention using traditional media, social media, and other methods to reach a broad audience, with a specific focus on men and young boys; andCivil society improves collaboration and coordination with reporting mechanisms and justice system, healthcare, and social service actors to better protect and respond to short-term and long-term GBV survivors’ needs.Competitive proposals will:Incorporate activities that provide communications and training regarding legal, media, psycho-social support / urgent assistance to survivors and survivor-supportive organizations;Include significant subawards, totaling at least 30% of the total program budget, to local organizations, including women-led organizations, and have a participatory design process that is inclusive of the local organizations and community needs;Integrate a trauma-sensitive, do-no-harm approach into the program design and overall implementation. Such an approach will recognize the unique traumas affecting target communities, fully integrate knowledge about trauma into policies, procedures, and practices, and seek to actively resist re-traumatization.All programs should aim to have impact that leads to reforms and have the potential for sustainability beyond DRL resources.  DRL’s preference is to avoid duplicating past efforts by supporting new and creative approaches.  This does not exclude from consideration projects that improve upon or expand existing successful projects in a new and complementary way.DRL is committed to advancing equity and support for underserved and underrepresented communities. In accordance with the Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Underserved Communities, programs should implement strategies for integration and inclusion of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries that can bring perspectives based on their religion, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, national origin, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, pregnancy, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  Programs should be demand-driven and locally led to the extent possible.DRL requires all programs to be non-discriminatory and expects implementers to include strategies for nondiscrimination of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries based on race, color, religion, sex, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, pregnancy, national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.Where appropriate, competitive proposals may include:Opportunities for beneficiaries to apply their new knowledge and skills in practical efforts;Solicitation of feedback and suggestions from beneficiaries when developing activities in order to strengthen the sustainability of programs and participant ownership of project outcomes;Input from participants on sustainability plans and systematic review of the plans throughout the life of the project, with adjustments made as necessary;Inclusion of vulnerable populations;Joint identification and definition of key concepts with relevant stakeholders and stakeholder input into project activities;Systematic follow-up with beneficiaries at specific intervals after the completion of activities to track how beneficiaries are retaining new knowledge as well as applying their new skills; andA line item in the budget to be made available for provision of reasonable accommodations and other resources and support of persons with disabilities to participate in program activities.Activities that are not typically allowed include, but are not limited to:The provision of humanitarian assistance;English language instruction;Development of high-tech computer or communications software and/or hardware;Purely academic exchanges or fellowships;External exchanges or fellowships lasting longer than six months;Off-shore activities that are not clearly linked to in-country initiatives and impact or are not necessary per security concerns;Theoretical explorations of human rights or democracy issues, including projects aimed primarily at research and evaluation that do not incorporate training or capacity-building for local civil society;Micro-loans or similar small business development initiatives;Initiatives directed towards a diaspora community rather than current residents of targeted countries.This notice is subject to availability of funding.B. Federal Award InformationPrimary organizations can submit 1 application in response to the NOFO.The U.S. government may: (a) reject any or all applications, (b) accept other than the lowest cost application, (c) accept more than one application, and (d) waive irregularities in applications received.The U.S. government may make award(s) on the basis of initial applications received, without discussions or negotiations. Therefore, each initial application should contain the applicant&#8217;s best terms from a cost and technical standpoint. The U.S. government reserves the right (though it is under no obligation to do so), however, to enter into discussions with one or more applicants in order to obtain clarifications, additional detail, or to suggest refinements in the project description, budget, or other aspects of an application.DRL anticipates awarding either a grant or cooperative agreement depending on the needs and risk factors of the program. The final determination on award mechanism will be made by the Grants Officer. The distinction between grants and cooperative agreements revolves around the existence of “substantial involvement.” Cooperative agreements require greater Federal government participation in the project. If a cooperative agreement is awarded, DRL will undertake reasonable and programmatically necessary substantial involvement. Examples of substantial involvement can include, but are not limited to:Active participation or collaboration with the recipient in the implementation of the award;Review and approval of one stage of work before another can begin;Review and approval of substantive provisions of proposed sub-awards or contracts beyond existing Federal policy;Approval of the recipient’s plan of work prior to the award.The authority for this funding opportunity is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).To maximize the impact and sustainability of the award(s) that result from this NOFO, DRL retains the right to execute non-competitive continuation amendment(s). The total duration of any award, including potential non-competitive continuation amendments, shall not exceed 54 months, or four and a half years. Any non-competitive continuation is contingent on performance and pending availability of funds. A non-competitive continuation is not guaranteed, and the Department of State reserves the right to exercise or not to exercise this option.C. Eligibility InformationFor application information, please see the proposal submission instructions (PSI), updated December 2023 on our website.C.1 Eligible ApplicantsDRL welcomes applications from U.S.-based and foreign-based non-profit organizations/nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and public international organizations; private, public, or state institutions of higher education; and for-profit organizations or businesses. DRL’s preference is to work with non-profit entities; however, there may be some occasions when a for-profit entity is best suited.Applications submitted by for-profit entities may be subject to additional review following the panel selection process. Additionally, the Department of State prohibits profit to for-profit or commercial organizations under its assistance awards. Profit is defined as any amount in excess of allowable direct and indirect costs. The allowability of costs incurred by commercial organizations is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at 48 CFR 30, Cost Accounting Standards Administration, and 48 CFR 31 Contract Cost Principles and Procedures.Please see 2 CFR 200.307 for regulations regarding program income.C.2 Cost Sharing or MatchingProviding cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not an eligibility factor or requirement for this NOFO and providing cost share will not result in a more favorable competitive ranking. Per 2 CFR 200.306, budget line items that are proposed for cost share must be allowable per 2 CFR 200, Subpart E—Cost Principles.C.3 OtherApplicants should have existing, or the capacity to develop, active partnerships with thematic or in-country partners, entities, and relevant stakeholders, including private sector partners and NGOs, and have demonstrable experience in administering successful and preferably similar projects. DRL encourages applications from foreign-based NGOs headquartered in the geographic regions/countries relevant to this NOFO. Applicants may form consortia in order to bring together organizations with varied expertise to propose a comprehensive program in one proposal. However, one organization should be designated in the proposal as the lead applicant, with the other members designated as sub-award partners. DRL reserves the right to request additional background information on applicants that do not have previous experience administering federal grant awards, and these applicants may be subject to limited funding on a pilot basis.DRL is committed to an anti-discrimination policy in all of its programs and activities. DRL welcomes applications irrespective of race, ethnicity, color, creed, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or other status. DRL seeks applications that demonstrate that the recipient does not discriminate against any beneficiaries in implementation of a potential award, such as, but not limited to, by withholding, adversely impacting, or denying equitable access to the benefits provided through this award on the basis of any factor not expressly stated in the award.  This includes, for example, race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  The recipient should insert this provision, including this paragraph, in all sub-grants and contracts under a potential award.Any applicant listed on the Excluded Parties List System in the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) (www.sam.gov) and/or has a current debt to the U.S. government is not eligible to apply for an assistance award in accordance with the OMB guidelines at 2 CFR 180 that implement Executive Orders 12549 (3 CFR,1986 Comp., p. 189) and 12689 (3 CFR,1989 Comp., p. 235), “Debarment and Suspension.” Additionally, no entity or person listed on the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov can participate in any activities under an award. All applicants are strongly encouraged to review the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov to ensure that no ineligible entity or person is included in their application.D. Application and Submission InformationD.1 Address to Request Application PackageApplicants can find application forms, kits, or other materials needed to apply on www.grants.gov and MyGrants (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com) under the announcement title “DRL Addressing Gender Based Violence in Kosovo,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010331.” Please contact the DRL point of contact listed in Section G if requesting reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities or for security reasons. Please note that reasonable accommodations do not include deadline extensions.D.2 Content and Form of Application SubmissionFor all application documents, please ensure:All documents are in English and all costs are in U.S. Dollars. If an original document within the application is in another language, an English translation must be provided (please note the Department of State, as indicated in 2 CFR 200.111, requires that English is the official language of all award documents). If any document is provided in both English and a foreign language, the English language version is the controlling version;All pages are numbered, including budgets and attachments;All documents are formatted to 8 1⁄2 x 11 paper; and,All documents are single-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, with 1-inch margins. Captions and footnotes may be 10-point Times New Roman font. Font sizes in charts and tables, including the budget, can be reformatted to fit within one page width.D.2.1 Application RequirementsComplete applications must include the following:Completed and signed SF-424, SF-424A, and SF-424B forms. Please see SF-424 instructions in Section 2B of the PSI.Organizations that engage in lobbying the U.S. government, including Congress, or pay for another entity to lobby on their behalf, are also required to complete the SF-LLL “Disclosure of Lobbying Activities” form (only if applicable). Please see SF-LLL guidance in Section 2B of the PSI.Cover Page (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that includes a table with the organization name, project title, target country/countries, project synopsis, and name and contact information for the application’s main point of contact. Please see Cover Page Section 2C of the PSI for a template and more details.Executive Summary (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that outlines project goals, objectives, activities, etc.The Executive Summary should include a brief section that explicitly states: (1) the problem statement addressed by the project, (2) research-based evidence justifying the unique project approach, and (3) quantifiable project outcomes and impacts.Table of Contents (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) listing all documents and attachments with page numbers.Proposal Narrative (not to exceed ten (10) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please note the ten-page limit does not include the Cover Page, Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Attachments, Detailed Budget, Budget Narrative, Audit, or NICRA. Applicants are encouraged to combine multiple documents into a single Word Document or PDF (i.e., Cover Page, Table of Contents, Executive Summary, and Proposal Narrative in one file). Please see Proposal Narrative Guidelines in Section 2F of the PSI for more details.The Proposal Narrative should demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to ensuring the participation of all people as a strategy for implementation. Please integrate inclusion strategies in all sections of the Proposal Narrative to enhance programmatic impact.Budget (preferably as an Excel workbook) that includes three (3) columns containing the request to DRL, any cost sharing contribution, and the total budget. A summary budget should also be included using the OMB-approved budget categories (see SF-424A as a sample) in a separate tab. Costs must be in U.S. Dollars. Detailed line-item budgets for sub-grantees should be included as additional tabs within the Excel workbook (if available at the time of submission).Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.The programming approach should be dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Please include costs associated with this commitment in the Budget and Budget Narrative.Budget Narrative (preferably as a Word Document) that includes substantive explanations and justifications for each line item in the detailed budget spreadsheet, as well as the source and a description of all cost-share offered. Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.The organization’s most recent audit, if applicable. This should be a single audit, program-specific audit, or other audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). Please see Audit Section 2H of the PSI for more information.Logic Model (preferably as a Word Document). Please see Logic Model Section 2I of the PSI for more information.Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative (not to exceed four (4) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please see Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative Section 2J of the PSI for more information.As stated within the DRL Guide to Program Monitoring and Evaluation (p. 6): DRL strongly encourages applicants to consider whether their monitoring and evaluation systems are utilizing human rights-based approaches, applying a gender and equity lens, and/or include the participation of sub-grantees and project participants. Within the Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative, applicants should demonstrate their commitment to inclusive strategies and consider whether evaluation design, data collection, analysis, reporting and learning are conducted in an ethical and responsible way with all project participants (e.g. direct beneficiaries, sub-grantees). Applicants should still make adequate provisions to protect the privacy of human subjects when collecting data from individuals. For instance, when collecting data from project participants, consider whether your organization will have the necessary informed consent forms, confidentiality agreements, and data security protocols. Applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.Risk Analysis (preferably as a Word Document). Please see Risk Analysis Section 2K of the PSI for more information on this requirement, including Do No Harm principles and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) policies/plans.Key Personnel (not to exceed two (2) pages, preferably as a Word Document). Please include short bios that highlight relevant professional experience. Given the limited space, CVs are not recommended for submission.Timeline (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document or Excel Sheet). The timeline of the overall proposal should include activities, evaluation efforts, and program closeout.Gender and Inclusion Analysis (not to exceed three (3) pages, preferably as a Word Document) that provides a concise analysis of relevant gender norms, equity and equality for underserved communities and marginalized populations, power relations, and conflict dynamics in target countries. Potential domains of analysis include institutional practices and barriers, cultural norms, gender roles, access to and control over assets and resources, and patterns of power and decision-making. Applicants should briefly explain how they have integrated findings from their analysis into project design and/or other proposal documents, including a plan for regularly reviewing and updating the gender and inclusion analysis with local partners/beneficiaries, and making any necessary adjustments to project implementation. A set of guiding questions can be found in Section 2L of the PSI.Applications that do not include the elements listed above will be deemed technically ineligible. D.2.2 Additional Application DocumentsStrong applications will also contain the following:Individual Letters of Support and/or Memorandum of Understanding. Letters of support and MOUs must be specific to the project implementation (e.g., from proposed partners or sub-award recipients) and will not count towards the page limit.Please refer to the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI), updated December 2023, on DRL’s website for detailed guidance on the documents above: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/. For an application checklist and sample templates please see the Resources page on DRL’s website: https://www.state.gov/resources-for-programs-and-grants/. The sample templates provided on the DRL website are suggested, but not mandatory.DRL reserves the right to request additional documents not included in this NOFO. Additionally, to ensure that all applications receive a balanced evaluation, the DRL review panel will review from the first page of each section up to the page limit and no further.Note: If ultimately provided with a notification of non-binding intent to make a federal award, applicants typically have two to three weeks to provide additional information and documents requested in the notification of intent. The deadlines may vary in each notification of intent and applicants must adhere to the stated deadline in the notification of intent.D.2.3 Additional Information Requested For Those Receiving Notification of IntentSuccessful applicants must submit, after notification of intent to make a federal award, but prior to issuance of a federal award:Written responses and revised application documents addressing conditions and recommendations from the DRL review panel;A copy of the applicant’s latest NICRA as a PDF file, if the applicant has a NICRA and includes NICRA charges in the budget;A completed copy of the Department’s Financial Management Survey, if receiving DRL funding for the first time;Submission of required documents to register in the Payment Management System managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, if receiving DRL funding for the first time (unless an exemption is provided);Other requested information or documents included in the notification of intent to make a federal award or subsequent communications prior to issuance of a federal award;Applicants who submit their applications through Grants.gov will be required to create a MyGrants account in order to accept the final award. Accounts must be logged into to every 60 days in order to maintain an active account.D.3 Unique Entity Identifier and System for Award Management (SAM)All prime organizations, whether based in the United States or in another country, must have a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and an active registration with the SAM.gov before submitting an application. DRL may not review applications from or make awards to applicants that have not completed all applicable UEI and SAM.gov requirements. A UEI is one of the data elements mandated by Public Law 109-282, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA), for all Federal awards.Note: As of April 2022, a DUNS number is no longer required for federal assistance applications.The 2 CFR 200 requires that sub-grantees obtain a UEI number. Please note the UEI for sub-grantees is not required at the time of application but will be required before the award is processed and/or directed to a sub-grantee.Note: The process of obtaining or renewing a SAM.gov registration may take anywhere from 4-8 weeks. Please begin your registration as early as possible.Organizations based in the United States or that pay employees within the United States will need an Employer Identification Number (EIN) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov. Please note that as of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language: “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense. I do not wish to obtain a CAGE code. I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that do not pay employees within the United States do not need an EIN from the IRS, but do need a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov. Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language: “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense. I do not wish to obtain an NCAGE code. I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO NOT plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions: Step 1: Proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process. SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions:Step 1: Apply for an NCAGE code by following the instructions on the NSPA NATO website linked below:NCAGE Homepage:https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/AC135Public/sc/CageList.aspxNCAGE Code Request Tool (NCRT):https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/Codification/CageTool/homeFor NCAGE help from within the United States, call +1 (888) 227-2423.For NCAGE help from outside the United States, call +1 (269) 961-7766.Or, email NCAGE@dlis.dla.mil for any problems in applying for an NCAGE code.Step 2: After receiving an NCAGE code, proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process. SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.All prime organizations must also continue to maintain active SAM.gov registration with current information at all times during which they have an active Federal award or application under consideration by a federal award agency. SAM.gov requires all entities to renew their registration once a year in order to maintain an active registration status in SAM.gov. It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure it has an active registration in SAM.gov and to maintain that active registration. If an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements at the time of application, the applicant may be deemed technically ineligible to receive an award and use that determination as a basis for making an award to another applicant.Please refer to 2 CFR 25.200 for additional information.Note: SAM.gov is not the same as MyGrants. It is free of charge to register in both systems, but the registration processes are different.Information is included on the SAM.gov website to help international registrations, including “Quick Start Guide for International Registrations” and “Helpful Hints.” Navigate to www.SAM.gov, click “HELP” in the top navigation bar, then click “Explore” and “New to SAM.gov?” for general information. Please note, guidance on SAM.gov and the guidance on GSA’s website about requirement for registering in SAM.gov is subject to change and is currently being updated. Applicants should review the website for the most up-to-date guidance.The attached “AQM Guidance for NCAGE-SAM.gov for Foreign Applicants Feb. 2023” is a compilation of resources gathered by the Department’s Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM). Any content shown from SAM.gov is not owned by the Department of State. This guidance and instruction are to the best of our knowledge based at the time of posting this solicitation. Where guidance in these attachments differs from the SAM.gov website, SAM.gov prevails and the applicant is encouraged to seek and document responses provided by the SAM.gov help desk.D.3.1 ExemptionsAn exemption from these requirements may be permitted on a case-by-case basis if:An applicant’s identity must be protected due to potential endangerment of their mission, their organization’s status, their employees, or individuals being served by the applicant.For an applicant, if the federal awarding agency makes a determination that there are exigent circumstances that prohibit the applicant from receiving a UEI and completing SAM.gov registration prior to receiving a federal award. In these instances, federal awarding agencies must require the recipient to obtain a UEI and complete SAM.gov registration within 30 days of the federal award date.Organizations requesting exemption from UEI or SAM.gov requirements must email the point of contact listed in the NOFO at least two weeks prior to the deadline in the NOFO providing a justification of their request. Approval for a SAM.gov exemption must come from the warranted Grants Officer before the application can be deemed eligible for review.Note: As of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. As of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. DoD awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.D.4 Submission Dates and TimesApplications are due no later than 11:59 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST), on Thursday June 6, 2024, on https://www.grants.gov/ or MyGrants (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com/mygrants) under the announcement title “DRL Addressing Gender Based Violence in Kosovo,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010331.” Grants.gov and MyGrants automatically log the date and time an application submission is made, and the Department of State will use this information to determine whether an application has been submitted on time. Late applications are neither reviewed nor considered. Known system errors caused by Grants.gov or MyGrants (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com/mygrants) that are outside of the applicant’s control will be reviewed on a case by case basis. Applicants should not expect a notification upon DRL receiving their application.D.5 Funding RestrictionsPrior to issuing a federal award with a total amount of federal share greater than $250,000, the Department of State is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is found in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (41 USC §2313). An applicant, at its option, may review information in the designated integrity and performance systems accessible through SAM.gov and comment on any information about itself that a federal awarding agency previously entered and is currently in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov. The Department of State will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in 2 CFR 200.206.DRL will not consider applications that reflect any type of support for any member, affiliate, or representative of a designated terrorist organization. Please refer the link for Foreign Terrorist Organizations: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/Project activities whose direct beneficiaries are foreign militaries or paramilitary groups or individuals will not be considered for DRL funding given purpose limitations on funding.In accordance with Department of State policy for terrorism, applicants are advised that successful passing of vetting to evaluate the risk that funds may benefit terrorists or their supporters is a condition of award. If chosen for an award, applicants will be asked to submit information required by DS Form 4184, Risk Analysis Information (attached to this solicitation) about their company and its principal personnel. Vetting information is also required for all sub-award performance on assistance awards identified by the Department of State as presenting a risk of terrorist financing. Vetting information may also be requested for project beneficiaries and participants. Failure to submit information when requested, or failure to pass vetting, may be grounds for rejecting your proposal prior to award.The Leahy Law prohibits Department foreign assistance funds from supporting foreign security force units if the Secretary of State has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Per 22 USC §2378d(a) (2017), “No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter  or the Arms Export Control Act  to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Restrictions may apply to any proposed assistance to police or other law enforcement. Among these, pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), no assistance provided through this funding opportunity may be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country when there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. In accordance with the requirements of section 620M of the FAA, also known as the Leahy law, project beneficiaries or participants from a foreign government’s security forces may need to be vetted by the Department before the provision of any assistance. If a proposed grant or cooperative agreement will provide assistance to foreign security forces or personnel, compliance with the Leahy Law is required.U.S. foreign assistance for Burma or Burmese beneficiaries is subject to restrictions. This includes restrictions, pursuant to section 7043(a)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. K, P.L. 117-328)(SFOAA), on funds appropriated under title III of the act for assistance for Burma. Section 7043(a)(3) provides that “none of the funds appropriated by this Act that are made available for assistance for Burma may be made available to the State Administration Council or any organization or entity controlled by, or an affiliate of, the armed forces of Burma, or to any individual or organization that has committed a gross violation of human rights or advocates violence against ethnic or religious groups or individuals in Burma, as determined by the Secretary of State.” In addition, funds cannot be made available to any individual or organization that has committed serious human rights abuse.Organizations should be cognizant of these restrictions when developing project proposals as these restrictions will require appropriate due diligence of program beneficiaries and collaboration with DRL to ensure compliance with these restrictions. Program beneficiaries subject to due diligence vetting will include any individuals or entities that are beneficiaries of foreign assistance funding or support. Due diligence vetting will include a review of open-source materials.Federal awards generally will not allow reimbursement of pre-award costs; however, the Grants Officer may approve pre-award costs on a case-by-case basis. Generally, construction costs are not allowed under DRL awards. For additional information, please see the DRL Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for Applications: https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.D.6 Application SubmissionAll application submissions must be made electronically via www.grants.gov or MyGrants (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com). Both systems require registration by the applying organization. Please note that the Grants.gov registration process can take ten (10) business days or longer, even if all registration steps are completed in a timely manner.It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure that it has an active registration in MyGrants or Grants.gov. Applicants are required to document that the application has been received by MyGrants or Grants.gov in its entirety. DRL bears no responsibility for disqualification that result from applicants not being registered before the due date, for system errors in either MyGrants or Grants.gov, or other errors in the application process. Additionally, applicants must save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Faxed, couriered, or emailed documents will not be accepted. Reasonable accommodations may, in appropriate circumstances, be provided to applicants with disabilities or for security reasons. Applicants must follow all formatting instructions in the applicable NOFO and these instructions.DRL encourages organizations to submit applications during normal business hours (Monday – Friday, 9:00 AM-5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST)). If an applicant experiences technical difficulties and has contacted the appropriate help desk but is not receiving timely assistance (e.g., if you have not received a response within 48 hours of contacting the help desk), you may contact the DRL point of contact listed in the NOFO in Section G. The point of contact may assist in contacting the appropriate help desk.The Grants Officer will determine technical eligibility of all applications.MyGrants Applications:Applicants using MyGrants for the first time should complete their “New Organization Registration.” To register with MyGrants, click “Login to https://afsitsm.servicenowservices.com/ilms” and follow the “create an account” link.Please note that establishing an account in MyGrants may require the use of smartphone for multi-factor authentication (MFA). If an applicant does not have accessibility to a smartphone during the time of creating an account, please contact the ILMS help desk and request instructions on MFA for Windows PC.Organizations must remember to save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.MyGrants Help Desk: For assistance with MyGrants accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com. Customer support is available 24/7.Grants.gov Applications:Applicants who do not submit applications via MyGrants may submit via www.grants.gov.Please be advised that completing all the necessary registration steps for obtaining a username and password from Grants.gov can take ten (10) business days or longer.Please refer to the Grants.gov website for definitions of various &#8220;application statuses&#8221; and the difference between a submission receipt and a submission validation. Applicants will receive a validation e-mail from Grants.gov upon the successful submission of an application. Validation of an electronic submission via Grants.gov can take up to two business days. Additionally, organizations must remember to save a screenshot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Grants.gov Helpdesk: For assistance with Grants.gov, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov. The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays.See https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/ for a list of federal holidays.E. Application Review InformationE.1 Proposal Review CriteriaThe DRL review panel will evaluate each application individually against the following criteria, listed below in order of importance, and not against competing applications. Please use the below criteria as a reference, but do not structure your application according to the sub-sections.Quality of Project IdeaApplications should be responsive to the program framework and policy objectives identified in the NOFO, appropriate in the country/regional context, and should exhibit originality, substance, precision, and relevance to DRL’s mission of promoting human rights and democracy. Projects should have the potential to have an immediate impact leading to long-term, sustainable reforms. DRL prefers new approaches that do not duplicate efforts by other entities. This does not exclude from consideration projects that improve upon or expand existing successful projects in a new and complementary way. In countries where similar activities are already taking place, an explanation should be provided as to how new activities will not duplicate or merely add to existing activities and how these efforts will be coordinated. Proposals that promote creative approaches to recognized ongoing challenges are highly encouraged. DRL prioritizes project proposals with inclusive approaches for advancing these rights.Project Planning/Ability to Achieve ObjectivesA strong application will include a clear articulation of how the proposed project activities contribute to the overall project objectives, and each activity will be clearly developed and detailed. A comprehensive monthly work plan should demonstrate substantive undertakings and the logistical capacity of the organization. Objectives should be ambitious yet measurable, results-focused and achievable in a reasonable timeframe. A complete application must include a Logic Model to demonstrate how the project activities will have an impact on its proposed objectives. The Logic Model should match the objectives, outcomes, key activities, and outputs described in the narrative. Applications should address how the project will engage relevant stakeholders and should identify local partners as appropriate.If local partners have been identified, DRL strongly encourages applicants to submit letters of support from proposed in-country partners. Additionally, applicants should describe the division of labor among the direct applicant and any local partners. If applicable, applications should identify target geographic areas for activities, target participant groups or selection criteria for participants, and the specific roles of sub-awardees, among other pertinent details.DRL recognizes that all programs have some level of risk due to internal/external variables that have the potential to adversely affect a program. Risk management should address how the project design incorporates the identification, assessment, and management of key risk factors. DRL will review the Risk Analysis based on the organization’s ability to identify risks that could have an impact on the overall program as well as how the organization will manage these risks.Institution’s Record and CapacityDRL will consider the past performance of prior recipients and the demonstrated potential of new applicants. Applications should demonstrate an institutional record of successful democracy and human rights programs, including responsible fiscal management and full compliance with all reporting requirements for past grants. Proposed personnel and institutional resources should be adequate and appropriate to achieve the project&#8217;s objectives. Projects should have potential for continued funding beyond DRL resources.Addressing Barriers to Equal ParticipationDRL strives to ensure its projects advance the rights and uphold the dignity of all persons. As the U.S. government’s lead bureau dedicated to promoting democratic governance, DRL requests a programming approach dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Discrimination, violence, inequity, and inequality targeting any members of society undermines collective security and threatens democracy. DRL prioritizes inclusive and integrated program models that assess and address the barriers to access for individuals and groups based on their race, ethnicity, religion, income, geography, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability. The proposal should also demonstrate how the project will further engagement in underserved communities and with individuals from underserved communities. Applicants should describe how programming will impact all of its beneficiaries, including support for underserved and underrepresented communities.  This approach should be an integral part of both the concept and explicit design, and implementation of all proposed project activities, objectives, and monitoring. Strong proposals will provide specific analysis, measures, and corresponding targets as appropriate.  Stakeholders shall identify the difference between opportunities and barriers to access, and design projects accordingly to not perpetuate these inequalities, but rather enhance programmatic impact by including all people in society. The goal of this approach is to bring communities and those in power together in support of more stable and secure societies.Cost Effectiveness DRL strongly encourages applicants to clearly demonstrate project cost-effectiveness in their application, including examples of leveraging institutional and other resources. However, cost-sharing or other examples of leveraging other resources are not required. Inclusion of cost-sharing in the budget does not result in additional points awarded during the review process. Budgets should have low and/or reasonable overhead and administration costs, and applicants should provide clear explanations and justifications for these costs in relation to the work involved. All budget items should be clearly explained and justified to demonstrate necessity, appropriateness, and connection to the project objectives.Please note: If cost share is included in the budget, the recipient must maintain written records to support all allowable costs that are claimed as its contribution to cost share, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal government. Such records are subject to audit. In the event the recipient does not meet the minimum amount of cost-sharing as stipulated in the recipient’s budget, DRL’s contribution may be reduced in proportion to the recipient’s contribution.Multiplier Effect/SustainabilityApplications should clearly delineate how elements of the project will have a multiplier effect and be sustainable beyond the life of the grant. A good multiplier effect will have an impact beyond the direct beneficiaries of the grant (e.g. participants trained under a grant go on to train other people; workshop participants use skills from a workshop to enhance a national level election that affects the entire populace). A strong sustainability plan may include demonstrating continuing impact beyond the life of a project or garnering other donor support after DRL funding ceases. Project Monitoring and EvaluationComplete applications will include a detailed M&amp;E Narrative, which detail how the project’s progress will be monitored and evaluated. Incorporating well-designed monitoring and evaluation processes into a project is an efficient method for documenting the change (intended and unintended) that a project seeks. Applications should demonstrate the capacity to provide objectives with measurable outputs and outcomes.The quality of the M&amp;E sections will be judged on the narrative explaining how both monitoring and evaluation will be carried out and who will be responsible for those related activities. The M&amp;E Narrative should explain how evaluation(s), internal or external, will be incorporated into the project implementation plan or how the project will be systematically assessed in the absence of one. Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the narrative.Note: Applicants are no longer required to submit a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in their proposals. However, applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.The output and outcome-based performance indicators should not only be separated by project objectives but also should match the objectives, outcomes, and outputs detailed in the Logic Model and Proposal Narrative. Performance indicators should be clearly defined (i.e., explained how the indicators will be measured and reported) either within the table or with a separate Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS). For each performance indicator, the table should also include baselines and quarterly and cumulative targets, data collection tools, data sources, types of data disaggregation, and frequency of monitoring and evaluation. There should also be metrics to capture how project activities target those who face discrimination due to their religion, gender, disabilities, ethnicity or sexual orientation and gender identity, where applicable. Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the plan.E.2 Review and Selection ProcessDRL strives to ensure that each application receives a balanced evaluation by a DRL review panel. AQM will determine technical eligibility for all applications. All technically eligible applications for a given NOFO are reviewed against the same seven criteria, which include quality of project idea, project planning/ability to achieve objectives, institutional record and capacity, inclusive programming, cost effectiveness, multiplier effect/sustainability, and project monitoring and evaluation.Additionally, the DRL review panel will evaluate how the application addresses the NOFO request, U.S. foreign policy goals, and the priority needs of DRL overall. DRL may also take into consideration the balance of the current portfolio of active projects, including geographic or thematic diversity, if needed.In most cases, the DRL review panel includes representatives from DRL, the appropriate Department of State regional bureau (to include feedback from U.S. embassies), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (to include feedback from USAID missions). In some cases, additional panelists may participate, including from other Department of State bureaus or offices; U.S. government departments, agencies, or boards; representatives from partner governments; or representatives from entities that are in a public-private partnership with DRL. At the end of the panel’s discussion about an application, the review panel votes on whether to recommend the application for approval by the DRL Assistant Secretary. If more applications are recommended for approval than DRL can ultimately fund, the review panel will rank the recommended applications in priority order for consideration by the DRL Assistant Secretary. The Grants Officer Representative (GOR) for the eventual award does not vote on the panel. All panelists must sign non-disclosure agreements and conflicts of interest agreements.DRL review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed project, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award. To ensure effective use of DRL funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and project activities.F. Federal Award Administration InformationF.1 Federal Award NoticesDRL will provide a separate notification to applicants on the result of their applications. Successful applicants will receive a letter electronically via email requesting that the applicant respond to review panel conditions and recommendations. This notification is not an authorization to begin activities and does not constitute formal approval or a funding commitment.Final approval is contingent on the applicant successfully responding to the review panel’s conditions and recommendations; being registered in required systems, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Payment Management System (PMS), unless an exemption is provided; and completing and providing any additional documentation requested by DRL or AQM. Final approval is also contingent on Congressional Notification requirements being met and final review and approval by the Department’s warranted Grants Officer.If awarded, payments under this award will be made through PMS or by completing form SF-270, Request for Advance or Reimbursement. Final determination will be made in conjunction with the Grants Officer. Unless otherwise stipulated, the recipient may request payments on a reimbursement or advance basis.Instructions for requesting payments via PMS are available at: https://pms.psc.gov/.Instructions for requesting payments via SF-270 are available at: https://apply07.grants.gov/apply/forms/sample/SF270-V1.0.pdf.Advance payments must be limited to the minimum amounts needed and be timed to be in accordance with the actual, immediate cash requirements of the recipient in carrying out the purpose of this award. The timing and amount of advance payments must be as close as is administratively feasible to the actual disbursements by the recipient for direct program or project costs and the proportionate share of any allowable indirect costs.The notice of Federal award signed by the Department’s warranted Grants Officers is the sole authorizing document. If awarded, the notice of Federal award will be provided to the applicant’s designated Authorizing Official via MyGrants to be electronically counter-signed in the system.F.2 Administrative and National Policy and Legal RequirementsDRL requires all recipients of foreign assistance funding to comply with all applicable Department and Federal laws and regulations, including but not limited to the following:The Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards set forth in 2 CFR Chapter 200 (Sub-Chapters A through F) shall apply to all non-Federal entities, except for assistance awards to Individuals and Foreign Public Entities.  Sub-Chapters A through E shall apply to all foreign organizations, and Sub-Chapters A through D shall apply to all U.S. and foreign for-profit entities. The applicant/recipient of the award and any sub-recipient under the award must comply with all applicable terms and conditions, in addition to the assurance and certifications made part of the Notice of Award.  The Department’s Standard Terms and Conditions can be viewed at https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-the-procurement-executive/.Additionally, DRL supports implementation of the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality; the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Act of 2017, which highlights the U.S. commitment to the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and the Department of State WPS Implementation Plan. For additional information, please refer to the following link: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1141.Due to the determination made under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) for funds obligated during FY 2024, assistance that benefits the governments of the following countries may be subject to a restriction under the TVPA.  The Department of State determines on a case-by-case basis what constitutes assistance to a government; the general principles listed below apply.Assistance to the government includes:All branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial) at all levels (national, regional, local);Public schools, universities, hospitals, and state-owned enterprises, as well as government employees;Cash, training, equipment, services, or other assistance provided directly to the government, assistance provided to an NGO or other implementer for the benefit of the government, and assistance to government employees.Subject to TVPA for funds obligated during FY 2024:AF: Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, South SudanEAP: Burma, China (PRC), Macau, North KoreaEUR: Belarus, RussiaNEA: Iran, SyriaSCA: AfghanistanWHA: Cuba, Curacao, Nicaragua, Sint MaartenAdditional requirements may be included depending on the content of the program.F.3 ReportingApplicants should be aware of the post-award reporting requirements for federal assistance awards as reflected in 2 CFR 200 Appendix XII &#8211; Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters. DRL awards require that all reports (financial and progress) are uploaded to the federal award file in MyGrants on a quarterly basis. The Federal Financial Report (FFR or SF-425) is the required form for financial reports and must be submitted in PMS, and a copy of the report submitted in PMS then uploaded to the award file in MyGrants. Progress reports uploaded to the award file in MyGrants must include a narrative as described below as well as Program Indicators (or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer), including standard (F) framework indicators and DRL framework indicators. F and DRL framework indicators will be reviewed and negotiated during the final stages of issuing an award on a project-by-project basis.Narrative progress reports should reflect the focus on measuring the project’s progress on the overarching objectives and should be compiled according to the objectives, outcomes, and outputs as outlined in the award’s Scope of Work (SOW) and in the Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Narrative. An assessment of the overall project’s achievements should be included in each progress report. Where relevant, progress reports should include the following sections:Relevant contextual information (limited);Explanation and evaluation of significant activities of the reporting period and how the activities reflect progress toward achieving objectives, including meeting benchmarks/targets as set in the approved M&amp;E Plan. In addition, attach the M&amp;E Plan, comparing the target and actual numbers for the indicators;Any qualitative impact or success stories from the project, when possible;Copy of baseline, mid-term, and/or final evaluation report(s) conducted by an external evaluator; if applicable;Relevant supporting documentation or products related to the project activities (such as articles, meeting lists and agendas, participant surveys, photos, manuals, etc.) as separate attachments;Description of how the recipient is pursuing sustainability, including looking for sources of follow-on funding;Any problems/challenges in implementing the project and a corrective action plan with an updated timeline of activities;Reasons why established goals were not met;Data for the required F and/or DRL framework indicator(s) for the quarter as well as aggregate data by fiscal year;Program Indicators or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer;Proposed activities for the next quarter; and,Additional pertinent information, including analysis and explanation of cost overruns or high unit costs, if applicable.Foreign Assistance Data Review: As required by Congress, the Department of State must make progress in its efforts to improve tracking and reporting of foreign assistance data through the Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR). The FADR requires tracking of foreign assistance activity data from budgeting, planning, and allocation through obligation and disbursement. Successful applicants will be required to report and draw down federal funding based on the appropriate FADR Data Elements, indicated within their award documentation. In cases of more than one FADR Data Element, typically program or sector and/or regions or country, the successful applicant will be required to maintain separate accounting records.A final narrative and financial report must also be submitted within 120 days after the expiration of the award.Please note: Delays in reporting may result in delays of payment approvals and failure to provide required reports may jeopardize the recipient&#8217;s’ ability to receive future U.S. government funds. DRL reserves the right to request any additional programmatic and/or financial project information during the award period.G. Contact InformationFor technical submission questions related to this NOFO, please contact DRL-EUR-ProgramInfo@state.gov.For assistance with MyGrants accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://afsitsm.servicenowservices.com/ilms. Customer support is available 24/7.Please note that establishing an account in MyGrants may require the use of smartphone for multi-factor authentication (MFA). If an applicant does not have accessibility to a smartphone during the time of creating an account, please contact the helpdesk and request instructions on MFA for Windows PC.For assistance with Grants.gov accounts and technical issues related to using the system, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov. The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays. For a list of federal holidays visit:https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/Except for technical submission questions, during the NOFO period U.S. Department of State staff in Washington and overseas shall not discuss this competition with applicants until the entire proposal review process has been completed and rejection and approval letters have been transmitted.H. Other InformationApplicants should be aware that DRL understands that some information contained in applications may be considered sensitive or proprietary and will make appropriate efforts to protect such information. However, applicants are advised that DRL cannot guarantee that such information will not be disclosed, including pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or other similar statutes.The information in this NOFO and “Proposal Submission Instructions for Applications” is binding and may not be modified by any DRL representative. Explanatory information provided by DRL that contradicts this language will not be binding. Issuance of the NOFO and negotiation of applications does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the U.S. government. DRL reserves the right to reduce, revise, or increase proposal budgets.This NOFO will appear on www.grants.gov, MyGrants, and DRL’s website https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.Background Information on DRL and General DRL FundingDRL has the mission of promoting democracy and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms globally. DRL supports projects designed through an evidence-based framework that empower local civil society partners to promote and defend democracy globally, including efforts to counter authoritarianism, promote human rights, and meaningfully address diversity, equity, and inclusion as a core element of good governance. DRL typically focuses its work in countries facing human rights violations and abuses, where democracy and human rights defenders are under pressure, and where governance infrastructure is undemocratic, in transition, or at risk of backsliding. Additional background information on DRL and its efforts can be found on https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/.
- Kosovo HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Kosovo				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kosovo																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Kosovo during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting ethnic minorities or other marginalized communities.The government took credible but inconsistent steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.As of September, the government’s Missing Persons Commission listed 1,616 persons who disappeared during the 1998-99 conflict and the political violence that followed. By law the government’s database did not include the ethnicity of missing persons unless voluntarily reported by their families. The commission estimated approximately 70 percent were ethnic Albanians and 30 percent were Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, Balkan-Egyptians, Bosniaks, Goranis, Montenegrins, and others.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and laws prohibited such practices, but the laws were inconsistently implemented.As of August, the National Preventive Mechanism against Torture (NPMaT) received 12 complaints of mistreatment by correctional service personnel, including from two detainees in the Gjilan/Gnjilane pretrial detention center. The Kosovo Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture (KRCT) also reported one instance of alleged use of force by correctional service personnel at the Pristina pretrial detention center, but a Ministry of Justice Inspectorate investigation found no evidence of inappropriate use of force.The Police Inspectorate of Kosovo was responsible for reviewing and investigating accusations of police criminal actions, and for inspecting police processes. The complaints primarily alleged mistreatment in exercise of official duty, abuse of official duty, bribery, bodily injury, threatening behavior, and domestic violence. As of August, the Ombudsperson Institution, an independent human rights organization, received 40 complaints of physical mistreatment by the police, of which 25 were dismissed on the merits and the rest remained under investigation. The Ombudsperson Institution initiated three additional ex-officio investigations of alleged police abuse.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention center conditions met some international standards, but problems persisted in penitentiaries, including reports of prisoner-on-prisoner violence, corruption, exposure to radical religious or political views, and inadequate treatment for prisoners with mental disabilities.Abusive Physical Conditions: According to the NPMaT and the KRCT, physical conditions in detention centers in Prizren, Peje/Pec, Lipjan/Lipljan, Gjilan/Gnjilane, and Mitrovica/e, as well as police stations in Pristina, Gjakova/Djakovica, Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje, Ferizaj/Urosevac, Rahovec/Orahovac, and Malisheva/Malisevo did not meet international standards due to inadequate ventilation, lack of natural light, and narrow physical spaces. None of the issues were reported to be life threatening.The KRCT noted facilities, treatment, sanitary conditions, and access for inmates with disabilities in Dubrava prison remained a problem. The NPMaT reported violence between detainees was a general problem.Administration: Authorities did not always conduct proper investigations of mistreatment. The KRCT noted internal complaint mechanisms at each facility mandated by law did not function effectively and lacked confidentiality.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits by independent human rights observers. The Ombudsperson Institution and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) had unfettered access to correctional facilities throughout the year, as did the Medical Inspectorate. The KRCT and the Center for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms were allowed unannounced access to detention centers through cooperation agreements with the Ministry of Justice.Improvements: Government officials acknowledged some prisons and detention centers did not meet physical standards and took steps to improve conditions. The government allocated funds for the construction of a new detention center in Prizren and a detention center for women and children, and recruited 47 women correction officers. The government completed the refurbishment of a housing unit at Dubrava prison.The KRCT noted overall increased transparency and responsiveness of correctional institutions to allegations of mistreatment by the correctional service institutions.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government, EULEX, and NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) generally observed these prohibitions. EULEX and KFOR personnel were not subject to the country’s legal system, but rather to their missions’ and their countries’ disciplinary measures. There were no reports of EULEX or KFOR personnel breaking local laws.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						By law, except when a crime was in progress, police could arrest suspects only upon an order based on evidence and issued by a judge or prosecutor. Within six hours of an arrest, prosecutors had to issue the arrested person a written statement describing the alleged offenses and the legal basis for the charges. Authorities had to bring arrested persons before a judge within 48 hours and had to provide detainees prompt access to a lawyer of their choice or one provided by the state. There was a functioning bail system.Suspects had the right to refuse to answer questions, except those concerning their identity, at all stages of an investigation. Suspects had the right to the free assistance of an attorney (after demonstrating financial need) and interpretation, as well as medical and psychological treatment. Suspects were allowed to have a family member notified of their arrest and could, at all stages of the process, communicate with their legal representation.Following an initial ruling, a court could hold individuals in pretrial detention for 30 days from the date of their arrest and could extend pretrial detention for up to 18 months. After an indictment and until the conclusion of trial proceedings, only a trial judge or a trial panel could terminate detention. The law allowed a judge to order house arrest, confiscate travel documents, and use bail or other alternatives to pretrial detention.Pretrial Detention: Although lengthy detentions, averaging six months, both before and during judicial proceedings, remained a problem, there were insufficient data to determine if pretrial detentions frequently equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime or of prescribed time limits for detention. Lengthy detention was partly due to judicial inefficiency. The NPMaT and KRCT both reported instances of pretrial detentions lasting several months. The KRCT reported judges frequently extended pretrial detentions without adequately re-evaluating the circumstances that led to the initial detention.In May, July, and August, the Constitutional Court ruled the length of pretrial detentions of three individuals charged with abuse of office and obstruction of justice violated their constitutional rights. In September, the defendants were released on bail, and one was subsequently acquitted of all charges.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary did not always provide due process. According to the Ombudsperson Institution, the administration of justice was slow and lacked the means to ensure judicial officials’ accountability. Judicial structures were subject to political interference, disputed appointments, and unclear mandates.Civil society frequently criticized the government for publicly interfering with the independence and impartiality of judicial institutions, particularly regarding corruption investigations of government officials. In August, the Prosecutorial Council published a press release calling on the government to stop “continuous blackmailing and demeaning statements towards the prosecutorial system.”As in previous years, the Ombudsperson Institution noted general concerns regarding nonenforcement of court decisions, which contributed to an increased backlog of cases. The Ombudsperson Institution reported a lack of effective, timely remedies to address violations of due process.Some Kosovan Serb representatives claimed government institutions failed to execute court rulings in favor of Kosovan Serbs, particularly in property-related disputes. Central and local authorities in Decan/Decani continued to refuse to implement the 2016 decision of the Constitutional Court confirming the Serbian Orthodox Church’s ownership of more than 24 hectares of land adjacent to the Visoki Decani Monastery. In September 2021, the Constitutional Court noted the government’s continued refusal to implement the court decision and referred the issue to the state prosecutor. As of December, the prosecutor had not initiated criminal proceedings. None of the officials failing to carry out the court order have been sanctioned.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for a fair and impartial trial, and while there were severe shortfalls in the judicial system, including instances of political interference, it generally upheld the law.Since 2019 the law allowed for trials in absentia for cases involving offenses of international humanitarian law and international criminal law. In such cases, a defendant was represented by a defense counsel throughout the court proceedings. Courts often failed to provide adequate interpretation services and did not provide adequate translation of statute and court documents as required by law.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										A complex mix of laws, regulations, administrative instructions, and court practices, as well as the illegal reoccupation of properties and multiple claims for the same property, continued to hamper resolution of property restitution cases arising from the war and its aftermath, from 1998-2000. More than 95 percent of claims were filed by ethnic Serbs. Private citizens and religious communities were largely unsuccessful in petitioning for the return of properties seized or confiscated during the Yugoslav era.By law the Property Comparison and Verification Agency had authority to adjudicate claims regarding the extent, value, and ownership of land parcels and to resolve discrepancies between cadastral documents. The absence of cadastral records, which Serbia removed from Kosovo in 1999 and continued to retain, prevented the agency from fully fulfilling its mandate. Claimants had the right to appeal decisions in the courts.As of August, the Property Comparison and Verification Agency had enforced two evictions of illegal occupants. The agency reported no cases of demolition of illegal structures or reusurpation of property. Kosovan Serbs in Zubin Potok and Leposavic/q expressed concerns the government was expropriating (their) land for police stations and related police infrastructure (fiber optic cables, roads, etc.) without following due process and legal procedures, and in a nontransparent manner.International legal experts in August assessed the country’s government did not follow its own expropriation laws and procedures in the planned expropriation of 118 parcels of land in northern Kosovo, the majority of which were Kosovan Serb-owned. The government subsequently adjusted its actions, though Kosovan Serb community representatives continued to criticize the government for not being clear regarding the intended use for the land.The government had laws or mechanisms in place, but nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups reported it did not make significant progress on resolving Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens. The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in July 2020, can be found on the Department’s website: https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress/. .																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, and there were no reports the government, EULEX, or KFOR failed to respect these prohibitions.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) and Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) were Kosovan institutions, created by Kosovo law and staffed with international judges, prosecutors, and officers, to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other serious crimes under Kosovo law commenced or committed between 1998-2000. The SPO and its predecessor, the EU Special Investigative Task Force, were established following the 2011 release of the Council of Europe report, Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo, which alleged individual Kosovo Liberation Army leaders had committed acts that could constitute war crimes in Kosovo between 1999 and 2000.In April, the trial against former Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, former Kosovo Parliamentary Speaker Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi, and Rexhep Selimiforf on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict began. As of December, the trial remained ongoing.In December 2022, the KSC issued its first judgment on substantive war crimes charges, finding former Kosovo Liberation Army Commander Salih Mustafa guilty of arbitrary detention, torture, and murder, and sentencing him to 26 years in prison. Mustafa appealed, and the appeal hearing took place October 26-27. On December 14, the appeals panel confirmed Mustafa’s conviction on all charges but reduced his sentence from 26 to 22 years in prison, including time served.The trial against Pjeter Shala, a member of the former Kosovo Liberation Army, on charges of war crimes began February 22 and was ongoing as of early December.The KSC continued to address witness protection and obstruction of justice challenges. In February, appeal proceedings largely affirmed trial charges in a second case involving obstruction of justice charges against two Kosovo Liberation Army War Veterans Organization leaders: Hysni Gucati and Nasim Haradinaj, although the sentence was slightly reduced from 4.5 years of imprisonment to four years and three months. Gucati secured an early release on October 17. Another case involving witness intimidation started against Kosovar nationals Sabit Januzi and Ismet Bahtjari in early October. On October 10, Albania’s Court of Appeals turned down a request from Kosovo to extradite former Kosovo Liberation Army fighter Dritan Goxhaj to The Hague on alleged offenses against the administration of justice. Goxhaj was released from custody. A first-instance court initially accepted the request for Goxhaj’s extradition on September 19, after he was arrested in Tirana in late July. Goxhaj was one of four arrests during the year based on charges of witness intimidation and obstruction related to the work of the KSC.The Humanitarian Law Center in Kosovo reported authorities had arrested seven ethnic Serbs and one Gorani on war crimes allegations during the year as of November. The Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo issued 12 indictments throughout the year for war crimes against five persons in Kosovo and eight in absentia. The Humanitarian Law Center noted resolution of conflict-related crimes committed in Kosovo between 1998-2000 remained a challenge, citing inadequate resources and lack of regional cooperation.In February, the Appellate Court upheld the Pristina Basic Court’s September 2022 sentencing of one Kosovan Serb to five years’ imprisonment for war crimes against civilians. According to the indictment, the defendant took an Albanian woman hostage from July-August 1998 in Bellopoje/Belo Polje village, Peja/Pec Municipality. In November, the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence of an ethnic Serb to 13 years’ imprisonment for committing sexual violence as a war crime against the ethnic Albanian civilian population in Vushtrri/Vucitrn. In June, the Prizren Basic Court sentenced an ethnic Albanian to nine years and six months’ imprisonment for the war crime of kidnaping another ethnic Albanian due to his alleged collaboration with Serbian forces.In July, the government extended to May 2025 the mandate of its commission to identify and recognize survivors of conflict-related sexual violence entitled to financial compensation. The law did not recognize as conflict-related any act of sexual violence that occurred after NATO intervention in June 1999 and did not provide free or adequate access to health services. The commission granted pensions to more than 1,583 women since 2018, including 177 during the year as of September. Civil society organizations working with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and authorized to assist survivors’ application process noted the slow pace of the government commission in the review of applications. The Ombudsperson Institution reported several complaints from applicants concerning breaches of privacy during the commission’s verification procedures. The Special Prosecution Office of the Republic of Kosovo designated one prosecutor for cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Police maintained a unit for war crimes cases, including cases of conflict-related sexual violence.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. Credible reports persisted that some public officials, politicians, businesses, criminal elements, and religious groups sought to intimidate media representatives and used violence or threats of violence against journalists.Freedom of Expression: The law prohibited “publicly inciting or spreading...hatred, discord, and intolerance between national, racial, religious, ethnic or other groups, or based on sexual orientation, gender identity, and other personal characteristics in a manner which is likely to disturb the public order.” As of September, Kosovo Police reported seven cases of “incitement of hatred and ethnic division,” mostly related to graffiti.Violence and Harassment: The Association of Journalists in Kosovo (AJK) reported it was targeted with digital smear campaigns several times when it defended journalists and the media. The AJK reported government officials, including the prime minister and ruling political party members, engaged in smear campaigns to undermine public trust in the media.As of September, the AJK reported 60 instances of government officials, political leaders, judicial staff, business interests, community groups, demonstrators, or religious groups physically assaulting or verbally threatening journalists, damaging their equipment, or conducting cyberattacks against media outlets. In April, police arrested three individuals for assaulting the owner of news portal Metro after the outlet posted a video allegedly mocking the grand mufti of Kosovo and a prominent imam. As of November, the trial of the three suspects continued.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Journalists claimed pressure from politicians and organized criminal groups frequently resulted in self-censorship. Cases of cyberattacks on the online media persisted. Some journalists refrained from critical investigative reporting due to fear for their physical safety or job security. Journalists occasionally received offers of financial benefits in exchange for positive reporting or for abandoning an investigation.According to the AJK, government officials as well as suspected criminals verbally threatened journalists for perceived negative reporting. According to some editors, government agencies and corporations withdrew advertising from outlets that published critical material.In July, the government announced the suspension of the business license of the country’s largest private broadcaster, Klan Kosova, due to an alleged registration violation. In August, the Commercial Court in Pristina ruled against the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade and overturned the suspension.Nongovernmental Impact: The AJK recorded 30 attacks against journalists covering political tensions in the north in May and June, including damage to equipment, burned vehicles, and physical assault of media crews. On June 16, masked individuals chased nine media representatives in Leposavic/q and assaulted a camera operator for the country’s public broadcaster. Journalists alleged some of the attacks were directed and tacitly approved by political leadership in the north, though officials there denied any involvement and publicly denounced attacks on media.Police arrested eight ethnic Serbs for physical attacks on journalists reporting on the tensions in the north in June. As of September, five of the suspects were released on bail and three remained in detention.In April, police arrested three individuals on allegations of assaulting a commentator and owner of an online news portal after he posted a video mocking a prominent imam. He was hospitalized for treatment of his injuries.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at .																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these related rights.Ethnic minorities had access to identity documents in the civil registry, and the number of Kosovan Serbs with these documents increased. Kosovan Serb representatives and civil society claimed some challenges remained, particularly for individuals who had obtained identity and other civil documents from illegal institutions established by the government of Serbia to replicate institutions run by the government of Kosovo. The government did not recognize these Serbian documents. Kosovan Serb representatives and civil society also complained about what they considered the government’s arbitrary interpretation and application of the law on citizenship and civil status.In-country Movement: The municipality of North Mitrovica continued to maintain a closure of the primary bridge connecting Mitrovica/e North and South to vehicular traffic, allegedly to prevent civil disturbances, but the bridge remained open to pedestrians. KFOR and police maintained permanent security at the location. Other bridges connecting the two cities were fully open.Exile: The ability of ethnic minority refugees from the war to return to the country remained a problem. Parliamentary representatives of the Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities reported social prejudice prevented the return of nearly 400 members of their communities, collectively.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of refugee status with subsidiary protection, a system for providing protection to refugees, and temporary admission of asylum seekers while their cases were adjudicated. The government had a system in place enabling foreign nationals or stateless persons to seek asylum at any entry point to or within the country.UNHCR reported all asylum applicants had unhindered access to asylum procedures. Information on the country’s asylum procedures, as well as the rights and obligations of applicants, was available at all official entry points, including the airport and asylum and detention centers, in multiple languages.UNHCR reported inadequate government capacity to respond to cases of violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity among asylum-seeking and refugee populations.Refoulement: In July, the Special Department of Pristina Basic Court acquitted two senior Ministry of Internal Affairs officials of all charges of misuse of official position and authority and unlawful deprivation of liberty, and the court sentenced the former director of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency to four years, eight months in prison for misuse of official position and authority. This was in connection to the 2018 rescission of residence permits and subsequent refoulement to Turkey of six Turkish citizens, whom Turkey accused of having ties to terrorism; 22 officers were charged in 2010 for participating in that operation. In 2019 the appellate court affirmed a prior ruling that the rationale for rescinding the residence permits was baseless. The prosecution did not file charges against the 22 police officers.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection, called subsidiary protection, to individuals who might not qualify as refugees. In 2023, the government provided subsidiary protection to more than 250 individuals, primarily Afghan nationals.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										In its October periodical review, UNHCR reported many individuals had displacement-related needs stemming from the 1998-99 conflict and the violent events of 2004, including 15,646 displaced persons within the country. Persistent concerns included discrimination against members of minority communities, fear of violence or harassment, failure to enforce court decisions (particularly those concerning property), property usurpation and damage, lack of access to educational and economic opportunities, and lack of public services in a common language. For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																				g. Stateless Persons										Official figures on stateless persons were not available. UNHCR reported 11 individuals were identified as stateless, and an additional 470 individuals remained at risk of statelessness as of September. The law contained no discriminatory provisions that would cause groups or individuals to be deprived or denied citizenship. There were no reports of violence or discrimination against stateless persons. Government procedures provided for access to naturalization for those granted stateless or refugee status five years after the determination.While laws relating to civil status permitted stateless persons to register life events such as birth, marriage, and death, implementation varied among municipalities. Children whose births were not registered, primarily from the Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities, were considered stateless.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot based on universal and equal suffrage.The Serbian government continued to operate illegal parallel government structures in Kosovan Serb majority areas and in areas primarily inhabited by the Kosovan Gorani community. The Serbian government often used these structures to influence Kosovan Serb and Kosovan Gorani communities and their political representatives.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: The country held parliamentary elections in February 2021. International observers largely considered the elections fair and free of abuses and irregularities. International and independent observers as well as ethnic minority group representatives reported concerns regarding the lack of competitiveness in Kosovan Serb areas and noted pressure and intimidation within ethnic minority communities to support parties aligned with Srpska List, a party closely aligned with the Serbian government.Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties operated freely in most of the country, and there were no significant barriers to registration. Party affiliation often played a role in access to government services and social and employment opportunities. Prospects for opposition parties in Kosovan Serb areas remained limited, however, due to reported pressure and intimidation tactics to influence Kosovan Serbs to support Srpska List.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. A lack of effective judicial oversight and general weakness in the rule of law contributed to the problem. Corruption cases were routinely subjected to repeated appeal, and the judicial system often allowed statutes of limitation to expire.Corruption: NGOs and international organizations alleged numerous failures by the judicial system to prosecute corruption, noting that very few cases brought against senior officials resulted in convictions. Sentencing of high-level officials convicted of corruption was often lenient.In June, the Pristina Basic Court concluded the 2019 trial of former Minister of Agriculture Nenad Rikalo and eight other ministry officials charged with abuse of power. The court sentenced Rikalo and the former secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture to three and two years in prison, respectively. The remaining six defendants were acquitted.Media reported that the Special Prosecution Office and the Kosovo Police Special Investigation Unit opened criminal investigations against at least five ministers and two deputy ministers on allegations of corruption-related offenses. Separately, the Pristina Basic Court found Minister of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade Rozeta Hajdari and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Liza Gashi guilty of failure to declare assets and fined them €700 ($764) and €500 ($545), respectively.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups operated generally without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. The government was cooperative and sometimes responsive to their views.Government Human Rights Bodies: The constitution established the Ombudsperson Institution as the national independent human rights body, mandated to monitor, protect, and promote the rights and freedoms of individuals from unlawful or improper acts, or failures to act, by public authorities.The Ombudsperson Institution had authority to investigate allegations of human rights violations and abuse of government authority and acted as the National Preventive Mechanism against torture. The institution was the primary agency responsible for monitoring detention facilities. Based on powers granted by the assembly, the Ombudsperson Institution could file amicus curiae briefs with basic courts on human rights-related cases. It could also make recommendations on the compatibility of laws and other sublegal or administrative acts, guidelines, and practices.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, and domestic violence, including rape of a relative or spouse. By law, rape was punishable by two to 15 years in prison. The government did not enforce the law effectively. EULEX noted that courts often applied penalties lighter than the legal minimum in rape cases and that law enforcement bodies rarely took steps to protect survivors and witnesses. In addition, sentences were often further decreased by appellate courts. Police investigated cases of domestic violence before transferring them to prosecutors who made the determination on filing charges. Instances of gender-based violence, including sexual violence and rape, were rarely reported by survivors, frequently due to social stigma or lack of trust in authorities.Advocates and court observers asserted prosecutors and judges favored family unification over survivor protection, with protective orders sometimes allowing the perpetrator to remain in the family home while a case was pending. Sentences ranged from judicial reprimands to up to five years’ imprisonment. The NGO Kosovo Women’s Network noted the lack of correctional and probation service programs for the reintegration and rehabilitation of perpetrators of gender-based violence.The law recognized gender-based violence as a form of discrimination but lacked a definition of gender-based violence for use in criminal and civil proceedings. The Prosecution Victim Assistance Office helped to provide access to justice for survivors of all crimes, with a special focus on survivors of domestic violence, trafficking in persons, child abuse, and rape. The Victim Assistance Office operated a 24/7 helpline with limited services in Serbian, Romani, Turkish and Bosnian languages. Each prosecutor’s office had a prosecutor specialized in handling domestic violence cases, while the Pristina Basic Prosecution Office established a Domestic Violence Unit staffed by four prosecutors. In addition, each prosecution office had prosecutors assigned as trafficking in persons coordinators and sex crimes coordinators. Prosecutors were encouraged to apply risk assessment tools to mitigate the risk of future abuse and to recommend harsher sentences for repeat offenders and violators of protective orders.The government provided partial funding to 10 NGO shelters that assisted women and child survivors of domestic violence, including two shelters for victims of human trafficking, but shelters for survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as most lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) survivors of violence, were not available. Shelters aided women survivors and their children for up to six months. Boys older than age 12 were not allowed to reside with their mothers in shelters but were accommodated separately in shelters for child survivors of abuse. The government maintained standard operating procedures for protection against domestic violence, but shelters did not have unified case management manuals to standardize operations and services. Integration programs for survivors of gender-based violence were generally lacking.In March, the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruled that the police station in Gracanica/Gracanice and the Pristina Basic Prosecutor’s Office failed to protect the life of Sebahate Morina in 2021. Morina was killed by her former husband, Lulzim Sopi, 11 days after their daughter reported to police that her mother was being abused physically. Sopi pleaded guilty to domestic violence charges in 2019, but the Gjilan/Gjnilane Basic Court only imposed a fine, despite his history of violence against his wife. A civil restraining order against Sopi was active until three months before Morina’s reported murder. Following the Constitutional Court decision, women’s rights organizations requested the resignation of the prosecution and police representatives involved in the case.In February, the Pristina Basic Court sentenced four suspects to a total of 40 years in prison for the 2022 rape of a girl, age 11, in a city park in Pristina while she was under supervision of the Center of Social Work as a victim of trafficking. In September, the Appellate Court overturned the decision and ordered a retrial.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law defined sexual harassment in civil and criminal proceedings. It stipulated criminal proceedings were to be initiated upon a survivor’s request and prison sentences were authorized for sexual harassment offenses against at-risk survivors. The government’s enforcement of this law was mixed. The government assigned designated sex crimes coordinators to improve effectiveness in prosecuting cases of sexual harassment and assault during the year. In cases where a crime was committed with the use of a weapon, sentences could vary from one to five years in prison. The NGO Kosovo Women’s Network reported that implementation of sexual harassment laws was hampered by poorly defined procedures for filing complaints, and lack of clarity regarding which government bodies should receive these complaints.According to women’s rights organizations, sexual harassment was common at workplaces in both the public and private sectors, including in public institutions of higher education, and remained underreported.Discrimination: The law provided the same legal status and rights for women and men. The law required equal pay for equivalent work. Nevertheless, women faced discrimination in employment.Relatively few women occupied upper-level management positions in business, police, or government, though the government included one woman deputy prime minister and five women ministers out of 15. The Ombudsperson Institution reported women were often subjected to discriminatory hiring practices and various forms of discrimination including sexual harassment at the workplace, both in the public and private sector. Women remained underrepresented in the labor market, with just one in five women participating in the formal labor market. According to the Agency of Statistics’ 2022 Labor Force Survey, the total labor force participation rate for women was 22 percent, compared to 55 percent for men. An independent study financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development of 2021 tax data indicated the average net monthly salary was €480 ($519) for men and €420 ($454) for women.The Ombudsperson Institution reported instances of discrimination against single mothers, particularly regarding the enrollment of their children to the public nurseries. Women’s rights organizations reported sexual abuse and harassment occurred on the job but went unreported due to fear of dismissal or retaliation. According to the Kosovo Women Network, trade unions and chambers of commerce lacked gender-friendly policies to address women’s rights.The law stipulated partners in marriage and civil unions had equal rights to own and inherit property, but men usually inherited family property and other assets. In rare instances, Kosovan Albanian widows, particularly in rural areas, risked losing custody of their children due to a family custom requiring children and property to pass to the deceased father’s family while the widow returned to her birth family.Single mothers and women with disabilities, from minority ethnic communities, or living in rural areas faced different forms of discrimination, including unequal access to public services.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.By law the government was obliged to provide equal access to sexual and reproductive health services including for survivors of sexual violence. Emergency contraception and postexposure contraception was not always available as part of clinical management of rape. The Ministry of Health included emergency contraception and postexposure contraception on its list of essential drugs for health centers, but human rights organizations reported some centers did not always have the drugs available. Survivors were assigned a “victim’s protection official” who assisted with both the criminal justice and medical treatment processes. Poor and marginalized communities often had insufficient access to information on reproductive health. According to the Kosovo Women’s Network, information regarding reproductive rights, family planning, and contraception was insufficient, inhibiting access to safe and effective reproductive health services.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution prohibited discrimination based on racial or ethnic background. The constitution further allowed for the adoption of interim measures to protect or advance the rights of individuals or minority ethnic groups that suffered from discrimination. Reports of violence and discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups persisted. The law provided for equal protection, without discrimination, on the grounds of race, color, language, religion, national or social origin, relation to any community, property, economic and social condition, birth, or other personal status. The Law on Protection from Discrimination established a comprehensive system of protection from discrimination in the country and designated two entities – the Ombudsperson Institution and the Office on Good Governance under the prime minister – as the administrative bodies responsible for resolving cases of discrimination, promoting equality, and monitoring the implementation of antidiscrimination measures. The criminal code contained provisions to classify as “hate acts” such offenses where race or ethnicity was a motivating factor.The Ombudsperson Institution reported that although there was a legal framework to protect racial and ethnic minorities, there were problems preventing full and effective implementation and enforcement, including a lack of institutional capacity. Societal violence, as well as social and employment discrimination, persisted against Kosovan Serb and other ethnic minority communities.In April, a police officer assigned to an official checkpoint in Zvecan municipality shot at a vehicle that did not stop on police orders, causing minor injuries to the ethnic Serb driver. Following an investigation by the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, the officer was arrested and charged with attempted murder, tampering with evidence, and failure to report; three other police officers were charged with failure to report. The officers were released on house arrest pending trial. The shooting prompted protests and criticism from Kosovan Serbs and the international community.In July, the Supreme Court acquitted former member of parliament and minister Ivan Todosijevic of charges of inciting intolerance and denying atrocities committed against ethnic Albanian civilians in 1999. Todosijevic was serving as the minister of local government administration in 2019 when he publicly denied the occurrence of the well-known Recak/Racak massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians. The court ruled the remarks fell within the scope of freedom of speech, reasoning the statement was his opinion, which despite being inaccurate, did not include calls for hatred of other communities.Access to justice for citizens in four Kosovan Serb-majority municipalities in the north remained limited following the November 2022 resignation of virtually all Kosovan Serbs in the judicial and law enforcement sectors in northern Kosovo, exacerbating pre-existing problems. Kosovan Serbs reported they resigned in protest of government decisions, including those related to the exchange of Serbia-issued license plates bearing Kosovan towns’ names, illegal in Kosovo, for legal Kosovan-issued plates. As of September, court branches in two municipalities remained closed due to short staffing, and approximately 7,000 cases were pending. The identities and photos of newly commissioned ethnic Serb police officers were posted online with threatening messages from ethnic Serb individuals and groups on social media, starting in late July and continuing throughout the year. Several Kosovan Serb police officers resigned in August shortly after they were commissioned and deployed in northern Kosovo, citing “threats and pressure.” Government officials and international community representatives condemned the acts of intimidation that preceded the officers’ resignations.Ethnic minorities including the Serb, Romani, Ashkali, Balkan-Egyptian, Turkish, Bosniak, Gorani, Croat, and Montenegrin communities faced varying levels of institutional and societal discrimination in employment, education, social services, language use, freedom of movement, the right to return to their homes (for displaced persons), and other basic, legally stipulated rights. Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities often lacked access to basic hygiene, medical care, and education, and were heavily dependent on humanitarian aid for subsistence.The Ombudsperson Institution noted discrimination in public sector employment in almost all local and national institutions. Although the law mandated that 10 percent of national government employees in the Kosovan Albanian majority country be ethnic minorities, their representation remained limited and generally confined to lower-level positions. Smaller communities, such as Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptians, were particularly underrepresented. The Ombudsperson Institution opened an investigation in August on the allocation of Office for Community Affairs’ grants that, according to complaints filed by several civil society organizations, favored Kosovan Albanian-led NGOs.The Office of the Language Commissioner continued to monitor the implementation of legislation that conferred equal status to the country’s two official languages, Albanian and Serbian, as well as other official languages at the local level, including Romani, Bosnian and Turkish. The commissioner and the Ombudsperson Institution reported municipal administrations and central government institutions were inconsistent in implementing provisions of national language laws, which resulted in unequal access to public services, information, employment, justice, and other rights.Lack of translation or poor translation remained a problem with regards to numerous laws, signage in public institutions, and communication in court proceedings. Courts often failed to provide adequate translation and interpretation services to minority defendants and witnesses and did not provide adequate translation of statute and court documents as required by law. Government efforts to address these problems were inconsistent.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Children not registered at birth were primarily from the Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian communities. UNICEF indicated lack of registration could harm a child’s access to social assistance, particularly for repatriated children.Education: The law required equal conditions for all schoolchildren and recognized minority students’ right to public education in their native language through secondary school. This law was not enforced. Bosniak, Croat, Gorani, Montenegrin, Romani, and Turkish community leaders cited the unavailability of textbooks and other materials in their native languages, occasionally turning to Albanian-language curricula or curricula sponsored by Serbia or Turkey to educate students.Segregation of Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan-Egyptian children in public schools remained a problem.Child Abuse: The Child Protection Law criminalized and provided for specific definition of different types of child abuse and neglect. In addition, the criminal code addressed various elements of child abuse, including in sections on sexual assault, rape, trafficking in persons, child pornography, forced marriage, child neglect and failure to report child abuse, among others. Penalties ranged from five to 20 years’ imprisonment. The government’s enforcement of the law was mixed.UNICEF, the Ombudsperson Institution, the Statistics Agency, and responsible ministries jointly operated a unified data management system to track child-related information in the justice, education, and social welfare sectors.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law allowed persons to marry at age 18 or age 16 with parental consent. Although there were no official data on early and forced child marriages, it was a common practice, including within the Romani, Ashkali, Balkan-Egyptian, Bosniak, and Gorani communities.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the sale, grooming or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. Persons who used a child in making or producing pornography could receive a prison sentence of one to five years. The distribution, promotion, transmission, offer, or display of child pornography was punishable by six months’ to five years’ imprisonment. Possession or procurement of child pornography was punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to three years. The government generally enforced the law against child pornography effectively, although lenient sentences remained a concern.The minimum legal age for consensual sex was 16. Statutory rape was a criminal offense punishable by five to 20 years in prison.																																				Antisemitism										Small Jewish communities of less than 100 persons existed in Prizren and Pristina, although exact numbers were unavailable. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: There were no laws that criminalized consensual same-sex conduct between adult individuals, cross-dressing, or any sexual or gender characteristic-related behavior.Violence and Harassment: There were no reports police or other government officials conducted violence against LGBTQI+ individuals. The Center for Social Group Development noted an increase of intolerant and discriminatory language against LGBTQI+ individuals by some public officials and elected politicians especially in relation to a draft civil code that would regulate marriage equality and civil unions.Violence against LGBTQI+ individuals remained prevalent. LGBTQI+ rights organizations noted an increase of domestic violence against LGBTQI+ individuals, though most instances went unreported. In November, a taxi driver attempted to strike with his vehicle an LGBTQI+ activist and owner of the only LGBTQI+ bar in Kosovo, and later posted threats to social media. The taxi driver was arrested in November, charged with attempted murder and incitement of hatred against the LGBQI+ community, and remanded to pretrial detention.Discrimination: The constitution and law prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the “public and private spheres of social life, including political and public life, employment, education, health, economy, social benefits, sports, culture and other areas.” These clauses and laws were unevenly enforced. When the motivation for a crime was based on gender, sexual orientation, or perceived affinity of the victim with persons who were targets of such hostility, the law considered motivation to be an aggravating circumstance.According to human rights NGOs, LGBTQI+ persons faced overt discrimination in employment, housing, access to education and health care.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: There was no standard administrative process by which individuals could change gender markers on identity documents to bring them into alignment with their gender identity. In 2019 the appeals court upheld a basic court ruling permitting the change of the gender marker on identity documents for specific individuals who brought their request before the courts. In total, two citizens changed their gender markers on identity documents following lengthy court procedures. As of September, the courts refused two citizens’ requests for change of identity documents; an additional 10 requests, filed over several years, remained pending.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of so-called conversion therapy practices to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.The law required doctors to issue a medical report determining the gender of intersex persons at birth. The practice of irreversible surgery to assign the sex of newborn intersex children was not specifically required by the law but could be performed with parental consent.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws or other restrictions on individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations, or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The constitution and law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, and provided for equal access to education, employment, and other state services. The government did not effectively enforce these provisions, and persons with disabilities faced discrimination and were unable to access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.Educational options for children with disabilities were limited. There was only one public school for blind and visually impaired children in the country, located in Peja/Pec. The school had dormitories with limited rooms available for children and parents, but travel to and from the school remained a challenge for students. Education at the school was available in the Albanian language only. According to local NGO Handi-Kos, only 12 percent of children with disabilities attended primary education. According to Handi-Kos, access to health and rehabilitative services, including social assistance and assistive devices for persons with disabilities, remained insufficient.Physical access to public institutions remained difficult. The Ombudsperson Institution noted the limited implementation of bylaws governing the technical conditions of buildings and access for persons with disabilities. Handi-Kos reported municipal compliance with a mandate on access to government buildings remained low.Although the law required equal access to transportation for persons with disabilities, the Ombudsperson Institution reported unequal access to interurban transportation for blind persons, including insufficient reserved seating and reduced fares for persons with disabilities.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination, and the violation of any individual’s labor rights due to their union activities. The law required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity, including in essential services. The law applied equally to all individuals working in the public and private sectors, including documented migrants and domestic servants.The law required trade union organizations to have at least 10 voluntary union members to register with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. The law stipulated valid reasons for strikes and required a seven-day advanced notification to the governing body or employer. Under the law, designated workers of “services of vital importance” faced added restrictions and had to provide “minimum work process and production” during a strike.The government did not effectively enforce labor laws, which included regulations and administrative instructions that governed employment relations, including rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. According to the Association of Independent Labor Unions in Kosovo (BSPK), resources, inspections, and remediation were inadequate. Penalties for violations were less than those for laws related to civil rights. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. Administrative and judicial procedures were circuitous and subject to lengthy delays or appeals.Employers did not always respect the right of worker organizations to bargain collectively, particularly in the private sector. The BSPK reported many private-sector employers essentially ignored labor laws. The BSPK reported difficulty in establishing new independent unions due to employer interference in workers’ associations and unions, particularly in the banking, construction, and hotel sectors. Representatives from these sectors anonymously told the BSPK some employers used intimidation to prevent the establishment of unions.Public sector employers also engaged in antiunion retaliation. As of September, the Ombudsperson Institution concluded one investigation of alleged antiunion discrimination in the public sector. The Ombudsperson Institution found that the Civil Aviation Authority violated the right of employees to associate in unions and refused to address the recommendations of the institution and the Kosovo Assembly Committee for Human Rights, Gender Equality, Missing Persons and Petitions. The labor inspectorate (not fully functional due to budgetary and staffing shortfalls) reported receiving no formal complaints of discrimination against employees who tried to join unions. In addition, employers did not always respect the rights of worker organizations and unions to bargain collectively or to network with unions outside their organization, particularly in the private sector.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at .																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The government minimum wage was higher than the official poverty income line.The law provided for a standard 40-hour work week, required rest periods, limited the number of regular hours worked to 12 per day, limited overtime to eight hours per week and 40 hours per month, required payment of a premium for overtime work, and prohibited excessive compulsory overtime. The law provided for 20 days of paid leave per year for employees and 12 months of partially paid maternity leave. Contacts reported alleged violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were common in the informal economy, construction, and textile sectors.The law was not enforced effectively. Violations of wage, hour, or overtime compensation remained common in the private sector.Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards were generally appropriate for the main industries in the country. The government did not proactively identify unsafe conditions and only responded to workers&#8217; OSH complaints. The responsibility for identifying unsafe workplaces lay with individual employers, while the changes that would secure safe work conditions were the responsibility of occupational safety and health experts rather than workers.Workers in the construction industry could not remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Labor Inspectorate was responsible for enforcing labor standards, including those pertaining to wages, hours, and OSH. The government did not effectively enforce the law, and penalties were less than those for similar violations. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The number of inspectors was insufficient to deter violations in both the formal and informal sectors. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions, although the inspectorate was not fully functional due to budgetary and staffing shortfalls.According to the BSPK, employers failed to abide by official labor standards that provided equal standards of protection to public and private sector workers. Agency of Statistics data indicated 12.3 percent of employees worked over the 40-hour limit set by labor law, and anecdotal evidence suggested that overtime was rarely compensated.There were no reliable official statistics on the informal economy, but a 2022 EU-commissioned report estimated the informal and black market at 32 percent of GDP. Workers in the informal sector were not covered by all wage, hour, and occupational safety and health laws. The BSPK reported lack of enforcement by the judiciary, especially in the informal sector, citing resource and capacity limitations within the labor inspectorate. The Ombudsperson Institution characterized the informal sector as the greatest violator of workers’ rights, with lack of workplace protections often resulting in fatalities, lack of work contracts, and refusal of employers to pay wages and respect working hours.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											The Bahamas											Tonga											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Kosovo
- Kosovo (23-824) – Agreement Concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information Office of Treaty AffairsDefense: Security of InformationSigned at Pristina August 24, 2023; entered into force August 24, 2023.
- Online Press Briefing with James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, And Gabriel Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Brussels Media HubMODERATOR:  Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub.  Welcome to everyone joining us today for this short-notice virtual press briefing.  We are very honored to be joined by both the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador James O’Brien, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the same bureau, Gabriel Escobar.Finally, a quick reminder that today’s session is on the record, and we’ll get to as many questions as possible in the 30 minutes that we have allotted today.  And with that, Ambassador and Assistant Secretary, I’ll turn it over to you for opening remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  Thanks very much, John.  Thanks, everyone, for joining today.  This is an opportunity for us to talk about a number of events recently and upcoming, including Gabe’s trip to the region, the meetings we’ve had with our Quint colleagues, and of course events over the next week.In the questions I see many of you are asking about most of those items, so I’m not going to comment on them in the opening.  But what I will do is start with something someone – a topic no one asked about in the questions that came to me, and that is that the U.S. welcomes the decision of the European Council to open negotiations on membership with Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We think this is a restatement that the future of the region lies in Europe.  We know there is a lot of very hard work ahead.  The reforms that are required by the European Union will go to many of the issues that citizens of Bosnia have wanted to see changed in their country, and we’ll call on the leaders to operate in a way that they’ve been reluctant to do recently.  So, we think this is a very good step, and we look forward to working very closely with our colleagues in the EU on moving the entire region forward toward its European path, both in the growth plan if that is finally adopted and in the accession process.For those of you not following, the growth plan that’s been proposed would give early access to the single market – this is very important for economies – and the accession process, of course, would lead eventually to membership of the European Union.This – as we are looking at a week of anniversaries, this is a really important follow-through on commitments made when the wars of the ‘90s ended, and then from the early 2000s, that the region should be encouraged to reform and really cement its place in Europe, and it’s a great step that we are willing to work in support of.And so with that, John, why don’t we gather up some questions?  And maybe it’s more efficient if we take two or three at a time.  I’ll try to answer them.  Gabe is here just off camera, so I may – occasionally I may turn it over to another voice.  But that’s – you’ll know who’s talking.MODERATOR:  Yes, sir.  Will do.  Why don’t we do – I’ll do one of the – two of the pre-submitted questions, and then we have a couple of hands raised.  So first from Jelica Tapušković from Tanjug News Agency in Serbia:  “Will the United States take additional pressure or measures to force Pristina to implement the agreement and form the Association of Serbian Municipalities but also withdraw the controversial decree of the Central Bank of Kosovo?”The second question, this time from Kosovo, from Ridvan Hamza from RTV:  “Last night,” he notes, “Prime Minister Kurti was alarmed once again about the approach of Serbian army units that are close to the Kosovo border.  Such a move comes just a few days after President Vučić opened – had threatened Kosovo and the position of the international community on Kosovo-Serbia issues.  Is the United States aware of such actions, and have you had a chance to clarify the situation with Serbian authorities?”And then, Ambassador, if you don’t mind, I’ll take a live question in addition.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  Great.MODERATOR:  Tatiana from north Mitrovica, Kosovo.  Tatiana, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Yes, thank you.  Question for Ambassador O’Brien.  Professor of constitutional law Vladan Kutlešić, a member of the delegation in Rambouillet, on several occasions (inaudible) in 2020 when he passed away, spoke very highly of you and your mutual work, testified about the de facto secret process in the first part of 1998 as a task entrusted to him by Milošević, to the progress that you both jointly achieved.  However, he also said that all that was abruptly stopped, although you went on vacation back to the United States during the summer and had family obligations and did not see each other again until the next meeting in Rambouillet, about which he also provided details.  Would the &#8212;ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  Could I – sorry, there’s something – it’s like water on the line.  I heard you say something about Vladan Kutlešić.QUESTION:  Yes.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  But maybe a little bit slower and louder, or maybe, John, you can paraphrase.QUESTION:  Okay.  Do you hear me now, sir?MODERATOR:  That’s better.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  I can – of course we can always hear when you ask if we can hear you.QUESTION:  Okay.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  That’s like one of the rules of Zoom.  But yeah, if you can just sort of more slowly and &#8212;QUESTION:  Okay.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  &#8212; to the point.  Yeah, sorry.QUESTION:  Okay.  So, Mr. Vladan Kutlešić spoke very highly of you and your mutual work.  He testified on several occasions about the de facto secret process negotiations in the first part of 1998 as a task that was entrusted to him by Milošević, to the progress that you both jointly achieved during those months.  However, he also said that all that was at some point abruptly stopped around summer 1998.  Although you went on vacation back to the United States, you did not see each other again until the next meeting in Rambouillet, about which Mr. Popovic also provided details with the emphasis that even then, at one minute to 12:00, both you and him tried to prevent war, followed by his replacement.  He testified that he never found out which partly – which party and why interrupted the useful work of the two of you during 1998, as he estimated.  What can you say us about that?  Why everything was stopped?  Thank you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  We might need to have a full history lesson, but why don’t I – I’ll take the questions in a couple orders.  So yeah, he was a very talented lawyer, and I was sorry to hear when he passed.  The – we had a number of peace talks with both representatives of Kosovo and in then Serbia-Montenegro, the – now Serbia.  The – over the course of ’98 to ’99, the goal was to stop the violence and to provide full rights for citizens in Kosovo.  That work happened in a number of venues.  Some of it was in small groups of lawyers; much of it was with a set of diplomats, led at various times by Secretary Albright on our side, Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Hill, who was then working in a regional capacity from his base.  Those talks were very intensive throughout that entire period.So, it’s probably true; I haven’t thought about my travel schedule.  I mean, I came to Belgrade often through the second half of ’98, so I’m not quite sure what this lull is.  And believe me, I have no memory of a vacation.  But the – there were talks all the way through that period.  And if you remember in this fall of 1998, then really Serbia – it was with interior ministry police and the – a little bit of help from the army – mounted a major operation that moved a number of Kosovo civilians into a very dangerous situation where they were at risk of freezing and starving.  So in the middle of that period, we found ourselves having to deal with an urgent crisis involving the use of force.And that is the problem with talks like this, that although I think we could see our way toward some situation where people in Kosovo would have had control of their own lives, the ability to govern themselves, the decision to use force lay in hands other than the two of us.  And that is ultimately what led to the failure of the peace talks in the spring of 1999.And so with that, you didn’t ask specifically, but I know we are coming on the 25th anniversary of the start of the NATO campaign.  And we are issuing a statement with our European partners, because we think it is very important that we all stand together on this day.  I’ll highlight a couple of the themes.  So the – a commemoration of any use of force is a very sober and difficult event, because I acknowledge that the decision to use force and the way in which it is used always brings with it a number of difficult decisions and has real consequences for human beings.  It was made necessary in that case because the government at that time decided to go forward with the use of force rather than to continue talks.I was meeting with many others – including with Mr. Kutlešić – in France twice, and we were in Belgrade in the days as that military operation started.  We felt it was the only option to stop what looked like an enormous humanitarian consequence with more than a million people forced to flee their homes and go across borders, often in unsafe situations.  That was why we did what we did.Now, it brought with it a lot of very difficult situations, but we were pleased when finally peace could be achieved and people could return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives.  That’s what we were trying to do.  It was a process of connections from the top, from presidents in the U.S. and prime ministers in Europe, with presidents in Belgrade, all the way up to and in fact after the military operation began.So there was no break, no walking away from the issues; it was just that the decision to resort to force was what led to the situation we’re now commemorating this week.  And with that, I don’t think we should focus on when two people were sitting alone in a room.  It was about all governments working with all the tools they had at their disposal to try to avoid a collapse of governance, a humanitarian crisis, and put an end to what was some pretty horrific violence.The positive side of this story is what I began the call with.  We are now in a situation where the six countries in the Western Balkans say that they want to be a part of Europe.  Europe has now acknowledged this and is engaging with each, and they’re in different phases of this process.  And we strongly support the integration of these countries into European structures, and when they choose to, into transatlantic structures such as NATO.  So three of the countries now are full NATO Allies, and we welcome that.  This is a sign of how we rebuild and re-equip our relations post-war for the kind of future that we all want, and that’s the work that we do here most every day.That’s that question.  To the specific tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and the way forward, I’ll address it in a couple of terms.  So, we know that the future for both countries, as they have said, is that they want to be a part of Europe and a global economy rather than to be not aligned or autarchic, trying to deal with different allies on specific issues.  We are working with each government to see that that is possible.In Serbia, President Vučić knows well that any use of force against Kosovo would be unacceptable, would be regarded as putting in danger the NATO troops, which are there in order to protect the population – so whether ethnically Serb or Albanian.  He has said that there will be no use of force.So these exercises, yes, we are tracking them, but the key point here is that both sides need to reduce the tensions around the region, and that involves actions that aren’t directly related to the exercises.  So, on the Serb side we’ve made clear that the individuals who were involved in the acts in September need to be held accountable for their actions.  And we expect that that will happen, and happen soon.  The Serbian Government already has taken a number of steps since September 24th, and we welcome those, including firing the head of the intelligence agency, moving the basing of troops back, and offering some assurances about activity in the north.  But we want to see those tensions remain low, and so some of these activities are ones we would prefer not happen.But that is on that side.  Also I had a question about Kosovo’s policies, and I think here I’d begin by noting the U.S. is a very strong supporter of Kosovo’s involvement in international organizations, and we want to see it be a member of the international community in full.  That means living up to the highest standards that those international organizations require.  So in that context, what we are hoping to see in coming days is that the government in Pristina takes actions that are called for and that it has agreed to with the international community.Now, on the central bank decree having to do with the dinar, Miroslav Lajčák, the EU special representative, has come up with a number of very specific ideas.  The fundamental point here for me is that no government should seek to impoverish its citizens, and we see in the north of Kosovo that it is very difficult for a number of individuals to buy the things they need for their daily lives.  Gabe Escobar just traveled there in large part to see for himself – but to see for us in the U.S. Government – the situation.  And what we came back with was a sense that this decree is being implemented in a way that makes it difficult for Kosovo’s own citizens to go about their daily lives.  That’s not a competent or effective government in operation.So, Kosovo’s friends are saying that we would like to see this decree now revised, implemented in a way that allows people to pay for the goods they need in their daily life.  That probably means taking a step back, letting in currency of some kind – euro, dinar – that’s something that that Minister Lajčák is discussing – but that – so that people are able to live their lives with some assurance that they will be able to wake up in the morning and buy what they need.Now, I’ll note that this particular policy was rolled out at a really inopportune time, because there had been a series of agreements last fall, including that citizens in the north would begin to pay their electricity bills.  And it’s sort of an odd thing to deny them the banking and currency facilities they need to pay Kosovo’s own utility.  So what we’d like to see is practical progress so that Kosovo’s communities in the north know that they are able to pay for the functioning of their basic institutions and their daily lives.  That’s what Miroslav Lajčák is working toward.We understand that a government wants to understand what currency is coming into its country.  There are ways to provide for that kind of transparency and the legitimate use of the currency without going through this exercise.  That increases tensions and it inflames the kind of unhelpful nationalist rhetoric that we would prefer everyone pull down.  So, we’d like to see that proceed.Kosovo faces a few really important votes on its progress toward international organizations in the next few weeks.  There’s a very talented rapporteur for the Council of Europe, who has laid out some conditions Kosovo has either agreed to meet or must meet in order to move forward in that organization.  So, one of them was good progress on resolving the property disputes around the Dečani Monastery, and we have welcomed publicly the steps that the government has taken in that regard.  It took a long time, and we wish it hadn’t taken the sort of time and focused effort because this, again, is just about preserving a part of Kosovo’s history and a vibrant community inside Kosovo.  We’d like to see a government regard that as its normal work.But that’s happened – but the rapporteur has also said that Kosovo needs to be able to – needs to move forward with the Association of Serb Municipalities before the council of ministers takes the issue up in the Council of Europe, and certainly – and have it implemented before the council of ministers votes on membership.  So, we support Kosovo on its path forward.  It’s agreed to move forward with the Association of Serb Municipalities.  That is the critical element for it to get what it says it wants, which is membership in an international body.  And so they need to just go ahead and do it.And those are the kinds of hard decisions governments need to make, and we will support them as they make the hard decisions needed in order to join European and international communities in the way that Kosovo says it wants.I think I got through all three questions with that.  So John, why don’t we take some more?MODERATOR:  Yes, sir, will do.  We’ll take another couple of submitted and then we’ll go to another raised hand.  First one from Iva Gajic from RFE/RL:  “Do you perceive recent events such as the visit of Serbia’s Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić to Moscow amidst his current role as acting prime minister as a signal of strengthened ties between Serbia and Russia?  Have you discussed this matter with Belgrade, and what is the response that you have received?”The second question would be from Milan Nesic from VOA Serbian Service:  “Can it be said from a quarter-century distance that NATO intervention in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has fulfilled its purpose?  During the past couple of years, it seems like Serbia has been overwhelmed by an anti-Western attitude, while Russian influence is easily disseminated and accepted.  Do you think there would be any difference if the intervention was avoided, and how would the U.S. define relations between Serbia and Kosovo 25 years after the intervention?”And finally, why don’t we go to Ekrem Krasniqi.  Ekrem, please go ahead and ask your question.  Ekrem, can you hear us?No?  Why don’t we go to Sitel TV, then.  Sitel, please?  You’re still muted, Sitel.Well, Ambassador, why don’t we start with those questions and then we can go to a live question in a moment.ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  Okay.  Wait, sorry, something odd has just happened with my screen.  They – I think I’ll group the two questions and note a few things.  So President Vučić has been clear that he sees Serbia’s future being in Europe, starting with the single market.  He has made also clear that he understands that this brings with it the need for certain reforms.  Already there are discussions about changing the way some payments are made and about the way that customs responsibilities are handled so that cargo can move more quickly.  It’s all in the way of implementing the four freedoms that underlie the entire European project.  That will take some changes in the way in which Serbia engages in Europe.  That’ll be for them to sort out.  That to me is one example of the relationship we are building today, and what – I think it’s on the whole a very strong relationship that – where we approach a number of difficult issues together.At the same time, we have the people of Kosovo who now are an independent state recognized by a hundred-odd countries around the world, and this was not predicted when the intervention happened many years ago.  The goal was to prevent people from starving and freezing and being subjected to violence when they had to walk through mountain passes, and that was accomplished.  A million people moved home very quickly after the war.  For all the problems, there has been peace between the states since, and now we are dealing with the remnants of a very difficult period.  But with both countries committed to being part of a wider European space, they will find a way forward, just as virtually every other country in Europe has had to do with its neighbors in order to build this incredibly successful project of the European single market and European Union.I’ll just say I spent many hours over the last week with visitors from Ireland.  When I was first negotiating peace in what was at first in Bosnia and Herzegovina then later in Kosovo, many participants in those wars – whether they were in the military or in the relevant governments – would point towards Ireland, particularly during the talks in 1995, ’94, and say: I can’t imagine that we’ll ever have a war that goes as long as theirs; those people are dedicated to continuing violence in a way that we’re not.And within a few years, we saw a generation in Ireland say that they didn’t want to pass this conflict on to their children.  And I just met this last week with the leaders of the government and opposition in the Republic of Ireland, but also to the co-ministers in Northern Ireland and the heads of political parties there, all of whom said that they are committed to their children having different opportunities than they were faced with.  And these are the next generation of people who grew up, often with parents deeply involved in the conflict.And to hear them talk about the possibility of peace, how even though they disagree on some fundamental issues and disagree on history, they agree that what they need in their societies is better childcare, better education, especially for special needs kids, and higher value investment – those are things politicians get together and work on.  And I’ve seen it happen in a place where many people in the Balkans said – was for them a worse case.  Now, it’s a very good case of the way forward, and all it took was courage among some of the leaders of the communities involved.So that’s the choice that’s in front of the leadership now in the region.  We try to make very clear specific steps that need to be taken along the way, but the fundamental choice is a choice of character and courage.  And that’s what we are working with the leaders to see that they feel able to express so that they’re able to move forward very quickly.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  Do you have time for one or two more?ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  Yes.MODERATOR:  Great.  Why don’t we try to go back to a live question.  Ekrem Krasniqi.  Ekrem, can you hear us now?QUESTION:  Hello?MODERATOR:  Yes, sir.QUESTION:  Can you hear me now?MODERATOR:  Yes.  Yes.QUESTION:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. O’Brien, for this.  If I can go back to last year agreements – that means the base agreement of February and then the implementation annex of March, and then the proposal for the stated association.  Will the United States Government agree with putting all these agreements (inaudible) in Kosovo?MODERATOR:  Oh, you’re still – Ambassador, you’re still muted.  I think – Ekrem, can you repeat that last part of your question?  It wasn’t very clear.QUESTION:  Yes.  The question is will the – would the United States Government agree to put the basic agreement, the implementation annex, and the statement of the (inaudible) association in the – in a referendum in Kosovo for a public, direct consultation?ASSISTANT SECRETARY O’BRIEN:  I haven’t heard this idea before, and I don’t think it’s necessarily our decision.  I mean, what was good about the agreement last March was that Pristina agreed that it would carry out certain actions with Brussels, Belgrade agreed on certain actions also with Brussels, and now it is up to the parties to follow through on what they have agreed to do.And again, the current step for Kosovo to take is to advance in its course with the Council of Europe.  For it to do that, the Council of Europe rapporteur has made clear that substantial progress and then the implementation of the association must be done.  Now, if some governing body or a referendum or some step in Kosovo wants to make a different decision, that’s of course your right.  But the consequence would be turning away from the path that Kosovo has said it wants to take for the last 15 to 20 years.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador.  Unfortunately, that is all the time we have for today.  We really appreciate everyone joining on such short notice.  We hope you found it useful.  Ambassador O’Brien and DAS Escobar, thank you so much for joining us.Shortly, we will send the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists and provide a transcript as soon as it is available.  Please always feel free to send us your feedback at TheBrusselsHub@state.gov.  Thanks again, everyone, for your participation.  We hope you can join us again for another press briefing in the future.  This ends today’s briefing.# # #
- Department Press Briefing – March 20, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 20, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 20, 2024																																																					March 20, 2024																																																								12:34 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. Happy Wednesday. I don’t have anything off the top today. Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Sure. I guess starting with Gaza.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: NSM-20 – follow up on that. I mean, there’s – the clock is ticking for a Israeli response, and not just Israel but – can you say what extent now has Israel submitted a response? Has there been any correspondence with the department?MR PATEL: So as I said yesterday, I’m just not going to speak to the specifics of any singular country at this moment. This is a broad memorandum touching various different corners of the world. And to take a step back, since the signing of the national security memorandum on February 8th, partner countries deemed to be in active armed conflict have 45 days to share letters of assurances. And upon receipt of each of those, the United States will assess whether or not a partner country – whether those assurances are credible and reliable.And so that work is ongoing, and implementation of that national security memorandum is ongoing, as is the assessment of those assurances from partner countries. So I just – I don’t – I’m not going to get into more specifics. I know Camilla asked about this yesterday.QUESTION: Right. The Secretary, of course – it’s been announced he’s going to continue on to Israel this week. Do you expect this to be a – to be one of the issues that’s raised, I mean, this response on NSM-20?MR PATEL: Well, we expect him to talk a wide – about a wide range of issues. The Secretary, as you note, is headed to Israel at the end of this week. He’s going to discuss with the Government of Israel, its leadership, the ongoing negotiations to secure the release of hostages. He’s going to discuss the need to defeat Hamas, including in Rafah, in a way that we believe will hopefully protect civilian populations, does not hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and advances Israel’s overall security.He’s also going to discuss the United States and international efforts to dramatically increase and sustain delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians, who are suffering from a lack of adequate food supplies. That’s obviously been a immense priority for us. And he’s also going to update Israeli leaders on his talks in the earlier part of this week with Arab leaders to build a lasting peace and security for Israelis, Palestinians, and the broader region.QUESTION: Just one for me before I pass it on, but the – Rafah, how much do you figure of that will be in the discussions? I mean, there’s – there have been calls from the U.S. quite explicitly to hold off without a plan for civilians in Rafah. Do you expect the Secretary to speak in depth about Rafah with the Israeli leaders?MR PATEL: I don’t have a percentage or an assessment to offer, Shaun. But we have been very clear that we believe that in order to undertake any kind of operation in Rafah, it would require a serious and significant plan, one that addresses the varying and complex humanitarian challenges that are posed in the Rafah region, talking specifically about more than 1 million people who are seeking refuge in the area, it continuing to be an area that is a conduit for the flow of humanitarian aid.So I have no doubt it will be one of the things that will be discussed, but also, as a reminder, National Security Advisor Sullivan spoke to this earlier in this week. We expect a team from Israel to meet with members of the interagency in the United States to also discuss ways in which we believe that Hamas can be defeated, but done so in a targeted and more precise manner, and hopefully does not impact or have any negative impact on Palestinian civilians.Daphne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Netanyahu has said that he will soon approve a plan for the evacuation of Palestinian civilians from fighting areas after having green-lit the military’s operational plans for Rafah. Has the U.S. seen any of these plans yet?MR PATEL: I have not seen – I don’t have any plan to read out or to offer an assessment on. But let me be very clear, and this has come up a couple of times this week: There should be no full-scale military operation in Rafah without a credible and executable plan to protect the civilian population. Part of that also, and this has been a – something that the Secretary has made clear and reiterated in some remarks he gave in Tokyo last year, that we do not support the forced displacement of Palestinians in Gaza to outside of Gaza. That’s not something that we would support or condone.QUESTION: And sorry, just not looking for any assessment, but have you actually received these plans from Israel?MR PATEL: I’m not aware. I’m not aware of that.QUESTION: And I have a few more on Haiti, but if you have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yes.QUESTION: Still on Rafah for one second?MR PATEL: Sure. Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Will the Secretary be in the conversations next week with administration officials with the Israelis who are coming here to discuss Rafah?MR PATEL: I don’t have – one, I don’t have specific scheduling to offer on, like, when those conversations will take place. Two, I don’t have an exact delegation makeup both from the United States side or the Israeli side. But what I can say is that I have no doubt the State Department will be deeply engaged in those conversations. I do not believe that they will be happening at the Secretary’s level, but of course we are deeply engaged on this issue from across the department.QUESTION: And just on Rafah generally, you guys have repeatedly talked about the importance of protecting the civilian population there. And given the outreach to Israel to discuss this plan in more detail, is the administration in a position where you guys would be willing to provide resources to Israel to actually protect the civilian population if they’re going to go ahead with this operation? Or is the onus on Israel to do that with their own resources?MR PATEL: I don’t want to get ahead of the – these conversations, Kylie. As you know, over the course of – since October 7th, but even prior to that, we have a longstanding relationship with Israel in terms of provisions of security assistance and things like that. What we hope to happen through this conversation is for there to be a clear and direct engagement on how they are thinking about this and offer some insight into advice on how we would approach this situation were we in that position.And so I don’t want to get ahead of that conversation, and if in the course of that it is determined that our Israeli partners need X, Y, and Z, that is of course a conversation that we’ll continue to have.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR PATEL: Can I – then I’ll go to you. Go ahead, Camilla. Still on Gaza, I assume?QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: No? Okay, then go ahead, Said.QUESTION: First, I wanted to ask about a colleague of mine in Gaza. He’s in fact the bureau chief of Gaza for our newspaper, and the editor-in-chief for the electronic version. His name is Mahmoud Abu Awad Abu Musab, but I’ll send you his name and his picture. He was taken by the Israelis on Sunday night, Sunday or Monday morning, and we lost his whereabouts. We don’t know anything about him. Then there was a picture published with him stripped naked along with other men and so on.So my point is: When will the United States demand and say that this cannot keep on going, where journalists that are credentialed, that have worked there for year after year, decade after decade, well-known to the Israelis – well-known to the Israelis – why do they keep taking them, targeting them, killing them, imprisoning them? With impunity? Why is that not outrageous to you?MR PATEL: Said, when we talk about continuing to press Israel to enhance its mechanisms to better protect civilians, we of course are also talking about extending that to journalists as well. We are always concerned for the safety of journalists, especially in conflict zones, especially in somewhere like Gaza, where journalism plays a critical role. And as Secretary Blinken has said, journalists – including many Palestinians in Gaza – are doing extraordinary work under the most dangerous conditions. And we’ve been unequivocal here. We also have been clear and reiterated the fact that Israel needs to abide by international humanitarian law, especially as it conducts these operations. And that’s something we’ll continue to reiterate with them.QUESTION: Yeah, well, honestly, Vedant, this slap-on-the-wrist kind of language is not going – in any way, shape, or form – to sway the Israelis, or to pressure them, or to make them do stuff. You should – everybody believes that a civilized country like the United States of America, who is basically the umbilical cord for Israel to do everything under the sun, can stand and say: This should not go on.MR PATEL: We &#8212;QUESTION: This should not go on. Not just “we urge them not to harm them” and so on because this is obviously a systematic – I mean, when you – when 150 – I don’t know how many, 150 journalists are killed &#8212;MR PATEL: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and imprisoned and taken, and so on, this is not just something that happens.MR PATEL: It doesn’t sound like you have a follow-up question, so let me just jump in and say from the President on down, we have reiterated that Israel needs to – it has a moral and strategic imperative to do more, and to do everything it can to work on and bolster its deconfliction mechanisms, to take additional steps to protect civilians and minimize civilian casualties. And that, of course, includes and extends to journalists, who we believe are doing important and vital work in the region.QUESTION: A couple of things on Rafah. It has been assessed that it is impossible to evacuate Gazans from Rafah – there’s about a hundred – 1.4 million and so on. And it seems that the United States is having meetings next week, or the administration will be having meetings with Ron Dermer and Hanegbi to discuss Rafah. So if you are convinced, and that’s what we get, at least the suggestion is that it is really very difficult, very – it’s impossible – why cannot this be made, like, restatement or the standard U.S. position? The standard U.S. position that Rafah should not be invaded?MR PATEL: Said, it is our position that such an operation should not and cannot be conducted without a credible and serious plan, a plan that needs to account for and address the varying humanitarian factors in the Rafah region: firstly, the more than 1 million people seeking refuge in the area; two, it continuing to be an area that is a conduit for humanitarian aid. It is out of serious concern for these two factors that we have not been unambiguous about our concerns as it relates to an operation in Rafah, and we’ll continue to have these conversations with our Israeli partners.Anything else?QUESTION: After weeks – my last one – after weeks of this Rafah dilemma has been going on, is there a conceivable way to remove such a huge amount of people and move them safely, in your view or anybody’s view?MR PATEL: When we’re talking about dealing with the more than one million people who are seeking refuge in Rafah, Said, we’re certainly not being prescriptive about how to go about and do that. And when it comes to the movement of the Palestinian people, especially those residing in Gaza, we’ve been very clear that the forcible movement or the forcible removal of them is certainly not something that we would support. But beyond that, I don’t have – we’re not aiming to be prescriptive here, Said. We’re going to continue to have these conversations with our Israeli partners on what we believe can hopefully be a path forward that will help defeat Hamas, but also be mindful of these varying humanitarian factors.On Gaza? Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. So you said that you expect Israel to act in line with international law. And last month you announced publicly that you are assessing whether or not Israel is complying with the international law and you’re also assessing the use of U.S. weapons in Israel’s war. Have you come to any conclusion, and do you have any expectation of that, how long it might take to – for this investigation?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates – I don’t have any updates to offer in that space. When we talk about that ongoing work, we’re talking about it in the context of how this kind of work is ongoing in all conflict areas where we’re assessing the circumstances and anecdotes on the ground, and we’re assessing what is happening. And of course there are a number of vectors and a number of lines of efforts within the State Department to assess those kinds of things. We’ve talked about a couple of them from up here: processes like the Leahy process, the – processes like CHIRG. And some of that work is just going to continue, and I don’t have any update to offer on that.QUESTION: Just one more on that. Yesterday, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam said that they submitted a memorandum to the U.S. Government regarding Israel’s violations of international law, and this includes the misuse of U.S. weapons and blocking the U.S-funded humanitarian aid. Have you (inaudible) – what is your assessment of this report? Because this includes like serious allegations like use of white phosphorous in Lebanon, in Gaza, and attacking ambulances, hospitals, and blocking the U.S. humanitarian aid. Do you have any response?MR PATEL: I’ve seen the open-source reporting of it as it relates to the report. I don’t have any specific assessment to offer on that, specifically as it relates to the national security memorandum and its linkage to that report. And just speaking to Shaun’s question, the implementation of the NSM is ongoing, and so I don’t have anything else to offer on that.Anything else on Gaza before – I want to make sure &#8212;QUESTION: One more Gaza one? Yeah.MR PATEL: I mean, we can do as many as you want. I just want to stay on topic.On Gaza – can I do Camilla first because she &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, of course. Yeah.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Just following up on Said’s question.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You and Matt have stood at the podium and you have confirmed that there are incidents that are raised with the Israelis every time something happens in Gaza that you guys want answers on. Every time a journalist is subjected to inhumane treatment or there’s evidence of that, or a journalist is killed in Gaza, is this treated the same way where you go to the Israelis and you ask them what has happened? And is there a list of journalists that you guys have asked about, especially ones that are colleagues of ours in Gaza who are working with us on this story every day? And have you had any response from the Israelis on any individual case in regards to Gaza?MR PATEL: There are – there certainly are. There certainly are specific incidents, especially as it relates to journalists, in which we have asked our partners in the Government of Israel for more information.QUESTION: Have they given any &#8212;MR PATEL: And in instances we have gotten more information on the specifics to those circumstances or things of that nature. I’m not at liberty to speak to some of those given privacy concerns, but this is something that we raise, and we raise it as – at the seriousness that we raise others issues that we have concerns about and we’re seeking more information on.QUESTION: And would this be – for Said’s colleague, would this be a case in which you would raise it with the Israelis?MR PATEL: I’m not aware of the specifics around this case. I’m happy to check, but I don’t want to speak to something in that specificity that – when I don’t have information in front of me.QUESTION: Just for the record, if this were a CBS colleague in Gaza, we would be expecting that to be something that would make the list of things to be raised with the Israelis. And then I can turn to Haiti after Gaza.MR PATEL: Kylie.QUESTION: With regard to the ongoing operation on the largest hospital complex in Gaza, obviously it was the same location where the Israelis carried out another operation in November. So I just wonder, if they’re having to go back again, if there are concerns about the efficacy of their operations as they continue to go after what they say are terrorists in this hospital?MR PATEL: So I will let the Israelis speak to their own operation and how they’re conducting it as well as any assessment that they have made that would make – that goes into their reasoning for why they’re deciding to conduct such an operation. What I will just say is that there continues to be plenty of open-source reporting out there of Hamas using civilian institutions – like hospitals, like schools – as command and control nodes, as areas in which hostages are being held, as areas that lead into their tunnel networks. So that is not something that is surprising to us. There is a clear track record of that. But as it relates to this specific – this specific operation, I’ll defer to the – to our Israeli partners.QUESTION: Just one more on Gaza?MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Realizing, of course, it relates to another country’s policies &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but do you have any comment on Canada saying they’re going to stop arms shipments to Israel?MR PATEL: That’s for our Canadian partners to speak to, and it’s a sovereign decision of theirs to make. The United States has been clear – you saw the President speak to this not too long ago – we continue to support Israel’s right to defend itself and have been clear that we must do so while also being very clear the moral and strategic imperative our partners in Israel have to protecting the lives of civilians. And our position hasn’t changed.QUESTION: And has there been discussion with the Canadians on this, on &#8212;MR PATEL: I – we talk to our Canadian partners all the time. I’m not aware of a specific conversation to read out though.On Gaza, Daphne?QUESTION: Haiti.MR PATEL: I want to make sure there’s – I think folks still have questions on Gaza, but then I will – we’ll have time to talk Haiti.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: I have this and – maritime corridor, when will it be ready?MR PATEL: So that is something that we’re continuing to work on around the clock. Since the beginning of this conflict we have been leading efforts to get lifesaving humanitarian aid into Gaza to alleviate the suffering. You saw at State of the Union the President announced this undertaking that he has directed the U.S. military to establish, and so that work is happening. I don’t have any other details to offer. But on the construction or any updates on the pier itself – the temporary pier itself, rather – I’m sure my Department of Defense colleagues would be happy to speak to that.QUESTION: And on Secretary’s trip to the region &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; will he be meeting Arab foreign ministers in Cairo tomorrow other than the Egyptian foreign minister?MR PATEL: I don’t want to get too much ahead of the Secretary’s schedule and will let his visit to the specific countries play out, but we fully expect him to engage with Arab leaders while he’s in the region.On Gaza, Nick? Okay. All right, anything else on Gaza? Okay. Camilla has been patiently waiting for Haiti. So go ahead – or Daphne, whoever wants to go.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have any updates on Americans trying to leave Haiti? Are there any more U.S.-organized flights planned?MR PATEL: So as of March 20th, the U.S. Government is facilitating the safe departure of U.S. citizens from Port-au-Prince, Haiti. We are in the process of organizing government-chartered helicopter flights from Port-au-Prince to Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, where U.S. Government personnel are present to provide consular assistance. And from Santo Domingo, American citizens will be responsible for their own onward travel to the United States.I assume your next question is going to be is – will there be more of these, and that is going to depend on the demand, the situations on the ground, the reliability of commercial transportation. Our hope is to keep these options available for American citizens who need it, and the feasibility and the assessment of that work is going to be ongoing.QUESTION: And how many Americans are on the flights today?MR PATEL: So I – for operational security reasons, and they’re ongoing, I don’t want to speak with greater specificity. But we do expect these helicopter movements to make multiple trips in order to try and get as many American citizens as we can today, while also continuing to look at what options might be available and how – what options might be available for reoccurring movements in the days ahead and even beyond.QUESTION: Okay. And then just on that transition council, any update on its formation? And are you concerned by how long this is taking?MR PATEL: Well, certainly every day counts, and our hope is that conversations are continuing with the membership of the transitional presidential council. We understand that Haitian stakeholders are very closely finalizing membership and remain in active discussions with CARICOM. And we think that this needs to happen swiftly because it is clear to us that this Haitian-led process is key for paving the way for free and fair elections, as well as the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission as well.Anything else on Haiti? Yeah, go ahead, Camilla.QUESTION: Just on the helicopters.MR PATEL: YeahQUESTION: Granted that it’s a – sensitive security wise, but are you able to comment at all on, like, concerns around helicopters taking off from Port-au-Prince and back – going that particular route from the capital where there’s &#8212;MR PATEL: So let me just say broadly first, and you’ve heard me say this before, Haiti is a Level 4 Do Not Travels country. It’s been so since 2020. The violence on the ground in Port-au-Prince has been dire. The security situation is certainly one of high risk. But I will also just say that we would not conduct such an operation if we did not feel that it was safe to do so and that we did not have the expertise to conduct something like this. So I will just leave it at that given security concerns.And of course the situation on the ground is one of the biggest factors into determining the frequency at which we can do this and what other options might be available to American citizens, including potential commercial options.QUESTION: And can you give any update on numbers of Americans interested in getting assistance or departure &#8212;MR PATEL: So again, when – remember, when we’re talking about the crisis intake form, we’re talking about a wide population of American citizens. Some are interested in exploring departure options. Some just want to stay in touch with the United States of America or the embassy. Some want expertise advice on how they may be able to remain safe, and others may not be in a place for safe departure now but may be down the line. So it’s important we talk about this population in the broad sense that it is, but our – the number of Americans who have reached out to us through this form is approaching 1,600.QUESTION: Can I just ask a clarifying question on the &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: How we can discuss the movements given that they’re ongoing? So we can say that they’re ongoing today and then the department is exploring options for continuing them as soon as tomorrow? Is that accurate?MR PATEL: The – we are exploring what options are possible for continuing them. And should the circumstances be proper, it’s very likely that they will continue. But again, I want to take this one day at a time given the very fluid situation on the ground.QUESTION: One more clarification &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, yeah. Go ahead, Nick.QUESTION: Because you said we are in the process of organizing government-chartered helicopter flights. Have they already started or are they starting later today, or &#8212;MR PATEL: That is what I am intentionally being vague about given operational security. So hopefully we’ll have more for you later today, but again, this is – the safety and security of American citizens is – we have no higher priority than that, and so wanted to make sure that you all had clarity on what we were doing while also maintaining the security for this operation to be conducted.Anything else on Haiti before we close out? Okay, Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. A couple of separate topics. On Ukraine, a UN human rights report says that Russia is using fear to control occupied territories. Can I get a reaction?MR PATEL: Look, Alex, I have not seen that specific report, but it should be no surprise to anybody that the Russian Federation is using – partaking in repressive tactics to silence the voice of dissenters, to silence the voices of opposition. And again, when it comes to these territories, let me just be unequivocally clear: They are Ukraine, and we’ll continue to support our Ukrainian partners as they continue to defend and fight for their territorial integrity and sovereignty.QUESTION: Polish foreign minister today was quoted as saying that success in Ukraine against Russian occupation is a question of U.S. credibility. Do you agree with that assessment that U.S. credibility is at stake here?MR PATEL: I would – I think that when it comes to our credibility, you needn’t look any further than the immense support that the United States and its allies and partners have provided to our Ukrainian partners since February of 2022, and that work is going to continue and we’re going to continue to do so in close coordination with our allies and partners. It is because – of course, the courageousness and the heroism of the Ukrainian people, but also the convergence with our partners in Europe and others around the country that we have been able to continue to support Ukraine in the way that we have and it has been able to defend itself so fiercely.QUESTION: And I have a couple more on human rights, if I may. There were expectations that annual Human Rights Reports will be released either during or before democracy summit. Is there any reason for a delay?MR PATEL: I don’t have any scheduling items to offer. I have no doubt that we will share the Human Rights Report with you all at some point soon.QUESTION: And broadly speaking, I’ve seen this morning the White House’s fact sheet on the democracy summit. Why do you think it was a successful summit? There are reports out there that it was a low-key – outcome was not really comparable with the previous year. Is it a successful summit this year?MR PATEL: We certainly would say it was a successful summit, and I know that the Secretary really appreciated the opportunity to be there and appreciated the Republic of Korea for hosting. The – I will also add that, outside of the Secretary, there continue to be or have been senior officials in Korea continuing to participate in this summit, folks like Under Secretary Zeya. The Secretary, as you saw, Alex – I spoke a little bit about this earlier this week – had the opportunity to give a set of remarks on information integrity, which we think is one of the most critical aspects at the nexus of democracy when we’re talking about it, and I’m sure we’ll have more to share on this space going forward.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Go ahead – I’m going to work the room a little bit, Alex. Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you very much. La Repubblica today reported that Secretary Blinken blocked the release of a G7 statement condemning the presidential election in Russia. Can you confirm that? Can you explain the decision?MR PATEL: I have not seen that report and I don’t believe it to be true, and we have taken a number of steps in close coordination with our G7 partners as well as independently to hold the Russian Federation to account for its actions and its infringement on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty.QUESTION: And one more: On Monday, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that the United States stands ready to engage in bilateral arms control talks with China and Russia without any preconditions. Do you know if Washington has put forward any propositions to Moscow or Beijing?MR PATEL: I’m not aware of any meetings or engagements to read out, but I’m happy to check.Go ahead. Yeah, you. Yes. Yes.QUESTION: So recently Prime Minister Modi has visited the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and as a reaction, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin has said that China “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the Indian leader’s visit to east section of China-India boundary. I want to get your comment on that.And secondly, China’s encroachments into other lands have – it seems like have encroachments happening within the Indo-Pacific as well, particularly in places like Solomon Islands, and now we’re seeing all over Micronesia. It seems like the folks on the ground are demanding for a counter to China’s encroachments into their sovereign territories. Can I also get your comment on that as well?MR PATEL: So let me take your first question. The United States recognizes Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory and we strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by incursions or encroachments, military or civilian, across the Line of Actual Control.I think I’m going to need you to repeat your second – your follow-up.QUESTION: So, very simply, Chinese encroachments into the Indo-Pacific has been very visible, especially in the past few months, and many folks within the Solomon Islands to Fiji all the way to places within the Micronesia have been demanding for a counter to the spread of Chinese influence in their area. A lot of them are also wondering what the U.S.’s position is on this.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: And so what – can I get your comment please?MR PATEL: Yeah. So when we talk about the Indo-Pacific, you have to remember we’re talking about a significant portion of the world’s population. We’re talking about one of the fastest growing economies, and I can’t think of a more important place where we want to make sure that the rules-based international order, the UN Charter, all of those things are being respected and abided by, and that’s been one of our tenets of our engagements in the region. The Secretary was just there in Seoul for this Summit for Democracy in the Republic of Korea, where he had the opportunity to meet with not just his foreign minister counterparts but also President Yoon.And over the course of this administration, there’s a number of steps that we’ve taken to bolster our engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. I’d remind you that just last year President Biden hosted the first trilateral summit at Camp David with our Japanese counterparts and our ROK counterparts. We have upped our engagement in the Quad. Secretary Blinken has had the opportunity to engage with his Quad counterparts a number of times since just when I’ve been on this job, but even more when you look at since the beginning of this administration. So it’s going to – something that we’re going to continue to emphasize and play a focus on.Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Yesterday, two U.S. retired generals – General Milley and McKenzie – testified at Congress about Afghanistan, and they said that they wanted 2,500 American troops in Afghanistan but the final decision was made by the President Biden and also State Department. And also I talked to some lawmakers, including Michael Waltz – they blamed President Biden and the State Department that made the final decision and the outcome was what we have seen in Afghanistan. So I would like to know what is the State Department’s reaction on that, and then if I may, I have another question too.MR PATEL: Okay. So I think it’s really important that we zoom out and widen the aperture to remember what it is that we’re exactly talking about, and we’re talking about the 20-year end of a complex war, America’s longest war. Thousands of troops were killed, many more thousands physically or mentally harmed, and we honor their service and mourn their losses and injuries with their families and loved ones. You have to remember that President Biden made the decision to end this war and has repeatedly said it was the right thing to do, and today our nation is stronger as a result.And as part of the robust, intense interagency process to end America’s longest war, the decision was made to keep an embassy and diplomatic presence in Kabul following the withdrawal of U.S. combatant troops. The embassy maintained an active emergency action committee planning process that convened repeatedly in 2021 to assess the situation on the ground. As many of you in this room so well know, embassies all around the world where we have diplomats maintain an EAC process, and a noncombatant evacuation operation was one of the tools available to an embassy, and Embassy Kabul was well versed in NEO planning. It had a plan and the generals testified to the existence of this plan yesterday. This is an entity that coordinated and met regularly. This kind of contingency and feasibility planning happens around the world.It’s also well documented that the U.S. did not want to publicly announce planning for or the start of a NEO so as to not weaken the position of the then Afghan government, potentially signaling a potential lack of faith. Again, our intention at the time was to keep open and operating Embassy Kabul, but by the summer of 2021, there was a task force stood up prepared to execute a NEO if and when it was called for.It’s also worth reminding and repeating that it was the previous administration that negotiated the Doha agreement with no subsequent plan for evacuating U.S. citizens or our Afghan allies and their families, and it was up to this administration, including from the garbled transition period, to do that. And in collaboration with our military colleagues, as the NEO was intended, we achieved the largest and most successful air lift in history, nearly 124,000 people on planes out of the country due to the Taliban’s overrunning of the city and the collapsing of the Afghan government.This occurred in a very fluid and dynamic and dangerous environment at the Kabul airport and included the death of 13 military colleagues of ours, hundreds of civilians, and injuries to many others, and those losses are tragic. Within weeks of the collapse of the Afghan government, the U.S. began relocation flights by continuing to protect Americans in harm’s way, as well as standing by our Afghan allies and their families.I’ll also note – and I know so many in this room are well aware of it – that Secretary Blinken also called for an after-action review to learn the important lessons and to fortify processes in how we respond to unexpected crises around the world and how we support American citizens and foreign nationals and others engaging with our diplomatic missions. This whole week I’ve been taking questions on places like Haiti, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Gaza – these are all places in which – where we have taken lessons from this after-action report and implemented them to further improve in the areas of communication, resources, preparedness, and that work will continue. We’re going to work to better inform our response in times of crisis, and we’ve already taken more than 40 concrete actions and identified additional steps to guide itself.We’re also going to continue to comply with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee’s legitimate oversight of the Afghanistan war, building on the dozens of witness and hundreds and hundreds of hours of testimony, and the tens of thousands of pages of documents that we have already made available and will continue to make available.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. So you talked about this previously as well. But I’m – so the Taliban announced reopening the schools for – only for boys again – a long story. So girls cannot go to school. I know – I’m aware that you have talked about this before. But my specific question for today is that: Is United States leverage declining over Taliban? If not, which kind of leverage is left to use in terms of convincing the Taliban to allow girls to go to school?MR PATEL: We continue to have a number of tools in our toolbelt at our disposal, and we have been clear that girls should have never been blocked from going to school in the first place. Advancing respect for the rights of Afghan women and girls is critical to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.Shaun, I saw that you had your hand up.QUESTION: Sure, sure.MR PATEL: Then I’ll come back to you, Leah. I’m sorry.QUESTION: I’ll just (inaudible) very quickly, a few different topics.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Indonesia. I saw there’s a statement from the Secretary this morning, but on Prabowo’s victory in the presidential race, of course it wasn’t so long ago that he wasn’t welcome in the United States due to human rights concerns. Are those going to figure into the relationship, do you think, with Indonesia, as he takes office?MR PATEL: So we extend our sincerest congratulation to the Indonesian president-elect, and we applaud, once again, the Indonesian people for the robust turnout and commitment to democracy and the rule of law. As close partners and friends under our comprehensive strategic partnership, we’re going to work hand in hand to better deliver for the future of our citizens, and we look forward to continuing to engage on that and partnering with the president-elect and his administration when they take office in October.QUESTION: Okay, and the rights concerns are not –MR PATEL: The is – look, just to take a bit of a step back, in any bilateral relationship that we have in countries around the world, we – when we have concerns about human rights or violations of other kinds, we raise those, and we raise those directly and candidly. And we’ll continue to do that when appropriate.QUESTION: Sure. I know also – a separate topic – I know probably from the podium you don’t want to engage too, too directly in campaign politics. But also regarding the previous administration, former President Trump has denounced the Australian ambassador here in the U.S., Kevin Rudd, saying that he should be – I think his term was, he’s not the brightest bulb or something. Is – does the U.S. have anything to say about that, and whether – about the relationship with Kevin Rudd (inaudible)?MR PATEL: Well, one of your colleagues just asked about the Indo-Pacific, and I would say that Australia is one of our most vital partners, not just when it comes to the Indo-Pacific but when we think about the world broadly. It is a country in which we share a number of likeminded points of view, and who also have done immense work to support our Ukrainian partners. And we’re going to continue to work closely and cooperate with them. I know Prime Minister Rudd, Ambassador Rudd, has been an important partner here in D.C. as ambassador, and I know folks around this building have enjoyed working with him and will continue to do so.QUESTION: Sure. Just &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Completely different part of the world. A follow-up to the question I asked yesterday on Serbia-Kosovo. Do you by chance have anything more to say about that – basically whether there’s an agreement arranged by U.S. for euros rather than Serbian dinars to and from Serbia?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates on the processes, Shaun, other than the concerns that we raised yesterday. And we’re going to continue to work through the EU-facilitated dialogue, and we’ll let the process go from there.Leah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Back to the Indo-Pacific.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: So on Monday the White House announced that President Biden will host the first trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders summit on April 11th. Especially given China’s continued provocations in the South China Sea, could you talk a little bit about what the significance of this meeting will be and what signal it’s intended to send?MR PATEL: So you – this is happening on the margins of Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to the United States for his state visit, but the Secretary spent a lot of time talking about this in his trip to Manila. And part of it is when we talk about our approach to the Indo-Pacific, a big key piece of that is coordinating closely with our allies and investing in those allies and partnerships. And when it comes to Japan and the Philippines, they are some of our most key, integral, and vital partners in a number of areas – in addressing the climate crisis, security cooperation, economic cooperation, trade, and a number of other spaces. And we look forward to talking about and discussing a number of these issues, both bilaterally with them but also through this trilateral mechanism as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Today Mr. Donald Lu was appear in congressional committee, and a congressman asked a question about the release of Dr. Shakil Afridi, who helped CIA to kill Osama bin Laden. He was asking that – if Pakistan is going to swap Dr. Afridi with Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, who’s in the American jails. He couldn’t complete his answer because there were, like, many questions the congressmen were asking. So I’m – could you tell us that – is there any plan to swap Dr. Aafia Siddiqui with Dr. Shakil Afridi?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any updates as it relates to that. I didn’t catch that part of the hearing. But you have to remember that one of the – this department’s most important priorities is engaging with Congress on our foreign policy. This was a routine hearing, and Assistant Secretary Lu’s testimony provided insight on the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship as a whole and a number of areas where we are hoping to deepen our collaboration. And I believe we – he spent a little bit of time talking about the U.S.-Pakistan Green Alliance framework, also bolstering respect for human rights. And so we’ll look forward to continuing to engage in these kinds of hearings.Okay. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 1:16 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Australia																								China																								Haiti																								India																								Indonesia																								Israel																								Japan																								Kosovo																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Russia																								Serbia																								Ukraine
- Department Press Briefing – March 19, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 19, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 19, 2024																																																					March 19, 2024																																																								12:39 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Sorry for being a couple minutes tardy. I apologize. I don’t have anything off the top today, so Shaun, you want to take us off?QUESTION: Sure. I’m sure most of you want to talk about Gaza first, but first can I just ask you about Hong Kong?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: The – in Hong Kong, there’s the approval by the legislature of the security law. Some rights groups have said this will further clamp down on free expression, on media freedom. Does the United States have a reaction or any preview of things it might to do as a result of this?MR PATEL: Certainly, Shaun. We believe that these kinds of actions have the potential to accelerate the closing of Hong Kong’s once open society. We’re alarmed by the sweeping and what we interpret as vaguely defined provisions laid out in their Article 23 legislation. We think that this was fast-tracked through the nondemocratically elected legislative council after a truncated public comment period. We also believe that a lot of the phrasing and crimes that are outlined are poorly defined and incredibly vague. They use phrases such as external interference, which is incredibly vague. So we’re analyzing this legislation, and we are taking a look at what the potential risk could be to not just U.S. citizens but other American interests that we might have.QUESTION: Sure. I just want to follow up on that.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: We’re hearing calls, particularly from the Hill, for the U.S. to stop treating Hong Kong entirely as a separate entity, that it’s been more integrated into the PRC. Is there any policy change do you think that will happen as a result of this? Any &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t want to speculate or go down any rabbit hole of a sort of potential outcome, Shaun, but what I can say is that we’re not going to hesitate to call out those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s promised autonomy. And when we see things like this that happen, we won’t hesitate to not use our voice but, should the circumstances require it, use other actions that the United States has at its disposal. But I am not in a place or – to announce any policy change or anything like that.QUESTION: Sure. Let me switch to Gaza unless anybody else wants to talk about Hong Kong. The – a few things. But the UN Human Rights Chief, Mr. Türk, said today that Israel may be using food or a lack of food as a weapon of war, which, of course, would be a war crime. Does the U.S. have a reaction to his remarks?MR PATEL: So let me just say that is not something that we have observed or witnessed, but we continue to be deeply concerned about the report that’s indicating that famine is imminent in Gaza. This report makes clear that the amount of aid reaching the people in Gaza is insufficient and that more needs to be done. We need to redouble our efforts to ensure that aid can get to the places that it needs to go, both – you heard me talk about this a little bit yesterday – via land routes, via air drops, and this forthcoming maritime corridor as well.There is a lot of work that needs to be done to ensure that this kind of aid can get to the kind of places that it needs to go. I will just also add though, Shaun, that yesterday we saw 69 trucks enter via Rafah. In response to, I believe, Simon’s question yesterday, I spoke about an 18-truck convoy making its way from the south to the north. And we’ve also seen reports of 182 trucks entering yesterday via Kerem Shalom. These are all helpful metrics and good steps in the right direction, but to echo again what I said yesterday, more needs to be done to help address this stark and devasting reality in Gaza right now.QUESTION: Just to follow up on that &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Of course, you mentioned things are being done – to include by the United States – to alleviate the situation, but why is it that the U.S. disagrees with the assessment of Mr. Türk that there is – that it’s – that it’s being used as a weapon of war?MR PATEL: Because we’re seeing aid and food and these kinds of provisions enter Gaza. They – they are not entering at the rate or clip that they need to be, they are not entering fast enough, they are not getting to the places that they need to go, and that’s why we’ve called for more. But I’m not – I am not in a place to offer any kind of like legal or geopolitical assessment, and it’s certainly not one that we have seen or characterized.QUESTION: Just one more before I turn it over to colleagues.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: But I was wondering if you have any follow-up on the conversation we had yesterday about the UNRWA Chief, Mr. Lazzarini. Do you have anything more to say? Yesterday, you said that you’re basically deferring comment on it. Does the United States see anything abnormal about him not being let in?MR PATEL: So as it relates to the specific incident, I will let the United Nations and Israel speak to that specifically. But to just say more broadly, all regional governments need to do what is necessary to enable the humanitarian response, and this, of course, includes allowing the free movement of international staff and the freedom of this movement to help with that kind of response. Commissioner General Lazzarini and UN staff, our belief is that they should be able to visit UNRWA’s fields of operation, including in Gaza. And we’re going to continue to work with the Government of Israel to rapidly approve all requested visas for UN and NGO workers in an expeditious fashion.QUESTION: Actually, that’s really specific. I mean, the – so I mean, is there a call for Israel to rapidly to approve Mr. Lazzarini’s entry?MR PATEL: Again, I don’t want to speak to that situation in specificity because I am not aware of the circumstances of what transpired and why he was specifically denied entry. But I will just echo again that we believe that the free movement of international workers is a key part of the humanitarian response and that Mr. Lazzarini and his staff we believe should be able to assess their operations. And so we’re going to continue to work with the Government of Israel and other appropriate interlocutors to push for that to happen.Simon.QUESTION: Can we come to – so the call between the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday, obviously the White House but this speaks to broader U.S. policy.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: So you’ve sort of talked about – well, it’s been talked about from this podium the – that the offensive in Rafah would be disastrous, and that it seems to be the warning has even made even more strongly on this call yesterday. But Prime Minister Netanyahu said today they’re determined to complete an elimination of the Hamas battalions in Rafah; there’s no way to do that except by going in on the ground. So do you have any response to basically this pushback to what the U.S. Government is trying to tell the Israelis?MR PATEL: It should come as no surprise that when it comes to this we are just squarely in a different place and have a different viewpoint than our Israeli partners. You saw National Security Advisor Sullivan speak about this a little bit yesterday, but I will also note that in this very same call President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to have their teams meet, for them to meet soon here in Washington, to exchange views and discuss alternative approaches that would target the key elements of Hamas, help secure the Egypt-Gaza border, and do so without a major ground operation in Rafah. We continue to feel quite strongly that such an operation in Rafah, where there are more than a million people seeking refuge, a region that continues to be a key conduit for the entrance of humanitarian aid, that doing something like that without a credible and clear plan is something that – without a plan that also doesn’t address for the various humanitarian pieces would be a disaster. And we hope that through this mechanism our officials will be able to discuss some of these issues in greater detail and find a path forward.QUESTION: So in that mechanism there will be – what you’re saying is the U.S. will have some suggestions of how – basically Netanyahu is saying it’s not possible to do it without a ground operation. You’re saying it is.MR PATEL: We will &#8212;QUESTION: So you’re going to give them ideas on how to do &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t want to get ahead of the process here, Simon. We’ll have an exchange of views with them and discuss approaches that we think are in line with our shared objective of degrading Hamas and ensuring that October 7th can no longer be repeated while simultaneously also being cognizant, mindful, respectful of the more than a million people seeking refuge in Rafah and being mindful of the important conduit that Rafah continues to be for humanitarian aid.QUESTION: Are you able to say when that meeting is going to take place?MR PATEL: I don’t have any scheduling updates at this moment.Yeah, Camilla.QUESTION: Thank you. Also just going back to what National Security Advisor Sullivan was talking about yesterday, he implied that there hasn’t been a response from Israel on the President’s national security memorandum. I was wondering whether you could confirm whether or not Israel has responded with a letter to that effect and if you could give us a bit more information on the what next, when they respond?MR PATEL: Sure. So as it relates to individual countries and their communications with us as it relates to the national security memorandum, I will defer to those other countries to speak to those pieces. I don’t want to get into those details on an internal processes from here, nor do I want to speak for other countries.But as you all recall, this was signed on February 8th, and as laid out quite clearly in the text of the national security memorandum, there are 45 days for countries to offer an assurance via a letter as it relates to the provision of U.S. lethal assistance. And in that time, after receiving that assurance, the United States also, through close coordination with the interagency as well as close consultation with our relevant embassies and consulates, will take a look at that certification that is provided to us.QUESTION: Can you confirm as to whether or not Israel has responded?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to speak to individual countries as it relates to an entire memorandum.Go ahead, Gillian.QUESTION: Haiti? A couple questions?MR PATEL: Can I see if anybody else has anything on Gaza, and then I’ll come back to you?Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Just following up on what Shaun was asking on the famine, you’re saying you don’t see that famine is imminent in Gaza?MR PATEL: That is literally not what I said, Said.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: I think in the very first thing I said in response to Shaun’s question is that we are &#8212;QUESTION: I’m just trying to understand it. Maybe I couldn’t hear.MR PATEL: The question was from – you can actually just read the transcript if you want to see what Shaun’s specific question was. But let me just echo again we are deeply concerned about the report that indicate that famine in – imminent in Gaza.QUESTION: Thank you. Because there was actually a report by Samantha Power saying that it is imminent, so glad you clarified that.MR PATEL: I think it was a press release.QUESTION: I have a couple other questions. The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel is going to expropriate, or steal as they called it, 60 percent of Gaza for a buffer zone. Is that something that you’re aware of or is that something that would be acceptable to the administration, considering that the administration said time and again that Gaza should not be reduced in size?MR PATEL: That’s absolutely right. You have heard me and the Secretary and Matt be very clear that there must be no reduction in territory of Gaza, that Israel needs to comply with international law in any measures it takes to defend itself, and it needs to take every feasible step to protect civilian harm. We certainly appreciate Israel’s need for security, especially since October 7th, but again, let me just be very clear that there can be no reduction in territory of Gaza.QUESTION: So the administration would never agree to the concept of a buffer zone?MR PATEL: That is not something – that is the kind of thing that would run contrary to the – one of the key principles that Secretary Blinken laid out in Tokyo last fall – or last winter.QUESTION: There was also an article in The Washington Post that said that the President and the administration, they knew very well early on, in the meeting on the 27th of October, that Israel was purposely targeting Palestinian civilians. Are you aware of that report? Have you seen it?MR PATEL: I – I am just not going to comment on any hearsay, Said. We have been very clear with our Israeli partners that they need to do more to improve its deconfliction mechanisms, that more must be done to minimize civilian casualties, and more needs to be done to protect the well-being of Palestinian civilians. And that’s something that we’ll continue to echo and raise with them at every opportunity.QUESTION: So you think that the administration was surprised by the amount of civilian casualties, was unaware that the Israelis were targeting purposely &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m just not going to – I’m not going to engage in reporting that is hearsay and rooted in internal deliberative assessments.QUESTION: And lastly, now, you said that you want to make sure – the administration wants to make sure that October 7th could never be repeated again, because it’s – it falls under Israel’s right to defend itself and all that stuff. Now, we know that – it’s been reported in the last couple days – that the Israelis have distributed something like 100,000 pieces of small arms to settlers, around settlers, to basically defend themselves. My question to you: Do Palestinians have the right to defend themselves? And in what form should the Palestinians defend themselves?MR PATEL: Are you talking about in the – in what context are you speaking about, Said?QUESTION: I’m saying that the Palestinians are being assaulted time and time and time again. I mean, Israel attacked Gaza – unlike what many people like to think, that the whole issue began on October 7, Israel has struck Gaza &#8212;MR PATEL: When we talk about &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; time and time again for decades before that, right.MR PATEL: Let me just say two things, Said. When we talk about Israel having the right to defend itself and Israel having the right to security, what we’re talking about is defending itself from terrorist groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who have a track record of carrying out terrorist attacks on the people of Israel as recently as – I’d point you no further than October 7th.When it comes to the expansions of settlements and activities from settlers which we find insightful, dangerous, reckless, we have not parsed our words. I recall just a number of weeks ago in which the Secretary spoke quite clearly about our viewpoint that we find the expansion of settlements to be inconsistent with international law. We believe that these kinds of activities run contrary to Israel’s security, and they run contrary to what we hope is a shared goal of a two-state solution, where Israelis and Palestinians can have equal measures of justice and peace and security. And that’s what we’re going to continue to work towards.QUESTION: What about the – what about the military raids night after night that go in with half-tracks and sometimes helicopters, Apache helicopters, and so on, and even with drones and armed assaults and so on? Do they have the right to defend themselves against such military assaults?MR PATEL: Said, what we’re talking about is – you’re using examples of our partners in Israel conducting legitimate security operations that are in the interest of their self-defense and the interest of security.All right. Anything else on Gaza? Go ahead, and then I promise I will get to you, Gillian. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. There was a Washington Post investigation published today about the killing of our freelancers, Al Jazeera freelancers, in Gaza: Mustafa and Hamza. And they – Washington Post also sought the help of experts in this investigation, and they found out that the reasons the Israelis give for this – it happens in January 7th – is not consistent with evidence that they found. I don’t know if you saw this report. But it shows, according to Washington Post, that there was no Israeli military presence around them, both of them. They were alone; they were conducting a story for us. And they were targeted and killed both in January 7.And I remember – I was in Tel Aviv at that time, but I remember you were – Matt was asked here in this room about if they reached to the Israeli partners for clarification, and he said that they – you did. And I’m asking you here: did you hear back from them?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates for you. First, let me just say, though – you heard me talk a little bit about this yesterday – we believe that journalists and the right to free speech needs to be protected, and especially in the situation in the context of what’s happening in Gaza, journalism is more important than ever. I will also say that we’ve been crystal clear that Israel needs to treat all detainees humanely and with dignity and in full accordance with international law.Go ahead.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: On Gaza?QUESTION: Yes, on Gaza.MR PATEL: Okay. All right.QUESTION: Vedant, why you are talking publicly about your disagreement with the Israeli? And this is a departure from your policy. Is it because you don’t have any kind of leverage? Is it – what are you trying to tell us?MR PATEL: Have you been to any State Department briefings in the past couple months?QUESTION: Yes, I have been, yes.MR PATEL: Are you sure?QUESTION: I mean, not – I’m not talking about this month. I’m talking lately. At the beginning you were very reluctant in talking publicly about your disagreement.MR MILLER: That’s – that’s – that’s not true. That – I would just respectfully disagree with the premise of your question. Dating back to October, we have been clear-eyed about a couple things. First, we have been clear-eyed that Israel has every right to defend itself, that Israel’s right to security is something that we agree with. We also agree with every step must be possible – every step must be taken to degrade Hamas so such an event like October 7th can’t be repeated.We also, when it has come to the provision of humanitarian aid, when we’ve talked about the protection and well-being of Palestinian civilians, and even recently in the context of Rafah, when we have had disagreements on policy, disagreements on course of action, we’ve not hesitated to say those and raise those privately. But when we’re asked about them in this briefing room or when the Secretary takes questions from you, we have not hesitated to make our point of view from the United States of America, from the State Department crystal clear.QUESTION: Just I want to clarify why I’m asking this question. Because yesterday Jake Sullivan, when he was laying down the arguments why the administration doesn’t support a military operation in Rafah, he said instead for – the Israeli – instead of stabilizing areas, they are planning. This kind of criticism didn’t come publicly this way before.MR PATEL: I’m not sure that I would interpret – I saw the National Security Advisor’s comments as well. I’m not sure I would categorize those as criticisms, either. Look, in the context of what we believe needs to happen with Rafah, we just have a different viewpoint. We have a different strategic viewpoint on what we believe is necessary to help target the key elements of Hamas. And our goal is, through this meeting that the prime minister and President Biden spoke about on their call, we hope that we’ll be able to have an exchange of views and discuss an alternative approach that, like I said, will target the key elements of Hamas, secure this border in the Rafah area, but also not negatively impact the more than a million people who are seeking refuge in the area, not negatively impact the important work that’s being done to further enhance the flow of humanitarian aid.Anything else on Gaza before I go back to Gillian, who has been patiently waiting? On Gaza? Okay, go ahead.QUESTION: Two quick questions &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; on the aid drops.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Question number one. U.S. officials have said that the rations air dropped in Gaza are pork-free, but I wanted to ask was it &#8212;MR PATEL: Are what?QUESTION: Pork-free, like there’s no pork products. But I wanted to ask: Was it ensured that all of the food provided was halal, including preservatives and such? And then question number two is it also seems that the packaging was labeled in English – was there any Arabic language material provided in those aid rations, including food names and instructions &#8212;MR PATEL: I – so as it relates to both of your questions, I just – as it relates to both of your questions, I don’t have the technical level of detail. I will just say if we’ve previously stated that they – that these rations are pork-free, I would have no reason not to say that that’s accurate. And in all of these circumstances, we try to be incredibly mindful of the local culture and food customs when it comes to these things. But I’m happy to check with the team if we have a more specific answer we can give you.Gillian, go ahead.QUESTION: Republican of Florida Cory Mills saying today that he – his office has evacuated 23 Americans out of the capital in Haiti. I’m wondering if that is something that was coordinated with the State Department, if it’s an action that you support.MR PATEL: So look, we are relieved when any American citizen is able to make its way to safety. We of course closely coordinate with Congress on a number of issues, but I will just note that operations like these that are sort of done deviating from formal State Department operations, they can be high-risk. We’re talking about a country that’s been a Level 4 Do Not Travel country since 2020. And so we want to make sure that we are not – that actions that are taken are not further inciting additional risk or putting individuals into harm’s way. But again, we find it welcome news when any American citizen makes its way to safety.I will just note from the State Department’s perspective, you’re aware of the operation that was conducted over the weekend that was able to facilitate the safe departure of over 30 U.S. citizens. We continue to explore options that we have at our disposal when it comes to American citizens interested in departing Haiti from specifically the Port-au-Prince area, and we’ll remain in touch with American citizens who have expressed an interest in staying in touch with the embassy and learning about options through not just our Crisis Intake Form, but Smart Traveler and the other mechanisms we have at our disposal.QUESTION: Yesterday you had said that nearly a thousand people have registered through the portal, the website. Any update on those numbers, or Americans generally in Haiti, today?MR PATEL: So that – so for – let me say two things. First, when we talk about individual – the population of people who register, we have to remember we’re – not everyone who registers with this form or contacts us necessarily is requesting departure assistance. Some just want to stay in touch with the embassy; some just want to see what information we have to share with them, advice on how they may be able to remain safely, and to potentially stay in touch if they choose to potentially depart in the future.Like in any country around the world, we do not ask American citizens to register with the U.S. Government when they travel abroad, so numbers of how many American citizens are in X amount of country is always – they always vary and they’re constantly changing. But the embassy uses estimates from Smart Traveler enrollments and from other measures to have a rough number to work with.I will note that in terms of our crisis intake form, the number continues to be approaching a thousand, and we’ll continue to remain in touch with those American citizens to answer any questions that they might have.QUESTION: Thank you. Last question. You mentioned yesterday that there was going to be some action today or communication today with adoption agencies. We’ve been hearing from, like, American parents who say that they have adopted children who are stuck in Haiti; they’re unable to get them out because maybe they don’t have their U.S. citizenship yet or visas. Any more specific information on what State is doing on that front?MR PATEL: I don&#8217;t have more specific information. We are continuing to communicate with adoption agencies as well as prospective families regarding recent developments and assessing the situation as it unfolds. We’re working with the Haitian Government to figure out what options are for children at the various stages in the adoption process, and we’re working through individual inquiries as well as working and collaborating closely with adoption service partners. But I don&#8217;t have a more specific breakdown to offer to you.As you know, there are limited consular services available, given the conditions in the country. But this is something that we’re continuing to work through. We recognize how difficult this situation might be. And we encourage prospective parents to remain in regular contact not just with us through our embassy channels, but also through their adoption service providers. And we encourage everybody to enroll in Smart Traveler to continue to stay up to date, as the situation on the ground is quite fluid.Anything else on Haiti before we move away? Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On those departure options from Port-au-Prince, potential departure options I should say – we’re in contact with Americans who’ve received communication from the State Department that there might be helicopter air lifts leaving the capital city for the Dominican Republic. Do you have any updates on that?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speak in specificity to these options, just given operational security. But I would just say that, as I’ve just said, we are exploring options for American citizens to depart Haiti from Port-au-Prince to Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic. From there, American citizens would be responsible for their own onward travel to the United States from Santo Domingo. And we’re continuing to look at what options might make sense and what will make the most sense for the impacted American citizens. And we, of course – as this is a very fluid situation on the ground, as more develops, we’ll continue to stay in touch with the impacted folks.QUESTION: And just a quick follow.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On the humanitarian condition, of course it remains very dire and it’s getting worse.MR PATEL: Of course.QUESTION: We’ve seen reports that the capital city may be completely out of food in the next week or so. Is the U.S. doing anything to enable aid to move into Haiti right now?MR PATEL: So for those of you that joined us in Kingston, Jamaica last Monday, the Secretary announced an additional $33 million in humanitarian aid. I believe our colleagues at the White House followed that announcement up later in the week for some additional funding that was announced to help address the humanitarian situation in Haiti. The situation is dire, and every day matters.And that is why we are hoping, as soon as possible, our partners at CARICOM, in close coordination with this forthcoming transitional presidential council, announce the members of the council, of who the makeup of that group will be, so that they can take on the very important task of selecting an interim prime minister who can help seek out stability on the ground, work closely with our Kenyan partners on the deployment of the multinational security force, and we’ll take this process step by step.QUESTION: Follow up briefly on that?MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just the – and you mentioned it yesterday as well, the transitional council. Do you have any update? I know CARICOM is in lead, but any update on this?MR PATEL: I don’t at this point. Again, we’ve been coordinating closely with our partners in CARICOM and its chairman, President Ali of Guyana. I don&#8217;t have any updates for you, but our hope continues to be that this transitional presidential council is announced as soon as possible. We believe that it is vital to paving the way to not just free and fair elections, but the deployment of this MSS as well.People I – I saw you saw your hand up on Haiti. Good? Okay. Anything else on Haiti before we move to something else?All right. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: A few questions from me, starting on Russia.MR PATEL: Can we just – let’s do a couple, so we can get to your friends. (Laughter.)QUESTION: The Secretary issued a statement on Russian election. He stopped short calling it undemocratic. Isn’t it a bit soft assessment, given all the violations, Russian crimes that he depicted in the very statement?MR PATEL: I would not read too much into the word choice, Alex. We believe this to be an undemocratic process. I said so yesterday. It’s something that I know the Secretary agrees with.QUESTION: On the occupied territories, Matt told us last week that the U.S. will use all their available tools to punish those who serve as election observers for the Kremlin’s sham election in occupied territories of Ukraine. I know you don’t telegraph any sanctions, but are you guys working on it? And secondly, is it going to be limited with Ukraine only, or you will also consider election observers who served in Georgia’s and Moldova’s occupied territories?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to preview actions, but I just want to use this opportunity to echo that all of those territories, we believe them to be Ukraine.QUESTION: On the Ukrainian front, does the Secretary agree with his European colleagues – most notably the EU Commission Chair Michel, and also previously French President Macron – that Europe needs to be prepared for war?MR PATEL: Sorry, I didn’t understand the first part of your question.QUESTION: That Europe needs to be prepared for war if it needs peace. These statements have been recently reflected by European leaders. Does the Secretary agree with that approach?MR PATEL: So look, we have been very clear that the U.S. is not going to send troops to fight in Ukraine, and NATO secretary general has also ruled out sending any NATO troops to fight in Ukraine. We believe that the most immediate and helpful path forward to stop Putin’s aggression would be for the House of Representatives to pass the national security supplemental so our Ukrainian partners have the weapons and ammunition they need to defend themselves, and they’ll continue to fight courageously to defend their democracy and to push back against this infringement on their territorial integrity and sovereignty.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up from me on the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: I’ll – okay. Okay, okay. Go ahead.QUESTION: On South Caucasus.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Armenian prime minister today was quoted as saying that quick border demarcation needed to avoid a war. How alarmed are you right now, given this statement?MR PATEL: Look, this is an issue that we are continuing to pay close attention to. It’s something that not just the Secretary but Assistant Secretary O’Brien as well as Senior Coordinator Bono are continuing to focus on, engaging with appropriate interlocutors. I don’t have an update for you, though, beyond that.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Patel. Only two questions, please.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: One question is about these two innocent kids that just got some relief from Pakistani courts today, and the public of Pakistan believes that this administration has a big role in it. These two kids had no money to pay their tuition fee when they were 16, 18 years old, and then just a couple of years later, then they had almost 500 million rupees. They were the children of prime minister – former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. They just got finally acquitted today in the corruption case that was registered against them after Panama Papers.Does the U.S. not feel bad that such corrupt people are back to Pakistan to rule again? And at the same time, Ambassador Blome is meeting the Pakistani finance minister about the economic situation of Pakistan. These are two very contradictory things happening in Pakistan.MR PATEL: So first, I just don’t really have anything for you on a Pakistani court case. That is an internal matter for Pakistan. What I will say, though, is I – and we spoke a little bit about this yesterday in discussing Ambassador Blome’s bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Sharif. There is a number of issues that I’m sure he looks forward to discussing with the finance minister, and so I will let our team in Islamabad speak more about that at its conclusion.QUESTION: Just one &#8212;MR PATEL: No, no, no.QUESTION: Just one more, sir.MR PATEL: Okay, go ahead.QUESTION: Today there is a hearing in Congress on Afghanistan. As you know, Pakistan and Afghanistan had a tussle yesterday. And I have been raising this &#8212;MR PATEL: Which I spoke to.QUESTION: And I have been raising this issue of Taliban expansionism with Matt quite a bit at – today the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the next-door province to Afghanistan, just got non-bailable arrest warrants for their raids that happened on some military installations. Do you think such situation is still not – you – that this current administration is not seeing this, what is happening in Pakistan, is giving room to the Taliban expansionism in the region?MR PATEL: Well, look, we’ve been very clear about the fact that we do not want Afghanistan to be a – be or become a safe haven for terrorism. And when it comes to counterterrorism cooperation with our Pakistani partners, that’s something we engage with them on quite regularly in – as – including other important bilateral consultations with them as well.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Yeah. On Niger, do you have any updates on the talks with authorities in Niger?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates for you. Again, we are remaining in touch with the CNSP and seeking additional clarification of their comments, as well as discussing potential next steps. I will just reiterate what I said yesterday, is that this was at the conclusion of a meeting with senior U.S. officials as part of a delegation who were meeting to discuss a number of areas, but also making it quite clear that we believed that the CNSP was heading down a path that we just disagree with and took a lot of issues.QUESTION: And on Cuba, what’s your understanding of what’s going on there? Did you track any demonstrations?MR PATEL: So I spoke a little bit about this yesterday, Michel. We are continuing to monitor the situation closely. There are protests across several cities in Cuba that were calling for electricity, food, and fundamental freedoms, and we are urging the Cuban Government to refrain from violence and unjust detentions and calling on authorities to respect Cuban citizens’ rights for peaceful assembly.QUESTION: And do you support the demonstration – demonstrators there?MR PATEL: We stand with the Cuban people and continue to support their demands of human rights, freedom, prosperity, and a future for greater dignity.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Russian foreign intelligence chief Naryshkin said today that France is preparing to deploy 2,000 troops to Odesa in Ukraine in the coming days, and there are even some media reports that France has already deployed them to Romania and they are about to cross the border to Odesa from Romania. Do you see this move as an escalation in the conflict, and do you support it or not?MR PATEL: Well, first I would just say I would take anything that – coming from Russian officials with a grain of salt. Secondly, this is something for our French partners to speak to. If true, I will just echo what I just said to Alex, that President Biden has been incredibly clear that the United States is not prepared to send troops to Ukraine, and that is something that the NATO secretary general has also echoed as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: One more. One more.MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a little bit. Go ahead.QUESTION: Could you please elaborate on Thomas West’s trip to UAE and India? Is he meeting the Taliban officials this time?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check with the team and get back to you.QUESTION: Second, tomorrow is the first day of new year in Afghanistan, and normally schools are open for the kids, but this is third year girls are banned from school. Is the U.S. pushing this topics, including the other topics, with their meeting with the Taliban officials?And last question – I’m repeating my last week’s question – could you please give us some information that the Taliban officials are asking for those military airplanes that they were taking to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 2001 when Kabul collapsed? They says this belongs to Afghanistan, but U.S. is not allowing them to be brought back to Afghanistan. What’s the U.S. stance on this issue?MR PATEL: On the last question, I don’t have an update for you, but I’m happy to check with the team.And on your first question, look, the fair treatment of Afghan women and girls continues to be our – one of our highest priorities when it comes to our engagements on policy as it relates to Afghanistan. We also believe that this is something that should be important to the so-called Taliban government and think that it is vital when talking about their own stated desire for international recognition. And so the fact that this is another year in which Afghan women and girls don’t have access to these kinds of schools, it’s heartbreaking and it’s troubling.Goyal, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Two questions, please. One, as far as elections in Russia and Pakistan, both were widely reported in the media and criticized by their citizens because there was no opposition in Russia and there was no opposition in Pakistan or opposition leader is still in jail. So what’s the difference between the two elections?MR PATEL: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear the &#8212;QUESTION: Election in Russia, election in Pakistan.MR PATEL: Well, the – I would take a little bit of issue with comparing both of those democratic processes. One, I will just say that Pakistan’s a country that has a little bit more of a robust media landscape open for dissenting ideas and opinions. But ultimately, this – the point is, Goyal, is that these are decisions that should be made by the people of these countries, and the people of these countries should have choices. They should have access to information that will help inform their decision-making when it comes to who they want to lead their country and the direction that they want to take their country in. And I will just say that as it relates to Russia, there is a clear track record of media suppression, of silencing dissenting voices.Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Second one, sir.MR PATEL: Oh sorry, go ahead.QUESTION: Sorry. Sorry for the &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: As far as China is concerned, I have been saying this for the last over 25 years that one day, some day, China will be a national security threat to the United States, and today we are hearing from every angle how much China is threat to the national security today, and we’re talking about TikTok and many other things that are stealings and copying and everything is going on against the United States as far as national security is concerned.MR PATEL: So, Goyal, let me just say that when it comes to our relations with the PRC – you’ve heard the Secretary say this – we want to ensure that we are taking steps to hold the PRC accountable for actions that we find to be coercive, that – actions that we find to be destabilizing, destabilizing not just in the Indo-Pacific region but also around the world more broadly. And we won’t hesitate to take appropriate actions to hold them accountable.I will also just note, though, that in the areas like climate cooperation, in areas like addressing the synthetic opioid crisis, we think that there are avenues for cooperation with the PRC. You’re seeing a direct result of that at least in the synthetic opioid space as a direct result of President Biden’s summit with President Xi in San Francisco.So beyond that, ultimately, Goyal, our approach to this is that this is a relationship we want to manage responsibly because that is what is expected of international powers.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Sure. Could I ask you two things about specific – Kosovo. The president of Kosovo says that there’s an agreement on what she has described as a U.S. proposal to use euros for Serbian payments to Serbs in Kosovo as opposed to dinars. Is that something you can &#8212;MR PATEL: Are you referring to the EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels, or &#8212;QUESTION: Sort of, yeah.MR PATEL: Yeah. So &#8212;QUESTION: She said that Gabriel Escobar was there and headed a &#8212;MR PATEL: So I will just say broadly – and I’m happy to check with the team on your specific question about euros – but these are talks that we welcome. And they are taking place within the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels today, and they include a discussion of the new Central Bank of Kosovo’s currency regulations, and these – we believe that these discussions should continue with urgency. The EU-facilitated dialogue is the proper channel for resolving these issues related to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.We’ve also been clear in expressing our concerns that this new regulation that restricts the import and use of the Serbian dinar in Kosovo – we’ve expressed some concerns about this, and we’ve also reiterated our calls to both Kosovo and Serbia to de-escalate tensions.QUESTION: Okay. So discussions are continuing with the Serbians?MR PATEL: Exactly.QUESTION: Can I just – something completely different.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know it’s a few days old, but the South African foreign minister is in town. The opposition in South Africa had written a letter to the Secretary asking for election observers – I’m not sure if State directly does that – but election observers for the upcoming elections there, and of course the ANC was – and the government were critical of that. Does the U.S. have a stance on whether there’s a point of sending U.S. observers to the election in South Africa?MR PATEL: I will have to check on the team with that, Shaun.All right, thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 1:24 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								China																								Cuba																								France																								Haiti																								Hong Kong																								Israel																								Kosovo																								Niger																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Serbia																								Ukraine
- Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robinson Travels to Tirana, Albania and Pristina, Kosovo HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robinson Travels to Tirana, Albania and Pristina, Kosovo				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Robinson Travels to Tirana, Albania and Pristina, Kosovo																																		Media Note																														March 18, 2024																																							Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Todd D. Robinson will travel to Tirana, Albania, from March 18-20 where he will meet with Prime Minister Edi Rama and INL partners who are supporting Albania’s work to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption and organized crime, and build strong institutions.From March 20-22, Assistant Secretary Robinson will travel to Pristina, Kosovo, where he will meet with Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani and with INL partners in the law enforcement and justice sectors.For more information, please contact INL-PAPD@state.gov and follow INL on Twitter/X at @StateINL.						Tags																					Albania																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs																																														Combating Drugs and Crime																																							Counternarcotics																															Kosovo																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Special Representative to the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar’s Travel to Belgium, Kosovo, Austria, and Montenegro Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs and Special Representative to the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar is traveling to Belgium, Kosovo, Austria, and Montenegro March 10-18, 2024.  His visit will reaffirm the United States’ commitment to the countries of the Western Balkans as they pursue Euro-Atlantic integration and deeper regional cooperation.While in Belgium, Special Representative Escobar will meet with EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák and other European Union and NATO officials to discuss efforts to advance reforms that will bring lasting peace, stability, and prosperity to the Western Balkan region.  In Kosovo, he will meet with Kosovan government leaders, civil society, and Kosovan Serb communities to underscore the United States’ continued strong support for the EU-facilitated Dialogue on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.The Special Representative will conduct meetings on the impact of the new Central Bank of Kosovo regulations on cash operations and urge steps to ensure that the needs of Kosovans citizens are met fully and without interruption.  In Austria, Special Representative Escobar will meet with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to discuss Serbia’s December elections and upcoming municipal elections in Serbia and national elections in North Macedonia.  The Special Representative will also travel to Montenegro, where he will emphasize U.S. support for a democratic Montenegro firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community in meetings with Montenegrin government, civil society, and business leaders.