Washington, DC 20548 

August 15, 2008 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Review of the Transportation Security Administration’s Air Cargo Screening 

Exemptions Report 

This report formally transmits the attached briefing in response to section 1602(b) of the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The act requires 

the Comptroller General to provide an assessment of the methodology used by the 

Secretary of Homeland Security for maintaining, changing or eliminating an exemption 

under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i)(1). We provided the mandated reporting committees with a 

restricted version of this briefing in July 2008. Based on the results of our review, we are 

not making any recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action. All 

information considered Sensitive Security Information by the Transportation Security 

Administration has been removed from this product. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. This report will also be 

available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff 

have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3404 or 

berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 

Steve Morris, Assistant Director; Lara Kaskie; Thomas Lombardi; Meg Ullengren; and 

Margaret Vo. 

Cathleen A. Berrick 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 1 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 
List of Committees 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

Page 2 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 3 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

1

Review of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) Air Cargo Screening 

Exemptions Report

Briefing to Congressional Committees

July 8, 2008

Enclosure: Briefing Slides 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 4 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

2

Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Summary

• Background 

• Results

• Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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3

Introduction

• Section 1602(b) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act

of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) requires TSA to submit to the appropriate committees

of Congress and GAO a report containing an assessment of each exemption 

granted under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i)(1) for the screening of cargo transported on 

passenger aircraft and an analysis of the risk of maintaining each exemption. The 

report is required to include (1) the rationale for each exemption; (2) the percentage 

of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g) (which defines 

“screening” in this context to mean a physical examination or nonintrusive method of

assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security); (3) the impact of

each exemption on aviation security; (4) the projected impact on the flow of 

commerce of eliminating an exemption; and (5) plans and rationale for maintaining,

changing, or eliminating each exemption.

• Section 1602(b) of the act also requires GAO to provide an assessment of the

methodology of determinations made by TSA for maintaining, changing, or

eliminating an exemption under section 44901(i)(1).
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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4

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

• In conducting our study, we reviewed TSA’s methodology for determining which air 

cargo screening exemptions to maintain, revise, or eliminate. Specifically, our 

objectives were to determine:

1) the extent to which TSA’s methodology for determining whether to maintain,

revise, or eliminate an exemption addresses the requirements set forth in the

act was risk-based and was consistent with the mission of TSA’s air cargo 

program to balance security with the flow of commerce; and

2) any challenges TSA may face in implementing its plans to maintain, revise or 

eliminate air cargo screening exemptions, and potential vulnerabilities that 

may continue to exist as a result of cargo being exempt from physical

screening.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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5

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont’d) 

• This review is focused on TSA's air cargo screening exemptions report.

1 In

conducting our study, we:

• Reviewed TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, security directives, and other 

documents that provide details on existing air cargo screening exemptions to

obtain an understanding of TSA’s current air cargo screening requirements.

• Compared the results from TSA's report to our previous findings2 on air cargo 

screening exemptions to determine whether the continued use of alternative 

means to secure air cargo exempt from physical screening3 may result in any

vulnerabilities, as identified by TSA and other stakeholders.

1 Transportation Security Administration, Report to Congress on Air Cargo Subject to Alternate Screening, February 2008.

2 See GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005) and GAO, Aviation

Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007).

3 For certain types of cargo, TSA has authorized the use of TSA-approved alternative methods for screening cargo carried on passenger aircraft. Alternative methods can

include verifying shipper and cargo information and conducting a visual inspection of the cargo shipment. For the purposes of this briefing and to remain consistent with our

prior work on air cargo security, the term screening exemption refers to cargo screened in accordance with such alternative methods; to the extent such cargo is no longer

“exempt,” TSA has determined that such cargo must be screened in accordance with current TSA requirements for the physical screening of cargo carried on board 

passenger aircraft.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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6

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont’d) 

• Assessed the extent to which TSA sought to balance security with the flow of

commerce when analyzing the exemptions, consistent with the mission of the 

agency’s air cargo program.

• Met with TSA officials to:

• determine the extent to which TSA addressed the reporting requirements set

forth in the act and to determine the agency’s methodology for completing its

assessment;

• discuss the extent to which the agency used risk assessments when

conducting its review of air cargo screening exemptions (GAO did not 

conduct an independent review of TSA’s risk assessments); and

• discuss the extent to which the agency may face challenges as it proceeds 

with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate air cargo screening exemptions.

• Contacted air cargo associations to determine their input, if any, to TSA’s 

assessment.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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7

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (cont’d) 

• We provided the mandated reporting committees with a restricted version of this

briefing in July 2008. All information considered Sensitive Security Information4 by

TSA has been removed from this product.

• We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 to July 2008 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a

reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit 

objectives.

4 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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8

Summary

• TSA’s report addresses the five key areas required by section 1602(b) of the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,

5 and its

methodology was consistent with TSA’s mission for the air cargo program to balance 

security with the flow of commerce. As part of their assessment, TSA officials stated

that they considered and determined the threat to and vulnerability of the exempted 

cargo types, and relied primarily on professional judgment for determining which 

screening exemptions to revise, maintain, or eliminate.

6 However, TSA has yet to

complete its air cargo vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify

potential security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions. Without such

information, TSA is limited in its ability to make risk-based decisions regarding the 

security of air cargo. TSA acknowledges the importance of completing air cargo 

vulnerability assessments and has plans to complete additional assessments by the 

end of calendar year 2009.

5 Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(b), 121 Stat. 266, 479-80 (2007).

6 TSA does not take any exemptions under 49 U.S.C. § 44901(i), as contemplated by the mandate. According to TSA, no cargo transported on passenger aircraft is truly exempt

from screening.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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9

Summary (cont’d)

• TSA may face potential resource challenges as the agency moves forward with its

plans to maintain, revise or eliminate domestic and outbound screening exemptions. 

In addition, TSA has not yet assessed the potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound

air cargo screening exemptions, which are similar to those posed to domestic and 

outbound air cargo.7

7 Air cargo bound for the United States from a foreign country is referred to as inbound air cargo. Cargo transported by air within the United States is referred to as domestic air

cargo, and cargo transported by air from the United States to a foreign location is referred to as outbound air cargo.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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10

Background

• According to TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, issued in November 2003, the 

agency’s mission for the air cargo program is to secure the air cargo transportation 

system while not unduly impeding the flow of commerce.

• Participants in the air cargo transportation system include individuals and 

businesses that ship their cargo on all-cargo and passenger aircraft, freight

forwarders that consolidate shipments and deliver them to air carriers, and 

passenger and all-cargo air carriers that use their cargo facilities to store cargo until

it is placed onboard an aircraft for transport.

• Assessing risk, a critical component of a risk-management approach in a homeland 

security setting, typically involves three key elements―threats, vulnerabilities, and 

consequences―that provide input into the decision-making process for homeland 

security.

8

8 A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies

weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses. An assessment of consequences evaluates the personal, physical,

and economic consequences to an area of a successful attack.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 13 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

11

Background (cont’d)

• In October 2005 and April 2007, we reported that TSA had established 

requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but had exempted some

domestic, outbound, and inbound cargo from screening.

9 Among other things, we 

identified potential vulnerabilities resulting from these exemptions and 

recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing screening exemptions 

and determine whether such exemptions left the air cargo system unacceptably

vulnerable. Since we have issued these reports, TSA has revised some of its 

screening exemptions for domestic and outbound air cargo carried on passenger 

aircraft. TSA has not revised its screening exemptions for inbound air cargo.

• In accordance with section 1602(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the

9/11 Commission Act of 2007, TSA is developing a system to physically screen 50 

percent of air cargo originating in the United States carried on passenger aircraft by

February 2009 and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010.

10

9 See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. TSA does not presently plan for this system to address inbound cargo.

10 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 14 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

12

Background (cont’d)

• To meet this requirement, TSA has begun development of a Certified Cargo 

Screening Program (CCSP), which is to allow Certified Cargo Screening Facilities

(CCSFs) to screen cargo prior to acceptance by a freight forwarder or air carrier. 

Manufacturing facilities and freight forwarders, among others, can apply to become

a CCSF. In January 2008, TSA initiated its pilot test of the CCSP in three cities, 

which includes identifying participants for the voluntary program. TSA plans to

expand the pilot to up to six additional cities during the first half of 2008.
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 15 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

13

TSA’s Report Addresses the Requirements Set Forth in the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act

• TSA’s report addresses the five key areas required by the act: 

1. the rationale for each exemption;

2. the percentage of cargo not screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 

44901(g); 

3. the impact of each exemption on aviation security;

4. the projected impact on the flow of commerce of eliminating an exemption;

and

5. the plans and rationale for maintaining, changing, or eliminating each 

exemption. 

• TSA’s report focuses on domestic and outbound air cargo screening exemptions

and does not include an assessment of inbound air cargo screening exemptions.

Results - Finding 1
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 16 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

14

TSA’s Report Addresses the Requirements Set Forth in the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act

(cont’d)

• According to TSA’s report and subsequent discussions with agency officials, TSA 

plans to maintain six screening exemption categories, make revisions to two 

categories, and eliminate another two categories. TSA officials stated that the

changes to the screening exemptions will be effective as of January 2009.

• Although TSA’s report does not specifically provide a percentage of cargo not 

screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g), it does provide details on the 

types of such cargo not screened. In addition, TSA officials told us that they believe

that approximately 5 percent of cargo carried on passenger aircraft will not be

physically screened in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g) after the changes to

the exemptions are implemented in January 2009.

Results - Finding 1
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 17 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

15

TSA Incorporated Elements of a Risk-Based Approach When Determining 

Whether to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Each Screening Exemption, But 

Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments 

• According to TSA officials, the agency used the results of select air cargo vulnerability

assessments as well as compliance inspection results when determining which screening 

exemptions to maintain, revise, or eliminate; and also considered the introduction of an

explosive device on a passenger aircraft, which the agency has identified as the primary 

threat to such cargo. 

• In October 2005 and in April 2007,

11 we reported that TSA had not conducted an

assessment to identify the range of security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists

related to air cargo operations, and recommended that TSA develop a methodology and

schedule for completing vulnerability assessments. Partly in response to our 

recommendation, and consistent with direction specified in law,

12 TSA implemented an Air 

Cargo Vulnerability Assessment Program in November 2006. TSA officials reported that as

of May 2008, the agency has completed air cargo vulnerability assessments at six domestic

airports and plans to complete air cargo vulnerability assessments at all 27 domestic

Category X airports13 by the end of calendar year 2009.

11 See GAO-06-76 and GAO-07-660. 12 See Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 140-41 (2007) (providing that the $80 million appropriated for air cargo shall be used to complete air cargo vulnerability

assessments for all Category X airports, among other purposes). 13 TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In general, Category X airports have the largest 

number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I, II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the nation’s air traffic.

Results – Finding 1
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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16

TSA Incorporated Elements of a Risk-Based Approach When Determining 

Whether to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Each Screening Exemption, But 

Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessments (cont’d)

• Absent the results of these assessments, which could help to identify potential security

vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions, TSA is limited in its ability to make riskbased decisions regarding the security of air cargo. TSA officials acknowledge the 

importance of completing air cargo vulnerability assessments. Officials noted that as

the agency conducts additional air cargo vulnerability assessments, officials will assess

these results to determine whether existing screening exemptions should be revised or 

eliminated. 

Results – Finding 1
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 19 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

17

TSA’s Methodology Was Consistent with its Goal to Balance Security

with the Flow of Commerce

• Consistent with the mission of TSA’s air cargo program, TSA considered, among 

other things, the balance between security and the flow of commerce in determining 

which air cargo screening exemptions to maintain, revise, or eliminate. In follow-up

discussions with TSA officials, they stated that they relied primarily on professional

judgment to determine which screening exemptions to revise, maintain, or eliminate. 

In addition, TSA officials told us that they took the following actions to assist in their

determinations:

• Reviewed recommendations related to revising screening exemptions made by

TSA’s internal cargo policy working group in March 2006.

• Held discussions with select air cargo industry stakeholders to discuss the 

potential impact on industry of revising or eliminating screening exemptions.

However, according to TSA officials, there was no formal process by which 

they solicited industry input as a part of TSA’s assessment of each exemption. 

Results - Finding 1
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 20 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

18

TSA’s Plans to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Screening

Exemptions May Pose Potential Resource Challenges to the 

Agency

As TSA moves forward with its plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate domestic and

outbound air cargo screening exemptions, the agency may face resource challenges,

including the following:

•Screening Resources: Although TSA plans to expand the use of TSA-certified 

explosives detection canine teams to screen air cargo before it is placed on passenger

planes, TSA has not assessed how the agency’s plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate 

screening exemptions may impact canine team needs. TSA is in the process of adding 

170 canine teams, of which 85 will be primarily used to screen air cargo.14 These teams

are to be primarily located at the 20 airports that, according to TSA officials, receive

approximately 65 percent of all air cargo transported within the United States. TSA 

officials could not tell us whether the additional 85 canine teams will be sufficient to meet

the agency’s increasing screening needs.

Results – Finding 2

14 There are currently 370 TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams that are cross-trained to work in multiple aviation environments, including air cargo. 
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

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19

TSA’s Plans to Maintain, Revise, or Eliminate Screening

Exemptions May Pose Potential Resource Challenges to the 

Agency (cont’d)

•Compliance Resources: TSA officials stated that although they believe the revisions and

eliminations of domestic and outbound air cargo screening exemptions should not

severely impact the workload of Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs), TSA has not

conducted an assessment to determine how the changes to air cargo screening 

exemptions may impact TSI resources. According to TSA officials, there may not be 

enough TSIs to conduct compliance inspections of all the entities that could be a part of

the CCSP once the program is fully implemented in August 2010.

Results – Finding 2
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 22 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

20

TSA Has Not Assessed the Vulnerabilities Posed by Inbound Air 

Cargo Security Exemptions

• Although TSA plans to conduct vulnerability assessments as part of its risk-based approach to

securing inbound air cargo, the agency has not established a time frame for doing so. Such 

assessments could provide information on the potential vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo 

screening exemptions. We reported in April 2007 that TSA officials told us that they would conduct 

vulnerability assessments of inbound air cargo after they had assessed the vulnerability of domestic

air cargo.15 Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist 

and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those facing the domestic air cargo supply

chain.

• In April 2007, we reported on the potential vulnerabilities associated with inbound air cargo screening

exemptions.

16 Specifically, we reported that screening exemptions could pose a risk to the inbound

air cargo supply chain because TSA has limited information on the background of and security risks 

posed by foreign freight forwarders and shippers whose cargo may fall into one of the exemption

categories. We recommended that TSA assess whether existing inbound air cargo screening

exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the air cargo supply chain and if necessary, 

address these vulnerabilities. TSA agreed with this recommendation and noted that the agency had 

recently revised and eliminated domestic and outbound air cargo screening exemptions. TSA,

however, has yet to fully address our recommendation for assessing inbound air cargo screening 

exemptions. 

15 See GAO-07-660. 16 See GAO-07-660.

Results – Finding 2
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 23 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

21

TSA Has Not Assessed the Vulnerabilities Posed by Inbound Air 

Cargo Security Exemptions (cont’d)

• TSA acknowledges that some categories of exempted cargo pose a potential 

vulnerability to the domestic air cargo supply chain and will be eliminated. TSA officials

stated that the agency will evaluate these exemptions for inbound cargo in the future. 

TSA officials also noted that they do plan to increase the percentage of inbound air

cargo required to be screened, but the screening exemptions for such cargo would be 

maintained. According to TSA officials, the requirement to screen an increased

percentage of inbound air cargo will be implemented in early 2009. 

• In response to a request by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee

and Congressman Edward Markey, GAO will initiate a review of TSA’s efforts to meet

the requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo carried on passenger aircraft.

17 As

part of this review, GAO will likely examine TSA’s plans to screen inbound air cargo.

17 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g).

Results – Finding 2
Enclosure: Briefing Slides 

Page 24 GAO-08-1055R Air Cargo Screening Exemptions 

22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

• We provided a draft of the information included in this briefing to TSA for review and

comment. On June 25, 2008, TSA officials provided oral comments to the briefing

slides. The Air Cargo Division General Manager noted that he generally agreed with

the information presented and our findings. TSA also provided us with technical 

written comments to the slides, which we incorporated as appropriate.

(440748) 
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