Afghanistan Food Security Bulletin 

 October/November 2005

Land Tenure 

Land tenure is an issue that needs to be looked at 

critically in Afghanistan. Eighty-five percent of the 

Afghan population subsists on agriculture. Though 

during the recent drought people diversified their 

sources of income to include labor migration and 

remittances, land still plays an important role in 

providing household income. This dependence on 

agriculture combined with inequitable land 

distribution contributes to food insecurity in 

Afghanistan. 

Land plays a vital role in Afghanistan. It is the source 

of identity, social status, and the means for earning 

ones livelihood (Feinstein International Famine 

Center, Tufts University, Human Security and 

Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002 to 2003). 

However, according to Looking for Peace on the 

Pasture, 21% to 24% of the rural Afghan population 

is landless. In addition, anecdotal evidence shows 

that a significant proportion of the Afghan 

population does not own a house as well. The land’s value depends on external factors such a security, 

and climate. The more the country moves toward stability and prosperity, the value of the land gets 

higher and higher. Thus, the number of claimants increases. However, when there is instability and poor 

climate conditions the land tends to devalue. 

Highlights: 

Food security has direct association with land 

tenure. The land tenure crisis has reached its peak 

in Afghanistan threatening food security, 

livelihoods and stability. 

Denying pastoralists access to pastures threatens 

the livelihoods of two and half million people.

Wheat prices slightly increased in Nangarhar, 

Maimana, Hirat, Bamyan and Faizabad due to the 

arrival of winter. On the other hand, Kabul market 

shows a slight decrease in wheat prices. 

Wage rates raised in Maimana, Bamyan, and 

Faizabad due to increases in job opportunities

such as wood cutting, mud roof plastering and 

construction that needs to be done prior to winter. 

Diesel prices sharply increased in all eight 

monitored locations of Afghanistan due to the 

global increase in oil prices 

In Afghanistan, history has proven that poor land management, or untactful land management, was 

the primary cause of conflict or civil war. The current problem in Afghanistan with regard to pastures is 

the result of management practices during the 19th century, which were believed to be done to favor 

Pashtuns (Wily Liz, Looking for Peace on the Pasture, AREU, Dec. 2004). Another example of how land 

policies cause conflict was demonstrated by the backlash against the pro-communist regime in 

Afghanistan cause by decree number seven which was about redistribution of the "skewed land 

distribution.” This decree was enacted in 1980 in order to give land ownership to those who worked on 

the land rather than to those who owned the land. 

Land tenure problems became more obvious and tangible in 2002 when refugees and IDPs started to 

repatriate back to their places of origin. A substantial proportion of refugee and IDP houses were 

occupied by people who had remained in Afghanistan. Further complicating the situation were the 

nomads who wanted to continue to have access to pastures, which had been restored to them during 

the Taliban period after nearly two decades. Returnee farm lands were taken and nomads were 

denied access to pastures. According to a July 2004 global IDP report, in Mazar, 8,000 cases of refugee 

property disputes had been reported. In addition, according to the Afghanistan Independent Human 

Rights Commission, since June 2003, 300 violations including arbitrary house destruction and property 

occupation were reported, these constitute the largest proportion of human rights violations. 

These disputes are not exclusively Pashtun versus non-Pashtun and residents versus nomads, but 

between people who stayed permanently in the area and those who left the area completely and/or 
only visited the area from time-to-time. Ethnicity and political affiliation have played an important role 

which needs to be taken into account, but not to the extent to overshadow the situation and confuse 

the decisions that distinguish between ownership and confiscation, particularly with regard to farm land 

and houses. 

Afghan Pastoralists and Their Access to Pastures 

The Kuchi pastoralists are a group whose livelihoods are based on raising and herding livestock, through 

migration in search of seasonal pastures. The name Kuchi refers to both a migratory lifestyle as well as a 

cultural identity. Afghan pastoralists consist of Pashtun, Tajik, Baluch, Uzbek and Aymaq ethic groups; 

however, they are predominately Pashtun (De Weijer Frauke, USAID/RAMP, Towards a Pastoralist 

Support Strategy, October 2005). 

The most recent information source on Afghan pastoralists' demography is the National Multi-Sectoral 

Assessment on Kuchi (De Weijer, Assil, and Pinney, 2005). This assessment estimates that there are 2.5 

million pastoralists which represent 10% of the total Afghan population. Frauke, the author of the 

Pastoralist Support Strategy, categorized the 

Afghan pastoralists in three groups: 1) longrange pastoralist, 2) short-range pastoralist 

and 3) recently settled pastoralists. 

Traditionally, pastoralists play a substantial 

role in Afghan economy (Barfield Thomas, 

Boston University, Nomadic Pastoralist in 

Afghanistan, Reconstruction of the Pastoral 

Economy, April 2004). Prior the war, livestock 

and its products (handicraft, rugs, and wool) 

contributed 16% to the country's Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP) and 34.6% to the 

total exportation which was equal to $US 95 

million per year (De Weijer Frauke, 

USAID/RAMP, Towards a Pastoralist Support Strategy, October 2005). Twenty-five years ago, 75-80% of 

the sheep population in Afghanistan was managed by Afghan pastoralists. Due to prolonged external 

and internal war and persistent drought these figures have decreased dramatically over the last 25 

years. In 1995, (pre-drought) Afghan pastoralists held 50% of the national sheep herd total. According 

to a May 2005 estimation, during the drought years the abovementioned figure decreased to 43% (De 

Weijer Frauke, October 2005). 

As a result of drought and lack of access to pasture, one million Afghan pastoralists lost their traditional 

way of life: they have settled or become IDPs in southwestern IDP camps (De Weijer Frauke, October 

2005). Changing their traditional way of life was financially costly and a difficult adaptation. For 

example, if a pastoralist wants to buy land in a rural area in order to build a house, he has to pay 

double the normal price. This price disparity occurs because of Afghan traditional and tribal practices 

which prevent tribe outsiders from buying property. In addition, by Sharia Law, if someone wishes to sell 

a property, the neighbor has the right of first refusal, which is called the Shafa rights. If the neighbor 

cannot pay the amount, then the owner can sell the property to someone else. Even without the 

financial and traditional hurdles to purchasing land, changing livelihoods, especially those that have 

been in place for many generations, is extremely difficult. It takes one generation to adapt to a new 

livelihood system. In addition, it is not only the pastoralists who need to adapt to their new livelihood 

system, but other peoples' perceptions about pastoralists must adapt as well. For example, if a resident 

wants to hire someone for agriculture labor or construction labor, he is not going to hire an expastoralist, since he has no experience in these fields. This prevents settled pastoralists from fully 

integrating into their new communities and from fully exploiting a full-range of income earning options. 

Population figures per category

1,265,432

795,766

365,106

-

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

Short range

migratory

Long range

migratory

Settled

No of individuals
Changes in national and regional geopolitics also negatively affected Afghan pastoralists' livelihoods. 

Afghan pastoralists used to benefit from the lowland (India and Pakistan) pastures during the winter and 

from highland (central Afghanistan) pastures during the summer. However, due to the AfghanistanPakistan dispute over Pashtunistan, Afghan pastoralists have been prevented from crossing the border 

between these countries since 1961. As a result, Afghan pastoralists lost access to winter lowland 

pastures which added pressure on Afghanistan winter pastures which are located in the southern, 

southwestern and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan. This caused tension between residents of 

these provinces and Afghan pastoralists (De Weijer Frauke, October 2005). Twenty-five years ago, when 

Afghans were armed by anti-communist allies in order to fight against Russian, Afghan pastoralists were 

denied summer pastures as well. During the Taliban rule, Afghan pastoralists retained the rights of 

summer pastures and the Taliban enacted a land rights law on pastures which recognized private 

pastures and public pastures. Private pastures are those gazing areas which can only be used by 

residents and are located in adjacent communities, to the extent someone can “hear the voice or the 

call to prayer.” Pastures which are located beyond this boundary are called public pasture and can 

be used by anyone, including nomads and residents. Under the current legislation, all pastures, both 

private and public, are government land. The government owns the pastures and can allocate "users 

rights and leasing rights to individuals or a group" (De Weijer Frauke, October 2005). However, 

practically the warlords are in control of pastures. 

Afghan pastoralists are also being left out of the reconstruction process (health care, education, access 

to clean drinking water and national solidarity). However, this exclusion is not intentional, but mainly 

due to their migratory lifestyle as pastoralists do not own land on which schools, wells, and health clinics 

can be built (De Weijer Frauke, October 2005). The presence of antipersonnel mines also threatens 

Afghan pastoralist lives. There are 10 millions mines in Afghanistan. Nine percent of Afghan pastoralists 

have the presence of mines in their summer pastures while 10% of pastoralists have mines in their winter 

pastures (De Weijer, Assil, and Pinney, 2005). The presence of mines prevents the pastoralists from fully 

utilizing the pastures that remain available to them. 

Afghan pastoralists have lost the practical support of politicians and law enforcement agencies. 

According to the Deputy Minister of Tribal Affairs, substantial proportions of pastures have been 

cultivated by residents, particularly by "warlords". According to the FAO report Pastures under Attack, 

40% of the Laili pasture (Maimana Province) has been cultivated. However, the government of 

Afghanistan has failed practically to intervene or facilitate an appropriate solution between pastoralists 

and residents. Many people believe that there are two main reasons that the government is not 

intervening: 1) the Afghan government does not want to be perceived as pro-Pashtun since Afghan 

pastoralists are predominately Pashtun, and 2) the Afghan government is too young to enforce law in 

rural Afghanistan, particularly on warlords—this is still a critical issue for the government to tackle. In the 

meantime, the government is forgetting the fact that ignoring the needs of 10% of the population has 

serious negative consequences for food security and country stability. Ten percent of the Afghan 

population is at risk of losing their livelihoods which could lead to further conflict and instability. The 

residents that are predominately non-Pashtun and who are denying pastoralists access to pastures are 

accusing the previous governments that their policies were in favor of pastoralists or, in other words, 

Pashtuns and therefore pastoralists should not have access to pastures that belong to them. 

Nonetheless, there is a controversial report which states that none of the previous governments were 

ever happy with pastoralists since administrative-wise they were non-manageable and they are 

perceived as backwards in comparison to the rest of the Afghan population (Barfield Thomas, Boston 

University, Nomadic Pastoralist in Afghanistan, Reconstruction of the Pastoral Economy, April 2004). 
Source of Map: Pastoralists Support Strategy 

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Source of Map: NMAK Report 

On November 15, the Chemonics International RAMP project, funded by USAID, with close collaboration 

from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, organized a workshop on Afghan 

pastoralists. Various organizations, experts and Afghan pastoralists participated in the workshop. The 

outputs of the Afghan pastoralist workshop were the fallowing points: 

 

Dr. Liz Wily, invited scholar of the workshop, suggested that there is a need for bottom up solutions in 

which the resident communities, together with pastoralists and through mediation by the government 

and the aid community, find a solution and come to an agreement. She stated: "Guns and documents 

should be left at door during negotiation” (guns refers to residents arms by which they prevent Afghan 
pastoralists from pastures and documents refers to Afghan pastoralist documents that secure their rights 

of access to pastures which were given by the pervious governments to the Afghan pastoralists.) This 

would be a compromise between pastoralist and residents. 

Ashraf Ahmadzai, elected leader of Afghan pastoralist council, said, "Afghan pastoralists would not 

agree to any solution in which their documents will be neglected.” He added, “documents are very 

important in the eye of any law. Neglecting documents will bring mess to the country, because in such 

cases anybody can claim anything.” Ahmadzai noted that there are two types of documentations: 1) 

documents that secure access rights to public pastures and 2) documents that represent ownership of 

the pasture. In the former case, the land belongs to the government but pastoralists have the rights of 

grazing and the latter is ownership status in which an individual pastoralist bought a pasture from a 

resident. These documents have the history of one and half centuries. 

Dr. Nasseri, the director of Dutch Committee for Afghanistan (DCA) and invited speaker of the 

workshop, presented the Dutch Committee's activities. He said despite a lot of effort, DCA's pastoralist 

coverage is inadequate. The main reason for this is inaccessibility of pastoralists to the veterinary clinics. 

He asked that the pastoralist community provide male high school graduates who DCA will train to work 

as veterinarians in pastoralist communities. Members of the pastoralist community indicated their 

willingness but noted that it is hard to find male high school graduates in the pastoralist community. 

The pastoralist representative for northern Afghanistan disagreed with Dr. Nasseri’s statements. He felt 

that access was not the problem, but rather the skill of the veterinarians which did not allow for proper 

diagnosis of animal diseases. 

The other important issues discussed were animal winter feeding and the quality of pastures. Animal 

winter feeding is a problem in Afghanistan and it needs to resolve with supplementary fodder. The 

author of the Pastoralist Support Strategy suggests that pastures may be under grazed. However, 

findings of other reports are contradictory to the findings of abovementioned report. They indicate that 

overgrazing is not a result of animal grazing but a result of collecting bushes for fuel wood. 

Market Prices 

October 2005 wheat prices slightly increased in comparison to August 2005 prices in Nangarhar, 

Maimana, Hirat, Bamyan and Faizabad markets. The increase in wheat prices in these provinces is likely 

to be the result of preparation for winter. In remote rural Afghanistan, people tend to buy all of the 

wheat that they need for the entire winter in August, September and October. This concentrated 

demand has caused prices to rise during the aforementioned months. Kabul market shows a slight 

decrease in the price of wheat, which is likely the result of wheat grain prices returning to normal. Due to 

parliamentary elections and associated increase in security threats, the Kabul wheat price was higher in 

August 2005. 

Wage rates in October 2005 compared to August 2005 have increased in Hirat, Faizabad, Bamyan and 

Mainmana. Increases in wage rates are likely the result of an increased demand for labor associated 

with wood cutting, mud roof plastering and construction - all activities that need to be completed prior 

to the arrival of winter. 

In comparison to August 2005 diesel prices, diesel prices in October 2005 experienced a notable 

increase in all eight locations (Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabab, Hirat, Mazar, Faizabad, Bamyan and 

Mainmana). This rise in diesel prices reflects the global increase in oil prices. Faizabad experienced the 

highest prices (Afs 36.6 per liter) and Hirat the lowest (Afs 28 per liter). Hirat is located on the supply route 

for diesel imports from Iran and Turkmenistan, which may account for the slightly lower price. 
August-05 September-05 October-05 

Locations Wheat/Kg Diesel/L 

Labor 

Wage/day Wheat/Kg Diesel/L 

Labor 

Wage/day Wheat/Kg Diesel/L 

Labor 

Wage/day 

Kabul 13.3 26 180 12.9 28 175 12.6 32 179

Kandahar 10.8 25 150 11.1 29 150 10.9 30 150

Nangarhar 9.4 26.6 126.6 9.9 31.9 126.6 10 32.3 126.6

Hirat 10 25 160 10.5 27 170 10.9 28 170

Mazar 9.8 24 178 10 34 173 9.8 31 160

Faizabad 11.2 31 200 11.6 41 213 12 37 250

Bamyan 10.8 28.3 185 10.8 36.5 180 11.5 36.5 196.3

Mainmana 11.4 26 220 12.1 30 200 11.6 30 233

The average exchange rate for August and October is Afs 49.90 to $1., Source of data WFP/VAM Unit 

Contact Address: 

Fazal Karim Najimi Email: FKNajimi@chemonics.com Cell phone: 070 15 60 60 

Famine Early Warning System Network Funded by USAID 

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development