# Uganda - United States Department of State

- Special Envoy for Sudan Perriello Travels to Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia Office of the Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Special Envoy for Sudan Perriello Travels to Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Special Envoy for Sudan Perriello Travels to Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia																																		Media Note																														May 13, 2024																																							Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello departed Washington on May 11 for travel to Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to meet with key regional partners to advance efforts to end the Sudan conflict and avert further mass atrocities, address the immediate and dire humanitarian needs of the Sudanese people, and map a path toward a transition to a civilian-led democratic government.The Special Envoy will meet with partner governments to coordinate diplomatic efforts to resume negotiations, build pressure needed to protect civilians and silence the guns, and facilitate a transition to a civilian-led democratic government.He will also meet with a broad range of Sudanese civilians, including civil society, resistance committees, local response networks, women, youth, grassroots organizations, and other parties to hear their perspectives on how to bolster efforts to end the conflict.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Egypt																								Kenya																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Saudi Arabia																								Uganda
- The Impact of Aid on Economic Growth: Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Evaluations in Agriculture and Food Security -->			HomeUganda						hide			 -->	$( document ).ready(function() {		if ($(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {			$(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){				$("#bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");				$(".bc_middle").toggle();				$(".bc_ellipse").toggle();				$(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");			});			$("#bc_hide").click(function(){				$("#bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");				$(".bc_middle").toggle();				$(".bc_ellipse").toggle();				$(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");			});		} else {			$(".bc_ellipse").hide();		}	}); -->The Impact of Aid on Economic Growth: Analysis of Quasi-Experimental Evaluations in Agriculture and Food SecuritySeptember 2023Rigorous quasi-experimental design studies (i.e. cause-and-effect designs that assume near-random assignment of an intervention) suggest foreign assistance, especially in value chain investments, can positively impact economic growth. Evaluations like this can help decision-makers identify projects with growth-related benefits in both agriculture and food security.BackgroundThis review examines evaluations conducted by the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to identify which foreign assistance programs, aimed at fostering economic growth among partners, have demonstrated sustainable impacts on their economic development from 2014 to 2019. A working group analyzed information from rigorous evaluations that sought to determine whether foreign assistance projects have resulted in sustainable economic growth. The working group developed a report specifically focused on five projects that employed quasi-experimental designs on agriculture or food security.FindingsInvestments and projects focusing on agricultural value chains—enhancing, for example, production and distribution—when tailored to specific recipient groups, can yield substantial growth-related impacts, including:A 27% increase in profits from investments in- genetically modified seed investments.Minority communities being 22% more likely to be employed after participating in a job training program.Poor farmers provided with improved farming inputs and strategies are 30 percentage points more likely to use them.RecommendationsAdvocate for quasi-experimental design to improve quality of findings on sustainable economic development.Support interventions to affect change at the household and community level as they can have significant, growth-related impacts.Evaluate projects after completion to measure sustainability and emphasize building capacity to ensure long-term viability.Specify targeted communities as narrowly as possible, paying attention to dynamics of those groups while designing projects.Consider designs that actively encourage participation to ensure rigorous design without denying services to any community.Evaluation QuestionsIs there quantitative evidence that foreign assistance programs have produced sustainable economic growth in the agriculture sector?Does the evidence suggest some of these types of projects are more effective than others?What are the lessons that can be learned from the design of these projects?Approach, Methods, &amp; DataThe report examined 15 evaluations, chosen from a pool of 2,285. These 15 were selected based on the study criteria. Data scientists applied this criteria to searches using computer programming code on the Department of State and USAID databases of projects from 2015-2019. From the 15 evaluations, there were additional criteria added to determine inclusion in the report – specifically, evaluations needed to have positive findings, utilize quasi-experimental or experimental techniques, and represent final evaluations. One mid-term evaluation was included because it covered a five-year period. This led to five evaluations, out of the 15, to be included in the final report. The report sorted these five evaluations into two broad categories (specifically, value-chain investments and training and outreach investments), summarized their key results, tried to reasonably compare the projects, analyzed the findings to offer insights, examined research designs for all 15 projects to find broader lessons learned from how the projects were evaluated, and suggested next steps.Detailed FindingsBroadly, the projects analyzed were impactful, suggesting that foreign assistance can help lead to economic growth. However, the evaluations did not capture outcomes well after the interventions had concluded, only intermediary ones, so the positive impact to long-term economic growth would require further study.Value-chain investments might have a particularly strong return, at least in the shorter term: While the wide variation in the types of projects made it unfeasible to directly compare them, projects directly investing in value chain inputs did appear to have stronger returns compared to those providing training and strengthening organizations. The latter may have more sustainable outcomes because they invest in people and institutions, but the lack of projects measuring outcomes after their completion made that impossible to conclude.Targeted projects can have significant, growth-related impacts: projects that were very targeted were particularly successful. Specifically, the project in Colombia providing job training to Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations led to a 22% increase in employment, and the project in Bangladesh providing genetically modified eggplant seeds to prevent a particular type of pest led to a 27% increase in profits. These are substantial results that directly address economic growth.Notable outcomes: communities in Colombia job training program were 22% more likely to be employed, 31% more likely to have retirement benefits; farmers in Bangladesh provided genetically modified eggplant seeds had a 27% increase in profits; those benefiting from water associations in Tajikistan cultivated .14 more hectares of high value crops; Ugandans encouraged to use e-verification of agricultural inputs were more likely to use better quality maize and herbicides; and Liberians trained on better agricultural strategies and techniques were 29 percentage points more likely to implement them.The evaluations were rigorous, ensuring confidence in their accuracy, which helps inform future work: There were important implementation and design lessons learned when examining all 15 projects under consideration for the report, particularly those that did not have positive results. First, it is likely that issues with project design affected the conclusions. Specifically, several projects failed to address the possibility that control group participants may have received similar interventions funded by other donors. This could eliminate much of a project’s measurable impact, since both control and treatment groups would be getting a similar treatment. Other projects would have benefited from more careful planning when they measured outcomes – for example, one project only had data for one year of implementation because they did not consider farming seasons when timing their surveys.Detailed RecommendationsAdvocate for quasi-experimental design to improve quality of findings on sustainable economic development: Quasi-experimental design relies on the near-random assignment of an intervention. Researchers who apply this method to existing data assume that they have identified a valid comparison group with which they can determine the impact of an intervention. Unlike experiments that are conducted- in the lab or field, researchers do not have the same amount of control in quasi-experiments. In this method, hidden variables may interfere with determining the impact of an intervention. Still, quasi-experiments can advance rigorous and ethical research.Support interventions at the household and community level as they can have significant, growth-related impacts: Given that most foreign aid projects are implemented in local communities or regions, the outcomes should be measured at the household or community level.Evaluate projects after completion to measure sustainability and emphasize building capacity to ensure long-term viability: Must examine outcomes well after projects finish to measure long-term gains.Specify targeted communities as narrowly as possible, paying attention to dynamics of those groups while designing projects: Projects are most likely to achieve success when they can really focus on the issues recipient groups face, and design around them to optimize delivery of services to them.Consider employing &#8216;encouragement&#8217; designs to maximize rigorous design without denying services to any community: Encouragement designs actively invite participation in the treatment groups. The difference in participation rates between those actively encouraged (the treatment group) and those not (the control group) contribute to assessing an intervention&#8217;s impact. This approach is ethically preferable as it does not withhold treatment from a control group, especially in impoverished regions receiving foreign assistance.Learning SummaryThe Department of State held four “Pause and Reflect” meetings to identify key lessons from this review that could inform current thinking and improve existing practices in the US Government (USG). Some of the lessons identified during the meetings were:The research products that resulted from this study capture important, growth-related insights. These insights can be used to inform (or provide background to) briefing checklists, information memos, interagency multilateral agendas, and other materials. In other words, there are efficiency and intelligence gains from ensuring that personnel at the Department of State have access to and can use the research products that resulted from this study.Dissemination of the findings will help raise awareness of USG efforts to support economic growth-related activities. It will provide examples of where growth-related programming has had impact.
- Uganda HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Uganda				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Forced Organ Harvesting																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				During the year, the government enacted the Anti-Homosexuality Act, which expressly criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, proscribing the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” and life imprisonment for “homosexuality.”Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; inability of citizens to determine their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and other forms of such violence; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.Opposition activists, local media, and human rights activists reported security forces killed some individuals the government identified as dissidents and those it accused of criminal activity. In February, local media and opposition supporters reported security agencies detained and tortured National Unity Platform (NUP) supporter Coster Muhongya, age 70, leading to his death. According to media reports, on January 5, plainclothes security officers arrested Muhongya in Kasese district and detained him at Masaka police post and later at the Special Investigations Division in Kireka, “where he died during interrogation.” A police spokesperson told a press conference Muhongya’s death “resulted from a bathroom fall while in custody,” adding police arrested Muhongya regarding his suspected involvement in recruiting members for the terrorist group ISIS-Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC, locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces).																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. Local media, opposition political parties, and human rights lawyers reported the military – particularly the Chieftaincy for Military Intelligence (CMI) and the Special Forces Command (SFC) – and police held individuals, often opposition supporters, at unidentified locations without charge. The opposition NUP party reported that while an unspecified number of its supporters were unaccounted for, security forces randomly detained its supporters without trial.The NUP petitioned the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) with the names of 30 supporters the party’s officials said were missing, some since 2019. On October 10, the UHRC reported its investigations revealed security agencies released from detention 12 of the 30 missing NUP supporters after charging them with various crimes, including murder.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports security forces tortured and physically abused suspects, according to Amnesty International and other human rights activists. Impunity was rampant.On February 13, NUP officials called a press conference and presented NUP supporter Eric Mwesigwa, who had burn marks on his chest, which he said were sustained during detention by the security services. According to Mwesigwa, a motorcycle taxi driver, on January 31, he was stopped and detained by unidentified security officers as he drove a client home. The security officers burned Mwesigwa “with hot metals” on his chest as they interrogated him concerning alleged NUP plans to overthrow the government. The security officers 10 days later dumped Mwesigwa, and a fellow motorcycle taxi driver found him and drove him to a health facility for medical treatment. On February 14, Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) spokesperson Brigadier Felix Kulayigye released a statement claiming none of the security agencies detained Mwesigwa. On March 1, at a UPDF press conference, Mwesigwa recanted his accusation and instead accused NUP officials of inflicting the burns to malign the security services, reportedly in exchange for a cash payment of 50 million Ugandan shillings ($13,500). NUP president Robert Kyagulanyi stated on March 1, “this was an amateurish attempt by the UPDF to spin the unfortunate torture of a citizen by the army.”On July 11, media reported a foreign lawyer petitioned the International Criminal Court with testimony from 215 opposition supporters in the country who alleged torture at the hands of security agencies in the aftermath of the 2021 general election. The petition named President Yoweri Museveni, his son General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Speaker of Parliament Anita Among, and 23 other officials as responsible for “aiding and abetting” human rights abuses. A government spokesperson told local media the torture allegations were “attention-seeking propaganda.”Human rights organizations reported police subjected lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons to forced anal exams. Impunity was a problem and was widespread within the police, military, prisons service, and executive branch. Security forces did not take adequate measures to investigate and punish officers implicated in human rights abuses, especially in incidents involving political opposition members.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in prisons and detention centers were harsh and, in some cases, life threatening due to gross overcrowding, inadequate sanitary conditions, physical abuse of detainees by security staff and fellow inmates, inadequate food, and understaffing.Abusive Physical Conditions: Gross overcrowding was a problem in prisons, police cells, and unofficial detention facilities. The Uganda Prisons Service (UPS) reported in July prisons operated at 273 percent over capacity with “four inmates occupying the space allocated for one.” Members of the Human Rights Committee of parliament in March reported some inmates were forced to sleep in bathrooms due to overcrowding, which exposed inmates to disease. Legislators also reported overcrowding enabled the spread of sexual abuse among inmates. Former detainees reported prison prefects (inmates upon whom prison authorities bestowed a leadership position to supervise their fellow inmates) often beat their fellow inmates whom they accused of disobeying prison regulations.Administration: Local human rights activists reported authorities did not always carry out investigations into credible allegations of mistreatment and only took administrative measures against errant officers if the abuses attracted negative publicity.Independent Monitoring: Local human rights organizations reported the government permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported it visited 13 places of detention in accordance with its standard procedures. Findings from these visits on detainees’ treatment and living conditions were submitted to and discussed confidentially with authorities, including the military, police, and UPS.Improvements: In April, the UPS reported it facilitated the training of 34 prisons officers in human rights law and supported the operations of human rights desks and committees in 259 prison stations.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										Although the law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, security forces often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, especially opposition supporters, activists, demonstrators, journalists, and LGBTQI+ persons. The law provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but this mechanism was seldom employed and rarely successful.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required judges or prosecutors to issue a warrant before authorities made an arrest unless the arrest occurred during commission of a crime or while in pursuit of a perpetrator, but authorities often arrested suspects without warrants. The law required authorities to arraign suspects within 48 hours of arrest, but they frequently held suspects longer without charge. A Lawyers without Borders survey of 59 suspects in police custody without court arraignment reported approximately half were detained for three to nine days, and a third were incarcerated from 10 days to one month. Authorities were required to try suspects arrested for capital offenses within 360 days (120 days if charged with an offense triable by subordinate courts) or release them on bail. If prosecutors presented the case to a court within this time, however, there was no limit on further pretrial detention. While the law required authorities to inform detainees immediately of the reasons for detention, at times they did not do so.The law provided for bail at the judge’s discretion, but many suspects were unaware of the law or lacked the financial means to pay bail fees. Judges generally granted requests for bail. Human rights organizations reported illiterate persons were disproportionately more likely to come into conflict with the law and be detained, which led to high rates of abuse of rights to bail and police bond due to a lack of awareness of the right and an inability to afford legal services. The law provided detainees the right to legal representation and access to a lawyer, but authorities did not always respect this right. The law required the government to provide an attorney for indigent defendants charged with capital offenses, and the government adhered to this requirement. Most defendants endured significant delays through the judicial process before the conclusion of their cases. Security forces often held opposition political members and other suspects incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest: Arbitrary arrests and unlawful detention, particularly of dissidents, were problems. Police and military officials on numerous occasions arrested and harassed opposition supporters, especially those who posted videos on social media platforms such as TikTok that were critical of government officials. Local media and the NUP reported that on February 15, UPDF officers arrested NUP supporter Hamza Isma Mubiru, also known as Sadam Sadat, in Kampala and detained him in the Makindye military barracks and the police’s Special Investigations Division for more than a month without an arraignment. On March 22, police released Mubiru after initiating an investigation into his alleged involvement in terrorism. A police spokesperson told local media the CMI was responsible for Mubiru’s detention, but the CMI refused to comment on the issue.Pretrial Detention: Case backlogs due to an inefficient judiciary, inadequate police investigations, absence of plea bargaining prior to 2015, insufficient use of bail, and absence of a time limit for the detention of detainees awaiting trial contributed to frequent prolonged pretrial detentions. There was not sufficient information available to determine if pretrial detentions frequently equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not always respect judicial independence and impartiality. Corruption, understaffing, inefficiency, and executive-branch interference with judicial rulings often undermined the courts’ independence. Human rights activists, lawyers, judicial officers, and local media reported that on many occasions, security agencies defied court orders to release detainees or arraign persons they detained without charge, and they reported security agents intimidated judicial officers from offering bail to political detainees. Activists also reported that due to a lack of judicial independence, the judiciary unnecessarily delayed human rights petitions by denying hearing dates or prolonging hearing sessions.Judicial corruption was a problem, and local media reported numerous cases where judicial officers in lower courts solicited and accepted bribes from the parties involved.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the government did not always enforce this right. Although the law provided for a presumption of innocence, authorities did not always respect this right. An inadequate system of judicial administration resulted in a serious backlog of cases, undermining suspects’ right to a timely trial. All nonmilitary trials were public. The law allowed military courts to try civilians who assisted members of the military in committing offenses or were found possessing arms, ammunition, or other equipment reserved for the armed forces. Military courts prosecuted NUP supporters wearing red berets, a clothing item common to both NUP and the military. Civilians charged in military courts were often denied the right to a public trial, to communicate with an attorney of their choice, and to file an appeal in the civilian court system.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						Authorities detained numerous opposition politicians and activists on politically motivated grounds. Authorities released many without charge but charged others in military courts with crimes such as illegal possession of firearms, spreading harmful propaganda, “offensive communication,” and inciting violence. According to human rights lawyers, military courts were less independent than their civilian counterparts and allowed authorities to hold detainees indefinitely. Human rights lawyers reported police and military detention facilities sometimes denied political detainees access to and communication with their attorneys. No reliable statistics on the total number of political detainees or prisoners were available. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the UHRC reported authorities provided access to places of detention upon request.NUP officials reported security agencies arrested and sometimes detained without trial party supporters who posted social media content critical of government officials. In January, NUP officials reported unidentified security officers arrested NUP supporter Anthony Agaba, also known as Bobi Young, outside Kampala, after he posted videos mocking Speaker of Parliament Anita Among. Agaba remained in detention until January 30, when UPDF officers arraigned him alongside two military officers in a military court in Kampala and charged him with spreading harmful propaganda. The accused officers pled guilty and received a nine-month prison sentence each. Agaba instead pled not guilty, and the court remanded him to prison until May 9, when it released him on bail. Authorities held more than 30 NUP supporters arrested in December 2020 in the run-up to the January 2021 election on charges of illegal possession of firearms. On April 4, a military prosecutor added an extra charge of treachery. On February 13, the court released on bail two NUP members of parliament, Muhammad Ssegirinya and Allan Ssewanyana, who were in detention 524 days on murder and terrorism charges, which they denied.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Human rights organizations reported government and private sector players provided inadequate compensation to families affected by evictions to make way for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline. Human Rights Watch reported in June some affected families spoke of receiving pressure and intimidation from private companies and government officials to accept financial compensation that would be “inadequate to buy replacement land.” A spokesperson for the government’s petroleum regulator dismissed the reports and stated the oil companies building the pipeline abided by local, national, and international standards.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, but there were reports the government failed to respect these prohibitions. Government authorities reportedly entered homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization; accessed, collected, or used private communications or personal data arbitrarily or without appropriate legal authority; implemented regulations and practices that allowed for arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, including use of technology arbitrarily or unlawfully to surveil or interfere with the privacy of individuals; used technologies and practices including internet and social media controls, blocking or filtering of websites and social media platforms, sensors, biometric data collection, and data analytics; and punished family members for offenses allegedly committed by relatives. The law authorized government security agencies to tap private conversations to combat terrorism-related offenses. The government invoked the law to monitor telephone and internet communications.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government often restricted this right.Freedom of Expression: The government restricted citizens’ ability to criticize its actions and officials or to discuss some matters of public interest. The law made it illegal to “write, send, or share any information through a computer, which is likely to ridicule, degrade, or demean another person, group of persons, a tribe, an ethnicity, a religion or gender.” Authorities used this law to intimidate internet users from criticizing government policies. NUP officials reported security agents tracked, intimidated, and arrested its supporters for posting videos on the internet critical of government officials and policies. Security officials arrested and charged NUP supporter Anthony Agaba with spreading harmful propaganda after he shared online videos critical of government officials. Several activists and journalists reported receiving death threats after participating in online campaigns on X (formerly Twitter) highlighting the poor state of road infrastructure and health services. The minister for information and communications technology warned social media users to desist from participating in the campaign or they would be arrested for breaching internet communication laws. Dissident author Kakwenza Rukirabashaija reported government officials blocked the importation and sale of his book The Savage Avenger, which was critical of President Museveni’s son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba.Violence and Harassment: Security forces subjected journalists and media houses to violence, harassment, and intimidation. Local media and media freedom activists reported numerous incidents of security officials, local government officials, and private individuals with connections to government officials assaulting journalists in the course of their work. Civil society organization Human Rights Network for Journalists Uganda also reported several incidents of police officers detaining journalists on the orders of government officials as punishment for unfavorable news coverage. On October 5, SFC officers arrested 14 journalists as they covered NUP President Kyagulanyi’s return to the country from a foreign trip. According to media freedom activists, SFC officers beat the journalists and confiscated their equipment, before releasing them later that day. A police statement noted police would investigate reports of assault on the journalists. On March 5, police arrested journalist Andrew Arinaitwe at a high school outside Kampala on suspicion of criminal trespass as he researched a sexual abuse story. On March 9, police arraigned Arinaitwe and charged him with criminal trespass. The court granted bail to Arinaitwe on March 15 and dismissed the charges against him on August 15.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Journalists, opposition politicians, and human rights activists reported authorities wielded control over editorial decisions at public broadcasters and at some private media outlets as well. The government penalized those who published items counter to its guidelines and directly and indirectly censored media, including by controlling licensing and advertising and instructing editors to suspend critical journalists. Press freedom activists reported the government used advertising to control editorial coverage of private media organizations. On July 18, President Museveni instructed all government advertising be issued to the public broadcaster and other government media to enable them to meet operational costs, but he rescinded the directive on August 10 after advocacy from private media owners.Government officials and ruling party members owned many of the private rural radio stations and imposed reporting restrictions. Media practitioners stated government and security agents occasionally called editors and instructed them to refrain from publishing stories portraying the government negatively, hosting critical commentators on radio and television talk shows, and discussing some political matters. The police’s Media and Political Crimes Unit and communications regulator Uganda Communications Commission closely monitored all radio, television, and print media. The government maintained a 2021 ban of Facebook stemming from the company’s suspension of accounts linked to government officials for “inauthentic behavior.” Journalists, facing government pressure, practiced self-censorship.Nongovernmental Impact: On July 21, media reported unidentified vigilante youth ran out of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) secretariat in Kampala and assaulted journalists covering party proceedings at the secretariat, injuring several. Party President Patrick Amuriat announced an “in-depth investigation.”																Internet Freedom						The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet by: censoring online content, monitoring internet communications without appropriate legal authority, blocking access, pressuring internet platforms and technology companies to restrict content, charging individuals with crimes punishable by civil fines or criminal punishments, prohibiting online anonymity for some individuals, disrupting communications prior to elections or planned demonstrations, and using bots or trolls to manipulate social media discourse.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. Government failure to investigate or prosecute attacks on human rights defenders and peaceful protesters led to de facto restrictions on freedom of assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution provided for freedom of assembly, but the government did not respect this right. The government blocked and disrupted public meetings and peaceful protests by the opposition, as well as trade unionists.On April 21, police officers used sticks, batons, and teargas to beat and disperse NUP officials and their supporters who gathered in Buvuma district to mark International Women’s Day. Local media reported NUP Member of Parliament for Buvuma District Suzan Nakaziba Mugabi was hospitalized after sustaining injuries. Police claimed in a statement that officers responded to an unlawful assembly and only arrested the politicians and their supporters after they turned violent. On April 24, police announced the suspension of 11 officers in Buvuma District pending investigation into “excessive use of force&#8230;and the alleged beating and torture of Buvuma Woman [parliamentarian] and some of her supporters.” On April 27, police arrested 11 NUP women parliamentarians who held a demonstration in Kampala to protest police brutality. Police released them the same day without charge.						Freedom of Association						While the constitution and law provided for freedom of association, the government did not respect this right. The government restricted the operations of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially those working on civil and political rights, including human rights of LGBTQI+ persons, and LGBTQI+ activists reported the government did not fully investigate attacks on LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations. The government also revoked the operational mandate for international organizations working on human rights matters (see section 5). Government regulations required NGOs to disclose sources of funding and personal information regarding employees and imposed onerous registration and reporting requirements.The regulations enabled the National Bureau for Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO Bureau), a government agency that formally registered organizations, and its local-level structures to deny registration to any organization focused on topics deemed “undesirable” or “prejudicial” to the “dignity of the people of Uganda.” The regulations also provided the NGO Bureau broad powers to inspect NGO offices and records and to suspend NGO activities without due process. The NGO Bureau imposed registration, permit renewal, and administrative fees, which local NGOs declared exorbitant. NGOs working on civil and political rights reported the NGO Bureau and police officials carried out numerous impromptu inspections of their offices, intimidating staff and threatening to close the premises, sometimes without cause. LGBTQI+ organizations reported frequent harassment by security officials and NGO Bureau officials.The government also restricted the operations of opposition political parties (see section 3, Elections and Political Participation).																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. Most refugees enjoyed access to asylum; relative freedom of movement; freedom of residence; the right to registration and documentation; and access to justice, education, health care, and employment.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees. Individuals fleeing South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (if the Congolese were from eastern DRC) who entered the country through a designated border post had prima facie refugee status (status without requiring individual determination of refugee status). The local Refugee Eligibility Committee, however, determined whether individuals fleeing from Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, or other countries, as well as South Sudanese and Congolese refugees who entered through nondesignated border points, were eligible for refugee status. The committee was functional, but administrative matters and the influx of asylum seekers caused backlogs, despite efforts by UNHCR and the government to expedite the process.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Some refugees reported government officials demanded bribes from refugees to process or issue paperwork, including for refugees to acquire land or food benefits.Durable Solutions: The government did not accept third-country refugees for resettlement, but it assisted in the safe and voluntary return of refugees to their homes and supported the resettlement of third-country refugees to other countries by providing birth certificates and travel documents. A 2015 Constitutional Court ruling confirmed certain long-term refugees had the right to apply to naturalize, and in 2016 the government committed to begin processing naturalization cases for an estimated 15,000 refugees who had resided in the country for approximately 20 years. The law provided restrictions to any such application, stating, “notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law, any period of residence in Uganda under the authority of any ... convention travel document shall not be taken into account in computing the time of residence in Uganda for purposes of acquisition of citizenship by registration or naturalization.” The law defined “convention travel document” as a travel document issued to a refugee under the relevant refugee instruments and laws. There were no known cases of any refugee completing naturalization.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. The law, however, also allowed authorities to carry out elections for local government officials by having voters line up behind their preferred candidate or the candidate’s representative, portrait, or symbol.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported not to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.The government held several parliamentary and local government by-elections, which media, opposition parties, and observers reported featured voter harassment, violence, and intimidation by the security forces, as well as ballot stuffing; President Museveni acknowledged some of these allegations. In June, the government held a local government by-election in Bukedea District. Independent candidate David Stephen Omagor told local media that on June 5, unidentified individuals dressed in police uniforms broke into his house, and on June 6, when Omagor arrived at the Electoral Commission offices for nomination, a group of unidentified youth assaulted and beat him. During the incidents, Omagor claims the individuals took his medication, 163 million Ugandan shillings ($43,900) meant for electoral campaign expenses, and his nomination documents, leading him to miss the nomination. On polling day June 14, local media reported FDC representatives complained security and polling officials allowed ruling party officials to stuff ballots premarked in favor of their favorite candidate into ballot boxes. Local media also reported police officers beat two journalists and confiscated their equipment as the journalists covered the distribution of polling materials. On June 26, President Museveni wrote to the Anti-Corruption Unit instructing officials to investigate acts of electoral malpractice in the by-election. In July, police arrested nine police and local government officers and charged them in court with a combination of robbery and assault charges. On July 26, the court granted bail to four of the suspects.Political Parties and Political Participation: Opposition parties reported security agencies used a provision of the law meant for regulating public meetings to restrict their operations. The NUP and FDC reported police officers restricted some of their officials from holding public events and blocked some party officials from participating in electoral processes. On August 5, police entered a hotel in Kyenjojo town in the western part of the country and disrupted a mobilization meeting held by NUP officials with party supporters, asserting the meeting was an unlawful assembly and accusing organizers of inciting violence. Police arrested five NUP officials and injured two in the process. Police released the NUP officials the same day without charge.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Cultural factors, high costs, and sexual harassment limited women’s ability to run for political office. Women activists reported the official fees required to secure a nomination to run for elected office were prohibitively high and prevented most women from running for election. Human rights activists also reported many women were locked out of political positions because they lacked minimum education qualifications for the positions, having been denied the right to education earlier in life. Activists reported members of security agencies committed violence and harassment, which discouraged women from voting. Women activists reported sexual harassment in political spaces discouraged women from participating in politics. Activists reported the number of women legislators holding open seats dwindled because of the affirmative action policy, which reserved a legislative position for women in each district. They also reported internal political party processes locked women out of contesting for open seats, limiting them to affirmative action seats, and media coverage mocked and trivialized women candidates. Activists also reported persons with a disability were discouraged from seeking electoral office because by law they would be required to show proof they were of sound mind.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials; however, civil society organizations stated the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: Officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, especially through inflation of public procurement costs, bribery, kickbacks, and diversion of public resources to private use, while many corruption cases remained pending for years. On February 13, local media reported the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Office of the President arrested three family members of Minister for Karamoja Affairs Mary Goretti Kitutu after they were found selling government relief items including roofing materials known as “iron sheets,” which were intended for some of the country’s poorest communities in Karamoja, in the northern part of the country. Local media subsequently reported Kitutu’s office diverted almost half of the iron sheets to other ministers for their personal use. On March 15, local media reported President Museveni instructed the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions to have the implicated officials prosecuted. In April, the public prosecutor charged Ministers Kitutu, Lugolobi, and Nandutu with corruption and the court remanded them to prison, before releasing them on bail. The ministers’ trials continued at year’s end. On March 28, police arrested 11 anti-corruption activists when they held a demonstration demanding prosecution of the ministers. Prosecutors charged the 11 activists with inciting violence and the court remanded them to prison until it released them on bail on May 5. Their trial continued at year’s end.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups operated under government restrictions, and government officials sometimes declined to cooperate with these groups. Local NGOs advocating for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons faced restrictions and lack of cooperation by the government.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders (HRDs) reported receiving numerous threats of arrest and death threats from security officials for their work. Some HRDs reported a certain number of human rights organizations temporarily sent HRDs out of the country for their safety after receiving threats. HRDs working in the environment space, especially those involved in advocacy against the East African Crude Oil Pipeline, reported some HRDs quit their jobs in fear of attack from security officers. LGBTQI+ activists reported HRDs working with sexual minorities were at a high risk of harassment from both security officials and private individuals.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government did not cooperate with some UN specialized agencies that monitored human rights. On February 3, the government notified the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) it would not renew the OHCHR’s mandate in the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the government had built sufficient human rights monitoring mechanisms, rendering the OHCHR office unnecessary. Media and human rights activists alleged the government’s decision was in retaliation for the OHCHR’s criticism of the country’s human rights record, especially in relation to reports of extrajudicial killings in the run-up to the 2021 election. The OHCHR closed its local office on August 5.Government Human Rights Bodies: The UHRC was a constitutionally mandated institution with quasi-judicial powers authorized to investigate allegations of human rights abuses, direct the release of detainees, and award compensation to abuse victims. The president appointed its board, consisting of a chairperson and five commissioners.The UHRC pursued suspected human rights abusers, including accused members of the military and police forces. It visited and inspected places of detention and held private conferences with detainees on their conditions in custody. It investigated reports of human rights abuses, reported its annual findings to parliament, and recommended measures to improve the executive branch’s respect of human rights. The government did not always implement UHRC recommendations during the year. The UHRC released its annual report on May 25, but human rights activists criticized the report for ignoring abuse of civil and political rights and rights of the LGBTQI+ community.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape of women, which was punishable by life imprisonment or death, but did not address spousal rape. During the year, the government enacted a law that expressly criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, proscribing the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality,” which included men raping other men. The government also used a law prohibiting “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature” to prosecute men accused of raping men. The law did not address so-called corrective rape of LGBTQI+ persons. The law also criminalized domestic violence and provided up to two years’ imprisonment upon conviction.Rape and domestic violence were common problems throughout the country, and the government did not effectively enforce the law. Local media and women rights activists reported numerous incidents of rape, sometimes involving kidnapping and killings of women, but authorities were often unable to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable. Local media reported perpetrators of rape included persons in positions of authority such as religious leaders, local government officials, police and military officers, health-care workers, and academic staff. Women’s rights activists reported some police officers sexually abused individuals in commercial sex whom they arrested as a precondition for their release. According to local media and human rights activists, many rape survivors lacked faith in government institutions to bring their abusers to justice and declined to report the crime, while others remained silent to avoid stigmatization.Human rights activists and local media reported that even when women reported cases of rape to police, officers blamed the women for causing the rape by dressing indecently, took bribes from the alleged perpetrators to stop the investigation, pressured survivors into withdrawing the cases, or simply dismissed the accusations and refused to record them. Women’s rights activists reported survivors also declined to report cases or participate in investigations because the process of collecting evidence was intrusive and dehumanizing. Disability rights activists reported women with disabilities, especially blind women, women with mental disabilities, and women living with albinism, were at a disproportionately higher risk for rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Freedom and Roam Uganda reported lesbians and transgender women suffered gender-based violence and “corrective rape” in reported attempts to change their sexuality.On August 3, local media reported police initiated investigations into allegations a senior police officer within the Directorate of Crime Intelligence, Gilbert Bwana Arinaitwe, raped a woman domestic worker, age 23, in his household after threatening her with a firearm. According to local media, the domestic worker stated Arinaitwe raped her on several occasions starting July 25, and warned her against reporting the crime to authorities. On August 11, the public prosecutor charged Arinaitwe with trafficking in persons. Court officials remanded Arinaitwe to prison and granted him bail on August 18. The judiciary held special gender-based violence court sessions, which reduced case backlog and helped the judiciary improve conviction rates.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The law prohibited FGM/C and established a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment for convicted perpetrators or life imprisonment if the victim died. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Local media and government officials reported the practice was common among some communities along the eastern border with Kenya. Women’s rights activists reported in July some elders within the Karamojong community smuggled girls younger than 18 into Kenya to undergo FGM because they believed Kenyan authorities were less diligent in enforcing anti-FGM measures. Activists also reported some traditional birth attendants within the Karamoja region forced pregnant women seeking services to undergo FGM before attending to them. Women’s rights activists reported some community elders in the eastern part of the country waited until teenage girls returned home during school holidays and then subjected them to FGM/C, when there was little scrutiny from school officials. Civil society organizations also reported community elders, predominantly women, who conducted FGM/C procedures, continued the practice because they did not have alternative livelihoods to replace the 15,000-to-30,000 Ugandan shillings ($4 to $8) paid for each procedure.Women’s rights activists reported they built informant networks with local government leaders who shared information on FGM practices and practitioners. Activists then used the information to report cases to police. Activists noted, however, that some police officers opted to warn FGM practitioners instead of arresting them. A police officer told local media in January that police failed to act against FGM perpetrators because the officers were unable to secure the requisite evidence that could lead to a conviction. Police reported officers carried out community sensitization efforts to encourage behavior change. Civil society organizations reported they worked with the government to identify and relocate girls at risk of FGM/C to shelters.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law criminalized sexual harassment, but authorities did not effectively enforce the law. Women’s rights activists reported sexual harassment was a widespread problem in homes, schools, universities, workplaces, public transport, public spaces, media, and the music and entertainment industry. Women members of parliament reported sexual harassment was so prevalent within the legislature it discouraged women from participating in politics. Women’s rights activists reported low-ranking women officials lacked adequate institutional tools for reporting sexual harassment in the workplace and stigma associated with reporting sexual harassment abuses prevented many survivors from speaking out.Local media, police, and women’s rights activists reported violence against widows was prevalent. Police officers in Wakiso District reported in June police stations were sometimes overwhelmed by the number of widows seeking shelter after their deceased husband’s families evicted them from the matrimonial property.Discrimination: The law provided women the same legal status and rights as men, but the government did not enforce the law effectively. Women’s rights activists reported numerous cases of discrimination against women, including in divorce, employment, education, and owning or managing businesses and properties. Many customary laws discriminated against women in adoption, marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Women’s rights activists reported as discriminatory a November 2022 court ruling that wives were not entitled to 50 percent of matrimonial property, as well as a March 2 court ruling that found an evangelical church could lawfully require only women to seek parental consent before marriage, not men. Customary laws in many areas stipulated widowed women could not own or inherit property or retain custody of their children. Human rights activists reported lesbians, transgender, and queer women were at a higher risk of discrimination at public health facilities. Traditional divorce law in many areas required women to meet stricter evidentiary standards than men to prove adultery. In some ethnic groups, men could “inherit” the widows of their deceased brothers. The law did not recognize cohabiting relationships, and women involved in such relationships had no judicial recourse to protect their rights. Women faced discrimination in employment and hiring, as well as broad economic discrimination.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Disability rights activists reported that although persons with disabilities had the right to access reproductive services, the absence of health workers with the ability to communicate with blind and deaf patients meant many persons with disabilities did not receive sufficient information regarding reproductive health services. Activists reported government sexual and reproductive health programs did not provide for adequate outreach to women with disabilities, leaving many in rural and remote areas without access to the services. According to activists, public health institutions did not cater to persons with disabilities when making official communication, for example, by using braille technology. Human rights activists also reported many women with disabilities depended on close family members for access to sexual and reproductive health services limiting their ability to make free choices regarding their sexual health and limiting their right to privacy. Activists reported some public health workers declined to attend to pregnant women with disabilities unless they employed a personal caretaker.LGBTQI+ activists reported LGBTQI+ persons were able to provide informed consent before receiving reproductive health treatment, although many lesbians and bisexual and queer women preferred to access sexual and reproductive health services at LGBTQI+ drop-in centers as they found public health facilities did not cater to their needs. The activists reported some public health officials declined to provide health care, including reproductive health services, to LGBTQI+ persons.Human rights activists and government officials reported cultural practices in some remote areas impeded access to sexual and reproductive health services for women. Women’s rights activists reported some public hospitals required women to secure their partner’s consent before accessing some sexual and reproductive health services. Public health workers provided insufficient information regarding the side effects of contraceptives, which inadvertently discouraged some women from seeking sexual and reproductive health services after experiencing severe side effects. Some men in rural and remote areas refused to use contraception and in turn also prohibited their partners from accessing sexual and reproductive health services.Activists also reported some religious organizations actively campaigned against women seeking sexual and reproductive health services, and cultural practices that placed a higher premium on women who bore more children prevented some women from accessing sexual and reproductive health services. Human rights activists reported many public health service providers declined to provide sexual and reproductive health services to teenagers, particularly those age 17 and younger, because the age of consent was 18. This practice led to many cases of teenage pregnancies and a rise in HIV infection among teenage girls.Human rights activists reported Family and Child Protection Units at police stations provided postexposure prophylaxis for rape survivors but often referred survivors to shelters for emergency contraception.Maternal mortality was 189 deaths per 100,000 live births, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) 2022 Demographics and Health Survey. Media and activists attributed the high rate to an inability of pregnant women to access skilled medical care due to limited funding of public health facilities, which led to understaffing, drug shortages, power outages, a preference for traditional birth attendants over skilled medical workers, and unsafe abortions. According to the WHO, adolescent birth rates were high at 111 per 1,000 girls for the period 2011 to 2020, the most recent period for which data was available. According to human rights activists and the WHO, the elevated adolescent pregnancy rate was caused by statutory rape, child sexual exploitation, a high rate of school dropouts, and limited knowledge of contraception among teenagers.There were social and cultural barriers related to menstruation and access to menstruation hygiene that impacted girls’ ability to participate equally in society, including many limits on girls’ access to education. Many girls in school suffered stigmatization and bullying due to the lack of access to menstrual hygiene products, causing higher instances of dropping out. Local media and child rights activists reported girls who became pregnant while in school almost always dropped out. According to child rights activists, for girls in school, the government required mandatory maternity leave at three months of a pregnancy until six months after delivery, but women’s rights activists reported schools owned by religious organizations declined to readmit the girls at all. The government policy required the boy responsible for the pregnancy to simultaneously drop out of school until the girl returned. Human rights activists reported teenage mothers who returned to school after giving birth quickly dropped out due to stigma and because schools lacked capacity to cater to the needs of lactating mothers.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination and violence based on race, ethnicity, religion, origin, social or economic standing, and political opinion, but the government did not enforce the law effectively. The government operated an Equal Opportunities Commission with a mandate to promote equal and fair access to opportunities without discrimination.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Some Indigenous minorities accused the government of marginalization that excluded them from participating in decisions affecting their livelihood. Human rights activists reported the government did not grant official recognition to several Indigenous communities, which led to political exclusion, limited access to social services, and limited access to livelihood resources. The activists reported members of some Indigenous communities took up other ethnic identities while submitting official documentation because their original documents were not officially recognized. Human rights activists reported the government only partially compensated and resettled Batwa and Benet communities whom it evicted from their ancestral lands to create wildlife protection areas in the eastern and southwestern parts of the country. The government did not issue land titles to members of the Batwa and Benet communities it resettled, thus restricting their access to land for livelihood. Local media reported the government made attempts to resettle the Batwa community on arable farmland, which did not accommodate the community’s hunter-gatherer lifestyle.																																				Children										Education: Local media and civil society organizations reported that child, early, and forced marriages and teenage pregnancy led to a higher rate of school dropouts for girls than for boys. Some schools – particularly those managed by religious institutions – did not allow pregnant girls to return to school. While primary school enrollment was high, according to the latest government statistics, only 27 percent of secondary school age children were enrolled in school.Human rights activists reported children from the Benet and Batuku Indigenous communities were forced by local education authorities to undertake school instruction in the languages spoken by their larger neighboring ethnic groups, a practice they believed threatened their culture.Child Abuse: The law prohibited numerous forms of child abuse and provided for fines, five years’ imprisonment, or both for persons convicted of abusing children’s rights. Victims’ parents, however, often opted to settle cases out of court for a cash or in-kind payment. Corporal punishment of children was prohibited by the law; however, corporal punishment of children was widespread. Despite the law, a pattern of child abuse existed in sexual assault, physical abuse, ritual killings, early marriage, FGM/C, child trafficking, infanticide, and child labor, among other abuses. Police reported responding to numerous reports of violence against children by persons in authority, such as teachers in school and guardians in domestic settings. On July 2, local media reported police arrested a man after he reportedly burned his son with heated cooking oil as a form of punishment for an alleged misdeed. The prosecutor charged the man with aggravated torture.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage was 18, but authorities generally did not enforce this law. Child marriages were prevalent. Local media, human rights activists, political leaders, and police reported some rural and remote communities in the country forced girls younger than 18 into marriage. Officials noted some parents married off girls they could not financially support in return for payments. Children’s rights activists reported some parents forced child survivors of statutory rape to marry their abusers if the child got pregnant. Officials from local government and police partnered with cultural institutions and civil society organizations to carry out community sensitization campaigns in rural areas to speak out against the practice.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. It set the minimum age for consensual sex at 18. The law defined “statutory rape” as any sexual contact outside marriage with a child younger than 18 regardless of consent or age of the perpetrator. The government did not enforce the law effectively, however, and violations were pervasive. Local media reported numerous cases where abusers recruited children from rural areas into commercial sexual exploitation under the guise of providing them legitimate employment opportunities.Infanticide, Including Infanticide of Children with Disabilities: The law criminalized infanticide, including of children with disabilities, and authorities sporadically enforced the law. Local media and LGBTQI+ activists reported intersex children were at high risk of infanticide and some parents of children with disabilities abandoned them in the bush or threw them in pit latrines and left them to die. Police reported an increase in infanticide cases.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish population numbered approximately 2,000 members centered in Mbale District in the eastern part of the country. There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking in-persons-report/.																																				Forced Organ Harvesting										Police, local media, and activists reported organized criminal groups carried out organ harvesting, and some workers who signed up with labor recruitment companies to work in Middle East and Gulf countries had their organs, especially kidneys and livers, harvested.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: Consensual same-sex sexual conduct was illegal according to a colonial-era law that criminalized “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature.” Penalties for same-sex sexual conduct (and a multitude of nonsexual activities) were stiffened by the passage and enactment of the Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA) in May, which prescribed the death penalty for serial offenders and life imprisonment for adult first-time offenders (three years for minor offenders). The law also criminalized “promotion of homosexuality,” required persons to report individuals they suspected of engaging in same-sex relations, and prohibited landlords and property managers from knowingly renting to persons who violated the act. LGBTQI+ activists petitioned the Constitutional Court to nullify the AHA. The Office of the Directorate of Public Prosecution issued a circular to prosecutors instructing them to secure clearance from headquarters before initiating any prosecutions under the AHA; some provisions of the law were enforced.LGBTQI+ activists reported police arrested numerous individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity and subjected many to forced anal exams, a medically discredited practice with no evidentiary value that was considered a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and could amount to torture. LGBTQI+ activists under the umbrella association Convening for Equality reported 18 instances of forced anal exams by police between January and August. On August 23, the prosecutor charged a spa manager in Njeru Magistrate’s Court with homosexuality, promotion of homosexuality, and knowingly allowing her premises to be used for homosexuality, with potential sentences of life in prison, 20 years in prison, and seven years in prison, respectively. Police arrested the accused after complaints from the spa’s neighbors, who reported the accused featured her workers in same-sex pornography video shoots. On August 22, prosecutors charged Elisha Mukisa, a prominent “ex-gay” activist, and his partner with homosexuality in breach of the AHA. The prosecution stated Mukisa lured his partner into same-sex relations and offered him accommodation in a government-sponsored apartment. Police detained the men and conducted anal exams on both. The court remanded the two to prison.Violence and Harassment: Human rights activists reported numerous instances of state and nonstate actor violence and harassment against LGBTQI+ persons and noted authorities did not adequately investigate the cases. The Strategic Response Team, a coalition of NGOs, reported 306 abuses against LGBTQI+ persons between January and August, with 25 of those abuses conducted by state actors. The Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF) reported in April a mob in Kampala kidnapped a transgender woman and stripped her naked. The mob forced her to walk through the streets as it hurled projectiles at her and recorded videos. Police arrested her, and the prosecutor charged her with being a public nuisance before court officials released her on bail; the government took no action against the perpetrators in this case. The HRAPF reported that in a limited number of cases police acted against those complicit in violence against LGBTQI+ persons. The HRAPF reported in June police in Kampala arrested an unidentified man after he assaulted a transgender woman.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination based on sex, among other categories, but did not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Provisions of the AHA discriminated against LGBTQI+ persons, for example by prohibiting landlord or property managers from knowingly renting to persons who might commit violations of the act and requiring all persons, including medical personnel, to report LGBTQI+ persons who might commit violations of the act. The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, or their families. LGBTQI+ activists reported LGBTQI+ persons suffered stigma and faced discrimination in access to health care, employment, housing, and other social services, and families disowned LGBTQI+ persons and expelled them from households, which left many homeless and led others to conceal their sexual orientation.LGBTQI+ activists reported a sharp rise in evictions of LGBTQI+ persons with the introduction of the AHA draft bill. The HRAPF and the Uganda Key Populations Consortium reported responding to 424 cases of eviction and the need for relocation by September. The HRAPF also reported LGBTQI+ persons were increasingly outed after enactment of the AHA and some were dismissed from their jobs by their employers. In June, the HRAPF reported unidentified individuals outed a lesbian by pinning a written notice to her door and sending one to her employer; she was immediately fired and forced to seek alternative accommodation after her neighbors threatened her.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available, and the law did not provide the option of identifying as “nonbinary/intersex/gender nonconforming.” Transgender persons could officially change their names, but the law did not provide an option for changing gender markers on official documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: LGBTQI+ activists reported LGBTQI+ persons endured intense social pressure to change their sexual orientation. The AHA provided for courts to order persons convicted under its provisions to undergo “rehabilitation,” although the government did not enforce this provision. Activists reported some families compelled LGBTQI+ children to undergo talk therapy sessions with religious leaders intended to change sexual orientation, compelled LGBTQI+ children to “denounce” their sexual orientation and gender identity in religious gatherings, or compelled their LGBTQI+ children into forced marriages in an attempt to change their sexual orientation. LGBTQI+ activists reported some public health workers attempted to compel LGBTQI+ persons to change their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression before providing health services. The Ministry of Health released two circulars instructing public health workers “not to deny services to any client who presents themselves for services,” and “not to discriminate or stigmatize any individual who seeks healthcare for any reason – gender, religion, tribe, economic or social status or sexual orientation.” Some government officials openly encouraged attempts to change the sexual orientation of LGBTQI+ persons.There were no reports of surgeries performed on nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: The government restricted LGBTQI+ organizations’ ability to legally register and operate. The AHA prohibited operation “of an organization which promotes or encourages homosexuality or the observance or normalization” of the same. Prior to the AHA, authorities used provisions of the law to restrict or deny the registration of LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations due to allegations the proposed names of the organizations were “undesirable” and their activities unlawful. The NGO Bureau maintained its 2022 suspension of NGO Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), citing SMUG’s failure to incorporate at the Uganda Registration Services Bureau and to register with the NGO Bureau, despite the courts’ longstanding failure to address SMUG’s appeal of those two bodies’ refusals to incorporate or to register the nonprofit organization. LGBTQI+ activists reported police often failed to investigate attacks on LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations and in September unknown individuals attacked the premises of Trans Network Uganda, set it on fire, and stole official documents. Police told LGBTQI+ activists it was investigating the incident. LGBTQI+ activists reported the NGO Bureau carried out a disproportionately higher volume of inspections on offices of LGBTQI+ organizations, during which some NGO Bureau staff threatened to shut down the organizations.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law criminalized discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities, but persons with disabilities could not access education and health services on an equal basis with others. The law provided for access on an equal basis to education, employment, health services, information, communications, buildings, transportation, and the judicial system for persons with disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce the law. According to disability rights activists, persons with disabilities lacked equitable access to public buildings and transportation. Activists reported many public schools, hospitals, and courts lacked ramps to enable access for persons with disabilities. Disability rights activists reported government offices did not always use sign-language interpreters during official communications and did not provide persons living with visual disability with written information in alternative formats such as braille or large format printing while making official communications.Human rights activists reported authorities failed to protect persons with disabilities from harassment and violence from some sections of the community. Activists reported many police and local government officials lacked knowledge of the specific needs of persons with disabilities, especially persons with mental illness, and many times encouraged and participated in harassment. Disability activists reported some police officers arrested persons living with mental illness, accusing them of being a public nuisance. Activists also reported inadequate and substandard sanitation facilities for persons with disabilities at public health centers exposed them to unhygienic conditions and infections. Human rights activists also reported persons with disabilities experienced discrimination in social service delivery and employment, while women with disabilities were at higher risk of rape and sexual harassment than women without disabilities. In April, activists reported government officials did not fulfil a 10 percent quota it allocated for persons with disabilities in its poverty alleviation programs, noting officials prevented persons with disabilities from creating credit and savings organizations, a prerequisite for accessing credit lines, and instead directed them to join preexisting organizations. Activists also reported legal provisions, such as requiring persons with disabilities seeking electoral office to prove they were of sound mind, discouraged women with disabilities from seeking electoral office.Human rights activists reported many parents of children with disabilities in rural and remote areas hid them from the public and denied them an education due to public stigma.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Mob violence was prevalent. Communities often resorted to mob violence due to a lack of confidence in police and the judiciary to deliver justice. Mobs often beat, lynched, burned, and otherwise brutalized persons suspected of robbery, homicide, rape, theft, ritual sacrifice, and witchcraft, among other offenses. On April 12, local media reported a mob in Kayunga town lynched a man suspected of theft.HIV-related stigma and discrimination were a concern in some employment situations. Police, the prison service, and the military regularly refused to recruit persons living with HIV and AIDS, claiming their bodies were too weak for the rigorous training and subsequent deployment. According to local media, labor export companies required applicants seeking work in Gulf countries to undergo HIV tests and refused to hire persons living with HIV and AIDS. Civil society organizations also reported employers declined to employ persons living with HIV and AIDS as domestic workers.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for workers, except members of the armed forces, to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development (Ministry of Labour) had to register unions before they could engage in collective bargaining. The law required registration of a labor union be completed within 90 days and provided the registrar authority to suspend and interdict a union elected officer if the officer was convicted by a court of law or under investigation with potential prosecution. The law gave the registrar authority to cancel a union’s registration if the union’s principal objectives or constitution became unlawful. The law did not define what constituted unlawful objectives. The law precluded noncitizens from becoming members of the executive committee of a trade union. The law gave the registrar authority to inspect the trade union books of account and membership.The law allowed unions to conduct activities without interference, prohibited antiunion discrimination by employers, and provided for reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity. The law also empowered the minister of labor and labor officers to refer disputes to the Industrial Court if initial mediation and arbitration attempts failed. The law, however, gave government labor officers power to declare industrial actions illegal if a given officer took steps to resolve the labor dispute in question through conciliation. The NGO Platform for Labor Action (PLA) reported funding shortfalls in the judiciary prevented recruitment of adequate judicial officers in the Industrial Court, which delayed resolution of cases.The government did not effectively enforce the law. Civil society organizations stated Ministry of Labour officials did not allocate sufficient funds to hire, train, and equip labor officers to enforce labor laws effectively. Employers who violated a worker’s right to form and join a trade union or bargain collectively faced penalties that were not commensurate with similar abuses, and penalties were rarely applied against violators. Administrative and judicial procedures were subject to lengthy delays and appeals. The PLA reported some companies refused to honor awards handed down by the Industrial Courts, and workers were forced to incur additional costs for the proceedings.The government and employers generally did not respect the constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The law did not provide trade union federations with a right to engage in collective bargaining and further imposed mandatory conciliation to resolve labor disputes before a strike action was recognized. The law gave the government the right to declare a strike illegal, and the minister of labor had authority to refer a dispute to the Industrial Court. The PLA reported workers in informal sectors such as domestic work, artisanal mining, and transport had a weaker right to freedom of association and lacked the ability to organize collective bargaining measures. The government restricted some union activity through issuance of threats and harassment of union leaders, especially of medical workers’ unions. Under the law, trade unions were required to provide notice and adhere to the time limits set for public meetings. Essential service employees were required to provide 14 to 22 days’ notice of their intent to strike; however, the law gave the minister authority to nullify the notice by referring the matter to the Industrial Court for arbitration and settlement within 14 days.Public health workers’ unions staged strikes during the year, largely concerning delayed salaries and undelivered promises of salary raises. A section of senior public health workers referred to as Senior House Officers called several strikes to protest lengthy delays of more than six months for payment of allowances. A Ministry of Health official told the health workers the government did not make provisions for their allowances, but the workers called off the strike after receiving assurances from the government it would make the payments.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law technically provided for a national minimum wage that was much lower than the government’s official poverty income level. This minimum wage standard was never implemented, and the level was unchanged since 1984.The maximum legal workweek was 48 hours, and the maximum workday was 10 hours. The law provided that the workweek could be extended to 56 hours, including overtime, with the employee’s consent. An employee could work more than 10 hours in a single day if the average number of hours over a period of three weeks did not exceed 10 hours per day or 56 hours per week. For employees who worked beyond 48 hours in a single week, the law required employers to pay a minimum of 1.5 times the employee’s normal hourly rate for the overtime hours, and twice the employee’s normal hourly rate for work on public holidays. According to labor rights organizations, violations of wage, hour, or overtime laws were common in the informal sector, particularly in domestic work, agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.Occupational Safety and Health: The law established appropriate occupational safety and health (OSH) standards and regulations for all workers. The law authorized labor inspectors in the Ministry of Labour’s Department of Occupational Safety and Health to access and examine any workplace unannounced, issue fines, and mediate some labor disputes. While the law allowed workers to remove themselves from situations endangering their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment, legal protection for such workers was ineffective. According to the PLA, most workers were unaware of their employers’ responsibility to ensure a safe working environment, and many did not challenge unsafe working conditions due to fear of losing their jobs.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Labour and local government labor offices were responsible for enforcement of wage and hour laws, but the government did not effectively enforce them. Inspection was insufficient to enforce compliance. In addition to inspectors, labor officers conducted inspections of worksites and examined standards of employment and workers’ rights more broadly. Labor officers had the authority to make unannounced inspections, initiate sanctions, instigate prosecutions of repeat offenders through the Industrial Court, and close worksites. With 189 labor officers covering more than 130 districts, the number of labor officers combined with the 21 labor inspectors was insufficient for the size of the country’s 15 million workers. Labor officers often depended on complainants and local civil society organizations to pay for their travel to inspection sites. PLA officials reported many of the labor officers were dual-hatted as social workers and did labor-related work only when a complainant reported an abuse. PLA officials also reported companies often did not respect recommendations made by labor officers during workplace inspections, including providing contracts or protective wear, or they bribed labor officers to prevent them from issuing penalties.Authorities rarely enforced labor laws on wages and hours, and penalties were not commensurate with those for similar abuses. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. The legal minimum wage was never implemented, and civil society organizations reported most domestic employees worked all year without leave. Wage arrears were common in both the public and private sectors. Workers’ claims for overtime wages were difficult to enforce as they lacked documentation of their accumulated hours. PLA officials reported abuses of standard wages and overtime pay were common in the manufacturing, education, private security, retail, agriculture, private health care, domestic work, and transport sectors.The same inspectors conducted wage, hour, and OSH inspections. Authorities rarely enforced OSH laws, and penalties were not commensurate with those for similar abuses. Penalties were rarely enforced against violators. Workers in the mining, construction, and textile sectors faced hazardous and exploitive working conditions. The PLA reported abuses of safety and health standards were common in the manufacturing, education, private security, and transport sectors.According to 2017 government statistics, the most recent available, the informal sector employed up to 86 percent of the labor force, primarily in agriculture, the service industry, trade, domestic work, construction, and transport. Labor officials reported labor laws did not effectively protect workers in the informal economy, including many domestic and agricultural workers. Live-in domestic workers were at increased risk of poor working conditions, forced to work longer hours without compensation in homes during lockdown periods, often not provided with medical care, and subject to reduced wages.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Forced Organ Harvesting																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Uganda
- United States Provides More Than $25 Million for Refugee Assistance in Uganda Office of the SpokespersonThe United States, through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), and USAID, is providing more than $25 million in additional humanitarian funding to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) to assist refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda. PRM is contributing more than $14 million to UNHCR, while USAID is providing $11 million to WFP. This additional funding brings the United States’ total humanitarian assistance in Uganda to more than $178 million since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2023.These additional contributions to UNHCR and WFP will support the provision of essential services such as health, education, protection, food assistance, and income-generating activities to the more than 1.6 million refugees in Uganda and will also benefit generous host communities across the country.&nbsp; &nbsp;Uganda hosts the highest number of refugees of any African country and received more than 130,000 new refugees last year alone, primarily fleeing conflict in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Sudan.The United States is committed to serving all people in Uganda without discrimination. We will continue to monitor program implementation and assistance to ensure that there is zero tolerance for any form of discrimination or harmful activities.The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in Uganda and will continue to support refugees sheltering in the country. We urge other donors to join us in supporting WFP and UNHCR and other humanitarian partners to assist the most vulnerable people affected by conflict and other crises throughout the region.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																																Humanitarian Aid																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Refugees																															Uganda																																United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- Department Press Briefing – April 3, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 3, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 3, 2024																																																					April 3, 2024																																																								1:37 p.m. EDMR MILLER: All right. I don’t have anything from the top, so Shaun, do you want to start us today?QUESTION: Sure. Welcome. I wanted &#8212;MR MILLER: Don’t look at me that way. Yeah, I’m going to call you out on that dirty look you flashed me. You can go second. (Laughter.) Sorry. Meant in jest.QUESTION: As you might guess, we – I’m sure all of us want to start on the – this issue with the foreign aid workers who were tragically killed in Gaza. What do you make of the Israeli explanation of it? Prime Minister Netanyahu says it was unintentional and that they’re investigating this. Is that enough at this point? What is the United States looking for Israel to do?MR MILLER: So we are looking for them to do two things – one, to conduct a full, swift, and transparent investigation; and if that investigation shows that accountability is appropriate, then there of course should be accountability. And we will wait to see the results of that investigation before we pass judgment on it. The Israelis have said to us, and they’ve said publicly, that they intend to conduct this investigation swiftly. We want to see it wrapped up as soon as possible and see them put in place any measures to prevent this from happening again in the future.And that’s – go to the second point that we think we need to see, not just – and they don’t have to wait for the outcome of this investigation to do it – they need to put in place better deconfliction and better coordination measures to protect humanitarian workers and to protect all the civilians on the ground. And it is something that we have consistently said to them over the past few months, is that they need to improve their deconfliction measures and they need to improve their coordination measures.I saw that the defense minister, Minister Gallant, said that they are going to stand up a situation room to improve coordination between aid workers and the IDF. That’s something that is absolutely critical; it’s something that’s overdue. Secretary Blinken has, in his conversations with Israeli counterparts, made the case for some time that they need to stand up something like that. He raised that with Minister Gallant as recently as last week when he was here in Washington. And so we’re glad to see them do it. It should have been done sooner, but it’s an important step for them to take going forward. But ultimately, as is – as the case with all of the measures they’ve put into place, we’re going to judge them on the results, not the intent.QUESTION: Now, I mean, there’s – this obviously is something that’s happened before. And not to have a – not exactly this situation, but there was the tragedy with people searching – receiving aid who were killed. If you go even before October 7th, there was the investigation into the killing of Shireen Abu Akleh. I mean, do you think that the Israeli investigations and the U.S. responses have had an impact? Particularly the U.S. responses. I mean, do you think that the – that just saying that you’re going to wait for the Israeli investigation, for the Israelis to act, has had an impact?MR MILLER: So there have been times that the steps they have put into place because of – at our urging have had an impact, and have had an impact to the – to – have had a positive impact. For example, when the Secretary traveled to Israel and pushed them to implement better deconfliction, we did see an improvement in deconfliction. We saw them evacuating specific neighborhoods instead of just sending blanket evacuation orders across entire stretches of north Gaza, and those did have a positive impact, but they haven’t been sufficient. And so that’s why I made this point at the beginning, that we want to see them take further steps – like the ones that they say they’re standing up – but we’re going to watch, and if there are more things that need to be done, we will of course call on them to do so.With respect to investigations, look, I don’t want to pass judgment on what this investigation will show, just as you don’t want to pass judgment on what any investigation would show before it’s concluded. It’s important that they conduct a full, transparent, swift investigation. They need to find out exactly what happened, and we will – I’ll wait to pass judgment on it until it’s completed.QUESTION: Just one more before – following up on that, but I mean, the President himself laid out this aid plan at the State of the Union. It was quite a – the United States was – is it – was very visible on that, saying that – talking about the portable pier and everything. What does this say about that? I mean, is this – is this ruining the U.S. efforts to get aid in? I mean, obviously it – the U.S. can still do it, but tons of aid that were supposed to go in are – have already gone back because of – because of this killing.MR MILLER: So it will not affect our efforts to stand up the pier to deliver aid through sea. That effort is ongoing. The Pentagon is working hard on that, and I know they brief on that on a regular occasion, and we want to get that stood up as soon as possible. Of course, this strike does reveal the very difficult situation that aid workers on the ground inside Gaza face when it comes to not just receiving aid in Gaza but then actually delivering it. So, for example, and I know we’ve talked about this quite a bit over the past few months, it’s one thing to get aid into Gaza, either through Rafah or Kerem Shalom or through a maritime option when we have that up and running. The real question is being able to distribute it, and that’s of course – it’s in the distribution efforts where we saw this tragic strike take place yesterday.So it does, of course, raise real concerns about the safety of those aid workers who are doing that dangerous work. And I think it’s important to remember that these were seven tragic deaths yesterday, but over 200 aid workers have lost their lives since this conflict began. So that just reiterates and heightens the need for Israel to do better going forward, and it’s why the steps that Minister Gallant outlined yesterday, we are going to be watching closely to see if they are fully implemented and implemented in a way that yields better results, because there very much need to be better results.And again, I’ll come back to one point that we often make, and you – you’ve heard me say this; you’ve heard the Secretary say this publicly, but this is a case that we make directly to the Government of Israel. We need – they need to do better in delivering – in allowing humanitarian assistance to be delivered, and in achieving better deconfliction and coordination measures for the benefit of the innocent civilians inside Gaza who are suffering. That’s enough of a reason to do it on its own; that should be enough of a reason to do better. But it is also in Israel’s security interest to do better. And so we will continue to press them to do that.QUESTION: Just one more. Is – could there be any repercussions for the United States? I mean, I know you’re going to say that you’re waiting for the result of the investigation and everything, but as we’ve discussed, I mean, the – we’ve had this before investigations; we keep seeing these – it wasn’t just these seven; I think there are 208 workers or so who have been killed, by some tallies.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: So obviously, something’s not happening. Are there more measures that the United States could do, could – more pressure that the United States could employ?MR MILLER: So we are going to continue to say exactly what we think about this publicly, we’re going to say exactly what we think about this privately, we’re going to offer our best advice to them on things that they could do better, and we are going to push them to do better, as we have done since the beginning.Humeyra.QUESTION: Matt, there’s been reporting in Israeli media about how the attack has taken place. Basically it said the drone fired three missiles in succession and, like, each of them sort of struck one of the cars. And Reuters just – we have an interview with José Andrés, actually, just on our wire. And he told us that the Israeli army targeted the convoy, quote, “systematically car by car.” And president – Prime Minister Netanyahu talked about this being a mistake and unintentional. How do you reconcile those two, the reporting and what José Andrés is saying, and what Prime Minister Netanyahu is saying?MR MILLER: So two things about that. So, number one, the chief of staff for the Israeli Defense Forces has come out and said it’s a – it was a misidentification. So while they were – I took that to mean while they were targeting those cars, they did not believe that it was a World Central Kitchen that was operating those vehicles at the time. But that said, we need to wait and see the outcome of this investigation to know with any confidence what it was that happened, and we’re going to wait to do that.But the second thing is – the second point is, it doesn’t really matter how they made the mistake. At the end of the day, you have seven dead aid workers who were there trying to deliver humanitarian assistance. So whatever the reason was that led to this tragedy, whatever the mistake that happened inside the IDF, it’s unacceptable, and they need to do better, and they need to put measures in place to ensure that it doesn’t happen again.QUESTION: And given there was an American citizen killed in this attack, why isn’t the United States conducting its own investigation?MR MILLER: So we don’t conduct investigations of the type I believe you’re referring to from this building, so I wouldn’t – I wouldn’t presume to speak to any.QUESTION: The – I mean, could the administration consider sort of Department of Justice can do that, FBI can do that?MR MILLER: Again, that – we don’t conduct that type of investigation from the State Department. I’m not going to speak on behalf of any other agency.QUESTION: And I just want to ask the evergreen question. We’ve reported, and other media outlets have reported as well, that U.S. – that the administration is looking at furthering a big $18 billion aircraft package, weapons package, to Israel. We reported that earlier this week. And looking at President Biden’s statement last night saying, like, this is not a one-off, there are – and you just talked about the number of humanitarian workers who’ve been killed. There are a lot of journalists who’ve been killed. Doesn’t this kind of, like – given the accusations of disregard for noncombatants by the IDF, doesn’t this kind of incident make U.S. stop and reconsider its arms sales or military aid to Israel?MR MILLER: So let me say two things with respect to that question. Number one, with respect to some of the reporting that we’ve seen over the past few weeks about arms transfers or potential arms transfers to Israel, some of which we have not officially notified to Congress and have not moved forward on at all, but a lot of those are with respect to weapon systems that would not be delivered for years – long after, hopefully, the conflict in Gaza has been resolved. It&#8217;s something we’re –QUESTION: But I’m not – I’m not entirely &#8212;MR MILLER: No, no – but no – I just want to say that I think it’s important to – because it does go to the exact point. We have had a longstanding security relationship with the State of Israel that predates this administration, that predates the current government in Israel. And that has existed through Democratic and Republican administrations in Washington, and through governments of different parties in Israel, because we are committed to Israel’s long-term security.So when I get questions and when I see some of the reporting about arms transfers or potential arms transfers to Israel, some of which started years ago or were approved years ago, and some of which relate to systems that won’t be delivered until years down the road, I think it’s important to put in context that those relate to our overall security relationship with Israel and our overall commitment to Israel’s defense against a number of adversaries that it faces in the region that are committed to the destruction of Israel.Now, with respect – with respect to the question I know that you’re getting at, which we’ve addressed a number of times here, we continue to be committed to Israel’s defense, but we continue to press them consistently to ensure that they fully comply with international humanitarian law; and, critically, that when they do make mistakes, as they very well – they very obviously did yesterday, that they are transparent about those mistakes, that they investigate them, and, if appropriate, there’s accountability.QUESTION: I’m not entirely sure how the delivery date for this being down the line four years, five years, has an impact on your decision-making today because you’re making the decision today with the information that you know there are, like, various accusations about Israeli military’s conduct in Gaza; elsewhere there are incidents that the State Department is looking at whether Israel has breached international rules – like humanitarian law – so I’m not entirely sure how relevant it is that the delivery of those are, like, down the line. But – just one last thing. You said a minute ago – so you talked about misidentification. Are you referring to the video of Israel chief of staff, or are you &#8212;MR MILLER: Correct.QUESTION: I mean &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, correct. The statement he said publicly.QUESTION: And also is that what Israel – is that what U.S. Government have been told, that it was a misidentification?MR MILLER: They have told us – they have told us the same things privately that they have said publicly.QUESTION: But I mean, that – they took the strike, but they didn’t – they weren’t aware that it was a WCK convoy?MR MILLER: I am not going to – they have – they have – as I said, the thing that – the point about misidentification that General Halevi said in that public statement is what they have communicated to us privately. I’m not going to get further into the conversations, but ultimately what’s important is that they conduct an investigation to identify how that mistake happened – exactly how it happened and what they can do to prevent it from happening in the future?QUESTION: So &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; a short follow-up on that. Also, in the IDF statement, Halevi said that the misidentification was at night. Is that the understanding of the U.S. Government as well? And can you shed any light on why aid convoys are traveling at night at the moment?MR MILLER: I don’t have any reason to dispute that statement. And with respect to aid convoys traveling at night, I think they – they travel at different times during the day, but some of them, especially those traveling to the north of Gaza where the aid situation has been much more restricted and there’s been much – a more desperate humanitarian situation, sometimes they’ve been traveling at night to minimize the scenes like we saw several weeks ago where you saw stampedes of desperate individuals trying to rush out and take aid from the trucks. So they’ve been trying to move at times that would mitigate the risk of that happening.QUESTION: And just one &#8212;MR MILLER: But I – they also do move during the day. They don’t move only at night.QUESTION: Okay. And one on just timing. I know you say a swift investigation. Can you give us any more detail whether this is days, weeks &#8212;MR MILLER: I would defer to the Government of Israel to speak to that. We want to see it happen as soon as possible while ensuring that it is thorough and gets to the actual bottom of what happened.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Just one more on this and then a question on the Benny Gantz comments from today. So has the Government of Israel shared with you any information that prove that this was what they’re saying, a misidentification, or are you just trusting that at this point?MR MILLER: They – what we are trusting is that they’re going to conduct a full investigation. But that said, we will look at how that investigation is conducted, we will look at the results of that, and then we will pass judgment on it. So I don’t want to pass judgment on anything that they have said privately or publicly until they’ve conducted a full investigation. And I only say that because, as is true with our own military, as is true with militaries around the world, oftentimes the early events of what happened don’t bear out when you conduct a full investigation into the underlying facts. So we’re going to wait and pass judgment when we see the full results.QUESTION: But in a way you’re passing judgment by standing up there and saying it was a misidentification already before you have the actual facts before you.MR MILLER: I don’t have any reason to dispute that, but we will pass – we will wait and see the full investigation.QUESTION: Okay. Benny Gantz, Israeli war cabinet minister, said today that he would call for parliamentary elections in September. What is the U.S. response to that? Would you support such elections taking place?MR MILLER: That is entirely a decision for the Israeli people and the Israeli – members of Israeli Government to make.Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: (Inaudible) something that Humeyra asked? When you’re talking about three strikes on this convoy, I mean, even if we take at face value that it’s just a misidentification, I mean, is that appropriate? I mean, you have a convoy which is apparently clearly marked by aid, but if it’s – whoever it was in there – having three strikes, so systematically destroying it – is – do you think that’s an appropriate way to go at &#8212;MR MILLER: I – it’s hard to comment on that without getting into a hypothetical. You can obviously see a scenario if they were a convoy of clear terrorists, that it might be appropriate. That obviously was not the case here. So I think we will wait, as I said, for the results of the investigation to pass judgment on how this mistake happened. But as I said, it ultimately doesn’t matter whether it was three or two – they killed seven aid workers. How ever they made the mistake, it resulted in a tragedy that should have never happened, and that’s what they need to prevent from happening again.QUESTION: Can I – can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you. On the investigation, Matt, do you believe that Israel’s record in investigating itself is a good record? They have come up with good results in the past? I mean, there have been – there has been so many investigations. Can you cite one investigation where they actually came clean?MR MILLER: So they have spoken to a number of investigations, including one where you had members of the IDF who behaved inappropriately inside a mosque, and they spoke to those members being disciplined. They have spoken to a number of other investigations that they have ongoing. I’ve read comments last week from the chief lawyer inside the IDF who talked about a number of ongoing investigations they have. But ultimately, let’s just wait, see what the investigation comes up with, and then we can make our judgments.QUESTION: Okay. Now, I have a couple more – just bear with me. On the misidentification, so when they say misidentification, does that tell us that they were actually after three-car convoy that had Hamas fighters in it and they were targeting, or – I mean, movement of fighters by cars, which is obviously unusual and so on? Is that – is that what you think they meant?MR MILLER: I don’t know what they were after. And ultimately, as I said, it doesn’t really matter what they were intending to do, because what they did do was kill seven aid workers, and it’s unacceptable and should not happen again.QUESTION: Okay. So there’s been about 196, I believe, 196 aid workers killed in Gaza; 175 UN workers, including UNRWA workers and so on. So I want to ask you: Do you believe there’s any kind of – what is different about this strike, the fact that this particular strike was – owned or headed by a famous chef and it had citizens of Canada and Australia and Britain and the United States, and not just Palestinians. Is that the only difference for this strike to garner such a great deal of space and to engender the anger of the President of the United States of America and your anger?MR MILLER: So Said, I won’t speak to why anyone strike gathers more attention than others. That’s a decision is largely not made by the United States Government. I will say, when it comes to the United States Government speaking out, we have talked at length about the need for Israel to do more to minimize civilian harm and minimize death to aid workers. That didn’t start this week with these deaths, this – the tragic death of these seven World Central Kitchen workers. We have talked about it for some time and we have pressed the Israeli Government to do better and offered them ideas on how to do better. And as I said at the outset, one of those ideas was to stand up the kind of situation room that they are now standing up.QUESTION: Last question, on Rafah and the meeting that took place on Monday. It seems that there are deep differences between the United States of America and Israel on the Rafah invasion. Can you update us on what’s going on? What will the United States – what does the United States expect – does it – what does the United States expect Israel to do? Because we’re talking about movement of maybe one and a half million people.MR MILLER: We – I couldn’t tell if you were – I was just going to jump in, and sometimes I’ve jumped in and you &#8212;QUESTION: No, please, please. Go ahead.MR MILLER: &#8212; you’ve not been done with the question, so I didn’t want to interrupt you.QUESTION: No, I’m fine. Go ahead.MR MILLER: So with respect to a potential operation in Rafah, what we have made clear to them is we share the goal of dismantling the remaining Hamas battalions that are – that exist in Rafah and do pose a legitimate security threat to the State of Israel and the people of Israel. But we do not want them to conduct a full-scale operation that we believe would not only lead to a high number of civilian deaths and would hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance, but would ultimately weaken Israel’s security. So what we did in that meeting that the Secretary attended at the White House a couple of days ago is to offer them our best advice on other ways to accomplish that mission. And we will have follow-up meetings in the coming days to further that conversation.Go ahead. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. So you said that we have seven dead international aid workers and you want to avoid seeing more killing in the future. So therefore, you said that you asked Israel to coordinate better and to establish deconflicting zones. But this is contradict with what exactly happened with World Central Kitchen. They coordinated with Israelis to every detail and they went into exactly the deconflict – deconflicting zone on the beach, and yet they were targeted. So how this applies now? What difference does it make?MR MILLER: That has been – that is exactly the point I was making. They have had deconfliction measures, they have had coordination measures to try to prevent tragedies like this from happening, and they haven’t worked well enough. Clearly they haven’t worked well enough when you see not just these seven aid workers that have been killed, but over 200 aid workers that have been killed since the outset of this conflict. And so they need to do a better job. Some of this has been bureaucratic with aid workers not talking to the – having the right – with the IDF not having set up the right channels to communicate with aid workers and messages not getting passed back and forth.But as I said, ultimately, whatever the details are that broke down here, the result is unacceptable, and that’s why they need to do better. And so that’s why they need to have improved deconfliction and coordination measures to prevent tragedies like this from happening in the future.QUESTION: Okay. So as a result of the killing of the World Central Kitchen staff – also Anera, which is an American NGO, suspended their work in delivering aid to Gaza. And before that, UNRWA was targeted by the Israelis of saying there is some people who are involved in the October 7 attack, and we’re still waiting for the investigation. So practically, three of the vital organizations that providing aid to Gaza either suspended their work or they don’t have enough fund to help the people who are starving in Gaza.Some people believe that this actually is kind of a strategy on behalf of the Israelis to use food as a weapon of war and to prevent Gazans of receiving the aid, and therefore forcing them to leave, as some kind of strategy by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Do you see it? Can you entertain this for a second, this thought that actually this is not a mistake or unintentional or haphazard or was accident, but actually there is some kind of thought process that get into it by the Israelis.MR MILLER: So a few things just in the preface to the question first. So with respect to UNRWA, it’s not just the Israeli Government that found that there were UNRWA workers that participated in the terrorist attacks – it was UNRWA itself. And I think that’s always an important thing to remember, UNRWA itself that actually briefed the United States on its own findings.With respect to UNRWA, it does continue to operate. Obviously it’s faced funding challenges, but you’ve seen a number of countries who have resumed their funding. And UNRWA is continuing to do important work on the ground now – vital work – that we want to see continued. So while they have faced funding challenges, they are continuing to deliver humanitarian assistance inside Gaza, and it’s critical that that work continue. I – obviously there are organizations that are going to look at what happened the other day now and be worried about the safety and security of their employees. How could they not be? And so it is why it is incumbent on the Government of Israel to institute better measures to give confidence to aid workers that their employee – or to give aid organizations that their employees won’t be killed just trying to deliver humanitarian assistance.With respect to the overall policy, look, I can just speak to what the Government of Israel has said and what they have done. So they have said they want to see humanitarian assistance come in and they have allowed humanitarian assistance to come in through Rafah, through Kerem Shalom, through the 96 gate. They’re working with us on this maritime option that we are standing up with the cooperation of other countries in the region. But in all of these circumstances, it has been not enough. It has been too little. It has been plagued in many cases by bureaucratic delays and bureaucratic obstacles that we are continuing to try to work through.But it’s kind of the same thing as – with respect to – it’s the same point I’m making with respect to these deaths. Whatever the reason the number – the amount of humanitarian assistance hasn’t gotten in at the levels it should had, the ultimate fact is the fact, which is not enough food, not enough water is getting in right now. And the Government of Israel needs to do more to allow it to get in and to facilitate it getting in.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Just want to follow up Said’s questions on nearly 200 aid workers killed in Gaza and your – difference in your approach. President Biden yesterday expressed outrage over the killing of seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen in Gaza. Is the administration also outraged by the killing of nearly 200 aid workers, 100 journalists, 30,000 – 33,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children? Are you outraged by this too?MR MILLER: We are outraged by every loss of civilian life in Gaza. And you have heard the President speak to this, you’ve heard the Secretary speak to this in saying far too many civilians have been killed, too many aid workers have died in this conflict, too many journalists have died in this conflict, and we want to see Israel do a better job in minimizing all of those casualties.QUESTION: Just one more on that. Biden also, in the same statement, said that Israel has not done enough to protect aid workers and civilians. And you yourself said that you have repeatedly urged Israel to take some steps to minimize civilian harm in Gaza. If there are steps that Israel needs to take and Israel chooses not to take them, doesn’t that mean that Israel is deliberately attacking aid workers and civilians?MR MILLER: No, I don’t think you can necessarily make that conclusion because there &#8212;QUESTION: Why?MR MILLER: Because sometimes there are bureaucratic obstacles that are presented. And we try to work through those bureaucratic obstacles. But &#8212;QUESTION: How do you explain the killing 33,000 Palestinians, then?MR MILLER: So partly this is because Israel is operating in an incredibly difficult environment where Hamas hides behind human shields. They’re operating in an urban environment where Hamas has constructed tunnels beneath apartment buildings, hides in mosques, hides in hospitals, even hospitals that – like al-Shifa that Israel had cleared. Hamas returns to those hospitals. And so it is an incredibly difficult environment, and the Israeli Defense Forces face real challenges &#8212;QUESTION: But does this justify killing of civilians?MR MILLER: Real challenges – but I’ll say it does not minimize at all their responsibility to do everything possible to prevent taking civilian life.Tom.QUESTION: Just to follow up on the several questions about the value of investigations after actions by the IDF, I mean, you have called numerous times for investigations after Palestinians have been killed in recent years. Some of those have been U.S. citizens. In the last two years, Omar Assad, February 2022, found dead after being detained by Israeli soldiers. You called for a thorough criminal investigation, full accountability. Shireen Abu Akleh, as we know, May 2022, a U.S. citizen – you called for a full investigation. June 2023, Omar Qatin, a U.S. resident in Turmus Ayya, which is a town full of U.S. passport holders in the West Bank – you called for full accountability and justice. I haven’t – what – are you satisfied with the outcome of those three investigations, for a start? And then what should we read into your call for an investigation in this case &#8212;MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to the specifics of every one of those investigations. Some of them predate my &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: I would say some of them predate my time here before I was working at the State Department. I can say with respect to the investigation of Shireen Abu Akleh, of course, we called on Israel to investigate and we also called on them to cooperate with our investigation. And they did cooperate with our investigation that the U.S. security coordinator conducted that concluded that gunfire from IDF positions was likely responsible for her tragic death. And so there were steps that they took to cooperate with the investigation that we had.Ultimately, as it pertains to the deaths of – and I should say there are two other cases that are ongoing right now, one of American citizens who were killed in the West Bank, one that’s being conducted by – one investigation that’s being conducted by Israeli law enforcement, one that’s being conducted by Palestinian Authority law enforcement. And in all of those cases, we want the same thing. We want a full investigation. We want to – it to happen as quickly as possible, but we don’t want that swiftness to come at the expense of thoroughness. Ultimately, it’s important that they get it right.And then with respect to all of them, we will make judgments on a case-by-case basis on whether that investigation was conducted fully and appropriately and led to appropriate outcomes and results.QUESTION: I mean, B’Tselem, which is a very well respected Israeli human rights group, several years ago said it would stop cooperating with military investigations in Israel because – in its words – they are “nothing more than a masquerade.” Do you see that view? Do you have any sympathy with it?MR MILLER: Let me just say with respect to – I think we’re all going to have a chance, the entire world, including the journalists in this room, including the United States Government, to look at an investigation being conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces with respect to the killing of these World Central Kitchen workers, and we are all going to be able to make our own independent judgments about the thoroughness and the reliability of that investigation. I know that we will do so, and I’m sure that all of you as well – will as well.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, let’s stay on. Alex, I’m just &#8212;QUESTION: Yes.MR MILLER: I’ll come back to you. Stay on – I’m sure we’ll stay in the region.QUESTION: Matt, just want to follow up on Said and a Rabiyah question regarding this attack on WCK convoy. It’s not an isolated incident. Been attacks on conveys before, on UNRWA’s storage facilities; people queuing for aid in Gaza have been also targeted by Israel forces. And now you’re calling them for an investigation. You’re calling them to change some – to make some changes so this incident doesn’t happen again. But don’t you think that the U.S. soft approach toward Israel in this war also let them to get away with it, for example?MR MILLER: So I would &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible) do that?MR MILLER: Sorry, sorry. I would disagree with the characterization. We have on a number of occasions pressed them to do more on deconfliction measures, on protection of civilians, and they have taken steps that have been important; in most cases – nearly all cases – not enough, but steps that have been tangible and that have produced results. But we want to see them do better, and that’s why we’ll continue to engage with them on that – in that regard.QUESTION: But do you think it was better enough? Let’s say, I mean, that northern Gaza is on the verge of famine already. Aid are not coming in for a while now, for months. Your pressing the Israelis’ counterparts, it seems that doesn’t yield results any more.MR MILLER: So I will say that you can look back at the history of our engagements with the Government of Israel and show where it has produced tangible results. And that includes in the immediate aftermath of October 7th, right up to the recent history, starting with the first trip that the Secretary made to the region when he urged the Government of Israel to open Rafah, and then the President came two days later and cemented that agreement to open Rafah, which allowed humanitarian assistance to get in.We then engaged with them to urge the opening of Kerem Shalom, which is an important step to allowing more humanitarian assistance to get in. The same thing is what led to the opening of the 96th gate in the north, the same thing that led to flour coming in through Ashdod, the same thing that is leading to the opening of a maritime route to get more humanitarian assistance in.When it comes to deconfliction measures, it was our involvement that led to them to implement a humanitarian pause, not just the pause of one week, but three-hour pauses with four hours’ notice in the early days of the war when they were bombing neighborhoods, oftentimes with kind of blanket notices but not with any kind of specificity. And it was our involvement that led them to start offering those pauses. It is our involvement that led to them offering, as I said earlier, specific neighborhood evacuation orders rather than just these blanket orders.That said, in all of these cases, we want to see them do more and we want to see them do better. We want to see them to do more to let humanitarian assistance in and to protect civilian lives. And that is why we are consistently engaged with them, from the President of the United States, to the Secretary of State, to our team on the ground, and everyone in the United States Government who works on this matter.QUESTION: The last – my last question about the statement that issued by the White House’s today on the – President Biden’s statement regarding this attack on – the latest attack on the convoy. The President sounded outraged and heartbroken, and blamed Israel that they are not doing enough to protect aid workers. Does this language signal a change in policy, or is just a statement regarding this incident?MR MILLER: It was a statement about this incident. But it’s not a change in policy because we have always, as I said, consistently been telling the Government of Israel that they need to do more to protect aid workers and civilians and journalists. Now, we’re glad to see them taking additional measures now; as I said, those measures were overdue. We’ve been urging them to do them from some time – for some time. But this has always been the policy that we have clearly communicated to them that we want them to follow.Camilla.QUESTION: Matt, sorry, just one on the U.S.-Canadian dual national who was amongst those killed. World Central Kitchen has also named him. Can you confirm that the State Department has reached out to his family, and what if any consular support the U.S. can give?MR MILLER: We have reached out to his family. We reached out to his family yesterday to offer our condolences and to offer any consular assistance that we can provide. That is always our standard practice in these cases when we see an American citizen who has tragically lost their life overseas. We offer any type of assistance that we can to facilitate whatever they need in the wake of this tragedy. And we’ll keep, obviously, the details of that private, but we have been in touch with his family.Let me just make sure. Stay in the – finish up on Gaza before – go ahead. Guita, sorry.QUESTION: Thanks. In the neighborhood?MR MILLER: In the neighborhood, yeah.QUESTION: Yes. Thank you. Regarding the attack on the Iranian facility in Damascus, I was wondering, well, we know that the United States has sent messages to Iran saying that it was not involved. It had no idea of this operation. I was wondering what – how was the American message received? Was it accepted, do you think, considering that there are now a number of officials threatening retaliation?MR MILLER: So I am not going to speak to how it might have been received. The Iranians can speak for theirselves. I will just say that we made very clear to the Iranians that we had no involvement in this strike, we didn’t know about it at the time, and we warned them not to use this attack as a pretext to attack U.S. facilities or personnel.QUESTION: Since then, have you – has the administration possibly followed up with reaching out to an intermediary, somebody that – a country that Iran trusts – to hone in that message?MR MILLER: I am not going to speak to our range of diplomatic engagements, but as we have made clear over a number of months, we have the ability to send messages, very clear messages, to Iran both directly and indirectly, and we do so when it’s in our interest.QUESTION: Matt, do you know if – have you – has the administration been able to ascertain the – that the facility, the Iranian facility, was indeed a diplomatic one, as Iran claims?MR MILLER: We are still gathering details about what it – what precisely type of facility that was.QUESTION: And given the Iranian response or threats, are U.S. interests – troops – in the region and across the world, have they been put on alert?MR MILLER: So I would defer to the Pentagon to speak to that. Obviously, we have been broadly – excuse me – we have been broadly – and I’m not speaking on behalf of the Pentagon but just on behalf of the State Department – broadly concerned about escalation since October 7th, and if you’ve seen us take a number of steps over time with respect to our embassies. We are constantly monitoring the situation and making assessments about the precise threat environment at any given day. But I don’t have any updates to posture to announce. And with respect to American forces in the region, I would defer to the Pentagon for comment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Two questions, basically. First question specifically: For you being diplomat, do you think so attacking diplomatic missions and diplomats in an area that is dedicated or declared a diplomatic mission? It sounds like the U.S. have no condemnation on this Israeli strike. It will be another continuation for Israel, another signal to continue this effort. Because the attack, where it happened, that location were adjacent to other missions, like Iranian mission is right next to it. So what is your comment?MR MILLER: We do not support attacks on diplomatic facilities, but as I said in response to Guita’s question, we’re still gathering information about what type of facility this was.QUESTION: And my other question is regarding the United States position on the strong support to Indian opposition as the State Department issued many statements in the support of Delhi Chief Minister Kejriwal and then the (inaudible) of Congress. So it seemed like United States have very strong position to – to condemning the attempts to silence the opposition in India. But regarding the political prisoners in Pakistan, specifically the female prisoners that are still behind the bars of a many political charges. So why so strong position for Indian opposition and nothing for the Pakistani political prisoners?MR MILLER: So I would – I would – I would not agree with that characterization. We have made clear on a number of occasions that we want to see everyone in Pakistan treated consistent with the rule of law, treated with respect for human rights, as is our position with respect to any country in the world.QUESTION: The female prisoners &#8212;MR MILLER: (Inaudible) go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. It’s been 110 days since journalist Samer Abu Daqqa was killed; 65 days since six-year-old Hind Rajab, her family, the medics sent to save her were killed. Per Shaun and other colleagues’ earliest question, today should be Shireen Abu Akleh’s birthday, our Palestinian-American colleague, I might add, killed in 2022. So I’m wondering if you have updates on not just the investigations but actual accountability measures in response to these? And if not, how can this administration’s approach of relegating things to months-long investigations while not changing policy – all as thousands more are killed – be a justified approach?MR MILLER: So I would say that with respect to Shireen, I did speak to that a moment ago. We can &#8212;QUESTION: Right, but in terms of accountability measures as well.MR MILLER: Yeah, I know. I know. We condemned her killing when it happened. We still condemn it now. There was an investigation conducted by the United States that found no reason to believe that that death was intentional, but it is a tragedy nonetheless. With respect to investigations – and, look, this is – I used to have to answer questions on behalf of the Justice Department that were very similar to this – investigations in some cases take time. You heard me a minute ago say we want them in every case to be conducted swiftly but not at the expense of thoroughness. And that is our position with respect to these investigations in Israel; it is our position with respect to investigations anywhere in the world, whether they impacted American citizens or they involve other types of tragedy. So we will continue to press for not just full investigations but, when warranted, all appropriate accountability measures.QUESTION: But so – yeah, like, given that approach, I understand; but given, again, that thousands of people have been killed since these instances I’ve laid out – Hind Rajab’s killing, the journalist’s killing – like, how is this justified given – and as you’ve said yourself, like, the material consequences of these things matter. The fact that seven aid workers have been killed matters. So how can this approach continue to be justified if – well, at the end, what matters is thousands of people continue to be killed with no change in policy.MR MILLER: So there are two things here. I think one is with respect to investigations, and we want to see accountability measures, when appropriate, for people who have behaved inappropriately, in violation of IDF code of conduct or in violation of international humanitarian law, we want to see accountability inside the Israeli system. But it’s also true that we have pressed the government to enact operational changes to prevent further civilian loss of life. And we have seen them – as I have spoken to at length – enact changes over time. Those haven’t been sufficient. We have seen Minister Gallant announce new changes that they are putting in place just yesterday, and we are going to watch those and make our judgments based on how they work.QUESTION: Finally, one more. As our colleagues have pointed out, hundreds of aid workers, doctors, volunteers have been killed even before this week. U.S. has cut funding to UNRWA, the World Central Kitchen is pausing operations, Anera is pausing, all out of fear of their workers being killed. And you think of, for instance, the Mr. Rogers quote, the infamous Mr. Rogers quote, if you’ll humor me: “When I was a boy and I would see scary things on the news, my mother would say to me, ‘Look for the helpers. You will always find people who are helping.’” I imagine you and your colleagues have come into this work hopefully trying to be helpers, too. So I wonder, what’s the United States’s message to the helpers in the world trying to help people in Gaza, given those helpers are being killed with American military aid?MR MILLER: So you saw the Secretary speak to this not the – with a very similar quote yesterday, speaking in Paris about how aid workers are the helpers that run into conflict to provide help to those who need it. And our message to them is what it has been throughout this conflict, that we support the work that you do, we fund the work that aid organizations do in Israel, in Gaza, all around the world, and we want to see that work continue, and we will continue to make very clear to the Government of Israel that it needs to do much better to protect those workers from harm.All right. Any more in the region before move on?QUESTION: It’s a – one follow-up question.MR MILLER: We’ll finish here, and then I’ll take a few.QUESTION: When you said that you don’t expect that this attack is going to impact the humanitarian pier being set up and the support from that pier getting to where it needs to go, I assume, or are you &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I was – what I was speaking to is the – you have to – when you think about the pier, you have to think about the same way as I think delivery through Rafah or anywhere else. There is both getting aid in through the pier and into Gaza, that’s the first step; and then there’s the delivery of that aid inside Gaza.QUESTION: Sure.MR MILLER: We do not expect that it would impact the first; of course, the ability of humanitarian aid workers to deliver aid inside Gaza, which is what we saw tragically impacted yesterday, continues to be an ongoing concern. And so it’s why it’s important that the Government of Israel improve deconfliction and coordination measures.QUESTION: So could this incident delay that pier being up and running and getting the support to people?MR MILLER: I would refer to the Pentagon for any comment about the timeline of this pier, which you should not read into one way or the other, other than that it’s a project that they are managing. It’s just something I’ve never been able to speak to from here.Humeyra.QUESTION: Just on – to follow up on that one, actually, have you had since yesterday any conversations with any – with Pentagon or with any possible humanitarian aid partners on the ground about how concerned they are because now it would be expected that perhaps they would look for additional measures to ensure their safety and security?MR MILLER: We’ve had a number of conversations with humanitarian aid organizations who, as you might expect, as you would obviously expect, are incredibly concerned about what happened. But the sad truth is – as we’ve spoken to, as some of you have mentioned in your questions I’ve spoken to – these are not the first death of aid workers. There have been 200 aid workers that have been killed. So the very sad truth is that the workers doing this important work are aware of the risk, because they’re living with them every day and are putting their lives potentially on the line to deliver humanitarian assistance.So what we have heard from aid groups is they want to see the Government of Israel do better, and that’s what we have pushed the Government of Israel to do.QUESTION: And have you picked a partner on who’s going to distribute from that pier, who’s going to pick it up from the pier?MR MILLER: I’m not aware of any further updates or developments on that question. It’s something we’re continuing to work through.QUESTION: Just a couple of other things. Is it the State Department’s or is it U.S. understanding that there are – there is already famine in Gaza? You have warned of imminent risk, but is it your understanding that there is already famine in &#8212;MR MILLER: I am not aware of an assessment that there is currently famine. Now, there are places where we have a lack of information, particularly in northern Gaza, where it is very clear that there is acute food insecurity and there is a potential for famine. What’s actually occurring on the ground is very difficult to know. Bottom line is there needs to be more food delivered to people who desperately need it, because if famine is not already occurring, there are at least parts of Gaza that are on the brink of famine, and we need to get food in to those people.QUESTION: And two more things. Palestinian Authority wants a vote at the UN Security Council in April to become a full member. Does the U.S. oppose this, and if necessary would you veto it?MR MILLER: So I am not going to speculate about what may happen down the road. But we have always made clear that we believe the – while we support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and you’ve seen the Secretary engage in very intensive diplomacy over the past few months to try to establish a Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel, that is something that should be done through direct negotiations through the parties – something we are pursuing at this time – and not at the United Nations.QUESTION: Okay. And the final thing is &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: &#8212; Kirby said – sorry, I’m almost done – Kirby said yesterday on the podium that the State Department has not found that Israel’s military conduct has violated international humanitarian law. His comment sounded conclusive and definitive. So I just want to follow up and clarify: Does the State Department have such a definitive conclusion that it has looked at all of the incidents raised so far, and all of the incidents and the review on those have been concluded, and as a result, you have a definitive assessment that no violations have occurred?MR MILLER: So I saw what the admiral said. He also said that we have ongoing processes here at the State Department, and that is &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, that is what he &#8212;MR MILLER: I – so that is correct. We have ongoing processes here at the State Department to examine that very question, and we have not at this time concluded that Israel has violated international humanitarian law, but these are very much ongoing processes with respect to that question.QUESTION: Can I just follow up one single thing on that?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Is – have any of those – when you’re making the assessments, have any of those gone to the Office of the Legal Adviser?MR MILLER: I have made it clear that we are not going to talk about the specifics of internal deliberations and how we’re conducting those processes. But there &#8212;QUESTION: This is – it’s about international humanitarian law, so it’s a legal assessment &#8212;MR MILLER: There – and there are a number of offices inside the State Department that are involved in these assessments, but I’m not going to speak to the exact specifics.QUESTION: Are you able to say how many incidents in total are you looking at? Is it a couple? Is it dozens?MR MILLER: A number of them. I’ll leave it at that.Shaun.QUESTION: Hey, Matt, in yesterday’s presser &#8212;MR MILLER: I meant Shaun, but go ahead, Alex. I’ve been – I’ve been overlooking you for some times, so go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, back to yesterday’s presser. At the presser the Secretary seemed to suggest that Russia has already received Iranian ballistic missiles and – and has used it in Ukraine. The White House yesterday couldn’t confirm that. Did the Secretary mean to say that? Was it translation error? I should mention that he was speaking in French.MR MILLER: He was speaking in French, and we have made very clear that we have been concerned about the burgeoning security partnership between Iran and Russia. The Secretary was speaking to the fact that they have delivered drones already.QUESTION: Thank you. I want to move to the South Caucasus. Secretary spoke with Aliyev today. If you look at Azerbaijan readout, Aliyev was venting about this week’s meeting-slash-Armenia summit. And he said that the failure to postpone the trilateral meeting – despite his concerns, he says – will lead to escalation of tension and – rather than peace. Does the Secretary agree with that assessment, and is a meeting still on?MR MILLER: So I – with respect to that, I am going to defer to a statement that we have coming out shortly. The President spoke to – I’m sorry – the Secretary spoke to President Aliyev earlier today, and we’ll have a readout coming.QUESTION: About – about the particular point that Aliyev made, did the Secretary – will that change any decision? Yeah.MR MILLER: We will speak to that in the readout, but their meeting is – the meeting is still ongoing.QUESTION: All right. On Georgia, do you have anything for me on Georgian Government’s trying to press – reintroduce, let’s say, the Russian law? They tried it last year; they failed. It looks like they are trying &#8212;MR MILLER: So we’ve seen the reports that they are considering that potential legislation. And And I would just say that last year, tens of thousands of Georgians took to the streets to make their European ambitions known and to reject the last attempt to implement this law. Georgia has a historic opportunity to open EU’s accession talks, and we stand ready to continue to support Georgia in that process.QUESTION: I have one more, if I may, on Russia sanctions. It appears as the administration removed three of Russia sanctions from the SDN list, targeting VTB Bank subsidiaries. U.S. imposed them two months ago against a Russian oligarch because of sanction violations. What is the reason for that decision?MR MILLER: So with respect to that specific question, I’ll refer you to the Treasury Department. But I would note that we have continued to impose new sanctions on Russia, including just in the past few months, and have taken measures to tighten the enforcement of our existing sanctions.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead. And then I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: A different topic – Uganda. The constitutional court in Uganda today struck down a bid to undo the anti-LGBTQ law. I was wondering if the U.S. has any reaction to the court ruling and whether this will have any implications on policy toward Uganda, including potentially more sanctions (inaudible).MR MILLER: So the United States continues to be deeply troubled by human rights abuses in Uganda and by the anti-homosexuality act. We believe that law undermines the human rights, prosperity, and welfare of all Ugandans. The Ugandan Government’s failure to safeguard the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons is part of the broader degradation of human rights protections that puts all in Uganda at risk and damages the country’s reputation abroad.And with respect to United States actions, so we have already imposed sanctions, including the visa restriction policy. We have ended Uganda’s eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, curtailed direct government-to-government funding to programs implemented with Uganda, issued a business advisory, a travel advisory, and advocated for Uganda’s full compliance with the social safeguards agreed to in the World Bank lending – in World Bank lending. And we will continue to take all appropriate measures.QUESTION: And just – just a very brief follow-up on that. I mean, it’s not the only place in Africa where this is happening. Ghana – there’s still the debate there. I mean, is there a concern about a broader push against LGBTQ equality in Africa? And particularly on Ghana, is there any communication on that with the Ghanaians?MR MILLER: So we are deeply concerned by legislation under consideration elsewhere in Africa and globally – it’s not just in Africa – that targets LGBTQI+ persons and their allies. We believe that governments should protect the – all individuals in their countries, and that every person deserves full dignity, and that these laws, whether they be in Africa or anywhere else in the world, undermine the human rights, prosperity, and welfare of individuals, and risk damaging their country’s reputation abroad.Go ahead, and then I’ll come to &#8212;QUESTION: Would you have a comment on the earthquake in Taiwan, the worst in 25 years?MR MILLER: I would say first and foremost we express our deepest condolences on behalf of the United States to the at least nine people dead and 900 injured and their families and everyone who was affected. We stand ready to support the people of Taiwan at this difficult time. USAID staff in the region and here in Washington will continue to closely monitor the earthquake and tsunami warnings, and will remain in close contact with the American Institute in Taiwan and are ready to provide assistance if necessary.QUESTION: Also, with the AIT chairperson now in Taipei, would you have a message ahead of the inauguration next month of Taiwan’s president-elect?MR MILLER: I would say that the chair will meet during this trip with a range of senior Taiwan leaders, political figures, and scholars from across party lines to discuss continued U.S.-Taiwan collaboration on issues of mutual interest, such as regional security, mutually beneficial trade and investment, and people-to-people, educational, and cultural ties. But broadly, U.S. policy has not changed. We have a longstanding, rock-solid partnership with Taiwan, and we look forward to continuing that unofficial relationship through the Taiwan political transition.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: On equality, the Secretary announced a new chief DEI officer yesterday, but there’s criticism both internally and outside of State on why this took so long. The position was vacant for 10 months and doesn’t require Senate confirmation, so why did it take so long if this is such a top priority for the Secretary?MR MILLER: So we were working to find the best possible candidate, and we believe we did find the best possible candidate. Oftentimes when it comes to these jobs, you have to go through difficult bureaucratic procedures to fill basic positions, but I will say the emphasis that the Secretary has put on this job has not wavered – and has put on this issue has not wavered – throughout that time, that our work to expand diversity has continued since the outset of this administration because the Secretary believes that having a workforce that reflects America in all of its diversity makes us stronger and improves our national security. And we look forward to working this – with this new diversity officer to expand the work that we are already doing.And I’ll take one more and then wrap for the day.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. An Indian internal investigation has found the involvement of the intelligence officials into the assassination attempt on Sikh leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in New York. According to Indian media, that report is also shared with the State Department. Do you have any response on that because you were also waiting for that (inaudible)?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to media reports. I will just say that we have made clear to the Government of India that we want to see them conduct a full investigation, and we continue to look forward to the results of that investigation, but I don’t have any updates to offer.QUESTION: Sir, according to some media reports, the United Nations has delivered more than $2.9 billion in cash to Afghanistan since the Taliban seized control, resulting in the flow of U.S. funds to the extremist group. So sir, is this happening with the consultation of U.S. Government or &#8212;MR MILLER: No, not at all. So let me make clear that we require all of our partners to have safeguards in place to ensure that assistance reaches those who need it. We also require robust monitoring and reporting from partner organizations implementing assistance programs, including those in unstable and unfriendly environments. When there is cause for concern related to the delivery of assistance, we have plans and protocols in place to respond, and we will continue to monitor all of our assistance programs and seek to mitigate the risk that U.S. assistance could indirectly benefit the Taliban or could be diverted to unintended recipients.QUESTION: Any response to the President Biden’s letter? Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has said that Pakistan is willing to work with the U.S. for global peace and regional prosperity. What support can U.S. offer Pakistan in addressing security threats from neighboring countries and combatting the Pakistani Taliban?MR MILLER: So we will continue to work to expand the security partnership between the United States and Pakistan. We have spoken to that a number of times from this podium. It’s been a priority for us and will continue to be so.And with that, I’ll wrap for today. Thanks.(The briefing was concluded at 2:35 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Georgia																								Ghana																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Taiwan																								Uganda
- Ugandan Court Decision on the Anti-Homosexuality Act Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe United States continues to be deeply concerned by reports of human rights abuses in Uganda, including against the LGBTQI+ community. The announcement that some provisions of the Anti-Homosexuality Act have been removed by the Constitutional Court is a small and insufficient step towards safeguarding human rights. The remaining provisions of the AHA pose grave threats to the Ugandan people, especially LGBTQI+ Ugandans and their allies, undermine public health, clamp down on civic space, damage Uganda’s international reputation, and harm efforts to increase foreign investment. Uganda should respect the human dignity of all and provide equal protection to all individuals under the law.
- Special Envoy for Sudan Perriello Travels to Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates Office of the SpokespersonSpecial Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello will travel to Africa and the Middle East March 11-23, demonstrating the priority the Administration places on ending the Sudan conflict, meeting the immediate and dire humanitarian needs of the Sudanese people, and charting a path toward civilian, democratic government.In Kampala, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Cairo, the Special Envoy will meet with a broad range of Sudanese civilians, including civil society, Resistance Committees, Emergency Response Room members, women, youth, and other Sudanese grassroots organizations and parties to hear their perspectives on how to bolster their efforts to respond to urgent needs, demand an end to the conflict, and prepare for a democratic transition in Sudan.In each of these capitals, as well as in, Djibouti, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi, he will meet key African, regional, and multilateral partners to align efforts to bring an end to the devastating Sudan conflict.
- Digital Press Briefing on U.S. Environmental Efforts on the African Continent Jennifer R. Littlejohn, Acting Assistant SecretaryBureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific AffairsDownload or listen to the audio here .MODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic of U.S. environmental efforts on the African continent.  Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the U.S. Department of State’s Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, J.R. Littlejohn, who is visiting Ghana and traveling on to the United Nations Environment Assembly in Nairobi.  Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn will discuss how the United States is working with partners across the continent to address key environmental issues like air quality, deforestation, nature crimes, plastic pollution, and promoting a sustainable blue economy.  She will also discuss the United States’ work to build partnerships on science and space exploration with countries in Africa, as well as U.S. efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn and then we will take your questions.  We will try to get to as many of them as we can during the briefing.As a reminder, today’s call is on the record.  And with that, I will turn it over to Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn for her opening remarks.ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  Thank you so much, and good morning, everyone.I’m actually thrilled to connect with you from Accra, Ghana, and to share the tremendous progress we’re making together on environmental and scientific cooperation across Africa.I’d say the main message I want to share with you today is that the United States is partnering with Ghana and countries across Africa to address the major challenges of our time – this includes addressing the climate crisis, the biodiversity crisis, and the pollution crisis.  We are working together to protect the ocean and the environment – for the benefit of all people all over the world.Now, let me start I think best with a few observations from my time here in Ghana.Yesterday, I visited a major harbor and spoke with community members about efforts to protect the fisheries industry that supports their livelihoods and provides a vital source of food.  Unfortunately, like in many places around the world, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is threatening the sustainability of fisheries there – and I’d say we’re proud to be working with Ghana on efforts to combat IUU fishing, as well as the crimes often associated with it.Today, I will meet with partners in the Ghanaian Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation and the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development.  I will also speak to students at the University of Ghana, where we have supported important work that monitors air quality.Ghana is a great example of environmental ambition, and I’d like to take a moment to talk about several of the environmental projects we are working on here in Ghana.Ghana&#8217;s commitment to forest conservation is translating into tangible outcomes, with initiatives like the LEAF Coalition and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, a coalition of 32 governments working to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030.  Under LEAF, the Emissions Reduction Payment Agreement will make up 50 – or up to 50 million available for Ghana&#8217;s efforts to protect forests and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.Ghana also has shown strong leadership as co-chair with the United States of the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership, a global coalition working to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030 while delivering sustainable development and inclusive rural transformation.  The United States was a key partner on the “Resilient Ghana” country package announced at COP28 to help support Ghana’s forest and climate goals.The U.S. Agency for International Development is supporting access to clean energy in Ghana through initiatives like supporting smallholder farmers to install solar-powered irrigation.  In addition, USAID provided technical assistance to the Bui Power hydro-solar plant.  The plant, the first of its kind in West Africa, will put Ghana on track to cut its power sector greenhouse gas emissions by 235,000 tons per year.These are groundbreaking moves.Since 2018, we have worked with Ghana to address the health risks created by mercury use in artisanal small-scale gold mining.  Similar projects are in motion in Mali, the DRC, Guinea, Senegal, and Burkina Faso – a collaborative effort that’s evolving and adapting.Journalists like you play a key role in exposing crimes like illegal logging and wildlife trade.  Last year, we inaugurated a program to train journalists in Ghana on how to report on nature crimes, and I am grateful to the 21 Ghanaian journalists who graduated from this program last December – oops, nope: September, if I’m corrected.  Right?I mentioned earlier my visit later today to the University of Ghana.  Since 2018, we’ve worked with experts at the university on projects related to air quality.  And just last month, they teamed up with colleagues at Columbia University to train 100 scientists, engineers, and policy makers from across West Africa on best practices for air quality management.  This is what it looks like to empower experts across a region to tackle air pollution.And of course, other countries across Africa are taking similar steps to protect nature and the health and livelihoods of all the people who depend on it.  I’m looking forward to discussions on a breadth of environmental topics of importance to the African continent in Nairobi, where I am headed next to lead the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Environmental Assembly.  Air quality will be a key focus for the United States at UNEA.  At that meeting, we will advocate for increased regional cooperation on air pollution.  Because, as we all know, air pollution doesn&#8217;t stop at international borders, so supporting collaboration across national borders is key to solving this problem.Now, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, or IUU fishing for short, is another challenge we’re actively working on with partners across the continent.  This is a critical issue in Africa, and the United States recognizes regions in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts of Africa as priority regions in the fight against IUU fishing activity.  In too many places, large foreign fishing fleets and some local bad actors are bringing in catches well above sustainable limits and are endangering the health of essential fish stocks and the livelihoods of those who rely on those stocks.  Through cooperative enforcement, information sharing, and working to implement the global Port State Measures Agreement, we have powerful tools to keep IUU-caught fish out of ports and markets, but more work, again, remains to be done.In partnership with our Department of Defense colleagues, last year 18 nations participated in the Obangame Express exercise to combat IUU fishing.  USAID is providing $17.8 million over five years to reduce fishing overcapacity and improve fisheries management in West Africa.  Now, it does so by working in small fishing villages and fish landing sites along the coasts.More broadly, we are also working with African countries through the new Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation that launched last fall.  The partnership is a platform for Atlantic coastal states to address common challenges and promote healthy, sustainable, and resilient Atlantic resources for generations to come.  It currently has 38 Atlantic member states.  Sixteen of those members are African countries, including Ghana.Next, I think I’d like to talk a little bit, if you’ll allow, about space.  Nigeria, Rwanda, Angola are all among the 35 countries around the world that have signed on to the Artemis Accords, committing to make the space environment safer and more predictable.  As African countries develop their space policy and capabilities, we also strongly encourage them to consider joining the Outer Space Treaty – the basis for international space law and for the Artemis Accords.Space exploration isn’t just for a select group of players; from our perspective, it’s for everyone willing to play fair.  And every country in the world, whether or not they have a space program, can reap benefits from space exploration and activity.  We already collaborate with African nations on multiple space-related issues like earth observation, helping to provide data to support decision making on forest conservation and water management.Now, back on Earth, we must make sure that all people – men and women, Indigenous people, and other marginalized communities – have a voice in our discussions and solutions.  These are the ones who have often felt the brunt of climate change and environmental degradation.  This means that the need to make sure that women have the same opportunities as their brothers to work in STEM fields – that is science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.  In the United States and around the world, barriers have made this difficult.  The only way to address the challenges of our time is through scientific discovery and innovation.  We want the best and the brightest working on these solutions, and that includes – it must include – women.OES is helping to build connections through our Embassy Science Fellows program to bring government scientists to serve at our overseas embassies.  Just in the past eight years, the State Department has built partnerships for 18 government scientists to work across West Africa, including two in Ghana.  As one example of this program, the State Department brought a U.S. expert on biotechnology to Accra to connect with Ghanaian companies on mentorship for young women on research in agricultural sciences.Now, as you can see, we have made a lot of progress by working collaboratively.  We are already making a difference, but we have, as I said earlier, so much work to do.  The United States will continue to be a steadfast partner to countries across Africa on environmental and scientific issues.  And of course, as President Biden said at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, “the United States is all in on Africa and all in with Africa.”I want to thank you, and I’m eagerly awaiting your questions.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question, since you raised IUU fishing:  “What is the – what is driving the growth of illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, and what are the consequences for biodiversity and for people?  What can we do about this problem?”  ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  Thank you.  That’s a really, really good question.  I think the way I’d answer that is by stating something that we all know, and that’s that global demand for seafood, as it continues to grow, there are more and bigger fishing vessels than ever before working to feed this market.  And as a result of that, we now see increased pressure on the fish stocks from fleets that fish around the world both on the high seas and in areas under national jurisdiction.  And of course, we know that the lucrative but competitive global fisheries market also spurs vessels to try to avoid the operational costs associated with sustainable fisheries management by engaging again in IUU fishing.  So fisheries subsidies can lead in many instances to overcapacity, overfishing, and artificially reduced prices.  And subsidies, I would say, and forced labor practices, perhaps, reduce the cost of fishing, making it cheaper for boats to be out on the water through support for operational or capital costs.  That’s how I would kind of frame the initial part of what’s driving this.Now, in terms of the consequences, I think we’ve all seen them and experienced them in some level.  Maybe I’d say that the 2019 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity Ecosystem Services – it’s a mouthful, but it’s important – this report on global biodiversity concluded that fishing has had the greatest impact on marine biodiversity in the past 50 years, which is exacerbated by IUU fishing.  So IUU fishing can result in overfishing, which damages ocean biodiversity, and additionally, the use of prohibited gear can result in bycatch of non-target species, causing yet even greater harm to biodiversity.So IUU fishing may also degrade, I would say, marine ecosystems such as corals and sea mounds with negative consequences for the marine species that depend on these habitats.  So we can see from that a range of challenges that emerge.  And in terms of – I think you – if I heard the question correctly, you asked in addition to the consequences.  I would also flag one other thing, or two, perhaps – because, again, I mentioned that the consequences are quite vast.  IUU fishing costs the world about tens of billions of dollars each year, and according to a recent report that I have reviewed from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, IUU fishing may in fact represent up to 26 million tons of fish caught annually.  And in the United States alone, that could translate into seafood imports worth as much as two and a half billion a year, or – if we translated that – nearly 11 percent of the U.S. market derived from IUU fishing, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission report.  Now, as both a major harvester and a top market for fishing products, the United States has, I would say, long emphasized working with other countries to improve fisheries governance and enforcement to prevent IUU-sourced fish and fish products from entering our markets, and I know that that is the same for markets around the globe.  So that gets at, I think, the consequences.  If we talk about consequences, then I suspect that it’s really important that we also talk about some of the tools that are associated with that.  At least I’d like to flag a few that we’re noticing that we are using to combat this around the world.So speaking from the U.S. perspective, the United States is a leader in promoting sustainable fisheries internationally through effective, science-based fisheries management and cooperative tools to combat IUU fishing, including strong monitoring, control, and surveillance measures.  Now, the United States promotes the implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement, a groundbreaking treaty designed to ensure catches from IUU fishing vessels cannot be offloaded in ports and then, of course, enter the global market.  Now, one other thing we did is we also helped launch, through the FAO, the Global Record of Fishing Vessels – it’s Refrigerated Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels.  This innovative, publicly accessible record of the world’s fishing vessels increases transparency in international fisheries and enhances the ability of countries and markets to verify fishing’s identity.  I suppose for that I’ll stop and I – and there may be additional questions, but I did want to give you a sense of the breadth and depth of the tools that we have at our disposal, the consequences of not acting, and, of course, a little bit about what it is.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question is from Ms. Sarah Mawerere of the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, in Uganda.  Her question is:  “Kaveera – or polythene bags – control has become a nightmare in Uganda.  What is your take on this?”ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  So plastic pollution is just a scourge on society, period.  And we applaud Uganda for its work to combat plastic pollution, and I believe it’s been since 2009, if I recall correctly, and we also recognize that it takes time to create the momentum among a range of stakeholders from really private sector, civil society, and subnational governments for successful implementation of those actions.  So we would want to work with Uganda and other countries to end plastic pollution, which will require action throughout the lifecycle of plastic, from upstream to downstream.  And of course, this is why we’re advocating for a new global agreement on plastic pollution that would encourage and support local and national efforts like Uganda’s to reduce plastic bags entering into the environment.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes from Mr. Emmanuel Igunza of the Associated Press/Freelance, in Kenya.  He asks:  “How can the U.S. lead global commitments for climate financing for the least polluters, but who are really bearing brunt of the climate crisis?”ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  Okay.  So this is what I think is an excellent question.  I’ll start there.  And I would say on this, Kenya is one of the United States’ strongest partners in Africa, and we appreciate that Kenya has joined on to the multilateral climate initiatives like, I would say, the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate – AIM4C – and the global pathways to net zero.  We know that Kenya is already experiencing, like others, firsthand the impact of climate change and is dealing with significant food security challenges brought on by severe drought, in the larger, I’d say, Horn of Africa region – across the region.  And so from the U.S. perspective, we have committed $2 billion in humanitarian assistance to respond to the drought in the Horn of Africa.  This would include about $356 million, if I have my numbers correct, specifically for Kenya in the past year.  We also allocated $45 million, including $20 million in supplemental funding, and this was funding development assistance to help Kenya address the current food security crisis in I believe it was Fiscal Year 2022.  I’d have to double-check, but I believe that’s correct. MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’re going to take a question from the Q&amp;A next, also from Sarah Mawerere of the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, in Uganda.  She asks:  “Ugandans are breathing badly due to air pollution, which causes respiratory diseases.  How would you advise Uganda as a country?” ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  First I’d say that that is a very accurate and a very timely question.  Air pollution more broadly is the fourth leading cause of premature death worldwide, and it’s responsible for nearly 7 million premature deaths, about $5 trillion in economic welfare losses, and $200 billion in productivity losses each year.  And I’d also add that transboundary air pollution cannot be addressed without international cooperation and policy coordination.  We are looking for – at least on the U.S. side, we’re looking for opportunities to get countries talking to each other about air pollution.  And frankly, every time I have a conversation with colleagues, they share our view on this.  It is a critical issue, and one of the critical issues of our time.  And one of the things that we’ve done about this is the United States has proposed an air quality resolution for UNEA-6 and submitted the zero draft on I believe it was December 18th.  And our goal is to elevate the need to address air pollution due to the risks to human health and the environment and leverage the expertise in existing regional bodies that take a regional cooperation approach to addressing air pollution.So that’s what I would say on that, and I hope that’s helpful.  MODERATOR:  Thanks for that.  We have time for one last question.  The last question goes to Mr. Pedro Alonso of the Spanish News Agency EFE, in Kenya.  He asks:  “What will the U.S. advocate for in the United Nations Environment Assembly 6?”ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  Well, again, a wonderful question because it allows me to emphasize what I think is a key point.  Just as I had mentioned in the last comment, air quality is going to be one of the primary objectives.  Again, we know air pollution is the leading environmental risk to human health, as I mentioned, and that is why we’re introducing a resolution on air quality.  This resolution, again, aims to leverage expertise in existing regional cooperation bodies for addressing air pollution, and build on UNEA resolutions 1/7 and 3/8.  And the goal is to re-energize the intention of these prior resolutions and to provide a platform to operationalize and drive multi-stakeholder actions that target the causes of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.  So those – that’s one of the key overarching objectives.  And frankly, another area that we will focus on will be nature crimes.  And we’ll be launching something called the Nature Crime Alliance at UNEA, which I think will be something that we hope that you all will follow quite closely going forward.  I’m told my time is wrapping up, and so I will stop there. MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  Acting Assistant Secretary J.R. Littlejohn, do you have any final words before we close?  ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY LITTLEJOHN:  I just want to thank everyone for joining this call.  These are critical issues.  And I mentioned sort of the triple threat of the crises of biodiversity loss, pollution, and climate change, and it is so important that these stories are told – that the narratives get out there with accuracy, based on the science.  And we need you to help do that.  And so I thank you very much for joining this call.  I thank you for asking really, really sharp questions, and I look forward to hearing or reading your stories.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That concludes today’s briefing.  I want to thank the U.S. Department of State’s Acting Assistant Secretary for Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, J.R. Littlejohn, for joining us today.  Thank you to all the journalists for participating.  A recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  I would also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you.# # #
- FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs Benefiting Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda Bureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationBasic InformationFunding Opportunity Number: DFOP0008371Assistance Listings (CFDA) number: 19.517 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for AfricaAnnouncement issuance date: Monday, February 12, 2024Announcement type: Cooperative AgreementProposal application submission deadline: Thursday, March 28, 2024, at 11:59:59 p.m. (23:59:59) EDT. Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Anticipated timeframe to award for selected proposals: Pending the availability of funds, PRM anticipates, but makes no guarantee, that awards will be made less than six months from the proposal submission deadline.Advisory: All applicants must submit proposal application packages through the website Grants.gov. PRM strongly recommends submitting your application packages early to allow time to address any technical difficulties that may arise on the Grants.gov website.If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher.PRM strongly recommends application narratives be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations when transmitted. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents. Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the concept note’ score. All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Organizations can retrieve PRM’s-recommended templates and NGO guidelines on PRM’s website and in this opportunity’s grants.gov page.Program DescriptionSummaryThis announcement is designed to accompany PRM’s General NGO Guidelines, which contain additional information on PRM’s priorities and NGO funding strategy with which selected organizations must comply. Please use both the General NGO Guidelines and this announcement to ensure that your submission is in full compliance with PRM requirements and that the proposed activities are in line with PRM’s priorities. Submissions that do not reflect the requirements outlined in these guidelines will not be considered.Geographic Regions / PopulationsProposed activities must primarily support refugees and asylum seekers in Rwanda, Tanzania, or Uganda. Because of PRM&#8217;s mandate to provide protection, assistance, and sustainable solutions for refugees and victims of conflict, PRM will consider funding only those programs that include a target program participant base of at least 50 percent refugees/asylum seekers.Program areaProposals must align with one or more of the following program areas.Humanitarian Protection and AssistanceInterim and Durable SolutionsProgram Sectors and ModalitiesProposals must focus on one or more of the programmatic sectors listed in the country-specific guidance below (see PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for sector descriptions).Note: In order to ensure greater accountability for protection outcomes in all overseas assistance program proposals, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector. If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Note: Cash and Voucher Assistance programs must include the relevant indicator(s) from the selection contained in the NGO Guidelines Appendix D.Number of Proposal ApplicationsOrganizations may submit a maximum of one application per country only. Any subsequent submissions received will be disqualified. (Note: Submissions by organizations as part of a consortium do not count toward an individual organization’s submission limit.)Country-specific GuidelinesRwanda Country-Specific GuidanceGeneral GuidanceProposals should explain how they align with UNHCR’s 2024 Strategic Vision in Rwanda, including the shift from a humanitarian approach to a developmental focus in the refugee response. We expect applicants to coordinate with UNHCR in planning, implementation, and reporting within the overall Rwanda Refugee Response Plan framework and respective sectors. PRM seeks to support programming oriented towards refugees likely to remain in Rwanda, rather than repatriation activities. Applicants should submit a letter of support from UNHCR for their proposal. Applications without a letter of support may have their panel review score impacted. Proposals must focus on one or more of the following sectors:Protection (Child Protection or GBV)HealthLivelihoods using the Graduation Approach (full proposals must include a market analysis, or will be disqualified)Duration of ActivityProgram plans for two or three years will be considered.Period of PerformancePrograms period of performance of one-year (12 months) cycles for a period not to exceed three years (36 months) will be considered.Funding limitsProgram proposals must not be less than the funding floor and not more than the funding ceiling per year or they will be disqualified.Funding floor per year (lowest $ value): $800,000Funding ceiling per year (highest $ value): $3,000,000Note: Funding ceilings and floors pertain to the PRM cost per year.Anticipated Number of AwardsThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined once final FY 2024 appropriations have been made.  This NOFO will be cancelled if FY2024 appropriations are insufficient to support new awards.Anticipated Amount to be Awarded TotalThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined as part of the application review process based on applications received and funding made available through appropriations.Tanzania Country-Specific GuidanceGeneral GuidanceProposals must focus on the Congolese and Burundian refugee and asylum seeker populations located in camp-based settings in Tanzania. We encourage proposals to demonstrate how the program will support Burundian refugees participating in UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program, such as providing services that will help refugees reintegrate upon return. We expect applicants to coordinate with UNHCR when planning, implementing, and reporting on its programs. Applicants should submit a letter of support from UNHCR for their proposal. Applications without a letter of support may have their panel review score impacted. Proposals must focus on the following sectors in the refugee camps:HealthChild ProtectionEducationDuration of ActivityProgram plans for one or two years will be considered.Period of PerformancePrograms period of performance of one-year (12 months) cycles for a period not to exceed three years (24 months) will be considered.Funding limitsProgram proposals must not be less than the funding floor and not more than the funding ceiling per year or they will be disqualified.Funding floor per year (lowest $ value): $600,000Funding ceiling per year (highest $ value): $1,750,000Note: Funding ceilings and floors pertain to the PRM cost per year.Anticipated Number of AwardsThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined once final FY 2024 appropriations have been made.  This NOFO will be cancelled if FY2024 appropriations are insufficient to support new awards.Anticipated Amount to be Awarded TotalThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined as part of the application review process based on applications received and funding made available through appropriations.Uganda Country-Specific GuidanceGeneral GuidanceProposed activities must explain how they align with Uganda’s Global Refugee Forum pledges and UNHCR’s 2024 Strategy. We expect applicants to coordinate with UNHCR in planning, implementation, and reporting within the overall Uganda Refugee Response Plan framework and respective sectors. Applicants should submit a letter of support from UNHCR for their proposal. Applications without a letter of support may have their panel review score impacted. All proposals must have a clearly defined localization plan that includes at least one of the following: 1) a transition plan with national or local-level government entities, 2) a local or refugee organization as a grantee or sub-grantee, or 3) an agreement to progressively strengthen the capacity of a local or refugee organization over the course of the award. Localization strategies must also demonstrate how they increase the project’s sustainability and the representation of local actors in Uganda’s broader refugee response. Proposals must focus on one or more of the following sectors:ProtectionProtection: LegalProtection: Child ProtectionProtection: GBVLivelihoods (full proposals must include a market analysis, or will be disqualified)Mental health and psychosocial supportCapacity Strengthening: Local/ Refugee-Led OrganizationsHealthDuration of ActivityProgram plans for two or three years will be considered.Period of PerformancePrograms period of performance of one-year (12 months) cycles for a period not to exceed three years (36 months) will be considered.Funding limitsProgram proposals must not be less than the funding floor and not more than the funding ceiling per year or they will be disqualified.Funding floor per year (lowest $ value): $1,000,000Funding ceiling per year (highest $ value): $3,250,000Note: Funding ceilings and floors pertain to the PRM cost per year.Anticipated Number of AwardsThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined once final FY 2024 appropriations have been made.  This NOFO will be cancelled if FY2024 appropriations are insufficient to support new awards.Anticipated Amount to be Awarded TotalThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined as part of the application review process based on applications received and funding made available through appropriations.Federal Award InformationProposed program start dates: July 1, 2024 – September 15, 2024Duration of Activity: See country-specific guidelines above. Applicants may submit multi-year proposals with activities and budgets that do not exceed three years from the proposed start date. Actual awards will not exceed three years in duration and activities and budgets submitted in year one can be revised/updated each year. Continued funding after the initial 12 month period of performance requires the submission of a noncompeting single proposal and will be contingent upon available funding, strong performance, and continuing need. In funding a program one year, PRM makes no representations that it will continue to fund the program in successive years and encourages applicants to seek a wide array of donors to ensure long-term funding possibilities. Please see Multi-Year Funding section below for additional information. Livelihoods programs are encouraged to be multi-year, and livelihoods proposals must include a market analysis or will be disqualified.Eligibility InformationEligible Applicants:Nonprofits having a 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (U.S.-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of non-profit tax status).Nonprofits without 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (overseas-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of registration in country of domicile); andInternational Organizations. International multilateral organizations, such as United Nations agencies, should not submit proposals through Grants.gov in response to this NOFO. Multilateral organizations that are seeking funding for programs relevant to this announcement should contact the PRM Program Officer (as listed below) on or before the closing date of the funding announcement.Cost Sharing or Matching: Cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not a requirement of an application in response to this funding announcement.Proposals for consideration should describe the sources and amounts of additional funding that may be utilized to complement PRM funding, and meet the following criteria:Are not paid by the Federal Government under another Federal award.Are verifiable from the non-Federal entity&#8217;s records.Are not included as contributions for any other Federal award; andAre necessary and reasonable for accomplishment of project or program objectives.Please include this information in the Budget Summary, Budget Detail, and Budget Narrative of the proposal, and separated from the PRM share of the proposed budget.Note: Though favorably looked upon, inclusion will not result in a competitive ranking increase when evaluated.OtherProposals must have a concrete implementation plan with well-conceived objectives and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and reliable, time-bound, and trackable (SMART), and have established baselines; objectives should be clearly linked to the sectors.Proposals must adhere to relevant international standards for humanitarian assistance, especially Sphere Standards. See PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for a complete list of sector-specific standards including guidance on proposals for programs in urban areas.PRM strongly encourages programs that target the needs of vulnerable and underserved groups among the program participant population (such groups may include women; children; adolescents; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals; older persons; the sick; persons with disabilities; and members of minority communities) and can demonstrate what steps have been taken to meet the specific and unique protection and assistance needs of these vulnerable groups effectively.PRM will accept proposals from any NGO working in the above-mentioned sectors although, given budgetary constraints, priority will be given to proposals from organizations that can demonstrate:a working relationship with UNHCR.a proven track record in providing proposed assistance both in the sector and specified location.evidence of coordination with international organizations (IOs) and other NGOs working in the same area or sector as well as – where possible – local authorities.an emphasis on the outcome or impact of program activities.a strong sustainability plan, involving local capacity building, where feasible.where applicable, adherence to PRM’s Principles for Refugee Protection in Urban Areas; andan understanding of and sensitivity to conflict dynamics in the program location.Application and Submission InstructionsWhere to Request Application Package: Application packages may be downloaded from the website www.Grants.gov.Consortia: Organizations may apply to this call as part of a consortia; however, for consortia, one organization must be designated as the lead applicant.For purposes of consortia applying for PRM funding, PRM’s considers consortium to be a group of no less than three NGOs that comprise an agreement, combination, or group formed to undertake, or proposing to undertake, an assistance activity beyond the resources of any one member. PRM may request to review and approve of substantive provisions of proposed sub-awards. Applicants may form consortia in order to bring together organizations with varied expertise to propose a comprehensive program in one proposal. The consortium arrangement may allow for greater geographic coverage, inclusion of technical and sectoral strengths from multiple organizations, increased inclusion of local and national organizations, and/or the potential of much greater impact through collaboration.Submissions by organizations as part of a consortium do not count toward an organization’s individual submission limit. If the applicant is applying as a consortium, a description of how the consortia will be organized and how lines of authority and decision-making will be managed across all team members and between the lead applicant and associate awardees should be included in the concept note. The prime applicant would be responsible for overall implementation of the proposed program activities, preparation/presentation of annual work plans, M&amp;E planning, and required reporting to PRM. The prime applicant should designate a single individual to be the liaison with PRM, although PRM would reserve the right to communicate with sub-grantees.Content and Form of Application: Organizations may submit a maximum of one (1) proposal per country only. Any subsequent submissions received will be disqualified. PRM strongly recommends using the proposal and budget templates that are available on PRM’s website.Single-Year Proposals:Single-year program proposal page limits: Single-year proposals using PRM’s templates must not exceed 15 pages in length (Times New Roman or Calibri 12-point font, letter sized paper, one-inch margins on all sides). If the applicant does not use PRM’s recommended templates, proposals must not exceed 10 pages in length. Organizations may choose to attach work plans, activity calendars, and/or logical frameworks as addendums/appendices to the proposal but are not required to do so. These attachments do not count toward the page limit total; however, annexes cannot be relied upon as a key source of program information. The proposal narrative must be able to stand on its own in the application process. For multi-year funding application instructions, see below.PRM strongly recommends application narrative be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents.Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the proposal’s score.All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Multi-Year Proposals:Applicants proposing multi-year programs should adhere to the following guidance: Applicants may submit proposals that include multi-year strategies presented in one-year (12 month) cycles for a period not to exceed three years (36 months) from the proposed start date as outlined in the country-specific guidance sections. Fully developed programs with detailed budgets, objectives and indicators are required for each year of activities. Applicants should use PRM’s recommended multi-year proposal template for the first year of a multi-year application.Multi-year funding applicants may use PRM’s budget templates, and must disaggregate budget by year, per year, and for each program year. Multi-year proposal narratives and budgets can be updated yearly upon submission of new noncompeting single year proposal narrative template with an updated budget.Multi-year program proposal page limits: multi-year proposals using PRM’s multi-year template must not exceed 17 pages in length (Times New Roman or Calibri 12-point font, letter sized paper, one-inch margins on all sides). If the applicant does not use PRM’s recommended templates, proposals must not exceed 15 pages in length. Organizations may choose to attach work plans, activity calendars, and/or logical frameworks as addendums/appendices to the proposal but are not required to do so. These attachments do not count toward the page limit total however annexes cannot be relied upon as a key source of program information. The proposal narrative must be able to stand on its own in the application process.PRM strongly recommends application narratives be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents.Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the proposal’s score.All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Multi-year applications selected for funding by PRM will be funded in one-year (12-month) increments based on the proposal submitted in the initial application as approved by PRM. Continued funding after the initial 12-month award requires the submission of a noncompeting single-year proposal narrative and will be contingent upon available funding, strong performance, and continuing need. Follow-on applications are submitted annually for years two through three of proposals through non-competed directed announcements for the continuation funding. It is strongly recommended that NGOs submit as early as possible after the directed announcement for continuation funding has been issued. Late submissions will jeopardize continued funding.In the proposal narrative, please include an explanation of why multi-year funding may be necessary for this program to succeed, how longer periods of consultation with program participant populations will inform programming and enable interventions to be studied and improved, and how the proposed activities in year one will contribute to outcomes and impacts in years two and three. Please, articulate and quantify cost efficiencies that could not otherwise be attained through single year programs as well.Application PackageTo be considered for PRM funding, organizations must submit a complete application package, including:Proposal Narrative not exceeding stated page limits.Indicator Table: Including all required PRM indicators and targets for each year (if multi-year).Cash and voucher assistances (CVA) modality must report on CVA indicatorsCompleted Budget table including summary and detail tabsdisaggregated by year and for each year of the program period (for multi-year proposals).Include total costs by objective and estimated costs by sector,Total costs divided by country (if applicable)Budget Narrative disaggregated by year and for each year of the program period.Completed and signed SF-424 andSF-424A. PRM requires that Box 21 of the SF-424 be checked.If the applicant organization has an active registration in SAM.gov that was either created or updated on or after February 2, 2019, then the applicant does NOT need to submit the SF-424B as they will be prompted to complete the representations and certifications in SAM.gov.Risk Assessment and Security Plan.Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Code of Conduct and a country or regional implementation plan specific to the country of region of the application. Note: Codes of Conduct must be consistent with the updated 2019 IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles. The country/regional implementation plan should outline how employees are trained and otherwise made aware of the Code of Conduct, how violations of the Code of Conduct against program participants are reported and followed up on in a safe and confidential manner, how program participants are made aware of the Code of Conduct and a mechanism to report any violations, and whether there is a focal point in the country or regional office for the Code of Conduct.Key Personnel for award applicant and sub-recipient(s)Applicants must furnish names, titles, and brief biographical information on the education and experience of key personnel in implementing the program and key supervisory personnel; (i.e., the members of the professional staff in a program supervisory position engaged for or assigned to duties under the award).A Market Analysis and a Participant Competency/Capacity Assessment for all proposals that include at least one livelihoods sector objective (or will be disqualified), if applicable. Please see the General NGO Guidelines for more details.Most recent Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA), if applicable, or a de minimis rate calculation of Modified Total Direct Costs (MTDC) if the applicant is eligible and elects to use the de minimis rate.Most recent external audit report is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation.Information in support of any cost-sharing/cost-matching arrangements, if applicable.Information detailing the source of any in-kind contributions, if applicable.Details on any sub-agreements associated with the program including the budget detail (must be part of the budget submission as noted above), if applicable.Organizational Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) Framework (is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation)Additionally, organizations must consider the following considerations as part of their proposal package:To be considered a competitive proposal, the Proposal Narrative, Indicator Table, and Budget Detail should include the following information:Focus on outcome or impact indicators as much as possible. At a minimum, each objective should have one outcome or impact indicator.Include specific information on locations of programs and participants (GPS coordinates highly recommended) to increase PRM’s ability to track the impact of PRM funding.Outline how the NGO will acknowledge PRM funding. If an organization believes that publicly acknowledging the receipt of USG funding for a particular PRM-funded program could potentially endanger the lives of the program participants and/or the organization staff, invite suspicion about the organization&#8217;s motives, or alienate the organization from the population it is trying to help, it must provide a brief explanation in its proposal as to why it should be exempted from this requirement.PRM expects each proposal, regardless of sector, to demonstrate protection mainstreaming, including by identifying potential protection risks associated with the program and how they will be mitigated. Assistance activities should mainstream protection by analyzing the protection risks in relation to each specific programming sector. An analysis of the risks should inform how assistance is designed to minimize them and maximize protection of program participants. Applicants may introduce gender-specific risks in this section but should provide a full analysis in the gender analysis.PRM partners must complete a gender analysis in the proposal narrative that briefly explains:Experiences of men, women, boys, and girls with a focus on the different familial roles, community privileges, and gender dynamics within the target population;Associated risks and threats experienced by women, girls, and other vulnerable populations based on their gender;Power imbalances and needs that arise based on gender inequalities that exist within the family or community; andProposed responses that will address the above and mitigate any gender differences in access, participation, or decision-making that may be experienced by at-risk groups, particularly women and girls. The gender analysis should aim to specify and target specific at-risk sub-populations of women and girls, such as women and girl heads of households, out-of-school girls, women and girls with disabilities, women and girl survivors of violence, married girls, adolescent mothers, as well as people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+), and those who are often unaware of and excluded from programs and services and who may be the hardest to reach based on their gender.The budget should include a specific breakdown of funds being provided by UNHCR, other USG agencies, other donors, and your own organization.Applicants whose proposals address gender-based violence (GBV) through their programs must estimate the total cost of these activities as a separate line item in their proposed budgets (see PRM’s budget template). Proposals and budgets must include details of any sub-agreements associated with the programs.For consortia only, a description of how the partnership will be organized and how lines of authority and decision-making will be managed across all team members and between the lead applicant and associate awardees should be included in the proposal.Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and System for Award Management (SAM)Note: On April 4, 2022, the formerly used DUNS Number was replaced by the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) UEI. For more information on the process, visit GSA&#8217;s website on the UEI transition.Each applicant is required to:be registered in SAM before submitting its application.provide a valid UEI number in its application; andcontinue to maintain an active SAM registration with current information at all times during which it has an active PRM award or an application or plan under consideration by PRM.No federal award may be made to an applicant until the applicant has complied with all applicable UEI and SAM requirements and, if an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements by the time the PRM award is ready to be made, PRM may determine that the applicant is not qualified to receive a PRM award and use that determination as a basis for making a PRM award to another applicant.Applications must be submitted via Grants.gov. Grants.gov registration requires a UEI number and active SAM.gov registration. If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher. Applicants may also refer to the “For Applicants” page on Grants.gov for complete details on requirements.Do not wait until the deadline to attempt to submit your application on Grants.gov. Organizations not registered with Grants.gov should register well in advance of the deadline as it can take several weeks to finalize registration (sometimes longer for non-U.S. based NGOs to receive required registration numbers). We also recommend that organizations, particularly first-time applicants, submit applications via Grants.gov no later than one week before the deadline to avoid last-minute technical difficulties that could result in an application not being considered. PRM has extremely limited ability to correct or facilitate rapid resolution to technical difficulties associated with Grants.gov, SAM.gov or UEI number issues. PRM partners must maintain an active SAM.gov registration with current and correct information at all times during which they have an active federal award or an application under consideration by PRM or any federal agency.When registering with Grants.gov, organizations must designate points of contact and Authorized Organization Representatives (AORs). Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their sam.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online to seek guidance on how to do so. Applicants experiencing technical difficulties with the SAM.gov registration process should contact the Federal Service Desk online or at 1-866-606-8220 (U.S.) and 1-334-206-7828 (International).Applications must be submitted under the authority of the Authorized Organization Representative at the applicant organization. Having proposals submitted by agency headquarters helps to avoid possible technical problems.If you encounter technical difficulties with Grants.gov please contact the Grants.gov Help Desk at support@grants.gov or by calling 1-800-518-4726.Applicants who are unable to submit applications via Grants.gov due to Grants.gov technical difficulties andwho have reported the problem to the Grants.gov help desk.received a case number.have completed UEI and SAM.gov registrations.and had a documented service request opened to research the problem.Applicants may contact the PRM NGO Coordinator before the submission deadline to determine whether an alternative method of submission is appropriate. However, PRM makes no guarantee to accept an application outside of the grants.gov system.It is the responsibility of each applicant to ensure the appropriate registrations are in place and active. Failure to have the appropriate organizational registrations in place or are experiencing issues resulting from discrepancies across registration platforms is not considered a technical difficulty and is not justification for an alternate means of submission.In accordance with 2 CFR §200.113, Mandatory disclosures, the non-Federal entity or applicant for a federal award must disclose, in a timely manner, in writing to the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity all violations of Federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award. Non-Federal entities that have received a federal award including the term and condition outlined in Appendix XII—Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters are required to report certain civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings to SAM. Failure to make required disclosures can result in any of the remedies described in 2 CFR §200.338 Remedies for noncompliance, including suspension or debarment. (See also 2 CFR part 180, 31 U.S.C. 3321, and 41 U.S.C. 2313.)Submission Dates and TimesAnnouncement issuance date: Monday, February 12, 2024Proposal submission deadline: Thursday, March 28, 2024, at 11:59:59 p.m. (23:59:59) EDT. Applications submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Intergovernmental Review: Not ApplicableFunding Restrictions: Federal awards will not allow reimbursement of Federal Award costs without prior authorization by PRM.Other Submission RequirementsBranding and Marking StrategyThe following provisions will be included whenever assistance is awarded:The Recipient shall recognize the U.S. Government’s funding for activities specified under this award at the project site with a graphic of the U.S. flag accompanied by one of the following two phrases based on the level of funding for the award:Fully funded by the award: “Gift of the United States Government”Partially funded by the award: “Funding provided by the United States Government”PRM highly encourages recognition of U.S. Government funding on social media and website platforms to be included in proposals branding and marking strategy. Recipients should tag PRM’s Twitter account @StatePRM and/or Facebook account @State.PRM (rather than using hashtags). Additionally, the applicable U.S. Embassy should be tagged as well.Updates of actions taken to fulfill this requirement must be included in quarterly program reports to PRM.All programs, projects, assistance, activities, and public communications to foreign audiences, partially or fully funded by the Department, must be marked appropriately overseas with the standard U.S. flag in a size and prominence equal to (or greater than) any other logo or identity. The requirement does not apply to the Recipient’s own corporate communications or in the United States.The Recipient must appropriately ensure that all publicity and promotional materials underscore the sponsorship by or partnership with the U.S. Government or the U.S. Embassy. The Recipient may continue to use existing logos or project materials; however, a standard rectangular U.S. flag must be used in conjunction with such logos.Do not use the Department of State seal without the express written approval from PRM.Sub non-Federal entities (sub-awardees) and subsequent tier sub-award agreements are subject to the marking requirements and the non-Federal entity shall include a provision in the sub non-Federal entity agreement indicating that the standard, rectangular U.S. flag is a requirement. Exemptions from this requirement may be allowable but must be agreed to in writing by the Grants Officer. (Note: An exemption refers to the complete or partial cessation of branding, not use of alternative branding). Requests should be initiated with the Grants Officer and Grants Officer Representative. Waivers issued are applied only to the exemptions requested through the Recipient’s proposal for funding and any subsequent negotiated revisions.In the event the non-Federal entity does not comply with the marking requirements as established in the approved assistance agreement, the Grants Officer Representative and the Grants Officer must initiate corrective action with the non-Federal entity.PRM Standardized Indicators: Partners must refer to PRM’s indicator list in Appendix D of the NGO Guidelines and include any mandatory and required indicators as part of the application. PRM has two categories of indicators:Required: Indicators marked as “required” in Appendix D must be included in the proposal as applicable. Each sector and sub-sector has at least one required PRM indicator; these must be included in the indicator table if the partner is proposing any activities or budget for that sector/sub-sector. In addition, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector.  If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Recommended if applicable: Partners may consider using these indicators to monitor any related activities as they are aligned with humanitarian standards and best practices. However, inclusion of recommended indicators is not mandatory and will not affect the proposal scoring. Please note that in rare cases PRM may request for a partner to use a particular recommended indicator if there is a strong technical/thematic need to track information on that indicator, or if a similar custom indicator was proposed by the partner.Application Review and Selection ProcessApplication Review ProcessPRM is committed to ensuring a competitive and standardized process for awarding funding. Applications will be screened initially in a Technical Eligibility Review stage to determine whether applicants meet the eligibility requirements and have submitted all required documents. Applications that do not meet these requirements will not advance beyond the Technical Eligibility Review stage and will be deemed ineligible for funding under this NOFO.PRM reserves the right to have all applications deemed to be technically eligible undergo a Subject Matter Expert (SME) review prior to the Merit Review Panel to determine whether an application is responsive to the information in this NOFO.All applications that proceed to the Merit Review Panel will be evaluated by a panel of at least three people based on the below-referenced programmatic criteria and PRM priorities in the context of available funding. Department of State review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed program, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award. To ensure effective use of limited PRM funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and program activities.Application Evaluation CriteriaEligible submissions will be those that comply with the criteria and requirements included in this announcement. In addition, the Merit Review Panel will evaluate the proposals based on the following criteria:Gap/Analysis (10)Profile of Target Population (5)Program Description (25)Objectives &amp; Indicators (10)Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Plan (10)Accountability to Affected Populations (5)(Note: The AAP section of a NOFO proposal narrative is specific to the program being proposed, is the criterion listed above being evaluated, and is distinct from the organization-level AAP framework.)Coordination (5)Sustainability and Capacity-Building (5)Management and Past Performance (5)Risk Management (10)Budget/Budget Narrative (10 points)Prior to making a Federal award with a total amount of Federal share greater than the simplified acquisition threshold, PRM is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is in the U.S. government designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (see 41 U.S.C. 2313);An applicant, at its option, may review and comment on any information about itself that a Federal awarding agency previously entered. Currently, federal agencies create integrity records in the integrity module of the Contractor Performance Assessment and Reporting System (CPARS) and these records are visible as responsibility/qualification records in SAM.gov;The Federal awarding agency will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under Federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in §200.206 Federal awarding agency review of risk posed by applicants.Federal Award Administration InformationFederal Award AdministrationA successful applicant can expect to receive a separate notice from PRM stating that an application has been selected before PRM actually makes the federal award. That notice is not an authorization to begin performance. Only the notice of award signed by the Grants Officer is the authorizing document. Unsuccessful applicants will be notified following completion of the selection and award process.Administrative and National Policy Requirements.PRM awards are made consistent with the following provisions in the following order of precedence: (a) applicable laws and statutes of the United States, including any specific legislative provisions mandated in the statutory authority for the award; (b) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); (c) Department of State Standard Terms and Conditions of the award; (d) the award’s specific requirements; and (e) other documents and attachments to the award.ReportingSuccessful applicants will be required to submit:Program Reports: PRM requires program reports describing and analyzing the results of activities undertaken during the validity period of the agreement. A program report is required within thirty (30) days following the end of each three-month period of performance during the validity period of the agreement. The final program report is due one hundred and twenty (120) days following the end of the agreement. The submission dates for program reports will be written into the cooperative agreement. Partners receiving multi-year awards should follow this same reporting schedule and should still submit a final program report at the end of each year that summarizes the NGO’s performance during the previous year.The Bureau suggests that NGOs receiving PRM funding use the PRM recommended quarterly program report template and annual/final report template. The suggested PRM NGO reporting templates are designed to ease the reporting requirements while ensuring that all required elements are addressed.Financial Reports: Financial reports are required within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar year quarter during the validity period of the agreement (January 30th, April 30th, July 30th, October 30th). The final financial report covering the entire period of the agreement is required within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the expiration date of the agreement. For agreements containing indirect costs, final financial reports are due within sixty (60) days of the finalization of the applicable negotiated indirect cost rate agreement (NICRA).Reports reflecting expenditures for the recipient’s overseas and United States offices should be completed in accordance with the Federal Financial Report (FFR SF-425) and submitted electronically in the Department of Health and Human Services’ Payment Management System (HHS/PMS) and in accordance with other award specific requirements. Detailed information pertaining to the Federal Financial Report including due dates, instruction manuals and access forms, is provided on the HHS/PMS website.Audit Reports: When a recipient-contracted audit is not required because the Federal award amount is less than the $750,000 threshold, the Department may determine that an audit must be performed, and the audit report must be submitted to the responsible grants office(r) for review, dissemination, and resolution as appropriate. The cost of audits required under this policy may be charged either as an allowable direct cost to the award or included in the organizations established indirect costs in the award’s detailed budget.PRM Points of ContactApplicants with technical questions related to this announcement should contact the PRM staff listed below prior to submission. Please note that responses to technical questions from PRM do not indicate a commitment to fund the program discussed.PRM Program Officer: Emily Gallagher, GallagherEE@state.gov, Washington, D.C.Regional Refugee Coordinator: Chris Jones, JonesCA@state.gov, Kampala, UgandaDisclaimerExternal websites linked above may not be supported or accessible by all web browsers. If you are unable to link to a referenced website, please try using a different browser or update to a more recent one. If you continue to experience difficulties to reach external resources, please contact PRM NGO Coordinator.Section 508Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794d), as amended by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, charges the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (US Access Board) with developing and promulgating standards address that access to information and communication technology (ICT) Accessibility Standards (36 CFR part 1194). Section 508 requires that when Federal agencies develop, procure, maintain, or use ICT. Federal employees with disabilities have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to the access and use by Federal employees who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. Section 508 also requires that individuals with disabilities, who are members of the public seeking information or services from a Federal agency, have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to that provided to the public who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. These standards are part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The complete text of the Section 508 Final Provisions can be accessed at https://www.access-board.gov/ict/.The Section 508 accessibility standards applicable to this contract or order are identified in the following paragraph. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense.The Section 508 standards applicable to this contract are: 1194.205 WCAG 2.0 Level A &amp; AA Success Criteria302 Functional Performance Criteria502 Inoperability with Assistive Technology504 Authoring Tools602 Support Documentation603 Support ServicesIn the event of a modification(s) to this contract or order, which adds new ICT supplies or services or revises the type of, or specifications for, supplies or services, the Contracting Officer may require that the contractor submit a completed Voluntary Product Accessibility Template (VPAT) 2.4 or greater, 508 revision (Rev 508) or another format approved by the Department, and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense. Information about VPAT can be accessed at the ITIC Website.If this is an Indefinite Delivery contract, a Blanket Purchase Agreement or a Basic Ordering Agreement, the task/delivery order requests that include ICT supplies or services will define the specifications and accessibility standards for the order. In those cases, the Contractor may be required to provide a completed VPAT and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards.
- Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hammer Travels to Uganda and Ethiopia																																		Media Note																														January 17, 2024																																							U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer will travel to Kampala and Addis Ababa January 17-24.&nbsp; In Kampala, Ambassador Hammer will attend the 42nd Extraordinary Summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Assembly Heads of State and Government, focused on the ongoing situation between Ethiopia and Somalia and on Sudan.&nbsp; The United States welcomes this IGAD diplomatic initiative and reiterates U.S. recognition of the Federal Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 1960 borders.&nbsp; On Sudan, Ambassador Hammer will continue to support ongoing regional and international efforts to end the conflict, press for unhindered humanitarian access, promote a democratic transition, and support justice and accountability for victims of the violence.In Ethiopia, Ambassador Hammer intends to meet with African Union officials to coordinate efforts on Sudan and other regional priorities.&nbsp; He will also discuss with Ethiopian officials the urgent need to continue implementing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on northern Ethiopia, including making progress on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and moving forward with a victim-centered transitional justice process.&nbsp; Ambassador Hammer will urge dialogue to address the political and security crises in the Amhara and Oromia regions, calling on all parties to protect civilians, refrain from incendiary rhetoric, and respect human rights.&nbsp;						Tags																													Africa																																							African Union																															Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																Democracy																																							Disarmament																															Ethiopia																																Human Rights																																							Humanitarian Aid																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																																																					Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance																															Somalia																																Sovereignty																															Sudan																								Uganda