highway

Motorcoach Collision With the Alexandria Avenue 

Bridge Overpass

George Washington Memorial Parkway 

Alexandria, Virginia

November 14, 2004

ACCIDENT REPORT

NTSB/HAR-06/04

Nati PB2007-916201 onal

Transportation

Safety Board

Highway Accident Report

Motorcoach Collision With the Alexandria Avenue 

Bridge Overpass

George Washington Memorial Parkway 

Alexandria, Virginia

November 14, 2004

NTSB/HAR-06/04

PB2007-916201 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7845A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted November 21, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Motorcoach Collision With the Alexandria Avenue Bridge 

Overpass, George Washington Memorial Parkway, Alexandria, Virginia, November 14, 2004. Highway 

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-06/04. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On November 14, 2004, about 9:30 a.m., eastern standard time, a 44-year-old bus driver 

departed the Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, operating a 2000 Prevost, 

58-passenger motorcoach owned by Eyre Bus Service, Inc., (Eyre) for an approximately 60-mile trip to 

Mount Vernon, Virginia. This vehicle was the second one of a two-bus team. About 10:40 a.m., the bus 

was traveling southbound in the right lane of the George Washington Memorial Parkway in Alexandria, 

Virginia, at an electronic control module–recorded speed of approximately 46 mph. Upon approaching the 

Alexandria Avenue bridge, the bus driver passed warning signs indicating that the bridge had a 10-foot, 2-

inch clearance in the right lane. The driver remained in the right lane and drove the 12-foot-high bus under 

the bridge, colliding with the underside and side of the overpass. At the time of the accident, the 13-foot, 

4-inch-high left lane was available to the bus, and the lead Eyre bus was in the left lane ahead of the 

accident bus. Witnesses and the bus driver himself reported that the bus driver was talking on a hands-free 

cellular telephone at the time of the accident. Of the 27 student passengers, 10 received minor injuries and 

1 sustained serious injuries. The bus driver and chaperone were uninjured. The bus’s roof was destroyed.

Major safety issues identified in this accident include low bridge clearance, cellular telephone use while 

driving, and collection of adequate cellular telephone accident data. As a result of this accident, the Safety 

Board makes recommendations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the 50 States and the 

District of Columbia, the American Bus Association, the United Motorcoach Association, the Community 

Transportation Association of America, the American Public Transportation Association, the National 

Association for Pupil Transportation, the National School Transportation Association, the National 

Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 

and the Amalgamated Transit Union. The Safety Board also reiterates Safety Recommendation H-03-09 to 

the 20 States that do not yet have driver distraction codes on their traffic accident investigation forms.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, 

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 

1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation 

safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its 

actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also 

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Records Management Division, CIO-40

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To 

purchase this publication, order report number PB2007-916201 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports 

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Preaccident Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Toxicology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Vehicle and Wreckage Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Evidence Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Speed Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Alexandria Avenue Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Existing Vertical Clearance Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Average Daily Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Recent Accident History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Motor Carrier Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Motor Carrier’s Cellular Telephone Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Permit Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Sleep/Awake History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Cellular Telephone Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bus Driver Interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Cellular Telephones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Previous Accident Investigation on Cellular Telephone 

Use and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Accident Investigations on the Alexandria Avenue Bridge’s 

Clearance and Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Actions Following the November 2004 Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Accident Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Alexandria Avenue Bridge’s Vertical Clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Cellular Telephone Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Cellular Telephone Accident Data Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Reiterated Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Previously Issued Recommendations Classified in This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators

ABA American Bus Association

ADT average daily traffic

ADTSEA American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association

APTA American Public Transportation Association

ATU Amalgamated Transit Union

BWI Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport

CDL commercial driver’s license

CDL manual Model Commercial Driver License Manual

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CTAA Community Transportation Association of America

DDEC ECM Detroit Diesel Electronic Control Module

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

ECM electronic control module

Eyre Eyre Bus Service, Inc.

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

GVWR gross vehicle weight rating

MUTCD Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

NAPT National Association for Pupil Transportation

NASDPTS National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation 

Services

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NPS National Park Service

NSTA National School Transportation Association

The Parkway George Washington Memorial Parkway

PCP phencyclidine

Teamsters International Brotherhood of Teamsters

UMA United Motorcoach Association

USPP United States Park Police
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On November 14, 2004, about 9:30 a.m., eastern standard time, a 44-year-old bus 

driver departed the Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, 

operating a 2000 Prevost, 58-passenger motorcoach for an approximately 60-mile trip to 

Mount Vernon, Virginia. Vehicle occupants were the bus driver, an adult chaperone, and 

27 high school students. This vehicle was the second one of a two-bus team traveling to 

Mount Vernon. The motor carrier, Eyre Bus Service, Inc., (Eyre) operates this route 

frequently, and the accident bus driver had driven this route on one previous occasion 9 

days earlier (November 5, 2004).

About 10:40 a.m., the bus was traveling southbound in the right lane of the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway in Alexandria, Virginia, at an electronic control module–

recorded speed of approximately 46 mph. As the bus approached the Alexandria Avenue 

bridge, the bus driver passed warning signs indicating that the bridge had a 10-foot, 2-inch 

clearance in the right lane. Nonetheless, the driver remained in the right lane and drove the 

12-foot-high bus under the bridge, colliding with the underside and side of the overpass. 

At the time of the accident, the 13-foot, 4-inch-high left lane was available to the bus, and 

the lead Eyre bus was in the left lane ahead of the accident bus. The accident bus came to 

a final stop in the right lane about 470 feet beyond the bridge. Witnesses and the bus driver 

himself reported that the bus driver was talking on a hands-free cellular telephone at the 

time of the accident.

Of the 27 student passengers, 10 received minor injuries and 1 sustained serious 

injuries. The bus driver and chaperone were uninjured. The bus’s roof was destroyed.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 

accident was the bus driver’s failure to notice and respond to posted low-clearance warning 

signs and to the bridge itself due to cognitive distraction resulting from conversing on a 

hands-free cellular telephone while driving. Contributing to the accident was the low vertical 

clearance of the bridge, which does not meet current National Park Service road standards or 

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials guidelines.

Major safety issues identified in this accident include low bridge clearance, 

cellular telephone use while driving, and collection of adequate cellular telephone 

accident data. As a result of this accident, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the 50 States and the District of Columbia, 

the American Bus Association, the United Motorcoach Association, the Community 

Transportation Association of America, the American Public Transportation Association, 

the National Association for Pupil Transportation, the National School Transportation 

Association, the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services, 

the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the Amalgamated Transit Union. The 

Safety Board also reiterates Safety Recommendation H-03-09 to the 20 States that do not 

yet have driver distraction codes on their traffic accident investigation forms.
1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

On November 14, 2004, about 9:30 a.m., eastern standard time, a 44-year-old bus driver 

departed the Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), operating 

a 2000 Prevost, 58-passenger motorcoach for an approximately 60-mile trip to Mount Vernon, 

Virginia. Vehicle occupants were the bus driver, an adult chaperone, and 27 high school 

students. This vehicle was the second one of a two-bus team traveling to Mount Vernon. The 

motor carrier, Eyre Bus Service, Inc., (Eyre) operates this route frequently, and the accident bus 

driver had driven this route on one previous occasion 9 days earlier (November 5, 2004).

About 10:40 a.m., the bus was traveling southbound in the right lane of the George 

Washington Memorial Parkway (the Parkway) in Alexandria, Virginia, at an electronic 

control module (ECM)–recorded speed of approximately 46 mph. As the bus approached the 

Alexandria Avenue bridge, the bus driver passed warning signs indicating that the bridge 

had a 10-foot, 2-inch clearance in the right lane. Nonetheless, the driver remained in the right 

lane and drove the 12-foot-high bus under the bridge, colliding with the underside and side 

of the overpass. At the time of the accident, the 13-foot, 4-inch-high left lane was available 

to the bus, and the lead Eyre bus was in the left lane ahead of the accident bus. The accident 

bus came to a final stop in the right lane about 470 feet beyond the bridge. Witnesses and the 

bus driver himself reported that the bus driver was talking on a hands-free cellular telephone 

at the time of the accident.

Of the 27 student passengers, 10 received minor injuries and 1 sustained serious 

injuries. The bus driver and chaperone were uninjured. The bus’s roof was destroyed.

Preaccident Events

Two Eyre buses were assigned for the trip from BWI to Mount Vernon, Virginia. 

The lead bus driver said he arrived at the bus terminal at 7:45 a.m. on the morning of the 

accident and completed a pretrip inspection of his bus. The accident bus driver said he 

arrived at the terminal at 8:45 a.m. and proceeded to complete the pretrip paperwork and 

vehicle inspection. According to the lead bus driver, after being informed by the dispatcher 

that the high school group had arrived at BWI, he left for the airport without the accident 

bus because it was not prepared to leave. He said that he loaded his bus and departed the 

airport as the accident bus arrived and began loading. The accident bus caught up with the 

lead bus on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway while en route. The lead bus driver said 

that when he entered the George Washington Memorial Parkway, he moved to the left lane 

of the roadway in anticipation of the low clearance of the Alexandria Avenue bridge. The 

accident bus driver remained in the right lane and subsequently collided with the overpass. 

The accident bus driver reported that he was talking to his sister on a hands-free cellular 

telephone prior to and at the time of the accident.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

Injuries

Twenty-nine people, including the driver, 1 adult chaperone, and 27 high school 

passengers, ages 16 to 17 years, were on the accident bus. Ten student passengers, seated 

primarily on the right side of the bus, received minor injuries consisting of contusions and 

small lacerations from broken glass (see table 1). An additional student passenger, seated 

in row 10 on the right side of the bus, sustained a fractured jaw and a laceration on his 

neck that required several stitches. The bus driver and chaperone were uninjured.

Table 1. Injuries.*

Injury type Bus driver Bus passengers Others Total

Fatal 0 0 0 0

Serious 0 1 0 1

Minor 0 10 0 10

None 1 17 0 18

*Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in death within 30 days of 

the accident. It defines a serious injury as an injury that requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing 

within 7 days from the date the injury was received; results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of the fingers,

toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; involves any internal organ; or involves 

second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.

Emergency Response

The United States Park Police (USPP) was the primary law enforcement agency 

responding to the accident; the Fairfax County and Alexandria fire departments were the 

primary emergency response agencies. Records indicate that, at 10:45 a.m., the Fairfax 

County Fire and Rescue Department received a telephone call from a citizen about the bus 

accident. The first Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department units arrived at 10:50 a.m., 

followed within minutes by Alexandria Fire Department units. At 10:52 a.m., the USPP 

communications center contacted the Fairfax County emergency operations center, 

provided an update, and requested additional assistance for traffic control. All injured 

passengers were extricated and transported to area medical facilities by 11:19 a.m.

Toxicology

The USPP collected toxicological specimens from the bus driver about 1 hour after 

the accident. The motor carrier also collected postaccident toxicological specimens from 

the bus driver approximately 5 hours after the accident. All test results were negative for 

drugs and alcohol.1

1 Title 49 CFR Part 382 requires motor carriers to conduct postaccident alcohol and drug testing. 

Title 49 CFR 40.85 requires testing for marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites, amphetamines, opiate 

metabolites, and phencyclidine (PCP). The specimen collected by the USPP was screened for 

amphetamines, barbiturates, benzidiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, PCP, and ethanol.
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle and Wreckage Information

The accident bus was a 2000 Prevost model H3-45, 58-passenger motorcoach. 

According to Prevost specifications, the bus was 45.6 feet long (including bumpers), 8.42 

feet wide, and 12 feet high. It had a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 52,060 

pounds. Posted on the dashboard was a placard informing the driver that the bus’s height 

was 12 feet, 4 inches.2

Postaccident examination showed that the bus’s roof was crushed downward at the 

front of the bus; damage was more pronounced on the right side (opposite the driver’s 

seat). (See figure 1.) Much of the roof was crushed downward to the point that it touched 

the top of the passenger seat headrests; a portion of the right side of the roof was in contact 

with the bottom window anchorages. (See table 2 for postaccident bus measurements.)

Figure 1. Postaccident view of the accident motorcoach.

The bus’s right-side mirrors were broken off, and there were gouge marks at the 

right-front corner of the bus, just forward of the boarding door. All of the windows on the 

right side of the bus were broken out, and all of the window frames were damaged. On the 

left side of the bus, two windows were unbroken but detached from their lower anchorage 

points. The tires and the steering and braking systems appeared to be undamaged.

2 The measurement noted on Eyre’s standard placard was greater than the accident bus’s actual height.
Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

Table 2. Postaccident dimensions of 2000 Prevost motorcoach.

Position Measurement

Overall length, including bumpers 45.6 feet

Height, right front (boarding door side) 10 feet, 3 inches

Height, center front 11 feet, 7 inches

Height, left front (driver’s side) 11 feet, 3 inches

Height, right rear 10 feet, 2 inches

Height, left rear 11 feet, 4 inches

Height at maximum downward roof intrusion (right side) 7 feet, 8 inches

Distance from front of bus to area of maximum downward roof intrusion (right side) 31 feet

Approximate length of roof damage from right side inward 3 feet, 7 inches

Width, rear 8 feet, 5 inches

Width, front 8 feet, 9 inches

The bus’s engine was equipped with a fourth generation Detroit Diesel Electronic 

Control Module (DDEC ECM), which is used to control engine timing and fuel injection 

based on engine and sensor inputs. The unit also performs diagnostics associated with 

engine and sensor inputs and may then illuminate warnings on the dashboard. In addition 

to recording information such as vehicle speed, the DDEC ECM is capable of collecting 

data regarding “last stop” and “hard brake” events.3 (See table 3 for the last three events 

recorded before the accident.)

Table 3. Data from DDEC ECM.

Report Odometer reading Time on DDEC ECM clock Adjusted timea

Last stop record 381699.4 miles 11/14/2004 09:02:49 10:39:00

Hard brake #1 381699.3 miles 11/14/2004 09:02:29 10:39:00

Hard brake #2b 379902.2 miles 11/09/2004 04:54:51 —

a

 Due to the known differential between local time (based on the accident investigator’s cellular telephone time) and the 

DDEC ECM clock, the reported DDEC ECM time has been adjusted by 1 hour, 37 minutes.

b

This incident occurred 5 days and nearly 1,800 miles before the accident.

The recorded data indicated a speed change from 45.5 mph (20 seconds before last 

stop) to 32.5 mph (19 seconds before last stop) in 1 second. Additionally, the data 

indicated that the brake pedal was applied 4 to 5 seconds after the rapid deceleration, the 

driver applied the throttle for at least a minute and a half before the crash, and cruise 

control was not being used.

3 A hard brake is triggered when the calculated vehicle wheel speed decelerates at a greater speed than 

the user-defined threshold, which can be configured from 0 to 15 mph per second. The accident bus was set 

at 7 mph per second.
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

Highway

General

The accident occurred in the southbound lanes of the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway at the Alexandria Avenue bridge, outside the city of Alexandria in 

Fairfax County, Virginia. The Parkway, which is maintained by the National Park Service 

(NPS), U.S. Department of the Interior, was the first federally funded highway. Initially 

constructed between 1927 and 1932, the Parkway was established with the specific 

legislative purpose of providing a scenic transportation route to Mount Vernon. The NPS 

and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) classify the Parkway as a Class VII 

Urban Parkway.4

The Parkway in the vicinity of the accident is a four-lane, undivided 

concrete-surfaced roadway that runs north and south. The Parkway’s pavement was most 

recently restored in June 1985. The width of the paved portion of the four-lane parkway 

is approximately 43 feet, measured from curb face to curb face. The southbound right 

lane is approximately 10 feet, 5 inches wide, and the southbound left lane is 

approximately 9 feet, 7 inches wide. The northbound left lane is approximately 

9 feet, 5 inches wide, and the northbound right lane is approximately 10 feet, 5 inches 

wide. A 1-foot, 7-inch-wide gutter pan runs from the edge of the travel lane to the face of 

curb, both northbound and southbound. Beyond the face of the curb is a 

1-foot, 4-inch-wide ledge. Beyond the ledge is a stone retaining wall that measures 2 feet,

7 inches high by 1 foot, 8 inches wide.

Vehicles heavier than 7,500 pounds gross vehicle weight, longer than 28 feet, 

6 inches, or wider than 102 inches may not use any park road without a permit.5 No fees 

are charged for the permits, which are valid for various time periods.6 The permit used at 

the time of the accident did not contain information or warnings regarding hazards on 

the Parkway, such as low vertical clearances or narrow road passages. The NPS intends 

to clarify the information on the permit. The NPS stated that, at the time of the accident, 

permit issuance and enforcement had not been a priority but that, since the accident, the 

NPS has increased enforcement and contacted carriers to inform them of the permit 

requirement. Eyre did not possess a permit to access the Parkway at the time of the 

accident.

Evidence Documentation

There were no tire marks in the southbound right lane of the Parkway approaching 

the Alexandria Avenue bridge. Scrape marks were observed southbound along the stone 

4 Class VII Urban Parkways are facilities that serve high volumes of park- and non-park-related traffic 

and are restricted, limited-access facilities in an urban area. This category of roads primarily includes the 

major parkways, which serve as gateways to the Nation’s capital. For further information, see National Park 

Service, Office of Policy, Park Road Standards (Washington, DC: NPS, 1984).

5 Title 36 CFR compendium.

6 For example, carriers that travel the Parkway regularly may be granted a yearly permit; carriers that 

travel the Parkway occasionally may be granted a per-trip permit.
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

arch bridge’s underside for its total depth in the direction of vehicles traveling beneath the 

overpass. Additional scrape marks, observed on the inside wall of the bridge’s west side, 

were matched with the right-front bumper and right windshield of the accident bus.

Speed Limit

The speed limit for the Parkway in the vicinity of the accident is 45 mph. At the 

time of the collision, the bus was traveling at an estimated speed of 46 mph.7

Alexandria Avenue Bridge

The Alexandria Avenue bridge (see figure 2), which is maintained by the Virginia 

Department of Transportation, accommodates vehicle travel from adjacent 

neighborhoods. The bridge’s construction began in 1930 and was completed in 1932. It is 

a rigid-frame, reinforced concrete structure that is faced with native stone. The two-lane 

bridge is about 43 feet long and spans the Parkway’s four lanes. The total depth of the 

bridge’s underside, in the direction of vehicles traveling beneath the overpass, is 39 feet.

Figure 2. Alexandria Avenue bridge over the Parkway (southbound).

The FHWA inspected the bridge on March 24, 2003, and stated in its report:8

This bridge is in fair to good condition overall. While there have been no 

significant changes in the structural condition since the last inspection, several 

problems remain. The main problems include parapet masonry mortar joint 

7 This estimate is based on the DDEC ECM–recorded speed.

8 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Bridge Inspection Report, 

Alexandria Avenue Overpass, Structure No. 3300-024P, Date of Inspection: 3/24/03, page 2 of 7.
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

deterioration throughout and severe deterioration of the vertical expansion joint 

filler. The parapet mortar joints should be repointed as required and the vertical 

expansion joints cleaned and resealed.

With corrective action and regular maintenance, a useful life of approximately 

20-25 years can be expected for this structure under current loading conditions.

On November 16, 2004, the Safety Board and the USPP measured the vertical 

clearance of the Alexandria Avenue bridge (see table 4). The vertical measurements were 

taken from the roadway to the bottom edge of the stone arch bridge every 2 feet along the 

width of the Parkway. Due to the arched configuration of the stone bridge, the outside 

lanes have less vertical clearance. The measured height of the arch ranges from 

approximately 14 feet, 9 1/2 inches at the center of the bridge to approximately 

10 feet, 3 inches at the face of the curb.

Table 4. Alexandria Avenue bridge measurements.

Lateral distance on Parkway from west to 

east curb faces

Vertical clearance from roadway to 

bottom edge of stone arch bridge

0 feet 10 feet, 3 inches

2 feet 11 feet, 0 inches

4 feet 11 feet, 10 inches

6 feet 12 feet, 6 inches

8 feet 13 feet, 1 inch

10 feet 13 feet, 6 inches

12 feet 13 feet, 11 inches

14 feet 14 feet, 3 inches

16 feet 14 feet, 6 inches

18 feet 14 feet, 8 inches

20 feet 14 feet, 9 inches

22 feet (approximate center of bridge) 14 feet, 9 1/2 inches

24 feet (approximate center of bridge) 14 feet, 9 inches

26 feet 14 feet, 7 inches

28 feet 14 feet, 5 inches

30 feet 14 feet, 3 inches

32 feet 13 feet, 10 inches

34 feet 13 feet, 6 inches

36 feet 13 feet, 0 inches

38 feet 12 feet, 5 inches

40 feet 11 feet, 8 inches

42 feet 10 feet, 11 inches

43.3 feet 10 feet, 4 inches
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

The 1984 edition of the NPS Park Road Standards recommends that, for new 

roadway bridges, the vertical clearance for underpasses be at least 14 feet above the entire 

roadway width. This recommendation is consistent with American Association of State 

Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) guidance, which recommends that, on 

local urban streets, the vertical clearance at underpasses be at least 14 feet over the entire 

roadway width, with an allowance for future resurfacing.9 The recommended 14-foot 

clearance would apply if the bridge were to be reconstructed or replaced.

Existing Vertical Clearance Signs

Among the signs posted in the southbound lanes preceding the accident site were 

those indicating the vertical clearance of the Alexandria Avenue bridge. Roadside warning 

signs placed next to the southbound lane 1,580 feet before the bridge, and mounted 

warning signs placed on the bridge’s face over the left and curb lanes, showed the 

clearance to be 13 feet, 4 inches in the left lane and 10 feet, 2 inches in the right (curb) 

lane (see figures 3 and 4). The signs complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic 

Control Devices (MUTCD).

Figure 3. Roadside warning signs—Alexandria Avenue bridge clearance.

10

9 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, A Policy on Geometric Design 

of Highways and Streets, 5th edition (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2004) 399.

10 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic 

Control Devices (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003) chapter 2C.
Figure 4. Mounted warning signs—Alexandria Avenue bridge clearance.

Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Average Daily Traffic

According to the FHWA and the NPS, the average daily traffic (ADT) in the 

vicinity of the accident in recent years is as follows in table 5:

Table 5. ADT data for station 6003 (Hunting Creek), located approximately 2 miles north 

of the accident site.

Year ADT

2000 9,500 

2001 10,225

2002 17,949

2003 24,386

2004 31,481

Source: FHWA and NPS.

According to the FHWA, 99.3 percent of the vehicles traveling on the Parkway are 

passenger vehicles (see table 6); tour buses comprise about 0.1 percent of total vehicles. 

The George Washington’s Mount Vernon Estate and Gardens reported that during the peak 

seasons of April, May, and June, approximately 200 tour buses a day use the Parkway to 

reach Mount Vernon. Tour buses that travel to Mount Vernon typically measure 12 feet 

high; 8 feet, 5 inches wide (10 feet wide with the mirrors extended); and 45 feet, 8 inches 

long. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority operates four morning and four
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

afternoon buses along the Parkway;11 these buses typically measure 10 feet, 1 inch high; 8 

feet, 6 inches wide; and 40 feet long. The Fairfax County Public School system also runs 

buses along the Parkway; they typically measure 10 feet high, 8 feet wide, and 35 feet long.

Table 6. Vehicles using the Parkway.

Vehicle type Percentage of total 

Passenger car 99.3

Recreational vehicle 0.0

Transit/shuttle bus 0.1

Tour bus 0.1

Light-duty truck 0.3

Motorcycle 0.2

Recent Accident History

Table 7 shows the Alexandria Avenue bridge’s recent accident history. From 2000 

to 2004, 13 accidents occurred, 10 of which involved trucks that struck the underside of 

the bridge.12 The current accident investigation brings the total number of bridge strikes 

during this period to 11. The two other accidents that occurred from 2000 through 2004 

were vehicle collisions.

Table 7. Alexandria Avenue bridge recent accident history.

Year Number of accidents

2000 1

2001 2

2002 2

2003 4

2004 4

 Total 13

Weather

Weather data obtained from the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, 

approximately 7 miles north of the accident site, indicated that, at 9:51 a.m., the 

temperature was 43° Fahrenheit, with a 10 mph wind from the north, unrestricted visibility 

of 10 statute miles, and clear skies. No precipitation was reported within 24 hours of the 

accident. According to the U.S. Naval Observatory, at 10:45 a.m., eastern standard time, 

the sun was at an altitude of 30.7° and an azimuth of 161.3° (east of north).13

11 The morning buses run from Mount Vernon to Farragut Square; the afternoon buses run from 18th 

Street and Pennsylvania Avenue to Mount Vernon.

12 Trucks are not permitted on the Parkway.

13 Azimuth is the horizontal component of a compass direction, measured around the horizon, usually 

from the north.
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

Motor Carrier Information

General

Eyre Bus Service, Inc., is an interstate, for-hire passenger carrier with 48-State 

operating authority, headquartered in Glenelg, Maryland.14 Eyre employs 30 full-time 

drivers and 39 part-time drivers and operates a fleet of 35 motorcoaches. In 2003, the 

company reported 3 million annual vehicle miles traveled. The carrier makes the trip to 

Mount Vernon about 30 to 40 times yearly.

In the 24-month period before the accident, Eyre received 230 vehicle roadside 

inspections and 80 driver roadside inspections, resulting in a vehicle out-of-service rate of 

3.5 percent and a driver out-of service rate of 1.2 percent.15 The Federal Motor Carrier 

Safety Administration’s (FMCSA’s) SafeStat record indicated the carrier had been 

involved in four accidents—one each in June and October 2002 and two more in February 

2003. The last compliance review for Eyre, conducted by the FMCSA on June 19, 2003, 

resulted in a “Satisfactory” rating. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) rated Eyre as a 

“1” on equipment and a “2” for the overall inspection.16

According to Eyre officials, bus driver applicants receive 3 weeks of initial 

training and 1 week of classroom training before being allowed to operate a vehicle. Each 

driver also receives a minimum of 35 hours of team driving prior to solo operation. Eyre 

officials stated that the company informs drivers about the height of their buses and 

cautions them about the possibility of low-clearance areas.

Motor Carrier’s Cellular Telephone Policy

All Eyre bus drivers are issued company-owned cellular telephones before a 

trip.17 At the time of the accident, the motor carrier permitted its drivers to use a cellular 

telephone while driving if the driver used a hands-free device. On November 15, 2004, 

the day after the accident, the motor carrier instituted a policy prohibiting the use of 

cellular telephones while operating company equipment.18 The new policy requires that 

drivers, except in an emergency, safely stop their vehicle to make a cellular telephone 

call.

Some other motor carriers, including Greyhound, Peter Pan, and Coach USA 

(which is developing a policy), have also instituted policies prohibiting the use of cellular

14 U.S. Department of Transportation authority number 110610; motor carrier number 116212.

15 The 2003 national vehicle out-of-service rate was 22.9 percent; the driver out-of-service rate was 

6.8 percent. The 2004 national vehicle out-of-service rate was 23.6 percent; the driver out-of-service rate 

was 6.7 percent. Information accessed on October 26, 2006, from 

<http:/ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/programmeasures/RI/RI.asp>.

16 The DoD rates motor carriers on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “outstanding” and 5 being “unsatisfactory.”

17 At the time of the accident, Eyre was issuing hand-held cellular telephones. Eyre is transitioning to a 

two-way communications system.

18 Eyre’s new cellular telephone policy appears in boldface in its driver/operating manual.
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

telephones while driving.19 The primary motorcoach industry associations (the American 

Bus Association [ABA] and the United Motorcoach Association [UMA]), public bus 

transportation organizations (the Community Transportation Association of America 

[CTAA] and the American Public Transportation Association [APTA]), school bus 

industry associations (the National Association for Pupil Transportation [NAPT], the 

National School Transportation Association [NSTA], and the National Association of 

State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services [NASDPTS]), and bus driver unions (the 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters [Teamsters] and the Amalgamated Transit Union 

[ATU]) do not have official policies concerning cellular telephone use.

Permit Compliance

Eyre officials said that the carrier did not possess a permit at the time of the 

accident because it was not required20 for the bus to access the Parkway. Eyre obtained a 

permit on May 25, 2006, which is valid for 1 year.

Driver Information

The 44-year-old driver had a valid Maryland Class AM, commercial driver’s 

license (CDL) with endorsements for passenger, tank, hazardous material, and school bus 

operations. The license was issued May 23, 2003, with an expiration date of 

September 19, 2008. He possessed a current medical certificate issued January 14, 2004, 

with an expiration date of January 13, 2006. According to the medical examination report, 

the bus driver reported no adverse medical history or use of medications, and the 

physician’s examination disclosed no disqualifying conditions.

The driver began working for Eyre as a full-time bus driver in February 2004 and 

entered part-time status in June 2004. During his first month of employment, he was a 

student in the company training program. The driver stated on his Eyre employment 

application that he had 3 years of CDL driving experience, reporting previous 

employment driving a tractor-semitrailer unit and a school bus. A certified copy of the bus 

driver’s Maryland driving record in the driver’s qualification file showed that the driver 

was convicted in 2001 for “failure to wear a seatbelt” and in 2002 for “driving or 

permitting a vehicle to be driven with expired registration.” The bus driver’s Maryland 

driving record also indicated that he had no record of moving traffic violations or accident 

history.

The bus driver reported three previous employers on his employment application 

to Eyre. Interviews with these companies revealed that the driver had experienced 

19 (a) “Cell Phone Use By Drivers Is Becoming More Routine: New Worry: GPS Devices,” Bus and 

Motorcoach News, June 1 (2006): 1. (b) “Driver Use of Cell Phones: Steering Clear of Liability,” Bus and 

Motorcoach News, June 1 (2006): 12. (c) June and July 2006 telephone conversations with Greyhound, Peter 

Pan, and Coach USA representatives.

20 According to the Title 36 CFR compendium, permits are required for vehicles heavier than 7,500 

pounds gross vehicle weight, longer than 28 feet, 5 inches, or wider than 102 inches.
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

problems dealing with customers and with other employees. The interviews also revealed 

that he had been involved in a December 2003 run-off-the-road, non-reported accident 

after he fell asleep while driving.

Sleep/Awake History

The bus driver started work on Saturday, November 13, 2004 (the day before the 

accident), at 4:45 a.m. and was on duty until 7:15 a.m. From 7:15 a.m. until 10:30 a.m., 

the driver was off duty. (See figure 5.) He was on standby from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., 

then off duty for 8.5 hours, from 1:00 p.m. until 9:30 p.m. He resumed driving at 9:30 p.m. 

and completed work at 11:45 p.m. He was off duty for 9 hours before returning to work on 

Sunday morning at 8:45 a.m. When interviewed by Safety Board investigators, the driver 

stated that he received about 9 hours of sleep at home the night before the accident and did 

not feel fatigued at the time of the accident. The driver was in compliance with the hoursof-service regulations.21 Earlier in the week (November 10, 11, and 12), he worked other, 

non-driving jobs.

Figure 5. Driver’s rest schedule.

Cellular Telephone Use

The bus driver possessed both a company-issued cellular telephone and a personal 

telephone. The bus driver reported that he had been talking with his sister on a hands-free 

personal cellular telephone when the accident occurred. Records from the bus driver’s 

personal cellular telephone service provider showed that the bus driver initiated a 

12-minute cellular telephone call at 10:23 a.m.22 the morning of the accident. The 

chaperone stated: “The driver was talking on a headset for [the] majority of [the] trip. I 

believe he was talking on the telephone when we hit the bridge. He also had a hand-held 

telephone that he used at one point. I don’t know whether he was using it when we hit the 

bridge.” The bus dispatcher on duty at the time of the accident reported that, shortly before 

the accident, the accident bus driver contacted her and complained about the conduct of 

the lead bus driver, stating that he refused to communicate with the accident driver 

21 Title 49 CFR 395.5 states: “No motor carrier shall permit or require any driver used by it to drive a 

passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicle, nor shall any such driver drive a passenger-carrying 

commercial motor vehicle more than 10 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty or for any period after 

having been on duty 15 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty.”

22 Time differences between cellular telephone and dispatcher records may be attributed to 

desynchronized clocks.
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

concerning bus movement. The dispatcher said she advised the accident bus driver to 

remain professional and cooperate with the lead bus driver, who was the senior driver 

assigned to bus movement.

Bus Driver Interview

The bus driver stated that he was upset at the time of the cellular telephone 

conversation with his sister because he believed that he had been mistreated by the lead 

bus driver during the trip. The bus driver stated that the lead bus driver had refused to 

communicate with him about the details of bus movement, had departed from the terminal 

without him, and had departed from the airport before the accident driver had finished 

boarding his passengers.

The bus driver said that he did not notice the signs warning of low-clearance 

restrictions for the Alexandria Avenue overpass while driving toward the accident site on 

the Parkway and that he did not recall seeing the bridge until the accident occurred. The 

accident bus driver told Safety Board investigators that he could see the lead bus ahead of 

him. The bus driver reported that he had driven the same route once previously; company 

records verified that the trip occurred on November 5, 2004, 9 days before the accident.

Other Information

Buses

The FHWA estimates that, of the 795,274 buses23 registered with the States in 

2004, a total of 647,531 were defined as school buses and other nonrevenue buses (such as 

church buses), 142,459 were defined as private commercial buses,24 and 5,284 were 

defined as federally owned buses.25 According to a 2006 motorcoach census update,26

39,068 motorcoaches operate in the United States and Canada, making an estimated 

631 million passenger trips and traveling more than 2.4 billion miles. According to the 

Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data for 2005, of the 59,373 vehicles involved 

in fatal accidents, 278 were buses. The 278 buses involved in fatal accidents include 111 

defined as school buses, 38 as cross country/intercity buses, 82 as transit (city) buses, 

33 buses as other, and 14 as unknown.

23 A bus is a vehicle designed to carry at least nine people, including the driver, that is not used for 

personal transportation.

24 Commercial buses are all buses used in intercity, charter, and local transit operations, including 

municipal and transit buses.

25 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2004, 

table MV-10 <www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs04/index.htm>.

26 American Bus Association, Motorcoach Census Update 2006 (Washington, DC: ABA, September 

2006). The 2006 ABA census update collected data for 2004 and 2005 and defined “motorcoach” as “a 

vehicle designed for long distance transportation of passengers, characterized by integral construction with 

an elevated passenger deck located over a baggage compartment. It is at least 35 feet in length and carries 

more than 30 passengers.”
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

Cellular Telephones

Research. According to industry data, more than 204.7 million subscribers 

receive U.S. wireless communications services,27 more than double the 97 million 

subscribers reported in 2000.28 Cellular telephones, like text messaging devices and 

personal digital assistants, are a type of interactive wireless communications device.

An observational survey conducted by NHTSA showed that hand-held cellular 

telephone use while driving increased from 5 percent in 2004 to 6 percent in 2005.29 The 

incidence of drivers using headsets increased from 0.4 to 0.7 percent of all drivers from 

2004 to 2005. A 2002 NHTSA-sponsored telephone survey indicates that about 30 percent 

of all drivers report using a cellular telephone while driving to make or receive calls.30

Epidemiological studies show that the risk of being involved in an injury accident 

almost quadruples when drivers use a cellular telephone as compared to when a telephone 

is not used.31 The 2002 telephone survey indicated that 0.1 percent of all drivers can 

attribute an accident in the past 5 years to cellular telephone use. According to 2003 FARS 

data, of the 58,517 drivers involved in fatal accidents, “cellular telephone in use in vehicle” 

was coded as a driver factor for 104 drivers (0.18 percent) and “cellular telephone present in 

vehicle” was coded for 1,670 drivers (2.9 percent). Analysis of North Carolina accident 

records from January 1, 1996, to August 31, 2000, revealed that 54.8 percent of accidents in 

which the driver was using a cellular telephone resulted in no injuries, 36.2 percent resulted 

in possible injuries, 6.4 percent resulted in non-incapacitating injuries, 2.1 percent resulted 

in incapacitating injuries, and 0.5 percent were fatal. In comparison, 58.4 percent of the 

accidents not involving a cellular telephone resulted in no injuries, 27.3 percent resulted in 

possible injuries, 10.6 percent resulted in non-incapacitating injuries, 3.1 percent resulted in 

incapacitating injuries, and 0.6 percent were fatal. Accidents involving cellular telephones 

were more likely than accidents not involving cellular telephones to involve a rear-end 

collision (45.1 percent of cellular telephone versus 25.6 percent of non-cellular telephone 

accidents), to occur during midday or afternoon hours (60 percent of cellular telephone 

27 Information accessed on March 10, 2006, from <www.ctia.org>.

28 CTIA—The Wireless Association. Wireless Industry Indices: 1985-2005. Annualized Wireless 

Industry Service Results—June 1985 to June 2005 <www.ctia.org/research_statistics/index.cfm/AID/10030>.

Data reflect domestic cellular, enhanced specialized mobile radio, and personal communication service 

providers.

29 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Driver Cell 

Phone Use in 2005—Overall Results, DOT HS 809 967 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005). The data source 

is the National Occupant Protection Use Survey, 2004-2005, conducted by the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) National Center for Statistics and Analysis. The survey data were 

collected by trained observers from June 6 to June 25, 2005, between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., at 

probabilistically selected intersections in the United States controlled by a stop sign or a stoplight.

30 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National 

Survey of Distracted and Drowsy Driving Attitudes and Behavior: 2002, Volume I: Findings, 

DOT HS 809 566 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2003).

31 (a) D.A. Redelmeier and R.J. Tibshirani, “Association Between Cellular-Telephone Calls and Motor 

Vehicle Collisions,” The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 336, No. 7 (1997). (b) S. McEvoy and 

others, “Role of Mobile Phones In Motor Vehicle Crashes Resulting In Hospital Attendance: A 

Case-Crossover Study,” BMJ (July 2005).
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

accidents occurred between 10:00 a.m. and 5:59 p.m. versus 54 percent of non-cellular 

telephone accidents), and to occur in urban areas (90.6 percent of cellular telephone 

accidents versus 62.3 percent of non-cellular telephone accidents) and on local streets (69.8 

percent of cellular telephone accidents versus 37.9 percent for non-cellular telephone 

accidents).32

NHTSA recently released initial findings from its 100-car naturalistic driving study 

in which 100 vehicles, equipped with video and sensor devices, tracked driver behavior for 1 

year.33 The vehicles were driven nearly 2,000,000 miles, and 43,000 hours of data were 

obtained. The 241 drivers participating in the study had 82 crashes, 761 near-crashes, and 

8,295 critical incidents.34 The most common distraction for drivers was hand-held devices, 

primarily cellular telephones. Dialing a hand-held device increased the risk of a crash or 

near-crash by almost 3 times and talking on or listening to a hand-held device, by 1.3 times.

Research or surveys of cellular telephone use by commercial vehicle drivers are 

relatively uncommon. One such survey of Danish drivers35 notes that cellular telephone 

use is likely to be a frequent and widespread activity among commercial drivers, that 

driving constitutes the sole or major part of a commercial driver’s working day, and that 

this group uses cellular telephones to communicate with employers and customers. The 

Danish survey further indicates that 99 percent of the drivers responding used cellular 

telephones while driving. Of the Danish survey respondents, 0.5 percent said a cellular 

telephone contributed to an accident and 6 percent said cellular telephone use contributed 

to a dangerous situation, citing paying less attention to other drivers and missing road 

signs as factors. Examination of data from six drivers in a naturalistic local or short-haul 

study36 showed that cellular telephone use accounted for about 4 percent of 4,329 events 

classified as distracting. The study further found that the average duration for cellular 

telephone conversations was 67.1 seconds, and the average duration for dialing was 

32 J.C. Stutts, H.F. Huang, and W.W. Hunter, “Cell Phone Use While Driving in North Carolina: 2002 Update 

Report,” final project report to the North Carolina Governor’s Highway Safety Program (December 2002).

33 (a) U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The 100-Car 

Naturalistic Driving Study. Phase II—Results of the 100-Car Field Experiment, DOT HS 810 593 (Washington, DC: 

NHTSA, 2006). (b) U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, The 

Impact of Driver Inattention on Near-Crash/Crash Risk: An Analysis Using the 100-Car Naturalistic Study Data, 

DOT HS 810 594 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2006).

34 NHTSA’s 100-car naturalistic driving study defines a crash as: “Any contact with an object, either moving or 

fixed, at any speed in which kinetic energy is measurably transferred or dissipated. Includes other vehicles, roadside 

barriers, objects on or off of the roadway, pedestrians, cyclists, or animals.” The study defines a near-crash as: “Any 

circumstance that requires a rapid, evasive maneuver by the subject vehicle, or any other vehicle, pedestrian, cyclist, or 

animal to avoid a crash.” A rapid, evasive maneuver is defined as “a steering, braking, accelerating, or any combination 

of control inputs that approaches the limits of the vehicle capabilities.” An incident would include crash-relevant 

conflicts requiring “a crash avoidance response on the part of the subject vehicle, any other vehicle, pedestrian, cyclist, 

or animal that is less severe than a rapid evasive maneuver, but greater in severity than a ‘normal maneuver’ to avoid a 

crash” and also proximity conflicts, which are “any circumstance resulting in extraordinarily close proximity of the 

subject vehicle to any other vehicle, pedestrian, cyclist, animal, or fixed object where, due to apparent unawareness on 

the part of the driver(s), pedestrians, cyclists, or animals, there is no avoidance maneuver or response.”

35 T. Troglauer, T. Hels, and P.F. Christens, “Extent and Variations In Mobile Phone Use Among Drivers of 

Heavy Vehicles in Denmark,” Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2006): 105-111.

36 L.C. Barr, C.Y.D. Yang, and T. Ranney, “An Exploratory Analysis of Truck Driver Distraction Using 

Naturalistic Driving Data,” Transportation Research Board, 82nd annual meeting, January 12-16, 2003, 

Washington, D.C.
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

13.4 seconds. The 2005 FARS data indicate that cellular telephones were coded as a 

driver-related factor for 6 of the 278 drivers (2.2 percent) involved in fatal bus 

accidents.37

A number of studies,38 including several using a simulator,39 show that driving 

performance is impaired when drivers use cellular telephones; these studies found that 

drivers have slower reaction times, take longer to recover speed following braking, 

drive more slowly, maintain greater following distances, and have more traffic 

violations. For example, a study examining the effects of cellular telephone use on 

younger (18 to 25 years) and older (65 to 74 years) drivers found, relative to drivers in a 

pace car, that drivers using a cellular telephone while driving had an 18-percent slower 

braking response time, maintained a 12-percent greater following distance, and took 

17-percent longer to recover speed after braking. Driving performance was impaired for 

both younger and older drivers.40 Other studies have focused on visual behavior and 

visual information in the driving environment. A Transport Canada on-road experiment 

showed that drivers engaged in a distracting conversation made fewer saccades (quick 

eye movements), spent more time looking centrally and less time looking to the right 

periphery, and spent less time checking instruments and looking at the rear view 

mirror.41

Some studies have focused on information that the driver missed or was unaware 

of in the driving environment. In a study evaluating a driver’s situational awareness, 

drivers using cellular telephones were found less likely to correctly answer questions 

37 Driver-related codes pertaining to cellular telephone use are “cellular telephone present in vehicle” 

and “cellular telephone in use in vehicle.”

38 (a) D.L. Strayer and F.A. Drews, “Profiles in Driver Distraction: Effects of Cell Phone Conversations 

on Younger and Older Drivers,” Human Factors, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2004): 640-649. (b) K.E. Beede and 

S.J. Kass, “Engrossed in Conversation: The Impact of Cell Phones On Simulated Driving Performance,” 

Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006): 415-421. (c) C.J.D. Patten, A. Kircher, J. Östlund, and 

L. Nilsson, “Using Mobile Telephones: Cognitive Workload and Attention Resource Allocation,” Accident 

Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2004): 341-350. (d) U.S. Department of Transportation, National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Examination of the Distraction Effects of Wireless Phone Interfaces 

Using the National Advanced Driving Simulator—Final Report on a Freeway Study, DOT HS 809 787

(Washington, DC: NHTSA, 2005). (e) U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, An Investigation of the Safety Implications of Wireless Communications In Vehicles, 

DOT HS 808 635 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 1997). (f) D.L. Strayer, F.A. Drews, and D.J. Crouch, “A 

Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver,” Human Factors, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2006): 

381-391. (g) D.L. Strayer and W.A. Johnston, “Driven to Distraction: Dual-Task Studies of Simulated 

Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Phone,” Psychological Science, Vol. 12 (2001): 462-466.

39 A simulator is a piece of training equipment that mimics real life situations. The 2004 Strayer study 

measured driver performance using a high-fidelity simulator, comparing driver performance under three 

conditions: (1) driving without using a cellular telephone or being intoxicated, (2) driving while using a 

cellular telephone, and (3) driving while intoxicated.

40 Strayer and Drews (2004).

41 J.L. Harbluk, Y.I. Noy, and M. Eizenman, The Impact of Cognitive Distraction on Driver Visual 

Behaviour and Vehicle Control, TP#13889 E (Ottawa, Canada: Transport Canada, 2002).
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

about the driving environment.42 Another study showed that drivers using cellular 

telephones had more traffic violations (such as speeding, ignoring stop signs and traffic 

signals, and committing lane violations) and attention lapses (defined as a driver failing 

to scan intersections at stop signs, stopping in the absence of a stop sign, stopping at a 

red light but proceeding before it turned green and then stopping again, or stopping at a 

green light).43 The authors suggested that the drivers were either unaware of, or failed to 

process information from, the driving environment. Other research has demonstrated 

that talking on a cellular telephone while driving interferes with creating a memory of 

objects in the environment, in some cases even when the driver looked directly at the 

object.44

Some research indicates that changes in driving behavior are a result of the 

cognitive distraction of a cellular telephone conversation45 diverting attention from driving 

to the conversation.46 Drivers have been found to attempt to compensate for talking on a 

cellular telephone by altering other behaviors, such as increasing their distance from the 

car in front of them.47

Researchers have concluded that complex cellular telephone conversations create 

the greatest distraction.48,49 Driver conversations with passengers differ from cellular 

telephone conversations because passengers are part of the environment, are aware of the 

42 A. Parkes and V. Hooijmeijer, The Influence of the Use of Mobile Phones on Driver Situation 

Awareness (undated). The study’s subjects were asked the following questions: “1. Can you tell me what 

other traffic was surrounding you just before I stopped the simulation? 2. Can you tell me the colour of the 

car that was in your rear-view mirror? 3. Was the car in your rear-view mirror driving faster than you or 

not?” Information accessed on July 28, 2006, from <www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-13/driverdistraction/pdf/2.pdf>.

43 Beede and Kass (2006).

44 D.L. Strayer, J.M. Cooper, and F.A. Drews, “What Do Drivers Fail to See When Conversing on a 

Cell Phone?,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 48th Annual Meeting, New 

Orleans, Louisiana, September 20 through 24, 2004. (b) D.L. Strayer, F.A. Drews, and W.A. Johnston, “Cell 

Phone-Induced Failures of Visual Attention During Simulated Driving,” Journal of Experimental 

Psychology–Applied, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2003): 23-32.

45 Transport Canada TP#13889 E.

46 Strayer, Drews, and Johnston (2003).

47 Strayer and Drews (2004).

48 (a) C. Wood and J. Hurwitz. “Driver Workload Management During Cell Phone Conversations,” 

Proceedings of the Third International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, 

Training, and Vehicle Design, Rockport, Maine, June 27 through 30, 2005 (Iowa City, IA: University of 

Iowa Public Policy Center, 2005). (b) J. McKnight and A.S. McKnight, “The Effect of Cellular Telephone 

Use Upon Driver Attention” (1991). Research sponsored by a grant from the AAA Foundation for Traffic 

Safety. Information accessed on July 28, 2006, from <www.aaafoundation.org/resources>.

49 Patten, Kircher, Östlund, and Nilsson (2004).
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

driving environment, and can monitor the effects of the conversation on driving.50 Drivers 

conversing on a cellular telephone have been found to speak more than they would during 

an in-car conversation.51 Suspending the cellular telephone conversation positively 

affected driving performance. 52

Studies comparing accident rates and performance between hand-held and handsfree cellular telephones suggest either that no difference exists between the two telephone 

modes or that hand-held telephones interfere more with driving.53 A study conducted on 

rural roadways using an instrumented vehicle showed that reaction times increased when 

conversing, but no difference was found between telephone modes (hand-held and handsfree).54 Reaction time results for both telephone modes were similar in a simulator study,55

which showed that lateral lane deviation position increased during dialing but decreased 

during conversation. In the simulator study, driving speed during a conversation was 

reduced for drivers when using hand-held telephones but not when using hands-free 

telephones. A meta-analysis56 revealed that hands-free cellular telephones produced 

similar performance decrements to hand-held telephones.57

Education. The FMCSA does not have a policy concerning cellular telephone use 

while driving. NHTSA states the following in its policy concerning cellular telephone use:

The primary responsibility of the driver is to operate a motor vehicle safely. The 

task of driving requires full attention and focus. Cellular telephone use can 

50 F.A. Drews, M. Paupathi, and D.L. Strayer, “Passenger and Cell-Phone Conversations in Simulated 

Driving,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 48th Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, September 20 through 24, 2004.

51 D. Crundall, M. Bains, P. Chapman, and G. Underwood, “Regulating Conversation During Driving: a 

Problem for Mobile Telephones?,” Transportation Research, Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, Vol. 8F, 

No. 3 (2005): 197-211.

52 Wood and Hurwitz (2005).

53 (a) Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997). (b) McEvoy and others (2005). (c) J.E.B. Törnros and 

A.K. Bolling, “Mobile Phone Use–Effects of Handheld and Handsfree Phones on Driving Performance,” 

Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2005): 902-909. (d) S.B. Wilcox, “Comparison of Driving In 

a Simulated Environment While Using a Cell Phone With and Without a Headset” (2004). Information 

accessed on July 28, 2006, from <www.ctia.org/industry_topics/topic.cfm/TID/17/CTID/16#16>. (e) Strayer, 

Drews, and Crouch (2006).

54 Patten, Kircher, Östlund, and Nilsson (2004).

55 Törnros and Bolling (2005).

56 A meta-analysis is a statistical method of combining results of studies that examine similar measures.

57 J.K. Caird, C.T. Scialfa, G. Ho, and A. Smiley, “A Meta-analysis of Driving Performance and Crash 

Risk Associated With the Use of Cellular Telephones While Driving,” Proceedings of the Third 

International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training, and Vehicle Design, 

Rockport, Maine, June 27 through 30, 2005 (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Public Policy Center, 2005).
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

distract drivers from this task, risking harm to themselves and others. Therefore, 

the safest course of action is to refrain from using a cellular telephone while 

driving.58

The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) notes 

in its Model Commercial Driver License Manual (CDL manual) that distracted driving 

can result when performing an activity that shifts full attention away from driving.59

The CDL manual lists several potential distractors, including talking on a cellular 

telephone or a citizens band radio. It provides specific guidance on in-vehicle 

communication equipment, suggesting that drivers pull off the road to a safe, legal 

place when making or receiving a call, stating, “Do not place a call while driving.” 

The CDL manual also suggests that drivers should, if possible, turn off cellular 

telephones while in transit. The CDL manual further suggests that, if a call must be 

made, drivers should keep conversations short, avoid social calls, and not use the 

equipment in challenging traffic conditions, such as when driving in severe weather, 

congested areas, or work zones. The CDL manual further advises drivers to use 

caution when talking into hands-free devices because these devices can be unsafe to 

use while driving.

Legislation. No jurisdiction completely bans the use of all cellular telephones 

while driving.60 Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and the District of Columbia 

prohibit the use of hand-held telephones while driving; California will also do so, 

effective July 2008. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 

Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, 

and the District of Columbia restrict the use of cellular telephones by drivers with 

learner’s permits. The DoD recently implemented a policy that prohibits the use of 

cellular telephones without a hands-free device while operating privately owned 

vehicles on DoD installations and while operating Government vehicles anywhere. 

Eleven States—Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, 

Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas—and the District of 

Columbia prohibit school bus drivers from using cellular telephones while operating a 

school bus.

Researchers found that, in the District of Columbia, the rate of hand-held cellular 

telephone use declined significantly, from 6.1 percent to 3.5 percent, after legislation 

banning their use while driving passed.61 An earlier study found that, in New York State, 

hand-held cellular telephone use while driving declined initially after the law’s 

58 See NHTSA Policy and FAQs on Cellular Phone Use While Driving under Drowsy and Distracted 

Driving <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.54757ba83ef160af9a7ccf10dba046a0/>. 

Information accessed on June 25, 2006.

59 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, “Section 2.9—Distracted Driving,” Model 

Commercial Driver License Manual (Arlington, VA: AAMVA, 2005).

60 Information on State cellular telephone laws can be found on the Governors Highway Safety 

Association Web site <http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/index.html>.

61 A.T. McCartt, L.A. Hellinga, and L.L. Geary, “Effects of Washington, D.C., Law on Drivers’ 

Hand-Held Cell Phone Use,” Traffic Injury Prevention, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006): 1-5.
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

introduction (from 2.3 percent to 1.1 percent) and increased to 2.1 percent 1 year later.62

The earlier study concluded that long-term compliance with bans on cellular telephone use 

will require substantial enforcement efforts.

Previous Accident Investigation on Cellular Telephone Use and Data

On February 1, 2002, about 8:00 p.m., on the outer lanes of Interstate 95/495 

near Largo, Maryland, a 1998 two-door Ford Explorer Sport, traveling northbound at an 

estimated speed of 70 to 75 mph, veered off the left side of the roadway, crossed over 

the median, climbed up a guardrail, flipped over, and landed on top of a southbound 

2001 four-door Ford Windstar minivan.63 Subsequently, a 1998 four-door Jeep Grand 

Cherokee ran into the minivan. Of the eight people involved in the accident, five adults 

were fatally injured, one adult sustained minor injuries, and two children were 

uninjured.

The Safety Board determined the probable cause of the accident was the 

Explorer driver’s failure to maintain directional control of her high-profile, shortwheelbase vehicle in the windy conditions, due to a combination of inexperience, 

unfamiliarity with the vehicle, speed, and distraction caused by use of a hand-held 

wireless telephone. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the lack of an 

effective median barrier at the accident site. Safety recommendations concerning 

cellular telephones issued as a result of this accident are discussed in the Analysis

section of this report.

Accident Investigations on the Alexandria Avenue Bridge’s Clearance and 

Visibility

On April 4, 1987, about 7:15 p.m., a 70-passenger double-decked sightseeing bus, 

carrying a driver and 65 passengers to Mount Vernon, Virginia, collided with the 

Alexandria Avenue bridge.64 The 13-foot, 2-inch-high bus was traveling southbound in the 

right lane of the Parkway, at an estimated speed between 22 and 42 mph, when it struck 

the Alexandria Avenue arched stone overpass. The impact sheared off the bus’s roof 

rearward, exposing the upper seating level. Thirty-three passengers were transported to 

four area hospitals. Twenty-five passengers with minor injuries were treated and released; 

eight sustained minor-to-critical injuries and were hospitalized. One passenger died 

approximately 10 hours after the accident from injuries sustained in the accident. All but 

one of the injured were on the upper level of the bus, and most of the severely injured were 

located toward the rear of the upper level.

62 A.T. McCartt and L.L. Geary, “Longer Term Effects of New York State’s Law On Drivers’ Handheld 

Cell Phone Use,” Injury Prevention, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2004): 11-15.

63 National Transportation Safety Board, Ford Explorer Sport Collision with Ford Windstar Minivan 

and Jeep Grand Cherokee on Interstate 95/495 Near Largo, Maryland, February 1, 2002, Highway 

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-03/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2003).

64 National Transportation Safety Board, Impact With Arched Stone Overpass of 70-Passenger 

Double-Decked Sightseeing Bus on the George Washington Memorial Parkway, Alexandria, Virginia, 

April 4, 1987, Highway Accident/Incident Summary Report NTSB/HAR-87/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 

1987).
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the 

failure of the bus driver to anticipate and to recognize his approach to the low-clearance 

overpass and move the bus into the left lane in time to allow it to clear the overpass. 

Contributing to the accident was the lack of appropriate advance warning of the low 

clearance, the inadequate delineation of the overpass by means of artificial illumination or 

reflective signing, and the driver’s recent use of illicit drugs.

As a result of the accident, the Safety Board recommended that the NPS:

H-87-58

Inform all park superintendents of the facts, conditions, and 

circumstances of this accident. Identify any low-clearance structures over 

roadways in the National Park System. Determine the extent and severity 

of any low-clearance problems in relation to the vehicles that use the park 

roads and provide information to roadway users about the low-clearance 

problems.

The Safety Board also recommended that the NPS, in cooperation with the FHWA:

H-87-59

Identify and implement appropriate countermeasures for low-clearance 

structures over all park roadways including, but not limited to, roadway 

and low-structure signing, lighting, or the prohibition of vehicles on the 

roadway that cannot clear the lowest clearance structures.

On April 4, 2003, the Safety Board classified both recommendations “Closed—

Acceptable Action,” after the NPS informed the Safety Board that it had forwarded the 

Safety Board’s report to all NPS regional directors and that it was in agreement with the 

intent of the Board’s recommendations.

In addition, on April 10, 1987, 6 days after the accident, the NPS replaced the 

low-clearance warning signs with signs meeting MUTCD guidance (see figures 3 and 

4). The new sign over the left southbound lane indicated a 13-foot, 4-inch clearance, 

and the new sign over the right southbound lane, a 10-foot, 2-inch clearance.

Actions Following the November 2004 Accident

Following the most recent bus accident in November 2004, the FHWA formed 

an interdisciplinary team of bridge, safety, and intelligent transportation system 

experts. The team made several recommendations to the NPS for the accident site: 

(1) provide additional signing and revise existing advance warning signs, (2) consider 

installation of an early warning overhead clearance system, (3) consider modification 

of lane number and configuration, and (4) consider bridge replacement. In response, 

the NPS installed four new warning signs on the Parkway before the Alexandria 

Avenue bridge. The new signs, which are identical, are located approximately 3,455 
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

feet and 1,197 feet before the Alexandria Avenue bridge for southbound motorists and 

4,282 feet and 1,018 feet before the bridge for northbound motorists. (See figure 6.)

Figure 6. One of the four new warning signs for the Alexandria Avenue bridge overpass.

The NPS also replaced the existing 24- by 24-inch “No Trucks” signs on all 

feeder roads to the southbound Parkway with larger 24- by 30-inch signs. The NPS did 

not consider installation of an early warning overhead clearance system, reconfiguration 

of the traffic lanes, or bridge replacement as viable options for several reasons, 

including aesthetic and historical considerations. The NPS also established a new 

standard for vegetation trimming; beginning about 1,200 feet from the Alexandria 

Avenue bridge, southbound and northbound, vegetation will be cut back about 37 feet 

from the curb and up the embankment. Finally, the NPS added to its Web site the 

following information pertaining to commercial vehicle permit requirements and lowclearance information:

A National Park Service Commercial Vehicle Permit must be obtained prior to 

the use of a commercial vehicle on the George Washington Memorial Parkway, 

the Clara Barton Parkway, Crest Lane, East Boulevard and West Boulevard. 

You must be aware that there are low bridge clearances which range from 10'2" 

to 18'5" in height. There are also weight restrictions for vehicles.65

65 Information accessed December 19, 2006, from <http://www.nps.gov/gwmp/planyourvisit/permits.htm>.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

On July 17, 2006, NPS and USPP representatives met to discuss concerns 

regarding trucks and buses using the Parkway. They identified several locations before the 

entrance to the Parkway with inadequate signage regarding Parkway restrictions (that is, 

“No Trucks”). They also determined that the text size on some of the signs along the 

Parkway is too small. Another related issue identified by the USPP concerns the fact that 

truck drivers who use Internet travel direction tools (for example, MapQuest, Yahoo, and 

Google) do not receive information on vehicle restrictions. In its August 25, 2006, letter, 

the NPS updated the Safety Board on its progress in resolving problems on the Parkway, 

noting that it had contacted the Virginia Department of Transportation to assist with 

incorporating “No Trucks” signage at selected locations and also contacted MapQuest and 

other Web sites to request that they add vehicle restrictions to their directions. The NPS 

plans to improve other signage along the Parkway and in advance of it.
25 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

This analysis first discusses the factors and conditions the Safety Board was able 

to exclude as neither causing nor contributing to the accident. It then provides a brief 

overview of the accident events and discusses the safety issues relevant to the accident: 

low bridge clearance, cellular telephone use while driving, and collection of adequate 

cellular telephone accident data.

Exclusions

At the time of the accident, skies were clear and no rain was reported. Postaccident 

mechanical inspection of the bus revealed no mechanical defects that would have affected 

the driver’s ability to control the vehicle. The vehicle was traveling at an ECM-recorded 

speed of approximately 46 mph, which was consistent with the posted speed limit signs of 

45 mph. Toxicological tests were negative for alcohol and drugs. At the time of the 

accident, the driver had been on duty for about 2 hours and he had been off duty for 9 

hours. He was in compliance with the hours-of-service regulations (49 CFR 395.5). 

Firefighters arrived at the scene 5 minutes following notification, and all of the injured 

were extricated and transported to a hospital within 30 minutes. The Safety Board 

therefore concludes that the following factors neither caused nor contributed to the 

accident: the weather, the mechanical condition of the vehicle, the vehicle’s speed, the 

driver’s use of alcohol or drugs, and driver fatigue. The Safety Board further concludes 

that the emergency response was timely and adequate.

The accident bus had a GVWR of 52,060 pounds and a length of 45 feet, 6 inches, 

clearly within range of permit requirements for access to the George Washington 

Memorial Parkway. At the time of the accident, Eyre did not possess such a permit. 

However, even had Eyre obtained a permit, it would not have increased the bus driver’s 

knowledge of hazards specific to the Parkway, such as low clearances, because Parkway 

permits did not contain that information. The Safety Board concludes that Eyre’s lack of a 

permit to access the Parkway did not contribute to the accident.

Truck and bus drivers must be aware of the height of their vehicles to avoid 

collisions with bridges and roof overhangs at gas stations, garages, hotels, and other 

buildings. According to the Prevost specifications, the bus was 12 feet high. A placard 

inside the vehicle on the dashboard noted that the vehicle’s height was 12 feet, 4 inches. 

Further, Eyre provides training to its drivers, including the accident driver, which presents 

information on bus height and the dangers of low-clearance areas. The Safety Board 

therefore concludes that sufficient information was provided to the accident driver on his 

vehicle’s height and on the dangers of low vertical clearance areas for him to have avoided 

this accident.
Analysis 26 Highway Accident Report

Accident Discussion

On November 14, 2004, a 2000 Prevost motorcoach occupied by the bus driver, 27 

student passengers, and a chaperone departed BWI heading toward Mount Vernon, 

Virginia. It was the second bus of a two-bus team. As the bus approached the Alexandria 

Avenue bridge on the Parkway, the driver failed to notice or respond to warning signs 

indicating that the bridge’s right lane has a 10-foot, 2-inch vertical clearance. The driver 

subsequently drove the 12-foot-high bus under the bridge, colliding with the bridge’s 

underside and side and coming to rest about 470 feet beyond the bridge. The bus’s roof 

was destroyed, and 11 of the 29 occupants were injured.

The data recovered postaccident from the accident bus’s DDEC ECM contained 

limited precrash information on “last stop” and “hard brake” events. The DDEC ECM 

data indicate that the driver applied the throttle for at least a minute and a half before the 

accident and that the accident bus was traveling approximately 46 mph just before the 

accident. The data also indicate that the driver was not using cruise control at the time of 

the accident and show that the speed of the bus decelerated from 45.5 mph (20 seconds 

before last stop) to 32.5 mph (19 seconds before last stop), a deceleration rate of 13 mph 

per second. This rapid deceleration rate can only be explained by an outside force acting 

on the bus because, according to the DDEC ECM data, the brakes were not being applied 

at the time of the accident. In this case, the outside force was the bridge, a fixed object 

capable of decelerating the bus at the recorded rate.

Furthermore, the DDEC ECM data indicate that about 4 to 5 seconds after the point 

of initial deceleration, which slowed the bus from 45.5 mph to 32.5 mph, the brakes were 

applied and remained applied until the bus came to a complete stop. Using the speeds given 

at each second from 19 seconds before last stop to initial braking, the bus would have 

traveled a distance of approximately 183 feet, placing the front of the bus approximately 144 

feet past the 39-foot-long bridge at the time the brakes were applied. The data also show that, 

after the brakes were applied, the bus traveled another 326 feet before coming to final rest 

approximately 470 feet beyond the overpass. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the 

driver did not attempt to stop the bus until after the vehicle struck the bridge.

Witnesses stated, the driver admitted, and cellular telephone records verify that the 

driver was talking on a hands-free cellular telephone about the time of the accident. The 

driver reported he was talking to his sister and that he was upset because he believed the 

lead bus driver had mistreated him during the trip. The accident bus driver stated that he 

saw neither the warning signs nor the bridge until after the accident occurred. Researchers 

have found that drivers conversing on a cellular telephone are cognitively distracted from 

the driving task;66 that is, drivers’ mental resources are diverted from the driving task, 

consequently impairing driving performance. Furthermore, complex cellular telephone 

conversations are more distracting than simple conversations. The Safety Board concludes 

that the bus driver’s cellular telephone conversation at the time of the accident diverted his 

attention from driving, and, as a result, he failed to notice the low-clearance warning signs 

for the bridge and the low vertical clearance of the bridge itself.

66 (a) Transport Canada TP#13889 E. (b) Strayer, Drews, and Johnston (2003).
Analysis 27 Highway Accident Report

Alexandria Avenue Bridge’s Vertical Clearance

The Alexandria Avenue bridge spans four lanes (two southbound and two 

northbound) of the Parkway. Due to the bridge’s arched configuration, the outside lanes 

have less vertical clearance than the inside lanes. At the time of the accident, the roadside 

sign 1,580 feet before the bridge, as well as signs on the bridge, warned motorists that the 

clearance was 13 feet, 4 inches in the left southbound lane and 10 feet, 2 inches in the 

right southbound lane. Since the accident bus was traveling near the posted speed of 

45 mph, the bus driver would have had sufficient time—approximately 23 seconds—to 

change lanes from the point at which he encountered the warning sign 1,580 feet before 

the bridge until his vehicle reached the bridge.

Although up to 200 buses per day were using the Parkway, only the bus involved 

in this accident had collided with the bridge in the 5 years preceding the accident. Because 

bus collisions with the Alexandria Avenue bridge are an uncommon event, the Safety 

Board concludes that the low-clearance warning signs located in advance of the bridge, as 

well as the low-clearance warning signs on the bridge, provide sufficient warning for 

drivers approaching the Alexandria Avenue bridge to avoid colliding with it.

Following the accident, the NPS placed four additional warning signs in advance 

of the structure: 3,455 feet and 1,197 feet before the bridge for southbound motorists and 

4,282 feet and 1,018 feet before the bridge for northbound motorists. The addition of the 

new southbound warning sign 3,455 feet before the bridge increases motorist warning 

time to 52 seconds, assuming travel at the 45-mph posted speed limit. This action and 

recent initiatives to improve signage and to add information about vehicle restrictions to 

travel direction Web sites should increase information available to drivers concerning 

vehicle height restrictions on the Parkway.

Cellular Telephone Use

As noted earlier in this report, more than 204 million people subscribe to U.S. 

wireless communications services, which include devices such as cellular telephones. 

Cellular telephone use by drivers continues to increase, as evidenced by NHTSA’s 2005 

observational survey in which 6 percent of drivers were observed to be using a hand-held 

cellular telephone, compared to 5 percent of drivers in 2004. Surveys of self-reported use 

of cellular telephones while driving show that about 30 percent of all drivers use a cellular 

telephone while driving.67 Furthermore, commercial drivers, such as the accident bus 

driver, who spend their workday on the road and use cellular phones for maintaining 

contact with their companies, are likely to be heavy cellular telephone users.68

Research has demonstrated that using a cellular telephone while driving degrades 

several aspects of driving performance, resulting in slower reaction times, slower driving 

67 DOT HS 809 566.

68 Troglauer, Heis, and Christens (2006).
Analysis 28 Highway Accident Report

speeds, and increased instances of attention lapses.69 The driver involved in this accident 

was using a hands-free cellular telephone at the time of the accident. Research has shown 

that conversing on a hands-free cellular telephone while driving impairs performance.70

Epidemiological studies indicate that the risk of being involved in a crash when using a 

cellular telephone is almost four times higher than when a cellular telephone is not used 

and that using a hands-free cellular telephone is no safer than using a hand-held cellular 

telephone.71 The Safety Board concludes that the use of either a hand-held or hands-free 

cellular telephone while driving can impair the performance of even a CDL holder, such as 

the driver of the accident vehicle.

This accident investigation, like the investigation of the Largo, Maryland, accident 

in 2003,72 shows the grave danger of driving while distracted by cellular telephone 

conversation. In its report of the Largo investigation, the Safety Board concluded that all 

drivers should be educated about the risks of distracted driving, including the cognitive 

demands associated with the use of wireless interactive communication devices, which 

include cellular telephones.73 As a result of the investigation, the Safety Board made the 

following recommendations to NHTSA (H-03-03 and -04), to the American Driver and 

Traffic Safety Education Association (ADTSEA) (H-03-10), and to the Advertising 

Council, Inc. (H-03-11):

H-03-03

Develop, in conjunction with The Advertising Council, Inc., [H-03-11] a 

media campaign stressing the dangers associated with distracted driving.

H-03-04

Develop, in conjunction with the American Driver and Traffic Safety 

Education Association, [H-03-10] a module for driver education 

curriculums that emphasizes the risks of engaging in distracting behavior.

H-03-10

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration [H-03-04], a module for driver education curriculums that 

emphasizes the risks of engaging in distracting behavior.

H-03-11

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration [H-03-03], a media campaign stressing the dangers 

associated with distracted driving.

69 (a) Strayer and Drews (2004). (b) Beede and Kass (2006). (c) Strayer and Johnston (2001).

70 (a) Patten, Kircher, Östlund, and Nilsson (2004). (b) Törnros and Bolling (2005).

71 (a) Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997). (b) S. McEvoy and others (2005).

72 NTSB/HAR-03/02.

73 NTSB/HAR-03/02.
Analysis 29 Highway Accident Report

NHTSA indicated on September 22, 2003, that it was working with an 

international public relations firm to develop an advertising campaign stressing the 

dangers of distracted driving that would focus initially on novice drivers and then phase in 

other groups identified as the highest risk users of potentially distracting technologies 

while driving. On March 2, 2004, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation 

H-03-03 “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response” because the public service campaign, 

even though not developed in conjunction with The Advertising Council, as 

recommended, made progress in addressing the intent of this recommendation. However, 

the Safety Board also noted the need for a media campaign that stresses the dangers of 

distracted driving for all populations, not just high-risk users. Since The Advertising 

Council did not participate in NHTSA’s campaign and had not responded to the Board, 

Safety Recommendation H-03-11 remained classified “Open—Await Response.”

NHTSA again addressed the issue in a January 27, 2006, letter to the Safety Board, 

in which it stated that it was serving in a technical advisory role to the Ford Multi-State 

Working Group and various advertising and public relations firms, including The 

Advertising Council, to develop a public service campaign targeting teenage reckless 

driving. The Safety Board acknowledges that teenage reckless driving is an important issue 

but remains concerned about the narrow focus of the campaign and its relevance to 

distracted driving, the intended target of Safety Recommendations H-03-03 and -11. Safety 

Recommendation H-03-03 to NHTSA remains classified “Open—Acceptable Alternate 

Response” pending establishment of a media campaign that stresses the dangers of 

distracted driving for all driving populations. Safety Recommendation H-03-11 to The 

Advertising Council is reclassified “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response” in this report.

NHTSA also stated in its January 27, 2006, letter to the Safety Board that the 

ADTSEA driver education curriculum had been updated to include a section discussing 

distractions that can cause driver inattention, such as cellular telephone use, passengers, 

and audio systems, and ways the distractions increase risk for negative consequences, 

such as a crash. NHTSA further indicated that it had served as a reviewer of the model 

curriculum revisions, which were finalized in spring 2006. The updated training materials, 

including videos, are available for a fee through the ADTSEA Web site 

<http://adtsea.iup.edu/adtsea/>. As this revised curriculum satisfies the intent of these 

recommendations, Safety Recommendations H-03-04 to NHTSA and H-03-10 to 

ADTSEA are classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Some States have prohibitions in place against cellular telephone use by novice 

drivers. As a result of the Largo, Maryland, accident investigation,74 the Safety Board 

recommended to the 48 States that did not have such prohibitions:

H-03-08

Enact legislation to prohibit holders of learner’s permits and intermediate 

licenses from using interactive wireless communication devices while 

driving.

74 NTSB/HAR-03/02.
Analysis 30 Highway Accident Report

Currently, 13 States and the District of Columbia limit cellular telephone use by 

drivers with learner’s permits.75 In an effort to provide safe transportation to school 

children, 11 States and the District of Columbia also prohibit the use of cellular telephones 

by drivers when driving a school bus.76 (For more information on individual State’s 

progress in implementing Safety Recommendation H-03-08, see table 8.)

Table 8. Status of Safety Recommendation H-03-08 by State.

Status State

Open—Acceptable Alternate Response AL, AZ, AR, CA, FL, GA, HI, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MA, 

MI, MS, MT, NE, NV, NH, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, VT, 

VA, WA, WI, WY

Open—Acceptable Response CO, NY, TX

Open—Unacceptable Response AK, ID, MO, NM, ND, OR, UT

Closed—Acceptable Action CT, DE, IL, MD, MN, NC, RI, TN, WV

The driver distraction initiatives being developed by NHTSA, ADTSEA, and the 

States target mainly noncommercial and young, novice drivers. The AAMVA’s CDL 

manual recognizes that cellular telephone use by commercial drivers can also be 

hazardous.77 The manual recommends pulling off the road in a safe, legal place when 

making or receiving a call on communications equipment, stating “Do not place a call 

while driving.” The manual also recognizes that hands-free cellular devices are unsafe to 

use while driving. Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and the District of Columbia 

prohibit the use of hand-held cellular telephones while driving by all drivers, including 

commercial drivers. Industry is also beginning to recognize the need for cellular telephone 

policies; in addition to Eyre, other motor carriers, including Greyhound, have instituted 

policies on restricting cellular telephone use or are in the process of doing so. However, 

the primary motorcoach industry associations (the ABA and the UMA), public bus 

transportation organizations (the CTAA and APTA), school bus industry associations (the 

NAPT, the NSTA, and the NASDPTS), and bus driver unions (the Teamsters and the ATU) 

have not yet developed such policies for their members. Furthermore, the FMCSA has not 

published a policy regarding cellular telephone use while driving.

Payment for transportation services creates an implicit contract between the 

passenger and the carrier that the carrier will transport the passenger safely and not allow 

the vehicle operator to take unnecessary risks. Motorcoaches, such as the accident bus, 

typically transport 40 to 50 passengers per trip, creating the potential for significant injury 

or death to a large number of people in the event of an accident. In addition, like school 

buses, such vehicles frequently transport children (27 high school students in this 

accident) and other vulnerable groups, including the elderly. Transit buses also transport 

75 These jurisdictions are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New 

Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

76 These jurisdictions are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, 

Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas, and the District of Columbia.

77 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, “Section 2—Driving Safely,” Model 

Commercial Driver License Manual (December 2005) 2-22.
Analysis 31 Highway Accident Report

large numbers of passengers, often in urban areas. Consequently, these drivers have a 

special obligation to provide the safest driving environment possible for the passengers in 

their care. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the States and the District of 

Columbia should enact legislation to prohibit cellular telephone use by CDL holders with 

a passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the authority of that 

endorsement, except in emergencies. Because the FMCSA is the primary oversight agency 

for buses, the Safety Board believes that the FMCSA should publish regulations 

prohibiting cellular telephone use by CDL holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus 

endorsement, while driving under the authority of that endorsement, except in 

emergencies. The Safety Board recognizes that regulatory change takes time and 

considers it imperative to alert motor carriers and drivers without delay about the dangers 

of using cellular telephones while driving; therefore, the Safety Board believes that the 

ABA, the UMA, the CTAA, APTA, the NAPT, the NSTA, the NASDPTS, the Teamsters, 

and the ATU should develop formal policies prohibiting cellular telephone use by CDL 

holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the 

authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies.

Cellular Telephone Accident Data Issues

The 2005 FARS data show that, of the 59,373 drivers involved in fatal accidents, 

“cellular telephone in use in vehicle” was coded for 135 drivers (0.23 percent) and 

“cellular telephone present in vehicle” was coded for 726 drivers (1.2 percent). As noted 

earlier, FARS data indicate that cellular telephones were coded as a driver-related factor 

for 2.29 percent of the bus drivers involved in fatal bus accidents that occurred in 

2005.78

In its 2003 investigation of the Largo, Maryland, accident, which involved a driver 

using a cellular telephone while driving,79 the Safety Board concluded that “available data 

are insufficient to determine the magnitude of risks associated with wireless telephone 

use” and identified several possible explanations:

(1) drivers are unlikely to self-report wireless telephone use during an accident; 

(2) police officers are not necessarily trained to detect wireless telephone use, nor 

are they required to report it in the majority of State accident reports; (3) obtaining 

and analyzing wireless telephone records is time-consuming; (4) culling wireless 

telephone use from existing accident reports is difficult; and (5) currently, [at the 

time of the Largo, Maryland, accident investigation] only 16 States have codes for 

driver distraction including codes for wireless telephone use, on their traffic 

accident investigation forms.

78 FARS, 2005.

79 NTSB/HAR-03/02.
Analysis 32 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board consequently recommended that the 34 States that did not have 

driver distraction codes on their traffic accident investigation forms: 80

H-03-09

Add driver distraction codes, including codes for interactive wireless 

communication device use, to your traffic accident investigation forms.

For information on individual State’s progress in implementing this 

recommendation, see table 9.

Table 9. Status of Safety Recommendation H-03-09 by State.

Status State

Open—Acceptable Alternate Response AL, AR, CT, HI

Open—Acceptable Response GA, IN,* ME, MS, NH, NC, OH, RI, WA,* WV, WI, 

WY

Open—Unacceptable Response AZ, ID, ND, CO*

Closed—Acceptable Action AK, DE, IL, KS, LA, NM, NV, SD, VT, VA

Closed—Reconsidered KY, MO, SC, UT

*The Safety Board has received and is currently reviewing information on the status of this recommendation for these 

States.

This accident, like others discussed in this report, demonstrates the negative 

consequences of driving while distracted by a cellular telephone conversation. However, it 

is difficult to determine the extent of this problem with the available accident data. The 

Safety Board concludes that the lack of data on cellular telephone use in accidents hinders 

a formal accounting of the driving risks associated with cellular telephone use. The Safety 

Board therefore reiterates Safety Recommendation H-03-09 to the States of Alabama, 

Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, 

Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, 

Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming to add driver distraction codes, 

including codes for interactive wireless communication device use, to their traffic accident 

forms.

80 These States are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 

Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New 

Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
33 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The following factors neither caused nor contributed to the accident: the weather, the 

mechanical condition of the vehicle, the vehicle’s speed, the driver’s use of alcohol or 

drugs, and driver fatigue.

2. The emergency response was timely and adequate.

3. Eyre Bus Service, Inc.’s, lack of a permit to access the George Washington Memorial 

Parkway did not contribute to the accident.

4. Sufficient information was provided to the accident driver on his vehicle’s height and 

on the dangers of low vertical clearance areas for him to have avoided this accident.

5. The driver did not attempt to stop the bus until after the vehicle struck the bridge.

6. The bus driver’s cellular telephone conversation at the time of the accident diverted 

his attention from driving, and, as a result, he failed to notice the low-clearance 

warning signs for the bridge and the low vertical clearance of the bridge itself.

7. The low-clearance warning signs located in advance of the bridge, as well as the 

low-clearance warning signs on the bridge, provide sufficient warning for drivers 

approaching the Alexandria Avenue bridge to avoid colliding with it.

8. The use of either a hand-held or hands-free cellular telephone while driving can 

impair the performance of even a commercial driver’s license holder, such as the 

driver of the accident vehicle.

9. The lack of data on cellular telephone use in accidents hinders a formal accounting of 

the driving risks associated with cellular telephone use.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the bus driver’s failure to notice and respond to posted low-clearance 

warning signs and to the bridge itself due to cognitive distraction resulting from 

conversing on a hands-free cellular telephone while driving. Contributing to the accident 

was the low vertical clearance of the bridge, which does not meet current National Park 

Service road standards or American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials guidelines.
34 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes 

the following safety recommendations:

New Recommendations

To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration:

Publish regulations prohibiting cellular telephone use by commercial 

driver’s license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus 

endorsement, while driving under the authority of that endorsement, except 

in emergencies. 

(H-06-27)

To the 50 States and the District of Columbia:

Enact legislation to prohibit cellular telephone use by commercial driver’s 

license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, while 

driving under the authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies. 

(H-06-28)

To the American Bus Association, the United Motorcoach Association, the Community Transportation Association of America, the American Public Transportation 

Association, the National Association for Pupil Transportation, the National School 

Transportation Association, the National Association of State Directors of Pupil 

Transportation Services, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the 

Amalgamated Transit Union:

Develop formal policies prohibiting cellular telephone use by commercial 

driver’s license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus 

endorsement, while driving under the authority of that endorsement, except 

in emergencies. (H-06-29)
Recommendations 35 Highway Accident Report

Reiterated Recommendation

To the 20 States that do not have driver distraction codes on their traffic accident 

investigation forms:

Add driver distraction codes, including codes for interactive wireless 

communication device use, to your traffic accident investigation forms. 

(H-03-09)

Previously Issued Recommendations Classified in This Report

H-03-03

Develop, in conjunction with The Advertising Council, Inc., [H-03-11] a 

media campaign stressing the dangers associated with distracted driving.

Safety Recommendation H-03-03, previously issued to the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration, remains classified “Open—Acceptable Alternate 

Response” in the Cellular Telephone Use section of this report’s Analysis.

H-03-04

Develop, in conjunction with the American Driver and Traffic Safety 

Education Association, [H-03-10] a module for driver education 

curriculums that emphasizes the risks of engaging in distracting behavior.

Safety Recommendation H-03-04, also previously issued to the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration, is reclassified from “Open—Acceptable Response” to 

“Closed—Acceptable Action” in the Cellular Telephone Use section of this report’s 

Analysis.

H-03-10

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration [H-03-04], a module for driver education curriculums that 

emphasizes the risks of engaging in distracting behavior.

Safety Recommendation H-03-10, previously issued to the American Driver and 

Traffic Safety Education Association, is reclassified from “Open—Acceptable Response” 

to “Closed—Acceptable Action” in the Cellular Telephone Use section of this report’s 

Analysis.
Recommendations 36 Highway Accident Report

H-03-11

Develop, in conjunction with the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration [H-03-03], a media campaign stressing the dangers 

associated with distracted driving.

Safety Recommendation H-03-11, previously issued to The Advertising Council, 

Inc., is reclassified from “Open—Await Response” to “Open—Acceptable Alternate 

Response” in the Cellular Telephone Use section of this report’s Analysis.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARK V. ROSENKER DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Chairman Member

ROBERT L. SUMWALT KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS

Vice Chairman Member

Adopted: November 21, 2006

Member Higgins filed the following concurring statement on November 29, 2006, 

and was joined in this statement by Member Hersman on December 11, 2006.

Notation 7845A

Member HIGGINS, concurring:

I commend staff for bringing this report to the Board and for raising the important 

and timely issue of the hazards of using a cellular telephone while driving a vehicle. The 

report and the staff’s formal presentations highlighted the distraction that a phone 

conversation can create with the great potential to distract a driver from the primary duty 

to operate a vehicle safely and with full attention to that task.

As I stated at the Board meeting, I fully support further action on the issue of cell 

phone use while operating motor vehicles. I understand the staff’s desire for a complete 

prohibition on all cell phone use for all drivers while driving, except in bona fide 

emergencies. While I share the concern that a piecemeal, driver-by-driver approach may 

not be the best way to address this issue, I hesitate to take the sweeping action 

recommended by some staff because I believe it is premature. I do not believe we have 

enough information to understand the level of cognitive impairment that results from cell 

phone use or from other activities that distract drivers. Nor do I believe a total ban on cell 

phone use can be achieved at this time.
Recommendations 37 Highway Accident Report

I continue to be concerned about the safety risks for drivers, passengers and other 

motorists when cell phones and other electronic devices are used by those behind the 

wheel of any vehicle. The data we have show that distractions are increasing and handheld electronic technology is changing constantly and being used more frequently.

I believe the NTSB has an important role to play in evaluating the research that has 

been done on the use of hand held devices and other driver distractions, seeking out 

expertise from industry, the states, law enforcement, academia, government and 

elsewhere, and educating the public on the issues and on what can and should be done to 

eliminate or minimize these distractions.

At the Board’s request, the staff agreed to come back to the Board with a proposal 

to address these issues. Possible options include a safety study or public forum. There may 

be others. I look forward to reviewing staff recommendations for addressing these critical 

issues and working with my colleagues to implement them. We have an opportunity, 

working together, to take additional and important actions that will contribute to reducing 

the unacceptable level of highway deaths and injuries that occur every year in this country.

39 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Alexandria, 

Virginia, accident on November 14, 2004. Investigative team members were dispatched 

from the Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Georgia, and Arlington, Texas, offices. Groups were 

established to investigate highway factors, motor carrier operations, vehicle factors, 

survival factors, and human performance factors.

Participating in the investigation were representatives of Eyre Bus Service, Inc., 

the National Park Service, and the Federal Highway Administration.

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.