United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1997 NUCLEAR

NONPROLIFERATION

AND SAFETY

Concerns With the

International Atomic

Energy Agency’s Technical

Cooperation Program

GAO/RCED-97-192

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-277303 

letter date goes here

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman, Committee on Government Reform

 and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bob Graham

United States Senate

The Honorable Peter Deutsch

The Honorable Robert Menendez

House of Representatives

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)1

 has the dual role of

promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear

materials under its supervision are not diverted to military purposes

(safeguards).2

 Since 1958, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy through its technical cooperation program, IAEA has provided

technical assistance to its member states by supplying equipment, expert

services, and training that support the upgrading or establishment of

nuclear techniques and facilities. Although the United States does not

receive technical assistance, it has been the leading financial donor to

IAEA’s technical cooperation program.

In March 1997, we reported to you on IAEA’s technical assistance for Cuba,

including assistance for the partially completed Cuban nuclear power

1

IAEA, an autonomous international organization affiliated with the United Nations, was established in

Vienna, Austria, in 1957. IAEA’s principal policy-making organizations are the General Conference,

composed of representatives of the 124 IAEA member states; its decision-making body, the 35-member

Board of Governors; and a Secretariat headed by a Director General. The United States is a permanent

member of IAEA’s Board of Governors.

2

In the early 1960s, IAEA established an inspection program based on a system of technical measures,

referred to as safeguards, designed to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material.

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expanded IAEA’s safeguards

responsibilities because it required signatory non-nuclear-weapon states to agree not to acquire

nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA’s safeguards for all nuclear material used for peaceful nuclear

activities. Both the nonproliferation treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which prohibits nuclear

weapons in signatory Latin American countries—bind signatories to blanket nonproliferation

agreements for their entire nuclear program and require inspections of all nuclear facilities by IAEA,

known as “full-scope” safeguards.

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reactors whose construction is suspended.3 As requested, this report

examines (1) the purpose and effectiveness of IAEA’s technical cooperation

program, (2) the cost of U.S. participation in IAEA’s technical cooperation

program, and (3) whether the United States ensures that the activities of

IAEA’s technical cooperation program do not conflict with U.S. nuclear

nonproliferation and safety goals.

Results in Brief While the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that

applying safeguards is IAEA’s most important function, most developing

countries believe that receiving technical assistance through IAEA’s

technical cooperation program is just as important. The United States and

other major donors principally participate in the program to help ensure

that the member states fully support IAEA’s safeguards and the 1970 Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the past, the United

States and other major donors raised concerns about the effectiveness and

efficiency of the technical cooperation program.4

 For example, the United

States expressed concern that some technical assistance projects were

devoid of significant technical, health, or socioeconomic benefit to the

recipient country. Most of IAEA’s program evaluation reports, internal

audits, and project files that we reviewed, covering the period from 1985

through 1996, did not assess the impact of the technical cooperation

program, and no performance criteria had been established to help

measure the success or failure of the program. For the past 5 years, IAEA’s

Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation has been taking steps

to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the program,

including establishing a system for measuring the performance of some of

its projects. The United States and other major donors strongly support

these initiatives, but State Department officials are concerned about their

sustainability.

The United States provided a voluntary contribution of about $16 million,

or about 32 percent of the total $49 million paid by IAEA member states to

the technical cooperation fund for 1996. The United States has historically

been the largest financial donor to the fund. Because many IAEA member

states are not paying into the technical cooperation fund, some member

states, including the United States and Japan, are carrying the program

3

See Nuclear Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Technical Assistance for Cuba

(GAO/RCED-97-72, Mar. 24, 1997).

4

Fourteen member states—known as the Geneva Group—are major donors to United Nations

agencies, including IAEA. These major donors are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and

the United States.

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financially. Specifically, for 1996, 72, or about 58 percent, of the 124 IAEA

member states made no payments at all to the technical cooperation fund,

yet most of these states received technical assistance from IAEA.

Officials from the Department of State, the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System

Organizations in Vienna, Austria, told us that they do not systematically

review or monitor all of IAEA’s technical assistance projects to ensure that

they do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation or safety goals.

However, we found that U.S. officials had sporadically reviewed projects

in countries of concern to the United States. U.S. officials also told us that

the vast majority of IAEA’s technical assistance projects do not pose any

concerns about nuclear proliferation because the assistance is generally in

areas, such as medicine and agriculture, that do not involve the transfer of

sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. However, we found that IAEA

has provided nuclear technical assistance projects for Iran, North Korea,

and Cuba—all countries where the United States is concerned about

nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety. For example, although

the United States strongly opposes the completion of Iran’s Bushehr

nuclear power plant because civilian nuclear technology and training

could help advance Iran’s nuclear weapons program, IAEA has budgeted,

for 1995 through 1999, about $1.3 million in technical assistance related to

Iran’s efforts to complete the plant. Moreover, a portion of the funds for

projects in countries of concern to the United States is coming from U.S.

voluntary contributions to IAEA.

Background Under its 1957 statute, IAEA is authorized, among other things, to facilitate

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the production of electric

power, by supplying materials, services, equipment and facilities to its

member states, particularly considering the needs of the developing

countries. About 90 countries receive technical assistance, mostly through

over 1,000 projects in IAEA’s technical cooperation program. IAEA’ s

technical cooperation program funds projects in 10 major program areas,

including agriculture, the development of member states’ commercial

nuclear power programs, and nuclear safety. The average cost of a

member state’s technical assistance project is about $60,000.

IAEA provided about $800 million in technical assistance to its member

states from 1958 through 1996, for equipment, expert services, training,

and subcontracts (agreements between IAEA and a third party to provide

services to IAEA member states). IAEA’s training activities include

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fellowships, scientific visits, and training courses. Egypt was the largest

recipient of IAEA’s technical assistance overall. About 44 percent of the

assistance was spent for equipment, and—from 1980 through 1996—about

half of the funds were provided for assistance in three program areas—the

application of isotopes and radiation in agriculture, general atomic energy

development, and safety in nuclear energy. For 1997 through 1998, IAEA

approved $154 million more in technical assistance for its member states.5

Technical assistance projects are approved by IAEA’s Board of Governors

for a 2-year programming cycle, and member states are required to submit

written project proposals to IAEA 1 year before the start of the

programming cycle. The proposals are appraised for funding by IAEA staff

and IAEA member states in terms of the projects’ technical and practical

feasibility, national development priorities, and the projects’ long-term

advantages to the recipient countries. Because IAEA’s full-scope

safeguards, as embodied in the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT), emerged after IAEA was established, all IAEA

member states in good standing are eligible for the same privileges,

including receiving technical assistance. IAEA does not bar technical

assistance for member states that do not have IAEA’s full-scope safeguards

or are not parties to the NPT. For example, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba

receive IAEA’s technical assistance but do not have full-scope safeguards

and are not parties to the NPT.

6

U.S. participation in IAEA’s technical cooperation program is coordinated

through an interagency group—the International Nuclear Technology

Liaison Office—which is chaired by the Department of State and includes

representatives from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC). The United States also maintains a presence at IAEA through the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria.

U.S. contractors from Argonne National Laboratory and the National

Academy of Sciences/National Research Council support U.S. training and

fellowship activities for the program. In addition to developing and

5

According to IAEA officials, about $45 million of this amount is for projects that are currently

unfunded.

6

India is also not a party to the NPT, but it has not requested technical assistance from IAEA since

1979. Cuba signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in March 1995 but has not ratified it. According to State

Department officials, despite Cuba’s failure to accept IAEA’s full-scope safeguards, all of Cuba’s

nuclear facilities are subject to safeguards under separate, legally binding agreements between IAEA

and Cuba. In addition, IAEA member states that receive technical assistance must sign a revised

supplementary agreement to ensure that the technical assistance they receive will be used only for the

peaceful applications of atomic energy and that the technical assistance projects in their country will

be subject to IAEA’s safeguards.

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coordinating U.S. policy towards IAEA’s technical cooperation program, the

interagency group (1) proposes and recommends U.S. support for specific

projects—known as “footnote a” projects—only in IAEA member states that

are parties to the NPT or other nuclear nonproliferation treaties;7

(2) selects courses and participants for U.S.-hosted IAEA training courses

and places IAEA fellows at U.S. institutions, such as national laboratories

and universities; (3) facilitates purchases of U.S. equipment on behalf of

IAEA; (4) recommends U.S. experts and consultants to represent the United

States at IAEA meetings, conferences, and symposia; and (5) recruits U.S.

nationals to provide expert advice to IAEA and to staff IAEA’s operations. In

addition, according to a U.S. Mission official, almost 200 U.S. nationals are

employed by IAEA.

Purpose and

Effectiveness of

IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program

U.S. officials and representatives of other IAEA major donor countries told

us that the principal purpose of IAEA’s technical cooperation program is to

help ensure that IAEA member states, many of whom are developing

countries, support IAEA’s safeguards and the NPT. Most of the member

states participate in IAEA primarily for the nuclear technical assistance it

provides. In the past, the United States and other major donors raised

concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical

cooperation program. However, since 1992, IAEA has been implementing

improvements to the program that the United States and other IAEA

member states strongly support.

IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program

Helps Ensure Support for

Safeguards and the NPT

While the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that

applying safeguards is IAEA’s most important function, most developing

countries believe that receiving technical assistance through the technical

cooperation program is just as important, and they participate in IAEA

primarily for the technical assistance it provides. State Department, ACDA,

and NRC officials told us that the principal purpose of U.S. participation in

IAEA’s technical cooperation program is to help ensure that IAEA member

states, many of whom are developing countries, support IAEA’s nuclear

safeguards system and the NPT. A State Department document noted that

the United States regarded support for the technical cooperation program

to developing countries as the “price tag” for safeguards. At an

October 1996 meeting, IAEA’s Director General told us that the opportunity

7

“Footnote a” projects are funded through extrabudgetary cash contributions by IAEA member states

that are in addition to these states’ contributions to IAEA’s technical cooperation fund. IAEA considers

these projects to be technically sound, but recipient states consider them to be a lower priority than

the projects that are funded through the technical cooperation fund.

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to receive technical assistance dissuades member states from engaging in

the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Representatives from four IAEA major donor countries—Australia, Canada,

Germany, and Japan—told us that they generally agree with U.S. views

that technical assistance is necessary to ensure that developing countries

support safeguards and the NPT. However, representatives from six

developing countries that have benefited from IAEA’s technical

assistance—Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, and South

Africa—told us that their countries participate in IAEA primarily because

their participation enables them to receive technical assistance.8

According to the representatives from India, Pakistan, and South Africa,

IAEA would simply become an international “policing” organization for

monitoring compliance with safeguards if IAEA did not provide technical

assistance. A U.S. Mission official stated that several member states,

including India and Pakistan, would be likely to withdraw from IAEA if its

technical assistance were severely scaled back.

According to IAEA officials, IAEA carries out its dual responsibilities and

manages the competing interests of its member states by maintaining a

balance in funding between providing technical assistance and ensuring

compliance with safeguards. As figure 1 shows, in 1996, IAEA spent about

$97 million on safeguards and about $89 million on technical assistance,

accounting for approximately 30 percent and 27 percent, respectively, of

IAEA’s total expenditures of about $325 million.9

8

Of the about 90 member states that receive IAEA’s technical assistance, 74 do not have operating

nuclear power plants. About 20 of the member states are considered to be “least-developed” countries.

9

Funding for safeguards comes from IAEA’s regular budget and from extrabudgetary contributions by

member states. Funding for technical assistance comes from voluntary contributions to IAEA’s

technical cooperation fund, extrabudgetary contributions from the United Nations Development

Program and from member states for “footnote a” projects, and a portion of IAEA’s regular budget for

administration and support.

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Figure 1: IAEA’s 1996 Expenditures, by

Major Activity

• 5%

Nuclear safety ($17.8)

30% • Safeguards ($97.4)

27% • Technical assistance ($89.0)

21%•

Other programs ($67.2)

•17%

Administration ($54.0)

Note: Dollars in millions.

Source: IAEA.

Concerns About the

Effectiveness and

Efficiency of IAEA’s

Technical Cooperation

Program Led to IAEA

Initiatives to Improve the

Program

In the past, officials in the United States and other IAEA major donor

countries had concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the

technical cooperation program. A 1993 State Department cable stated that

the United States had long been concerned that “footnote a” projects were

devoid of significant technical, health, or socioeconomic benefit to the

recipient country. Some of the evaluations that we reviewed indicated

other deficiencies in the technical cooperation program. For example, an

October 1993 special evaluation review of lessons learned from completed

evaluation reviews noted that inadequate project plans and designs

resulted in implementation problems and delays in 30 percent of the

technical assistance projects reviewed from 1988 through 1993. Some of

the negative effects IAEA cited that resulted from insufficient project

planning included (1) approving a 2-year project without obtaining

sufficient evidence about its feasibility; (2) planning research reactor

activities that did not yield significant results because they were

premature or ambitious in relation to local resources; and (3) conducting

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nuclear physics projects in Africa that lacked clear results and benefits to

the recipient country.

IAEA officials in the Department of Technical Cooperation told us they have

not prepared a comprehensive report on the accomplishments of the

program since its inception in 1958. Although IAEA has provided its

member states with detailed descriptions of all of its technical assistance

projects, it did not assess the success or failure of these projects in the

past. According to the head of IAEA’s Department of Technical

Cooperation’s Evaluation Section, evaluations of projects’ impact were not

required because IAEA was focusing on the efficiency of projects’

implementation. Moreover, IAEA stated that in 1993, the technical

cooperation program’s priorities shifted from implementing research and

infrastructure-building activities efficiently to designing projects that have

an impact on the end-user and provide nuclear science and technology

activities that contribute to national development. IAEA noted that it is

unrealistic to expect impact analyses of projects designed and

implemented according to standards that did not embody measures of

impact at the time. In the year 2000, IAEA plans to review the program’s

performance against the criteria for success contained in IAEA’s strategy

for technical cooperation.

We reviewed 40 reports prepared by IAEA’s Department of Technical

Cooperation’s Evaluation Section and summaries of four audits of the

program prepared by IAEA’s Office of Internal Audit and Evaluation

Support, which covered the period from 1985 through 1996, to determine

whether they contained assessments of the program’s effectiveness.10 We

found that most of the 40 reports and audit summaries did not assess the

impact of specific technical assistance projects, and no performance

criteria had been established to help measure the success or failure of the

projects. The evaluations and audits were also limited because insufficient

travel funds generally precluded visits by IAEA staff to the recipient

nations.11 We also reviewed the project files for four selected technical

assistance projects in Iran, North Korea, Bulgaria, and Egypt that had been

completed or canceled by IAEA. None of the project files we reviewed

contained information on the project’s accomplishments. Our review of

other project files was limited by IAEA’s policy on confidentiality, which

10Of the 40 IAEA reports that we reviewed, fewer than half were project or program evaluation reports.

The remaining reports were country program summaries that provided an inventory of selected

member states’ projects by program area.

11IAEA devotes 1 percent of its resources in the technical cooperation program to program evaluation.

Several major donor countries have expressed a desire to maintain this limit.

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regards information obtained by IAEA under a technical cooperation

project as belonging to the country receiving the project. Under this

policy, IAEA cannot divulge information about a project without the formal

consent of the receiving country’s government.

Since 1992, IAEA’s Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation has

taken steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical

cooperation program. For example, IAEA is establishing a system for

measuring the quality and performance of some of its technical assistance

projects. However, in 1996, IAEA’s Secretariat reported to the Board of

Governors that outcomes were still clearly defined for only 25 percent of

the 90 technical assistance projects whose results they had monitored

from January through October 1996. The Evaluation Section of IAEA’s

Department of Technical Cooperation is also helping the department to

establish criteria for measuring the results of a project while planning it.

The United States and other IAEA major donor countries strongly support

IAEA’s efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program,

but U.S. officials are concerned that all of the improvements may not be

fully implemented and made permanent in the 2 years before the term of

the current Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation ends.

(App. I discusses the status of IAEA’s efforts to improve the effectiveness

and efficiency of the technical cooperation program and the U.S. position

on these actions.) According to a State Department cable describing the

results of meetings held in September 1996, the major donors in

attendance were highly supportive of IAEA’s initiatives to improve the

program. The donors concluded that they were

• under increasing pressure at home to demonstrate that their countries’

contributions to IAEA were being well spent;

• supportive of the Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation’s

efforts to make the entire technical cooperation program more efficient

and effective;

• concerned because the technical cooperation program had not set

priorities or established a schedule for accomplishing improvements to the

program; and

• concerned that IAEA’s Department of Technical Cooperation may not have

the management skills required to accomplish these improvements.

More recently, during the Board of Governors’ June 1997 meeting, the

members highly praised IAEA’s efforts in carrying out its initiatives to

improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation

program.

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Cost of U.S.

Participation in IAEA’s

Technical

Cooperation Program

Most of the funding for IAEA’s technical cooperation program—about 70

percent—comes from voluntary contributions made by member states to

IAEA’s technical cooperation fund. In 1996, the United States provided a

total of about $99 million to IAEA, which consisted of about $63 million for

IAEA’s regular budget and an additional voluntary contribution of

$36 million. About $16 million of the $36 million U.S. voluntary

contribution to IAEA went to the technical cooperation fund; this

contribution represented about 32 percent of the fund, which totaled

$49 million. The remainder of the U.S. voluntary contribution to

IAEA—about $20 million—was spent on other forms of support for the

technical cooperation program, including (1) U.S.-hosted IAEA training

courses, (2) “footnote a” projects, (3) placements of IAEA fellows at U.S.

institutions, (4) the services of U.S. experts, and (5) support for other IAEA

programs, including safeguards. In 1996, the United States was the largest

single supplier of equipment for the program. (App. II provides

information on the sources of funding for IAEA’s technical assistance

program from 1958 through 1996.)

Because many IAEA member states are not paying into the technical

cooperation fund, the United States and some other major donors are

paying for a larger percentage of the fund than designated. IAEA has

informally adopted a target funding level for member states’ contributions

to the technical cooperation fund. IAEA’s data show that, as of August 1997,

52 of 124 member states had paid into the 1996 technical cooperation fund.

The United States and Japan contributed the most, accounting for over

half of the total payments to the fund. Seventy-two—or 58 percent—of the

member states made no payments at all, yet 57 of these states received

technical assistance. In a statement made to IAEA’s Board of Governors in

June 1996, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations

System Organizations in Vienna, Austria, observed that the United States

strongly believed that IAEA’s technical assistance should go only to those

member states that support technical assistance fully, by paying their fair

share. The Ambassador further noted that, because many IAEA member

states are not paying their designated share of the technical cooperation

fund, some member states, including the United States and Japan, are

carrying the program financially, by paying more than their share. (App. III

lists the IAEA member states and their shares of and payments to the 1996

technical cooperation fund.)

The Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa

in Vienna, Austria, who chairs IAEA’s Informal Consultative Working Group

on the Financing of Technical Assistance, told us that the group was

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designed to, among other things, encourage member states to increase

their payments to the fund and to review whether member states that have

not regularly paid into the fund should receive the benefits of IAEA’s

technical assistance. The Ambassador from South Africa also told us that

many of the developing countries that are members of IAEA believe that

funding for the technical cooperation program should be predictable and

assured and have proposed that the program be funded through member

states’ contributions to IAEA’s regular budget. The major donors do not

support this proposal because they believe that the program will be

adequately funded if all member states provide financial support for the

program. Representatives of the major recipients of IAEA’s technical

assistance, including Argentina, China, Pakistan, and South Africa, told us

that they are concerned that some major donors are considering reducing

their voluntary contributions to IAEA, which fund the technical cooperation

program. Canadian and German representatives told us that their

countries may reduce their voluntary contributions to IAEA because of

budget constraints. In a statement before the June 1997 meeting of IAEA’s

Board of Governors, the Ambassador from South Africa said that the

members of the working group were deeply divided on whether to put the

technical cooperation fund into IAEA’s regular budget. She believed,

however, that IAEA should take member states’ records of payment to the

technical cooperation fund into account in deciding upon requests for

technical assistance. IAEA officials stated that they took member states’

past payments to the fund into account when preparing for their 1997-98

program.

U.S. Officials Do Not

Systematically

Monitor Projects for

Consistency With U.S.

Nuclear

Nonproliferation and

Safety Goals

U.S. officials do not systematically review or monitor all of IAEA’s technical

assistance projects to ensure that IAEA’s activities do not conflict with U.S.

nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. We found that U.S. officials had

sporadically reviewed projects in countries of concern to the United

States. Several of IAEA’s technical assistance projects were related to a

nuclear power plant under construction in Iran, to uranium prospecting

and exploration in North Korea, and to a nuclear power plant whose

construction has been suspended in Cuba. These are countries where the

United States has concerns about nuclear proliferation and threats to

nuclear safety. Moreover, since 1996, a portion of the funds for projects in

countries of concern to the United States has come from U.S. voluntary

contributions to IAEA.

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U.S. Officials’ Reviews of

Technical Assistance

Projects Are Sporadic

The Special Assistant to the U.S. Representative to IAEA in the State

Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs told us that the State

Department, in conjunction with its contractor at the Argonne National

Laboratory, is chiefly responsible for reviewing IAEA’s technical assistance

projects for consistency with U.S. nonproliferation and safety goals before

the projects are approved by IAEA’s Board of Governors. However, we

found that although U.S. officials at the State Department and U.S. Mission

have reviewed technical assistance projects in countries of concern to the

United States sporadically, they have not done so systematically. Officials

in IAEA’s Department of Technical Cooperation told us that they do

coordinate with IAEA’s Department of Safeguards in reviewing projects that

may involve the transfer of nuclear materials or other items with

implications for proliferation. We also spoke with officials in IAEA’s

Department of Safeguards to determine whether they systematically

review all of IAEA’s technical assistance projects for consistency with

nonproliferation goals. These IAEA officials told us that they do not.

We found that the International Nuclear Technology Liaison Office—the

interagency group that coordinates U.S. participation in the technical

cooperation program and includes representatives from the State

Department, DOE, ACDA, and NRC—and the U.S. contractor at Argonne

National Laboratory focus their review on the “footnote a” projects that

the United States may want to support with U.S. funds. The interagency

group does not systematically review the majority of the technical

assistance projects that are proposed for funding through IAEA’s technical

cooperation fund. Neither does it regularly monitor ongoing projects. An

Argonne official informed us that he reviews the list of “footnote a”

projects to determine whether they have technical merit and should be

funded by the United States; however, he is not responsible for assessing

whether these or other projects funded through the technical cooperation

fund are in keeping with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.

State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization

Affairs told us that the Department did not have the resources to review all

of the ongoing technical assistance projects and that U.S. oversight of

these projects could be improved.

ACDA, DOE, and U.S. Mission officials told us that the vast majority of IAEA’s

technical assistance projects do not pose any concerns about nuclear

proliferation because the assistance is provided in benign areas, such as

medicine and agriculture, that do not involve transferring sensitive nuclear

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materials and technologies.12 IAEA’s Director General also told us that IAEA

will not provide technical assistance in sensitive areas, such as the

reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear material. State Department and

U.S. Mission officials told us that if the United States does have concerns

about specific technical assistance projects, it can informally raise its

objections to IAEA’s Secretariat. However, U.S. officials we spoke with

generally could not recall whether the United States had raised objections

or had attempted to cancel any projects in the past several years. These

U.S. officials also said that the United States does not have absolute

control over the approval of specific technical assistance projects because

decisions about approving and funding the projects are made collectively

every 2 years at the December meeting of IAEA’s Board of Governors.

A former U.S. Mission official told us that U.S. Mission representatives can

meet informally with IAEA staff to discuss a preliminary list of technical

assistance projects months before the Board of Governors’ meeting. The

United States and other IAEA member states also have an opportunity to

formally review the proposed list of technical assistance projects at IAEA’s

General Conference in September and at the November meeting of the

Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, the final meeting where

member states can provide recommendations for the December Board of

Governors’ meeting. U.S. officials told us that by the time the list of

technical assistance projects reaches the Board of Governors, IAEA

member states consider the projects to be approved. The U.S. officials

added that it would be rare for representatives from the United States or

any other member state to object formally to a specific technical

assistance project during a meeting of IAEA’s Board of Governors.

IAEA Provides Technical

Assistance for Several

Projects in Countries of

Concern

Of the total amount in technical assistance (about $800 million) that IAEA

provided from 1958 through 1996 for its member states, about $52 million

was spent on technical assistance for countries of concern to the United

States, as defined by section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

as amended. These countries include Cuba, Libya, Iran, Myanmar

(formerly Burma), Iraq, North Korea, and Syria.13 Iran and Cuba ranked

19th and 21st, respectively, among the 120 nations that received assistance

12Our analysis of the technical assistance that IAEA provided to its member states by program area,

from 1980 through 1996, shows that most of IAEA’s assistance was provided in three program

areas—the application of isotopes and radiation in agriculture, general atomic energy development,

and safety in nuclear energy—as discussed in app. IV.

13The Palestine Liberation Organization is also covered under the act but is considered to be a political

entity and is thus not a member of IAEA. North Korea has not received technical assistance since it

withdrew from IAEA in June 1994.

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over this period, receiving about 1.5 percent each of the total amount in

technical assistance that IAEA provided. Projects IAEA provided for these

countries involved nuclear training and techniques in medicine and

agriculture, including establishing laboratory facilities for the production

of radiopharmaceuticals in Iran and using nuclear techniques to improve

the fertility of the soil in Iraq and the productivity of the livestock in Libya.

(App. IV provides information on the dollar amounts and types of

technical assistance that IAEA provided for its members states, including

the countries of concern to the United States, from 1958 through 1996.)

Although IAEA provides most of its technical assistance in areas that do not

generally pose concerns about nuclear proliferation, our review of

projects in countries of concern to the United States identified three cases

in which IAEA provided technical assistance to countries where the United

States has concerns about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear

safety. A discussion of these three cases follows.

Bushehr Nuclear Power

Plant in Iran

The United States strongly opposes the sale of any nuclear-related

technology to Iran, including the sale of Russian civilian reactor

technology, because the United States believes that any nuclear

technology and training could help Iran advance its nuclear weapons

program. At an April 1997 hearing on concerns about proliferation

associated with Iran, held before the Committee on Foreign Relations,

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, the former

director of the Central Intelligence Agency stated that through the

operation of the Bushehr reactor, the Iranians will develop substantial

expertise that will be relevant to the development of nuclear weapons.14

For 1995 through 1999, IAEA has budgeted about $1.3 million for three

ongoing technical assistance projects for the Bushehr nuclear power plant

under construction in Iran. As of May 1997, about $250,000 of this amount

had been spent for two of these projects. According to IAEA’s project

summaries for 1997 through 1998, the three projects are (1) developing a

nuclear regulatory infrastructure by training personnel in nuclear safety

assessment; (2) establishing an independent multipurpose center that will

provide emergency response services, train nuclear regulators, and

conduct accident analyses in preparation for licensing the plant; and

(3) building the capability of the nuclear technology center in Iran to

14In 1973, a German firm began to construct two reactors in Iran near Bushehr, but the construction

was halted during the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In 1995, Iran and Russia reached an $800 million

agreement for the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to resume

construction of Unit 1 of the Bushehr nuclear power plant with a Russian VVER-1000 design nuclear

power reactor.

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support the Bushehr plant. (See app. V for more details on the assistance

IAEA is providing to Iran for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.)

IAEA also spent about $906,000 more for three recently completed technical

assistance projects for the Bushehr plant in Iran.15 According to IAEA’s

status reports, the objectives of these projects were (1) to increase the

capacity of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for evaluating nuclear

power plant bids and to develop a regulatory infrastructure and policy;

(2) to assist in assessing the status of the Bushehr plant before

construction resumed, including advising on nuclear safety criteria for

licensing and assisting in developing a national infrastructure for work on

the plant’s construction; and (3) to assist in assembling and installing a

radioactive waste incinerator for the plant. Under these projects, IAEA has

sent experts on numerous missions to conduct safety reviews of the

Bushehr plant and has provided equipment, such as computer systems.

According to IAEA documents, IAEA believes that this assistance made a

valuable contribution to the establishment of an infrastructure for Iran’s

nuclear power program. In addition, IAEA cited an on-site assessment of the

reactor building and components by Russian contractors as a critical

element in the decision to complete the plant.

We asked the State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Nonproliferation for his views on the technical assistance that IAEA has

provided for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. According to his

representative in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Special

Assistant to the U.S. Representative to IAEA, the United States, as a general

rule, opposes nuclear cooperation with Iran and the State Department

would rather not see IAEA provide technical assistance for Iran’s Bushehr

nuclear power plant. The State Department official also told us that the

United States had informally raised concerns to IAEA about its provision of

technical assistance to the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Uranium Prospecting and

Exploration in North Korea

In March 1994, Senator Jesse Helms sent a letter to the President stating

his concerns about IAEA’s providing technical assistance for uranium

exploration in North Korea at a time when the country was suspected of

developing a nuclear weapons program.16 According to an April 1994 letter

15In addition to these recently completed projects, IAEA spent about $107,000 for two other projects

for the plant, completed in 1985. The objectives of these projects were to (1) train a group of Iranian

engineers in quality assurance with a view to completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant and

(2) assist in assessing the safety of the concrete structure of Unit 1 of the plant’s reactor building.

Furthermore, IAEA has funded projects for Iran in uranium prospecting and exploration.

16Highly enriched uranium can be used in the development of nuclear weapons.

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to IAEA’s Director General from the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Mission,

IAEA’s Director General had earlier assured U.S. congressional

representatives that IAEA had suspended its technical assistance for North

Korea because North Korea was in violation of its obligations under the

NPT for failing to comply with IAEA’s safeguards. The U.S. Ambassador to

the U.S. Mission stated that he was unaware that several technical

assistance projects for North Korea were still ongoing or had recently

begun. At the June 1994 meeting of the Board of Governors, the U.S.

delegation strongly recommended that IAEA’s Director General suspend the

provision of technical assistance to North Korea for all activities related to

nuclear material, fuel cycle, and nuclear industrial applications until

concerns about North Korea’s compliance with IAEA’s safeguards had been

resolved. North Korea withdrew from IAEA in June 1994, and its technical

assistance projects were canceled.

From 1987 through 1994, IAEA spent about $396,000 in technical assistance

for two projects on uranium prospecting and exploration in North Korea.

According to IAEA’s April 1997 project status reports, the objectives of

these projects were (1) to enable North Korea to better assess the

potential of its nuclear raw materials in view of its increasing commitment

to nuclear power and (2) to provide support for North Korea’s uranium

exploration program. Under the uranium prospecting project, which was

completed in 1994, the status report shows that IAEA contributed a

considerable amount of uranium exploration equipment to North Korea, as

well as a microcomputer and software for data processing. IAEA spent

more than one-third of the $87,000 budgeted for the follow-on project on

uranium exploration before the project was canceled following North

Korea’s withdrawal from IAEA.

Nuclear Power Plant in

Cuba

In March 1997, when we issued our report on IAEA’s nuclear technical

assistance for Cuba, including IAEA’s technical assistance to the partially

completed nuclear power plant, the State Department’s Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Nonproliferation visited IAEA’s Deputy Director General for

Technical Cooperation to raise concerns about IAEA’s technical assistance

projects for the nuclear power plant. The Deputy Assistant Secretary

noted that strong U.S. support for IAEA’s technical cooperation program

could be endangered by perceptions that IAEA is supporting Cuban plans to

build an unsafe reactor. He also told IAEA’s Deputy Director General for

Technical Cooperation that the United States found it hard to justify IAEA’s

provision of assistance to Cuba’s nuclear power plant for quality

assurance and licensing when, because of financial constraints, it was

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unlikely that the plant would be completed. However, as of June 1997, IAEA

was still conducting these two projects in licensing and quality assurance

for the Cuban plant.

United States No Longer

Withholds Voluntary Funds

to IAEA for Countries of

Concern

In our March 1997 report, we noted that, from 1981 through 1993, the

United States was required, under section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 and related appropriations provisions, to withhold a

proportionate share of its voluntary contribution to the technical

cooperation fund for Cuba, Libya, Iran, and the Palestine Liberation

Organization because the fund provided assistance to these entities. The

United States withheld about 25 percent of its voluntary contribution to

the fund for these entities. From 1981 through 1995, the State Department

withheld a total of over $4 million. State Department officials told us they

believe that the withholding was primarily a symbolic gesture that had no

practical impact on the total amount of technical assistance that IAEA

provided to these countries. On April 30, 1994, the Foreign Assistance Act

was amended, and Myanmar (formerly Burma), Iraq, North Korea, and

Syria were added to the list of entities from which U.S. funds for certain

programs sponsored by international organizations were withheld. At the

same time, IAEA was exempted from the withholding requirement.

Consequently, as of 1994, the United States was no longer required to

withhold a portion of its voluntary contribution to IAEA’s technical

cooperation fund for any of these entities. However, State Department

officials told us that they misinterpreted the act and continued to withhold

funds in 1994 and 1995. Beginning in 1996, the State Department

discontinued withholding any of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the

fund.17

Conclusions The United States and other IAEA major donor countries have had concerns

about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation

program. However, IAEA has taken steps to improve the effectiveness and

efficiency of the technical cooperation program and the measurement of

the program’s performance. The United States and others strongly support

these initiatives, but concerns remain about the sustainability of these

improvements.

17On June 3, 1997, H.R. 1757, which authorizes appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal

years 1998 and 1999, was introduced by the 105th Congress. The bill proposes, among other things,

that the United States withhold a proportional share of its funds for IAEA’s programs or projects in

Cuba.

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The United States is paying for more than its designated share of the

technical cooperation fund because many member states are not paying

into the fund. Yet many of these states are receiving the benefits of IAEA’s

technical assistance. This is contrary to the State Department’s position

that all IAEA member states, particularly those that receive technical

assistance, should provide financial support for the program.

Although U.S. officials are sporadically reviewing technical assistance

projects in countries of concern to the United States, they are neither

systematically reviewing technical assistance projects before their

approval nor regularly monitoring ongoing technical assistance projects.

Without a systematic review, U.S. officials may be unaware of specific

instances in which IAEA’s assistance could raise concerns for the United

States about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety. Most of

the assistance that IAEA provides is not considered to be sensitive.

However, in several cases, the technical assistance that IAEA has provided

is contrary to U.S. policy goals. Moreover, since 1996, a portion of the U.S.

funding has supported technical assistance projects that will ultimately

benefit nuclear programs, training, and techniques in countries of concern

to the United States, including Iran and Cuba.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

To assist the Congress in making future decisions about the continued U.S.

funding of IAEA’s technical cooperation program, the Congress may wish to

require that the Secretary of State periodically report to it on any

inconsistency between IAEA’s technical assistance projects and U.S.

nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.

If the Congress wishes to make known that the United States does not

support IAEA’s technical assistance projects in countries of concern, as

defined by section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as

amended, it could explicitly require that the State Department withhold a

proportional share of its voluntary funds to IAEA that would otherwise go

to these countries.

Recommendations to

the Secretary of State

We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. interagency

group on technical assistance, in consultation with the U.S. representative

to IAEA, to systematically review all proposed technical assistance projects

in countries of concern, as covered by section 307(a) of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, before the projects are approved by

IAEA’s Board of Governors, to determine whether the proposed projects are

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consistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. If U.S.

officials find that any projects are inconsistent with these goals, we

recommend that the U.S. representative to IAEA make the U.S. objections

known to IAEA and monitor the projects in these countries.

Agency Comments We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of State for

review and comment. The Department obtained and coordinated

comments from Argonne National Laboratory; ACDA; DOE; NRC; the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria;

and IAEA. On August 1, 1997, we met with officials from the Department of

State—including the Deputy Director, Office of Technical Specialized

Agencies, Bureau of International Organization Affairs—and from the

Department of Energy— including a Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Office

of Nonproliferation and National Security. The agencies provided

clarifying information and technical corrections, which we incorporated

into the report.

The agencies generally agreed with the facts as presented in the report and

made no comments on our recommendations. They did, however, express

one concern about our matters for congressional consideration.

Specifically, they suggested that withholding a part of the U.S. voluntary

contribution to IAEA that is proportional to all of the assistance that IAEA

provides to Cuba, North Korea, and other countries of concern would be

seen as a politicization of the technical assistance process that could

undercut U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The agencies added that they do

not object to IAEA’s providing technical assistance to countries of concern

in the areas of nuclear safety, medicine and agriculture. We cannot

speculate on how others might view such a withholding requirement.

However, as discussed in the report, the United States did, from 1981

through 1995, withhold a portion of its voluntary contribution to IAEA,

amounting to over $4 million, for technical assistance for countries of

concern to the United States. IAEA was exempted from the withholding

requirement in 1994, although the State Department continued to withhold

funds in 1994 and 1995. Our report also notes the recent introduction into

the Congress of a bill proposing that the United States withhold a

proportional share of its funds for IAEA’s programs or projects in Cuba.

In addition, the agencies said that IAEA’s technical cooperation program, in

general, has strongly supported U.S. nuclear safety policy objectives, most

notably in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent

States that operate unsafe Soviet-designed reactors. The agencies further

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observed that the United States continues to support IAEA’s nuclear safety

efforts. In appendix IV, we acknowledge IAEA’s contribution to nuclear

safety, noting that from 1958 through 1996, IAEA spent about 16 percent of

its technical assistance on safety in nuclear energy.

Scope and

Methodology

We discussed U.S. participation in IAEA’s technical cooperation program

with officials of and gathered data from the Department of State; DOE;

ACDA; NRC; Argonne National Laboratory; and the National Academy of

Sciences/National Research Council in Washington, D.C., as well as from

the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations and IAEA in

Vienna, Austria. We met with IAEA’s Director General; Deputy Directors

General for Administration, Research and Isotopes, Nuclear Energy,

Nuclear Safety, and Technical Cooperation; the Principal Officer for the

Deputy Director General for Safeguards; a Senior Legal Officer in the

Department of Administration; and other staff.

We reviewed program files at the Department of State and at the U.S.

Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria. We

gathered financial and programmatic data from IAEA on its technical

cooperation for the period from 1958, when the program began, until 1996.

Programmatic data for the entire period were not always available from

IAEA. We did not independently verify the quality and accuracy of IAEA’s

data.

We also met in Vienna, Austria, with representatives from four of the

member states that are major financial donors to the technical cooperation

program and six of the states that receive extensive technical assistance or

represent the views of the developing countries. The four major donors

were Japan, Australia, Canada, and Germany; the six major recipient

and/or developing countries were Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan,

and South Africa.

We also reviewed 40 reports on various aspects of the technical

cooperation program that were prepared by IAEA’s Department of

Technical Cooperation’s Evaluation Section; summaries of four audits of

the program prepared by IAEA’s Office of Internal Audit and Evaluation

Support that covered the period from 1985 through 1996; and four project

files for selected technical assistance projects in Iran, North Korea,

Bulgaria, and Egypt that were completed or canceled. We reviewed IAEA’s

data on the technical assistance projects provided for countries of concern

to the United States to determine whether IAEA’s assistance conflicted with

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U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. We observed two meetings

of the International Nuclear Technology Liaison Office (the U.S.

interagency group that coordinates U.S. participation in IAEA’s technical

cooperation program), the November 1996 meeting of the Technical

Assistance and Cooperation Committee, and the December 1996 meeting

of IAEA’s Board of Governors in Vienna, Austria.

We performed our work from July 1996 through August 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Energy,

the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Director of the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other interested parties. We

will also make copies available to others on request. Please call me at

(202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors

to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Victor S. Rezendes

Director, Energy, Resources,

 and Science Issues

Page 21 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Improving the

Effectiveness and

Efficiency of IAEA’s

Technical

Cooperation Program

26

IAEA Has Initiated Efforts to Improve the Program 26

United States Supports IAEA’s Efforts to Improve the Program 27

Appendix II 

Sources of Funding

for IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program

From 1958 Through

1996

28

Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’

Contributions to the

1996 Technical

Cooperation Fund

30

Appendix IV 

Dollar Amount and

Type of Technical

Assistance IAEA

Provided for Its

Member States,

Including Countries of

Concern, From 1958

Through 1996

35

Major Recipients of IAEA’s Technical Assistance 35

IAEA’s Technical Assistance, by Program Area 36

Dollar Amount and Type of IAEA’s Technical Assistance for

Countries of Concern

37

Page 22 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Contents

Appendix V 

IAEA’s Active

Technical Assistance

Projects for the

Bushehr Nuclear

Power Plant in Iran

39

Infrastructure for Implementation of Bushehr Nuclear Power

Plant Program Project

39

Regulatory Infrastructure for Licensing of Bushehr Nuclear

Power Plant Project

40

Strengthening Reactor Technology for Bushehr Nuclear Power

Plant Project

40

Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to

This Report

42

Related GAO Products 44

Tables Table III.1: IAEA Member States That Contributed to the 1996

Technical Cooperation Fund, Ranked by the Amount Paid as a

Percentage of Total Contributions, as of August 1997

30

 Table III.2: IAEA Member States That Did Not Contribute to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund, Ranked by the Amount of

Assistance Received in 1996, as of August 1997

32

Table IV.1: Major Recipients of IAEA’s Technical Assistance,

1958-96

36

 Table IV.2: Amount and Type of IAEA’s Technical Assistance for

Countries Currently of Concern to the United States, 1958-96

38

 Table V.1: Expenditures for Infrastructure for Implementation of

Bushehr Nuclear Power Program Project, 1995-97

40

Figures Figure 1: IAEA’s 1996 Expenditures, by Major Activity 7

Figure II.1: Primary Sources of Funding for IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program, 1958-96, Dollars in millions

29

Figure IV.1: Dollar Amount and Type of Technical Assistance

That IAEA Provided for Its Member States, 1958-96 Dollars in

millions

35

Figure IV.2: Technical Assistance Provided by IAEA for Its

Member States, by Program Area, 1980-96

37

Page 23 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Contents

Abbreviations

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

DOE Department of Energy

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

MINATOM Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy

NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

UNDP United Nations Development Program

Page 24 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Page 25 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix I 

Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency

of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program

In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Deputy Director

General for Technical Cooperation embarked on a series of improvements

so that the technical cooperation program would better meet the needs of

its recipients and its impact would be measurable. The United States and

other IAEA member states strongly support the Deputy Director General’s

efforts to improve the program.

IAEA Has Initiated

Efforts to Improve the

Program

When IAEA’s current Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation

began his term in 1992, he established a new strategy for improving the

effectiveness and efficiency of the program. According to an IAEA paper,

the goal of the new strategy is to develop partnerships between IAEA and

its member states so that technical assistance produces a “measurable

socio-economic impact by directly contributing in a cost-efficient manner

to the achievement of the highest development priority of the [recipient]

country.” Important components of the strategy are “model” projects that

are expected to

• respond to a real need of the recipient country,

• produce a significant economic or social impact by looking beyond the

immediate recipient of assistance to the final end user,

• demonstrate sustainability after the project’s completion through a strong

government commitment,

• require detailed workplans and objective performance indicators, and

• demonstrate an indispensable role for nuclear technology with distinct

advantages over other approaches.

Since 1994, IAEA has initiated nearly 60 model projects, including those

under the 1997-98 technical cooperation program. Few model projects

have been completed, so it is too early to assess their impact.

Nevertheless, some of the model projects that IAEA expects will have

measurable results include

• using a radioimmunoassay to screen for thyroid deficiency in newborn

children in Tunisia,

• providing nuclear methods to evaluate the effectiveness of a government

food supplement intervention program to combat malnutrition in Peru,

• supporting a program for using nuclear techniques to improve local

varieties of sorghum and rice in Mali, and

• eliminating the tsetse fly from the island of Zanzibar using radiation to

sterilize male flies.

Page 26 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix I 

Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency

of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program

IAEA is also working to design model projects within a “country program

framework.” The goal of this framework is to achieve agreement between

IAEA and the recipient country on concentrating technical cooperation on a

few high-priority areas where projects produce a significant national

impact. IAEA expects to have concluded the frameworks with one-half of

the recipients of technical assistance by the year 2000.

United States

Supports IAEA’s

Efforts to Improve the

Program

Like most other IAEA member countries, the United States supports the

efforts of IAEA’s Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation to

improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation

program. U.S. officials believe that the initiatives and strategic goals of the

Technical Cooperation Department and IAEA are extremely significant,

particularly now that donor countries’ resources may be declining and the

effectiveness and efficiency of all international organizations are being

questioned. Since these reform efforts began, the United States has been a

strong supporter of the program, making experts available to IAEA, funding

specific model projects, and supporting the program in statements before

IAEA’s Board of Governors.

Although the United States, with other IAEA major donor countries,

supports efforts to improve the technical cooperation program, it also

shares some concerns with the other major donors about the sustainability

of these improvements. State Department officials, including U.S. Mission

officials, believe that IAEA must focus on implementation if the efforts at

improvement are to last beyond the tenure of the current Deputy Director

General, which ends in 1999. According to State Department officials,

there is a difference between initiating change and achieving permanent

change. These officials have insisted that the Department of Technical

Cooperation provide IAEA’s Board of Governors with a strategic plan that

will lead to permanent change.

Page 27 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix II 

Sources of Funding for IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program From 1958 Through

1996

Within IAEA, the Department of Technical Cooperation and three other

technical departments—the departments of Research and Isotopes,

Nuclear Safety, and Nuclear Energy—are the main channels for

technology transfer activities within the technical cooperation program.

IAEA receives funding for the costs of administration and related support in

the Department of Technical Cooperation and for activities in the three

technical departments through IAEA’s regular budget. However, most of the

funding for IAEA’s technical assistance—about 70 percent—comes from

voluntary contributions made by the member states to IAEA’s technical

cooperation fund, as figure II.1 shows. In addition to the technical

cooperation fund, other sources of voluntary financial support for the

program include the following:

• Extrabudgetary cash contributions are made by member states for specific

technical assistance projects—known as “footnote a” projects—and for

training. Although “footnote a” projects are considered to be technically

sound by IAEA, they are of lower priority to recipient member states than

the projects that are financed through the technical cooperation fund. The

United States endeavors to provide support for “footnote a” projects in

countries that are parties to nonproliferation treaties.

• Assistance in kind includes equipment donated by member states, expert

services, or fellowships arranged on a cost-free basis.

• The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provide funds through

IAEA for its development projects that IAEA implements in areas involving

nuclear science and technology.

Page 28 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix II 

Sources of Funding for IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program From 1958 Through

1996

Figure II.1: Primary Sources of

Funding for IAEA’s Technical

Cooperation Program, 1958-96, Dollars

in Millions

12% •

Member states ($93.1)

• 7%

In-kind ($56.8)

11%•

UNDP ($84.9)

70%•

Technical cooperation fund

($558.7)

Note: Figures in parentheses have been rounded and do not include funds from IAEA’s regular

budget that are used to provide administration and support for technical assistance.

Source: IAEA.

Page 29 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’ Contributions to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund

For calendar year 1996, fewer than half of the 124 IAEA member states

contributed to the technical cooperation fund. As table III.1 indicates, 52

states contributed a total of about $48.6 million. Of these states, the United

States and Japan contributed the most, accounting for over half of the

total payments to the fund. Twenty-four member states that contributed to

the fund also received about $22.5 million in technical assistance from

IAEA.

Table III.1: IAEA Member States That

Contributed to the 1996 Technical

Cooperation Fund, Ranked by the

Amount Paid as a Percentage of Total

Contributions, as of August 1997

Member state

Designated

percentage of $64.5

million fund target Amount paid to fund

Actual percentage of

total payments

United States 25.00 $15,723,000a 32.4

Japan 13.97 9,010,650 18.60

Germany 8.96 4,579,200 9.40

France 6.33 4,082,850 8.40

United Kingdom 5.28 3,405,600 7.00

Canada 3.08 1,914,077 4.00

Netherlands 1.58 1,019,100 2.10

Australia 1.47 969,925 2.00

Sweden 1.22 786,900 1.60

Switzerland 1.21 780,450 1.60

Austria 0.85 548,250 1.10

Mexico 0.78 503,100 1.00

China 0.72 464,400 1.00

Denmark 0.70 451,500 0.90

Finland 0.61 393,450 0.80

Spain 2.25 355,155 0.70

Norway 0.55 354,750 0.70

Korea, Republic

of 0.80 350,000 0.70

Argentina 0.48 310,000 0.60

Poland 0.38 245,100 0.50

Turkey 0.34 219,300 0.50

Czech Republic 0.32 206,400 0.40

India 0.31 199,950 0.40

Iran 0.60 190,000 0.40

Brazil 1.62 151,028 0.30

South Africa 0.34 109,650 0.20

Israel 0.26 100,000 0.20

Hungary 0.15 96,750 0.20

(continued)

Page 30 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’ Contributions to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund

Member state

Designated

percentage of $64.5

million fund target Amount paid to fund

Actual percentage of

total payments

Romania 0.15 96,750 0.20

Malaysia 0.14 90,300 0.20

Thailand 013 83,850 0.20

Portugal 0.20 69,900 0.10

Indonesia 0.14 70,000 0.10

Slovakia 0.10 64,500 0.10

Colombia 0.11 60,000 0.10

Egypt 0.07 50,445 0.10

Algeria 0.16 50,000 0.10

Ireland 0.20 50,000 0.10

Slovenia 0.07 48,762 0.10

Cuba 0.07 45,150 0.10

Pakistan 0.06 38,700 0.10

Philippines 0.06 38,700 0.10

Morocco 0.03 20,000 0.04

Iceland 0.03 19,350 0.04

Bulgaria 0.10 10,000 0.02

Bangladesh 0.01 6,450 0.01

Lebanon 0.01 6,450 0.01

Liechtenstein 0.01 6,450 0.01

Vietnam 0.01 6,450 0.01

Sri Lanka 0.01 5,000 0.01

Syria 0.05 4,000 0.01

Total $48,579,932

aIn addition, the United States paid $402,000 in fiscal year 1995 that was credited to fiscal year

1996.

Source: IAEA.

In 1996, 72, or about 58 percent, of the 124 IAEA member states did not

contribute to the technical cooperation fund. Fifty-seven of these states

received a total of $26,039,722 in technical assistance from IAEA, as table

III.2 indicates.

Page 31 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’ Contributions to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund

Table III.2: IAEA Member States That

Did Not Contribute to the 1996

Technical Cooperation Fund, Ranked

by the Amount of Assistance Received

in 1996, as of August 1997

Member state

Amount of technical assistance

received in 1996

Tanzania $2,020,700

Ghana 1,508,200

Nigeria 1,342,100

Peru 1,222,200

Mongolia 962,400

Chile 946,900

Sudan 935,200

Myanmar (Burma) 922,700

Ukraine 906,600

Bolivia 771,300

Albania 695,900

El Salvador 683,000

Armenia 667,000

Ethiopia 635,000

Uruguay 633,900

Uganda 615,600

Costa Rica 593,100

Venezuela 578,300

Jordan 573,000

Namibia 570,300

Zambia 492,600

Kenya 466,700

Tunisia 442,300

Guatemala 437,000

Dominican Republic 433,100

Nicaragua 398,500

Zimbabwe 371,000

Kazakstan 368,000

Sierra Leone 366,100

Niger 354,100

Belarus 339,400

Mali 326,300

Cameroon 323,700

Iraq 300,200

Madagascar 288,600

Macedonia 279,400

Mauritius 235,700

(continued)

Page 32 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’ Contributions to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund

Member state

Amount of technical assistance

received in 1996

Croatia 234,400

Ecuador 231,500

Cote d’Ivoire 222,000

Panama 214,100

Libya 200,600

Uzbekistan 158,600

Cyprus 148,900

Paraguay 129,900

Senegal 126,800

Saudi Arabia 117,400

Zaire 97,400

United Arab Emirates 90,000

Bosnia and Herzegovina 88,500

Estonia 77,800

Lithuania 57,000

Jamaica 31,900

Marshall Islands 8,600

Haiti 8,200

Liberia 6,300

Kuwait 5,500

Afghanistan 0

Belgium 0

Cambodia 0

Gabon 0

Georgia 0

Holy See 0

Italy 0

Luxembourg 0

Monaco 0

New Zealand 0

Qatar 0

Russian Federation 0

Singapore 0

Yemen 0

Yugoslavia 0

Total $26,039,722

(Table notes on next page)

Page 33 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix III 

IAEA Member States’ Contributions to the

1996 Technical Cooperation Fund

Note: Technical assistance includes funds from the technical cooperation fund, extrabudgetary

contributions from member states, assistance in kind, and UNDP funds.

Source: IAEA.

Page 34 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix IV 

Dollar Amount and Type of Technical

Assistance IAEA Provided for Its Member

States, Including Countries of Concern,

From 1958 Through 1996

IAEA spent about $800 million on technical assistance for its member states

from 1958—when the technical cooperation program began—through

1996, for equipment, expert services, training, and subcontracts. Figure

IV.1 shows that about 44 percent of the funds were spent for equipment,

such as computer systems and radiation-monitoring and laboratory

equipment. In 1996, the United States was the largest single supplier of

equipment for IAEA’s technical cooperation program.

Figure IV.1: Dollar Amount and Type of

Technical Assistance That IAEA

Provided for Its Member States,

1958-96 Dollars in Millions

1%

Subcontracts ($11)

25% • Expert services ($195)

22% • Fellowships/scientific visits ($174)

44%•

Equipment ($346)

•

8%

Training course ($67)

Note: Figures in parentheses have been rounded.

Source: IAEA.

Major Recipients of

IAEA’s Technical

Assistance

Of the more than 120 IAEA member states that received IAEA’s technical

assistance from 1958 through 1996, 10 states received more than 20

percent of the $800 million given, or about $175.7 million collectively, as

table IV.1 indicates. Egypt, which started to receive technical assistance

from IAEA in 1970, has received the largest total amount.

Page 35 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix IV 

Dollar Amount and Type of Technical

Assistance IAEA Provided for Its Member

States, Including Countries of Concern,

From 1958 Through 1996

Table IV.1: Major Recipients of IAEA’s

Technical Assistance, 1958-96 Dollars in millions

Rank

Recipient

country

Amount of

technical

assistance

received

Percentage of

total

assistance

provided

First year

assistance

was received

1 Egypt $27.5 3.5 1970

2 Brazil 21.3 2.7 1959

3 Indonesia 18.6 2.3 1959

4 Thailand 18.5 2.3 1959

5 Peru 16.1 2.0 1960

6 Pakistan 15.6 2.0 1959

7 Philippines 15.0 1.9 1959

8 China 14.7 1.9 1959

9 Poland 14.4 1.8 1959

10 Bangladesh 14.0 1.8 1972

Total $175.7 22.1

Source: IAEA.

IAEA’s Technical

Assistance, by

Program Area

About half—or $334 million—of the $648 million that IAEA spent for

technical assistance from 1980 through 1996 was provided for three

program areas—the application of isotopes and radiation in agriculture,

general atomic energy development, and safety in nuclear energy—as

figure IV.2 shows.18 Moreover, two other program areas—nuclear

engineering and technology, and the application of isotopes and radiation

in industry and hydrology—received about 26 percent of the funds, for a

total of about $169 million. IAEA approved about $154 million more in

technical assistance projects for its member states for 1997 through 1998.

Over half of this additional assistance will be provided for the application

of isotopes and radiation in medicine, agriculture, and safety in nuclear

energy.

18IAEA was not able to provide us with data for years prior to 1980.

Page 36 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix IV 

Dollar Amount and Type of Technical

Assistance IAEA Provided for Its Member

States, Including Countries of Concern,

From 1958 Through 1996

Figure IV.2: Technical Assistance

Provided by IAEA for Its Member

States, by Program Area, 1980-96

General atomic energy 

development

Application of isotopes and 

radiation in biology

Nuclear engineering and technology

Application of isotopes and 

radiation in agriculture

1.3%

16.4%

8.2%

13.1%

3.4%

19%

13.1%

16.2%

6.1%

Nuclear chemistry

Application of isotopes and 

radiation in medicine

Application of isotopes and radiation 

in industry and hydrology

Nuclear physics

Safety in nuclear energy

Prospecting, mining, and 

processing nuclear materials 3.3%

Note: Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.

Source: IAEA.

Dollar Amount and

Type of IAEA’s

Technical Assistance

for Countries of

Concern

Of the about $800 million in technical assistance provided by IAEA to all of

its member states from 1958 through 1996, about $52 million was spent on

countries currently of concern to the United States. As table IV.2 indicates,

most assistance given to these countries was in the form of equipment.

Page 37 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix IV 

Dollar Amount and Type of Technical

Assistance IAEA Provided for Its Member

States, Including Countries of Concern,

From 1958 Through 1996

Table IV.2: Amount and Type of IAEA’s Technical Assistance for Countries Currently of Concern to the United States,

1958-96

Type of technical assistance

Dollars in thousands

Country of

concern

Rank in terms

of technical

assistance

received

First year

technical

assistance was

received

Expert

services Equipment

Fellowships

and scientific

visits Subcontractsa Total

Iran 19 1959 $2,950 $6,006 $2,839 $212 $12,007

Cuba 21 1963 1,248 8,718 1,915 113 11,994

Syria 31 1968 1,385 5,078 1,556 256 8,275

North Korea 36 1978 494 5,142 1,033 0 6,669

Myanmar 43 1959 1,505 2,806 1,056 0 5,368

Libya 51 1970 1,190 1,441 1,652 0 4,283

Iraq 55 1960 912 1,381 1,089 18 3,400

Total $9,684 $30,572 $11,141 $599 $51,996

aAgreements between IAEA and a third party to provide services to member states.

Source: IAEA.

Page 38 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix V 

IAEA’s Active Technical Assistance Projects

for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran

In 1973, a German firm began the construction of two reactors in Iran near

Bushehr, but construction was halted during the Islamic Revolution in

1979. In 1995, Iran and Russia reached an $800 million agreement for the

Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to resume

the construction of Unit 1 of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and to

switch from a German-designed to a Russian-designed VVER-1000 model

reactor. According to IAEA’s project summaries for the proposed 1997-98

program, the decision to resume the Bushehr project with a new design

has placed heavy responsibility on Iran’s Nuclear Safety Department, the

regulatory body of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

For 1995 through 1999, IAEA budgeted about $1.3 million for three ongoing

technical assistance projects for the Bushehr nuclear power plant under

construction in Iran. As of May 1997, about $250,000 of this amount had

been spent for two of these projects. According to IAEA’s project

summaries for 1997-98, the three projects are (1) developing a nuclear

regulatory infrastructure by training personnel in nuclear safety

assessment; (2) establishing an independent multipurpose center that will

provide emergency response services, train nuclear regulators, and

analyze accidents in preparation for licensing the plant; and (3) building

the capability of the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center in Iran to support

the Bushehr plant.

Infrastructure for

Implementation of

Bushehr Nuclear

Power Plant Program

Project

This ongoing project was originally approved in 1995 and is partly a

continuation of another project—completed in 1995 for about $77,000—to

increase the capability of staff at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

to evaluate nuclear power plant bids and to develop a regulatory

infrastructure and policy. The aim of the ongoing project is to develop a

nuclear regulatory infrastructure by training personnel in nuclear safety

assessment and in operator responsibilities. Under the project, IAEA has

sent experts on numerous missions to Iran to provide advice and training

in quality assurance, project management, and site and safety reviews; has

provided supplies such as books and journals; and has sponsored some

fellowships and scientific visits. A workshop for the top management of

Iran’s atomic energy authority was held on quality assurance in 1995. Eight

reports have been prepared under the project by experts on topics such as

quality assurance, a preliminary safety review of the plant, and a review of

seismic hazard studies at the plant site. As of May 1997, IAEA had spent

about $241,000 for expert services, equipment (supplies), and

fellowships—or about half of the approximately $494,000 that it plans to

spend through 1998, as indicated in table V.1.

Page 39 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix V 

IAEA’s Active Technical Assistance Projects

for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran

Table V.1: Expenditures for

Infrastructure for Implementation of

Bushehr Nuclear Power Program

Project, 1995-97

Year Expert services Equipment Fellowships Total

1995 $99,546 $1,126 0 $100,673

1996 99,269 490 $5,225 104,985

1997 34,108 0 2,015 36,123

Total $232,924 $1,617 $7,240 $241,781

Note: Expenditure data are as of May 1997.

Source: IAEA.

Regulatory

Infrastructure for

Licensing of Bushehr

Nuclear Power Plant

Project

This new model project, which was approved under IAEA’s 1997-98

technical cooperation program, is intended to improve the overall safety of

the plant by establishing an independent multipurpose center that will

provide emergency response services, train regulators, and analyze

accidents. IAEA will furnish experts to advise, assist, and provide training in

the following areas: (1) identify safety features and evaluate them in the

context of the VVER-1000 design for formulating the regulatory

requirements; (2) formulate a safety policy and associated licensing and

supervisory procedures for the completion of the plant; (3) train

regulatory staff; (4) evaluate submitted regulatory documents; and

(5) establish a national regulatory inspectorate to carry out inspections

during the design, construction, commissioning, and operation of the

plant. IAEA has already sent a number of experts on missions to Iran as a

part of the project. IAEA expects that the project will help the national

regulatory body to discharge its statutory responsibilities for ensuring that

the plant is constructed according to regulatory standards conducive to

safe operation. As of May 1997, IAEA had provided approximately $8,440 in

expert services and was planning to provide a total of approximately

$403,000 for expert services and fellowships though 1999.

Strengthening Reactor

Technology for

Bushehr Nuclear

Power Plant Project

Another new project for the plant, which was approved under IAEA’s

1997-98 technical cooperation program, will enhance the ability of Iran’s

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center to support the Bushehr plant. IAEA’s

project summary states that while Iran’s nuclear technology center has

adequate technical and scientific expertise on nuclear safety and quality

assurance to support Iran’s nuclear regulatory body and the plant, the

center has asked for IAEA’s expert advice and transfer of up-to-date

knowledge. IAEA will provide expert services to help the center analyze the

capabilities of the power plant and will provide training in reactor safety

Page 40 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix V 

IAEA’s Active Technical Assistance Projects

for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran

analysis and reactor technology. According to the project summary, this

project will develop expertise at the center in safety analysis and other

technical expertise for the Bushehr plant. IAEA plans to provide a total of

$400,800 for expert services and fellowships for the project by 1999.

Page 41 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

Resources,

Community, and

Economic

Development

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Gene Aloise, Assistant Director

Sarah E. Veale, Evaluator-in-Charge

Daniel Semick, Senior Evaluator

Duane G. Fitzgerald, Ph.D., Nuclear Engineer

Office of General

Counsel

Jackie A. Goff, Senior Attorney

Page 42 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 43 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
Related GAO Products

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implementation of the U.S./North Korean

Agreed Framework on Nuclear Issues (GAO/RCED/NSIAD-97-165, June 2, 1997).

International Organizations: U.S. Participation in the United Nations

Development Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-8, Apr. 17, 1997).

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Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed

Reactors Safer (GAO/RCED-94-234, Sept. 29, 1994).

Foreign Assistance: U.S. Participation in FAO’s Technical Cooperation

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Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Challenges Facing the International

Atomic Energy Agency (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-284, Sept. 22, 1993).

Nuclear Safety: Progress Toward International Agreement to Improve

Reactor Safety (GAO/RCED-93-153, May 14, 1993).

Nuclear Safety: Concerns About the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba

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Page 44 GAO/RCED-97-192 IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program
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