# Gabon - United States Department of State

- Gabon HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Gabon				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Gabon																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses.																																																																																														d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Toward International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				On August 30, the Gabonese military abruptly deposed President Ali Bongo Ondimba, ending the Bongo family’s 56-year dynastic rule.  Shortly after the electoral authority declared Bongo the winner of the August 26 elections, which many observers regarded as highly implausible, the military intervened.  The nonviolent coup d’etat was broadly supported by the Gabonese public.  The newly formed Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions (hereafter Transition Council) dissolved the constitution and all state institutions, including parliament and the Constitutional Court.  In the interim, the Transition Council announced the country would be governed by a charter drafted by the council.  Upon taking power, the Transition Council began a crackdown on corruption within the government, released all political prisoners from the Bongo regime, allowed the return of Gabonese citizens who were previously persona non grata for political reasons, and opened the country to foreign journalists.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests or detentions; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on free expression and media freedom, including violence and harassment of journalists and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; trafficking in persons including forced labor; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.Prior to the coup d’etat, the Bongo government took some steps to identify, investigate, and prosecute officials and punish those convicted of human rights abuses.  The transition government took further steps to address human rights abuses.  The Transition Council, however, was also involved in some of its own human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention of journalists and union leaders, and extrajudicial killings of individuals for violating curfew.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were two reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, related to curfew violations.  On October 15, a man, age 30, was beaten and killed by gendarmes for violating the curfew.  On December 18, a man, age 20, was killed by the military for violating curfew in the city of Port-Gentil.  Authorities investigated and arrested the soldiers and gendarmes involved, but no information regarding sentencing was released.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses.																																													The constitution (suspended on August 30 during the coup d’etat) prohibited such practices.  The subsequent Transition Charter did the same.  There were reports of torture in prisons where unidentified personnel employed torture, including one case reported by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) SOS Prisonniers in December 2022.  Several high-profile prisoners were kept in solitary confinement for extended periods.Impunity was a widespread problem among security forces, including the Republican Guard, Gendarmes, the General Directorate of Counterintelligence and Military Security, and the Directorate General of Documentation and Immigration, among others.  Nevertheless, the Bongo government took some steps to identify, investigate, and prosecute officials and punish human rights abusers under the Bongo regime.  Authorities operated a national hotline to report abuses by security force members.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and potentially life threatening due to low-quality food, inadequate sanitation, lack of ventilation, gross overcrowding, and limited medical care.  Conditions in jails and detention centers mirrored those in prisons.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Libreville’s central prison was severely overcrowded; it was built to hold 500 inmates but held approximately 4,000.  There were also reports of overcrowding in other prisons.Some prisoners and detainees were kept in solitary confinement for several months without access to exercise or use of showers or other sanitary facilities.Prisoners had only limited access to food, lighting, sanitation, potable water, and exercise areas.  Management of the spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV or tuberculosis, was inadequate.  According to the NGO SOS Prisonniers, since January, there were four cases of deaths in prison due to lack of adequate medical care.Administration:  There was no prison ombudsperson or comparable independent authority available to respond to prisoner complaints.  Prisoners filed few complaints.  NGOs indicated that the low incidence of complaints was due to ignorance of, or lack of faith in, the process, or fear of retribution.Independent Monitoring:  The government permitted human rights organizations to conduct independent monitoring of prison conditions and granted access to centers for detained migrants and asylum seekers to provide social assistance.  Representatives of several NGOs, including Malachie, the Sylvia Bongo Foundation, and the Voice of the Forgotten, visited prisons.  After the August 30 coup d’etat, the Transition Council prevented prison visits of any kind until October 30.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution (suspended as of year’s end) and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for detainees or persons arrested to challenge in court the lawfulness and arbitrary nature of their detention.  The law also provided for compensation if a court ruled the detention unlawful.  The government, however, did not always respect these provisions.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Although the law required arrest warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by a duly authorized official, security forces in some cases disregarded these provisions.  The law allowed authorities to detain a suspect up to 48 hours without charge, after which it required the suspect be charged before a judge.  Police often failed to respect this time limit.Once authorities charged a person, the law provided for conditional release if further investigation was required.  There was a functioning bail system.  Detainees did not always have prompt access to family members and a lawyer of their choice.  The law required the government to provide indigent detainees with lawyers and interpretation, but this was not always done, often because the government could not find lawyers willing to accept the terms of payment offered for taking such cases, or adequate interpreters.Arbitrary Arrest:  Several credible accounts described cases where the Directorate General of Documentation and Immigration, arrested, detained, interrogated, and eventually released persons without being charged with a crime.  As part of the coup d’etat of August 30, authorities put deposed President Ali Bongo, his wife Sylvia, and ministers under house arrest, and arrested Bongo’s son Noureddin and many of his associates.  Ali Bongo was released from house arrest on September 6, but Sylvia, Noureddin, and others remained in detention.  In December seven union leaders from the Gabon Energy and Water Company (SEEG) were arrested for three days after SEEG employees went on strike to denounce the SEEG’s decision to withhold the traditional 13-month bonus.  The seven union leaders were never charged with a crime, and while in detention they were reportedly abused, humiliated, and forced to participate in acts of patriotism to be released.Pretrial Detention:  Approximately two-thirds of prison inmates were held in pretrial detention that sometimes lasted up to three years.  Some pretrial detentions exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime.  Prolonged pretrial detention was common due to overburdened dockets and an inefficient judicial system.  The law limited pretrial detention to six months on a misdemeanor charge and one year on a felony charge, with six-month extensions if authorized by the examining magistrate.  Detainees generally lacked knowledge of their rights and the proper procedure for submitting complaints and might not have submitted complaints due to fear of retribution.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary demonstrated only partial independence and only in some cases.  The NGO Freedom House alleged the executive branch exercised firm control over the judiciary.  The judiciary was inefficient.  The president appointed and could dismiss judges through the Ministry of Justice, to which the judiciary was accountable.  Corruption was a problem.  For example, individuals charged with offenses reportedly paid bribes to influence the judicial process, avoid facing trial, or both.																Trial Procedures						The currently suspended constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial and to legal counsel, and the judiciary generally respected these rights.  Trial dates were often delayed.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						On September 13, authorities released former Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) deputy Bertrand Zibi Abeghe from prison after Zibi served six years for inciting violence and possessing a firearm.  Many observers considered the charges and conviction politically directed and the evidence fabricated.Authorities under the Bongo regime permitted routine consular and NGO visits to political prisoners.  Following the coup d’etat on August 30, the Transition Council ordered some political prisoners freed, and all those who had gone into exile would be invited to return to Gabon.  The Transition Council, however, also prevented any prisoners from being visited from August 30 – October 30.On September 5, Renaud Allogho Akoue, former Director of the Health Insurance and Social Guarantee Fund, and Leandre Nzue, former mayor of Libreville, were released following the Transition Council’s decision to provide amnesty to prisoners of conscience.On September 11, officials offered the former chief of staff of Ali Bongo Ondimba, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, amnesty, but Laccruche refused until his brother, Grégory Laccruche-Alihanga, was also released.  Officials eventually released the two on October 20.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										Although the suspended constitution and law prohibited such actions, the government did not always respect these prohibitions.  As part of criminal investigations, police requested and easily obtained search warrants from judges, sometimes after the fact.  Security forces conducted warrantless searches for irregular immigrants and criminal suspects.  Authorities reportedly monitored private telephone conversations, personal mail, and the movement of citizens.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The suspended constitution and law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right.  According to the law, contempt of the president or of any government official “committed anywhere, on any occasion, or by any means,” was punishable by six months’ to five years’ imprisonment and fines.  The country’s High Authority for Communication (HAC) acted as the state media regulator and was used as an arm of the government to protect the president.Violence and Harassment:  Prior to the coup d’etat, some journalists reported receiving anonymous instructions or calls from persons suspected of being connected with the government telling them not to report on matters that would cast President Bongo in a negative light.  In the run-up to the August elections, the Bongo government barred foreign journalists from entering the country.  After the coup d’etat, the Transition Council reversed these restrictions.  Four members of the editorial staff of Gabon Media Time were arrested for two days in October after they published concerns over the conduct of a public prosecutor who then claimed he had been defamed.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The NGO Reporters Without Borders asserted that arbitrary media suspensions by the HAC increased in recent years.  On July 12, the HAC suspended the newspaper La Plume for one month.  The HAC also issued formal notices to the newspapers Médiaposte, Médias241, and Lalibreville; these online media outlets were accused of disseminating false information.  Magazine Superstar, an online newspaper, was suspended on July 26 due to the publication of an article unfavorable to Ali Bongo.On the evening of the August 26 elections, the HAC suspended France 24, RFI, and TV5 Monde television and radio programs, claiming they disseminated propaganda and misinformation.  Immediately after the coup d’etat on August 30, authorities assumed control of all television channels and only permitted the broadcast of communiqués from the Transition Council.  The Transition Council also shut down the newspaper L’Union for two days, but reopened all forms of media by September 1 and removed all restrictions on members of the press, allowing for the entry of foreign journalists without visas for the first time.Libel/Slander Laws:  Libel and slander could be treated as either criminal or civil offenses.  There were no reports of libel and slander laws being used against journalists during the year.																Internet Freedom						Shortly after the polls closed on August 26, the Bongo government completely shut down the internet, and blocked most international news broadcasts normally available in the country.  One of the first actions by the Transition Council on August 30 was to restore the internet and re-establish international media links.  The government did not otherwise restrict or disrupt access to the internet.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The suspended constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, although the government severely curbed these rights in the lead-up to the August 26 elections.  The Bongo government historically limited freedom of peaceful assembly for some groups and associations by creating bureaucratic hurdles and failing to issue permits in a timely manner.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The freedom of peaceful assembly was severely curbed in the lead-up to the August 26 elections, with groups of more than five persons barred from assembling.  The Bongo government denied several requests by opposition political parties to hold rallies.  One opposition political rally was violently disrupted in Franceville, Haut-Ogooué Province (home province of deposed President Bongo) on July 23, forcing the opposition presidential candidate to flee.After the coup d’etat on August 30, individuals were not allowed to leave their homes or assemble, but the restrictions on assembly were gradually lessened as the Transition Council consolidated power.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The suspended constitution and existing laws provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.  Nevertheless, the government did not always respect these rights.In-country Movement:  Although there were no legal restrictions on freedom of internal movement, military and police personnel and gendarmes stopped travelers at checkpoints to check identity, residence, or registration documents and on some occasions to solicit bribes.  Prior to the August 26 elections, the Bongo government used aircraft restrictions to prevent the main opposition candidate from traveling to conduct election rallies in the Bongo family’s home area.  There were other reports of opposition figures being delayed or denied access to cross bridges by land, hampering their ability to campaign.  Refugees required a travel document endorsed by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and by government authorities to circulate freely within the country.After the August 30 coup d’etat, individuals were not allowed to leave their homes.  The Transition Council then instituted the strict enforcement of curfews during the night, requiring individuals to be in their homes between 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.  The curfew remained in effect, although the hours were reduced to 12 a.m. to 5 a.m.  Military units enforcing the curfew were accused of using excessive force on individuals out past curfew.  There were two documented cases of the military killing individuals for violating curfew in October and December.  Authorities investigated and arrested the soldiers and gendarmes involved, but no information regarding sentencing was released.Foreign Travel:  Refugees and most holders of a residence permit needed an exit visa to leave and return to the country.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government established a system for providing protection to refugees.Freedom of Movement: (See section 2.d., In-country Movement.)Durable Solutions:  The nationality code allowed refugees to apply for naturalization; however, the process was long and expensive.  At age 18, children born in the country of refugee parents could apply for citizenship.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The suspended constitution and existing laws provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage; however, in the August 26 elections, the Bongo government interfered with the ability of opposition parties to campaign, and then barred international monitors, diplomats, and foreign journalists from observing the elections and counting of ballots.  Shortly after authorities announced results that many observers found questionable, the military stepped in and took over the government.  The Transition Council then annulled the results of the elections.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  During the August 26 presidential, legislative, and local election campaign the Bongo government and ruling PDG party restricted the ability of opposition parties to hold rallies, used various methods to restrict the consensus opposition presidential candidate, Albert Ondo Ossa, from campaigning in many areas, and barred foreign journalists from entering the country.  The Bongo government refused to allow independent election monitors from the European Union, African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States, or international NGOs to enter the country and conduct their observation missions.  The Bongo government appointed a ruling party partisan to chair the formerly independent election commission (CGE) in February.The CGE enacted several changes to the electoral code to benefit the ruling party, which should not have been possible after January according to the law.  Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court allowed the CGE to change rules on polling station representation, limiting access to vote counting to only one representative from the ruling party and one from the opposition, despite there being more than 100 political parties vying for seats in the three elections.  The CGE also changed the ballot procedure to make it harder for votes to remain anonymous.Voters were also disenfranchised from fully voting in the elections.  The CGE changed the ballot structure, creating a combined presidential and legislative ballot, and forcing voters to choose the same party for both elections.  Furthermore, if an independent were on the ballot for president (as was the case for the consensus opposition candidate), the voter would not be able to vote in the legislative election, and vice-versa.  Opposition leaders were therefore forced to choose between sacrificing the legislative or presidential elections, as the government did not allow voters the opportunity to vote their conscience in the ballot box.Numerous voting irregularities were reported on election day, August 26.  Polling stations had missing opposition party ballots and ballot boxes as well as incorrect or old ballots.  Some polling stations opened eight hours after the official opening, and those stations did not remain open into the night to allow for voters to cast a vote.  The opposition claimed the government instructed the CGE to destroy ballots of consensus opposition candidate Albert Ondo Ossa to disrupt and confuse voters in key opposition strongholds.  The Transition Council provided evidence of the Bongo regime implementing a vote-buying scheme, by which PDG officials would pay individuals 10,000 CFA francs ($16.50) to enter the voting booth.  The individuals would then receive another 15,000 CFA francs ($25) upon providing proof they voted for Bongo.At 4:30 a.m. on August 30, the CGE announced that incumbent Ali Bongo Ondimba had won the presidential election with 64 percent of the vote, with consensus opposition candidate Albert Ondo Ossa receiving 30 percent.  The CGE did not provide any detailed voting results.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Until the coup d’etat, the ruling PDG dominated the government.  PDG membership conferred advantages in obtaining government positions.  Opposition party members complained voter districts were unfairly drawn, alleging the president’s home province received disproportionately more parliamentary seats than other provinces.  They also stated the PDG had greater access to government resources for campaign purposes than other parties.After the August 30 coup d’etat, the transitional president and other members of the Transition Council held consultations with members of opposition parties and promised a transition leading to fresh multi-party elections and a re-established civilian government.  On November 13, the Transition Council announced a detailed two-year timeline that would end with elections in August 2025.  The timeline noted the date for elections would be decided by the national dialogue expected to occur in April 2024.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Cultural and traditional factors, as well as social stigma, prevented women and historically marginalized groups such as persons with disabilities and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons from participating equally in political life.Although members of all major ethnic groups occupied prominent government civilian and security force positions, members of Indigenous populations rarely participated in the political process.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.  When charges for corruption were brought forward, the law took effect.  Mechanisms for identifying and prosecuting corruption, however, were imperfect.Corruption:  After the coup d’etat on August 30, the Transition Council arrested Noureddin Bongo Valentin, son of former President Bongo, and other officials for massive embezzlement of public funds, international financial embezzlement in organized gangs, forgery and use of forgery, falsification of the signature of the president of the republic, active corruption, and drug trafficking.  The former Minister of Oil and Gas, Vincent de Paul Massassa, and the former Director General of Forests in the Ministry of Environment, Ghislain Moussavou, were also arrested on corruption charges.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Toward International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Prior to the coup d’etat, a few domestic human rights groups operated, albeit with government restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.  Several human rights NGOs reported governmental intimidation and a general lack of responsiveness to their views.  The Transition Council met with human rights organizations as part of its meeting with civil society leaders and included members of civil society organizations in the new transitional government as part of the Transition Council’s goals of an inclusive government.Government Human Rights Bodies:  Under the Bongo regime, the Ministry of Justice oversaw the Human Rights and Gender Equality portfolio and coordinated government efforts to improve respect for human rights, organized human rights training for government officials, and addressed major human rights problems.  The National Human Rights Commission, composed of representatives from civil society, media, religious groups, and the judiciary, had a degree of independence.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized rape for both women and men; convicted rapists faced penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine.  Nevertheless, authorities seldom prosecuted rape cases, largely due to victims underreporting or being unwilling to testify.  The law addressed spousal and intimate partner rape regardless of gender.  The government made strides to address violence against women; however, societal barriers continued to deter women from reporting cases to authorities.  There were no reliable statistics on the prevalence of rape, but a women’s advocacy NGO estimated it was frequent.  Discussing rape remained taboo, and survivors often opted not to report it due to shame or fear of reprisal.Although the law prohibited domestic violence, NGOs reported it was common.  Penalties ranged from two months’ to 15 years’ imprisonment.  Women rarely filed complaints, due to shame or fear of reprisal, although the government operated a counseling group to provide support for abuse survivors.  The government provided in-kind support to an NGO center to assist survivors of domestic violence, and through the center’s work, police intervened in response to incidents of domestic violence.  The government funded a toll-free national hotline to assist persons experiencing any kind of violence.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  NGOs reported sexual harassment of women was widespread.  The law stated sexual harassment “constitutes an offense against morals (and includes) any behavior, attitude or repeated assiduous or suggestive words, directly or indirectly attributable to a person who, abusing the authority or influence conferred on him by his functions or its social rank, aims to obtain sexual favors from an individual of one or the other sex.”  Sexual harassment was punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment and a substantial fine.  The December 2022 conviction of a male teacher for sexual harassment of a female student led to widespread media coverage on the pervasiveness of sexual harassment of girls in schools.Discrimination:  The law did not generally distinguish between the legal status and rights of women and men.  The law provided for equal treatment regarding marital rights, property, nationality, and inheritance.  There were no reports of the government failing to enforce the law effectively.  Although the labor code prohibited discrimination with respect to employment and work conditions based on sex, no specific law required equal pay for equal work, and women’s wages were frequently less than those of men for equivalent work.  LGBTQI+ women continued to be discriminated against, with openly LGBTQI+ women reportedly near 100 percent unemployment and forced into prostitution to survive.  No openly LGBTQI+ women were employed at any level in the government.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs provided guidance on family-planning best practices to health facilities throughout the country.  There were some social and cultural barriers to access family planning methods based on behavioral norms, religious beliefs, and an individual’s sexual orientation.  LGBTQI+ individuals reported some discrimination when seeking access to sexual and reproductive health services.  Adolescents in rural areas also sometimes lacked access to family planning.  While sexual and reproductive health services were available to survivors of sexual violence at government and private medical facilities, emergency contraception could only be purchased at local pharmacies.  Local NGOs provided support to sexual violence survivors.  Public health institutions had a protocol to provide one month of HIV prophylaxis for survivors of sexual assault, though HIV medication was not always available.The World Health Organization estimated the maternal mortality rate in 2017 at 252 deaths per 100,000 live births.  According to the 2012 Gabon Demographic and Health Survey, girls and women ages 15 to 19 were among the most affected, representing 34 percent of maternal deaths.  The main causes of maternal death were hemorrhages during childbirth, high blood pressure, and infections.  Limited system wide access to prenatal care contributed to poor outcomes during pregnancy and delivery.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										There were no laws that specifically provided for the protection of members of racial or ethnic minorities or groups against violence and discrimination; they had the same civil rights as other citizens.  There were no reports during the year of racial or ethnic violence and discrimination.  The labor code prohibited discrimination with respect to employment and work conditions based on race, color, religion, national origin or citizenship, or social background.  Undocumented foreign workers frequently experienced wage discrimination and poor working conditions.  Penalties for violations were commensurate with penalties related to civil rights.  Penalties were regularly applied against violators.																																				Indigenous Peoples										The Babongo, Baghama, Baka, Bakoya, and Barimba ethnic groups were the earliest known inhabitants of the country and were commonly referred to as “Indigenous” and given certain legal protections.  The law granted members of these groups the same civil rights as other citizens, but they experienced societal discrimination.  Indigenous peoples complained of abuses related to natural resource extraction.  Indigenous peoples were relocated to less desirable areas and were negatively affected by pollution caused by mining and timber operations.  There were no reports that authorities took action to address these complaints.  Discrimination in employment also occurred.  Indigenous persons had little recourse if mistreated by persons from the majority Bantu population, and there were no specific government programs or policies to assist them.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Registration of all births was mandatory, and children without birth certificates could not attend school or participate in most government-sponsored programs.  Many mothers could not obtain birth certificates for their children due to isolation in remote areas of the country or lack of awareness of the requirements of the law.Child Abuse:  Child abuse was illegal, with penalties of up to life in prison, a substantial fine, or both.  According to NGOs, child abuse occurred, including sexual abuse.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The minimum age for marriage was 15 for girls and 18 for boys and the government generally enforced this requirement.  NGOs and the UN Population Fund, however, agreed early marriages were more common among Indigenous ethnic groups, who had significantly different lifestyles and societal norms, and the government did not actively prevent these practices.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The age of consent was 15 for girls and 18 for boys.  The law prohibited child sex trafficking and child pornography, and authorities generally enforced the law.  Perpetrators of child trafficking or a child pornography-related offense could be sentenced to between two- and five-years’ imprisonment.  Under the law, sex trafficking of a child was aggravated child trafficking, punishable by life imprisonment and substantial fines.  Possession of child pornography was punishable by imprisonment of six months to one year and a substantial fine.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish population was very small, and there were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  There were no laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct, nor disproportionate prosecution of apparently neutral laws against LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment:  There were no reports that state actors incited, perpetrated, condoned, or tolerated violence or harassment against LGBTQI+ persons.  Civil society and media reported that LGBTQI+ persons were subject to verbal abuse or assault.  Such incidents were rarely reported to police.Discrimination:  No law prohibited state or nonstate actors from discriminating based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.  The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals or families.  Civil society contacts reported nearly 100 percent unemployment amongst openly LGBTQI+ persons, with those who were openly LGBTQI+ limited to jobs as hair stylists, makeup artists, or caterers.  Transgender persons were excluded from employment in most sectors and were often forced into prostitution to survive.  There were no openly LGBTQI+ individuals employed at any level of the government, and LGBTQI+ civil society organizations were excluded from participation in talks with the Transition Council.  The Transition Council’s Transitional Charter defined “marriage” as the “union between two persons of different sexes,” as did the suspended constitution.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Members of the LGBTQI+ community reported that individuals were subjected to involuntary conversion therapies, most predominantly through religious groups and traditional rituals.  Individuals reported the use of exorcisms, intense religious indoctrination, and psychological therapies to “cure” LGBTQI+ individuals.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There were no legal restrictions on speaking out on LGBTQI+ topics.  Some LGBTQI+ organizations, however, reported being unable to register legally or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others, even though the law required they have access to public transport and services, including health care and education, and public buildings, including voter access to election polling centers.  Most public buildings, however, did not provide adequate access and accommodation for persons with disabilities, hindering their ability to obtain state services and take part in the judicial system.  Enforcement of the rights of persons with disabilities to education, health care, and transportation was limited; there were no government programs to provide access to buildings, information, and communications for persons with disabilities.  Children with disabilities generally attended school at all levels, including mainstream schools.  There was accommodation for persons with disabilities in air travel but not for ground transportation.The law prohibited discrimination against persons with “physical, mental, congenital, and accidental” disabilities.  The law subsumed sensory disabilities under congenital and “accidental” disabilities but did not recognize the concept of intellectual disability.  Although the law prohibited employment discrimination against persons with disabilities, individuals with physical disabilities faced barriers in obtaining employment, such as gaining access to human resources offices to apply for jobs, because public buildings did not provide access for persons with physical disabilities.  The inaccessibility of buses and taxis complicated efforts to seek jobs or get to places of employment by those without their own means of transportation.  There were no laws limiting persons with disabilities from participating in civic life, although government and private buildings often lacked accessibility for persons with disabilities which could prevent their participation.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Local NGOs reported discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS.  Such persons encountered difficulties obtaining loans and finding employment in some sectors.  NGOs worked closely with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to combat both the associated stigma and the spread of HIV.Ritual killings were reported in which persons were killed and their limbs, genitals, or other organs removed.  The law criminalized ritual killing and organ trafficking.  A local ritual crimes watchdog NGO reported five cases of ritual killing for organ removal, including three children and two men.  There were eight cases of ritual crimes associated with forced disappearances or kidnappings, including six children and two men.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the rights of workers to form and join independent unions and to bargain collectively.  The law provided for the right to strike, with restrictions.  Antiunion discrimination was illegal, and the law provided for the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activities.  The government required unions to register with the government to obtain official recognition, and the government routinely granted registration.  Agreements negotiated by unions also applied to nonunion workers.Strikes could be called only after eight days’ advance notification and only after mandatory arbitration failed.  Public-sector employees’ right to strike could be restricted where the government determined it posed a threat to public safety.  The law did not define the essential-services sectors in which strikes were prohibited; however, the armed services were prohibited from unionizing and striking.  The law prohibited government action against strikers who abided by the notification and arbitration provisions and excluded no groups from this protection.The government generally enforced applicable laws.  Resources to protect the right to form unions, bargain collectively, and strike were adequate.  Penalties for violations of these rights were compensatory, determined on a case-by-case basis, and commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights.  Administrative and judicial procedures were sometimes delayed.  Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were not always respected.  Some unions were politically active, and the government accused them of siding with opposition parties.  The government sometimes restricted strikes.Employers created and controlled some unions.  Although antiunion discrimination was illegal, some trade unionists in both the public and private sectors complained of occasional discrimination, including the blacklisting of union members, unfair dismissals, and threats to workers who unionized.  Trade union representatives complained they experienced hurdles accessing educational establishments during their efforts to represent and defend their members’ interests.  Labor union leaders reported that most labor violations stemmed from illegal dismissals, including of workers on strike, leaving them without social security and insurance benefits.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The government established a national monthly minimum wage that was above the official poverty line.  Authorities did not enforce wage laws adequately, although workers could file suit if they received less than the minimum wage.  Labor inspections were infrequent.  Minimum wage laws were not enforced in the informal sector, which accounted for most workers.The labor code stipulated a 40-hour workweek with a minimum rest period of 48 consecutive hours.  The law also provided for paid annual holidays.  The government required employers to compensate workers for overtime work as determined by collective agreements or government regulations.  By law, the daily limit for compulsory overtime could be extended from 30 minutes to two hours to perform specified preparatory or complementary work, such as starting machines in a factory or supervising a workplace.  It also could be extended for urgent work to prevent or repair damage from accidents.  The daily limit did not apply to establishments in which work was continuous or to establishments providing retail, transport, dock work, hotel and catering services, housekeeping, security services, medical establishments, domestic work, and journalism.  Employers generally respected minimum wage standards.  Formal-sector employees could submit complaints regarding overtime, and the ministry’s labor inspectors investigated such complaints.  The government penalized violations with a range of fines that were commensurate with those for similar crimes.Occupational Safety and Health:  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs established occupational safety and health (OSH) standards.  Formal-sector employees could submit complaints regarding health and safety standards, and labor inspectors investigated such complaints.  In the formal sector, workers could remove themselves from situations that endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment, and authorities effectively protected employees in this situation.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws, particularly in the informal sector.  The number of labor inspectors was not sufficient to enforce compliance and COVID-19-mitigation measures further limited enforcement action.  The government penalized violations with a range of fines commensurate with those for similar crimes.  Penalties were sometimes applied against violators depending on the sector.Significant numbers of persons worked in the informal sector in the country, mainly in the retail and agriculture sectors.  The government did not enforce labor code provisions in the informal economy, for part-time work, or in sectors staffed predominantly by undocumented foreign workers, such as in mining, timber, and domestic work.  Employers forced foreign workers to work under substandard conditions, dismissed them without notice or recourse, and often physically mistreated them.  Employers frequently paid noncitizens less than they paid citizens for the same work and required them to work longer hours, often hiring them on a short-term, casual basis to avoid paying taxes, social security contributions, and other benefits.  No official entity provided social protection programs for informal economy workers.																																				    							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- Military Coup d’Etat in Gabon Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States has concluded that a military coup d’état has taken place in Gabon.  Pursuant to section 7008 of the Department of State’s annual appropriations act, the United States is suspending most U.S. assistance to the Government of Gabon.  This foreign assistance has been temporarily paused by the United States since September 26.We underscore that our humanitarian, health, and education assistance will continue to benefit the people of Gabon.The United States reaffirms our commitment to support Gabon in conducting a timely and durable transition to democratic civilian governance and advancing shared security interests in the Gulf of Guinea.  We will resume our assistance alongside concrete actions by the transitional government toward establishing democratic rule.  We will continue to work closely with the Gabonese people and regional partners.The United States stands with the Gabonese people in their aspirations for democracy, prosperity, and stability.
- Foreign Assistance Programs and Events in Gabon Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe U.S. government is pausing certain foreign assistance programs benefiting the government of Gabon while we evaluate the unconstitutional intervention by members of the country’s military. This interim measure is consistent with steps taken by the Economic Community of Central African States, the African Union, and other international partners, and will continue while we review the facts on the ground in Gabon. We are continuing U.S. government operational activities in Gabon, including diplomatic and consular operations supporting U.S. citizens.
- Department Press Briefing – September 5, 2023 Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy SpokespersonWashington, D.C.													HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; September 5, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; September 5, 2023																																																					September 5, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									RUSSIA / NORTH KOREA / UKRAINEIRANUNITED ARAB EMIRATESSAUDI ARABIAPAKISTANNORTH KOREAIRANRUSSIA / UKRAINECHINAIRANIRAQCUBA / RUSSIARUSSIARUSSIA / TÜRKIYEUKRAINE / RUSSIARUSSIA / TÜRKIYEISRAEL / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIESSOUTH AFRICARUSSIA / TÜRKIYEARMENIA / AZERBAIJANGEORGIASYRIAJAPAN / CHINACHINAASEANGABONASEAN																													1:15 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon.QUESTION: Hey.MR PATEL: How’s everyone doing? The flags are really close. I don’t have anything off the top today, Matt, so if you would like to start us off.QUESTION: I don’t really have anything off the top that I expect that you’re going to be able to answer, so – but I do know that there’s a lot of interest in this idea that Kim Jong-un and President Putin are going to be meeting. What do you know, if anything, about that?MR PATEL: So I would say a couple things to that, Matt. First, we have warned publicly for some time now that arms negotiations between Russia and the DPRK are actively advancing. As you all know, some of you reported that last month Sergei Shoigu, the Russian defense minister, traveled to the DPRK to try and convince Pyongyang to sell artillery ammunition to Russia. And we have information that Kim Jong-un expects these discussions to continue, to include leader-level diplomatic engagement in Russia. We urge the DPRK to cease its arms negotiations with Russia and to abide by the public commitment that Pyongyang has made to not provide or sell arms to Russia.I will also just note that Russia has been forced to search desperately around the world for weapons it can use in its war in Ukraine because of our sanctions and export controls and the effects that those have had, which has made it harder for them to get material that they need. You’ve seen this with their attempts at a security relationship with the DPRK and the deepening relationships with the Iranian regime and their provision of drones that we’ve talked a great deal about as well.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: All right.QUESTION: Could I just press on that a little bit?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: In terms of the information that actually leads the U.S. to believe this – I mean, obviously, I’m sure you’re not going to – intelligence here, but the Kremlin, for example, isn’t actually confirming that this would take place, but the U.S. is reasonably confident that it expects this &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not going to get into more of the details from here, Shaun, as you said. But again, we have warned publicly about this before, and it’s, of course, something that continues to be concerning and we’re paying close attention to as it progresses.QUESTION: In terms of consequences, I mean, obviously, there are heavy sanctions through the United States in both countries. Is that something that – are there any risks involved from the United States perspective if they go forward?MR PATEL: Well, we have been incredibly clear about the potential consequences of any country taking action to support Russia further its illegal and unjust war of aggression in Ukraine. And you have seen us take action in a number of these instances. I’m not going to preview actions from up here, but of course we will calibrate appropriately with our allies and partners, including those in the region, and take appropriate steps as necessary.Humeyra.QUESTION: Can I go to Iran? We reported yesterday and there was a Wall Street Journal report in August as well Iran’s stock of uranium enriched to – up to 60 percent purity. I’m wondering if you guys have seen this report, whether you have any comment, and will repeat the question that I had at the time: whether there is any understanding with the Iranians that they’re going to be taking these steps.MR PATEL: So first, we’ve seen those press reports about the rate of accumulation of uranium enriched – enriched up to 60 percent, but not going to comment on an IAEA report that has not been made public yet. I will also note, as you’ve heard us say before, that we’ve been clear that Iran’s production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent has no credible peaceful purpose. No other country in the world today utilizes uranium enriched to 60 percent for the purposes of its claim. I have no other updates on discussions or talks on the nuclear issue with the Iranian regime, and so would leave it to when we spoke about this a number of weeks ago.QUESTION: Have you been in touch with IAEA about this? And do you have any reason to believe that that report is not authentic?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to comment on a report that is not public yet. But I will say that we have the full confidence in the IAEA and Director General Grossi, and, of course, they are a body in which we communicate with quite regularly. I’m certainly not going to speak to specifics of this case. Thanks so much.Michel.QUESTION: Thank you. I have a couple of questions.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: First, the report said that the U.S., UK, and EU are pressing UAE to halt shipments of goods to Russia that could help with war in Ukraine, including computer chips. Can you confirm that? And is there any U.S. official in the UAE at this time?MR PATEL: So I don&#8217;t have a specific delegation list for you, Michel, but senior officials from the EU, the UK, and the U.S. are visiting the UAE this week to discuss the effective implementation of our sanctions in close coordination with our Emirati partners. This is part of our broader diplomatic engagement with a range of partner countries to discuss how collectively we can continue to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression in Ukraine. But I don&#8217;t have any other specifics or updates on the talks to share at this time.QUESTION: And what is your – what is your main concern?MR PATEL: Again, this is, Michel, just a broader diplomatic engagement to discuss these issues with our partner countries, this issue and others, and so I’m not going to get ahead of that.QUESTION: One on Saudi Arabia.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Can you confirm that Assistant Secretary Barbara Leaf is in Saudi Arabia with Brett McGurk to discuss the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel?MR PATEL: So Deputy Assistant to the President and NSC Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk will be in Saudi Arabia for routine consultations on a range of regional and bilateral matters. He is joined by Assistant Secretary Barbara Leaf as well as Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking. This was a long-scheduled visit. Brett will also be stopping by to see the leadership of Bahrain before the visit to the Crown Prince to Washington next week as well. So again, as I said, this was a long-scheduled visit on a multiplicity of issues that – at the nexus of our bilateral and regional matters.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Patel. Two detailed question, one quick one.MR PATEL: Okay. Let’s maybe do one question and then we’ll try and come back to you as I work the room. Go ahead, though.QUESTION: Okay. So I hope you’re aware that now Imran Khan, the reason why he’s in jail is because of the case related to the cypher, so to the State Department. Has Congress asked State Department to do any investigation or anything with regard to this whole cypher scenario, or no, there is nothing?MR PATEL: So we consult with our congressional partners on a number of issues. I’m certainly not going to speak to something like that to specificity. Again, though, as you’ve heard us talk about, we are continuing to monitor this case and monitor the situation closely.QUESTION: Okay. One more thing. Yesterday, I had my first video log with this journalist from London, Adil Raja, and he raised a question about Pakistani Americans having their visas to their original motherland country being rejected. And has the State Department been approached by their – again, by – is the State Department is aware of this thing or has anybody approached the State Department with regard to this &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m not aware. This obviously would be – if there were to any – be any issues that arise in this area, certainly would be something for Pakistani consular officials to speak to and not anything as it relates to the State Department, so we’ll just leave it at that.Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a bit. I’ll try to come back with you, Jalil.QUESTION: (Inaudible) State Department because it’s a personal thing, something on your team that I think you should be aware of.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: I did find out that one of the staff members of the colleague of your State Department got fired because of sexual harassment, and you guys fired him. And I do want to give you congratulations, because in countries where I’ve been reporting from, women are working very pathetic conditions, so congratulations on taking the move for firing the gentleman.MR PATEL: I’m not totally aware of the circumstance that you’re referring to, so I’m going to move on to Olivia, who’s had her hand up. Thank you.QUESTION: (Inaudible) Vedant. I have two separate questions for you too.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Back on North Korea.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: So as the U.S. is considering what steps it may take in response to this potential provision of aid to Russia, are there any updates on the well-being and whereabouts of Travis King? And does his case have any bearing on the U.S. response potentially here?MR PATEL: So I unfortunately have no updates for you since when I last spoke about this a number of weeks ago. Our goal, our desire continues to be to try and ascertain as much information as possibly about Private King. That continues to be the case and have no updates on this matter since when we last spoke about it.These issues are not related. I think first and foremost, as – in the matter of Private King, we’re just trying to get as much information as we can as it relates to this servicemember. But aside, there is – of course, continues to be this incredibly concerning deepening of relations between the Russians and the DPRK, specifically in the security nexus, and that’s of course something that we’re going to continue to pay close attention to and take appropriate steps as needed.QUESTION: On separate matter but still involving American detainees.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Has the State Department had any additional contact with the Americans who were transferred to house arrest in Iran? Is there any update on their eventual transfer to the United States?MR PATEL: So those five individuals, they remain on house arrest. We continue to monitor their health and welfare closely with the assistance of our Swiss partners. This is an ongoing process. The move to house arrest, of course, is a positive step, but we’re going to continue to work and do everything we can and won’t rest until the individuals are back in the United States, reunited with their families. But I don’t have any other updates for you on this at the moment.QUESTION: You’ve been assured that their well-being is okay?MR PATEL: We’re continuing to remain in close touch with our Swiss partners, which, of course – our protecting power in Iran, but no updates beyond that.QUESTION: If I may just squeeze in one more –MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Just because there was a Swedish citizen detained by the Iranian regime, and I’m just wondering if that individual’s detention has any bearing on the Americans’ cases.MR PATEL: What I would just say, Olivia, is that I would widen the aperture a little bit. Of course the Iranian regime has a track record of wrongfully detaining individuals and nationals from a variety of countries. I am not aware of the specifics of this case. I have no reason to assume that it has any bearing on the circumstances regarding these five Americans.We of course remain in close touch with our Swiss partners and are so thankful for their partnership and their – the role that they’ve been able to play in this circumstance. And we’ll just continue to monitor and assess the situation as it progresses.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Welcome back.MR PATEL: Thanks.QUESTION: A couple questions before I move on. Can you please expand a little bit on what you told Shaun and Matt about North Korea and Russia? What should we be bracing ourselves for if this – if this goes through? Are there weapons that could actually impact the course of the war? And secondly, in terms of accountability, you’re talking about a UN Security Council member. Are you trying to take any action within the UN if Russia goes with this plan?MR PATEL: So first, let me just say we have not hesitated to take any actions against entities who have taken steps to support Russia’s unjust and unlawful war of aggression in Ukraine. And the best example that I would offer you that there is a very clear recent track record of is the provision of drones to Russia from Iran. We of course have taken multiple steps to continue to hold not just the Russian Federation but the Iranian regime accountable for this kind of relationship. And as I said to Shaun, I’m certainly not going to preview actions from up here, but of course we will continue to monitor and watch this space very closely and take appropriate steps to support our Ukrainian partners as we need.As it relates to the specifics of the security relationship, I am just not going to speak to that, Alex. It’s something that we also are continuing to pay close attention to, and we’ll have more as the situation progresses.QUESTION: Thank you. Separately, do you have any reaction to Putin’s today’s claims targeting President Zelenskyy and the West? I don’t want to dignify everything he said, but basically he was talking about the West installing Zelenskyy to cover up Ukrainian actions.MR PATEL: Well, President Zelenskyy was elected to his role in Ukraine in the previous administration, if you’re looking at the calendar correctly. So it’s – again, to not dignify the – many of the false accusations coming out of the Russian Federation, it’s hard to even make sense of that false claim.So, Julia, you had your hand up.QUESTION: Yes.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Well, first, quickly, does the State Department have a comment on Zelenskyy replacing his defense minister?MR PATEL: So this is – this is a decision for Ukraine, and it’s a perfect segue from Alex’s question – a decision for Ukraine and its democratically elected leadership to undertake. We have a strong and deep partnership with our Ukrainian partners, and we will continue to stand with Ukraine. It’s of course up to President Zelenskyy and his government to make his own personnel decisions.QUESTION: Then if I could get your response to a recent report that Chinese nationals sometimes presenting themselves as tourists have attempted or accessed military bases and other sensitive sites as many a hundred times in recent years, and U.S. officials calling those potential espionage threats. How does that affect diplomatic relations with China, with the fact that a hundred times they’ve accessed sensitive sites in the U.S.?MR PATEL: So first, we’ve seen those reports, and we of course are incredibly concerned by them. And of course, our colleagues at the Pentagons and the Department of Defense can speak to any specific comments or questions. But I think collectively across the interagency, the security of our installations remains a top priority, and physical security standards of our installations take in a wide variety of potential threats. But again, I will let our Pentagon colleagues speak to this in more specificity.Yeah, go ahead. I can come back to you, Julia, after. Go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Thank you for that, Vedant. Appreciate it.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I was just wondering if you could confirm that Acting Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley did in fact speak with the son of Shahab Dalili, I guess two weeks ago, and he told him that there was no progress, that his father was still not deemed wrongfully in prison.MR PATEL: So that is accurate. Abram had the opportunity to speak with members of the Dalili family. Again, would reiterate what we’ve said previously – that he has not been determined to be wrongfully detained – but yes, we’ve been in touch with the family and we will continue to remain in touch with them, as we would in any consular situation like this.QUESTION: Just to be clear &#8212;MR PATEL: Yes.QUESTION: Is that something you’re still looking into, whether to deem him wrongfully &#8212;MR PATEL: I am just not going to speak to the specificity of these cases. What I will say broadly is that of course in any circumstance when an American citizen is detained or an American national is detained in this circumstance, we are – of course assess the situation for indicators that would be consistent with a wrongful detention designation. That work is always ongoing, and when we have updates to share as it relates to someone’s status, we of course will share those.Diyar, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. A few questions about Iraq. The first: What’s your comment about the recent events in Kirkuk, which is disputed area in Iraq? There were protesting between the Kurds and Arabists. Four protesters were killed and dozens were wounded and arrested. What’s your comment on that, and what is the U.S. view about the current tension between Kurds and Arabists in Kirkuk?MR PATEL: So we’re closely monitoring the tensions in Kirkuk. We condemn the violence that took place and express our condolences to the families of those killed. The U.S. calls on all parties to resolve any disputes through dialogue and through the activation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.QUESTION: One more question between – the disputes between Baghdad and Erbil over the budget and also revenue sharing. There are still the Baghdad refuse to disburse the KRG shares, and the KRG accusing Baghdad that they are – they have an intention to fuel the current financial crisis in KRG just to have some to get more gains, strategic gains in the Kurdistan region. Have you any engagement with both Baghdad and Erbil on this?MR PATEL: We of course engage regularly with partners in Baghdad and Erbil, and I will let our missions in both of those cities speak to this engagement with any more specificity.Nick.QUESTION: Sorry if I missed this earlier, but &#8212;MR PATEL: No, you’re good.QUESTION: The Cuban Government says it disrupted a scheme aimed at recruiting Cuban citizens to fight in Ukraine. The Cuban foreign minister called the plan last night a human trafficking ring. Are you aware of these reports? Do you have any comment on them?MR PATEL: So we’re aware of these reports and we’re currently just trying to assess some additional information. I don’t have anything to offer on the veracity or any of the information offered in that statement, but we are continuing to look into it.Shannon, go ahead. I’ll come – on this, Kylie?QUESTION: Yeah, just &#8212;MR PATEL: I’ll come to you right after.QUESTION: I’m just wondering if you have guys had been tracking that Russia has been carrying out such human trafficking efforts in multiple places around the world, or if this is the first that you guys are hearing of any possible effort like this?MR PATEL: Well, Kylie, there has – there is of course a reported track record of the Russian Federation having citizens specifically from Ukraine participate in forced relocation efforts, so certainly this kind of activity would not be new.Specifically as it relates to Nick’s question though, we’re still looking into those reports and trying to get additional information. And in – additional circumstances I just don’t have more specificity to offer from up here.Shannon, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I’d like to ask about Travis Leake, the American detained in Russia. He was in court the other day and he said that Russians are starving him while he’s in prison. Now, the NSC says the State Department has had some consular access to him. I was just wondering if you can give an update on if that is in fact the case, that he’s not getting adequate nutrition. And also, is there any updates on whether he is considered a wrongfully detained American or where that evaluation process is?MR PATEL: So we are monitoring the ongoing detention of Michael Travis Leake in Moscow. We are continuing to seek consular access to Mr. Leake and continue to insist that the Russian Federation allow consistent, timely consular access to all U.S. citizen detainees consistent with the consular conventions that we have in place.Embassy officials have the – attended his arraignment on June 10th as well as hearings on August 3rd and 21st and are closely monitoring the developments, including the recent hearing yesterday. We’re remaining in close touch with his family and we’ll continue to monitor his case.As it relates to any update and designation, as I said to the earlier question, in cases, broadly, we review the circumstances surrounding the detentions of all U.S. nationals overseas, including those in Russia, for indicators that that they could be wrongful.QUESTION: Just one quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On consular access, can you say when you last were able to obtain that in this case?MR PATEL: So that’s what I’m saying: We are continuing to seek consular access for Mr. Leake. That has &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR PATEL: Correct. We have not been granted consular access to Mr. Leake yet.Go ahead.QUESTION: President Erdogan and Putin met in Sochi yesterday, and it seems like Russia has demands including a return of agricultural bank to the SWIFT payment system and insuring the ships involved in the grain initiative. Any comments on Russian demands?MR PATEL: So Russia’s decision to terminate its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, it hurts communities vulnerable to food insecurity around the world. And we welcome the efforts of our Turkish partners, including President Erdogan, to try and convince Russia to return to the deal. And we are continuing to engage with the UN and Türkiye, both of which have worked very hard to make the BSGI possible, previously, and functional. We also thank our NATO Ally Türkiye for its important role in the efforts to try and get the Black Sea Grain Initiative back on track.QUESTION: Follow-up on that?MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: So, Vedant, can you confirm the reports that the U.S. is proposing the Danube River route as an alternative to the Black Sea grain corridor? And if so, have you evaluated the risks it may carry, including the risks of further military escalations there? Like, how are you planning to protect those ships from Russian attacks?MR PATEL: So thanks for your question. I spoke a little bit about this a number of weeks ago. The one thing that I can say clearly is that it is our goal and our hope that Russia re-enters the Black Sea Grain Initiative so grain and food product can get to the places that it needs to go. We of course are continuing to assess and look at what other options are available to make sure that the flow of food product can get to the places that it needs to go. I don’t have any announcement to offer, and I certainly am not going to read into deliberative processes that are ongoing. But again, we of course want Ukrainian grain to get to the markets that it needs to get to. We think that’s incredibly important because we saw the Black Sea Grain Initiative have a track record of success of getting a food product where it was needed.QUESTION: Can I have a quick one on Niger?MR PATEL: Let me come back in case there’s anything else on &#8212;QUESTION: One more on Ukraine?MR PATEL: Yeah, on Ukraine. Go ahead.QUESTION: There are local reports in Ukraine right now that the Secretary is going to be visiting there. Do you have any announcement on his travel to make?MR PATEL: I have no updates on any official travel from the department.QUESTION: Okay. And then as Americans are, like, heading back to work and back to school, what is the department’s message to them about the status of the war in Ukraine right now and how long this is going to last? President Biden was elected promising that there wouldn’t be for-forever wars, and now this is going on on almost two years now. Just what is the message to the American people from the administration right now?MR PATEL: What I would say, Kylie, is that I think the American people recognize the importance of ensuring that countries cannot act without impunity, and what we have in this instance is Russia trying to totally subjugate and erase the borders of its neighbor. And you see the Russian Federation doing so with immense aggression and there continue to be immense follow-on impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine. We just spent a couple of minutes talking about them – food prices. There are global impacts to the ability of Ukrainian grain being able to flow to the places that it needs to go. And that of course is something that’s going to affect kitchen tables all around the world, including in the United States.QUESTION: Do you – does the administration believe that a peaceful resolution to the war is any closer now than it was, say, six months ago?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to speculate or prognosticate on something like that, Kylie. The important thing is, for us, is to continue to stand with our Ukrainian partners as they endure this. I will note to anybody asking questions about things like a conclusion or a negotiation, is that the Ukrainians and President Zelenskyy have very clearly laid out a proposal for a just and durable peace and a conclusion to this war. President Putin and the Russian Federation have continuously not been interested in engaging in these kinds of discussions. And so what the United States is going to continue to do – is going to stand with our Ukrainian partners and ensure that they have the ability to defend themselves, defend their territorial integrity, and their sovereignty as well.QUESTION: Can I quickly follow up on Ukraine grain deal?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Does yesterday’s meeting between President Erdogan and Vladimir Putin – does the U.S. – did you guys see that as progress?MR PATEL: It’s hard to put an exact pinpoint on it, Humeyra, because ultimately the conclusion that we and our allies and partners want is re-entry into the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and I don’t think it is helpful for me or anybody to be up here offering play-by-plays on – as these diplomatic engagements progress. What I can say is that we want the Black Sea Grain Initiative to be up and running again. We know that it worked. And we also are incredibly thankful for the UN and our Turkish partners for the role that they played previously in getting this deal together and the role that they continue to play to try and convince Russia to re-enter.QUESTION: And what did the U.S. think about President Erdogan’s suggestion that Ukraine soften its stance on that &#8212;MR PATEL: I – again, I’m just not going to get into the specifics of the diplomatic engagements. What I will just say is that we know countries around the world, including our Turkish partners, recognize how important this deal is, and that’s why you see collectively us, the Turkish – our Turkish partners, the UN, and others working to try and get this deal back on.Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Change of topic?MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary today spoke both to Palestinian leader Abbas and Israeli leader Netanyahu, and the readouts from the State Department – the one about the Abbas call mentioned continued support for a two-state solution, but the one about the Netanyahu call did not. It omitted that terminology. And I just want to know if that’s now the policy, not even to talk about the two-state solution when communicating about Israel (inaudible)?MR PATEL: There is – there has – there has been absolutely no change in policy when it comes to that region of the world. Our viewpoint continues to be that a negotiated two-state solution is the best path forward, something that we believe will help bring stability and further peace to the region. So I would not read too significantly into the discrepancy.QUESTION: Do you know why it wasn’t included? Just &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t. I have no doubt that things like that are discussed quite regularly with our Israeli counterparts, and it’s something we speak about from up here quite regularly. So.Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Sure – also involves ships and wheat/grain, Russia.MR PATEL: Fun.QUESTION: South Africa.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: President Ramaphosa said that South Africa &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; launched an investigation into the allegations that the Lady R ship had carried weapons to Russia, said that there’s no evidence to that, for that. Does the U.S. have any reaction to this and whether it still backs the assertions made by the ambassador of what the ship was doing?MR PATEL: So we appreciate the seriousness with which the panel of inquiry in South Africa undertook to investigate irregularities surrounding the Lady R’s presence in South Africa in December of 2022. We’ve been in some – in direct communication with the South African Government on this matter and will continue these bilateral conversations via diplomatic channels, and we appreciate President Ramaphosa’s commitment to investigating this matter and look forward to advancing our relationship with our South African partners on a number of shared priorities, including trade and health. But as it relates to the specific findings, Shaun, I will just let the South African panel speak to the specifics of that.QUESTION: Sure. But does the United States still back the initial allegation that was made there, or does this clear it up at all? Does this – does the U.S. still stand by what the ambassador said previously?MR PATEL: So I – no change in policy or anything like that. We had raised our concerns in December and had continued to raise our concerns about the presence of this vessel and certain irregularities around it. But again, we appreciate the seriousness that – which the South African Government has acted and taken this.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: I want to move to South Caucasus, but before that, just want to make sure I understood your response to Humeyra correctly.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Does the administration believe that BSGI is revivable, or was President Erdogan shooting in the dark?MR PATEL: We have no reason to think that diplomacy is not possible to getting some of these done. Again, Alex, I think it is deeply unhelpful to – for me to offer diplomatic play-by-plays from up here. So our viewpoint is that the Black Sea Grain Initiative was incredibly helpful; it was a good thing. It was a good thing to the tune of millions of metrics – of tons of grain getting to the ports and markets that it needed to get to. And we will continue to work with partners to try and get the Russian Federation to rejoin. But we are also continuing to work with allies and partners to assess what other options may be available to get grain to the places that it needs to go.QUESTION: Thank you. On the South Caucasus &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; Armenia and Azerbaijan. Matt had a statement last week on the current state of play in the region and the current situation of the conflict. Has the situation been developing since the statement, or what is your observation? Is it worsening? And has there been any communication with the sides? I know that Armenian ambassador was in this building. Besides that, has there been any communication?MR PATEL: So first, on the matters of communication, Alex, I will just say that this is something that we are going to remain deeply engaged on. I don’t have specific engagements to read out to you, but we are deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Nagorno-Karabakh resulting from the continued blockage of food, medicine, and other essential goods. The U.S. has worked continuously with the sides over the past several weeks to allow humanitarian assistance to reach the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, and we reiterate our call to immediately reopen the Lachin corridor to humanitarian, commercial, and passenger traffic as well.QUESTION: Thank you. I have one more on Georgia, if I may.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Georgian pro-Russian Government is now going after their own president who is trying to pursue European pathway, and they’re trying to impeach her. Does the U.S. have any comment on this?MR PATEL: So we’ve been clear, as have the Georgian people, and we’ve been clear on what we’ve been seeing, which is that the Georgian people have been clear that they see their future with Europe and the European Union, and has given Georgia a clear roadmap to achieve a candidate status. And we urge the Georgian Government and all stakeholders to come together now and work towards that objective, especially to implement the reforms required to achieve EU candidate status, and the need of a unified Georgia has never been more urgent.Go ahead.QUESTION: One on Syria, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Deputy Secretary Goldrich is still in Syria? And what was his message to the SDF and the tribal forces?MR PATEL: So Deputy Assistant Secretary Goldrich and OIR Commander Major General Vowell met in northeast Syria with the SEF and the SDC and tribal leaders from Deir al-Zour. They agreed on the importance of addressing the grievances of the residents of Deir al-Zour, the dangers of outsiders interfering in Deir al-Zour, and the need to avoid civilian deaths and casualties, and the need for de-escalation of violence as soon as possible. Deputy Assistant Secretary Goldrich and Major General Vowell reiterated the importance of a strong U.S. partnership with the SDF in the D-ISIS efforts.QUESTION: Is he still there?MR PATEL: I don’t have any specifics – updates on his status. I believe so.QUESTION: What was that line? You talked about the dangers of outsiders &#8212;MR PATEL: Interfering with Deir al-Zour.QUESTION: Okay. And outsiders you define as?MR PATEL: People from outside of the region.QUESTION: Oh, like the United States?MR PATEL: That’s – I take your point, Matt. That’s not &#8212;QUESTION: You do?MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I don’t think you do because it’s not all outsiders that you’re opposed to, quote/unquote, “interfering.” And I’m not saying you are interfering, but I mean, you would admit that the United States is an outsider in northeast Syria, correct?MR PATEL: Certainly, and I think that statement is &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. All right. That’s all.MR PATEL: What I am referring to, Matt, is outsiders not committed to the convergence and joint partnership as it relates to the degradation of D-ISIS efforts.QUESTION: Okay, just – okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead in the back.QUESTION: What is the State Department’s view on China’s ban on Japanese seafood after the release of the treated water from the Fukushima nuclear plant? And do you think this can be classified as economic coercion from China?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any specifics as it relates to that policy from the PRC. But what I will just say – and you saw the Secretary speak to this a little bit when he was down here – is that we are satisfied with Japan’s plans, which are safe and in accordance with international standards, including the IAEA nuclear safety standards. Japan has coordinated proactively with the IAEA on its plans, conducting a science-based and transparent process. We also understand that our Japanese partners have consulted scientists and partners from across the Indo-Pacific region on this matter.Go ahead.QUESTION: Recently, China has released a new official map that lays claim to most of South China Sea and as well as contested parts of India. What’s your comment on this?MR PATEL: We note that the PRC recently released national map has elicited a wave of protests from countries that reject the territorial and maritime claims depicted on it. With respect to the dashed lines in the South China Sea depicted on the new map, like many countries, we reject the unlawful maritime claims reflected on that map and call on the PRC to comport its maritime claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere with the International Law of the Sea, as reflected in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. China’s expansive and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea were determined to be inconsistent with international law by a unanimous tribunal in the Philippines China arbitration brought under the dispute settlement provisions of the convention.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Vedant. So the Biden administration has articulated its commitment to partners in Southeast Asia, but several Southeast Asian leaders expressed disappointment that President Biden wouldn’t be attending the ASEAN summit. Do you have any comment on this?MR PATEL: I would say that the administration and President Biden are committed to Southeast Asia and ASEAN. President Biden and Vice President Harris have visited six ASEAN member states, and the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Energy, the U.S. Trade Rep, Special Envoy Kerry have all visited the region. Many of those were travels related to ASEAN meetings.The engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN member states enjoys strong bipartisan support. In the past year, 85 different members of both parties of Congress have visited ASEAN member states. It’s also very clear that the President is interested and invested in what is happening in the region broadly, as he recently hosted the Republic of Korea and Japan at Camp David for a trilateral summit. This is a region that we will continue to engage in deeply, and I know that the Vice President looks forward to attending and representing the United States.QUESTION: Well, okay, just along those lines &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; do you have any comment on neither President Xi nor President Putin going to either one?MR PATEL: To ASEAN or &#8212;QUESTION: Or the G20.MR PATEL: These are sovereign decisions for &#8212;QUESTION: Or apparently the UNGA. And &#8212;MR PATEL: These are decisions for countries and their leadership to make.QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah. But the question was raised that Southeast Asian leaders are apparently upset that President Biden is not going to the East Asia Summit. The Vice President is going. However, neither the Russian president nor the Chinese president are going to that, nor are they, either of them, going to the G20, nor are they going to the UN General Assembly. So I’m just wondering if you think the question – questions along these lines are little bit misplaced.MR PATEL: Well, I think what is clear is that the United States has a pretty stellar track record of not just investment prioritization and engagement in Southeast Asia but also certain multilateral fora. And we look forward to continuing to conduct our foreign policy in that manner. And I will let the Russian Federation and the PRC speak to their own reasoning.All right. Thanks, everybody.QUESTION: Can I just one more &#8212;MR PATEL: Oh, Shaun. And then we’ll wrap up.QUESTION: Just war in Gabon.MR PATEL: Yeah. Sure.QUESTION: Just the new – I’m sorry – the new military leader says that he’s committed to elections and releasing prisoners. Does the U.S. have any take on these promises? Do you see any positive inklings to this?MR PATEL: Well, we’re, Shaun, concerned by the evolving events in Gabon and remain strongly opposed to military seizures or other unconstitutional transfers of power. And we urge those responsible to release and ensure the safety of members of the government and their families to preserve civilian rule. And we call on actors to show restraint and respect for human rights, to address their concerns peacefully through dialogue following the announcement of the election results.You had your hand up. Why don’t you go and you – one more and then we can wrap.QUESTION: Just had one quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Would you say that President Biden’s decision to visit Hanoi instead of attending the ASEAN summit reflects a preference for bilateral meetings in Southeast Asia as opposed to larger summits?MR PATEL: Absolutely not. As you just heard me say to Matt, the United States has a commitment to, of course, not just Southeast Asia but multilateral fora as well. You needn’t look further than the long litany of international travel that President Biden has undertook since coming into office, and I will just leave it at that.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Thank you, everybody.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 1:56 p.m.)...with... ↑						Tags																					Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Cuba																								Gabon																								Georgia																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Japan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								South Africa																								Syria																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								United Arab Emirates
- Events in Gabon Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is deeply concerned by evolving events in Gabon.  We remain strongly opposed to military seizures or unconstitutional transfers of power.  We urge those responsible to release and ensure the safety of members of government and their families and to preserve civilian rule.  In addition, we call on all actors to show restraint and respect for human rights and to address their concerns peacefully through dialogue following the announcement of election results.  We also note with concern the lack of transparency and reports of irregularities surrounding the election.  The United States stands with the people of Gabon.
- Elections in Gabon Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonAs Gabonese prepare to head to the polls tomorrow, the United States encourages the Gabonese people to exercise their right to vote and make their voices heard.  Elections are a fundamental part of a functioning democracy, and all Gabonese deserve this chance to choose their future without fear of repression or intimidation.  We affirm the importance of election observation and call on all actors to commit to free, fair, and peaceful elections.
- Gabon HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Gabon				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Gabon																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																								Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																																																								7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources																																																																											Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Gabon is a historically stable country in a volatile region that benefits from significant economic advantages: a small population (roughly 2.3 million), an abundance of natural resources, and a strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea. After taking office in 2009, President Ali Bongo Ondimba introduced reforms to diversify Gabon’s economy away from oil and traditional investment partners such as EU countries, particularly France, and to position Gabon as an emerging economy. Gabon promotes foreign investment across a range of sectors, particularly in oil and gas, infrastructure, timber, ecotourism, and mining. Gabon remains dependent on revenue from petroleum and mining.Foreign investors participating in Gabon’s investment climate face hurdles establishing new businesses, connecting to utilities like electricity and water, and transferring company ownership. Many companies report difficulties in obtaining business financing. Banks and other financiers struggle to release funds, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), due to a lack of guarantees and insufficient documentation. These challenges make Gabon a difficult place for foreign businesses to operate. According to the World Bank 2022 report, Gabon ranks 38th in Africa for the protection of minority investors and 43rd for the payment of taxes.Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 significantly increased inflation and concerns over food security in Gabon. The government estimated overall inflation at almost 4 percent in 2022, but economic experts noted countries in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), an organization that includes Gabon, had lower inflation than other countries in the region. However, the prices for many food items in Gabon surged with global food instability in 2022 due to the vast majority of food items being imported for consumption. Gabon was forced to continue fuel and food subsidies enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic due to the inflationary pressure from food and energy insecurity in 2022.Though economic conditions in Gabon recovered from the COVID-19 recession, the business environment is challenging. Corruption and lack of transparency, including inconsistently applied customs regulations and duties, remain impediments to investment. Many international companies, including U.S. firms, continue to report difficulties in collecting timely payments from the government, including significant delays in VAT reimbursements that hinder further foreign trade and investment. As part of the IMF’s 2021-2024 $553.2 million Fund Facility arrangement, the Gabonese government has agreed to enact significant governance and transparency reforms.Historically, the petroleum and mining sectors attracted the most investment in Gabon. To entice more investors in other sectors, particularly the timber sector, Gabon created a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Nkok near Libreville in 2010. The 1,350-hectare SEZ offers considerable tax and financial incentives for local and foreign investors to start business there, provides dedicated electricity and water services to the area and preferred access to the deep-sea port of Owendo, all of which enhance industrial competitiveness and build a business-friendly ecosystem to attract investment. With the success of the Nkok SEZ, Gabon launched two new SEZs in Inkolo (June 2021) and Mpassa-Lebombi (April 2022), with a fourth planned near Port-Gentil in the future. In addition, Gabon has several business incubators active in the country that attempt to facilitate all business activities, foster entrepreneurialism, and develop startups.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index2022136 of 180http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index2022N/Ahttps://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2021233https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita20216,440http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										Gabon’s 1998 investment code conforms to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) investment regulations and provides the same rights to foreign companies operating in Gabon as to domestic firms. The government proposed a new investment code in 2021, but it has yet to pass in parliament. If passed and implemented, the new code will shift incentives for investments away from tax exemptions and toward performance-based awards. It will also provide incentives for investors who are already established in Gabon to re-invest more, and for investments targeting Gabon’s interior.Gabon’s domestic and foreign investors are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party. Certain sectors, such as mining, forestry, petroleum, agriculture, and tourism have specific investment codes, which encourage investment through customs and tax incentives.Gabon established the Investment Promotion Agency (ANPI-Gabon) with the assistance of the World Bank in 2014. Its mission is to promote investment and exports, support SMEs, manage public-private partnerships (PPPs), and help companies establish themselves. It is designed to act as the gateway for investment into the country and to reduce administrative procedures, costs, and waiting periods.Gabonese authorities have made efforts to prioritize investment. In 2017, the High Council for Investment was established to promote investment and boost the economy. This body provides a platform for dialogue between the public and private sectors, and its main objectives are to improve the economy and create jobs.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										Foreign investors are largely treated in the same manner as their Gabonese counterparts regarding the purchase of real estate, negotiation of licenses, and entering into commercial agreements. There is no general requirement for local participation in investments (see local labor requirements below). Many businesses find it useful to have a local partner who can help navigate the esoteric aspects of the business environment.There are no limits on foreign ownership or control in most sectors, though there are some ownership and control regulations surrounding petroleum and mining. For example, Gabon Oil Company, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) created in 2011, has an automatic right to purchase shares of up to a 15 percent in any petroleum sector contract at market price. The standard practice is for the Gabonese President to review foreign investment contracts after ministerial-level negotiations are completed. In certain cases, the President has appeared to intervene to keep negotiations stalled at the ministerial level, even when the deal was on track to a mutually satisfactory solution.The President takes an active interest in meeting with investors. The lack of standardized procedures for new entrants to negotiate deals with the government can lead to confusion and time-consuming negotiations. Moreover, the centralization of decision-making by a few senior officials who are exceedingly busy can also delay the process. As a result, new entrants often find the process of finalizing deals time-consuming and difficult to navigate.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										Gabon has been a World Trade Organization (WTO) member since 1995. In June 2013, Gabon conducted an investment policy review with the WTO. The government has not conducted any investment policy reviews through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since 2017.																																				Business Facilitation										The government encourages investments through preferential customs and tax incentives in those economic sectors that contribute the greatest share to gross national product (GNP), including oil and gas, mining, and timber. For example, oil and mining companies are exempt from customs duties on imported machinery and equipment specific to their industries. The Tourism Investment Code, enacted in 2000, provides tax incentives to foreign tourism investors during the first eight years of operations. The three special economic zones (SEZs) offer tax incentives to industrial investors, and the government intends to create a fourth to attract further industrial investment.ANPI-Gabon covers more than 20 public and private agencies, including the Chamber of Commerce, National Social Security Fund (CNSS), and National Health Insurance and Social Security (CNAMGS). It aims to attract domestic and international investors through improved methods of approving and licensing new companies, and to support public-private dialogue. It has a single-window registration process that allows domestic and foreign investors to register their businesses in 48 hours, facilitating the processing and handling of all required paperwork in one location. There are, however, no special mechanisms for the equitable treatment of women and underrepresented groups in Gabon.ANPI-Gabon’s website contains information on investing in Gabon:  https://www.investingabon.ga/ 																																				Outward Investment										One of ANPI-Gabon’s primary goals is to promote outward investments and exports. The Gabonese government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						Gabon has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, China, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Romania, and Spain. Additionally, although not in force, Gabon has signed BITs with Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritius, Portugal, South Africa, and Turkey.Gabon has not signed a BIT or Bilateral Taxation Treaty with the United States.																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										Government policies and laws often do not establish clear rules and regulations, and foreign firms can have difficulty navigating the bureaucracy. Despite reform efforts, hurdles and red tape remain, especially at the lower and mid-levels of the ministries. Lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays occasionally raise questions for companies about fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts.Rule-making and regulatory authority rests at the ministerial level. There are no NGOs or private sector associations that manage informal regulatory processes. The Gabonese government has not exhibited any recent tendency to discriminate against U.S. investments, companies, or representatives.The government does not publish proposed laws and regulations in draft form for public comment. There are no centralized online locations where key regulatory actions, or their summaries, are published. Key regulatory actions are published in the government’s printed Official Journal. It is not uncommon for legislative proposals to be provided “off the record” to the press.Gabon is affiliated with the Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (Organisation pour l&#8217;harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires, OHADA,  http://www.ohada.com /).The Transformation Acceleration Plan (PAT) launched in January 2021 created a new enforcement mechanism to ensure administrative processes are transparent and regulations followed. The PAT monitors the implementation of administrative processes, and regularly transmit the monitoring information necessary for decision-making to the President and the Prime Minister.No new regulatory systems have been announced in the last year, and no new reforms have been implemented in the last year, though the government is working with the IMF to enact reforms relating to the transparency and good governance of the petroleum sector in 2023.Gabon lacks transparency on public finances and debt obligations or explicit contingent liabilities.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										Gabon is a member of CEMAC, along with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. Gabon is also a member of the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which is headquartered in Gabon and has 11 members: Gabon, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Both CEMAC and ECCAS work to promote economic cooperation among members.Gabon is a member of OHADA, which includes nine validated Uniform Acts: General Commercial Law, Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups, Secured Transactions Law, Debt Resolution Law, Insolvency Law, Arbitration Law, Harmonization of Corporate Accounting, Contracts for the Carriage of Goods, and Cooperatives Companies Law.Gabon has been a member of the WTO since January 1, 1995. It fulfills its duties on notification of all draft technical regulations to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										Gabon’s legal system is based on French Civil Law. Regular courts handle commercial disputes in compliance with OHADA’s standards. Courts do not apply the law consistently, however, and delays are frequent in the judicial system. A lack of transparency in administrative processes and lengthy bureaucratic delays call into question the country’s commitment to fair treatment of foreign businesses and the sanctity of contracts. Judicial capacity is weak, and many government contacts underscore the need for specialized training on technical issues, such as money laundering and environmental crimes. Foreign court and international arbitration decisions are accepted, but enforcement may be difficult.Gabon has a written code of commercial law.Gabon’s judicial system is not independent from its executive branch, making it subject to political influence, which creates uncertainty around the fair treatment and the sanctity of contracts. Regulations or enforcement actions are appealable and are adjudicated in the national court system.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										Gabon’s 1998 investment code, which gives foreign companies operating in Gabon the same rights as domestic firms, allows foreign investors to choose freely from a wide selection of legal business structures, such as a private limited liability company or a public limited liability company. The distinctions arise primarily from the minimum capital requirements and the conditions under which shares may be re-sold. Foreign investment in Gabon is subject to local law that is in many instances unsettled or unclear, and in certain cases, Gabonese law may require local majority ownership of businesses. The state reserves the right to invest in the equity capital of ventures established in certain sectors (e.g., petroleum and mining). There are no known systemic practices by private firms to restrict foreign investment, participation, or control.No major laws have come out this past year, though Parliament has been debating a new investment code which is expected to pass in 2023 (see above).																																				Competition and Antitrust Laws										There are no specific ministries in charge of reviewing transactions and conduct for competition-related concerns. That responsibility lies with the ministry that is party to a contract.The Gabonese Law No. 14/1998 of July 23, 1998, on the Establishment of the Competition Regime of Gabon on Competition, covers all aspects of competition and anti-trust measures.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										Foreign firms established in Gabon operate on an equal legal basis with national companies. Businesses are protected from expropriation or nationalization without appropriate compensation, as determined by an independent third party.The Gabonese government has not exhibited a tendency to expropriate, nor have there been any indications or reports of incidences of indirect expropriation.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						Gabon is a member state of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). The 1965 Code of Civil Procedure provides for various means of enforcement of judgments (both foreign and domestic), depending on the nature of the decree or decision.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						As noted above, Gabon does not have a BIT with the United States. The Embassy is not aware of any investment dispute involving a U.S. company. In 2018, there was a foreign arbitration award issued against the government. The Société d&#8217;Energie et d&#8217;Eau du Gabon (SEEG), a subsidiary of the French transnational Company, the Veolia Group, filed a request for conciliation against Gabon through the ICSID. Veolia and the Gabonese government signed an agreement to settle the case in February 2019. Gabon agreed to buy Veolia’s 51 percent stake in SEEG, and Veolia agreed to withdraw its arbitrage case.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						No alternative dispute resolution options exist within Gabon. Investment disputes are generally negotiated directly with the governmental entity involved. There is no domestic arbitration body within the country. Local courts recognize foreign arbitral awards, but enforcement may be difficult.The Embassy is not aware of any cases of SOEs being involved in investment disputes in the court system.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										Gabon has a bankruptcy law, but it is not well developed. In the World Bank&#8217;s Doing Business Report 2020, Gabon ranked 130 out of 190 economies on the ease of resolving insolvency.Gabon’s bankruptcy law is based on OHADA regulations. According to Section 3: Art 234-239 of OHADA’s Uniform Insolvency Act, creditors and equity shareholders, collectively or individually, may designate trustees to lodge complaints or claims to the commercial court. These laws criminalize bankruptcy, and the OHADA regulations grant Gabon the discretion to apply its own remedies.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										Some of Gabon&#8217;s main industries (oil and gas, mining, and timber) enjoy investment preferences through customs and tax incentives. For example, oil and mining companies are exempt from customs duties on imported machinery and equipment specific to their industries making capital investments more affordable. The government implemented a new tourism code passed in February 2019 that provides tax exemptions to foreign tourism investors during their first eight years of operation.President Bongo outlawed the export of unprocessed wood in 2009 to boost Gabon&#8217;s value-added timber industry and increase domestic consumption. The government partnered with Singapore-based firm Olam to set up a special economic zone (SEZ) at Nkok to process timber, and later expanded its mandate to a broader range of businesses. The SEZ provides a single-window business service to participants and provides new investors with beneficial fiscal incentives, including tax-free operation for 25 years, no customs duties on imported machinery and parts, and 100 percent repatriation of funds. With the success of the Nkok SEZ, Gabon launched two new SEZs in Inkolo (June 2021) and Mpassa-Lebombi (April 2022), with a fourth planned near Port-Gentil in the future.Gabon’s agriculture code of 2008 gives tax and customs incentives to agricultural operators, with a particular focus on SMEs. Land used for agriculture and farm exploitation is exonerated from fiscal taxes. All imported fertilizers and animal feed are also exempt from customs duties.As a member of CEMAC, Gabon&#8217;s trade with other member countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea) is subject to low or no customs duties.In 2022, Gabon did not implement any investment incentives for net-zero or clean energy investment, nor any incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented groups such as women.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										Inaugurated in 2011, the SEZ at Nkok is a public-private partnership between the government of Gabon and Arise, a subsidiary company of Singapore-based Olam Group that also operates similar industrial facilitation zones in the region after its proof-of-concept proved successful in Gabon. The SEZ offers tax and customs incentives to attract foreign investors. In 2017, the SEZ inaugurated the New Owendo International Port. With a surface area of 18 hectares, the terminal has annual capacity of three million tons.Encouraged by the success of the SEZ at Nkok, Gabon expanded the SEZ project to three other economic hubs near Lambaréné, Franceville, and Port-Gentil.The Lambaréné SEZ at Ikolo is located in the province of Moyen-Ogooué and began operations in June 2021. The first investor was Greenply Industries Limited, India’s largest interior infrastructure company, who started the subsidiary Greenply Gabon to create veneer, plywood, and other lumber and construction materials.The Franceville SEZ at Mpassa-Lebombi is located in the south-eastern province of Haut-Ogooué and was launched in April 2022. In January 2023, the Gabonese government signed an agreement with the ARISE group, a privileged partner of the State, to expand Gabon’s agricultural and forestry sectors in the Mpassa-Lebombi SEZ.The Port-Gentil SEZ at Mandji Island in the Ogooué-Maritime province was the second SEZ concept, but the process has seen hurdles due to its focus on the highly regulated petroleum sector. It is not yet operational and there is no expected launch date.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Gabon mandates local employment.In 2010, the Gabonese government agreed to National Organization of Petroleum Workers demands to limit foreign workers in the oil sector to 10 percent of a company’s workforce and to require that Gabonese occupy all executive posts.Firms are required to obtain authorization from the Ministry of Labor before hiring foreigners. Foreign workers must obtain permits before working in Gabon, and the availability of a permit for a job depends on the availability of Gabonese nationals to fill the job in question.There is no specific requirement imposed as a condition on investment.Labor inspectors are charged with following a company’s implementation of the “forced localization” rules under Gabonese labor laws regarding foreign workers.There are no performance requirements for investors, nor are there any requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code and/or provide access to encryption. There are no measurements that prevent or unduly impede companies from freely transmitting customer or other business-related data outside Gabon’s territory. No mechanisms exist to enforce rules on local data storage.In September 2011, Gabon adopted Law No. 001/2011 on the Protection of Personal Data (available in French at  http://www.afapdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Gabon-Loi-relative-%C3%A0-la-protection-des-donn%C3%A9es-personnelles-du-4-mai-20112.pdf ), which defines all the rules on data storage for the following agencies:the Gabon data protection authority (CNPDCP);the Electronic Communications and Postal Authority (ARCEP); andthe General Population and Housing Census (the GPHC Order).																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										Secured interest in property is recognized, and the recording system is relatively reliable.There are no specific regulations for foreign and/or non-resident investors regarding land lease or acquisition. Laws in Gabon for private and commercial property do not provide any restrictions on nationality for the possession and ownership of property in Gabon.Almost 85 percent of Gabon’s area (and possibly 95 percent or more) is legally owned by the state. Only 14,000 private land titles, mostly tiny urban parcels, appear to have been registered in Gabon according to a 2012 report (the most recent year for which such records exist). Urban areas constitute no more than one percent of total land area. The government created the National Agency for Urban Planning, Surveys, and the Land Registry in 2011.If legally purchased property is unoccupied by the owner, property ownership can revert to others.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										Gabon is not on the U.S. Trade Representative Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.The Ministry of Commerce manages patents and copyrights in Gabon. Gabon is a member of the African Intellectual Property Office (OAPI), based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. OAPI aims to ensure the publication and protection of patent rights, encourage creativity and technology transfer, and create favorable conditions for research. As a member of OAPI, Gabon acceded to international agreements on patents and intellectual property (IP), including the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, and the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.During the past year, no IP related laws or regulations were enacted concerning IP rights protection. Gabon does not report on seizures of counterfeit goods, so data is not available on enforcement.																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										There is no law prohibiting or limiting foreign investment in Gabon. Aside from the preference in employment given to Gabonese workers, from a general corporate law perspective, there are no specific legislative requirements. Regardless of the type of company, there must be one resident representative on the management board of all Gabonese companies. However, this resident representative can be a non-Gabonese citizen.The State is entitled to hold a mandatory participating interest in a petroleum contract of up to 20 percent. Any acquisition by the state in excess of 20 percent must be purchased at market price. The Gabon Oil Company (i.e., the national oil and gas company) is also entitled to acquire at market price a participating interest in any petroleum contract of up to 15 percent.The contracting company can assign its rights and obligations under any petroleum contract to a third party, subject to the prior approval of the Ministry of Oil and Gas and the Ministry of Economy. The State is entitled to the right of first refusal on assigning these rights to a third party, excluding assignments between the contracting company and its affiliates.The Gabonese government encourages and supports foreign portfolio investment, but Gabon&#8217;s capital markets are poorly developed. Gabon is home to the Central Africa Regional Stock Exchange, which began operation in August 2008. In 2019, the Bank of Central African States finalized the consolidation of the Libreville Stock Exchange into a single CEMAC zone stock exchange based in Douala, Cameroon.On June 25, 1996, Gabon formally notified the IMF that they accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Articles of Agreement. These sections provide that members shall not impose or engage in certain measures, namely restrictions on making payments and transfers for current international transactions, discriminatory currency arrangements, or multiple currency practices, without the approval of the IMF.Foreign investors are authorized to obtain credit on the local market and have access to a variety of credit instruments offered by local banks without restriction.																																				Money and Banking System										Gabon shares a common Central Bank (Bank of Central African States) and a common currency, the Communauté Financière Africaine Franc (FCFA), with the other countries of CEMAC. The CFA is pegged to the Euro.The banking sector is composed of seven commercial banks and is open to foreign institutions. Foreign banks are allowed to establish operations in the country. There is one U.S. bank (Citigroup) present in Gabon. There are no restrictions on a foreigner’s ability to establish a bank account in the local economy. However, the banking sector remains highly concentrated, with three of the largest Gabonese banks accounting for 77 percent of all loans and deposits. The lack of diversification in the economy has constrained bank growth in the country, a problem only compounded by financing of the oil sector being largely undertaken by foreign international banks. Access to banking services outside major cities is limited. As a result, Gabon’s financial system is shallow and financial intermediation levels remain low. Basic documents are required for applying for a residency permit in Gabon.The Gabonese banking sector saw an increase in deposits and loans in 2022 mainly due to a surge in deposits and a consolidation of permanent capital, increasing its total balance sheet from 2.656 trillion FCFA to 3.041 trillion FCFA, representing a year-over-year increase of 14.6 percent. Conversely, the loan coverage rate by deposits, a ratio that compares deposit net present value to debt obligations, decreased from 157.8 percent in September 2021 to 137.3 percent in September 2022. Overdue receivables, for their part, fell by 7.9 percent, totaling 168 billion FCFA at the end of September 2021. Gabonese banks issued 1.848 trillion FCFA in gross loans in 2022, an annual growth of 15 percent compared to 1.607 trillion FCFA in 2021. According to the Central African Banking Commission (COBAC), this increase was primarily driven by an increase in loans granted to the private sector.According to the Professional Association of Gabon Credit Institutions (APEC), BGFI Bank Gabon is the largest Gabonese bank in both deposits and loans with approximatively 45 percent market share and a total balance sheet of over 3 trillion FCFA. The Bloomfield Investment Corporation financial rating agency gave the BGFI Bank a mark of A+ in recognition of its financial strength and management system.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						The Bank of Central African States’ policy on foreign exchange requirements is in flux. Please contact the Embassy for additional information.Funds associated with any form of investment to be freely converted into any world currency must go through the Bank of Central African States’ new process related to foreign and exchange currency rules.Gabon’s currency is the FCFA, which is convertible and is tied to the Euro (EUR 1: FCFA 656). As of March 2023, 1 U.S. dollar is roughly equivalent to FCFA 609.						Remittance Policies						The Gabonese government recently changed investment remittance policies to tighten access to foreign exchange for investment remittances. There is no time limitation on capital inflows or outflows.						Sovereign Wealth Funds						Gabon created a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2008. Initially called the Fund for Future Generations (Fonds des Génerations Futures), and later changed to the Sovereign Funds of the Gabonese Republic (Fonds Souverains de la République Gabonaise), the current iteration of Gabon’s SWF is referred to as Gabon’s Strategic Investment Funds (Fonds Gabonaises d’Investissements Stratégiques, the Fund, or FGIS). The most recent FGIS report from June 2022 highlighted that FGIS had nearly $2 billion in assets under management.FGIS does not follow the Santiago principles, nor does Gabon participate in the IMF-hosted International Working Group on SWFs. The FGIS is the exclusive manager of the Sovereign Wealth Fund of the Gabonese Republic and of the non-allocated holdings of the Gabonese State portfolio.FGIS invests to achieve shared prosperity for the benefit of the Gabonese population and future generations. As a partner of the government’s action, defined in the 2021-2023 Transformation Acceleration Plan, FGIS intervenes in three strategic areas: infrastructure financing, support for SMEs, and support for the social sectors. Its approach is guided by three fundamental principles: sustainability of impact, innovation, and risk mitigation for its stakeholders. FGIS has been designated as the sole manager of Gabon’s 187 million carbon credits that were certified by the UN in October 2022. FGIS has committed to reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in its portfolio by 2050 and setting intermediate targets every five years.FGIS provides no information on its investments, neither domestic nor international.																																		7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						Government-appointed civil servants manage Gabonese SOEs, which operate primarily in the energy, extractive industries, and public utilities sectors. SOEs generally follow OECD guidelines on corporate governance by establishing a board of directors who operate under the authority of the related ministry. That ministry chooses the board members, who may be government officials or members of the public. The SOEs often consult with their associated ministry before making important business decisions. The corresponding ministry in each sector prepares and submits the budget of each SOE annually. Independent auditors examine the SOEs’ activities each year, conducting audits according to international accounting standards. Auditors do not publish their reports, but rather submit them to the relevant ministry.There are no specific laws or rules that offer preferential treatment to SOEs. Private enterprises may compete with public enterprises under open market access conditions, however, SOEs often have a competitive advantage in the industries in which they operate. SOEs are required to respect domestic market terms that apply to all companies in the market. Gabon does not maintain a list of published SOEs and there is no evidence Gabonese SOEs compete on the international market.																										Privatization Program										Gabon does not have an active privatization program. However, when there is a privatization program, foreign investors are usually invited to participate. The bidding process for these programs are typically easy to understand, non-discriminatory, and transparent.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						There is a general awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) among both producers and consumers; however, there are no formal rules or regulations pertaining to RBC in Gabon. There has been no high-profile private sector case on RBC in recent years. The government does not release any reports concerning human rights or other RBC issues.Gabon has several NGOs working primarily in the environment, human rights, and mining sectors. The political labor unions in Gabon have taken the lead in promoting and monitoring RBC, and they are able to work freely. With a push from these labor unions, Gabon fairly enforces labor rights laws and regulations intended to protect individuals from adverse business impacts. However, Gabon has not effectively enforced consumer protection laws and regulations.While Gabon is widely praised as a leader in environmental protection and has been praised as a positive example in Africa, it still experiences significant issues with pollution where prosecution is weak and penalties insufficient. However, the President is highly environmentally minded, and Gabon is known for its beautiful national parks and beaches.Gabon has not put in place corporate finance, accounting, or executive compensation standards to protect shareholders. There are no domestic measures requiring supply chain due diligence for companies that source minerals.Gabonese authorities state that they are committed to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles. Gabon was a candidate for the EITI beginning in 2007. By December 2012, Gabon was required to have completed an EITI validation that demonstrated compliance with the initiative’s rules. However, after a review of Gabon’s National EITI Committee found it had missed significant deadlines and underperformed on EITI metrics, the International Council of the EITI voted in 2013 to exclude Gabon from the application process.Gabon applied and was re-admitted as an EITI implementing partner in October 2021 under its current IMF program. Gabon has vowed to fully meet the EITI requirements and criteria on data collection for the management of natural resources, notably the oil and gas sectors. On February 2022, an EITI Secretary assessment delegation visited Libreville to review Gabon’s implementation of EITI standards before the EITI board members conduct their first evaluation of Gabon&#8217;s performance since it was re-admitted. The evaluation is expected to be released in April 2023.There is no information on national legislation regarding private security companies. Gabon is not a signatory of The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. Little information is available on the private security industry in Gabon. An estimate from 2015 nevertheless indicated that the private security sector in Gabon employs around 7,000 personnel, indicating that it is a significant actor in the Gabonese security landscape.																										Additional Resources										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/);Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/);Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/) and;North Korea Sanctions &amp; Enforcement Actions Advisory ( https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_supplychain_advisory_07232018.pdf )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  ) and.List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods ).Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab ) and;Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ ).																																				Climate Issues										President Bongo established the National Climate Council to develop a strategic Climate Plan that would incorporate climate change considerations into sectoral development strategies. The government’s first Climate Plan, adopted in January 2012, identified key climate change priorities, such as reducing deforestation and being a net carbon dioxide absorber.In 2002, 11 percent of Gabonese territory was set aside for conservation as national parks, forming 13 national parks in total. Gabonese authorities promote sustainable logging activities through the strict application of forestry laws and compel all logging concessions to comply with Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification by 2022. Since 2011, Gabon prohibited exportation of raw timber and required that 100 percent of timber be processed in the country; this further halted deforestation and promoted forest conservation. In 2010, President Bongo banned gas flaring in Gabon, with some experts estimating the ban will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 23 percent by 2025.Gabon signed the 2015 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) REDD+ mechanism, creating a regulatory framework within Gabon for environmental and biodiversity protection. Gabon has played a leadership role at COP 26 in Glasgow and COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh and became the first country in Africa to receive results-based payments for curbing deforestation under the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI). Despite already significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it remains committed to reducing emissions by at least 50 percent by 2025.Gabon’s fight against deforestation directly concerns current and future land use and the socio-economic activities that depend on it. With 88 percent of Gabon’s territory covered by forests, any land-based activity comes into direct confrontation with Gabon’s deforestation policies, but particularly affect the timber, mining, and agricultural sectors. Only the timber sector has specific policies that target deforestation, such as the ban on exporting raw timber.																																												9. Corruption						    																						The Gabonese Penal Code criminalizes abuse of office, embezzlement, passive and active bribery, trading in influence, extortion, offering or accepting gifts, and other undue advantages in the public sector. However, enforcement remains limited and official impunity is a problem. Private sector corruption is criminalized whenever a given company is related to a public entity. Punishments for public officials found guilty of soliciting or accepting bribes include prison sentences ranging from two to ten years, and a fine of FCFA 5 million ($8,572). Corruption is rarely prosecuted in Gabon, except in limited high-profile cases. In 2022, Transparency International ranked Gabon at 136 of 180 countries.The government established the Commission to Combat Illicit Enrichment (CNLCEI) in 2004; however, in the summer of 2018, the CNLCEI’s five-year mandate was not renewed, nor did its regulations extend to the family members of civil servants or to political parties.There are no known laws or regulations to counter conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or government procurements. There is no information about any action on the part of the government to encourage or require private companies to establish codes of conduct that prohibit the bribery of public officials. Some private companies use internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs to detect and prevent bribery of government officials.Gabon is a signatory to the UN Convention against Corruption and is a member of the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe d’action contre le blanchiment d’argent en Afrique Centrale, or GABAC). However, no international or regional watchdog organizations operate in Gabon. Local civil society lacks the capacity to play a significant role in highlighting cases of corruption.Companies contend with a high risk of corruption when dealing with the Gabonese extractive industries. Gabon has vast oil, manganese, and timber resources; however, contracting and licensing processes lack transparency.																										Resources to Report Corruption										National Financial Investigations AgencyTel : +241 01176 1773Agence Nationale d’Investigation FinancièreImmeuble Arambo, Boulevard TriomphalBP :189Libreville, Gabon contact@anif.ga 																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Violence related to politics is relatively rare in Gabon, though there are reports of kidnappings and false arrests. There are several political prisoners in confinement, and credible reports of torture of prisoners. The threat of crime is high due to the large wealth disparity and high unemployment amount the youth population, with crime on the rise in 2022.While the 2018 legislative and local elections took place without major incident, violence did break out during the 2016 elections after the National Electoral Commission announced that the incumbent President Bongo defeated his opponent Jean Ping in the presidential election by a margin of less than 2 percent. Outside observers noted numerous voting irregularities, and the opposition claimed the election was stolen from them. Protestors took to the streets, attempting to burn the National Assembly building. NGOs stated the government’s use of excessive force to disperse demonstrators resulted in approximately 20 deaths and over 1,000 arrests; the opposition claimed at least 50 people were killed.Nationwide elections are expected in August 2023 and there have been heightened tensions in the lead up to the elections. The Gabonese government has forbidden outside observers from following the elections. Some analysts believe some degree of demonstrations and violence is inevitable during the elections.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						Gabon has a population of approximately 2.3 million, with third country nationals (TCNs) making up roughly one-third of the population. Many young Gabonese are unable to acquire vocational skills and are thus excluded from the labor market. A report in October 2018 indicated that 60 percent of Gabonese under 30 are unemployed, and informal reporting indicates the percentage continues to remain steady due to the poor quality of the basic education system, insufficient output of technical and vocational training, and a lack of resources and effectiveness in the education sector. Between 2017 and 2021, the Gabonese market lost over 16,000 jobs, or about 8.3 percent of the labor market, primarily due to the COVID-19 recession.Foreign firms report a shortage of highly skilled Gabonese labor. Chinese industrial companies import most of their workers from China. Authorization from the Ministry of Labor is required to hire foreigners. Reforms adopted in 2010 in the education and research system represent a step towards developing service training and encouraging PPPs. For example, the Petroleum and Gas Institute, located in Port-Gentil and supported by the Gabonese government and oil industry, has been training engineers specialized in oil-related technical areas since 2014.When hiring workers, firms must give priority to Gabonese nationals. If no Gabonese worker with the appropriate qualifications can be found, a firm is expected to hire a Gabonese to work along with the foreigner and, within a reasonable time, the Gabonese worker should replace that foreigner.Labor laws differentiate between layoffs and firings. There is no unemployment insurance or other social safety net program for workers laid off for economic reasons. However, the SEZs are not subject to the same foreign labor restrictions as the rest of the country. Collective bargaining is common in Gabon. Gabon’s French-inspired labor code recognizes the right of workers to form and join independent unions, collectively bargain, and receive protection against antiunion discrimination. The government observes the resolution of labor disputes and takes an active interest in labor-management relations. Unions in each sector of the economy negotiate with employers over pay scales, working conditions, and benefits.However, the right to strike is limited or restricted. Strikes may be called only after eight days’ advanced notice and only after arbitration fails. Public sector employees are not allowed to strike if public safety could be jeopardized. The law does not define essential services sectors in which workers are prohibited from striking. Despite these limitations, public and private sector strikes are frequent and disruptive. Government employees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment have been on strike for most of 2022 due to failure to adhere to contractual obligations. The civil servants in the financial authorities initiated strikes several times in the past few years, slowing customs processing and work done in the tax, custom, treasury, and hydrocarbons sectors. The threat of strikes from private sector unions often leads to swift negotiations with the Gabonese government.The Gabonese government strictly enforces the labor code’s mandatory retirement age of 60.Gabon has ratified most of the International Labor Organization (ILO) laws and conventions. There are no gaps in compliance in law or practice with international labor standards that may pose a reputational risk to investors.A new Gabonese Labor Code was adopted (Law no. 022/2021) in November 2021. The new code reforms several key issues, including the strengthening of protections for workers’ rights, fighting against discrimination, eliminating gender inequalities, opening up the formal labor market to new categories of work, and codifying telework. The new code was designed to improve the employability of young people and simplify work authorization procedures for large projects. It also affects professional and trade union representative elections. It has strengthened apprenticeships, bringing the world of vocational training closer to that of employment and promoting professional integration and retraining.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs						    																						In 2019, the DFC issued insurance related to the GSEZ Mineral Port. Currently, the DFC is working on providing loans to finance solar energy technology and services, such as solar lighting, home systems, mini grids, and commercial solar projects in off-grid communities for Gabon through a U.S. company. The approximate investment amount is $4.5 million. DFC has also been looking into the potential of providing political risk insurance in Gabon to fund marine conservation efforts through local conservation organizations, which would require foreign government approval to move forward.The DFC has an Investment Guaranty between Gabon and the United States, effected by exchange of notes signed in Libreville on April 10, 1963. No amendment or replacement to this Investment Guaranty has been negotiated. Existing agreements remain in force and allow for DFC activities.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2019$16,852021$20,22www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2020$1852021$233.0BEA data available athttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)N/AN/A2020$0BEA data available athttps://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-dataTotal inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP2018$9.420218.6%https://unctadstat.unctad.org/countryprofile/generalprofile/en-gb/266/index.html * Source for Host Country Data:  Gabon 2021 budget; the World Bank 2019-2021 report; the IMF country report; the website for the Gabonese Ministry of Economy.Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIIMF CDIS does not have data for Gabon.																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Lyle MikowiczPolitical and Economic ChiefU.S. Embassy LibrevilleTel: +241 1145 7118 / +241 7798 2613 MikowiczLV@state.gov  LibrevillePE@state.gov 																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											The Bahamas											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																												Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources																																																						Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Gabon
- Gabon HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Fiscal Transparency Report&#8230;Gabon				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Fiscal Transparency Report: Gabon 																																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Government-by-Government Assessments: Gabon 																																												Government-by-Government Assessments: Gabon 				During the review period, the government made significant progress by publishing its enacted budget online within a reasonable period. It did not make its executive budget proposal or its end-of-year report publicly available within a reasonable period. Only limited information on debt obligations, excluding major state-owned enterprise debt, was publicly available and it was not updated within a reasonable period. Publicly available budget documents provided a substantially complete picture of the government’s planned expenditures and revenue, however quarterly budget reports were limited and unreliable, so it was unclear whether actual revenues and expenditures reasonably corresponded to those in the enacted budget. The supreme audit institution did not meet international standards of independence. It reviewed the government’s accounts but did not make its reports publicly available within a reasonable period. While the government specified in law the criteria and procedures for awarding natural resource extraction contracts and licenses, it did not always follow those regulations in practice or make basic information on natural resource extraction publicly available. While the sovereign wealth fund had a soundlegal framework, it did not disclose its source of funding or general approach to withdrawals.Gabon’s fiscal transparency would be improved by:Making substantially complete and reliable budget documents publicly available within a reasonable period, including the executive budget proposal and end-of-year report;Publishing information on debt obligations, including major state-owned enterprise debt, within a reasonable period;Reviewing its budget throughout the fiscal year and ensuring actual revenues and expenditures reasonably correspond to those in the enacted budget;Ensuring the supreme audit institution meets international standards of independence;Making audit reports publicly available within a reasonable period;Making basic information for natural resource extraction awards publicly available;Following natural resource extraction laws and regulations in practice; andDisclosing its sovereign wealth fund’s source of funding and general approach to withdrawals.																												    							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- Gabon HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Gabon				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Gabon																																					Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons																																																																																																				 In this section										/																							GABON (Tier 2 Watch List)																																													GABON (Tier 2 Watch List)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								GABON (Tier 2 Watch List)				The Government of Gabon does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.  These efforts included increasing funding and capacity at one NGO-run shelter providing services to victims, as well as increasing prosecutions and convictions of alleged traffickers.  However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity.  The government did not report referring any trafficking victims to services.  It did not report on specific efforts to provide justice for, identify, and protect adult trafficking victims, which have remained inadequate for several reporting periods.  For the fourth consecutive year, the government did not adopt its anti-trafficking NAP and the anti-trafficking commission, though renamed, did not formally meet to coordinate national efforts.  Authorities did not report investigating allegations of judicial corruption related to trafficking crimes.  Therefore Gabon remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Finalize, resource, and implement the NAP and formally convene the national inter-ministerial anti-trafficking commission to coordinate government efforts. Increase efforts to proactively identify adult and child victims of trafficking, including among key sectors such as domestic service, markets, and individuals in commercial sex, and refer trafficking victims to care. Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, including complicit officials, and adequately sentence convicted traffickers. Amend the penal code to define trafficking in line with the international definition and ensure penalties for adult sex trafficking are commensurate with penalties for other grave crimes, such as rape. Provide training for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges on the penal code and victim-centered, trauma-informed investigations. Increase financial or in-kind support to government- and NGO-run shelters. Finalize and implement SOPs for identifying and referring adult trafficking victims to care.  Regularly convene the Special Criminal Session to increase the number of trafficking cases heard. Implement and consistently enforce strong regulations and oversight of labor recruitment companies, including training labor inspectors to identify and report trafficking crimes and holding fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable. Develop and institute a course on victim-centered trafficking investigations in Gabon’s National Magistrate School to increase judicial officials’ ability to prosecute trafficking cases. Conduct a nationwide campaign to raise awareness of trafficking in markets and domestic service. Develop an information management system to capture nationwide investigation and victim identification data in partnership with international organizations. Implement a systemic victim-witness assistance program to increase protective services for victims participating in the criminal justice process. Strengthen rules and regulations to ensure immigration enforcement does not hinder human trafficking detection, criminal law enforcement, or victim protections.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government maintained law enforcement efforts.  Articles 225 to 225-7 of the 2020 revised penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, prescribing penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 100 million Central African francs (CFA) ($162,920) for trafficking offenses involving adult victims, and up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 100 million CFA ($162, 920) for those involving child victims.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent, but with respect to adult sex trafficking, not commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.  Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, the penal code established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as aggravating factors rather than essential elements of the crime; penalties were increased to up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 100 million CFA ($162,920) if such factors were involved.  Finally, the penal code conflated the crimes of migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.The government did not investigate any trafficking crimes during the reporting period, compared with 10 investigations in 2021 and zero in 2020.  The government initiated prosecution of 10 alleged traffickers, compared with seven in 2021 and 16 in 2020.  Courts convicted 10 traffickers, compared with six in 2021 and three in 2020.  The government did not report sentencing data.  Only the country’s Special Criminal Session court was authorized to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases.  The court did not have an adequate budget to operate regularly and only met once during the reporting period, as the planned second session was postponed because of lack of funding.The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action.  Due to alleged corruption and a lack of training, prosecutorial judges tasked with investigating trafficking cases did not always investigate cases brought to their attention.  Experts alleged some traffickers bribed judges to actively delay or dismiss trafficking cases, while the government stated delays were the result of insufficient knowledge of trafficking laws.  The government, in partnership with an international organization, provided anti-trafficking training to judicial officials in June 2022.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government maintained protection efforts.  The government did not report identifying any trafficking victims, compared with seven child trafficking victims identified and referred to care in 2021, and 41 in 2020.  An NGO, however, identified 20 potential child labor trafficking victims and referred them to social services for care.  In addition, the government repatriated 10 trafficking victims and an unknown number of child trafficking victims, compared with 33 repatriated in 2021.  The government continued to use a trafficking procedural manual, developed in coordination with an international organization, that outlined SOPs for identification and referral to care of child trafficking victims.  The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs continued to have a referral process to transfer child trafficking victims to government and NGO-run shelters for assistance.  The government continued to lack robust SOPs for identification and referral to care of adult trafficking victims.Observers reported limited shelter space hindered support for some law enforcement investigations due to concerns victims would not have access to long-term shelter.  The government continued to fund two NGO-run shelters offering holistic services to child trafficking victims, orphans, and children experiencing homelessness, providing financial and in-kind support, including funding for social workers, medical support, psychological services, legal assistance, and education. In partnership with local NGOs, the government increased funding for the Angondje shelter to 150 million CFA ($244,380) and increased its capacity to care for 120 children, up from 80.  The government reported it provided shelter service to 20 children during the reporting period.  NGOs reportedly had inadequate funding to effectively care for victims.  The same services were available for male, female, foreign national, and Gabonese victims, including those repatriated from abroad.  There were no government or NGO-run shelters specifically designated for adult trafficking victims, although adult victims could potentially access government services for victims of crime, including domestic violence, or other forms of maltreatment.  The government reported shelter and protection services returned to normal operations in March 2022 with the lifting of all pandemic restrictions.Victims were eligible for immigration relief to remain in Gabon if they faced threats to their safety in their country of origin; however, officials did not report any victims utilizing this legal alternative during the reporting period.  The government allowed restitution for trafficking victims; however, the government did not report if victims received any amount of restitution during the reporting period.  Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers, but there were no known cases of such action, in part due to lack of awareness of the option.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained insufficient prevention efforts.  The government’s anti-trafficking inter-ministerial committee has not met since 2019.  After four years of inactivity, the Ministry of Justice renamed the inter-ministerial committee as the National Commission for the Prevention and Fight Against Human Trafficking; it did not conduct any formal meetings but convened informally during the reporting period.  For the fourth consecutive year, the government did not finalize the pending NAP, which among other things, would designate the Ministry of Justice as the lead agency to coordinate the inter-ministerial committee.  The government had a hotline for abuse victims, in partnership with an international organization, but did not report numbers of calls received and if any led to victim identification and referrals.  The government did not conduct any public awareness raising campaigns.  The government did not have effective laws or policies regulating labor recruiters.  Officials did not disclose funding levels for Gabon’s anti-trafficking programming.  Officials initiated a bilateral agreement with Burkina Faso to cooperate on anti-trafficking efforts; however, it remained incomplete at the close of the reporting period.The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.  The government did not provide any updates on the 30 open cases of alleged sexual exploitation by Gabonese peacekeepers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions (with the dates of the incidents as follows: 10 in 2022, seven in 2021, nine in 2020, three in 2019, and one in 2018).  All of these allegations concerned Gabonese peacekeepers deployed to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), leading the Secretary-General to repatriate the entire Gabonese contingent in MINUSCA in September 2021.  Investigations remained open and the government had not yet reported accountability measures taken, if any, at the end of the reporting period.  The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Gabon, and traffickers exploit victims from Gabon abroad.  Gabon is a primary destination and transit country for West and Central African men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.  Poverty continues to represent a key risk factor in forced labor and sex trafficking in the country.  Traffickers exploit girls in forced labor in domestic service, markets, or roadside restaurants; force boys to work as street vendors, mechanics, microbus transportation assistants, and laborers in the fishing sector; and coerce West African women into domestic servitude or commercial sex within Gabon.  Criminals may exploit children in illegal gold mines and in wildlife trafficking in the country’s interior.  NGOs reported Cameroonian and Gabonese labor recruiters associated with large agricultural firms exploit English-speaking Cameroonians displaced by the violence and insecurity in Cameroon’s Northwest and Southwest regions.  The recruiters force some Cameroonians to labor on rubber and palm oil plantations around Bitam in northern Gabon.West African traffickers reportedly exploit children from their countries of origin to work in Libreville markets, such as N’Kembo, Mont Bouët, and PK7, as well as in other urban centers, including Port-Gentil.  In Gabon’s eastern provinces, shopkeepers force or coerce Gabonese children to work in markets.  In some cases, smugglers who assist foreign adults migrating to Gabon – or through the country to Equatorial Guinea – subject those economic migrants to forced labor or commercial sex after they enter the country via plane or boat with falsified documents.  In some cases, families willingly give children to intermediaries who fraudulently promise education or employment and instead subject the children to forced labor through debt bondage.  Roadside bars – or “maquis” – are a common sector where traffickers sexually exploit women, and the Libreville neighborhood of Lalala is an area where some brothel owners reportedly exploit children in child sex trafficking.  NGOs reported actors operating illicit adoption rings, either through women pretending to be mothers of newborn children and paying off the birth mothers, or through tricking birth mothers into thinking their newborn died in childbirth and then selling the children.  Some criminals procure falsified documents for child trafficking victims identifying them as older than 18 years of age to avoid prosecution under the child trafficking law.  Traffickers often operate outside the capital to avoid detection by law enforcement and take advantage of Gabon’s porous borders and unguarded beaches to import victims by car or boat, often using falsified identify documents.																																				    							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- Gabon HomeReportsOffice of International Religious Freedom2022 Report on International Religious Freedom&#8230;Gabon				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Gabon																																					Office of International Religious Freedom																																																																																							Download Report																																																																																	 In this section										/																							Executive Summary																																													Executive Summary																															Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																																																																								Executive Summary				The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of religion and worship and equality for all, irrespective of religious belief. It grants religious groups autonomy and the right to provide religious instruction.The government continued to report local actors attempting to use religious cover to defraud individuals. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) rejected some applications to register religious groups for lack of documentation and “authenticity.”There were no reports during the year of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.U.S. embassy staff met with senior MOI officials, nongovernmental organizations, and local religious leaders to encourage continued respect for religious freedom and interreligious dialogue and activities.																														Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															The U.S. government estimates the total population at 2.3 million (midyear 2022).  Demographic studies do not track religious affiliation and estimates from religious leaders and government agencies vary widely.  The Episcopal Conference of Gabon estimates approximately 80 percent of the population are Christian.  Of the Christian population, approximately two-thirds are Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant, which includes evangelical churches.  The High Council of Islamic Affairs estimates approximately 12 percent of the population are Muslim, including many noncitizen residents with origins in West Africa.  There are no published estimates of the Sunni/Shia populations, although the Sunni are predominant.  The remaining 8 percent of the population practice animism or does not identify with any religious group.  Many individuals practice a syncretic faith such as Bwiti that combines elements of Christianity with traditional indigenous faiths, Voodoo, or animism.  Other traditional faiths are Mwiri and Ndiobi.  Groups that together constitute less than 5 percent of the population include Jews and Baha’is.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										The constitution defines the state as secular and establishes separation of religion and state. It prohibits religious discrimination and holds all citizens equal before the law, regardless of religion. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the free practice of religion, and the right to form religious communities that may govern and manage their affairs independently, consistent with public order. The constitution stipulates religious communities whose activities are contrary to laws of the country or promote conflict among ethnic groups may be banned.The law requires all associations, including religious groups, to register with the MOI. Registered groups are eligible for exemptions from fees for land use and fees for construction permits. To register, a group must present to the MOI copies of its founding statutes and internal rules, a letter attesting to publication of these documents in the applicable local administrative bulletin, a formal letter of request for registration addressed to the MOI, a property lease, the police records of the group’s leaders, and the group’s bank statements. The registration fee is 10,000 CFA francs ($16). Registered religious groups must also provide the MOI with proof of nonprofit status to receive exemptions from local taxes and customs duties on imports. The MOI maintains an official registry of religious groups.The constitution states parents have the right to choose their children’s religious education. The state provides for public education based on “religious neutrality.” Public schools are secular and do not provide religious instruction. Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim groups operate primary and secondary schools, in which representatives of religious groups provide religious instruction. These schools must register with the Ministry of Education, which ensures they meet the same standards as public schools. The government does not fund private schools, religious or secular, although in some schools it may subsidize a portion of the teachers’ salaries.The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.																																				Government Practices										The MOI reported it continued to face trouble with “one-man operations”, individuals who attempted to register themselves as representing religious groups without justification. The MOI stated that such individuals, who tended to practice a mixture of Christianity and animism, lacked “authenticity.” Religious groups said these individuals appeared to be trying to manipulate the system to get benefits they did not deserve, such as tax exoneration to import items and fee exemptions for residence permits. MOI officials stated the government’s regulatory framework governing associations and religious groups was a neutral set of laws, though some new groups experienced difficulty registering because they did not provide the appropriate documents for verification. The MOI reported charging several groups, primarily one-man operations, with fraud or sanctioned for other illegal activities, with the government using the regulatory framework to attempt to prevent further abuses.																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															There were no reports during the year of significant societal actions affecting religious freedom.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy and Engagement												    																																															Embassy officials met with senior MOI officials during the year to encourage continued respect for religious freedom.  Embassy staff also met with the country’s head imam and with the chief religious advisor to President Ali Bongo Ondimba.  They also met with the representative of the Episcopal Conference to discuss interreligious dialogue and activities.  Embassy staff discussed the work of religious groups in charity and assistance operations with the representative of Caritas Gabon.																																				    							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Religious Demography																																																	Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																							Legal Framework																																																						Government Practices																																																			Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																	Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																							Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Gabon																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom