15-Passenger Van Single-Vehicle

Rollover Accidents,

Henrietta, Texas, May 8, 2001, and

Randleman, North Carolina,

July 1, 2001

Highway Accident Report

NTSB/HAR-03/03

PB2003-916203

Notation 7567

National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

Highway Accident Report

15-Passenger Van Single-Vehicle 

Rollover Accidents, 

Henrietta, Texas, May 8, 2001, 

and Randleman, North Carolina,

July 1, 2001

NTSB/HAR-03/03

PB2003-916203 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7567 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted July 15, 2003 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2003. 15-Passenger Van Single-Vehicle Rollover Accidents,

Henrietta, Texas, May 8, 2001, and Randleman, North Carolina, July 1, 2001. Highway Accident

Report NTSB/HAR-03/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On May 8, 2001, a 1993 Dodge 15-passenger van was eastbound on U.S. Route 82 near

Henrietta, Texas. The driver and 11 passengers, all members of the First Assembly of God Church in

Burkburnett, Texas, occupied the van. As the vehicle approached milepost 538, the left rear tire

experienced a tread separation and blowout; subsequently, the van departed the roadway and rolled over at

least two times, ejecting seven passengers. The driver and three of the ejected passengers sustained fatal

injuries, and eight passengers sustained serious injuries.

On July 1, 2001, a 1989 Dodge Ram 15-passenger van was northbound in the left lane on U.S. Route 220,

near Randleman, North Carolina. The van, owned by Virginia Heights Baptist Church of Roanoke,

Virginia, was occupied by the driver and 13 passengers. As the vehicle approached the Level Cross, North

Carolina, exit, the left rear tire experienced a tread separation and blowout; subsequently, the van

overturned, ejecting four passengers. One ejected passenger was fatally injured, and three sustained serious

injuries; the driver and nine passengers sustained injuries ranging from none to serious.

The major safety issues discussed in this report are 15-passenger van classification, driver training,

occupant protection, and tire condition, inspection, and maintenance.

As a result of its investigation of these accidents, the Safety Board made recommendations to the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the 50 States

and the District of Columbia, the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, the American

Automobile Association, the National Safety Council, the American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2003-916203 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Henrietta, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Operational Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Randleman, North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Operational Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Independent Tire Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Dynamic Vehicle Handling Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

NHTSA ìConsumer Advisoryî . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Seat Belt Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

State Vehicle Safety Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Previous Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Accident Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Henrietta, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Randleman, North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Vehicle Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Occupant Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Interior Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Seat Belt Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Roof Crush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Tires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Appendix

A: Henrietta, Texas, Investigation 

 Randleman, North Carolina, Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

B: Potential Occupant Motion in Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

C: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 201, 209, and 216 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DaimlerChrysler DaimlerChrysler Corporation

EDVSM Engineering Dynamics Corporationís Simulation Model

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMVSSs Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

FMVSS Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

Ford Ford Motor Company

GVWR gross vehicle weight rating

GM General Motors Corporation

HVE Human Vehicle Environment

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

psi pounds per square inch

STL Standards Testing Laboratories, Inc.

TREAD Act Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and 

Documentation Act of 2000
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On May 8, 2001, about 8:57 a.m., central daylight time, a 1993 Dodge Ram 15-

passenger van was eastbound on U.S. Route 82 near Henrietta, Texas, en route from

Burkburnett, Texas, to an outlet mall in Gainesville, Texas. The driver and 11 passengers,

all members of the First Assembly of God Church, occupied the van. As the vehicle

approached milepost 538 in the left lane, at a calculated speed of 61 to 67 mph, the left

rear tire experienced a tread separation and blowout; subsequently, the van departed the

roadway and rolled over at least two times in the median, ejecting seven passengers before

coming to final rest. The driver and three of the ejected passengers sustained fatal injuries,

and eight passengers sustained serious injuries.

On July 1, 2001, about 2:30 p.m., eastern daylight time, a 1989 Dodge Ram 15-

passenger van was northbound in the left lane on U.S. Route 220, near Randleman, North

Carolina, en route from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, to Roanoke, Virginia. The van,

owned by Virginia Heights Baptist Church of Roanoke, Virginia, was occupied by the

driver and 13 passengers, ages 13 to 19. As the vehicle approached the Level Cross, North

Carolina, exit, at a witness-estimated speed of 65 mph, the left rear tire experienced a tread

separation and blowout; subsequently, the van moved from the left lane into the right lane,

then back into the left lane, where it overturned and came to rest in the travel lanes. During

the accident sequence, four passengers were ejected, one of whom was fatally injured and

three of whom sustained serious injuries; the driver and the other nine passengers

sustained injuries ranging from none to serious.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accidents was tire failure, the driversí response to that failure, and the driversí inability

to maintain control of their vans. Contributing to the accidents was the deteriorated

condition of the tires, as a result of the churchesí lack of tire maintenance, and the

handling characteristics of the vans. Contributing to the severity of the injuries was the

lack of appropriate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards applicable to 15-passenger

vans in the areas of restraints and occupant protection.

The major safety issues discussed in this report are 15-passenger van

classification, driver training, occupant protection, and tire condition, inspection, and

maintenance.

As a result of its investigation of these accidents, the Safety Board makes

recommendations to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the 50 States and the District of Columbia, the

American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, the American Automobile

Association, the National Safety Council, the American Association of Motor Vehicle

Administrators, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation.
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual

Henrietta, Texas

Accident Narrative

On May 8, 2001, about 8:57 a.m., central daylight time, a 1993 Dodge Ram 15-

passenger van was eastbound on U.S. Route 82 near Henrietta, Texas, en route from

Burkburnett, Texas, to an outlet mall in Gainesville, Texas (see figure 1). Eleven

passengers and a driver, all members of the First Assembly of God Church, occupied the

van. As the van approached milepost 538 in the left lane, at a calculated speed1

 of 61 to 67

mph, the left rear tire experienced a tread separation and blowout; subsequently, the van

departed the roadway and rolled over at least two times in the median, ejecting seven

passengers before coming to final rest (see figure 2). The driver and three of the ejected

passengers sustained fatal injuries, and eight passengers sustained serious injuries.

1 The speed was calculated as part of the accident simulation. See Vehicle Dynamics Simulation

section below.

Figure 1. Henrietta accident route.
Factual 2 Highway Accident Report

Figure 2. Henrietta accident scene.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Edge of paveme westbound lane

Eastbound

U.S. Route 82

Scale in feet

 Rim ring

Tire casing

debris

Debris

field

Tire and 

furrow marks 

 Ejected

 occupants

Van

 Tire casing

 debris

N 

Direction of 

travel 

 Grass center

 median
Factual 3 Highway Accident Report

According to the pastor of the church, a group of parishioners had scheduled a trip

to the Texas Outlet Centers in Gainesville, Texas, one of about four trips the group makes

each year. The church, which owned the van, provided transportation for the trips at no

cost to the group members. The trip began at the church parking lot about 8:30 a.m.

Gainesville is about 100 miles from Burkburnett, and the trip would have taken about 2

hours to complete. The van had traveled about 34 miles from the church when the accident

occurred.

According to one passenger, she heard what she said was a sound ìsimilar to a

muffled gunshot,î and she believed that it was a tire blowout. She stated that as soon as

she heard the noise, the vehicle began to swerve and then departed the roadway. A witness

driving in the right lane at a witness-estimated distance of about 200 yards behind the

accident van said that the van swerved left off the edge of the pavement and then returned

to the road, but the back end of the van slid to the right and then off the left side of the road

into the median before the van began to roll. This witness thought the van rolled ìfour or

five times at least.î Another witness, traveling in the right lane approximately three

vehicles behind the van, stated that he saw rubber come out from under the van when ìit

had a blowout.î He said that he saw the van brake and then it ìbobbledî back and forth a

few times before sliding into the median. This witness stated that ìthe vehicle rolled onto

its right side and over, then end-to-end once, and then rolled over on its side two more

times.î

Injuries

Table 1. Injuries.2

Medical and Pathological Information

Four of the van passengers, including the driver, sustained fatal injuries as a result

of the accident. The driver, who was wearing a lap/shoulder belt, sustained multiple skull

fractures, brain avulsion,3 bilateral lung contusions, fractured sternum, fractured right ribs

Injuries Driver Passengers Total

Fatal 1 3 4

Serious 0 8 8

Minor 0 0 0

None 0 0 0

Total 1 11 12

2 49 Code Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death

within 30 days of the accident. It defines a serious injury as an injury that requires hospitalization for more

than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any

bone (except simple fractures of the fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or

tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting

more than 5 percent of the body surface.

3 An avulsion is a separation or detachment.
Factual 4 Highway Accident Report

1 through 7, fractured left clavicle, fractured left ribs 1 through 8, abraded contusions to

the right hand and abrasions and lacerations of the left forearm and elbow. The fatally

injured passenger in seat 3 (see figure 3) was ejected and sustained a large gaping

laceration of the scalp; C1 and C2 vertebrae fractures with partial dislocation into the

spinal canal and laceration of the spinal cord; spleen laceration; liver pulpification;

laceration of the inferior vena cava; fractured right ribs 1 through 9; fractured left ribs 1

through 11; fractured right clavical, pelvis, left femur, left radius, and ulna; multiple

abrasions; contusions; and lacerations. The fatally injured passenger in seat 9 was ejected

and sustained a deep laceration to the right femoral region extending into the anterior right

thigh and a large scalp laceration.4 The fatally injured passenger in seat 12 was ejected and

sustained a C2 vertebra fracture with partial dislocation into the spinal canal and

transection of the spinal cord and medulla, liver lacerations, fractured right posterior

pelvis, dislocation of the left femur head, and multiple contusions and abrasions.

4 This passenger was not autopsied, and no further information on her injuries was available.

Figure 3. Henrietta seating chart. (*ejected; shading indicates fatal injuries)

1 2

345

678

9 10 11

12 13 14 15

* *

* *

*

* *

Seat

Lap/shoulder

Age Belt Use Injury

1 Fatal

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

11

12

14

15

62

55

59

62

63

51

59

Lap/shoulder Serious

None Fatal

None Serious

None Serious

None Serious

None Serious

71

71

62

74

68

None Fatal

Lap Serious

None Fatal

None Serious

None Serious
Factual 5 Highway Accident Report

The remaining eight passengers, four of whom were ejected, sustained serious

injuries. The passenger in seat 2 was wearing a lap/shoulder belt. She sustained multiple

right rib fractures with right pneumothorax5 and multiple contusions and abrasions to the

scalp, thorax, and lower frontal abdomen. The passenger in seat 4 was ejected and

sustained a splenic injury, right hip fracture, brain hemorrhage, and multiple abrasions and

contusions. The passenger in seat 5 remained within the vehicle and sustained a closed

fracture of the acetabulum,6 a closed fracture of the scapula, and multiple rib fractures.

The passenger in seat 6 was ejected and sustained a closed C5 vertebra fracture, right rib

fractures, and multiple abrasions, contusions, and lacerations. The passenger in seat 8 was

ejected and sustained bilateral brain hemorrhages, multiple rib fractures, a lung contusion,

radius shaft fracture, and multiple contusions and abrasions. The passenger in seat 11 was

wearing a lap belt and remained within the van. She sustained a right ulna fracture,

forehead and chest contusions, lacerations, and abrasions. The passenger in seat 14

remained within the vehicle and sustained a major scalp avultion, left first rib fracture with

right lung contusion, laceration of the wrist, and multiple abrasions and contusions. The

passenger in seat 15 was ejected and sustained liver injury, right kidney injury with

hemorrhage, right rib fractures, head laceration, and right side extremity contusions.

Survival Aspects

The driver was wearing a lap/shoulder belt, as was the front seat passenger. The

left outer seating positions on each of the four rows and the right outer seating position in

the fourth row were equipped with lap/shoulder belts. All remaining seating positions

were equipped with lap belts. Only the passenger in seat 11 was wearing the lap belt

restraint. Of the nine unrestrained passengers, seven were ejected.

Emergency Response

At 8:57 a.m. the Clay County (Texas) Sheriffís Office received a 911 call reporting

the accident. Within 2 minutes, the first ambulance with emergency medical personnel

was dispatched from the Clay County Memorial Hospital. Two minutes later, a Clay

County Sheriffís unit was dispatched and en route to the accident site. When the

emergency medical personnel arrived on scene and reported the severity of the accident

and the number of injured, the mutual aid plan was initiated for Clay County fire and

medical response. A total of 14 medical personnel responded to the scene in eight

emergency vehicles. Fire response included local departments from Henrietta, Dean, and

Jolly, Texas. Law enforcement units from the Texas Department of Public Safety State

Highway Patrol also responded.

An informal critique of the emergency response was held after the accident.

According to a captain with the Clay County Sheriffís Office, who was also a volunteer

firefighter with the Henrietta Fire Department, the issues addressed as a result of the

response were minor and not documented. Overall, according to the captain, the response

5 Pneumothorax is a condition in which air or other gas is present in the pleural cavity; it occurs

spontaneously as a result of injury to the lung tissue or puncture of the chest wall.

6 The acetebulum is the cavity at the base of the hip bone into which the head of the femur fits.
Factual 6 Highway Accident Report

went well and all patients were transported from the scene within 22 minutes of the

dispatch call. The only issues for improvement discussed during the critique were the

initial assessment of the severity of the accident and the response resources required. As a

result, a review of the mutual aid plan was conducted.

Driver Information

At the time of the accident, the 62-year-old driver held a Texas class C,

noncommercial driverís license, valid through July 8, 2005, with a corrective lens

restriction. A review of Texas Department of Public Safety records revealed no traffic

convictions or accidents.

A 72-hour history of the driverís activities was constructed based on an interview

with the driverís husband and is shown in table 2.

Table 2. Henrietta van driver 72-hour history.

According to the driverís husband, the driver was familiar with the accident van;

she had driven the 15-passenger van for the church for about 15 years. Her husband stated

that prior to the accident, she had been driving the van at least once a week locally and

drove on longer distance highway trips about six or seven times per year.

Date Time Activity Sleep

May 4, 2001 10:00 p.m. ñ 10:30 p.m. Went to bed

May 5, 2001 5:30 a.m. Awoke 7 ñ 7.5 hours

6:15 a.m. ñ 8:00 a.m. Travel/shopping

8:00 a.m. ñ 6:00 p.m. Sales at flea market (with 

light lunch)

6:00 p.m. Dinner

8:00 p.m. ñ 8:30 p.m. Went to bed

May 6, 2001 8:00 a.m. Awoke 11.5 ñ 12 hours

11:30 a.m. ñ 4:00 p.m. Shopping (lunch between 

2:30 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.)

8:00 p.m. ñ 9:00 p.m. Went to bed

May 7, 2001 8:00 a.m.ñ 9:00 a.m. Awoke 11 ñ 13 hours

Daytime Shopping/worked in yard

6:00 p.m. ñ 7:00 p.m. Dinner

10:00 p.m. Went to bed

May 8, 2001 6:30 a.m. Awoke 8.5 hours

7:30 a.m. Departed home after 

breakfast to pick up van

8:00 a.m. ñ 8:30 a.m. Departed in van
Factual 7 Highway Accident Report

The driver had Crohnís Disease,7 requiring a strict diet, as well as high cholesterol

and arthritis, according to her husband. He stated that she took Tylenol for the arthritis but

was not taking any other medications. She wore photoreactive prescription sunglasses

when she drove. Toxicological tests of the driverís blood by the Civil Aeromedical

Institute were negative for alcohol or other drugs.

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

Exterior. The 1993 Dodge Ram 350 Maxi-Wagon was configured to accommodate

15 passengers, including the driver. The vehicle had a wheelbase of 127.6 inches, an

overall length of 222.8 inches, and a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)8

 of 8,510

pounds. The van was equipped with a 5.9-liter fuel-injected V-8 gasoline engine and a

four-speed automatic transmission; it had an odometer reading of 44,156 miles. Inspection

of the suspension system revealed no anomalies.

The van was equipped with front disc brakes and rear antilock drum brakes. When

the brakes were applied, both front wheel hubs remained locked without creep or slippage.

The front brake friction surfaces were smooth and did not show excessive grooving or

wear ridging. The friction surfaces of the rear brakes were smooth with slight wear ridging

on the edges of the drums. Examination of the brake system revealed no hydraulic system

leaks or restrictions. The brake pedal was intact and functional.

The van was equipped with a hydraulic power-assisted steering system, a 15-inch

concentric two-spoke steering wheel, and tilt steering column. The steering wheel and

column were pushed rearward and to the right due to accident damage. Rotating the

steering wheel resulted in a correlating movement of the steering box sector shaft, as well

as the associated steering system components. No excessive play or wear was observed

within the steering system components. The steering wheel could be rotated from stop to

stop without restriction other than resistance due to the damaged column.

All four tires were manufactured by Michelin and conformed to the size for the

vehicle recommended by the manufacturer. The tread depths complied with Texas vehicle

inspection criteria. Both front tires were inflated to 60 pounds per square inch (psi) and the

right rear tire was inflated to 58 psi. The pressure of the left rear tire prior to the blowout

could not be determined. The manufacturer recommended a tire pressure of 55 psi for the

front tires and 80 psi for the rear tires. A placard containing this information was located

on the inside of the driverís doorsill. The left front and both rear tires were more than 8

years old.

The left front tire exhibited extensive circumferential sidewall (see figure 4) and

tread groove cracking (see figure 5). According to the manufacturer, the cracking was due

to weather and is commonly referred to as weather checking, that is, surface cracks in the

exterior tire rubber. Written in yellow crayon on the sidewall were the words ìRE7 Crohnís disease causes chronic inflammation in the gastrointestinal tract. Symptoms are typically

controlled through diet, drugs, nutritional supplements, and surgery.

8 GVWR is the maximum weight of the vehicle plus passengers and any cargo the vehicle can carry.
Factual 8 Highway Accident Report

INFLATE TO 60 PSI.î The right front tire had sustained a circumferential cut along the

outer shoulder and tread; otherwise, examination revealed no anomalies. The right rear

tire exhibited circumferential scrubbing,9 as well as soil or dirt and grass between the

flange/bead seat and the tire.

9 Scrubbing is the action of rubbing the tire surface against another surface, for example, sidewall

against curb or tread surface against the road.

Figure 4. External tire diagram. Source: Michelin.
Factual 9 Highway Accident Report

The left rear tire (see figure 6) sustained extensive damage to the inner and outer

sidewalls and tread, exposing the body plies10 and inner liner (see figure 7). The tire

exhibited extensive circumferential cracking and deterioration of the sidewall and bead

areas, which the manufacturer attributed to weather. Radial splits and abrasions were

noted on the sidewalls, as was severe weather checking. The tread and belt components

were partially detached from the tire. Where the bottom belt remained attached, it was

separated from the body ply along the interior edge. A nail found embedded in the

detached tread and top belt piece had not penetrated all components. Another puncture

hole, extending through all components, was found. The inner liner was split radially.

Figure 5. Left front tire tread groove cracking.

10 Layers of fabric that make up the tire body.
Factual 10 Highway Accident Report

Figure 6. Left rear tire.

Figure 7. Inner tire diagram. Source: Michelin.
Factual 11 Highway Accident Report

Interior. The van had driver and front passenger bucket seats, three rows with

seating for three passengers each, and a fourth row with seating for four passengers. All

four rows of passenger seats were intact.

Lap belts were attached to the seat frame for passengers in the middle and right

aisle seats of the first three rows. Lap belts for two middle seats in the fourth row were

attached to the floor behind the seat frame (see figure 8). A single bolt near the right seat

frame pedestal base secured the two webbing straps with buckles to the floor for these two

middle seats; the two webbing straps with latch plates were bolted to the floor near the left

seat frame pedestal base. DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DaimlerChrysler) engineers

stated that they were unable to determine why the anchorages had been designed in such a

manner. As a result of this configuration for the fourth row lap belts, the two buckles were

on the right side of the seat, and the two latch plates were on the left side of the seat (see

figure 9); they had to cross one another in order to buckle the belts (see figure 10).

Figure 8. Fourth row lap belt attachments.
Factual 12 Highway Accident Report

Figure 9. Fourth row center lap belt configuration.

Figure 10. Fourth row center lap belts in use.

18”

15”

11”

64”
Factual 13 Highway Accident Report

The roof of the van was deflected to the right and downward (see figures 11 and

12), damaging all the pillars that supported the roof. The pillar behind the driver was in

contact with the headrest of the driverís seat and protruded 17 inches into the passenger

compartment over the second row of seats. The roof shifted to the extent that the first and

second rows of seats extended 16 inches beyond the edge of the roof, the third row

extended 15 inches, and the fourth row extended 8 inches. The distance between the top of

the seat and the roof at the point of maximum crush was 5.5 inches in the first row, 6

inches in the second row, 4 inches in the third row, and 5 inches in the fourth row.

Investigators compared these measurements to those for an undamaged, exemplar 1999

Dodge Ram van, which had a distance between the seatback and the roof of 22 inches in

the first row, 20 inches in the second row, 18 inches in the third row, and 18.5 inches in the

fourth row.

The front windshield and rear door windows were found outside the van at the

accident scene. The driver and passenger window glazing was missing, as was the glazing

on the three passenger windows on the driverís side and the glazing on the four passenger

windows on the passenger side.

Highway Information

U.S. Route 82 in Texas is primarily a four-lane divided, controlled-access highway

with exit and entrance ramps and a posted speed limit of 70 mph (daytime) and 65 mph

(nighttime) at the accident location. The 12-foot-wide traffic lanes were divided by 4-inch

wide pavement markings consisting of reflectorized painted white lines, approximately 12

Figure 11. Henrietta van roof crush.
Factual 14 Highway Accident Report

feet long and spaced every 28 feet. Four-inch-square raised pavement markers

(retroreflective delineators) were spaced 80 feet apart and were centered between every

other painted white line. The lanes were separated from the shoulders by a 4-inch-wide

white edgeline delineating the 10-foot-wide outside shoulder and a 4-inch-wide yellow

edgeline delineating the 4-foot-wide inside shoulder. Each shoulder had milled rumble

strips, 9 inches wide, 18 inches long, and 0.5 inch deep, spaced 6 inches apart and located

6 inches from the edge of the traffic lane. The eastbound and westbound traffic lanes were

separated by a 120-foot-wide depressed earthen median at the accident location.

The average annual traffic volume was 18,000 vehicles in 1998 and 1999. From

1997 to 2002, the Texas Department of Transportation reported a total of 63 accidents on

U.S. Route 82 in an area 2.5 miles in either direction from the accident site. Of these

accidents, 39, or 62 percent, were single-vehicle accidents. According to the Texas

Department of Transportation, rumble strips were installed in 2000 and single-vehicle

accidents decreased thereafter to 13 (7 of which were not run-off-road accidents), or 48

percent, in 2001 and 2002.

The accident occurred near milepost 538 in the eastbound lanes of U.S. Route 82

in Clay County about 6 miles north of Henrietta. The van departed the left side of the

asphaltic concrete road surface, crossed the asphalt shoulder, and rolled in the earthen

median. Tire marks and pieces of tire casing were found on the roadway and shoulder

leading up to the earthen median. Furrow marks and gouge marks continued in the

median.

Figure 12. Front of Henrietta van.
Factual 15 Highway Accident Report

Operational Information

The van was owned and operated by the First Assembly of God Church in

Burkburnett and was used exclusively for church-sponsored activities, according to

church officials, who also stated that these activities took place primarily in Texas and

occasionally in Arkansas and Oklahoma. When not in use, the van was parked in an

unprotected area of the church parking lot. The church did not maintain a qualification file

for drivers, nor was it required to. The pastor of the church told investigators that he was

not aware of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrationís (NHTSAís)

ìConsumer Advisoryî on the risks of rollover crashes in 15-passenger vans, released April

9, 2001 (see NHTSA ìConsumer Advisoryî below for more information). He was also

unaware of the additional training that NHTSA recommends for van operators.

A review of available church records and receipts, as well as conversations with

current and past pastors, did not indicate any systematic vehicle maintenance or

preventive inspection activities. 

Several documents pertaining to vehicle maintenance were found in the van,

including a tire ownerís manual and a document entitled Tire Inflation Pressures for 1993

Chrysler11 vans and trucks. The tire ownerís manual stated in several places the

importance of maintaining proper tire inflation pressures, and both the manual and the

vehicle tire information placard recommended seeking vehicle-specific information

regarding inflation pressures. The tire ownerís manual made several references to

checking inflation pressures at least once a month and noted the consequences of

operating tires while underinflated. The Tire Inflation Pressures manual recommended

checking the pressure once a month and inflating the tires to 55 psi for the front and 80 psi

for the rear when the van was fully loaded.

According to the vehicleís inspection certificate, the van had last been inspected,

in accordance with the Texas Department of Public Safetyís Texas Vehicle Inspection Act,

on October 23, 2000. All passenger vehicles registered in Texas are required to be

inspected annually at designated, approved, privately owned and operated garages and

repair facilities. All facilities operate under the Rules and Regulations Manual for Official

Vehicle Inspection Station issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety. Tires are

observed for proper inflation (a tire gauge check is not required).12 In addition, tires are to

be inspected for physical defects and rejected if any tire is found to have ìtread or sidewall

cracks, cuts, or snags (such as measured on the outside of the tire) in excess of one inch in

any direction and deep enough to expose the body cords.î13 No inspection criteria address

the sidewall and tread groove cracking that was observed during postaccident tire

inspections.

Since the accident, according to the pastor, the church has created a driver file and

requires that drivers be 25 or more years old, have no accidents, and have no more than

11 Chrysler (now DaimlerChrysler) owned Dodge in 1993.

12 Inspection Item 04.20.28 (Tires), section I, paragraph 3.

13 Inspection Item 04.20.28 (Tires), section II.
Factual 16 Highway Accident Report

two moving violations in the last 5 years. He also reported that the church now limits the

occupancy of its 12-passenger van to no more than 9 passengers and has decided not to

purchase another 15-passenger van.

Meteorological Information

The National Weather Service observatory at the Wichita Falls, Texas, Municipal

Airport, about 20 miles north of the accident site, reported clear conditions, visibility of 10

miles, and a temperature of 70° Fahrenheit with variable winds of about 4 knots (4.6 mph)

at 8:52 a.m. on May 8, 2001.

Randleman, North Carolina

Accident Narrative

On July 1, 2001, about 2:30 p.m., eastern daylight time, a 1989 Dodge Ram 15-

passenger van was northbound in the left lane on U.S. Route 220, near Randleman, North

Carolina, en route from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, to Roanoke, Virginia (see figure

13). The van, owned by Virginia Heights Baptist Church of Roanoke, Virginia, was

occupied by the driver and 13 passengers, ages 13 to 19. As the van approached the Level

Cross, North Carolina, exit, at a witness-estimated speed of 65 mph, the left rear tire

experienced a tread separation and blowout; subsequently, the van moved from the left

lane into the right lane, then back into the left lane, where it overturned and came to rest in

the travel lanes (see figure 14). During the accident sequence, four passengers were

ejected, one of whom was fatally injured and three of whom sustained serious injuries; the

driver and the other nine passengers sustained injuries ranging from none to serious.

According to the driver, the church youth group had gone to Myrtle Beach for 4

days. On the day of the accident, they left Myrtle Beach about 10:15 a.m. to return to

Roanoke, a distance of about 310 miles. The driver said the group stopped for lunch about

12:40 p.m. and then continued the trip. The accident occurred about 187 miles from

Myrtle Beach. The church music director stated that he was traveling in a Plymouth Grand

Voyager with three youths in front of the accident vehicle, and most of the luggage was in

the Grand Voyager, not in the accident vehicle.

The accident van driver stated that he was ìjust drivingî when he ìheard a

grinding noise and had to fight to keep the van from swerving.î One passenger reported

saying he thought the tire was going flat. Another passenger said she heard what sounded

like an explosion immediately thereafter. According to several passengers, the van began

shaking and vibrating before changing lanes. Two passengers stated that they saw debris

from the tire before the van began to roll over. Three witnesses traveling southbound on

U.S. Route 220 reported that the left rear tire blew out before the van began to swerve. All

three witnesses stated that they thought the van rolled sideways at least three times before

coming to rest.
Factual 17 Highway Accident Report

Figure 13. Randleman accident route.
Factual 18 Highway Accident Report

Figure 14. Randleman accident scene.

Grass

center median

Pavement

edge

 Tire mark

Northbound

U.S. Route 220

 Pavement edge

N

 Van

 Paved

 shoulder

 Paved

 shoulder

Gouge mark 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Scale in feet

Direction

of

travel

 Approximate path

 of travel

 Beginning of

 tire mark
Factual 19 Highway Accident Report

Injuries

Table 3. Injuries.

Medical and Pathological Information

One passenger, who was in seat 5 (see figure 15) before being ejected, died in the

hospital 4 days after the accident. She sustained a left front parietal14 skin subdural

hematoma, right temporal and parietal fractures, a diastic lambdoid15 fracture, left

temporal fracture, left basilar skull fracture, left petrous16 fracture, left occipital fracture,

and left orbital roof fracture.

The driver and three of the ejected passengers sustained serious injuries. The

driver sustained a concussion, a left clavicle fracture, and left scalp laceration. The

passenger in seat 8 sustained a brain laceration, open finger wound, open lateral abdomen

wound, large deep shoulder abrasion and contusion, and multiple contusions. The

passenger in seat 11 sustained a T7 vertebra compression fracture, a T12 vertebra Chance

fracture,17 an open occipital area laceration, and an elbow abrasion. The passenger in seat

15 sustained a basilar skull fracture; frontal bone fracture, including the left orbital roof

into the anterior cranial fossa;18 left maxillary fracture; diffuse axonal injury; cerebral

contusion; left lower posterior calcaneal (heel bone) fracture; left periorbital contusion;

and abrasions.

Eight passengers sustained minor injuries. The passenger in seat 2 sustained neck

strain. The passenger in seat 3 sustained a left zygomatic contusion, left knee sprain, and

knee abrasions. The passenger in seat 4 sustained left shoulder and left foot contusions.

The passenger in seat 7 sustained abrasions to the right side of the face and right posterior

shoulder and a small scalp laceration. The passenger in seat 9 sustained a right eye

contusion and abrasions. The passenger in seat 10 sustained neck and back strains and

multiple abrasions. The passenger in seat 12 sustained a right ulnar ligament sprain. The

passenger in seat 13 sustained a scalp laceration. The passenger in seat 6 was uninjured.

Injuries Driver Passengers Total

Fatal 0 1 1

Serious 1 3 4

Minor 0 8 8

None 0 1 1

Total 1 13 14

14 The parietal bones form the roof of the skull.

15 The lambdoid is the suture between the occipital and parietal bones.

16 The petrous is the hard portion of the temporal bone that forms a protective case for the inner ear.

17 A Chance fracture is a horizontal fracture through the vertebra.

18 Front subdivision of the floor for the cranium.
Factual 20 Highway Accident Report

Survival Aspects

The driver was wearing the available lap/shoulder belt. The front-seat passenger

said she was wearing the lap portion of the lap/shoulder belt and had the shoulder portion

behind her back. All remaining seating positions were equipped with lap belts. None of

the other passengers reported wearing their lap belts.

Some of the restraints (seats 5, 7, 9, 11, and either 13 or 14) were missing or had

buckles that were inaccessible because they were within the seat bights.19

Figure 15. Randleman seating chart. (*ejected; shading indicates fatal 

injury)

19 The seat bight is the point at which the lower edge of the seatback cushion and the rear edge of the

seat bottom cushion meet.

1 2

3 4 5

6 7 8

9 11

12 14 15

10

13

*

*

*

*

Seat

Lap/shoulder

Age Belt Use Injury

Fatal

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

11

12

13

15

26

24

27

13

13

12

14

Lap/shoulder

None Minor

None

Inaccessible

Serious

None

None Serious

15

19

17

17

15

Serious

None

None Serious

7 14 Missing

10 13 None

Lap only of

Minor

None

Minor

Inaccessible Minor

Minor

Inaccessible

Minor

Inaccessible Minor

Minor
Factual 21 Highway Accident Report

Emergency Response

The Randolph County (North Carolina) Communications Center received a 911

cellular call at 2:31 p.m. Because the accident occurred outside Randleman city limits, the

North Carolina Highway Patrol had jurisdiction over the investigation. The Randleman

Fire Department was the first responder on scene at 2:38 p.m. Nine fire, police, and rescue

departments responded to the accident scene. Six ambulances responded to transport

passengers to local hospitals. One passenger was transported by air ambulance to the

University of North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill, North Carolina; the air

ambulance departed the scene at 3:24 p.m.

Driver Information

The 26-year-old driver held a Virginia driverís license valid through July 2005. A

review of his driving history revealed a conviction for speeding in April 1998 and a

personal injury accident in December 1998. The driver said he was familiar with the van

and had about 5 years of experience driving a 15-passenger van for the church. He had

driven the van on the same route about 2 weeks before the accident occurred.

The driver provided a 72-hour history (see table 4).

Table 4. Randleman van driverís 72-hour history.

No toxicological tests were performed on the driver because, according to law

enforcement personnel on scene, they did not have reasonable suspicion that the driver

was intoxicated or under the influence of an impairing substance. In North Carolina, law

enforcement personnel are required to have ìan articulable and reasonable suspicionî that

a driver has operated a vehicle under the influence in order to request a toxicological test.

Date Time Activity Sleep

June 29, 2001 1:00 a.m. Went to bed

7:00 a.m. ñ 7:30 a.m. Awoke 6 ñ 6.5 hours

June 30, 2001 1:00 a.m. Went to bed

7:00 a.m. Awoke 6 hours

12:20 p.m. Ate lunch

5:20 p.m. Ate dinner

July 1, 2001 1:00 a.m. Went to bed

6:30 a.m. Awoke 5.5 hours

7:00 a.m. Attended church service

10:15 a.m. Departed

12:40 p.m. Ate lunch
Factual 22 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

Exterior. The 1989 Dodge Ram Maxi-Wagon was designed to accommodate 15

passengers, including the driver. The vehicle had a wheelbase of 127.6 inches, an overall

length of 222.8 inches, and a GVWR of 8,510 pounds. The van was equipped with a 5.9-

liter fuel-injected V-8 gasoline engine and a three-speed automatic transmission; it had an

odometer reading of 76,465 miles.

The van was also equipped with front disc brakes and rear drum brakes. When the

brakes were applied, both front wheel hubs remained locked without creep or slippage.

The front brake friction surfaces were smooth with no significant wear ridges. The front

left inside brake pad had worn to the fastener surface, which was in contact with the rotor

surface. The friction surfaces of the rear brakes were smooth and showed slight wear

ridging on the edges of the drums. The left rear shoe lining and drum friction surfaces

were contaminated with axle gear case lubricant from a leaking left axle seal. Scrape

marks were observed on the backing plates of both brake assemblies, consistent with

brake drum contact due to axle shaft bending or flexing. Examination of the brake system

revealed no hydraulic system leaks or restrictions. The brake pedal was intact and

functional.

The van was equipped with a hydraulic, power-assisted steering system. Rotating

the steering wheel resulted in corresponding movement to the steering box sector shaft

and associated steering system components. The steering wheel could be rotated from stop

to stop without restriction other than resistance from the damaged column. Inspection of

the suspension system revealed extensive cracking in the front antisway/stabilizer bar link

bushings.

Three of the four tires were the vehicle manufacturer-recommended Michelin tires.

The right rear tire had been manufactured by Radial Medalist and was below the

recommended load range E.20 All tread depths complied with Virginia vehicle inspection

criteria. The left front tire was inflated to 62.5 psi, the right front tire to 60.5 psi, and the

right rear to 60 psi. The pressure of the left rear tire prior to the blowout could not be

determined. The manufacturer recommended a tire pressure of 50 psi for the front tires

and 80 psi for the rear tires. A tire information placard containing this information was

located on the inside of the driverís doorsill. Both front tires and the left rear tire were

more than 8 years old.

The left front tire exhibited extensive circumferential sidewall and tread groove

cracking. Weather checking was evident circumferentially along the outer sidewall

extending from 1 inch above the rim flange, through the buttress, and into the tread area. A

5-inch long, 0.125-inch deep incision was located within the inner buttress area, as was

chunking.21 Scrape marks were found along the outboard rim flange.

20 A load range E tire, the recommended tire for this vehicle, is rated at 2,680-pound capacity at 80 psi,

whereas a load range D tire, found on the right rear wheel, is rated at 2,335-pound capacity at 65 psi.

21 Michelin defines ìchunkingî as the tearing off of small pieces of tread rubber while the tire is in

service.
Factual 23 Highway Accident Report

The right front tire exhibited extensive circumferential sidewall and tread groove

cracking (see figure 16). Weather checking was evident along the outer sidewall from 1.75

inches above the rim into the tread area. Scrape marks were found on the rim flange. A

0.1875-inch deep radial split was found in the buttress, and a 0.625-inch long near-radial

split was 0.75 inch from the rim flange. The body plies22 were exposed due to missing tire

material that measured approximately 0.5 inch long, 0.1875 inch wide, and 0.1875 inch

deep.

The left rear tire sustained extensive damage to the inner and outer sidewalls,

tread, belts, and body plies (see figure 17). The tire exhibited extensive circumferential

cracking and weather checking of the sidewall. The inner and outer beads were unseated

from the wheel flanges and a 0.5-inch deep circumferential groove was found in the bead

area. In another location, the bead area was cut or torn, exposing the body cords. Some

sidewall rubber was missing and bare body cords were exposed. Multiple radial splits had

breached the inner liner. A radial split was found in the sidewall rubber, and the rubber

was not attached to the body cords. Radial splits were also found in the tread and buttress.

22 Michelin defines body plies as the principal load-supporting component, usually reinforcing textile

cords or steel cables encased in rubber, extending from bead to bead across the crown of the tire.

Figure 16. Right front tire sidewall cracking.
Factual 24 Highway Accident Report

Portions of the tread and all three steel belts were partially detached. Bare body cords were

visible in the tread and buttress areas.

The right rear tire exhibited circumferential scrubbing, as well as asphalt between

the rim flange and the tire.

Interior. The driver and front passenger bucket seats were equipped with

lap/shoulder belts. The first three rows could seat three passengers each. The fourth row

could seat four passengers. The center of the seatbacks in all rows bowed rearward (see

figure 18) due to accident damage. The outboard armrest was missing on the first row and

broken on the second row. The roof deflected upward near the center of the van, extending

longitudinally the entire length of the vehicle (see figure 19).

The fourth row center lap belts were configured similarly to those in the Henrietta

accident van. The two center lap belt buckle webbing straps were attached to the floor

with one bolt near the right seat frame pedestal base, and the two center latch plate

webbing straps were attached to the floor with one bolt near the left seat frame pedestal

base.

Figure 17. Left rear tire.
Factual 25 Highway Accident Report

Figure 18. Bowed Randleman seatbacks.

Figure 19. Randleman van damage.
Factual 26 Highway Accident Report

The windshield and rear left door window were missing; the windshield was found

inside the vehicle. The glazing on the driver window, front passenger window, first

window on the driverís side, and all passenger side windows was missing. The glazing on

the third window on the driverís side was broken; that on the second window was intact.

Highway Information

U.S. Route 220 in North Carolina is primarily a four-lane divided, controlledaccess highway. The posted speed limit is 65 mph. The 12-foot-wide traffic lanes were

divided by 4-inch-wide pavement markings consisting of reflectorized painted white lines,

approximately 12 feet long and spaced every 28 feet. The lanes were separated from the

shoulders by a 4-inch-wide white edgeline, delineating the 10-foot-wide outside shoulder,

and a 4-inch-wide yellow edgeline, delineating the 3-foot-wide inside shoulder. The

northbound and southbound traffic lanes were separated by a 60-foot-wide depressed

earthen median directly adjacent to the area where the collision occurred. In the roadway

in the vicinity of the accident was an 800-foot-long, 1° left hand curve with a 0.5-percent

downgrade and a 0.33° maximum superelevation.

The average annual traffic volume was 22,000 vehicles in 1998, 24,000 vehicles in

1999, and 23,000 vehicles in 2000. From 1997 to October 2002, the North Carolina

Department of Transportation reported a total of 10 accidents on U.S. Route 220 in an area

1 mile in either direction from the accident site. Four of the 10, including the subject

accident, were single-vehicle accidents.

The accident occurred near milepost 26.5 in the northbound lanes of U.S. Route

220 in Randolph County about 4 miles north of Randleman. The van left a series of tire

marks in the right lane and across the left lane, followed by gouge marks on the left

shoulder. As the van overturned, it returned to the travel lanes, where it came to rest.

Operational Information

The 15-passenger van was owned and operated by the Virginia Heights Baptist

Church in Roanoke. The accident van was the only one operated by the church and,

according to church officials, was used exclusively for church-sponsored activities;

estimated use was once a week on a 20-mile trip. The van was typically parked in an

unprotected location on church property, according to the church minister, who was not

aware of NHTSAís ìConsumer Advisory,î or of NHTSAís recommended training for van

operators.

The church did not maintain driver qualifications files, nor was it required to. It

had submitted the names of van drivers to its insurance company, which required that the

church do so and also required that all drivers be at least 21 years old.

The churchís board of directors was responsible for operating and maintaining the

van. If a driver found a problem with the van, he or she was to complete a form that was

forwarded to the board for action. The boardís role was primarily financial rather than

safety or operational oversight.
Factual 27 Highway Accident Report

All motor vehicles registered in Virginia must be inspected annually at an

approved, privately owned and operated garage or repair facility authorized by the

Virginia Department of State Police. The van had most recently been inspected in

December 2000.

The Virginia inspection manual has a paragraph on inspection of vehicle tires,

wheels, and rims (19VAC 30-70-130). The inspection procedures cover tread depth,

cracks in wheels or rims, cut or worn tires if the fabric or steel cord is visible, and knots

and bulges in the sidewalls. The manual addresses neither tire inflation pressure nor the

sidewall and tread groove cracking that was found during postaccident inspection of the

tire.

Meteorological Information

At 2:30 p.m. on the day of the accident, the National Weather Service Observatory

at the Greensboro, North Carolina, Piedmont Triad International Airport, approximately

21 miles north of the accident site, reported clear conditions, visibility of 10 miles, and a

temperature of 86° Fahrenheit; winds were out of the southwest at about 11 knots (12.7

mph).

Tests and Research

Simulation

National Transportation Safety Board staff conducted simulations of the Henrietta

accident to determine general occupant motion and injury mechanisms during the rollover

sequence and to evaluate the benefits of restraint use. The simulation showed that the van

most likely rolled over two or more times and that the outboard occupants had greater

potential for ejection due to their proximity to the windows. The simulation predicted that

unbelted occupants were more prone to ejection and received more serious injuries than

the belted occupants. A more detailed description of the simulations follows.

Vehicle Dynamics Simulation. The purpose of the vehicle dynamics simulation

was to determine, based upon available physical evidence, the driver inputs before and

after loss of control of the vehicle. Definitive physical evidence was not available to

indicate the number of vehicle overturns or the contact points between the vehicle and the

ground. Using Engineering Dynamics Corporationís Vehicle Simulation Model (EDVSM)

software, Safety Board staff assessed several potential overturn scenarios.

To perform the simulation, the accident scene was modeled23 using threedimensional mapping data obtained on scene. The vehicle was modeled using

23 The scene was built with AutoCAD Land Development Desktop release 2i.
Factual 28 Highway Accident Report

measurements obtained from the accident van and an exemplar van,24 as well as data from

the Human Vehicle Environment (HVE) software.

The results of the vehicle dynamics simulation indicated that the initial speed of

the van before the tire blowout was 67 mph. After the blowout, steering input to the right

and then back to the left was required to match the physical evidence on the roadway. The

steering toward the left and the resulting yaw would have caused the vehicle to depart the

roadway at an angle of approximately 100° counterclockwise to the initial direction of

travel prior to the tire failure. Simulations of the overturn sequence indicated that the

vehicle completed at least two rolls before reaching final rest. For a depiction of the van at

various stages of the overturn, see figure 20.

24 A 1990 Dodge Ram 350.

Figure 20. Potential path of the van during the overturn; the time is based on the beginning of the rollover.
Factual 29 Highway Accident Report

Several crash pulses25 were developed to evaluate the rollover dynamics and

occupant motion. Three of the scenarios involved the vehicle overturning twice (720°).26

The fourth scenario involved the vehicle overturning three times before reaching final rest

(1,080°). The simulation results were consistent with the location of the van when it first

struck the ground and after it came to rest and with the damage it sustained.

Occupant Kinematics Simulation. Based on the results of the vehicle dynamics

simulation, occupant kinematics were modeled using the Graphical Articulated Total

Body27 software program. This program calculates the unrestricted motion of a simulated

occupant and the resulting forces due to occupant interaction with contact surfaces, such

as the seats, roof, sidewalls, and windows.

The 10 passengers seated in the rear of the van were simulated (seats 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,

9, 11, 12, 14, and 15). Because the program can simulate a maximum of four occupants at

a time, each row was simulated separately and interactions between occupants in different

rows were not simulated.

The initial occupant kinematics simulation was based on the crash pulse generated

from the original EDVSM physics module. Occupants were simulated in three conditions:

actual,28 all restrained by lap belts, and all restrained by lap/shoulder belts. When the

enhanced EDVSM program became available, the occupant kinematics simulations were

again conducted based on the three additional crash pulses. For these three crash pulses,

only the unrestrained condition was simulated in an effort to understand the effects of

changes in crash pulse on occupant kinematics during rollovers. Because the restraints in

the initial simulation maintained the occupants within the vehicle, similar beneficial

results were assumed for the three additional pulses.

In the actual restraint condition, the occupant kinematics based on the original

crash pulse were evaluated for the full overturn sequence. Due to limitations in modeling

the restraint systems for multiple overturns, the belted conditions were only evaluated

during the first overturn and then compared to the results of the first overturn in the actual

restraint condition. Similarly, only the first overturn was evaluated for the three additional

crash pulses.

The occupant kinematics were similar among all four crash pulses. The main

difference between the runs was the roll rate of the van, which affected the distance the

25 Crash pulse is the vehiclesí change in acceleration over time.

26 Based on this simulation work and correspondence with the developers of HVE, enhancements were

made to the EDVSM physics software module. Safety Board staff then reran the simulations to better

understand how these enhancements would affect the rollover dynamics when the tire struck the ground at

an angle parallel to the ground. The first simulation, involving two rollovers, was run using the original

EDVSM physics module, while the other three simulations were run using the enhanced EDVSM physics

module.

27 W.D. Grimes, ìUsing ATB Under the HVE Environment,î SAE 970967 (Warrendale, PA: Society of

Automotive Engineers, 1997).

28 In the accident, all passengers were unrestrained except the passenger in seat 11, who was restrained

by the available lap belt.
Factual 30 Highway Accident Report

occupants traveled inside the van during each segment of the overturn. The series of still

images in appendix B shows the path of motion for the simulated occupants in each crash

pulse. Occupants in the original simulation (run one) traveled farther toward the right side

of the van as the vehicle initially began to roll toward its right side. Occupants in runs

three and four experienced the least travel toward the right side of the van. In all runs,

occupants seated in the vanís outboard positions were more likely to be ejected as the

vehicle overturned because of their proximity to the windows.

These simulations revealed the potential for head, neck, and chest injuries in the

actual restraint condition; one chest injury in the lap-belted condition; and no injuries in

the lap/shoulder-belted condition. These results must be considered in the context that

only the first overturn was simulated for the restrained conditions and intrusion was not

modeled. In the actual restraint condition, simulated occupants were potentially ejected at

various points during the overturn sequence. Some were predicted to be ejected during the

first overturn as the van rotated from the roof onto its left side. Ejection was not predicted

for others until the second overturn sequence, when the right side struck the ground. For

others, ejection was not predicted until the end of the second overturn sequence. In both

the lap- and lap/shoulder-belted conditions, the simulation did not predict full ejection for

the passengers; the belts provided an additional level of protection that was not fully

reflected in the predicted injury levels.

Independent Tire Examination

Standards Testing Laboratories, Inc., (STL)29 examined the failed left rear tires of

both vehicles on October 24, 2001. STL staff concluded that the Henrietta tire was:

Ö9 years old, [and] exhibits severe heat/UV aging. Evidence of run low,

generating severe heat buildup causing belt/tread separation, sidewall splits and

rapid air loss.

STL staff concluded that the Randleman tire was:

Öheat/ozone/time aged. Tire exhibits prolonged run low evidence which caused

excessive heat/stress resulting in belt tread separation and resulting sidewall splits

and rapid air out.

Dynamic Vehicle Handling Tests

Tests. On November 14, 2001, STL staff and Safety Board investigators

conducted a series of dynamic vehicle stability and handling tests on a 1990 Dodge Ram

350 15-passenger van at the Transportation Research Center in East Liberty, Ohio. The

tests focused on the handling characteristics of a 15-passenger van in circumstances

similar to those of the Henrietta accident. The test vehicle had the same dimensions as the

Henrietta accident van. Safety Board investigators installed an accelerometer and

monitored road speed using radar equipment. In all seven tests, the van was ballasted with

29 STLís TransTech Division, which conducted the testing, is an independent research and testing

facility specializing in product performance needs of the transportation industry.
Factual 31 Highway Accident Report

sandbags to correlate with the known occupant weights and seating positions in the

Henrietta accident. Measurements of the exemplar van showed that loading the van moved

the center of gravity approximately 11 inches rearward, placing it about 10 inches behind

of the centerline of the wheelbase. The professional driver was experienced in driving

during tire blowouts. STL and Michelin determined that braking after the blowout would

be dangerous, and the driver stated that he would be uncomfortable conducting the tests if

he were required to brake. Table 5 summarizes the test scenarios.

Table 5. Dynamic testing scenarios.

*Factory-recommended.

**Henrietta accident van.

***The course was based on International Standards Organization standard 3888-1.

For the rapid air loss scenarios, the left rear tire (was the same tire that blew out in

the Henrietta accident) was prepared with a driver-controlled explosive charge to simulate

a blowout. For the tread/belt detachment, the left rear tire was prepared to facilitate a

tread/belt separation near 75 mph. The driver was instructed to trigger the blowout when

he heard the tread and belt begin to detach.

Results. Safety Board investigators determined the maximum lateral acceleration

and peak speed attained during the testing. Table 6 shows these values.

Test Tire pressure Test scenario Driver instruction

1a 55 psi front and 80 psi 

rear *

50 mph, double lane 

change***

1b 60 psi front and 58 psi 

rear **

50 mph, double lane 

change

2 60 psi front and 58 psi 

rear

40 mph, rapid air loss

3 60 psi front and 58 psi 

rear

75 mph, rapid air loss 

and tread/belt 

detachment 

Maintain speed after 

blowout (the driver 

was unable to 

accelerate because 

the accelerator was 

already fully 

depressed to 

maintain 75 mph)

4 55 psi front and 80 psi 

rear

75 mph, rapid air loss 

and tread/belt 

detachment

Maintain speed after 

blowout

5 55 psi front and 80 psi 

rear

75 mph, rapid air loss 

and tread/belt 

detachment

Decelerate by 

removing foot from 

accelerator, no 

braking 

6 60 psi front and 58 psi 

rear

75 mph, rapid air loss 

and tread/belt 

detachment

Decelerate by 

removing foot from 

accelerator, no 

braking 
Factual 32 Highway Accident Report

Table 6. Peak lateral forces and speed for each test.

*One G equals 32.2 feet per second squared (9.8 meters per second squared).

The professional driver stated that he did not have a problem controlling the van

when executing either lane change maneuver during testing; he commented that the van

seemed to ìwallowî (behave in an ungainly manner) during the lane change maneuver

when the tire pressures were low. During test 2, the blowout at 40 mph, the driver rated his

ability to control the vehicle after the blowout as a 9 on a scale of 1 (completely out of

control) to 10 (completely in control). During test 3 at 75 mph with underinflated tires, the

van did not stay in its lane after the blowout, initially veering left until the driver countered

by steering to the right. Safety Board staff observed side-to-side motion of the van body

after the tire failure. The driver stated that ìthe rear of the van became looseî and said the

key issue was not to oversteer, since any steering input was magnified. On a controllability

scale of 1 to 10, the driver rated this test as a 5.

In test 4, with the tires inflated to the recommended pressures, the van veered to

the left before the driver could counter by steering to the right, but the driver was able to

maintain the van within its lane. The driver stated that the handling was better than during

the previous test, but the vehicle remained sensitive to steering input, and tire pressure was

a ìsignificantî factor during the tests. The driver rated this run as a 7 for controllability. In

tests 5 and 6, the van also veered left initially, but the driver was able to take corrective

action and maintain the lane. He stated that tests 5 and 6 were comparable to the previous

tests, except that the van pulled more toward the left when he took his foot off the gas. The

driver said he preferred to keep his foot on the gas, but was comfortable taking it off, even

though the vehicle tended to go left. Overall, the driver stated that steering input was key

and that ìany time you add steering, you lose some control.î

Other Information

Federal Regulations

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) (49 CFR 571.3) define bus as a

motor vehicle designed to carry more than 10 passengers. Based on this definition, a 12-

or 15-passenger van is a bus and has to meet the FMVSSs applicable to buses.

Test number

Lateral acceleration 

left (Gís*)

Lateral acceleration 

right (Gís) Peak speed (mph)

1a 0.49 0.44 51.67

1b 0.38 0.55 51.73

2 0.03 0.18 41.80

3 0.30 0.26 71.29

4 0.20 0.23 73.08

5 0.17 0.25 75.18

6 0.09 0.21 74.88
Factual 33 Highway Accident Report

Some FMVSSs apply only to vehicles with a GVWR less than 8,500 pounds and

thus do not apply to 15-passenger vans, which have a GVWR exceeding that criterion.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 201, Section 6, ìRequirements for

Upper Interior Components,î specifically excludes buses with a GVWR greater than

8,500 pounds. FMVSS 216, ìRoof Crush Resistanceî does not apply to buses with a

GVWR greater than 6,000 pounds. All these sections apply to passenger cars.

Title 49 CFR Part 390.5 defines a commercial motor vehicle as any self-propelled

vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce to transport passengers when the

vehicle is designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers, including the driver, for

compensation or is designed or used to transport more than 15 passengers, including the

driver, and is not used to transport passengers for compensation.

If a motor carrier operates a commercial motor vehicle designed or used to

transport 9 to 15 passengers, including the driver, for compensation, the carrier must file a

motor carrier identification report, mark its vehicles with a U.S. Department of

Transportation identification number, and maintain an accident registry.

NHTSA ìConsumer Advisoryî

On April 9, 2001, and again on April 15, 2002, NHTSA issued a ìConsumer

Advisoryî warning the public that ìresearch has shown that 15-passenger vans have a

rollover risk that increases dramatically as the number of occupants increases from fewer

than five to more than ten.î The rollover rate for vans loaded with more than 10

passengers is three times greater than that for a van loaded with fewer than 10 passengers.

NHTSA recommended that 15-passenger vans be operated by trained, experienced drivers

familiar with the handling of such vehicles and that all passengers wear seat belts at all

times. According to the NHTSA contact listed on the advisory, the advisory was issued to

NHTSA news media contacts, newsletter subscribers, and about 40 to 50 umbrella

groups30 that typically use these vehicles. The advisory was also posted on the NHTSA

website (www.nhtsa.dot.gov). The advisory is not listed on NHTSAís home page and can

only be found by conducting a search for it.

Seat Belt Laws

Texas law requires that every person sitting in the front seat of a passenger vehicle

wear a seat belt. ìPassenger vehicleî includes passenger cars, light trucks, sport utility

vehicles, trucks, and truck tractors. It does not include 15-passenger vans.

In North Carolina, all drivers and front-seat passengers ages 16 and older must

have a seat belt properly fastened about their bodies at all times when the vehicle is on a

street or highway. Children under 16 must use age-appropriate child restraints or wear seat

belts in all seating positions of any vehicle (including 15-passenger vans) required by

Federal law to be equipped with seat belts.

30 Religious groups, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, senior centers, and so forth.
Factual 34 Highway Accident Report

State Vehicle Safety Inspections

Currently, 18 States31 and the District of Columbia conduct annual or biannual

vehicle safety inspections of passenger vehicles. The States generally base their inspection

criteria on guidelines found in the Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Inspection

Handbook published by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

(AAMVA). The handbook sets forth recommended procedures for conducting safety

inspections of vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds GVWR. In the chapter on tires,

the AAMVA handbook recommends that inspectors measure tire pressure; check for tire

condition and wear, including cuts, snags, or cracks that exceed 1 inch and are deep

enough to expose cords or visible bumps, bulges or knots; measure tread depth; and

inspect for tire size or type mismatching.

Previous Recommendations

The Safety Board has investigated several accidents and addressed the issue of

passenger vehicle safety in previous reports. Below is a summary of the safety

recommendations that have been issued as a result of these reports and their status.

On September 20, 1996, the Safety Board adopted a safety study on The

Performance and Use of Child Restraint Systems, Seat Belts, and Air Bags for Children in

Passenger Vehicles (NTSB/SS-96/01). In that report, the Safety Board concluded that

occupants seated in the center rear seat position should be afforded the same level of

protection as other occupants of the back seat, who had lap/shoulder belts available to

them since January 1, 1990. The Safety Board recommended that NHTSA:

Require installation of center rear lap/shoulder belts in all newly manufactured

passenger vehicles for sale in the United States. (H-96-28)

NHTSA replied on August 27, 2002, that it had initiated rulemaking for

lap/shoulder belts for nonoutboard seats and expected to publish a proposal to require

these belts by late summer 2003. The Safety Board classified the recommendation

ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî on February 5, 2003.

As a result of the same study, the Safety Board urged automobile manufacturers to:

Voluntarily install center rear lap/shoulder belts in all newly manufactured

passenger vehicles for sale in the United States. (H-96-33)

Ford Motor Company (Ford) responded on February 3, 1999, that nearly half of

the 1998 model year vehicles were equipped with rear lap/shoulder belts and they planned

to expand installation to newly designed passenger vehicles and light trucks. The Safety

Board classified the recommendation ìClosedóAcceptable Actionî on May 11, 1999.

General Motors Corporation (GM) responded to this recommendation on November 20,

2002, stating that it currently offers center rear lap/shoulder belts on 60 percent of its

31 Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West

Virginia.
Factual 35 Highway Accident Report

vehicles and would install them on the balance of the fleet by 2007. The Safety Board

classified the recommendation to GM ìClosedóAcceptable Actionî on February 27,

2003. DaimlerChrysler responded to this recommendation on June 21, 1999, stating that

all passenger cars would be equipped with center lap/shoulder belts by 2002 and that light

truck vehicles (including sport utility vehicles, pick-up trucks, and vans) would be

equipped with center lap/shoulder belts as they are redesigned over the next several years.

The Safety Board classified the recommendation to DaimlerChrysler ìClosedó

Acceptable Actionî on October 27, 1999.

On March 17 to 20, 1997, the Safety Board convened a public hearing to discuss

concerns related to the effectiveness of air bags, passenger vulnerability to injuries from

air bag deployment, other countriesí experience with air bags, and ways to increase seat

belt and child restraint use. As a result of issues identified in the hearing, the Safety Board

recommended that the States, the U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia:

Enact legislation that provides for primary enforcement of mandatory seat belt use

laws, including provisions such as the imposition of driver license penalty points

and appropriate fines. Existing legal provisions that insulate people from the

financial consequences of not wearing a seat belt should be repealed. (H-97-2)

The intent of the recommendation is that seat belt laws should apply to all motor

vehicle occupants, not just those in the front seat. The recommendation was classified

ìOpenóAcceptable Responseî for Texas on December 30, 2002, since Texas has a

primary enforcement law, although it only requires those in the front seat to be restrained.

The Safety Board has not received a written response from North Carolina, but is aware

North Carolina has a primary enforcement law that only requires those in the front seat to

be restrained.

In 1998 and 1999, the Safety Board investigated four accidents involving vehicles

used to transport children to or from school that were not built to school bus occupant

protection standards. Three of these accidents involved 15-passenger vans. The Safety

Board adopted a report and issued recommendations in 1999.32 Most of the

recommendations pertained to the transportation of children to or from school or schoolrelated activities, including day care and Head Start. The Safety Board recommended that

the States, U.S. Territories, and the District of Columbia:

Review your State and local laws and, if applicable, revise to eliminate any

exclusions or exemptions pertaining to the use of age appropriate restraints in all

seat belt-equipped vehicles carrying more than 10 passengers (buses) and

transporting school children. (H-99-23)

The Safety Board sent a letter to the Governor of North Carolina on November 16,

2000, requesting action on this recommendation, since at the time North Carolina

exempted vehicles carrying more than 10 passengers from child restraint laws. In that

same letter, the Board classified this recommendation ìOpenóAwait Response.î North

32 National Transportation Safety Board, Pupil Transportation in Vehicles Not Meeting Federal School

Bus Standards, Special Investigation Report NTSB/SIR-99/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1999).
Factual 36 Highway Accident Report

Carolina now requires that all passengers under the age of 16 be properly secured in a

child passenger seat or a seat belt in any vehicle required by Federal law to be equipped

with seat belts.

The Safety Board also recommended that various associations and churches:

Inform their members about the circumstances of the accidents discussed in this

special investigation report and urge that they use school buses or buses having

equivalent occupant protection to school buses to transport children. (H-99-25)

The Safety Board has not received a response from the Southern Baptist

Convention, of which Virginia Heights Baptist Church is a member. The First Assembly

of God church in Burkburnett was not a member of a national organization. The Safety

Board received few responses to this recommendation, and on March 11, 2003, prepared

an article about the circumstances of these accidents, urging the use of school buses or the

equivalent to transport children; the Board asked that the associations and churches

distribute the article in their newsletters or by other means of communication.

In 2002, the Safety Board issued a safety report, Evaluation of the Rollover

Propensity of Fifteen Passenger Vans (NTSB/SR-02/03), based on rollover accidents the

Safety Board had investigated to date and fatality data involving 15-passenger vans. In it,

the Safety Board recommended that NHTSA:

Include 15-passenger vans in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

dynamic testing program. The dynamic testing should test the performance of

15-passenger vans under various load conditions. (H-02-26)

Extend the New Car Assessment Program rollover resistance program to 15-

passenger vans, especially for various load conditions, and use the dynamic

testing results of 15-passenger vans, as described in Safety Recommendation H02-26, to supplement the static measures of stability in the New Car Assessment

Program rollover resistance program. (H-02-27)

Evaluate, in conjunction with the manufacturers of 15-passenger vans, and test, as

appropriate, the potential of technological systems, particularly electronic stability

control systems, to assist drivers in maintaining control of 15-passenger vans. (H02-28)

The Safety Board received a response from NHTSA on December 23, 2002,

stating that the agency will consider how best to accomplish these recommendations.

While the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) rating system remains under review,

NHTSA indicated that it cannot state whether 15-passenger vans will be part of this

testing and rating system. The Safety Board classified these recommendations ìOpenó

Acceptable Responseî on June 30, 2003.

The Safety Board issued a companion recommendation to Ford and GM (H02-29). Dodge no longer manufactures 15-passenger vans effective model year 2002. Ford

responded on February 21, 2003, that it is researching electronic stability systems on

various Ford products and evaluating the feasibility of adapting the technology for
Factual 37 Highway Accident Report

different vehicle lines. The Safety Board classified the recommendation to Ford ìOpenó

Acceptable Responseî on June 30, 2003. GM responded on February 14, 2003, that it will

implement an electronic stability system, called a Vehicle Stability Enhancement System,

in the near future for its 15-passenger vans. Because GM had evaluated the potential of

Vehicle Stability Enhancement System before the Board issued its recommendation, the

Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation H-02-29 to GM ìClosedó

Reconsideredî on May 6, 2003.
38 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

Accident Discussion

In both the Henrietta and Randleman accidents, a tire blowout precipitated the

events leading to the rollover. The Safety Board, which addressed the propensity of 15-

passenger vans to roll over in its 2002 safety report, Evaluation of the Rollover Propensity

of Fifteen Passenger Vans, found that 15-passenger vans with 10 or more occupants had a

rollover ratio33 of 85 percent compared with a ratio of 28.3 percent for vans with fewer

than 5 occupants. In other words, 15-passenger vans that were loaded with 10 or more

occupants were three times more likely to roll over in single-vehicle accidents than lightly

loaded vans. NHTSA conducted simulations of the effects that loading can have on the

handling of 15-passenger vans and concluded that the computer simulations illustrated the

adverse effects that a fully loaded passenger van can have on its handling properties.34

Manufacturers of electronic stability control systems maintain that the systems

will activate in a blowout situation. Given the extreme nature of the Henrietta and

Randleman accidents and the driversí steering and braking reactions to the blowouts, the

Safety Board cannot definitively state that an electronic stability control system would

have prevented the accidents. Nonetheless, such a system would probably have provided

the drivers with greater opportunity to regain control of their vehicles. Because the Safety

Board has already considered and made recommendations on dynamic rollover testing and

electronic stability control for 15-passenger vans, the rollover propensity of these vehicles

will not be the subject of further discussion in this analysis.

The issues identified as a result of the Henrietta and Randleman accident

investigations are similar. Throughout the report, the vehicles discussed are 15-passenger

vans; the same issues also apply to 12-passenger vans. Following a discussion of each

accident scenario, the analysis will present issues related to vehicle classification, driver

training, occupant protection, and tire condition, inspection, and maintenance, which are

relevant to both accidents.

Henrietta, Texas

The failure of the left rear tire initiated the Henrietta accident sequence. The tire

experienced a separation of the tread and belt and rapid air loss, causing a change in the

vehicleís handling characteristics. The failed tire created more rolling resistance on the

roadway than the other tires did, and the driver would have felt the van begin to rotate

counterclockwise. When a driver feels his or her vehicle start to rotate, the instinctual

33 Rollover ratio is the number of single-vehicle rollover accidents divided by the number of all singlevehicle accidents.

34 W.R. Garrott, B. Rhea, R. Subramanian, and G.J. Heydinger, The Rollover Propensity of FifteenPassenger Vans, Research Note (Washington, DC: NHTSA, April 2001).
Analysis 39 Highway Accident Report

reaction is to turn the vehicle in the opposite direction to stop the rotation and then to

brake. Physical evidence and witness statements indicate that the Henrietta driver did try

to correct the vanís orientation by steering toward the right and braking.

Application of the brakes would have increased the lateral force created by the left

rear tire, requiring more driver input. Physical evidence indicated that as greater steering

force was applied, the van started rotating toward the right. In an effort to correct the

clockwise rotation, the driver probably steered left; that input, coupled with the drag of the

left rear tire, would have caused further vehicle instability as the van rotated back toward

the left. The van departed the roadway, rolling over twice toward the right, and seven

passengers were ejected during the rollover sequence.

Compensatory steering and braking are natural driver reactions when a vehicle

begins to lose control. In an automobile, the effects of such steering and braking are not

necessarily disabling, but because a loaded 15-passenger van has a high, rearward center

of gravity, driver input is magnified and quickly leads to instability. During the dynamic

stability testing with underinflated tires, the test driver reported that he experienced

reduced steering control following the blowout.

Neither the highway design, nor pavement conditions, nor the weather contributed

to the Henrietta accident. The driver had not used alcohol or other performance-degrading

drugs before the accident, and she had no known health problems that would have affected

her ability to drive a vehicle. The driver had obtained sufficient rest in the 72 hours prior

to the accident. On the day of the accident, she did get at least 2.5 hours less sleep than on

the previous 2 days, and small reductions in sleep (as little as 2 hours) can result in

measurable changes in vigilance.35 However, the circumstances of the accident do not

indicate that the driverís performance was degraded due to lack of sleep nor do they

suggest that she was less than vigilant in her driving behavior and reaction to the tire

blowout. The emergency response to the accident was timely and adequate.

Randleman, North Carolina

The failure of the left rear tire also initiated the Randleman accident sequence.

Again, the tire experienced separation of the tread and belt and rapid air loss, causing a

change in the vehicleís handling characteristics. The failed tire created more rolling

resistance on the roadway than the other tires did, and the driver, as in the case of the

Henrietta accident, would have felt the van rotating counterclockwise. The van was in the

left lane when the tire blew out. Physical evidence indicated that the driver quite likely

steered to the right to counteract the counterclockwise rotation, causing the van to move

into the right lane. The driver then probably overcorrected back to the left and possibly

applied the brakes as the van returned to the left lane in an arc and toward the median,

hitting the shoulder. At this point, the driver may have steered back to the right to return to

the roadway, when the van rotated clockwise and then overturned toward the driverís side.

35 R.T. Wilkinson, R.S. Edwards, and E. Haines, ìPerformance Following a Night of Reduced Sleep,î

Psychonomic Science Vol. 5 (1966): 471-472.
Analysis 40 Highway Accident Report

Neither the highway design, nor pavement conditions, nor the weather contributed

to the accident. Law enforcement personnel on scene stated that they did not believe that

the van driver was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and they did not request a

test of the driver for these substances. Although a toxicology test was not available, the

driverís performance during the accident and his behavior afterward do not indicate that

he was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. The driver stated that he did not have

any chronic medical conditions. While the driver had only obtained an average of 6 hours

of sleep per night in the previous 72 hours, he was not necessarily sleep-deprived at the

time of the accident. The average sleep requirement is about 7.5 to 8 hours per night;

given the variability and individual differences in sleep needs, 6 hours of uninterrupted

sleep may have been sufficient for this driver. Furthermore, the driverís performance and

reaction to the tire blowout do not indicate that he was operating in a fatigued state. The

emergency response in this accident was timely and adequate.

The Safety Board concludes that following the tire blowouts, both accident drivers

instinctively, but inappropriately, applied the brakes and oversteered in an attempt to

regain control of their vans; however, these actions led to further vehicle instability,

resulting in loss of control and subsequent rollover. The Safety Board further concludes

that there is no evidence of alcohol use, other drug use, or fatigue on the part of either

driver. Weather and roadway conditions did not contribute to the Henrietta and Randleman

accidents, and the emergency response to both was adequate. 

Vehicle Classification

According to NHTSAís FMVSSs, 12- and 15- passenger vans, which can carry

more than 10 passengers, are buses and therefore not required to meet the same safety and

occupant protection requirements as passenger vehicles. Yet these vans are built neither to

the standards for school buses nor to the industry standards for motorcoaches. Moreover,

vans are often used in the same manner as passenger vehicles, even though they have

different safety requirements and are required to meet different safety standards in some

areas. Vans have a higher center of gravity and can accommodate more occupants than

passenger vehicles, but are currently held to less stringent occupant protection and roof

crush requirements than passenger vehicles (see occupant protection section below). Even

though these vans are used in a manner similar to passenger cars, the occupants are not

afforded the same level of safety as those occupants riding in passenger cars.

Although NHTSA classifies 12- and 15-passenger vans as buses, the Federal

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) considers them commercial vehicles only

if they are used for compensation, in which case a van designed to carry 8 or more

passengers is considered a commercial vehicle. Therefore, any individual who has a

driverís license and is not operating the vehicle for compensation can operate a 12- or 15-

passenger van without additional training, despite NHTSAís statement in its consumer

advisory that they have different operating characteristics from passenger cars. Because

the vans in the Henrietta and Randleman accidents were not used for compensation, the

FMCSA did not consider them commercial vehicles; therefore, the operators were not
Analysis 41 Highway Accident Report

required to have a commercial driverís license. The FMCSA regards 12- and 15-passenger

vans as commercial vehicles based solely on their intended use (for compensation), not on

their handling characteristics. Yet the vanís handling characteristics are the same,

regardless of whether the driver is being paid. These vans are the only type of vehicle that

may or may not be classified as commercial, depending on use; all other vehicles, such as

trucks over 26,000 pounds or buses carrying more than 15 passengers, are always defined

as commercial vehicles.

Despite NHTSAís consumer advisory, the general public may not be aware that 12-

and 15-passenger vans, which are not sold or used differently from passenger vehicles,

have unique operating characteristics. Church officials in the Henrietta and Randleman

accidents did not know that the vans differed from passenger cars in any way except size,

even though the accident vans were not required to meet the same safety standards as

passenger vehicles. Additionally, the vans may or may not be defined as commercial

vehicles, depending on their use, leading to further confusion on the part of the public and

a lack of consistent requirements for training and licensure.

The Safety Board concludes that NHTSAís and the FMCSAís inadequate and

inconsistent vehicle classification of 12- and 15-passenger vans leaves a gap that

adversely affects regulations pertaining to the manufacture and safe operation of these

vehicles. The Safety Board believes that NHTSA and the FMCSA should revise their

definitions of buses and commercial motor vehicles to apply consistently to 12- and 15-

passenger vans, taking into account the unique operating characteristics and multiple

functions of these vans. 

Training

NHTSAís study on The Rollover Propensity of Fifteen-passenger Vans

demonstrated that 15-passenger vans are inherently unstable when loaded to the level for

which they are designedócarrying more than 10 passengers. NHTSA therefore advises all

van drivers to obtain specific training on the handling and operation of these vehicles.

However, as investigators found during the Henrietta and Randleman accident

investigations, the van owners were not aware of the information provided by NHTSA in

its consumer advisory. The advisory has not reached all 15-passenger van operators, even

those within the target group, such as churches, and the Henrietta and Randleman

operators did not know that they should have specific training to operate the vans safely.

Both accident drivers had experience operating 15-passenger vans, but no specialized

training on the handling and driving characteristics of these vehicles; neither driver was

able to control the van in an emergency.

As shown in testing, the van was controllable during an anticipated blowout, and

the test driver thought that the effort required to control the vehicle was within the range

of an unimpaired driver. However, even the professional test driver was unable to maintain

the lane of travel in test 3 when the tires were inflated below the manufacturerís

recommended inflation pressures, which were similar to those in the Henrietta accident;
Analysis 42 Highway Accident Report

the van swayed from side to side as the test driver brought it under control. The

professional test driver also stated that the van was more difficult to control at higher

speeds, particularly with lower tire inflation pressures, and that steering inputs were

magnified after the blowout. The test driver had experience operating unloaded 15-

passenger vans during a blowout, and he triggered the tire blowout himself, so the

situation was not unexpected, as it was during the accidents. Further, an experiment on

driver reaction to tread separation that was conducted in the National Advanced Driving

Simulator found that 

findings from test track studies in which test drivers were aware of an imminent

tread separation may underestimate the extent to which tread separation occurring

in the real world leads to instability and loss of vehicle control.36

Thus, even though the test van was configured similarly to the Henrietta van, the

test did not replicate either accident in the critical area of operator behavior. 

While both accident drivers were familiar with their respective vans and had

driven them previously, investigators did not find evidence that either driver had

experienced an emergency situation, such as tire failure, while operating the van. Both

drivers are likely to have overcorrected and braked following the blowout because they

did not know how to respond appropriately to the vehicle dynamics that occurred after the

blowout and did not understand the potential instability problems associated with 15-

passenger vans. The drivers are likely to have reacted instinctively by attempting to

correct the rotation of the van while braking to slow it. Had the two drivers maintained

their speed, not applied the brakes, and exerted more controlled steering, as the

professional driver did during the tests, they may have been able to control their vans.

Braking, the likely response on the part of both drivers, can lead to further vehicle

instability during a tire failure, particularly in a fully loaded 15-passenger van with a high,

rearward center of gravity. The driversí lack of training on their vehiclesí operating and

handling characteristics, particularly in emergency situations, put them at a disadvantage

in reacting to the blowout.

As the National Safety Council, the American Automobile Association, and most

driver education programs recognize, acceleration is the appropriate response to a

blowout, but that response is counterintuitive to the general public. Therefore, such groups

emphasize that drivers need to refrain from braking and to decelerate slowly in the event

of a tire blowout. This strategy requires that the driver provide steering input to counteract

the lateral dragging force created by the blown tire. If a driver brakes, the lateral steering

force experienced by the vehicle is greater and the driver must provide more steering input

to maintain control of the vehicle. If the driver provides too much steering input, he or she

will have to try to correct the direction of the vehicle and may oversteer. When the vehicle

has a high, rearward center of gravity, as a loaded 15-passenger van does, the rapid

changes in steering direction can lead to instability and rollover. A similar driver reaction

36 T.A. Ranney, G. Heydinger, G. Watson, K Salaani, E.N. Mazzae, and P. Grygier, Investigation of

Driver Reactions to Tread Separation Scenarios in the National Advanced Driving Simulator (NADS), DOT

HS 809 523 (Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2002).
Analysis 43 Highway Accident Report

to a blowout in a passenger car is unlikely to have such severe consequences because the

passenger carís lower center of gravity makes it more forgiving of inappropriate driver

inputs.

Impressing upon 15-passenger van drivers the inherent dangers of operating these

vehicles, particularly when fully loaded, and educating them about proper handling and

control, particularly during emergency situations, can reduce the risk of rollover. Such

training can also help dispel the expectation that these vans operate like large passenger

cars. While the accident drivers had experience operating the vans, they did not have

experience with how the vehicles would respond in this type of emergency situation or

other emergency situations or the consequences of their instinctive reactions to such

situations. Educating drivers on how such vehicles respond to, and on the consequences

of, different driver input could help operators approach 15-passenger van driving more

cautiously.

In addition, training would provide a forum for educating drivers about the tire

pressures and maintenance required for 15-passenger vans. The rear tires on a fully loaded

van, for instance, must be inflated to 80 psi, which is much higher than the rear tire

pressure for most passenger cars. Stressing the importance of proper tire inflation during

training will help drivers avoid potential problems. Drivers should also be taught to check

the tires and tire pressure before driving the vehicle. In both these accidents, the tires were

in very poor condition, which should have been readily apparent to someone who knew to

look for cracks and rotting rubber. 

Although NHTSA recommends that 15-passenger van drivers be trained to operate

the vehicles, the agency does not provide information on the source of such training. The

National Safety Council offers computer-based training, ìCoaching the Van Driver,î and

many colleges and universities use this program to train their employees who drive vans.

But this course does not educate drivers about emergency handling of the vans, nor does it

discuss tire pressure and maintenance. 

To ensure that drivers have the necessary skills to operate vehicles other than

passenger vehicles, States have established classes of driverís licenses, for example, a

commercial driverís license, a motorcycle license, or a chauffeurís endorsement, that

require specialized training and testing. No such class of license exists for 15-passenger

vans. Yet, as NHTSA has acknowledged, 15-passenger van operators need training in the

handling of those vehicles, and testing has demonstrated that controlling 15-passenger

vans in a blowout is possible, albeit difficult, for a trained driver. The Safety Board

concludes that safe operation of 15-passenger vans requires a knowledge and skill level

different from and above that for passenger vehicles, particularly when the vans are fully

loaded or drivers experience an emergency situation. Therefore, the Safety Board believes

that the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association,37 in conjunction with

NHTSA, the National Safety Council, the American Automobile Association, GM, and

Ford, should develop a training program that incorporates the skills required for safe

37 The American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association establishes and publishes policies

and guidelines for traffic safety education.
Analysis 44 Highway Accident Report

operation of 12- and 15-passenger vans and addresses the consequences of unsafe

operation, including, but not limited to, operating in a fully loaded condition, emergency

braking, high-speed lane changes, tire blowouts, and tire pressure and maintenance. The

Safety Board further believes that the States and the District of Columbia should establish

a driverís license endorsement for 12- and 15-passenger vans that adopts the standards

established by the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association; to obtain

the endorsement, drivers should have to complete a training program on the operation of

12- and 15-passenger vans and pass a written and skills test.

While training will help 15-passenger van drivers understand the vehiclesí unique

handling and operating characteristics, it will not prevent all accidents involving such

vehicles. The Safety Board realizes that tire blowouts require split-second, instinctual

reactions that are not easily trained. For this reason, the Safety Board has recommended

that 15-passenger vans be equipped with electronic stability control systems to assist

drivers in maintaining control of the vehicle during emergencies (Safety

Recommendations H-02-28 and -29).

Occupant Protection

Research into rollover crashes shows that a systems approach to occupant

protection, involving seat belts, seats, the roof, and interior structures, is necessary to

minimize occupant exposure to injury-causing mechanisms.38 While much of this research

was performed on passenger cars, it applies equally to 15-passenger vans, whose

occupants also need to be protected during accidents.

In a rollover accident, the accelerations experienced by occupants at the vehicleís

center of gravity can be low compared to the accelerations experienced by occupants in

frontal or side impact collisions. Nonetheless, the severity of rollovers can still be

significant. Researchers have found that the acceleration at a roof rail can be three times

that at the center of gravity,39 posing risks for occupants located near the accelerating roof

rail. In the Henrietta simulation, the unbelted occupants sustained severe injuries, even

though maximum accelerations experienced by the passengers at the vanís center of

gravity were less than 10 times the acceleration of gravity in the first rollover.

The Henrietta, Randleman, and other accidents, as well as the simulations

conducted for this investigation, demonstrate that when a 15-passenger van is involved in

a rollover accident, occupant protection needs to be improved in order to save lives and

reduce injuries. Specifically, changes are needed in interior surfaces, seat belts, and roof

crush protection.

38 M.W. Arndt, G.A. Mowry, C.P. Dickerson, and S.M. Arndt, ìEvaluation of Experimental Restraints

in Rollover Conditions,î SAE Paper 95712 (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers, 1995).

39 J.W. Carter, J.L. Habberstad, and J. Croteau, ìA Comparison of the Controller Rollover Impact

System (CRIS) with the J2114 Rollover Dolly,î SAE Paper 2002-01-0694 (Warrendale, PA: Society of

Automotive Engineers, 2002).
Analysis 45 Highway Accident Report

Interior Surfaces

FMVSS 201, ìOccupant Protection in Interior Impact,î specifies requirements for

protecting occupants inside passenger cars, multipurpose vehicles, trucks, and buses that

have a GVWR less than 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds); the requirements for upper interior

components do not apply to buses, including 15-passenger vans, that have a GVWR

greater than 3,860 kg (8,510 pounds). The requirements that apply to 15-passenger vans

include those for instrument panels, seatbacks, interior compartment doors, sun visors,

and armrests. Fifteen-passenger vans do not have to meet the phased-in requirement for

upper interior components in passenger vehicles manufactured after September 1, 1998,

which mandates that vehicles meet head injury criteria for impacts with the front header,

rear header, side rails, sliding door track, all pillars, roof braces or stiffeners, and seat belt

anchorages.

In both the Henrietta and Randleman accidents, occupants contacted and sustained

injuries from one or more interior surfaces that are required to be protected in passenger

vehicles but not in 15-passenger vans. The front passenger in the Henrietta accident was

restrained by a lap/shoulder belt but sustained injuries due to contact with the interior roof

and B-pillar during the rollover sequence. Four passengers in the Henrietta accident were

seated on the left side of the vehicle (seats 3, 6, 9, and 12). A possible source of their

injuries prior to ejection was deceleration into the noncrash-protected interior surfaces,

including the roof, exposed window frame, and collapsed sidewalls, during the initial

rollover and subsequent roof crush. Two passengers in the Henrietta van (seats 5 and 14)

were unbelted but remained inside the vehicle, and both sustained serious injuries. The

passenger in seat 14, for example, sustained a first rib fracture, which is rare unless

extreme force is applied to the upper torso.40 The injuries to these passengers most likely

resulted from contact with interior vehicle components, roof crush deformation into the

survivable space of the vehicle compartment, or striking or being struck by other

occupants during the rollover.

While restraint use in rollovers increases an occupantís chance of survival by

preventing ejections, seat belts cannot prevent head contact with the adjacent roof or

window.41 The most frequent harmful contact points for nonejected occupants are the roof,

pillars, rails, and headers (28.1 percent combined).42 Therefore, vehicles need to be

designed with impact protection to minimize injuries when an individualís head strikes the

roof or windows.

The Henrietta and Randleman accident vans did not afford passengers the

occupant-protected surfaces that passenger cars would have provided. The Safety Board

concludes that during the rollover sequences in the Henrietta and Randleman accidents,

40 David Viano, Chest: Anatomy, Types and Mechanisms of Injury, Tolerance Criteria and Limits, and

Injury Factors, AAM and IRCOBI Biomechanics of Trauma Course Book, October 1997, p. 9.

41 G.S. Bahling, R.T. Bundorf, G.S. Kaspzyk, E.A. Moffatt, K.O. Orlowski, and J.E. Stocke, ìRollover

and Drop Tests ñ The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury Mechanics Using Belted Dummies,î Stapp Car

Crash Conference 34th Proceedings, Orlando, Florida (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers,

1990) 101-112.

42 M.W. Arndt, G.A., Mowry, C.P. Dickerson, and S.M. Arndt.
Analysis 46 Highway Accident Report

passengers remaining inside the vehicles, as well as some ejected occupants, sustained

injuries as a result of contact with interior surfaces, which were not required to be

protected from occupant impact. Even if these accidents had occurred in vans

manufactured today, those passengers who remained within the vehicles or struck surfaces

before being ejected may still have sustained injuries, since parts of FMVSS 201 do not

apply to 15-passenger vans. FMVSS 201 reduces fatal injuries because it mandates use of

technologies such as side airbags, curtain airbags, or energy-absorbing materials.

Passenger cars today incorporate these technologies, but occupants of 15-passenger vans

do not benefit from such protection. The Safety Board believes that NHTSA should

include 12- and 15-passenger vans in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 201, Section

6, ìRequirements for Upper Interior Component Protection.î Further, the Safety Board

believes that Ford and GM should voluntarily develop and install technologies, to provide

upper interior component protection within 12- and 15-passenger vans by model year

2006. DaimlerChrysler no longer manufactures 15-passenger vans.

Seat Belt Usage

Lap/Shoulder Belts. In the Henrietta accident, 7 of the 12 occupants were ejected

from the van during the rollover, and 3 of the 7 ejected occupants sustained fatal injuries;

none of the 3 belted occupants were ejected. In the Randleman accident, 4 of 14 occupants

were ejected from the van during the rollover, 1 of whom sustained fatal injuries. None of

the ejected Randleman occupants was wearing his or her seat belt, and at least five of the

vehicleís lap belts were unusable.

When a passenger is ejected from a vehicle during an accident, he or she is

exposed to rapid deceleration into injury-causing surfaces outside the vehicle. The

orientation and speed of the passenger and the kind of surface struck are important factors

in determining the nature and extent of the injuries sustained.

In the Henrietta accident, the ejected passengersí injuries included traumatic head

injuries, spinal injury, skeletal fractures, blunt force trauma to the internal organs, and

severe lacerations. Seven passengers were ejected during the accident sequence, five of

whom had lap/shoulder belts available, although none wore the restraint. Had they been

restrained, the vehicle would have given them some protection during the overturn

sequence; instead they struck the ground at the same speed at which they were ejected

from the vehicle, exacerbating the injuries they sustained inside the vehicle. The accident

simulation showed that during the first overturn, head, neck, and thorax injuries were not

predicted for simulated occupants wearing lap/shoulder belts.

In the Randleman accident, the three ejected passengers experienced traumatic

head injuries, spinal injury, and lacerations. The injuries sustained by those who remained

in the van were minor because these passengers did not experience rapid decelerations

into injury-causing surfaces outside the vehicle. The ejected passengers were seated on the

right side of the van and were unrestrained. Thus, during the accident sequence, they did

not remain within their seating area, but moved about the compartment before being

ejected. Had they been wearing their lap belts, as two of them were required to do by
Analysis 47 Highway Accident Report

North Carolina law (because they were less than 16 years old), they may have benefited

from the protection provided by the vehicle.

In both accidents, the ejected passengersí injuries were significantly more severe

than those sustained by passengers who remained in the vehicles. The one exception was

the Henrietta driver, whose injuries were due to roof crush and the loss of survivable space

(see roof crush section below). One of the five occupants who remained within the vehicle

(seat 11) in the Henrietta accident was restrained by a lap belt only and sustained injuries

when her upper body struck the interior surfaces or when she contacted other unrestrained

passengers during the accident sequence. A lap belt does not prevent movement of the

upper body and acts as a fulcrum for flailing of the upper body and lower extremities.43

However, the lap belt did prevent ejection, giving the passenger some protection as the

van overturned and deformed. She did not experience the rapid deceleration into injurycausing surfaces inside or outside the vehicle that the ejected passengers did. Additionally,

this passengerís injuries were not as severe as those of the unbelted passengers seated

around her who also remained within the van, probably because she did not strike injurycausing surfaces within the vehicle or other passengers at as great a velocity. The

simulation of lap-belted occupants within the van predicted a thorax injury for the

simulated occupant in seat 15 during the first rollover sequence, further indicating that lap

belts alone are not the most effective restraint.

The Henrietta simulations showed that the amount of movement for unrestrained

occupants was significantly greater than that of their restrained counterparts, resulting in

far more serious predicted injuries and exposing them to the serious injuries associated

with ejection. These predicted injuries occurred because the simulated occupants struck

parts of the van during the accident sequence. Additionally, several simulated occupants in

the unrestrained conditions were either partially or fully ejected, whereas neither of the

restrained conditions resulted in predicted ejections during the first overturn. The Safety

Board concludes that had the passengers in the accident vans been wearing lap/shoulder

belts, their injuries may have been less severe because of fewer and less forceful impacts

with nonoccupant-protected interior components and other occupants and because those

who were ejected would have remained in the vehicles. 

The Safety Board has advocated use of lap/shoulder belts for many years because

they greatly reduce a passengerís risk of injury during a collision. Restrained by lap belts

only, passengers sometimes sustain abdominal injuries as a result of pivoting about the lap

belt or as the upper body flails about. Yet the Ford and GM vans being manufactured

today are equipped with lap/shoulder belts only at the outboard locations, rather than at all

seating locations. NHTSA is developing a rulemaking to require that all center seats be

equipped with lap/shoulder belts but has not disclosed whether the rulemaking will apply

to 15-passenger vans. Ford and GM have begun to equip the passenger vehicles in their

fleets with center lap/shoulder belts but have not indicated whether they will so equip their

15-passenger vans, which are not classified as passenger vehicles. The Safety Board

believes that NHTSA should include 12- and 15-passenger vans in its upcoming

43 J.K. Mason, The Pathology of Violent Injury (London: Edward Arnold, 1978) 28.
Analysis 48 Highway Accident Report

rulemaking that will require lap/shoulder belts at all center seats. The Safety Board also

believes that Ford and GM should voluntarily install lap/shoulder belts at all center seating

positions in 12- and 15-passenger vans and make all lap/shoulder belts in outboard and

center seating positions adjustable by model year 2006.

The fatally injured occupant in the Randleman accident was seated in a position

that had a seat belt that was completely unusable; the buckle was wedged so tightly inside

the seat bight that investigators could not even remove the buckle for inspection. In four

other seats in the van, the seat belts were unusable either because of missing components

or because the seat belt was stuck in the seat bight or under the seat frame. Children, who

are required to be restrained by North Carolina law, occupied four of the five seating

positions with unusable belts. Thus, even if these passengers had wanted to wear their seat

belts, they would have been unable to do so. In an informal survey of other 15-passenger

vans, investigators found that the vehicles lacked any mechanism to ensure that seat belt

latches and buckles remain accessible in the seat bight. The Safety Board believes that

Ford and GM should redesign the seat belts in their 12- and 15-passenger vans to ensure

that the buckle and latch components remain readily accessible to occupants at all times

by model year 2006. The Safety Board plans to inform 12- and 15-passenger van owners

and operators about the importance of maintaining seat belt accessibility.

Lap Belt Configuration. The purpose of seat belts is to reduce the likelihood of

injury in the event of a crash. The two lap belts in the center of row 4 in both accident

vehicles were configured so that one of the webbing straps for each passenger would have

to pass behind the adjacent passenger if both occupants were to be lap belted at the same

time. In the event of a forward deceleration, the webbing of the belt passing behind a

passenger would compress his or her abdomen, potentially causing abdominal injuries. In

the event of a lateral collision, because one webbing strap for each passenger (the buckle

for one and the latch plate for the other) would have to extend quite far from its anchor

position, the lack of a properly fitting restraint at the two positions would permit lateral

movement of the passengers, thereby increasing the risk of injury to all four passengers in

the fourth row.

Also, because of the distance between the two anchorages, two people could

conceivably share one lap belt, leaving the other latch and buckle unused. FMVSS 209,

ìSeat Belt Assemblies,î requires that such assemblies be designed for use by one, and

only one, person at a time. Thus, the current configuration of the lap belt anchorages does

not conform to FMVSS 209 and provides users with an opportunity to use the seat belts in

an unsafe manner. The Safety Board concludes that the lap belt assemblies and anchorages

in the center of the fourth row of both accident vans were configured in a manner that had

potential to increase the risk of injury to passengers in the event of an accident. On July

10, 2003, staff met with DaimlerChrysler representatives, who demonstrated that, even

though a potential hazard exists, no actual occurrence has been reported in more that 30

years of fleet operations. Although Dodge no longer manufactures these vans,

DaimlerChrysler committed to monitoring the issue of the fourth row center lap belts

through its defect investigation system and will report to the Safety Board any relevant

complaints identified. 
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

Roof Crush

One of the impact points between the Henrietta van and the ground during the

rollover was the left front corner of the roof; the resulting roof crush at that location was

so severe that it brought the roof in contact with the top of the driverís seatback. The

driver was belted but sustained fatal head injuries as a result of the roof intrusion. 

After the Henrietta accident, roof crush left 4 to 6 inches of space above each row

of passenger seats; originally, the vehicle had 18 to 21 inches of space between the roof

and the seats. Passengers probably sustained more serious injuries due to contact with the

roof during the rollover and the resulting lack of interior space. The Safety Board

concludes that roof crush to the Henrietta accident van contributed to the severity of the

driverís injuries and diminished survivable space for the passengers. The roof in the

Randleman accident did not sustain similar crush damage, probably due to the vehicle

dynamics during the rollover sequence. The lack of roof crush damage may be one reason

the injuries to those passengers who remained within the vehicle were less severe than in

the case of the Henrietta accident. Other factors that may have contributed to the differing

severity of injuries in these two accidents were the age of the occupants, the points of

impact during the rolls, and the crash pulse experienced as the vehicles rolled over.

The Safety Board investigated another accident involving roof crush in a 15-

passenger van that occurred on March 12, 2000, near San Antonio, Texas.44 The driver,

who had attempted to change lanes, left the roadway; when she tried to correct her path of

travel, the vehicle rolled over, landed on a guardrail, and the rear of the vehicle straddled

the guardrail on its roof. A lap/shoulder-belted 15-year-old female passenger was fatally

injured; a lap/shoulder-belted 15-year-old male passenger and an unrestrained 15-year-old

female passenger were seriously injured. All three were seated in the area of roof crush

damage. The driver and the other 10 passengers, also belted, were outside the roof crush

area and did not sustain serious injuries.

Studies have shown that the initial roof crush usually does not increase injuries to

unrestrained occupants; passengers generally sustain serious injuries during contact with

the roof and upper door window areas and when the head is adjacent to these areas during

contact the ground.45 However, the reduction in survivable space due to roof crush for

those who remain within the vehicle can lead to injuries, particularly during subsequent

rollovers. NHTSA, which evaluated 1988-1999 National Automotive Sampling System

and Fatality Analysis Reporting System data, found that, on average, 26,376 occupants

sustain serious or fatal injuries in light-vehicle rollovers annually. Roof crush intrusion is

estimated to occur and possibly contribute to serious or fatal injury in about 26 percent of

rollover crashes.46 If the roof does not crush, belted occupants may benefit because they

44 Docket No. HWY-00-IH-032.

45 K.F. Orlowski, R.T. Bundorf, and E.A. Moffatt, ìRollover Crash TestsóThe Influence of Roof

Strength on Injury Mechanics,î SAE Paper 851734 (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers,

1985).

46 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof

Crush Resistance, NHTSA-1999-5572; Notice 2 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, October 2001).
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

have less chance of contacting the roof and being subjected to the forces of roof-to-ground

contact during the rollover sequence.47

The purpose of FMVSS 216, ìRoof Crush Resistance,î which establishes strength

requirements for passenger compartment roofs, is to reduce death and injury due to roof

crush in rollover crashes. The standard applies only to passenger cars, multipurpose

vehicles, and buses with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. The

GVWRs of 15-passenger vans exceed 8,500 pounds and, therefore, the vans are not

required to meet FMVSS 216. Yet statistics show that 15-passenger vans are involved in a

higher percentage of rollover accidents than are passenger cars and smaller vans. About 52

percent of the 15-passenger vans involved in fatal single-vehicle accidents experience a

rollover, while 33 percent of passenger cars involved in such accidents do.48

NHTSA requested comments on its proposed amendments to FMVSS 216 on

October 22, 2001. In the request, NHTSA stated that it is considering whether to extend

FMVSS 216 to vehicles weighing up to 10,000 pounds, because the composition of the

vehicle fleet has changed since the previous rulemaking was issued; in particular, the

number of vehicles weighing more than 6,000 pounds has increased.

The Safety Board believes that NHTSA should include 12- and 15-passenger vans

in FMVSS 216, ìRoof Crush Resistance,î to minimize the extent to which survivable

space is compromised in the event of a rollover accident. Further, the Safety Board

believes that Ford and GM should voluntarily redesign 12- and 15-passenger vans to

minimize the extent to which survivable space is compromised in the event of a rollover

accident by model year 2006.

Tires

Two of the Henrietta vanís four tires, including the tire that suffered the tread/belt

separation, were original tires (8 years old). Three of the four tires on the Randleman van

were more than 8 years old. When not in use, both vans had been parked in the

unprotected parking lots of their respective churches since purchase. The tires were

subject to the ozone and ultraviolet light present outdoors, which can degrade the tire

rubber, leading to dry rot and weather checking. These phenomena are typical of a

sedentary vehicle; during normal use, anti-degradants introduced during the tire

manufacturing process are released and brought to the surface of the tire. When a vehicle

is not driven extensively (the Henrietta van averaged 5,500 miles per year and the

Randleman van averaged about 7,000 miles per year), this release does not occur. Visual

inspection of the two original tires on the Henrietta van and all the tires on the Randleman

van revealed that the tires were drying out and that the rubber was rotting and cracking.

47 G.S. Bahling, R.T. Bundorf, G.S. Kaspzyk, E.A. Moffatt, K.O. Orlowski, and J.E. Stocke.

48 National Transportation Safety Board, Evaluation of the Rollover Propensity of 15-passenger Vans,

Safety Report NTSB/SR-02/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002).
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

These conditions can lead to tire failure. The sidewall and tread groove cracking on the

tires of both vans was evidence of this degradation due to weather.

None of the Henrietta or Randleman tires were inflated to the recommended

pressure, even though the manufacturer-recommended pressures were specified on a label

inside the driverís doorsill. The two front tires on the Henrietta van were inflated to 60 psi;

the recommended pressure was 55 psi. The right rear tire on the Henrietta van was inflated

to 58 psi; the preaccident pressure of the left rear tire could not be determined. However,

given that three of the four tires on the Henrietta van were inflated to or near 60 psi and the

words ìreinflate to 60 psiî were written on the right front tire in yellow crayon, the left

rear tire was also probably inflated to about 60 psi. Thus, the two rear tires were

significantly under the manufacturerís recommended pressure of 80 psi. On the

Randleman van, the left and right front tires were inflated to 62.5 psi and 60.5 psi,

respectively, and the right rear tire was inflated to 60 psi. Again, the preaccident pressure

on the left rear tire could not be determined but is likely to have been about 60 psi, as was

true of the other three tires. The manufacturer-recommended tire pressures for the

Randleman van were 50 psi49 for the front tires and 80 psi for the rear tires.

Overinflated tires can result in excessive tire wear to the center of the tread.

Underinflation can shorten a tireís life and lead to premature tire failure. According to

NHTSA, ìWhen a tire is used while significantly underinflated, its sidewalls flex more

and the air temperature inside the tire increases, increasing stress and the risk of failure. In

addition, a significantly underinflated tire loses lateral traction, making handling more

difficult.î50

Underinflated tires are also able to carry less weight. In the case of the tires on the

accident vehicles, when inflated to a pressure of 60 psi, each rear tire could carry almost

500 pounds less than it was designed to carry had it been inflated to the manufacturerís

recommended pressure of 80 psi. 

Neither the degradation of the tires from weather nor the underinflated pressure of

the left rear tire by itself is likely to have caused the tire failure on either van. Nonetheless,

they were contributory factors. Also, a small hole extending through all the tire

components of the Henrietta tire may have allowed air to penetrate the tire, thereby

degrading its structural integrity. The Safety Board concludes that a combination of

underinflation, degradation from weather, and, in the case of the Henrietta van tire, a

possible infiltration of air through a small puncture, is likely to have led to the rapid air

loss and tread/belt separation on both the Henrietta and the Randleman left rear tires. 

In addition, the right rear tire on the Randleman van was underrated for the

accident vehicle, that is, the tire could not carry the maximum load required for the

vehicle. An underrated tire flexes too much and can lead to failure. The required tire rating

is printed in the ownerís manual and can also be found on the tire. A replacement tire

49 The recommended front tire pressures for the two vans were probably different because of a 1992

design change to the van.

50 Docket No. NHTSA 2000-8572.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

should always have the same or greater load rating as the original. The owner could

provide no information on why an underrated tire had been placed on the Randleman van.

Tires may be not be inflated to the proper pressure or an underrated tire may be

placed on a vehicle because drivers are unaware of the proper pressure or load rating. As

part of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation

(TREAD) Act of 2000, NHTSA issued a final rulemaking that requires manufacturers to

place a prominent label stating the manufacturer-recommended tire pressures and tire load

ratings on all vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds; the label is to be printed in

yellow, red, black, and white and is to be affixed to the vehicleís B-pillar (the pillar behind

the driver). By requiring placement of the label in a prominent location and providing

consistent information, NHTSA seeks to ensure that consumers have the necessary

information to maintain their tires.

As required by the TREAD Act, NHTSA also issued a rulemaking on June 5,

2002, directing that all vehicles be equipped with a tire pressure monitoring system that

will alert the driver when a tire is significantly underinflated. During the period from

November 1, 2003, through October 31, 2006, manufacturers must begin phasing in tire

pressuring monitoring systems on their vehicles. To allow itself sufficient time to consider

additional data on the effect and performance of tire pressure monitoring systems,

NHTSA plans to defer a decision on long-term performance requirements for such

systems on vehicles manufactured after October 31, 2006. It intends to publish these

requirements by March 1, 2005, to give manufacturers sufficient lead time to comply with

the final rule.

In its rulemaking, NHTSA requires manufacturers to employ a system that alerts

drivers if the tire pressure of one or more tires is at least 25 or 30 percent51 below the

vehicle manufacturerís recommended cold inflation pressure for the tires. Based on this

criterion, a tire pressure monitoring system on the accident vans would only have been

required to warn the drivers when the pressure in the rear tires reached 25 or 30 percent of

the recommended pressure of 80 psi, that is, 56 or 60 psi. At the time of the accidents, the

rear tires of the vans were quite likely inflated to 58 or 60 psi and thus may not have been

beyond the threshold that todayís tire pressure monitoring systems were designed to

detect. The Safety Board concludes that because low tire pressure in fully loaded 15-

passenger vans contributes to vehicle instability, the current tire pressure monitoring

standard of 25 or 30 percent below manufacturerís recommended pressure is insufficient

to warn van drivers of potentially unsafe low pressures. 

As was seen during the vehicle dynamics testing, the van became more unstable

and difficult to control when the tire pressures were inflated to 58 psi for the rear tires. The

test driver stated that in the lane change maneuver, the vehicle ìwallowedî when the tire

pressures were low. During the blowout testing, the driver reported that the van handled

better when the tires were inflated to their recommended pressure and that tire pressure

significantly affected the handling of the van.

51 Manufacturers have two options, 25 percent or 30 percent, based on the capabilities of currently

available technologies.
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board understands that tire pressure monitoring systems are a new

technology and that detecting pressure differentials below 20 percent is currently difficult.

However, as these accidents and the dynamic testing demonstrate, tire pressures that are

25 or 30 percent below the manufacturerís recommended pressure can have significant

negative effects on the handling of 15-passenger vans. Therefore, the Safety Board

believes that NHTSA, in developing long-term performance requirements for tire pressure

monitoring systems, should adopt more stringent detection standards than 25 or 30 percent

below manufacturer-recommended levels, since pressures at those levels can have an

adverse effect on safe handling of vehicles, such as 12- and 15-passenger vans.

Both accident vehicles had undergone recent State safety inspections; the Henrietta

van passed a Texas inspection on October 23, 2000, and the Randleman van passed a

Virginia inspection in December 2000. The Texas criteria included visual inspection of tire

pressure, as well as identification of tread or sidewall cracks and cuts or snags of more

than 1 inch that were deep enough to expose the body cords. The Virginia criteria included

checking for cuts in tire fabric, for wear so extensive that the fabric or steel cord is visible,

and for knots or bulges in the sidewalls, broken belts, or tread separation from the fabric.

Neither Stateís criteria included excessive cracking and weather checking, a defect on five

of the eight tires on the two accident vehicles. Nor did either State require inspectors to

make sure that proper load-rated tires were on the vehicle or that tires were inflated to the

manufacturer-recommended pressure. While none of these conditions alone was

responsible for the tire failures in these accidents, the weather checking and underinflation

were contributory factors, and the improperly rated tire on the Randleman accident van

could have created an unsafe condition. 

The AAMVA inspection handbook recommends that vehicle inspections include

measuring tire pressure and, as necessary, correcting deficiencies if the owner agrees. The

guidelines do not address weather checking and cracking as criteria for rejection during an

inspection. The Safety Board concludes that the Texas and Virginia safety inspection

criteria, which do not adequately address tire pressure, overlook an important factor in

vehicle safety inspection and that the Texas, Virginia, and AAMVA guidelines for vehicle

safety inspections are not thorough enough because they exclude factors such as weather

checking and tire rating. The Safety Board believes that Texas and Virginia should require

that all passenger vehicle inspections include (1) tire pressure measurement and correction

of any inflation deficiencies detected and (2) identification and failure of those tires that

exhibit extensive weather checking and deterioration or that are not properly load-rated.

The Safety Board believes that AAMVA should revise its Passenger Vehicles and Light

Trucks Inspection Handbook to provide guidance on inspecting and failing tires for

extensive weather checking or deterioration and on examining tires to ensure that they

have the proper load rating. 

The tires on both accident vans were in poor condition because neither church had

a comprehensive maintenance program for its vehicle. No one was responsible for making

sure the tires were in sound condition and inflated properly. The Safety Board will inform

various users of 12- and 15-passenger vans about the need to inspect the tires frequently

and to maintain proper tire pressure.
54 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Following the tire blowouts, both accident drivers instinctively, but inappropriately,

applied the brakes and oversteered in an attempt to regain control of their vans;

however, these actions led to further vehicle instability, resulting in loss of control and

subsequent rollover. 

2. There is no evidence of alcohol use, other drug use, or fatigue on the part of either

driver. Weather and roadway conditions did not contribute to either the Henrietta,

Texas, or Randleman, North Carolina, accidents and the emergency response to both

was adequate.

3. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administrationís and the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Administrationís inadequate and inconsistent vehicle classification of 12- and

15-passenger vans leaves a gap that adversely affects regulations pertaining to the

manufacture and safe operation of these vehicles.

4. Safe operation of 15-passenger vans requires a knowledge and skill level different

from and above that for passenger vehicles, particularly when the vans are fully

loaded or drivers experience an emergency situation.

5. During the rollover sequences in the Henrietta, Texas, and Randleman, North

Carolina, accidents, passengers remaining inside the vehicles, as well as some ejected

occupants, sustained injuries as a result of contact with interior surfaces, which were

not required to be protected from occupant impact.

6. Had the passengers in the accident vans been wearing lap/shoulder belts, their injuries

may have been less severe because of fewer and less forceful impacts with

nonoccupant-protected interior components and other occupants and because those

who were ejected would have remained in the vehicles.

7. The lap belt assemblies and anchorages in the center of the fourth row of both

accident vans were configured in a manner that had potential to increase the risk of

injury to passengers in the event of an accident.

8. The roof crush to the Henrietta, Texas, accident van contributed to the severity of the

driverís injuries and diminished survivable space for the passengers.

9. A combination of underinflation, degradation from weather, and, in the case of the

Henrietta, Texas, van tire, a possible infiltration of air through a small puncture, is

likely to have led to the rapid air loss and tread/belt separation on both the Henrietta,

Texas, and the Randleman, North Carolina, left rear tires.
Conclusions 55 Highway Accident Report

10. Because low tire pressure in fully loaded 15-passenger vans contributes to vehicle

instability, the current tire pressure monitoring standard of 25 or 30 percent below

manufacturerís recommended pressure is insufficient to warn van drivers of

potentially unsafe low pressures.

11. The Texas and Virginia safety inspection criteria, which do not adequately address

tire pressure, overlook an important factor in vehicle safety inspection and that the

Texas, Virginia, and American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

guidelines for vehicle safety inspections are not thorough enough because they

exclude factors such as weather checking and tire rating.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the accidents was tire failure, the driversí response to that failure, and the driversí inability

to maintain control of their vans. Contributing to the accidents was the deteriorated

condition of the tires, as a result of the churchesí lack of tire maintenance, and the

handling characteristics of the vans. Contributing to the severity of the injuries was the

lack of appropriate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards applicable to 15-passenger

vans in the areas of restraints and occupant protection.
56 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

In cooperation with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,

revise your definitions of buses and commercial motor vehicles to apply

consistently to 12- and 15-passenger vans, taking into account the unique

operating characteristics and multiple functions of these vans. (H-03-12)

In cooperation with the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education

Association, the National Safety Council, the American Automobile

Association, General Motors Corporation, and Ford Motor Company,

develop a training program that incorporates the skills required for safe

operation of 12- and 15-passenger vans and addresses the consequences of

unsafe operation, including, but not limited to, operating in a fully loaded

condition, emergency braking, high-speed lane changes, tire blowouts, and

tire pressure and maintenance. (H-03-13)

Include 12- and 15-passenger vans in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standard 201, Section 6, ìRequirements for Upper Interior Component

Protection.î (H-03-14)

Include 12- and 15-passenger vans in your upcoming rulemaking that will

require lap/shoulder belts at all center seats. (H-03-15)

Include 12- and 15-passenger vans in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standard 216, ìRoof Crush Resistance,î to minimize the extent to which

survivable space is compromised in the event of a rollover accident. (H03-16)

In developing long-term performance requirements for tire pressure

monitoring systems, adopt more stringent detection standards than 25 or 30

percent below manufacturer-recommended levels, since pressures at those

levels can have an adverse effect on the handling of vehicles, such as 12-

and 15-passenger vans. (H-03-17)

To Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

In cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

revise your definitions of buses and commercial motor vehicles to apply

consistently to 12- and 15-passenger vans, taking into account the unique

operating characteristics and multiple functions of these vans. (H-03-18)
Recommendations 57 Highway Accident Report

To the 50 States and the District of Columbia:

Establish a driverís license endorsement for 12- and 15-passenger vans that

adopts the standards established by the American Driver and Traffic Safety

Education Association; to obtain the endorsement, drivers should have to

complete a training program on the operation of 12- and 15-passenger vans

and pass a written and skills test. (H-03-19)

To Texas and Virginia:

Require that all passenger vehicle inspections include (1) tire pressure

measurement and correction of any inflation deficiencies detected and (2)

identification and failure of those tires that exhibit extensive weather

checking and deterioration or that are not properly load-rated. (H-03-20)

To the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association:

In cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

the National Safety Council, the American Automobile Association,

General Motors Corporation, and Ford Motor Company, develop a training

program that incorporates the skills required for safe operation of 12- and

15-passenger vans and addresses the consequences of unsafe operation,

including, but not limited to, operating in a fully loaded condition,

emergency braking, high-speed lane changes, tire blowouts, and tire

pressure and maintenance. (H-03-21)

To the American Automobile Association and the National Safety Council:

In cooperation with the American Driver and Traffic Safety Association,

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, General Motors

Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and each other, develop a training

program that incorporates the skills required for safe operation of 12- and

15-passenger vans and addresses the consequences of unsafe operation,

including, but not limited to, operating in a fully loaded condition,

emergency braking, high-speed lane changes, tire blowouts, and tire

pressure and maintenance. (H-03-22)

To American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

Revise your Passenger Vehicles and Light Trucks Inspection Handbook to

provide guidance on inspecting and failing tires for extensive weather

checking or deterioration and on examining tires to ensure that they have

the proper load rating. (H-03-23)
Recommendations 58 Highway Accident Report

To Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation:

In cooperation with the American Driver and Traffic Safety Association,

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the National Safety

Council, the American Automobile Association, and each other, develop a

training program that incorporates the skills required for safe operation of

12- and 15-passenger vans and addresses the consequences of unsafe

operation, including, but not limited to, operating in a fully loaded

condition, emergency braking, high-speed lane changes, tire blowouts, and

tire pressure and maintenance. (H-03-22)

Voluntarily develop and install technologies to provide upper interior

component protection within 12- and 15-passenger vans by model year

2006. (H-03-24)

Voluntarily install lap/shoulder belts at all center seating positions in 12-

and 15-passenger vans and make all lap/shoulder belts in outboard and

center seating positions adjustable by model year 2006. (H-03-25)

Redesign the seat belts in your 12- and 15-passenger vans to ensure that the

buckle and latch components remain readily accessible to occupants at all

times by model year 2006. (H-03-26)

Voluntarily redesign 12- and 15-passenger vans to minimize the extent to

which survivable space is compromised in the event of a rollover accident

by model year 2006. (H-03-27)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

ELLEN G. ENGLEMAN JOHN J. GOGLIA

Chairman Member

MARK V. ROSENKER CAROL J. CARMODY

Vice Chairman Member

RICHARD F. HEALING

Member

Adopted: July 15, 2003
59 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Henrietta, Texas, Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Henrietta, Texas,

accident on May 8, 2001. The Safety Board dispatched an investigative team consisting of

members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Worth, Texas; and

Parsippany, New Jersey, offices. Groups were established to investigate human

performance; motor carrier operations; and highway, vehicle, and survival factors and to

conduct on-scene documentation.

Representatives of Michelin, North America, Inc., participated in the investigation.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.

Randleman, North Carolina, Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Randleman, North

Carolina, accident on July 1, 2001. The Safety Board dispatched an investigative team

consisting of members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Worth, Texas;

and Parsippany, New Jersey, offices. Groups were established to investigate human

performance; motor carrier operations; and highway, vehicle, and survival factors.

Representatives of Michelin, North America, Inc., participated in the investigation.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.
60 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B

Potential Occupant Motion in Simulations
Time = 0.0 seconds (~13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (~40° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (~110° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (~220° rotation) 

Time = 2.0 seconds (~380° rotation) Time = 3.05 seconds (~420° rotation) 

Figure 1. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics for Run One in the 

actual restraint condition at various stages of the rollover. 
Time = 0.0 seconds (13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (46° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (146° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (327° rotation) 

 Time = 2.0 seconds (463° rotation) 

Figure 2. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics for Run Two in the

actual restraint condition at various stages of the rollover. 
Time = 0.0 seconds (13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (82° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (203° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (382° rotation) 

 Time = 2.0 seconds (450° rotation) 

Figure 3. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics for Run Three in

the actual restraint condition at various stages of the rollover. 
Time = 0.0 seconds (13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (84° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (205° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (390° rotation) 

 Time = 2.0 seconds (529° rotation) 

Figure 4. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics for Run Four in the 

actual restraint condition at various stages of the rollover. 
Time = 0.0 seconds (~13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (~40° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (~110° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (~220° rotation) 

Time = 2.0 seconds (~380° rotation) 

Figure 5. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics in the lap-belted 

condition at various stages of the rollover. 
Time = 0.0 seconds (~13° rotation) Time = 0.4 seconds (~40° rotation) 

Time = 0.8 seconds (~110° rotation) Time = 1.3 seconds (~220° rotation) 

Time = 2.0 seconds (~380° rotation) 

Figure 6. A series of still images illustrating the occupant kinematics in the lap/shoulderbelted condition at various stages of the rollover. 
67 Highway Accident Report

Appendix C

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 201, 209, and 216
446

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

[67 FR 38746, June 5, 2002]

§ 571.201 Standard No. 201; Occupant 

protection in interior impact. 

S1. Purpose and scope. This standard 

specifies requirements to afford impact 

protection for occupants. 

S2. Application. This standard applies 

to passenger cars and to multipurpose 

passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses 

with a GVWR of 4,536 kilograms or less, 

except that the requirements of S6 do 

not apply to buses with a GVWR of 

more than 3,860 kilograms. 

S3. Definitions.

A-pillar means any pillar that is entirely forward of a transverse vertical 

plane passing through the seating reference point of the driver’s seat. 

Ambulance means a motor vehicle designed exclusively for the purpose of 

emergency medical care, as evidenced 

by the presence of a passenger compartment to accommodate emergency 

medical personnel, one or more patients on litters or cots, and equipment 

and supplies for emergency care at a 

location or during transport. 

B-pillar means the forwardmost pillar 

on each side of the vehicle that is, in 

whole or part, rearward of a transverse 

vertical plane passing through the 

seating reference point of the driver’s 

seat, unless there is only one pillar 

rearward of that plane and it is also a 

rearmost pillar. 

Brace means a fixed diagonal structural member in an open body vehicle 

that is used to brace the roll-bar and 

that connects the roll-bar to the main 

body of the vehicle structure. 

Convertible means a vehicle whose Apillars are not joined with the B-pillars 

(or rearmost pillars) by a fixed, rigid 

structural member. 

Convertible roof frame means the 

frame of a convertible roof. 

Convertible roof linkage mechanism

means any anchorage, fastener, or device necessary to deploy a convertible 

roof frame. 

Daylight opening means, for openings 

on the side of the vehicle, other than a 

door opening, the locus of all points 

where a horizontal line, perpendicular 

to the vehicle longitudinal centerline, 

is tangent to the periphery of the opening. For openings on the front and rear 

of the vehicle, other than a door opening, daylight opening means the locus of 

all points where a horizontal line, parallel to the vehicle longitudinal centerline, is tangent to the periphery of the 

opening. If the horizontal line is tangent to the periphery at more than one 

point at any location, the most inboard 

point is used to determine the daylight 

opening. 

Door opening means, for door openings on the side of the vehicle, the 

locus of all points where a horizontal 

line, perpendicular to the vehicle longitudinal centerline, is tangent to the periphery of the side door opening. For 

door openings on the back end of the 

vehicle, door opening means the locus 

of all points where a horizontal line, 

parallel to the vehicle longitudinal 

centerline, is tangent to the periphery 

of the back door opening. If the horizontal line is tangent to the periphery 

at more than one point at any location, 

the most inboard point is the door 

opening. 

Dynamically deployed upper interior 

head protection system means a protective device or devices which are integrated into a vehicle and which, when 

activated by an impact, provide, 

through means requiring no action 

from occupants, protection against 

head impacts with upper interior structures and components of the vehicle in 

crashes. 

Forehead impact zone means the part 

of the free motion headform surface 

area that is determined in accordance 

with the procedure set forth in S8.10. 

Free motion headform means a test device which conforms to the specifications of part 572, subpart L of this 

chapter. 

Mid-sagittal plane of a dummy means a 

longitudinal vertical plane passing 

through the seating reference point of 

a designated seating position. 

Motor Home means a motor vehicle 

with motive power that is designed to 

provide temporary residential accommodations, as evidenced by the presence of at least four of the following facilities: Cooking; refrigeration or ice 

box; self-contained toilet; heating and/

or air conditioning; a potable water 

supply system including a faucet and a 

sink; and a separate 110–125 volt electrical power supply and/or an LP gas 

supply. 

447

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

Other pillar means any pillar which is 

not an A-pillar, a B-pillar, or a rearmost pillar. 

Pillar means any structure, excluding 

glazing and the vertical portion of door 

window frames, but including accompanying moldings, attached components such as safety belt anchorages 

and coat hooks, which: 

(1) Supports either a roof or any 

other structure (such as a roll-bar) 

that is above the driver’s head, or 

(2) Is located along the side edge of a 

window. 

Roll-bar means a fixed overhead 

structural member, including its 

vertical support structure, that extends from the left to the right side of 

the passenger compartment of any 

open body vehicles and convertibles. It 

does not include a header. 

Seat belt anchorage means any component involved in transferring seat belt 

loads to the vehicle structure, including, but not limited to, the attachment 

hardware, but excluding webbing or 

straps, seat frames, seat pedestals, and 

the vehicle structure itself, whose failure causes separation of the belt from 

the vehicle structure. 

Sliding door track means a track 

structure along the upper edge of a side 

door opening that secures the door in 

the closed position and guides the door 

when moving to and from the open position. 

Stiffener means a fixed overhead 

structural member that connects one 

roll-bar to another roll-bar or to a 

header of any open body vehicle or convertible. 

Upper roof means the area of the vehicle interior that is determined in accordance with the procedure set forth 

in S8.15. 

Windshield trim means molding of any 

material between the windshield glazing and the exterior roof surface, including material that covers a part of 

either the windshield glazing or exterior roof surface. 

S4 Requirements

S4.1 Except as provided in S4.2, each 

vehicle shall comply with either: 

(a) The requirements specified in S5, 

or, 

(b) The requirements specified in S5 

and S6. 

S4.2 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1998 shall comply 

with the requirements of S5 and S6. 

S5 Requirements for instrument panels, seat backs, interior compartment 

doors, sun visors, and armrests. Each vehicle shall comply with the requirements specified in S5.1 through S5.5.2. 

S5.1 Instrument panels. Except as 

provided in S5.1.1, when that area of 

the instrument panel that is within the 

head impact area is impacted in accordance with S5.1.2 by a 6.8 kilogram, 

165 mm diameter head form at—

(a) A relative velocity of 24 kilometers per hour for all vehicles except 

those specified in paragraph (b) of this 

section, 

(b) A relative velocity of 19 kilometers per hour for vehicles that meet 

the occupant crash protection requirements of S5.1 of 49 CFR 571.208 by 

means of inflatable restraint systems 

and meet the requirements of 

S4.1.5.1(a)(3) by means of a Type 2 seat 

belt assembly at the right front designated seating position, the deceleration of the head form shall not exceed 

80 g continuously for more than 3 milliseconds. 

S5.1.1 The requirements of S5.1 do 

not apply to: 

(a) Console assemblies; 

(b) Areas less than 125 mm inboard 

from the juncture of the instrument 

panel attachment to the body side 

inner structure; 

(c) Areas closer to the windshield 

juncture than those statically 

contactable by the head form with the 

windshield in place; 

(d) Areas outboard of any point of 

tangency on the instrument panel of a 

165 mm diameter head form tangent to 

and inboard of a vertical longitudinal 

plane tangent to the inboard edge of 

the steering wheel; or 

(e) Areas below any point at which a 

vertical line is tangent to the rearmost 

surface of the panel. 

S5.1.2 Demonstration procedures.

Tests shall be performed as described 

in Society of Automotive Engineers 

Recommended Practice J921, 

‘‘Instrument Panel Laboratory Impact 

Test Procedure,’’ June 1965, using the 

specified instrumentation or instrumentation that meets the performance 

requirements specified in Society of 

448

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

Automotive Engineers Recommended 

Practice J977, ‘‘Instrumentation for 

Laboratory Impact Tests,’’ November 

1966, except that: 

(a) The origin of the line tangent to 

the instrument panel surface shall be a 

point on a transverse horizontal line 

through a point 125 mm horizontally 

forward of the seating reference point 

of the front outboard passenger designated seating position, displaced 

vertically an amount equal to the rise 

which results from a 125 mm forward 

adjustment of the seat or 19 mm; and 

(b) Direction of impact shall be either: 

(1) In a vertical plane parallel to the 

vehicle longitudinal axis; or 

(2) In a plane normal to the surface 

at the point of contact. 

S5.2 Seat Backs. Except as provided 

in S5.2.1, when that area of the seat 

back that is within the head impact 

area is impacted in accordance with 

S5.2.2 by a 6.8 kilogram, 165 mm diameter head form at a relative velocity of 

24 kilometers per hour, the deceleration of the head form shall not exceed 

80g continuously for more than 3 milliseconds. 

S5.2.1 The requirements of S5.2 do 

not apply to seats installed in school 

buses which comply with the requirements of Standard No. 222, School Bus 

Passenger Seating and Occupant Protection (49 CFR 571.222) or to rearmost 

side-facing, back-to-back, folding auxiliary jump, and temporary seats. 

S5.2.2 Demonstration procedures.

Tests shall be performed as described 

in Society of Automotive Engineers 

Recommended Practice J921, 

‘‘Instrument Panel Laboratory Impact 

Test Procedure,’’ June 1965, using the 

specified instrumentation or instrumentation that meets the performance 

requirements specified in Society of 

Automotive Engineers Recommended 

Practice J977, ‘‘Instrumentation for 

Laboratory Impact Tests,’’ November 

1966, except that: 

(a) The origin of the line tangent to 

the uppermost seat back frame component shall be a point on a transverse 

horizontal line through the seating reference point of the right rear designated seating position, with adjustable forward seats in their rearmost design driving position and reclinable 

forward seat backs in their nominal design driving position; 

(b) Direction of impact shall be either: 

(1) In a vertical plane parallel to the 

vehicle longitudinal axis; or 

(2) In a plane normal to the surface 

at the point of contact. 

(c) For seats without head restraints 

installed, tests shall be performed for 

each individual split or bucket seat 

back at points within 100 mm left and 

right of its centerline, and for each 

bench seat back between points 100 mm 

outboard of the centerline of each outboard designated seating position; 

(d) For seats having head restraints 

installed, each test shall be conducted 

with the head restraints in place at its 

lowest adjusted position, at a point on 

the head restraint centerline; and 

(e) For a seat that is installed in 

more than one body style, tests conducted at the fore and aft extremes 

identified by application of subparagraph (a) shall be deemed to have demonstrated all intermediate conditions. 

S5.3 Interior compartment doors. Each 

interior compartment door assembly 

located in an instrument panel, console 

assembly, seat back, or side panel adjacent to a designated seating position 

shall remain closed when tested in accordance with either S5.3.1(a) and 

S5.3.1(b) or S5.3.1(a) and S5.3.1(c). Additionally, any interior compartment 

door located in an instrument panel or 

seat back shall remain closed when the 

instrument panel or seat back is tested 

in accordance with S5.1 and S5.2. All 

interior compartment door assemblies 

with a locking device must be tested 

with the locking device in an unlocked 

position. 

S5.3.1 Demonstration procedures.

(a) Subject the interior compartment 

door latch system to an inertia load of 

10g in a horizontal transverse direction 

and an inertia load of 10g in a vertical 

direction in accordance with the procedure described in section 5 of SAE Recommended Practice J839b, ‘‘Passenger 

Car Side Door Latch Systems,’’ May 

1965, or an approved equivalent. 

(b) Impact the vehicle perpendicularly into a fixed collision barrier at a 

forward longitudinal velocity of 48 kilometers per hour. 

449

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

(c) Subject the interior compartment 

door latch system to a horizontal inertia load of 30g in a longitudinal direction in accordance with the procedure 

described in section 5 of SAE Recommended Practice J839b, ‘‘Passenger 

Car Side Door Latch Systems,’’ May 

1965, or an approved equivalent. 

S5.4 Sun visors.

S5.4.1 A sun visor that is constructed of or covered with energy-absorbing material shall be provided for 

each front outboard designated seating 

position. 

S5.4.2 Each sun visor mounting 

shall present no rigid material edge radius of less than 3.2 mm that is statically contactable by a spherical 165 

mm diameter head form. 

S5.5 Armrests.

S5.5.1 General. Each installed armrest shall conform to at least one of 

the following: 

(a) It shall be constructed with energy-absorbing material and shall deflect or collapse laterally at least 50 

mm without permitting contact with 

any underlying rigid material. 

(b) It shall be constructed with energy-absorbing material that deflects 

or collapses to within 32 mm of a rigid 

test panel surface without permitting 

contact with any rigid material. Any 

rigid material between 13 and 32 mm 

from the panel surface shall have a 

minimum vertical height of not less 

than 25 mm. 

(c) Along not less than 50 continuous 

mm of its length, the armrest shall, 

when measured vertically in side elevation, provide at least 50 mm of coverage within the pelvic impact area. 

S5.5.2 Folding armrests. Each armrest 

that folds into the seat back or between two seat backs shall either: 

(a) Meet the requirements of S5.5.1; 

or 

(b) Be constructed of or covered with 

energy-absorbing material. 

S6 Requirements for upper interior 

components.

S6.1 Vehicles manufactured on or after 

September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 

2002. Except as provided in S6.3, for vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 

2002, a percentage of the manufacturer’s production, as specified in S6.1.1, 

S6.1.2, S6.1.3, or S6.1.4, shall conform, 

at the manufacturer’s option, to either 

S6.1(a) or S6.1(b). The manufacturer 

shall select the option by the time it 

certifies the vehicle and may not thereafter select a different option for the 

vehicle. 

(a) When tested under the conditions 

of S8, comply with the requirements 

specified in S7 at the target locations 

specified in S10 when impacted by the 

free motion headform specified in S8.9 

at any speed up to and including 24 km/

h (15 mph). The requirements do not 

apply to any target that cannot be located using the procedures of S10. 

(b) When equipped with a dynamically deployed upper interior head protection system and tested under the 

conditions of S8, comply with the requirements specified in S7 at the target 

locations specified in S10 as follows: 

(1) Targets that are not located over 

any point inside the area measured 

along the contour of the vehicle surface within 50 mm (2.0 inch) of the periphery of the stowed system projected 

perpendicularly onto the vehicle interior surface, including mounting and 

inflation components but exclusive of 

any cover or covers, shall be impacted 

by the free motion headform specified 

in S8.9 at any speed up to and including 

24 km/h (15 mph). The requirements do 

not apply to any targets that can not 

be located by using the procedures of 

S10. 

(2) Targets that are over any point 

inside the area measured along the 

contour of the vehicle interior within 

50 mm (2.0 inch) of the periphery of the 

stowed system projected perpendicularly onto the vehicle interior surface, 

including mounting and inflation components but exclusive of any cover or 

covers, when the dynamically deployed 

upper interior head protection system 

is not deployed, shall be impacted by 

the free motion headform specified in 

S8.9 at any speed up to and including 19 

km/h (12 mph) with the system 

undeployed. The requirements do not 

apply to any target that can not be located using the procedures of S10. 

(3) Each vehicle shall, when equipped 

with a dummy test device specified in 

Part 572, Subpart M, and tested as 

specified in S8.16 through S8.28, comply 

with the requirements specified in S7 

when crashed into a fixed, rigid pole of 

450

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

254 mm in diameter, at any velocity between 24 kilometers per hour (15 mph) 

and 29 kilometers per hour (18 mph). 

S6.1.1 Phase-in Schedule #1

S6.1.1.1 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 1999. Subject to S6.1.5(a), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 1998 and 

before September 1, 1999, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 10 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1996 and 

before September 1, 1999, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 1998 and before 

September 1, 1999. 

S6.1.1.2 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1999 and before September 1, 2000. Subject to S6.1.5(b), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 1999 and 

before September 1, 2000, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 25 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1997 and 

before September 1, 2000, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 1999 and before 

September 1, 2000. 

S6.1.1.3 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 2000 and before September 1, 2001. Subject to S6.1.5(c), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2000 and 

before September 1, 2001, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 40 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1998 and 

before September 1, 2001, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 2000 and before 

September 1, 2001. 

S6.1.1.4 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 2001 and before September 1, 2002. Subject to S6.1.5(d), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2001 and 

before September 1, 2002, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 70 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1999 and 

before September 1, 2002, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 2001 and before 

September 1, 2002. 

S6.1.2 Phase-in Schedule #2

S6.1.2.1 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 1999. Subject to S6.1.5(a), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 1998 and 

before September 1, 1999, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than seven percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1996 and 

before September 1, 1999, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 1998 and before 

September 1, 1999. 

S6.1.2.2 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1999 and before September 1, 2000. Subject to S6.1.5(b), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 1999 and 

before September 1, 2000, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 31 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1997 and 

before September 1, 2000, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 1999 and before 

September 1, 2000. 

S6.1.2.3 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 2000 and before September 1, 2001. Subject to S6.1.5(c), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2000 and 

before September 1, 2001, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 40 percent of: 

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1998 and 

before September 1, 2001, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 2000 and before 

September 1, 2001. 

S6.1.2.4 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 2001 and before September 1, 2002. Subject to S6.1.5(d), for 

vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2001 and 

before September 1, 2002, the amount of 

vehicles complying with S7 shall be not 

less than 70 percent of: 

451

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

(a) The manufacturer’s average annual production of vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1999 and 

before September 1, 2002, or 

(b) The manufacturer’s production on 

or after September 1, 2001 and before 

September 1, 2002. 

S6.1.3 Phase-in Schedule #3

S6.1.3.1 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 1999 are not required to comply with the requirements specified in 

S7. 

S6.1.3.2 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1999 shall comply 

with the requirements specified in S7. 

S6.1.4 Phase-in Schedule #4 A final 

stage manufacturer or alterer may, at 

its option, comply with the requirements set forth in S6.1.4.1 and S6.1.4.2. 

S6.1.4.1 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1998 and before September 1, 2003 are not required to comply with the requirements specified in 

S7. 

S6.1.4.2 Vehicles manufactured on or 

after September 1, 2003 shall comply 

with the requirements specified in S7. 

S6.1.5 Calculation of complying vehicles. 

(a) For the purposes of complying 

with S6.1.1.1 or S6.1.2.1, a manufacturer 

may count a vehicle if it is manufactured on or after May 8, 1997, but before 

September 1, 1999. 

(b) For the purposes of complying 

with S6.1.1.2 or S6.1.2.2, a manufacturer 

may count a vehicle if it: 

(1) Is manufactured on or after May 

8, 1997, but before September 1, 2000, 

and 

(2) Is not counted toward compliance 

with S6.1.1.1 or S6.1.2.1, as appropriate. 

(c) For the purposes of complying 

with S6.1.1.3 or S6.1.2.3, a manufacturer 

may count a vehicle if it: 

(1) Is manufactured on or after May 

8, 1997, but before September 1, 2001, 

and 

(2) Is not counted toward compliance 

with S6.1.1.1, S6.1.1.2, S6.1.2.1, or 

S6.1.2.2, as appropriate. 

(d) For the purposes of complying 

with S6.1.1.4 or S6.1.2.4, a manufacturer 

may count a vehicle if it: 

(1) Is manufactured on or after May 

8, 1997, but before September 1, 2002, 

and 

(2) Is not counted toward compliance 

with S6.1.1.1, S6.1.1.2, S6.1.1.3, S6.1.2.1, 

S6.1.2.2, or S6.1.2.3, as appropriate. 

S6.1.6 Vehicles produced by more than 

one manufacturer. 

S6.1.6.1 For the purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each manufacturer and the 

number of vehicles manufactured by 

each manufacturer under S6.1.1 

through S6.1.4, a vehicle produced by 

more than one manufacturer shall be 

attributed to a single manufacturer as 

follows, subject to S6.1.6.2. 

(a) A vehicle which is imported shall 

be attributed to the importer. 

(b) A vehicle manufactured in the 

United States by more than one manufacturer, one of which also markets the 

vehicle, shall be attributed to the manufacturer which markets the vehicle. 

S6.1.6.2 A vehicle produced by more 

than one manufacturer shall be attributed to any one of the vehicle’s manufacturers specified by an express written contract, reported to the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

under 49 CFR part 589, between the 

manufacturer so specified and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would 

otherwise be attributed under S6.1.6.1. 

S6.2 Vehicles manufactured on or after 

September 1, 2002. Except as provided in 

S6.3, vehicles manufactured on or after 

September 1, 2002 shall, when tested 

under the conditions of S8, conform, at 

the manufacturer’s option, to either 

S6.2(a) or S6.2(b). The manufacturer 

shall select the option by the time it 

certifies the vehicle and may not thereafter select a different option for the 

vehicle. 

(a) When tested under the conditions 

of S8, comply with the requirements 

specified in S7 at the target locations 

specified in S10 when impacted by the 

free motion headform specified in S8.9 

at any speed up to and including 24 km/

h (15 mph). The requirements do not 

apply to any target that cannot be located using the procedures of S10. 

(b) When equipped with a dynamically deployed upper interior head protection system and tested under the 

conditions of S8, comply with the requirements specified in S7 at the target 

locations specified in S10 as follows: 

(1) Targets that are not located over 

any point inside the area measured 

452

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

along the contour of the vehicle surface within 50 mm (2.0 inch) of the periphery of the stowed system projected 

perpendicularly onto the vehicle interior surface, including mounting and 

inflation components but exclusive of 

any cover or covers, shall be impacted 

by the free motion headform specified 

in S8.9 at any speed up to and including 

24 km/h (15 mph). The requirements do 

not apply to any targets that cannot be 

located by using the procedures of S10. 

(2) Targets that are over any point 

inside the area measured along the 

contour of the vehicle interior within 

50 mm (2.0 inch) of the periphery of the 

stowed system projected perpendicularly onto the vehicle interior surface, 

including mounting and inflation components but exclusive of any cover or 

covers, when the dynamically deployed 

upper interior head protection system 

is not deployed, shall be impacted by 

the free motion headform specified in 

S8.9 at any speed up to and including 19 

km/h (12 mph) with the system 

undeployed. The requirements do not 

apply to any target that cannot be located using the procedures of S10. 

(3) Each vehicle shall, when equipped 

with a dummy test device specified in 

Part 572, Subpart M, and tested as 

specified in S8.16 through S8.28, comply 

with the requirements specified in S7 

when crashed into a fixed, rigid pole of 

254 mm in diameter, at any velocity between 24 kilometers per hour (15 mph) 

and 29 kilometers per hour (18 mph). 

S6.3 A vehicle need not meet the requirements of S6.1 through S6.2 for: 

(a) Any target located on a convertible roof frame or a convertible roof 

linkage mechanism. 

(b) Any target located rearward of a 

vertical plane 600 mm behind the seating reference point of the rearmost designated seating position. 

(c) Any target located rearward of a 

vertical plane 600 mm behind the seating reference point of the driver’s seating position in an ambulance or a 

motor home. 

(d) Any target in a walk-in van-type 

vehicles. 

S7 Performance Criterion. The HIC(d) 

shall not exceed 1000 when calculated 

in accordance with the following formula:

HIC

t t

adt t t

t

t

= ( ) −















 ( ) − ∫ 1

2 1

2 5

2 1

1

2

.

Where the term a is the resultant head 

acceleration expressed as a multiple of 

g (the acceleration of gravity), and t1 

and t2 are any two points in time during the impact which are separated by 

not more than a 36 millisecond time interval. 

(a) For the free motion headform; 

HIC(d)=0.75446 (free motion headform 

HIC)+166.4. 

(b) For the part 572, subpart M, 

anthropomorphic test dummy; 

HIC(d)=HIC. 

S8 Target location and test conditions. 

The vehicle shall be tested and the targets specified in S10 located under the 

following conditions. 

S8.1 Vehicle test attitude. 

(a) The vehicle is supported off its 

suspension at an attitude determined 

in accordance with S8.1(b). 

(b) Directly above each wheel opening, determine the vertical distance between a level surface and a standard 

reference point on the test vehicle’s 

body under the conditions of S8.1(b)(1) 

through S8.1(b)(3). 

(1) The vehicle is loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight, plus its rated 

cargo and luggage capacity or 136 kg, 

whichever is less, secured in the luggage area. The load placed in the cargo 

area is centered over the longitudinal 

centerline of the vehicle. 

(2) The vehicle is filled to 100 percent 

of all fluid capacities. 

(3) All tires are inflated to the manufacturer’s specifications listed on the 

vehicle’s tire placard. 

S8.2 Windows and Sunroofs. 

(a) Movable vehicle windows are 

placed in the fully open position. 

(b) For testing, any window on the 

opposite side of the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle from the target 

to be impacted may be removed. 

(c) For testing, movable sunroofs are 

placed in the fully open position. 

S8.3 Convertible tops. The top, if any, 

of convertibles and open-body type vehicles is in the closed passenger compartment configuration. 

S8.4 Doors. 


ER04AU98.002</GPH>
453

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

(a) Except as provided in S8.4(b) or 

S8.4(c), doors, including any rear 

hatchback or tailgate, are fully closed 

and latched but not locked. 

(b) During testing, any side door on 

the opposite side of the longitudinal 

centerline of the vehicle from the target to be impacted may be open or removed. 

(c) During testing, any rear 

hatchback or tailgate may be open or 

removed for testing any target except 

targets on the rear header, rearmost 

pillars, or the rearmost other side rail 

on either side of the vehicle. 

S8.5 Sun visors. Each sun visor shall 

be placed in any position where one 

side of the visor is in contact with the 

vehicle interior surface (windshield, 

side rail, front header, roof, etc.). 

S8.6 Steering wheel and seats.

(a) During targeting, the steering 

wheel and seats may be placed in any 

position intended for use while the vehicle is in motion. 

(b) During testing, the steering wheel 

and seats may be removed from the vehicle. 

S8.7 Seat belt anchorages. If a target 

is on a seat belt anchorage, and if the 

seat belt anchorage is adjustable, tests 

are conducted with the anchorage adjusted to a point midway between the 

two extreme adjustment positions. If 

the anchorage has distinct adjustment 

positions, none of which is midway between the two extreme positions, tests 

are conducted with the anchorage adjusted to the nearest position above 

the midpoint of the two extreme positions. 

S8.8 Temperature and humidity.

(a) The ambient temperature is between 19 degrees C. and 26 degrees C., 

at any relative humidity between 10 

percent and 70 percent. 

(b) Tests are not conducted unless 

the headform specified in S8.9 is exposed to the conditions specified in 

S8.8(a) for a period not less than four 

hours. 

S8.9 Headform. The headform used 

for testing conforms to the specifications of part 572, subpart L of this 

chapter. 

S8.10 Forehead impact zone. The forehead impact zone of the headform is determined according to the procedure 

specified in (a) through (f). 

(a) Position the headform so that the 

baseplate of the skull is horizontal. 

The midsagittal plane of the headform 

is designated as Plane S. 

(b) From the center of the threaded 

hole on top of the headform, draw a 69 

mm line forward toward the forehead, 

coincident with Plane S, along the contour of the outer skin of the headform. 

The front end of the line is designated 

as Point P. From Point P, draw a 100 

mm line forward toward the forehead, 

coincident with Plane S, along the contour of the outer skin of the headform. 

The front end of the line is designated 

as Point O. 

(c) Draw a 125 mm line which is coincident with a horizontal plane along 

the contour of the outer skin of the 

forehead from left to right through 

Point O so that the line is bisected at 

Point O. The end of the line on the left 

side of the headform is designated as 

Point a and the end on the right as 

Point b. 

(d) Draw another 125 mm line which 

is coincident with a vertical plane 

along the contour of the outer skin of 

the forehead through Point P so that 

the line is bisected at Point P. The end 

of the line on the left side of the 

headform is designated as Point c and 

the end on the right as Point d. 

(e) Draw a line from Point a to Point 

c along the contour of the outer skin of 

the headform using a flexible steel 

tape. Using the same method, draw a 

line from Point b to Point d. 

(f) The forehead impact zone is the 

surface area on the FMH forehead 

bounded by lines a-O-b and c-P-d, and 

a-c and b-d. 

S8.11 Target circle. The area of the 

vehicle to be impacted by the headform 

is marked with a solid circle 12.7 mm in 

diameter, centered on the targets specified in S10, using any transferable 

opaque coloring medium. 

S8.12 Location of head center of gravity.

(a) Location of head center of gravity 

for front outboard designated seating positions (CG–F). For determination of 

head center of gravity, all directions 

are in reference to the seat orientation. 

(1) Location of rearmost CG–F (CG–F2).

For front outboard designated seating 

positions, the head center of gravity 

with the seat in its rearmost normal 

454

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

design driving or riding position (CG–

F2) is located 160 mm rearward and 660 

mm upward from the seating reference 

point. 

(2) Location of forwardmost CG–F (CG–

F1). For front outboard designated 

seating positions, the head center of 

gravity with the seat in its 

forwardmost adjustment position (CG–

F1) is located horizontally forward of 

CG–F2 by the distance equal to the 

fore-aft distance of the seat track. 

(b) Location of head center of gravity 

for rear outboard designated seating positions (CG–R). For rear outboard designated seating positions, the head center of gravity (CG–R) is located 160 mm 

rearward, relative to the seat orientation, and 660 mm upward from the seating reference point. 

S8.13 Impact configuration.

S8.13.1 The headform is launched 

from any location inside the vehicle 

which meets the conditions of S8.13.4. 

At the time of launch, the midsagittal 

plane of the headform is vertical and 

the headform is upright. 

S8.13.2 The headform travels freely 

through the air, along a velocity vector 

that is perpendicular to the headform’s 

skull cap plate, not less than 25 mm before making any contact with the vehicle. 

S8.13.3 At the time of initial contact 

between the headform and the vehicle 

interior surface, some portion of the 

forehead impact zone of the headform 

must contact some portion of the target circle. 

S8.13.4 Approach Angles. The 

headform launching angle is as specified in Table 1. For components for 

which Table 1 specifies a range of angles, the headform launching angle is 

within the limits determined using the 

procedures specified in S8.13.4.1 and 

S8.13.4.2, and within the range specified 

in Table I, using the orthogonal reference system specified in S9.

TABLE 1.—APPROACH ANGLE LIMITS

[In degrees] 

Target component Horizontal angle 

Vertical 

angle 

Front Header ............................... 180 0–50

Rear Header ................................ 0 or 360 0–50

Left Side Rail ............................... 270 0–50

Right Side Rail ............................. 90 0–50

Left Sliding Door Track ................ 270 0–50

Right Sliding Door Track ............. 90 0–50

TABLE 1.—APPROACH ANGLE LIMITS—

Continued

[In degrees] 

Target component Horizontal 

angle 

Vertical 

angle 

Left A-Pillar .................................. 195–255 ¥5–50

Right A-Pillar ................................ 105–165 ¥5–50

Left B-Pillar .................................. 195–345 ¥10–50

Right B-Pillar ................................ 15–165 ¥10–50

Other Left Pillars .......................... 270 ¥10–50

Other Right Pillars ....................... 90 ¥10–50

Left Rearmost Pillar ..................... 270–345 ¥10–50

Right Rearmost Pillar .................. 15–90 ¥10–50

Upper Roof .................................. Any 0–50

Overhead Rollbar ........................ 0 or 180 0–50

Brace or Stiffener ........................ 90 or 270 0–50

Seat Belt Anchorages .................. Any 0–50

S8.13.4.1 Horizontal Approach Angles 

for Headform Impacts.

(a) Left A-Pillar Horizontal Approach 

Angles.

(1) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F1 

for the left seat and the right A-pillar. 

The maximum horizontal approach 

angle for the left A-pillar equals 360 degrees minus the angle formed by that 

line and the X-axis of the vehicle, 

measured counterclockwise. 

(2) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F2 

for the left seat and the left A-pillar. 

The minimum horizontal approach 

angle for the left A-pillar impact 

equals the angle formed by that line 

and the X-axis of the vehicle, measured 

counterclockwise. 

(b) Right A-Pillar Horizontal Approach 

Angles.

(1) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F1 

for the right seat and the left A-pillar. 

The minimum horizontal approach 

angle for the right A-pillar equals 360 

degrees minus the angle formed by that 

line and the X-axis of the vehicle, 

measured counterclockwise. 

(2) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F2 

for the right seat and the right A-pillar. The maximum horizontal approach 

angle for the right A-pillar impact 

equals the angle formed by that line 

and the X-axis of the vehicle measured 

counterclockwise. 

(c) Left B-Pillar Horizontal Approach 

Angles.

(1) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F2 

for the left seat and the left B-pillar. 

455

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

The maximum horizontal approach 

angle for the left B-pillar equals the 

angle formed by that line and the Xaxis of the vehicle measured counterclockwise, or 270 degrees, whichever is 

greater. 

(2) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–R 

for the left seat and the left B-pillar. 

The minimum horizontal approach 

angle for the left B-pillar equals the 

angle formed by that line and the Xaxis of the vehicle measured counterclockwise. 

(d) Right B-Pillar Horizontal Approach 

Angles.

(1) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–F2 

for the right seat and the right B-pillar. The minimum horizontal approach 

angle for the right B-pillar equals the 

angle formed by that line and the Xaxis of the vehicle measured counterclockwise, or 90 degrees, whichever is 

less. 

(2) Locate a line formed by the shortest horizontal distance between CG–R 

for the right seat and the right B-pillar. The maximum horizontal approach 

angle for the right B-pillar equals the 

angle between that line and the X-axis 

of the vehicle measured counterclockwise. 

S8.13.4.2 Vertical Approach Angles

(a) Position the forehead impact zone 

in contact with the selected target at 

the prescribed horizontal approach 

angle. If a range of horizontal approach 

angles is prescribed, position the forehead impact zone in contact with the 

selected target at any horizontal approach angle within the range which 

may be used for testing. 

(b) Keeping the forehead impact zone 

in contact with the target, rotate the 

FMH upward until the lip, chin or 

other part of the FMH contacts the 

component or other portion of the vehicle interior. 

(1) Except as provided in 

S8.13.4.2(b)(2), keeping the forehead impact zone in contact with the target, 

rotate the FMH downward by 5 degrees 

for each target to determine the maximum vertical angle. 

(2) For all pillars except A-Pillars, 

keeping the forehead impact zone in 

contact with the target, rotate the 

FMH downward by 10 degrees for each 

target to determine the maximum 

vertical angle. 

S8.14 Multiple impacts. 

(a) A vehicle being tested may be impacted multiple times, subject to the 

limitations in S8.14 (b) and (c). 

(b) As measured as provided in 

S8.14(d), impacts within 300 mm of each 

other may not occur less than 30 minutes apart. 

(c) As measured as provided in 

S8.14(d), no impact may occur within 

150 mm of any other impact. 

(d) For S8.14(b) and S8.14(c), the distance between impacts is the distance 

between the centers of the target circle 

specified in S8.11 for each impact, 

measured along the vehicle interior. 

S8.15 Upper Roof. The upper roof of a 

vehicle is determined according to the 

procedure specified in S8.15 (a) through 

(h). 

(a) Locate the transverse vertical 

plane A at the forwardmost point 

where it contacts the interior roof 

(including trim) at the vehicle centerline. 

(b) Locate the transverse vertical 

plane B at the rearmost point where it 

contacts the interior roof (including 

trim) at the vehicle centerline. 

(c) Measure the horizontal distance 

(D1) between Plane A and Plane B. 

(d) Locate the vertical longitudinal 

plane C at the leftmost point at which 

a vertical transverse plane, located 300 

mm rearward of the A-pillar reference 

point described in S10.1(a), contacts the 

interior roof (including trim). 

(e) Locate the vertical longitudinal 

plane D at the rightmost point at 

which a vertical transverse plane, located 300 mm rearward of the A-pillar 

reference point described in S10.1(a), 

contacts the interior roof (including 

trim). 

(f) Measure the horizontal distance 

(D2) between Plane C and Plane D. 

(g) Locate a point (Point M) on the 

interior roof surface, midway between 

Plane A and Plane B along the vehicle 

longitudinal centerline. 

(h) The upper roof zone is the area of 

the vehicle upper interior surface 

bounded by the four planes described in 

S8.15(h)(1) and S8.15(h)(2): 

(1) A transverse vertical plane E located at a distance of (.35 D1) forward 

of Point M and a transverse vertical 

456

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

plane F located at a distance of (.35 D1) 

rearward of Point M, measured horizontally. 

(2) A longitudinal vertical plane G located at a distance of (.35 D2) to the 

left of Point M and a longitudinal 

vertical plane H located at a distance 

of (.35 D2) to the right of Point M, 

measured horizontally. 

S8.16 Test weight—vehicle to pole test.

Each vehicle shall be loaded to its unloaded vehicle weight, plus 136 kilograms (300 pounds) or its rated cargo 

and luggage capacity (whichever is 

less), secured in the luggage or loadcarrying area, plus the weight of the 

necessary anthropomorphic test 

dummy. Any added test equipment 

shall be located away from impact 

areas in secure places in the vehicle. 

S8.17 Vehicle test attitude—vehicle to 

pole test. Determine the distance between a level surface and a standard 

reference point on the test vehicle’s 

body, directly above each wheel opening, when the vehicle is in its ‘‘as delivered’’ condition. The ‘‘as delivered’’

condition is the vehicle as received at 

the test site, filled to 100 percent of all 

fluid capacities and with all tires inflated to the manufacturer’s specifications listed on the vehicle’s tire 

placard. Determine the distance between the same level surface and the 

same standard reference points in the 

vehicle’s ‘‘fully loaded condition.’’ The 

‘‘fully loaded condition’’ is the test vehicle loaded in accordance with S8.16. 

The load placed in the cargo area shall 

be centered over the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. The pretest vehicle attitude shall be the same as either 

the ‘‘as delivered’’ or ‘‘fully loaded’’ attitude or is between the ‘‘as delivered’’

attitude and the ‘‘fully loaded’’ attitude. If the test configuration requires 

that the vehicle be elevated off the 

ground, the pretest vehicle attitude 

must be maintained. 

S8.18 Adjustable seats—vehicle to pole 

test. Initially, adjustable seats shall be 

adjusted as specified in S6.3 of Standard 214 (49 CFR 571.214). 

S8.19 Adjustable seat back placement—vehicle to pole test. Initially, position adjustable seat backs in the manner specified in S6.4 of Standard 214 (49 

CFR 571.214). 

S8.20 Adjustable steering wheels—vehicle to pole test. Adjustable steering 

controls shall be adjusted so that the 

steering wheel hub is at the geometric 

center of the locus it describes when it 

is moved through its full range of driving positions. 

S8.21 Windows and sunroof—vehicle 

to pole test. Movable windows and vents 

shall be placed in the fully open position. Any sunroof shall be placed in the 

fully closed position. 

S8.22 Convertible tops—vehicle to pole 

test. The top, if any, of convertibles and 

open-body type vehicles shall be in the 

closed passenger compartment configuration. 

S8.23 Doors—vehicle to pole test.

Doors, including any rear hatchback or 

tailgate, shall be fully closed and 

latched but not locked. 

S8.24 Impact reference line—vehicle to 

pole test. On the striking side of the vehicle, place an impact reference line at 

the intersection of the vehicle exterior 

and a transverse vertical plane passing 

through the center of gravity of the 

head of the dummy seated in accordance with S8.28, in the front outboard 

designated seating position. 

S8.25 Rigid Pole—vehicle to pole test.

The rigid pole is a vertical metal structure beginning no more than 102 millimeters (4 inches) above the lowest 

point of the tires on the striking side 

of the test vehicle when the vehicle is 

loaded as specified in S8.16 and extending above the highest point of the roof 

of the test vehicle. The pole is 254 mm 

±3 mm (10 inches) in diameter and set 

off from any mounting surface, such as 

a barrier or other structure, so that the 

test vehicle will not contact such a 

mount or support at any time within 

100 milliseconds of the initiation of vehicle to pole contact. 

S8.26 Impact configuration—vehicle to 

pole test. The rigid pole shall be stationary. The test vehicle shall be propelled sideways so that its line of forward motion forms an angle of 90 degrees (±3 degrees) with the vehicle’s 

longitudinal center line. The impact 

reference line shall be aligned with the 

center line of the rigid pole so that, 

when the vehicle-to-pole contact occurs, the center line of the pole contacts the vehicle area bounded by two 

transverse vertical planes 38 mm (1.5 

457

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

inches) forward and aft of the impact 

reference line. 

S8.27 Anthropomorphic test dummy—

vehicle to pole test.

S8.27.1 The anthropomorphic test 

dummy used for evaluation of a vehicle’s head impact protection shall conform to the requirements of subpart M 

of part 572 of this chapter (49 CFR part 

572, subpart M). In a test in which the 

test vehicle is striking its left side, the 

dummy is to be configured and instrumented to strike on its left side, in accordance with subpart M of part 572. In 

a test in which the test vehicle is striking its right side, the dummy is to be 

configured and instrumented to strike 

its right side, in accordance with subpart M of part 572. 

S8.27.2 The part 572, subpart M, test 

dummy specified is clothed in form fitting cotton stretch garments with 

short sleeves and midcalf length pants. 

Each foot of the test dummy is 

equipped with a size 11EEE shoe, which 

meets the configuration size, sole, and 

heel thickness specifications of MIL–S–

13192 (1976) and weighs 0.57 ±0.09 kilograms (1.25 ±0.2 pounds). 

S8.27.3 Limb joints shall be set at 

between 1 and 2 g’s. Leg joints are adjusted with the torso in the supine position. 

S8.27.4 The stabilized temperature of 

the test dummy at the time of the side 

impact test shall be at any temperature between 20.6 degrees C. and 22.2 degrees C. 

S8.27.5 The acceleration data from 

the accelerometers installed inside the 

skull cavity of the test dummy are 

processed according to the practices 

set forth in SAE Recommended Practice J211, March 1995, 

‘‘Instrumentation for Impact Tests,’’

Class 1000. 

S8.28 Positioning procedure for the 

Part 572 Subpart M Test Dummy—vehicle 

to pole test. The part 572, subpart M, 

test dummy shall be initially positioned in the front outboard seating 

position on the struck side of the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of 

S7 of Standard 214, 49 CFR 571.214, and 

the vehicle seat shall be positioned as 

specified in S6.3 and S6.4 of that standard. The position of the dummy shall 

then be measured as follows. Locate 

the horizontal plane passing through 

the dummy head center of gravity. 

Identify the rearmost point on the 

dummy head in that plane. Construct a 

line in the plane that contains the 

rearward point of the front door daylight opening and is perpendicular to 

the longitudinal vehicle centerline. 

Measure the longitudinal distance between the rearmost point on the 

dummy head and this line. If this distance is less than 50 mm (2 inches) or 

the point is not forward of the line, 

then the seat and/or dummy positions 

shall be adjusted as follows. First, the 

seat back angle is adjusted, a maximum of 5 degrees, until a 50 mm (2 

inches) distance is achieved. If this is 

not sufficient to produce the 50 mm (2 

inches) distance, the seat is moved forward until the 50 mm (2 inches) distance is achieved or until the knees of 

the dummy contact the dashboard or 

knee bolster, whichever comes first. If 

the required distance cannot be 

achieved through movement of the 

seat, the seat back angle shall be adjusted even further forward until the 

50mm (2 inches) distance is obtained or 

until the seat back is in its full upright 

locking position. 

S9. Orthogonal Reference System. The 

approach angles specified in S8.13.4 are 

determined using the reference system 

specified in S9.1 through S9.4. 

S9.1 An orthogonal reference system 

consisting of a longitudinal X axis and 

a transverse Y axis in the same horizontal plane and a vertical Z axis 

through the intersection of X and Y is 

used to define the horizontal direction 

of approach of the headform. The X–Z 

plane is the vertical longitudinal zero 

plane and is parallel to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle. The X–

Y plane is the horizontal zero plane 

parallel to the ground. The Y–Z plane 

is the vertical transverse zero plane 

that is perpendicular to the X–Y and X–

Z planes. The X coordinate is negative 

forward of the Y–Z plane and positive 

to the rear. The Y coordinate is negative to the left of the X–Z plane and 

positive to the right. The Z coordinate 

is negative below the X–Y plane and 

positive above it. (See Figure 1.) 

S9.2 The origin of the reference system is the center of gravity of the 

headform at the time immediately 

prior to launch for each test. 

458

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

S9.3 The horizontal approach angle 

is the angle between the X axis and the 

headform impact velocity vector projected onto the horizontal zero plane, 

measured in the horizontal zero plane 

in the counter-clockwise direction. A 0 

degree horizontal vector and a 360 degree horizontal vector point in the 

positive X direction; a 90 degree horizontal vector points in the positive Y 

direction; a 180 degree horizontal vector points in the negative X direction; 

and a 270 horizontal degree vector 

points in the negative Y direction. (See 

Figure 2.) 

S9.4 The vertical approach angle is 

the angle between the horizontal plane 

and the velocity vector, measured in 

the midsagittal plane of the headform. 

A 0 degree vertical vector in Table I coincides with the horizontal plane and a 

vertical vector of greater than 0 degrees in Table I makes a upward angle 

of the same number of degrees with 

that plane. 

S10 Target Locations. 

(a) The target locations specified in 

S10.1 through S10.13 are located on 

both sides of the vehicle and, except as 

specified in S10(b), are determined 

using the procedures specified in those 

paragraphs. 

(b) Except as specified in S10(c), in 

instances in which there is no combination of horizontal and vertical angles 

specified in S8.13.4 at which the forehead impact zone of the free motion 

headform can contact one of the targets located using the procedures in 

S10.1 through S10.13, the center of that 

target is moved to any location that is 

within a sphere with a radius of 25 mm, 

centered on the center of the original 

target, and that can be contacted by 

the forehead impact zone at one or 

more combination of angles. 

(c) If there is no point within the 

sphere specified in S10(b) which the 

forehead impact zone of the free motion headform can contact at one or 

more combination of horizontal and 

vertical angles specified in S8.13.4, the 

radius of the sphere is increased by 25 

mm increments until the sphere contains at least one point that can be 

contacted at one or more combination 

of angles. 

S10.1 A-pillar targets

(a) A-pillar reference point and target 

AP1. On the vehicle exterior, locate a 

transverse vertical plane (Plane 1) 

which contacts the rearmost point of 

the windshield trim. The intersection 

of Plane 1 and the vehicle exterior surface is Line 1. Measuring along the vehicle exterior surface, locate a point 

(Point 1) on Line 1 that is 125 mm inboard of the intersection of Line 1 and 

a vertical plane tangent to the vehicle 

at the outboardmost point on Line 1 

with the vehicle side door open. Measuring along the vehicle exterior surface 

in a longitudinal vertical plane (Plane 

2) passing through Point 1, locate a 

point (Point 2) 50 mm rearward of 

Point 1. Locate the A-pillar reference 

point (Point APR) at the intersection 

of the interior roof surface and a line 

that is perpendicular to the vehicle exterior surface at Point 2. Target AP1 is 

located at point APR. 

(b) Target AP2. Locate the horizontal 

plane (Plane 3) which intersects point 

APR. Locate the horizontal plane 

(Plane 4) which is 88 mm below Plane 3. 

Target AP2 is the point in Plane 4 and 

on the A-pillar which is closest to CG–

F2 for the nearest seating position. 

(c) Target AP3. Locate the horizontal 

plane (Plane 5) containing the highest 

point at the intersection of the dashboard and the A-pillar. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 6) half-way between 

Plane 3 and Plane 5. Target AP3 is the 

point on Plane 6 and the A-pillar which 

is closest to CG–F1 for the nearest 

seating position. 

S10.2 B-pillar targets. 

(a) B-pillar reference point and target 

BP1. Locate the point (Point 3) on the 

vehicle interior at the intersection of 

the horizontal plane passing through 

the highest point of the forwardmost 

door opening and the centerline of the 

width of the B-pillar, as viewed laterally. Locate a transverse vertical 

plane (Plane 7) which passes through 

Point 3. Locate the point (Point 4) at 

the intersection of the interior roof 

surface, Plane 7, and the plane, described in S8.15(h), defining the nearest 

edge of the upper roof. The B-pillar reference point (Point BPR) is the point 

located at the middle of the line from 

Point 3 to Point 4 in Plane 7, measured 

along the vehicle interior surface. Target BP1 is located at Point BPR. 

459

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

(b) Target BP2. If a seat belt anchorage is located on the B-pillar, Target 

BP2 is located at any point on the anchorage. 

(c) Target BP3. Target BP3 is located 

in accordance with this paragraph. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 8) which 

intersects Point BPR. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 9) which passes 

through the lowest point of the daylight opening forward of the pillar. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 10) halfway between Plane 8 and Plane 9. Target BP3 is the point located in Plane 10 

and on the interior surface of the B-pillar, which is closest to CG–F(2) for the 

nearest seating position. 

(d) Target BP4. Locate a horizontal 

plane (Plane 11) half-way between 

Plane 9 and Plane 10. Target BP4 is the 

point located in Plane 11 and on the interior surface of the B-pillar which is 

closest to CG–R for the nearest seating 

position. 

S10.3 Other pillar targets. 

(a) Target OP1.

(1) Except as provided in S10.3(a)(2), 

target OP1 is located in accordance 

with this paragraph. Locate the point 

(Point 5), on the vehicle interior, at the 

intersection of the horizontal plane 

through the highest point of the highest adjacent door opening or daylight 

opening (if no adjacent door opening) 

and the centerline of the width of the 

other pillar, as viewed laterally. Locate a transverse vertical plane (Plane 

12) passing through Point 5. Locate the 

point (Point 6) at the intersection of 

the interior roof surface, Plane 12 and 

the plane, described in S8.15(h), defining the nearest edge of the upper roof. 

The other pillar reference point (Point 

OPR) is the point located at the middle 

of the line between Point 5 and Point 6 

in Plane 12, measured along the vehicle 

interior surface. Target OP1 is located 

at Point OPR. 

(2) If a seat belt anchorage is located 

on the pillar, Target OP1 is any point 

on the anchorage. 

(b) Target OP2. Locate the horizontal 

plane (Plane 13) intersecting Point 

OPR. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 

14) passing through the lowest point of 

the daylight opening forward of the pillar. Locate a horizontal plane (Plane 

15) half-way between Plane 13 and 

Plane 14. Target OP2 is the point located on the interior surface of the pillar at the intersection of Plane 15 and 

the centerline of the width of the pillar, as viewed laterally. 

S10.4 Rearmost pillar targets

(a) Rearmost pillar reference point and 

target RP1. Locate the point (Point 7) 

at the corner of the upper roof nearest 

to the pillar. The distance between 

Point M, as described in S8.15(g), and 

Point 7, as measured along the vehicle 

interior surface, is D. Extend the line 

from Point M to Point 7 along the vehicle interior surface in the same 

vertical plane by (3*D/7) beyond Point 7 

or until the edge of a daylight opening, 

whichever comes first, to locate Point 

8. The rearmost pillar reference point 

(Point RPR) is at the midpoint of the 

line between Point 7 and Point 8, measured along the vehicle interior. Target 

RP1 is located at Point RPR. 

(b) Target RP2.

(1) Except as provided in S10.4(b)(2), 

target RP2 is located in accordance 

with this paragraph. Locate the horizontal plane (Plane 16) through Point 

RPR. Locate the horizontal plane 

(Plane 17) 150 mm below Plane 16. Target RP2 is located in Plane 17 and on 

the pillar at the location closest to CG–

R for the nearest designated seating 

position. 

(2) If a seat belt anchorage is located 

on the pillar, Target RP2 is any point 

on the anchorage. 

S10.5 Front header targets.

(a) Target FH1. Locate the contour 

line (Line 2) on the vehicle interior 

trim which passes through the APR 

and is parallel to the contour line (Line 

3) at the upper edge of the windshield 

on the vehicle interior. Locate the 

point (Point 9) on Line 2 that is 125 mm 

inboard of the APR, measured along 

that line. Locate a longitudinal 

vertical plane (Plane 18) that passes 

through Point 9. Target FH1 is located 

at the intersection of Plane 18 and the 

upper vehicle interior, halfway between a transverse vertical plane 

(Plane 19) through Point 9 and a transverse vertical plane (Plane 20) through 

the intersection of Plane 18 and Line 3. 

(b) Target FH2.

(1) Except as provided in S10.5(b)(2), 

target FH2 is located in accordance 

with this paragraph. Locate a point 

(Point 10) 275 mm inboard of Point 

460

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)

APR, along Line 2. Locate a longitudinal vertical plane (Plane 21) that 

passes through Point 10. Target FH2 is 

located at the intersection of Plane 21 

and the upper vehicle interior, halfway 

between a transverse vertical plane 

(Plane 22) through Point 10 and a transverse vertical plane (Plane 23) through 

the intersection of Plane 21 and Line 3. 

(2) If a sun roof opening is located 

forward of the front edge of the upper 

roof and intersects the mid-sagittal 

plane of a dummy seated in either 

front outboard seating position, target 

FH2 is the nearest point that is forward 

of a transverse vertical plane (Plane 24) 

through CG–F(2) and on the intersection of the mid-sagittal plane and the 

interior sunroof opening. 

S10.6 Targets on the side rail between 

the A-pillar and the B-pillar or rearmost 

pillar in vehicles with only two pillars on 

each side of the vehicle.

(a) Target SR1. Locate a transverse 

vertical plane (Plane 25) 150 mm rearward of Point APR. Locate the point 

(Point 11) at the intersection of Plane 

25 and the upper edge of the 

forwardmost door opening. Locate the 

point (Point 12) at the intersection of 

the interior roof surface, Plane 25 and 

the plane, described in S8.15(h), defining the nearest edge of the upper roof. 

Target SR1 is located at the middle of 

the line between Point 11 and Point 12 

in Plane 25, measured along the vehicle 

interior. 

(b) Target SR2. Locate a transverse 

vertical plane (Plane 26) 300 mm rearward of the APR or 300 mm forward of 

the BPR (or the RPR in vehicles with 

no B-pillar). Locate the point (Point 13) 

at the intersection of Plane 26 and the 

upper edge of the forwardmost door 

opening. Locate the point (Point 14) at 

the intersection of the interior roof 

surface, Plane 26 and the plane, described in S8.15(h), defining the nearest 

edge of the upper roof. Target SR2 is 

located at the middle of the line between Point 13 and Point 14 in Plane 26, 

measured along the vehicle interior. 

S10.7 Other side rail target (target 

SR3).

(a) Except as provided in S10.7(b), 

target SR3 is located in accordance 

with this paragraph. Locate a transverse vertical plane (Plane 27) 150 mm 

rearward of either Point BPR or Point 

OPR. Locate the point (Point 15) as 

provided in either S10.7(a)(1) or 

S10.7(a)(2), as appropriate. Locate the 

point (Point 16) at the intersection of 

the interior roof surface, Plane 27 and 

the plane, described in S8.15(h), defining the nearest edge of the upper roof. 

Target SR3 is located at the middle of 

the line between Point 15 and Point 16 

in Plane 27, measured along the vehicle 

interior surface. 

(1) If Plane 27 intersects a door or 

daylight opening, the Point 15 is located at the intersection of Plane 27 

and the upper edge of the door opening 

or daylight opening. 

(2) If Plane 27 does not intersect a 

door or daylight opening, the Point 15 

is located on the vehicle interior at the 

intersection of Plane 27 and the horizontal plane through the highest point 

of the door or daylight opening nearest 

Plane 27. If the adjacent door(s) or daylight opening(s) are equidistant to 

Plane 27, Point 15 is located on the vehicle interior at the intersection of 

Plane 27 and either horizontal plane 

through the highest point of each door 

or daylight opening. 

(b) Except as provided in S10.7(c), if a 

grab handle is located on the side rail, 

target SR3 is located at any point on 

the anchorage of the grab-handle. Folding grab-handles are in their stowed 

position for testing. 

(c) If a seat belt anchorage is located 

on the side rail, target SR3 is located 

at any point on the anchorage. 

S10.8 Rear header target (target RH). 

Locate the point (Point 17) at the 

intersection of the surface of the upper 

vehicle interior, the mid-sagittal plane 

(Plane 28) of the outboard rearmost 

dummy and the plane, described in 

S8.15(h), defining the rear edge of the 

upper roof. Locate the point (Point 18) 

as provided in S10.8(a) or S10.8(b), as 

appropriate. Except as provided in 

S10.8(c), Target RH is located at the 

mid-point of the line that is between 

Point 17 and Point 18 and is in Plane 28, 

as measured along the surface of the 

vehicle interior. 

(a) If Plane 28 intersects a rear door 

opening or daylight opening, then 

Point 18 is located at the intersection 

of Plane 28 and the upper edge of the 

door opening or the daylight opening 

(if no door opening). 

461

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.201

(b) If Plane 28 does not intersect a 

rear door opening or daylight opening, 

then Point 18 is located on the vehicle 

interior at the intersection of Plane 28 

and a horizontal plane through the 

highest point of the door or daylight 

opening nearest to Plane 28. If the adjacent door(s) or daylight opening(s) 

are equidistant to Plane 28, Point 18 is 

located on the vehicle interior at the 

intersection of Plane 28 and either horizontal plane through the highest point 

of each door or daylight opening. 

(c) If Target RH is more than 112 mm 

from Point 18 on the line that is between Point 17 and Point 18 and is in 

Plane 28, as measured along the surface 

of the vehicle interior, then Target RH 

is the point on that line which is 112 

mm from Point 18. 

S10.9 Upper roof target (target UR). 

Target UR is any point on the upper 

roof. 

S10.10 Sliding door track target (target 

SD). Locate the transverse vertical 

plane (Plane 29) passing through the 

middle of the widest opening of the 

sliding door, measured horizontally 

and parallel to the vehicle longitudinal 

centerline. Locate the point (Point 19) 

at the intersection of the surface of the 

upper vehicle interior, Plane 29 and the 

plane, described in S8.15(h), defining 

the nearest edge of the upper roof. Locate the point (Point 20) at the intersection of Plane 29 and the upper edge 

of the sliding door opening. Target SD 

is located at the middle of the line between Point 19 and Point 20 in Plane 29, 

measured along the vehicle interior. 

S10.11 Roll-bar targets.

(a) Target RB1. Locate a longitudinal 

vertical plane (Plane 30) at the midsagittal plane of a dummy seated in 

any outboard designated seating position. Target RB1 is located on the rollbar and in Plane 30 at the location 

closest to either CG–F2 or CG–R, as appropriate, for the same dummy. 

(b) Target RB2. If a seat belt anchorage is located on the roll-bar, Target 

RB2 is any point on the anchorage. 

S10.12 Stiffener targets.

(a) Target ST1. Locate a transverse 

vertical plane (Plane 31) containing either CG–F2 or CG–R, as appropriate, for 

any outboard designated seating position. Target ST1 is located on the stiffener and in Plane 31 at the location 

closest to either CG–F2 or CG–R, as appropriate. 

(b) Target ST2. If a seat belt anchorage is located on the stiffener, Target 

ST2 is any point on the anchorage. 

S10.13 Brace target (target BT) Target 

BT is any point on the width of the 

brace as viewed laterally from inside 

the passenger compartment.

462

§ 571.201 49 CFR Ch. V (10–1–02 Edition)


ER08AP97.008</GPH>
463

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.202

[62 FR 16725, Apr. 8, 1997; 63 FR 28, Jan. 2, 

1998; 63 FR 41464, Aug. 4, 1998; 63 FR 45965, 

Aug. 28, 1998; 64 FR 7140, Feb. 12, 1999; 64 FR 

69671, Dec. 14, 1999; 67 FR 41354, June 18, 2002]

§ 571.202 Standard No. 202; Head restraints. 

S1. Purpose and scope. This standard 

specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the frequency and 

severity of neck injury in rear-end and 

other collisions. 

S2. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and 

buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less. 

S3. Definitions. Head restraint means a 

device that limits rearward angular 

displacement of the occupant’s head 

relative to his torso line. 

S4. Requirements.

S4.1 Each passenger car shall comply with S4.3. 


ER08AP97.009</GPH>
559

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

December 1, 1999, may be used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to test the suppression system of a vehicle that has been certified as being in compliance with 49 CFR 571.208 S19. When the restraint system comes equipped with a removable base, the test may be run either with 

the base attached or without the base.

Britax Handle with Care 191

Century Assura 4553

Century Avanta SE 41530

Century Smart Fit 4543

Cosco Arriva 02727

Cosco Opus 35 02603

Evenflo Discovery Adjust Right 212

Evenflo First Choice 204

Evenflo On My Way Position Right V 282

Graco Infant 8457

C. Any of the following forward-facing convertible child restraint systems, manufactured on or after December 1, 1999, may be 

used by the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration to test the suppression system of a vehicle that has been certified as 

being in compliance with 49 CFR 571.208 S19, 

or S21:

Britax Roundabout 161

Century Encore 4612

Century STE 1000 4416

Cosco Olympian 02803

Cosco Touriva 02519

Evenflo Horizon V 425

Evenflo Medallion 254

D. Any of the following forward-facing toddler/belt positioning booster systems, manufactured on or after December 1, 1999, may be 

used by the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration as test devices to test the 

suppression system of a vehicle that has 

been certified as being in compliance with 49 

CFR 571.208 S21 or S23:

Britax Roadster 9004

Century Next Step 4920

Cosco High Back Booster 02–442

Evenflo Right Fit 245

[36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971]

EDITORIAL NOTE: For FEDERAL REGISTER citations affecting § 571.208, see the List of CFR 

Sections Affected, which appears in the 

Finding Aids section of the printed volume 

and on GPO Access.

§ 571.209 Standard No. 209; Seat belt 

assemblies. 

S1. Purpose and scope. This standard 

specifies requirements for seat belt assemblies. 

S2. Application. This standard applies 

to seat belt assemblies for use in passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. 

S3. Definitions. Adjustment hardware

means any or all hardware designed for 

adjusting the size of a seat belt assembly to fit the user, including such hardware that may be integral with a buckle, attachment hardware, or retractor. 

Attachment hardware means any or all 

hardware designed for securing the 

webbing of a seat belt assembly to a 

motor vehicle. 

Automatic-locking retractor means a 

retractor incorporating adjustment 

hardware by means of a positive selflocking mechanism which is capable 

when locked of withstanding restraint 

forces. 

Buckle means a quick release connector which fastens a person in a seat 

belt assembly. 

Emergency-locking retractor means a 

retractor incorporating adjustment 

hardware by means of a locking mechanism that is activated by vehicle acceleration, webbing movement relative to 

the vehicle, or other automatic action 

during an emergency and is capable 

when locked of withstanding restraint 

forces. 

Hardware means any metal or rigid 

plastic part of a seat belt assembly. 

Load-limiter means a seat belt assembly component or feature that controls 

tension on the seat belt to modulate 

the forces that are imparted to occupants restrained by the belt assembly 

during a crash. 

Nonlocking retractor means a retractor from which the webbing is extended 

to essentially its full length by a small 

external force, which provides no adjustment for assembly length, and 

which may or may not be capable of 

sustaining restraint forces at maximum webbing extension. 

Pelvic restraint means a seat belt assembly or portion thereof intended to 

restrain movement of the pelvis. 

Retractor means a device for storing 

part or all of the webbing in a seat belt 

assembly. 

Seat back retainer means the portion 

of some seat belt assemblies designed 

to restrict forward movement of a seat 

back. 

Seat belt assembly means any strap, 

webbing, or similar device designed to 

secure a person in a motor vehicle in 

order to mitigate the results of any accident, including all necessary buckles 

and other fasteners, and all hardware 

560

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

designed for installing such seat belt 

assembly in a motor vehicle. 

Strap means a narrow nonwoven material used in a seat belt assembly in 

place of webbing. 

Type 1 seat belt assembly is a lap belt 

for pelvic restraint. 

Type 2 seat belt assembly is a combination of pelvic and upper torso restraints. 

Type 2a shoulder belt is an upper torso 

restraint for use only in conjunction 

with a lap belt as a Type 2 seat belt assembly. 

Upper torso restraint means a portion 

of a seat belt assembly intended to restrain movement of the chest and 

shoulder regions. 

Webbing means a narrow fabric woven 

with continuous filling yarns and finished selvages. 

S4. Requirements.

S4.1 (a) Single occupancy. A seat belt 

assembly shall be designed for use by 

one, and only one, person at any one 

time. 

(b) [Reserved] 

(c) Upper torso restraint. A Type 2 seat 

belt assembly shall provide upper torso 

restraint without shifting the pelvic 

restraint into the abdominal region. 

An upper torso restraint shall be designed to minimize vertical forces on 

the shoulders and spine. Hardware for 

upper torso restraint shall be so designed and located in the seat belt assembly that the possibility of injury to 

the occupant is minimized. 

A Type 2a shoulder belt shall comply 

with applicable requirements for a 

Type 2 seat belt assembly in S4.1 to 

S4.4, inclusive. 

(d) Hardware. All hardware parts 

which contact under normal usage a 

person, clothing, or webbing shall be 

free from burrs and sharp edges. 

(e) Release. A Type 1 or Type 2 seat 

belt assembly shall be provided with a 

buckle or buckles readily accessible to 

the occupant to permit his easy and 

rapid removal from the assembly. 

Buckle release mechanism shall be designed to minimize the possibility of 

accidental release. A buckle with release mechanism in the latched position shall have only one opening in 

which the tongue can be inserted on 

the end of the buckle designed to receive and latch the tongue. 

(f) Attachment hardware. A seat belt 

assembly shall include all hardware 

necessary for installation in a motor 

vehicle in accordance with Society of 

Automotive Engineers Recommended 

Practice J800c, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Seat 

Belt Installation,’’ November 1973. 

However, seat belt assemblies designed 

for installation in motor vehicles 

equipped with seat belt assembly anchorages that do not require anchorage 

nuts, plates, or washers, need not have 

such hardware, but shall have 7⁄16–20 

UNF–2A or 1⁄2–13UNC–2A attachment 

bolts or equivalent metric hardware. 

The hardware shall be designed to prevent attachment bolts and other parts 

from becoming disengaged from the vehicle while in service. Reinforcing 

plates or washers furnished for universal floor, installations shall be of 

steel, free from burrs and sharp edges 

on the peripheral edges adjacent to the 

vehicle, at least 1.5 mm in thickness 

and at least 2580 mm2 in projected area. 

The distance between any edge of the 

plate and the edge of the bolt hole shall 

be at least 15 mm. Any corner shall be 

rounded to a radius of not less than 6 

mm or cut so that no corner angle is 

less than 135° and no side is less than 6 

mm in length. 

(g) Adjustment. (1) A Type 1 or Type 2 

seat belt assembly shall be capable of 

adjustment to fit occupants whose dimensions and weight range from those 

of a 5th-percentile adult female to 

those of a 95th-percentile adult male. 

The seat belt assembly shall have either an automatic-locking retractor, 

an emergency-locking retractor, or an 

adjusting device that is within the 

reach of the occupant. 

(2) A Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly for use in a vehicle having seats 

that are adjustable shall conform to 

the requirements of S4.1(g)(1) regardless of seat position. However, if a seat 

has a back that is separately adjustable, the requirements of S4.1(g)(1) 

need be met only with the seat back in 

the manufacturer’s nominal design 

riding position. 

(3) The adult occupants referred to in 

S4.1(g)(1) shall have the following 

measurements:

561

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

5th percen- tile 

adult female 

95th percentile 

adult male 

Weight ........................... 46.3 kg ............... 97.5 kg. 

Erect sitting height ........ 785 mm .............. 965 mm. 

Hip breadth (sitting) ...... 325 mm .............. 419 mm. 

Hip circumference 

(sitting).

925 mm .............. 1199 mm. 

Waist circumference 

(sitting).

599 mm .............. 1080 mm. 

Chest depth .................. 190 mm .............. 267 mm. 

Chest circumference: 

Nipple ........................ 775 mm .............. 1130 mm. 

Upper ......................... 757 mm .............. 1130 mm. 

Lower ......................... 676 mm .............. 1130 mm. 

(h) Webbing. The ends of webbing in a 

seat belt assembly shall be protected or 

treated to prevent raveling. The end of 

webbing in a seat belt assembly having 

a metal-to-metal buckle that is used by 

the occupant to adjust the size of the 

assembly shall not pull out of the adjustment hardware at maximum size 

adjustment. Provision shall be made 

for essentially unimpeded movement of 

webbing routed between a seat back 

and seat cushion and attached to a retractor located behind the seat. 

(i) Strap. A strap used in a seat belt 

assembly to sustain restraint forces 

shall comply with the requirements for 

webbing in S4.2, and if the strap is 

made from a rigid material, it shall 

comply with applicable requirements 

in S4.2, S4.3, and S4.4. 

(j) Marking. Each seat belt assembly 

shall be permanently and legibly 

marked or labeled with year of manufacture, model, and name or trademark 

of manufacturer or distributor, or of 

importer if manufactured outside the 

United States. A model shall consist of 

a single combination of webbing having 

a specific type of fiber weave and construction, and hardware having a specific design. Webbings of various colors 

may be included under the same model, 

but webbing of each color shall comply 

with the requirements for webbing in 

S4.2. 

(k) Installation instructions. A seat 

belt assembly, other than a seat belt 

assembly installed in a motor vehicle 

by an automobile manufacturer, shall 

be accompanied by an instruction sheet 

providing sufficient information for installing the assembly in a motor vehicle. The installation instructions shall 

state whether the assembly is for universal installation or for installation 

only in specifically stated motor vehicles, and shall include at least those 

items specified in SAE Recommended 

Practice J800c, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Seat 

Belt Installations,’’ November 1973. If 

the assembly is for use only in specifically stated motor vehicles, the assembly shall either be permanently and 

legibly marked or labeled with the following statement, or the instruction 

sheet shall include the following statement:

This seat belt assembly is for use only in 

[insert specific seating position(s), e.g., 

‘‘front right’’] in [insert specific vehicle 

make(s) and model(s)].

(l) Usage and maintenance instructions.

A seat belt assembly or retractor shall 

be accompanied by written instructions for the proper use of the assembly, stressing particularly the importance of wearing the assembly snugly 

and properly located on the body, and 

on the maintenance f the assembly and 

periodic inspection of all components. 

The instructions shall show the proper 

manner of threading webbing in the 

hardware of seat belt assemblies in 

which the webbing is not permanently 

fastened. Instructions for a nonlocking 

retractor shall include a caution that 

the webbing must be fully extended 

from the retractor during use of the 

seat belt assembly unless the retractor 

is attached to the free end of webbing 

which is not subjected to any tension 

during restraint of an occupant by the 

assembly. Instructions for Type 2a 

shoulder belt shall include a warning 

that the shoulder belt is not to be used 

without a lap belt. 

(m) Workmanship. Seat belt assemblies shall have good workmanship in 

accordance with good commercial practice. 

S4.2 Requirements for webbing.

(a) Width. The width of the webbing 

in a seat belt assembly shall be not less 

than 46 mm, except for portions that do 

not touch a 95th percentile adult male 

with the seat in any adjustment position and the seat back in the manufacturer’s nominal design riding position 

when measured under the conditions 

prescribed in S5.1(a). 

(b) Breaking strength. The webbing in 

a seat belt assembly shall have not less 

than the following breaking strength 

when tested by the procedures specified 

in S5.1(b): Type 1 seat belt assembly—

26,689 N; Type 2 seat belt assembly—

562

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

22,241 N for webbing in pelvic restraint 

and 17,793 N for webbing in upper torso 

restraint. 

(c) Elongation. Except as provided in 

S4.5, the webbing in a seat belt assembly shall not extend to more than the 

following elongation when subjected to 

the specified forces in accordance with 

the procedure specified in S5.1(c): Type 

1 seat belt assembly—20 percent at 

11,120 N; Type 2 seat belt assembly 30 

percent at 11,120 N for webbing in pelvic restraint and 40 percent at 11,120 N 

for webbing in upper torso restraint. 

(d) Resistance to abrasion. The webbing of a seat belt assembly, after 

being subjected to abrasion as specified 

in S5.1(d) or S5.3(c), shall have a breaking strength of not less than 75 percent 

of the breaking strength listed in 

S4.2(b) for that type of belt assembly. 

(e) Resistance to light. The webbing in 

a seat belt assembly after exposure to 

the light of a carbon arc and tested by 

the procedure specified in S5.1(e) shall 

have a breaking strength not less than 

60 percent of the strength before exposure to the carbon arc and shall have a 

color retention not less than No. 2 on 

the Geometric Gray Scale published by 

the American Association of Textile 

Chemists and Colorists, Post Office Box 

886, Durham, NC. 

(f) Resistance to micro-organisms. The 

webbing in a seat belt assembly after 

being subjected to micro-organisms 

and tested by the procedures specified 

in S5.1(f) shall have a breaking 

strength not less than 85 percent of the 

strength before subjection to micro-organisms. 

S4.3 Requirements for hardware.

(a) Corrosion resistance. (1) Attachment hardware of a seat belt assembly 

after being subjected to the conditions 

specified in S5.2(a) shall be free of ferrous corrosion on significant surfaces 

except for permissible ferrous corrosion at peripheral edges or edges of 

holes on underfloor reinforcing plates 

and washers. Alternatively, such hardware at or near the floor shall be protected against corrosion by at least an 

electrodeposited coating of nickel, or 

copper and nickel with at least a service condition number of SC2, and other 

attachment hardware shall be protected by an electrodeposited coating 

of nickel, or copper and nickel with a 

service condition number of SC1, in accordance with American Society for 

Testing and Materials B456–79, 

‘‘Standard Specification for 

Electrodeposited Coatings of Copper 

Plus Nickel Plus Chromium and Nickel 

Plus Chromium,’’ but such hardware 

shall not be racked for electroplating 

in locations subjected to maximum 

stress. 

(2) Surfaces of buckles, retractors 

and metallic parts, other than attachment hardware, of a seat belt assembly 

after subjection to the conditions specified in S5.2(a) shall be free of ferrous 

or nonferrous corrosion which may be 

transferred, either directly or by 

means of the webbing, to the occupant 

or his clothing when the assembly is 

worn. After test, buckles shall conform 

to applicable requirements in paragraphs (d) to (g) of this section. 

(b) Temperature resistance. Plastic or 

other nonmetallic hardware parts of a 

seat belt assembly when subjected to 

the conditions specified in S5.2(b) shall 

not warp or otherwise deteriorate to 

cause the assembly to operate improperly or fail to comply with applicable 

requirements in this section and S4.4. 

(c) Attachment hardware. (1) Eye 

bolts, shoulder bolts, or other bolt used 

to secure the pelvic restraint of seat 

belt assembly to a motor vehicle shall 

withstand a force of 40,034 N when tested by the procedure specified in 

S5.2(c)(1), except that attachment bolts 

of a seat belt assembly designed for installation in specific models of motor 

vehicles in which the ends of two or 

more seat belt assemblies cannot be attached to the vehicle by a single bolt 

shall have breaking strength of not less 

than 22,241 N. 

(2) Other attachment hardware designed to receive the ends of two seat 

belt assemblies shall withstand a tensile force of at least 26,689 N without 

fracture of a section when tested by 

the procedure specified in S5.2(c)(2). 

(3) A seat belt assembly having single 

attachment hooks of the quick-disconnect type for connecting webbing to 

an eye bolt shall be provided with a retaining latch or keeper which shall not 

move more than 2 mm in either the 

vertical or horizontal direction when 

tested by the procedure specified in 

S5.2(c)(3). 

563

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

(d) Buckle release. (1) The buckle of a 

Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly 

shall release when a force of not more 

than 133 N is applied. 

(2) A buckle designed for pushbutton 

application of buckle release force 

shall have a minimum area of 452 mm2

with a minimum linear dimension of 10 

mm for applying the release force, or a 

buckle designed for lever application of 

buckle release force shall permit the 

insertion of a cylinder 10 mm in diameter and 38 mm in length to at least the 

midpoint of the cylinder along the cylinder’s entire length in the actuation 

portion of the buckle release. A buckle 

having other design for release shall 

have adequate access for two or more 

fingers to actuate release. 

(3) The buckle of a Type 1 or Type 2 

seat belt assembly shall not release 

under a compressive force of 1779 N applied as prescribed in paragraph 

S5.2(d)(3). The buckle shall be operable 

and shall meet the applicable requirement of paragraph S4.4 after the compressive force has been removed. 

(e) Adjustment force. The force required to decrease the size of a seat 

belt assembly shall not exceed 49 N 

when measured by the procedure specified in S5.2(e). 

(f) Tilt-lock adjustment. The buckle of 

a seat belt assembly having tilt-lock 

adjustment shall lock the webbing 

when tested by the procedure specified 

in S5.2(f) at an angle of not less than 30 

degrees between the base of the buckle 

and the anchor webbing. 

(g) Buckle latch. The buckle latch of a 

seat belt assembly when tested by the 

procedure specified in S5.2(g) shall not 

fail, nor gall or wear to an extent that 

normal latching and unlatching is impaired, and a metal-to-metal buckle 

shall separate when in any position of 

partial engagement by a force of not 

more than 22 N. 

(h) Nonlocking retractor. The webbing 

of a seat belt assembly shall extend 

from a nonlocking retractor within 6 

mm of maximum length when a tension 

is applied as prescribed in S5.2(h). A 

nonlocking retractor on upper torso restraint shall be attached to the nonadjustable end of the assembly, the reel 

of the retractor shall be easily visible 

to an occupant while wearing the assembly, and the maximum retraction 

force shall not exceed 5 N in any strap 

or webbing that contacts the shoulder 

when measured by the procedure specified in S5.2(h), unless the retractor is 

attached to the free end of webbing 

which is not subjected to any tension 

during restraint of an occupant by the 

assembly. 

(i) Automatic-locking retractor. The 

webbing of a seat belt assembly 

equipped with an automatic locking retractor, when tested by the procedure 

specified in S5.2(i), shall not move 

more than 25 mm between locking positions of the retractor, and shall be retracted with a force under zero acceleration of not less than 3 N when attached to pelvic restraint, and not less 

that 2 N nor more than 5 N in any strap 

or webbing that contacts the shoulders 

of an occupant when the retractor is 

attached to upper torso restraint. An 

automatic locking retractor attached 

to upper torso restraint shall not increase the restraint on the occupant of 

the seat belt assembly during use in a 

vehicle traveling over rough roads as 

prescribed in S5.2(i). 

(j) Emergency-locking retractor. An 

emergency-locking retractor of a Type 

1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly, when 

tested in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph S5.2(j)—

(1) Shall lock before the webbing extends 25 mm when the retractor is subjected to an acceleration of 7 m/s2 (0.7 

g); 

(2) Shall not lock, if the retractor is 

sensitive to webbing withdrawal, before 

the webbing extends 51 mm when the 

retractor is subjected to an acceleration of 3 m/s2 (0.3 g) or less. 

(3) Shall not lock, if the retractor is 

sensitive to vehicle acceleration, when 

the retractor is rotated in any direction to any angle of 15° or less from its 

orientation in the vehicle; 

(4) Shall exert a retractive force of at 

least 3 N under zero acceleration when 

attached only to the pelvic restraint; 

(5) Shall exert a retractive force of 

not less than 1 N and not more than 5 

N under zero acceleration when attached only to an upper torso restraint; 

(6) Shall exert a retractive force of 

not less than 1 N and not more than 7 

564

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

N under zero acceleration when attached to a strap or webbing that restrains both the upper torso and the 

pelvis. 

(k) Performance of retractor. A retractor used on a seat belt assembly after 

subjection to the tests specified in 

S5.2(k) shall comply with applicable requirements in paragraphs (h) to (j) of 

this section and S4.4, except that the 

retraction force shall be not less than 

50 percent of its original retraction 

force. 

S4.4 Requirements for assembly performance. 

(a) Type I seat belt assembly. Except as 

provided in S4.5, the complete seat belt 

assembly including webbing, straps, 

buckles, adjustment and attachment 

hardware, and retractors shall comply 

with the following requirements when 

tested by the procedures specified in 

S5.3(a): 

(1) The assembly loop shall withstand 

a force of not less than 22,241 N; that is, 

each structural component of the assembly shall withstand a force of not 

less than 11,120 N. 

(2) The assembly loop shall extend 

not more than 7 inches or 178 mm when 

subjected to a force of 22,241 N; that is, 

the length of the assembly between anchorages shall not increase more than 

356 mm. 

(3) Any webbing cut by the hardware 

during test shall have a breaking 

strength at the cut of not less than 

18,683 N. 

(4) Complete fracture through any 

solid section of metal attachment 

hardware shall not occur during test. 

(b) Type 2 seat belt assembly. Except as 

provided in S4.5, the components of a 

Type 2 seat belt assembly including 

webbing, straps, buckles, adjustment 

and attachment hardware, and retractors shall comply with the following 

requirements when tested by the procedure specified in S5.3(b): 

(1) The structural components in the 

pelvic restraint shall withstand a force 

of not less than 11,120 N. 

(2) The structural components in the 

upper torso restraint shall withstand a 

force of not less than 6,672 N. 

(3) The structural components in the 

assembly that are common to pelvic 

and upper torso restraints shall withstand a force of not less than 13,345 N. 

(4) The length of the pelvic restraint 

between anchorages shall not increase 

more than 508 mm when subjected to a 

force of 11,120 N. 

(5) The length of the upper torso restraint between anchorages shall not 

increase more than 508 mm when subjected to a force of 6,672 N. 

(6) Any webbing cut by the hardware 

during test shall have a breaking 

strength of not less than 15,569 N at a 

cut in webbing of the pelvic restraint, 

or not less than 12,455 N at a cut in 

webbing of the upper torso restraint. 

(7) Complete fracture through any 

solid section of metal attachment 

hardware shall not occur during test. 

S4.5 Load-limiter. (a) A Type 1 or Type 

2 seat belt assembly that includes a 

load-limiter is not required to comply 

with the elongation requirements of 

S4.2(c), S4.4(a)(2), S4.4(b)(4) or 

S4.4(b)(5). 

(b) A seat belt assembly that includes 

a load limiter and that does not comply with the elongation requirements 

of this standard may be installed in 

motor vehicles at any designated seating position that is subject to the requirements of S5.1 of Standard No. 208 

(§ 571.208). 

S4.6 Manual belts subject to crash protection requirements of Standard No. 208.

(a)(1) A manual seat belt assembly, 

which is subject to the requirements of 

S5.1 of Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) 

by virtue of any provision of Standard 

No. 208 other than S4.1.2.1(c)(2) of that 

standard, does not have to meet the requirements of S4.2(a)–(f) and S4.4 of 

this standard. 

(2) A manual seat belt assembly subject to the requirements of S5.1 of 

Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208) by 

virtue of S4.1.2.1(c)(2) of Standard No. 

208 does not have to meet the elongation requirements of S4.2(c), 

S4.4(a)(2), S4.4(b)(4), and S4.4(b)(5) of 

this standard. 

S5. Demonstration procedures.

S5.1 Webbing—(a) Width. The width 

of webbing from three seat belt assemblies shall be measured after conditioning for at least 24 hours in an atmosphere having relative humidity between 48 and 67 percent and a temperature of 23° ±2 °C. The tension during 

measurement of width shall be not 

more than 22 N on webbing from a Type 

565

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

1 seat belt assembly, and 9786 N ± 450 N 

on webbing from a Type 2 seat belt assembly. The width of webbing from a 

Type 2 seat belt assembly may be 

measured during the breaking strength 

test described in paragraph (b) of this 

section. 

(b) Breaking strength. Webbing from 

three seat belt assemblies shall be conditioned in accordance with paragraph 

(a) of this section and tested for breaking strength in a testing machine of capacity verified to have an error of not 

more than one percent in the range of 

the breaking strength of the webbing 

in accordance with American Society 

for Testing and Materials E4–79 

‘‘Standard Methods of Load 

Verification of Testing Machines.’’ The 

machine shall be equipped with split 

drum grips illustrated in Figure 1, having a diameter between 51 and 102 mm. 

The rate of grip separation shall be between 51 and 102 mm per minute. The 

distance between the centers of the 

grips at the start of the test shall be 

between 102 and 254 mm. After placing 

the specimen in the grips, the webbing 

shall be stretched continuously at a 

uniform rate to failure. Each value 

shall be not less than the applicable 

breaking strength requirement in 

S4.2(b), but the median value shall be 

used for determining the retention of 

breaking strength in paragraphs (d), (e) 

and (f) of this section. 

(c) Elongation. Elongation shall be 

measured during the breaking strength 

test described in paragraph (b) of this 

section by the following procedure: A 

preload between 196 N and 245 N shall 

be placed on the webbing mounted in 

the grips of the testing machine and 

the needle points of an extensometer, 

in which the points remain parallel 

during test, are inserted in the center 

of the specimen. Initially the points 

shall be set at a known distance apart 

between 102 and 203 mm. When the 

force on the webbing reaches the value 

specified in S4.2(c), the increase in separation of the points of the extensometer shall be measured and the percent elongation shall be calculated to 

the nearest 0.5 percent. Each value 

shall be not more than the appropriate 

elongation requirement in S4.2(c). 

(d) Resistance to abrasion. The webbing from three seat belt assemblies 

shall be tested for resistance to abrasion by rubbing over the hexagon bar 

prescribed in Figure 2 in the following 

manner: The webbing shall be mounted 

in the apparatus shown schematically 

in Figure 2. One end of the webbing (A) 

shall be attached to a mass (B) of 2.35 

kg ± .05 kg, except that a mass of 1.5 kg 

± .05 kg shall be used for webbing in 

pelvic and upper torso restraints of a 

belt assembly used in a child restraint 

system. The webbing shall be passed 

over the two new abrading edges of the 

hexagon bar (C) and the other end attached to an oscillating drum (D) 

which has a stroke of 330 mm. Suitable 

guides shall be used to prevent movement of the webbing along the axis of 

hexagonal bar C. Drum D shall be oscillated for 5,000 strokes or 2,500 cycles at 

a rate of 60 ± 2 strokes per minute or 30 

± 1 cycles per minute. The abraded webbing shall be conditioned as prescribed 

in paragraph (a) of this section and 

tested for breaking strength by the 

procedure described in paragraph (b) of 

this section. The median values for the 

breaking strengths determined on abraded and unabraded specimens shall 

be used to calculate the percentage of 

breaking strength retained. 

(e) Resistance to light. Webbing at 

least 508 mm in length from three seat 

belt assemblies shall be suspended 

vertically on the inside of the specimen 

track in a Type E carbon-arc light exposure apparatus described in Standard 

Practice for Generating Light-Exposure Apparatus (Carbon-Arc Type) 

With and Without Water for Exposure 

of Nonmetallic Materials, ASTM Designation: G23 81, published by the 

American Society for Testing and Materials, except that the filter used for 

100 percent polyester yarns shall be 

chemically strengthened soda-lime 

glass with a transmittance of less than 

5 percent for wave lengths equal to or 

less than 305 nanometers and 90 percent 

or greater transmittance for wave 

lengths of 375 to 800 nanometers. The 

apparatus shall be operated without 

water spray at an air temperature of 

60° ± 2 °Celsius ( °C) measured at a 

point 25 ± 5 mm outside the specimen 

rack and midway in height. The temperature sensing element shall be 

shielded from radiation. The specimens 

566

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

shall be exposed to light from the carbon-arc for 100 hours and then conditioned as prescribed in paragraph (a) of 

this section. The colorfastness of the 

exposed and conditioned specimens 

shall be determined on the Geometric 

Gray Scale issued by the American Association of Textile Chemists and 

Colorists. The breaking strength of the 

specimens shall be determined by the 

procedure prescribed in paragraph (b) 

of this section. The median values for 

the breaking strengths determined on 

exposed and unexposed specimens shall 

be used to calculate the percentage of 

breaking strength retained. 

(f) Resistance to micro-organisms. Webbing at least 508 millimeters (mm) in 

length from three seat belt assemblies 

shall first be preconditioned in accordance with Appendix A(1) and (2) of 

American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists Test Method 381, 

‘‘Fungicides Evaluation on Textiles; 

Mildew and Rot Resistance of Textiles,’’ and then subjected to Test I, 

‘‘Soil Burial Test’’ of that test method. 

After soil-burial for a period of 2 

weeks, the specimen shall be washed in 

water, dried and conditioned as prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section. 

The breaking strengths of the specimens shall be determined by the procedure prescribed in paragraph (b) of this 

section. The median values for the 

breaking strengths determined on exposed and unexposed specimens shall be 

used to calculate the percentage of 

breaking strength retained.

NOTE: This test shall not be required on 

webbing made from material which is inherently resistant to micro-organisms.

S5.2 Hardware.

(a) Corrosion resistance. Three seat 

belt assemblies shall be tested in accordance with American Society for 

Testing and Materials B11773, 

‘‘Standard Method of Salt Spray (Fog) 

Testing.’’ Any surface coating or material not intended for permanent retention on the metal parts during service 

life shall be removed prior to preparation of the test specimens for testing. 

The period of test shall be 50 hours for 

all attachment hardware at or near the 

floor, consisting of two periods of 24 

hours exposure to salt spray followed 

by 1 hour drying and 25 hours for all 

other hardware, consisting of one period of 24 hours exposure to salt spray 

followed by 1 hour drying. In the salt 

spray test chamber, the parts from the 

three assemblies shall be oriented differently, selecting those orientations 

most likely to develop corrosion on the 

larger areas. At the end of test, the 

seat belt assembly shall be washed 

thoroughly with water to remove the 

salt. After drying for at least 24 hours 

under standard laboratory conditions 

specified in S5.1(a) attachment hardware shall be examined for ferrous corrosion on significant surfaces, that is, 

all surfaces that can be contacted by a 

sphere 19 mm in diameter, and other 

hardware shall be examined for ferrous 

and nonferrous corrosion which may be 

transferred, either directly or by 

means of the webbing, to a person or 

his clothing during use of a seat belt 

assembly incorporating the hardware.

NOTE: When attachment and other hardware are permanently fastened, by sewing or 

other means, to the same piece of webbing, 

separate assemblies shall be used to test the 

two types of hardware. The test for corrosion 

resistance shall not be required for attachment hardware made from corrosion-resistant steel containing at least 11.5 percent 

chromium or for attachment hardware protected with an electrodeposited coating of 

nickel, or copper and nickel, as prescribed in 

S4.3(a). The assembly that has been used to 

test the corrosion resistance of the buckle 

shall be used to measure adjustment force, 

tilt-lock adjustment, and buckle latch in 

paragraphs (e), (f), and (g), respectively, of 

this section, assembly performance in S5.3 

and buckle release force in paragraph (d) of 

this section.

(b) Temperature resistance. Three seat 

belt assemblies having plastic or nonmetallic hardware or having retractors 

shall be subjected to the conditions 

prescribed in Procedure D of American 

Society for Testing and Materials 

D756–78, ‘‘Standard Practice for Determination of Weight and Shape Changes 

of Plastics under Accelerated Service 

Conditions.’’ The dimension and weight 

measurement shall be omitted. Buckles 

shall be unlatched and retractors shall 

be fully retracted during conditioning. 

The hardware parts after conditioning 

shall be used for all applicable tests in 

S4.3 and S4.4. 

(c) Attachment hardware. (1) Attachment bolts used to secure the pelvic restraint of a seat belt assembly to a 

567

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

motor vehicle shall be tested in a manner similar to that shown in Figure 3. 

The load shall be applied at an angle of 

45° to the axis of the bolt through attachment hardware from the seat belt 

assembly, or through a special fixture 

which simulates the loading applied by 

the attachment hardware. The attachment hardware or simulated fixture 

shall be fastened by the bolt to the anchorage shown in Figure 3, which has a 

standard 7⁄16–20UNF–2B or 1⁄2-UNF–2B or 

metric equivalent threaded hole in a 

hardened steel plate at least 10 mm in 

thickness. The bolt shall be installed 

with two full threads exposed from the 

fully seated position. The appropriate 

force required by S4.3(c) shall be applied. A bolt from each of three seat 

belt assemblies shall be tested. 

(2) Attachment hardware, other than 

bolts, designed to receive the ends of 

two seat belt assemblies shall be subjected to a tensile force of 26,689 N in a 

manner simulating use. The hardware 

shall be examined for fracture after the 

force is released. Attachment hardware 

from three seat belt assemblies shall be 

tested. 

(3) Single attachment hook for connecting webbing to any eye bolt shall 

be tested in the following manner: The 

hook shall be held rigidly so that the 

retainer latch or keeper, with cotter 

pin or other locking device in place, is 

in a horizontal position as shown in 

Figure 4. A force of 667 N ± 9 N shall be 

applied vertically as near as possible to 

the free end of the retainer latch, and 

the movement of the latch by this 

force at the point of application shall 

be measured. The vertical force shall 

be released, and a force of 667 N ± 9 N 

shall be applied horizontally as near as 

possible to the free end of the retainer 

latch. The movement of the latch by 

this force at the point of load application shall be measured. Alternatively, 

the hook may be held in other positions, provided the forces are applied 

and the movements of the latch are 

measured at the points indicated in 

Figure 4. A single attachment hook 

from each of three seat belt assemblies 

shall be tested. 

(d) Buckle release. (1) Three seat belt 

assemblies shall be tested to determine 

compliance with the maximum buckle 

release force requirements, following 

the assembly test in S5.3. After subjection to the force applicable for the assembly being tested, the force shall be 

reduced and maintained at 667 N on the 

assembly loop of a Type 1 seat belt assembly, 334 N on the components of a 

Type 2 seat belt assembly. The buckle 

release force shall be measured by applying a force on the buckle in a manner and direction typical of those 

which would be employed by a seat belt 

occupant. For push button-release 

buckles, the force shall be applied at 

least 3 mm from the edge of the push 

button access opening of the buckle in 

a direction that produces maximum releasing effect. For lever-release buckles, the force shall be applied on the 

centerline of the buckle lever or finger 

tab in a direction that produces maximum releasing effect. 

(2) The area for application of release 

force on pushbutton actuated buckle 

shall be measured to the nearest 30 

mm2. The cylinder specified in S4.3(d) 

shall be inserted in the actuation portion of a lever released buckle for determination of compliance with the requirement. A buckle with other release 

actuation shall be examined for access 

of release by fingers. 

(3) The buckle of a Type 1 or Type 2 

seat belt assembly shall be subjected to 

a compressive force of 1779 N applied 

anywhere on a test line that is coincident with the center line of the belt extended through the buckle or on any 

line that extends over the center of the 

release mechanism and intersects the 

extended centerline of the belt at an 

angle of 60°. The load shall be applied 

by using a curved cylindrical bar having a cross section diameter of 19 mm 

and a radius of curvature of 152 mm, 

placed with its longitudinal center line 

along the test line and its center directly above the point or the buckle to 

which the load will be applied. The 

buckle shall be latched, and a tensile 

force of 334 N shall be applied to the 

connected webbing during the application of the compressive force. Buckles 

from three seat belt assemblies shall be 

tested to determine compliance with 

paragraph S4.3(d)(3). 

(e) Adjustment Force. Three seat belt 

assemblies shall be tested for adjustment force on the webbing at the buckle, or other manual adjusting device 

568

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

normally used to adjust the size of the 

assembly. With no load on the anchor 

end, the webbing shall be drawn 

through the adjusting device at a rate 

of 508 mm ±50 mm per minute and the 

maximum force shall be measured to 

the nearest 1 N after the first 25 mm of 

webbing movement. The webbing shall 

be precycled 10 times prior to measurement. 

(f) Tilt-lock adjustment. This test shall 

be made on buckles or other manual 

adjusting devices having tilt-lock adjustment normally used to adjust the 

size of the assembly. Three buckles or 

devices shall be tested. The base of the 

adjustment mechanism and the anchor 

end of the webbing shall be oriented in 

planes normal to each other. The webbing shall be drawn through the adjustment mechanism in a direction to increase belt length at a rate of 508 mm 

±50 mm per minute while the plane of 

the base is slowly rotated in a direction to lock the webbing. Rotation 

shall be stopped when the webbing 

locks, but the pull on the webbing shall 

be continued until there is a resistance 

of at least 89 N. The locking angle between the anchor end of the webbing 

and the base of the adjustment mechanism shall be measured to the nearest 

degree. The webbing shall be precycled 

10 times prior to measurement. 

(g) Buckle latch. The buckles from 

three seat belt assemblies shall be 

opened fully and closed at least 10 

times. Then the buckles shall be 

clamped or firmly held against a flat 

surface so as to permit normal movement of buckle part, but with the 

metal mating plate (metal-to-metal 

buckles) or of webbing end (metal-towebbing buckles) withdrawn from the 

buckle. The release mechanism shall be 

moved 200 times through the maximum 

possible travel against its stop with a 

force of 133 N ±13 N at a rate not to exceed 30 cycles per minute. The buckle 

shall be examined to determine compliance with the performance requirements of S4.3(g). A metal-to-metal 

buckle shall be examined to determine 

whether partial engagement is possible 

by means of any technique representative of actual use. If partial engagement is possible, the maximum force of 

separation when in such partial engagement shall be determined. 

(h) Nonlocking retractor. After the retractor is cycled 10 times by full extension and retraction of the webbing, the 

retractor and webbing shall be suspended vertically and a force of 18 N 

shall be applied to extend the webbing 

from the retractor. The force shall be 

reduced to 13 N when attached to a pelvic restraint, or to 5 N per strap or 

webbing that contacts the shoulder of 

an occupant when retractor is attached 

to an upper torso restraint. The residual extension of the webbing shall be 

measured by manual rotation of the retractor drum or by disengaging the retraction mechanism. Measurements 

shall be made on three retractors. The 

location of the retractor attached to 

upper torso restraint shall be examined 

for visibility of reel during use of seat 

belt assembly in a vehicle.

NOTE: This test shall not be required on a 

nonlocking retractor attached to the free 

end of webbing which is not subjected to any 

tension during restraint of an occupant by 

the assembly.

(i) Automatic-locking retractor. Three 

retractors shall be tested in a manner 

to permit the retraction force to be determined exclusive of the gravitational 

forces on hardware or webbing being 

retracted. The webbing shall be fully 

extended from the retractor. While the 

webbing is being retracted, the average 

force or retraction within plus or 

minus 51 mm of 75 percent extension 

(25 percent retraction) shall be determined and the webbing movement between adjacent locking segments shall 

be measured in the same region of extension. A seat belt assembly with 

automatic locking retractor in upper 

torso restraint shall be tested in a vehicle in a manner prescribed by the installation and usage instructions. The 

retraction force on the occupant of the 

seat belt assembly shall be determined 

before and after traveling for 10 minutes at a speed of 24 kilometers per 

hour (km/h) or more over a rough road 

(e.g., Belgian block road) where the occupant is subjected to displacement 

with respect to the vehicle in both horizontal and vertical directions. Measurements shall be made with the vehicle stopped and the occupant in the 

normal seated position. 

(j) Emergency-locking retractor. A retractor shall be tested in a manner 

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Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

that permits the retraction force to be 

determined exclusive of the gravitational forces on hardware or webbing 

being retracted. The webbing shall be 

fully extended from the retractor, passing over or through any hardware or 

other material specified in the installation instructions. While the webbing is 

being retracted, the lowest force of retraction within plus or minus 51 mm of 

75 percent extension shall be determined. A retractor that is sensitive to 

webbing withdrawal shall be subjected 

to an acceleration of 3 m/s2 (0.3 g) within a period of 50 milliseconds (ms) 

while the webbing is at 75 percent extension, to determine compliance with 

S4.3(j)(2). The retractor shall be subjected to an acceleration of 7 m/s2 (0.7 

g) within a period of 50 milliseconds 

(ms), while the webbing is at 75 percent 

extension, and the webbing movement 

before locking shall be measured under 

the following conditions: For a retractor sensitive to webbing withdrawal, 

the retractor shall be accelerated in 

the direction of webbing retraction 

while the retractor drum’s central axis 

is oriented horizontally and at angles 

of 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180° to the horizontal plane. For a retractor sensitive 

to vehicle acceleration, the retractor 

shall be: 

(1) Accelerated in the horizontal 

plane in two directions normal to each 

other, while the retractor drum’s central axis is oriented at the angle at 

which it is installed in the vehicle; and, 

(2) Accelerated in three directions 

normal to each other while the retractor drum’s central axis is oriented at 

angles of 45°, 90°, 135°, and 180° from the 

angle at which it is installed in the vehicle, unless the retractor locks by 

gravitational force when tilted in any 

direction to any angle greater than 45°

from the angle at which it is installed 

in the vehicle. 

(k) Performance of retractor. After 

completion of the corrosion-resistance 

test described in paragraph (a) of this 

section, the webbing shall be fully extended and allowed to dry for at least 

24 hours under standard laboratory 

conditions specified in S5.1(a). The retractor shall be examined for ferrous 

and nonferrous corrosion which may be 

transferred, either directly or by 

means of the webbing, to a person or 

his clothing during use of a seat belt 

assembly incorporating the retractor, 

and for ferrous corrosion on significant 

surfaces if the retractor is part of the 

attachment hardware. The webbing 

shall be withdrawn manually and allowed to retract for 25 cycles. The retractor shall be mounted in an apparatus capable of extending the webbing 

fully, applying a force of 89 N at full 

extension, and allowing the webbing to 

retract freely and completely. The 

webbing shall be withdrawn from the 

retractor and allowed to retract repeatedly in this apparatus until 2,500 

cycles are completed. The retractor 

and webbing shall then be subjected to 

the temperature resistance test prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section. 

The retractor shall be subjected to 

2,500 additional cycles of webbing withdrawal and retraction. Then, the retractor and webbing shall be subjected 

to dust in a chamber similar to one illustrated in Figure 8 containing about 

0.9 kg of coarse grade dust conforming 

to the specification given in Society of 

Automotive Engineering Recommended Practice J726, ‘‘Air Cleaner 

Test Code’’ Sept. 1979. The dust shall be 

agitated every 20 minutes for 5 seconds 

by compressed air, free of oil and moisture, at a gage pressure of 550 ±55 kPa 

entering through an orifice 1.5 ± 0.1 mm 

in diameter. The webbing shall be extended to the top of the chamber and 

kept extended at all times except that 

the webbing shall be subjected to 10 cycles of complete retraction and extension within 1 to 2 minutes after each 

agitation of the dust. At the end of 5 

hours, the assembly shall be removed 

from the chamber. The webbing shall 

be fully withdrawn from the retractor 

manually and allowed to retract completely for 25 cycles. An automaticlocking retractor or a nonlocking retractor attached to pelvic restraint 

shall be subjected to 5,000 additional 

cycles of webbing withdrawal and retraction. An emergency locking retractor or a nonlocking retractor attached 

to upper torso restraint shall be subjected to 45,000 additional cycles of 

webbing withdrawal and retraction between 50 and 100 per cent extension. 

The locking mechanism of an emergency locking retractor shall be actuated at least 10,000 times within 50 to 

570

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

100 percent extension of webbing during 

the 50,000 cycles. At the end of test, 

compliance of the retractors with applicable requirements in S4.3 (h), (i), 

and (j) shall be determined. Three retractors shall be tested for performance. 

S5.3 Assembly performance— (a) Type 

1 seat belt assembly. Three complete seat 

belt assemblies, including webbing, 

straps, buckles, adjustment and attachment hardware, and retractors, arranged in the form of a loop as shown 

in Figure 5, shall be tested in the following manner: 

(1) The testing machine shall conform to the requirements specified in 

S5.1(b). A double-roller block shall be 

attached to one head of the testing machine. This block shall consist of two 

rollers 102 mm in diameter and sufficiently long so that no part of the seat 

belt assembly touches parts of the 

block other than the rollers during 

test. The rollers shall be mounted on 

antifriction bearings and spaced 305 

mm between centers, and shall have 

sufficient capacity so that there is no 

brinelling, bending or other distortion 

of parts which may affect the results. 

An anchorage bar shall be fastened to 

the other head of the testing machine. 

(2) The attachment hardware furnished with the seat belt assembly 

shall be attached to the anchorage bar. 

The anchor points shall be spaced so 

that the webbing is parallel in the two 

sides of the loop. The attaching bolts 

shall be parallel to, or at an angle of 

45° or 90° to the webbing, whichever results in an angle nearest to 90° between 

webbing and attachment hardware except that eye bolts shall be vertical, 

and attaching bolts or nonthreaded anchorages of a seat belt assembly designed for use in specific models of 

motor vehicles shall be installed to 

produce the maximum angle in use indicated by the installation instructions, utilizing special fixtures if necessary to simulate installation in the 

motor vehicle. Rigid adapters between 

anchorage bar and attachment hardware shall be used if necessary to locate and orient the adjustment hardware. The adapters shall have a flat 

support face perpendicular to the 

threaded hole for the attaching bolt 

and adequate in area to provide full 

support for the base of the attachment 

hardware connected to the webbing. If 

necessary, a washer shall be used under 

a swivel plate or other attachment 

hardware to prevent the webbing from 

being damaged as the attaching bolt is 

tightened. 

(3) The length of the assembly loop 

from attaching bolt to attaching bolt 

shall be adjusted to about 1295 mm, or 

as near thereto as possible. A force of 

245 N shall be applied to the loop to remove any slack in webbing at hardware. The force shall be removed and 

the heads of the testing machine shall 

be adjusted for an assembly loop between 1220 and 1270 mm in length. The 

length of the assembly loop shall then 

be adjusted by applying a force between 89 and 98 N to the free end of the 

webbing at the buckle, or by the retraction force of an automatic-locking 

or emergency-locking retractor. A seat 

belt assembly that cannot be adjusted 

to this length shall be adjusted as 

closely as possible. An automatic-locking or emergency locking retractor 

when included in a seat belt assembly 

shall be locked at the start of the test 

with a tension on the webbing slightly 

in excess of the retractive force in 

order to keep the retractor locked. The 

buckle shall be in a location so that it 

does not touch the rollers during test, 

but to facilitate making the buckle release test in S5.2(d) the buckle should 

be between the rollers or near a roller 

in one leg. 

(4) The heads of the testing machine 

shall be separated at a rate between 51 

and 102 mm per minute until a force of 

22,241 ± 222 N is applied to the assembly 

loop. The extension of the loop shall be 

determined from measurements of head 

separation before and after the force is 

applied. The force shall be decreased to 

667 ± 45 N and the buckle release force 

measured as prescribed in S5.2(d). 

(5) After the buckle is released, the 

webbing shall be examined for cutting 

by the hardware. If the yarns are partially or completely severed in a line 

for a distance of 10 percent or more of 

the webbing width, the cut webbing 

shall be tested for breaking strength as 

specified in S5.1(b) locating the cut in 

the free length between grips. If there 

is insufficient webbing on either side of 

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Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

the cut to make such a test for breaking strength, another seat belt assembly shall be used with the webbing 

repositioned in the hardware. A tensile 

force of 11,120 ± 111 N shall be applied 

to the components or a force of 22,241 ±

222 N shall be applied to the assembly 

loop. After the force is removed, the 

breaking strength of the cut webbing 

shall be determined as prescribed 

above. 

(6) If a Type 1 seat belt assembly includes an automatic-locking retractor 

or an emergency-locking retractor, the 

webbing and retractor shall be subjected to a tensile force of 11,120 ± 111 

N with the webbing fully extended from 

the retractor. 

(7) If a seat belt assembly has a buckle in which the tongue is capable of inverted insertion, one of the three assemblies shall be tested with the 

tongue inverted. 

(b) Type 2 seat belt assembly. Components of three seat belt assemblies 

shall be tested in the following manner: 

(1) The pelvic restraint between anchorages shall be adjusted to a length 

between 1220 and 1270 mm, or as near 

this length as possible if the design of 

the pelvic restraint does not permit its 

adjustment to this length. An automatic-locking or emergency-locking 

retractor when included in a seat belt 

assembly shall be locked at the start of 

the test with a tension on the webbing 

slightly in excess of the retractive 

force in order to keep the retractor 

locked. The attachment hardware shall 

be oriented to the webbing as specified 

in paragraph (a)(2) of this section and 

illustrated in Figure 5. A tensile force 

11,120 ± 111 N shall be applied on the 

components in any convenient manner 

and the extension between anchorages 

under this force shall be measured. The 

force shall be reduced to 334 ± 22 N and 

the buckle release force measured as 

prescribed in S5.2(d). 

(2) The components of the upper 

torso restraint shall be subjected to a 

tensile force of 6,672 ± 67 N following 

the procedure prescribed above for testing pelvic restraint and the extension 

between anchorages under this force 

shall be measured. If the testing apparatus permits, the pelvic and upper 

torso restraints may be tested simultaneously. The force shall be reduced to 

334 ± 22 N and the buckle release force 

measured as prescribed in S5.2(d). 

(3) Any component of the seat belt 

assembly common to both pelvic and 

upper torso restraint shall be subjected 

to a tensile force of 13,344 ± 134 N. 

(4) After the buckle is released in 

tests of pelvic and upper torso restraints, the webbing shall be examined 

for cutting by the hardware. If the 

yarns are partially or completely severed in a line for a distance of 10 percent or more of the webbing width, the 

cut webbing shall be tested for breaking strength as specified in S5.1(b) locating the cut in the free length between grips. If there is insufficient 

webbing on either side of the cut to 

make such a test for breaking 

strength, another seat belt assembly 

shall be used with the webbing repositioned in the hardware. The force applied shall be 11,120 ± 111 N for components of pelvic restraint, and 6,672 ± 67 

N for components of upper torso restraint. After the force is removed, the 

breaking strength of the cut webbing 

shall be determined as prescribed 

above. 

(5) If a Type 2 seat belt assembly includes an automatic-locking retractor 

or an emergency-locking retractor the 

webbing and retractor shall be subjected to a tensile force of 11,120 ± 111 

N with the webbing fully extended from 

the retractor, or to a tensile force of 

6,672 ± 67 N with the webbing fully extended from the retractor if the design 

of the assembly permits only upper 

torso restraint forces on the retractor. 

(6) If a seat belt assembly has a buckle in which the tongue is capable of inverted insertion, one of the three assemblies shall be tested with the 

tongue inverted. 

(c) Resistance to buckle abrasion. Seat 

belt assemblies shall be tested for resistance to abrasion by each buckle or 

manual adjusting device normally used 

to adjust the size of the assembly. The 

webbing of the assembly to be used in 

this test shall be exposed for 4 hours to 

an atmosphere having relative humidity of 65 per cent and temperature of 18 

°C. The webbing shall be pulled back 

and forth through the buckle or manual adjusting device as shown schematically in Figure 7. The anchor end 

572

§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

of the webbing (A) shall be attached to 

a mass (B) of 1.4 kg. The webbing shall 

pass through the buckle (C), and the 

other end (D) shall be attached to a reciprocating device so that the webbing 

forms an angle of 8° with the hinge stop 

(E). The reciprocating device shall be 

operated for 2,500 cycles at a rate of 18 

cycles per minute with a stroke length 

of 203 mm. The abraded webbing shall 

be tested for breaking strength by the 

procedure described in paragraph 

S5.1(b).

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Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209


EC01AU91.090</GPH>
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§ 571.209 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)


EC01AU91.091</GPH>
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Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.209

[44 FR 72139, Dec. 13, 1979, as amended at 45 FR 29048, May 1, 1980; 46 FR 2620, Jan. 12, 1981; 

48 FR 30140, June 30, 1983; 49 FR 36508, Sept. 18, 1984; 51 FR 9813, Mar. 21, 1986; 51 FR 31774, 

Sept. 5, 1986; 52 FR 44912, Nov. 23, 1987; 56 FR 15299, Apr. 16, 1991; 56 FR 56325, Nov. 4, 1991; 59 


EC01AU91.092</GPH> EC01AU91.093</GPH>
576

§ 571.210 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

FR 17994, Apr. 15, 1994; 61 FR 20171, May 6, 1996; 63 FR 28936, May 27, 1998; 63 FR 51003, Sept. 

24, 1998; 64 FR 27206, May 19, 1999]

§ 571.210 Standard No. 210; Seat belt 

assembly anchorages. 

S1. Purpose and scope. This standard 

establishes requirements for seat belt 

assembly anchorages to insure their 

proper location for effective occupant 

restraint and to reduce the likelihood 

of their failure. 

S2. Application. This standard applies 

to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses. 

S3. Definition. Seat belt anchorage

means any component, other than the 

webbing or straps, involved in transferring seat belt loads to the vehicle 

structure, including, but not limited 

to, the attachment hardware, seat 

frames, seat pedestals, the vehicle 

structure itself, and any part of the vehicle whose failure causes separation of 

the belt from the vehicle structure. 

S4. Requirements.

S4.1 Type.

S4.1.1 Seat belt anchorages for a 

Type 1 or a Type 2 seat belt assembly 

shall be installed for each designated 

seating position for which a Type 1 or 

a Type 2 seat belt assembly is required 

by Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208). 

Seat belt anchorages for a Type 2 seat 

belt assembly shall be installed for 

each designated seating position for 

which a Type 2 seat belt assembly is required by Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 

571.208). 

S4.1.2 (a) Notwithstanding the requirement of S4.1.1, each vehicle manufactured on or after September 1, 1987 

that is equipped with an automatic restraint at the front right outboard designated seating position, which automatic restraint cannot be used for securing a child restraint system or cannot be adjusted by the vehicle owner to 

secure a child restraint system solely 

through the use of attachment hardware installed as an item of original 

equipment by the vehicle manufacturer, shall have, at the manufacturer’s option, either anchorages for a 

Type 1 seat belt assembly installed 

atthat position or a Type 1 or Type 2 

seat belt assembly installed at that position. If a manufacturer elects to install anchorages for a Type 1 seat belt 

assembly to comply with this requirement, those anchorages shall consist 

of, at a minimum, holes threaded to accept bolts that comply with S4.1(f) of 

Standard No. 209 (49 CFR 571.209). 

(b) The requirement in S4.1.1 of this 

standard that seat belt anchorages for 

a Type 1 or a Type 2 seat belt assembly 

shall be installed for certain designated seating positions does not 

apply to any such seating positions 

that are equipped with a seat belt assembly that meets the frontal crash 

protection requirements of S5.1 of 

Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208). 

S4.2 Strength.

S4.2.1 Except as provided in S4.2.5, 

and except for side-facing seats, the anchorages, attachment hardware, and 

attachment bolts for any of the following seat belt assemblies shall withstand a 5,000 pound force when tested in 

accordance with S5.1 of this standard: 

(a) Type 1 seat belt assembly; and 

(b) Lap belt portion of either a Type 

2 or automatic seat belt assembly, if 

such seat belt assembly is equipped 

with a detachable upper torso belt. 

S4.2.2 Except as provided in S4.2.5, 

and except for side facing seats, the anchorages, attachment hardware, and 

attachment bolts for any of the following seat belt assemblies shall withstand a 3,000 pound force applied to the 

lap belt portion of the seat belt assembly simultaneously with a 3,000 pound 

force applied to the shoulder belt portion of the seat belt assembly, when 

tested in accordance with S5.2 of this 

standard: 

(a) Type 2 and automatic seat belt assemblies that are installed to comply 

with Standard No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208); 

and 

(b) Type 2 and automatic seat belt assemblies that are installed at a seating 

position required to have a Type 1 or 

Type 2 seat belt assembly by Standard 

No. 208 (49 CFR 571.208). 

S4.2.3 Permanent deformation or 

rupture of a seat belt anchorage or its 

surrounding area is not considered to 

be a failure, if the required force is sustained for the specified time. 

S4.2.4 Anchorages, attachment 

hardware, and attachment bolts shall 

632

§ 571.215 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

plane is six inches. To the extent practicable, the left leg of the test dummy 

is in a vertical longitudinal plane. 

S7.3.2 For a test dummy in the outboard passenger positions. The upper legs 

of each test dummy rest against the 

seat cushion to the extent permitted 

by placement of the feet. The initial 

distance between the outboard knee 

clevis flange surfaces is 11.5 inches. To 

the extent practicable, both legs of the 

test dummies in outboard passenger 

positions are in vertical longitudinal 

planes. Final adjustment to accommodate placement of feet in accordance 

with S7.4 for various passenger compartment configurations is permitted. 

S7.4 Feet.

S7.4.1 For a test dummy in the driver 

position. The right foot of the test 

dummy rests on the undepressed accelerator with the heel resting as far forward as possible on the floorpan. The 

left foot is set perpendicular to the 

lower leg with the heel resting on the 

floorpan in the same lateral line as the 

right heel. 

S7.4.2 For a test dummy in the front 

outboard passenger position. The feet of 

the test dummy are placed on the vehicle’s toeboard with the heels resting on 

the floorpan as close as possible to the 

intersection of the toeboard and 

floorpan. If the feet cannot be placed 

flat on the toeboard, they are set perpendicular to the lower legs and placed 

as far forward as possible so that the 

heels rest on the floorpan. 

S7.4.3 For a test dummy in either of 

the rear outboard passenger positions.

The feet of the test dummy are placed 

flat on the floorpan and beneath the 

front seat as far as possible without 

front seat interference. If necessary, 

the distance between the knees can be 

changed in order to place the feet beneath the seat. 

S8. Phase-in of dynamic test and performance requirements.

S8.1–S8.2 [Reserved] 

S8.3 Passenger cars manufactured on 

or after September 1, 1995 and before September 1, 1996.

S8.3.1 The number of passenger cars 

complying with the requirements of 

S3(c) shall be not less than 40 percent 

of: 

(a) The average annual production of 

passenger cars manufactured on or 

after September 1, 1992, and before September 1, 1995, by each manufacturer, 

or 

(b) The manufacturer’s annual production of passenger cars during the 

period specified in S8.3. 

S8.4 Passenger cars produced by more 

than one manufacturer.

S8.4.1 For the purposes of calculating average annual production of 

passenger cars for each manufacturer 

and the number of passenger cars manufactured by each manufacturer under 

S8.1, S8.2, and S8.3, a passenger car produced by more than one manufacturer 

shall be attributed to a single manufacturer as follows, subject to S8.4.2: 

(a) A passenger car which is imported 

shall be attributed to the importer. 

(b) A passenger car manufactured in 

the United States by more than one 

manufacturer, one of which also markets the vehicle, shall be attributed to 

the manufacturer which markets the 

vehicle. 

S8.4.2 A passenger car produced by 

more than one manufacturer shall be 

attributed to any one of the vehicle’s 

manufacturers specified by an express 

written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration under 49 CFR part 586, between the manufacturer so specified 

and the manufacturer to which the vehicle would otherwise be attributed 

under S8.4.1. 

[36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971, as amended at 45 

FR 17018, Mar. 17, 1980; 55 FR 45752, Oct. 30, 

1990; 56 FR 27437, June 14, 1991; 56 FR 47011, 

Sept. 17, 1991; 57 FR 21615, May 21, 1992; 57 FR 

30921 and 30922, July 13, 1992; 58 FR 14169, 

Mar. 16, 1993; 60 FR 38761, July 28, 1995; 60 FR 

57839, Nov. 22, 1995; 63 FR 16140, Apr. 2, 1998]

§ 571.215 [Reserved]

§ 571.216 Standard No. 216; Roof crush 

resistance. 

S1. Scope. This standard establishes 

strength requirements for the passenger compartment roof. 

S2. Purpose. The purpose of this 

standard is to reduce deaths and injuries due to the crushing of the roof into 

the occupant compartment in rollover 

crashes. 

S3. Application. This standard applies 

to passenger cars, and to multipurpose 

passenger vehicles, trucks and buses 

633

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.216

with a GVWR of 2722 kilograms or less. 

However, it does not apply to—

(a) School buses; 

(b) Vehicles that conform to the rollover test requirements (S5.3) of Standard No. 208 (§ 571.208) by means that require no action by vehicle occupants; 

or 

(c) Convertibles, except for optional 

compliance with the standard as an alternative to the rollover test requirements in S5.3 of Standard No. 208. 

S4. Definitions.

Altered roof means the replacement 

roof on a motor vehicle whose original 

roof has been removed, in part or in 

total, and replaced by a roof that is 

higher than the original roof. The replacement roof on a motor vehicle 

whose original roof has been replaced, 

in whole or in part, by a roof that consists of glazing materials, such as those 

in T-tops and sunroofs, and is located 

at the level of the original roof, is not 

considered to be an altered roof. 

Raised roof means, with respect to a 

roof which includes an area that protrudes above the surrounding exterior 

roof structure, that protruding area of 

the roof. 

Roof over the front seat area means the 

portion of the roof, including windshield trim, forward of a transverse 

vertical plane passing through a point 

162 mm rearward of the SgRP of the 

rearmost front outboard seating position. 

Windshield trim means molding of any 

material between the windshield glazing and the exterior roof surface, including material that covers a part of 

either the windshield glazing or exterior roof surface. 

S5. Requirements. Subject to S5.1, 

when the test device described in S6 is 

used to apply a force to either side of 

the forward edge of a vehicle’s roof in 

accordance with the procedures of S7, 

the lower surface of the test device 

must not move more than 127 millimeters. The applied force in Newtons is 

equal to 1.5 times the unloaded vehicle 

weight of the vehicle, measured in 

kilograms and multiplied by 9.8, but 

does not exceed 22,240 Newtons for passenger cars. Both the left and right 

front portions of the vehicle’s roof 

structure must be capable of meeting 

the requirements. A particular vehicle 

need not meet further requirements 

after being tested at one location. 

S5.1 For multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses that have a 

raised roof or altered roof, manufacturers have the option of using the test 

procedures of S8 instead of the procedures of S7 until October 25, 2000. The 

option of using the test procedures of 

S8 ceases to be available on that date. 

S6. Test device. The test device is a 

rigid unyielding block whose lower surface is a flat rectangle measuring 762 

millimeters by 1,829 millimeters. 

S7. Test procedure. Each vehicle must 

be capable of meeting the requirements 

of S5 when tested in accordance with 

the procedure in S7.1 through 7.6. 

S7.1 Place the sills or the chassis 

frame of the vehicle on a rigid horizontal surface, fix the vehicle rigidly in 

position, close all windows, close and 

lock all doors, and secure any convertible top or removable roof structure in 

place over the occupant compartment. 

Remove roof racks or other non-structural components. 

S7.2 Orient the test device as shown 

in Figure 1 of this section, so that—

(a) Its longitudinal axis is at a forward angle (in side view) of 5 degrees 

below the horizontal, and is parallel to 

the vertical plane through the vehicle’s 

longitudinal centerline; 

(b) Its transverse axis is at an outboard angle, in the front view projection, of 25 degrees below the horizontal. 

S7.3 Maintaining the orientation 

specified in S7.2—

(a) Lower the test device until it initially makes contact with the roof of 

the vehicle. 

(b) Position the test device so that—

(1) The longitudinal centerline on its 

lower surface is on the initial point of 

contact, or on the center of the initial 

contact area, with the roof; and 

(2) Except as specified in S7.4, the 

midpoint of the forward edge of the 

lower surface of the test device is within 10 mm of the transverse vertical 

plane 254 mm forward of the 

forwardmost point on the exterior surface of the roof, including windshield 

trim, that lies in the longitudinal 

vertical plane passing through the vehicle’s longitudinal centerline. 

S7.4 If the vehicle being tested is a 

multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck, 

634

§ 571.216 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

or bus that has a raised roof or altered 

roof, and the initial contact point of 

the test device is on the raised roof or 

altered roof to the rear of the roof over 

the front seat area, the plate is positioned so that the midpoint of the rearward edge of the lower surface of the 

test device is within 10 mm of the 

transverse vertical plane located at the 

rear of the roof over the front seat 

area. 

S7.5 Apply force so that the test device moves in a downward direction 

perpendicular to the lower surface of 

the test device at a rate of not more 

than 13 millimeters per second until 

reaching the force level specified in S5. 

Guide the test device so that throughout the test it moves, without rotation, 

in a straight line with its lower surface 

oriented as specified in S7.2(a) and 

S7.2(b). Complete the test within 120 

seconds. 

S7.6 Measure the distance that the 

test device moved, i.e., the distance between the original location of the 

lower surface of the test device and its 

location as the force level specified in 

S5 is reached. 

S8 Alternate test procedure for multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and 

buses that have a raised roof or altered 

roof manufactured until October 25, 2000 

(see S5.1). Each vehicle shall be capable 

of meeting the requirements of S5 

when tested in accordance with the following procedure. 

S8.1 Place the sills or the chassis 

frame of the vehicle on a rigid horizontal surface, fix the vehicle rigidly in 

position, close all windows, close and 

lock all doors, and secure any convertible top or removable roof structure in 

place over the passenger compartment. 

S8.2 Orient the test device as shown 

in Figure 2, so that—

(a) Its longitudinal axis is at a forward angle (side view) of 5° below the 

horizontal, and is parallel to the 

vertical plane through the vehicle’s 

longitudinal centerline; 

(b) Its lateral axis is at a lateral outboard angle, in the front view projection, of 25° below the horizontal; 

(c) Its lower surface is tangent to the 

surface of the vehicle; and 

(d) The initial contact point, or center of the initial contact area, is on the 

longitudinal centerline of the lower 

surface of the test device and 254 millimeters from the forwardmost point of 

that centerline. 

S8.3 Apply force in a downward direction perpendicular to the lower surface of the test device at a rate of not 

more than 13 millimeters per second 

until reaching a force in Newtons of 11⁄2

times the unloaded vehicle weight of 

the tested vehicle, measured in kilograms and multiplied by 9.8. Complete 

the test within 120 seconds. Guide the 

test device so that throughout the test 

it moves, without rotation, in a 

straight line with its lower surface oriented as specified in S8.2(a) through 

S8.2(d). 

S8.4 Measure the distance that the 

test device moves, i.e., the distance between the original location of the 

lower surface of the test device and its 

location as the force level specified in 

S8.3 is reached. 

FIGURE 1 TO § 571.216

635

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT § 571.216

FIGURE 2 TO § 571.216


ER27AP99.032</GPH>
636

§ 571.217 49 CFR Ch. V (10– 1– 02 Edition)

[36 FR 23300, Dec. 8, 1971, as amended at 38 FR 21930, Aug. 14, 1973; 56 FR 15517, Apr. 17, 1991; 

58 FR 5633, Jan. 22, 1993; 60 FR 13647, Mar. 14, 1995; 64 FR 22578, Apr. 27, 1999; 65 FR 4581, Jan. 

31, 2000]

§ 571.217 Standard No. 217; Bus emergency exits and window retention 

and release.

S1. Scope. This standard establishes 

requirements for the retention of windows other than windshields in buses, 

and establishes operating forces, opening dimensions, and markings for bus 

emergency exits. 

S2. Purpose. The purpose of this 

standard is to minimize the likelihood 

of occupants being thrown from the bus 

and to provide a means of readily accessible emergency egress. 

S3. Application. This standard applies 

to buses, except buses manufactured 

for the purpose of transporting persons 

under physical restraint. 

S4. Definitions. Adjacent seat means a 

designated seating position located so 

that some portion of its occupant space 

is not more than 10 inches from an 

emergency exit, for a distance of at 

least 15 inches measured horizontally 

and parallel to the exit. 

Daylight opening means the maximum 

unobstructed opening of an emergency 

exit when viewed from a direction perpendicular to the plane of the opening. 

Mid-point of the passenger compartment

means any point on a vertical transverse plane bisecting the vehicle longitudinal centerline that extends between the two vertical transverse 

planes which define the foremost and 

rearmost limits of the passenger compartment. 

Occupant space means the space directly above the seat and footwell, 

bounded vertically by the ceiling and 

horizontally by the normally positioned seat back and the nearest obstruction of occupant motion in the direction the seat faces. 

Passenger compartment means space 

within the school bus interior that is 

between a vertical transverse plane located 76 centimeters in front of the 

forwardmost passenger seating reference point and a vertical transverse 

plane tangent to the rear interior wall 

of the bus at the vehicle centerline. 

Post and roof bow panel space means 

the area between two adjacent post and 

roof bows. 

Push-out window means a vehicle 

window designed to open outward to 

provide for emergency egress. 


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