Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50073

UNITED FORMING, INC; CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

FAULKNERUSA, LP

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:08-CV-520

Before BARKSDALE, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case arises out of a construction project where Appellant

FaulknerUSA, LP (“Faulkner”) was the general contractor, United Forming, Inc.

was the subcontractor and Continental Casualty Company was the surety on

their agreement. After disputes about United Forming’s work, the parties went

to arbitration before an American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) panel. The

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 27, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-50073

 Because the interests of United Forming and Continental Casualty align on this 1

appeal, we will hereinafter refer only to United Forming.

 Faulkner also complains that the district court improperly restricted his discovery 2

of Yungblut’s alleged conflicts. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that Faulkner failed to show that the requested discovery would yield relevant

evidence.

2

AAA panel ruled in favor of United Forming and Continental Casualty. United 1

Forming filed an action to confirm the award, while Faulkner moved to vacate

it. The district court ruled in United Forming’s favor. Faulkner appeals, and we

AFFIRM.

On a motion to vacate an award brought under the Federal Arbitration Act

(“FAA”), the FAA sets forth the exclusive grounds for vacatur. Hall Street

Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402–03 (2008). In this case,

Faulkner attacks the arbitrators with the following arguments: (1) Arbitrator

Yungblut failed to make proper pre-arbitration disclosures of conflicts; (2) the 2

arbitrators’ comments at the arbitration demonstrated bias; and (3) the

arbitrators’ rulings as to the legal issues presented were so grossly wrong as to

be “misconduct” or “misbehavior” under the FAA. We address each contention

briefly in turn. 

As part of his pre-arbitration disclosures, Arbitrator Yungblut disclosed

that his former partner, Steven Nelson, had represented Faulkner’s predecessor

company. However, Faulkner alleges that Yungblut should have disclosed

Nelson’s status as an officer of that entity, as well as Nelson’s alleged “bad

feelings” about the sale of the entity to what is now Faulkner. It also alleges

that Yungblut should have disclosed his friendship with the vice president and

general counsel of a competitor of Faulkner. These claims about Yungblut’s

nondisclosure are foreclosed by our decision in Positive Software Solutions, Inc.

v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 281–85 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc)

(discussing circumstances in which nondisclosure supports a finding of “evident
No. 09-50073

 Section 10 of the FAA allows vacatur “where there was evident partiality or 3

corruption in the arbitrators.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).

 We also note that the information about Nelson’s position was known to Faulkner’s 4

president and, therefore, should have been raised at the time of Yungblut’s selection.

 Another ground for vacatur under the FAA is “where the arbitrators were guilty of 5

misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing

to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by

which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).

3

partiality” under the FAA). At most, the undisclosed information would support 3

only a “speculative impression of bias” and not a “significant compromising

relationship.” See id. at 285–86.

4

Faulkner accuses Arbitrators Yungblut and Snyder of “actual bias” based

upon statements they made during the arbitration proceeding allegedly

suggesting defenses and causes of action to United Forming, as well as an

alleged failure to allow response to a motion and supposed mistakes of law. Cf.

Positive Software, 476 F.3d at 281 (“evident partiality” under the FAA means

“bias” that is “clearly evident in the decisionmakers”). We conclude that

Faulkner has failed to meet its “onerous burden” of demonstrating actual bias.

Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550

(N.D. Tex. 2006).

Finally, Faulkner argues that the AAA panel’s award was so contrary to

law that it constitutes “misconduct” or “misbehavior” under the FAA. We note 5

that Faulkner was careful not to use the phrase “manifest disregard of the law”

in this court (as it did in the district court), mindful that we have held that Hall

Street has overruled the use of that standard to vacate an award in a proceeding

under the FAA. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th

Cir. 2009). We need not reach the question of whether an intentional complete
No. 09-50073

 “Misconduct” does not seem to fit Faulkner’s allegation. See generally Roehrs v. FSI 6

Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 811 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (“The [FAA] seems

to limit ‘misconduct’ to cases in which an arbitrator denies a postponement of the hearing or

refuses to hear material evidence . . . .”).

4

disregard of the applicable law could constitute “misbehavior” under the FAA 6

because we conclude that such a situation is not presented here. Even if the

AAA panel’s decision was erroneous – a question we do not reach – it was at

least debatable.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s confirmation of the

arbitration award and denial of Faulkner’s motion to vacate.