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1

37–319 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–37]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S ATOMIC ENERGY

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

HEARING HELD

MARCH 20, 2007

(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, March 20, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request for the Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy Defense Activities ..................................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, March 20, 2007 ........................................................................................ 31

TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security

and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, accompanied

by; Hon. Will Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation beginning on ......................................................................................... 4

Podonsky, Glenn S., Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, U.S. Department of Energy ..................................................................................................... 10

Rispoli, Hon. James A., Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management,

U.S. Department of Energy ................................................................................. 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 35

Podonsky, Glenn S. ........................................................................................... 72

Rispoli, Hon. James A. ..................................................................................... 61

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 101

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 89

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT

OF ENERGY’S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 20, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic

Forces Subcommittee will come to order.

Today, we will consider the Department of Energy’s (DOE) fiscal

year 2008 budget request.

Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished witnesses: the Honorable Tom D’Agostino, Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); the Honorable James

Rispoli, DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management

(EM); and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, the Director of DOE Office of

Health, Safety and Security (HSS).

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee. Each of you brings a wealth of experience and talent to

your role.

The fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Department of En- ergy totals over $24 billion. The Committee on Armed Services annually authorizes about two-thirds of this total for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities.

This year the request of $15.8 billion for these programs is basically flat compared to last year’s budget request. It requests an increase of about $115 million over the last year’s Continuing Resolution appropriation.

This committee and I have been and remain strong supporters of

the critical missions embodied in your respective program areas.

Between the three of you, your portfolios include responsibilities

and oversight for maintaining and ensuring the reliability of our

Nation’s nuclear deterrent, conducting the scientific research and

production activities necessary to support that deterrent, keeping

the arsenal and complex safe from physical and other threats, leading the Government’s international non-proliferation efforts, and

cleaning up the environmental legacy of decades of nuclear stockpile work.

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Congress is here to help you with these critical tasks. But as you

know, we also bare a responsibility to scrutinize the policies and

priorities and the spending of the Department and of the NNSA.

In that spirit, the subcommittee is eager to hear your testimony

about the fiscal year 2008 budget request.

We are especially interested in five areas.

First, what does the budget indicate about the stewardship of our

nuclear weapons stockpile? Are we devoting adequate resources to

the Stockpile Stewardship Program life extension and stockpile

maintenance activities and the dismantlement work that is critical

to the down-sizing of our weapons stockpile, which is still too large?

Does the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, program

fit in, and how does it fit in?

Second, does the budget balance various safety and security priorities appropriately? Is the NNSA able to bring the complex into

compliance with the 2005 Design Basis Threat (DBT) standards

while simultaneously addressing rapidly growing cyber security

threats?

Third, how does the budget support the various commitments the

Federal Government has made within the cleanup program? Are

you employing earned-value management systems for troubled

projects such as Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)?

How does the budget help speed consolidation of special nuclear

materials (SNM)? How does your consolidations plan affect each of

these broad areas: stockpile stewardship, safety and security, and

environmental cleanup? Do the challenges facing the mixed oxide

(MOX) program affect consolidation plans?

And finally, I would like to know why the Defense Nuclear NonProliferation Budget is cut in a number of areas, including verification, research and development (R&D), and non-proliferation in

international security.

DOE’s non-proliferation programs are some of our most critical

national security tools. And I have advocated that they be fully

funded for some time.

I would like to commend you and the NNSA on the outstanding

progress over the last several years in the construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and its campaign for fusion ignition.

But I am deeply concerned that the President’s 2008 request for

the National Ignition Campaign cannot sustain this effort as

planned without increased delay or risk.

Due to your efforts, the U.S. is poised to capitalize on this investment and achieve fusion ignition for the first time in history. Attaining fusion ignition is crucial to the stewardship of our nuclear

stockpile and a key capability in the supporting complex, and

achieving vital security in non-proliferation goals, ensuring the

safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons without live testing.

And this is why I will work closely with you to ensure that this

schedule is maintained.

These are the kinds of concerns we hope you will address in your

testimony.

With that, let me turn to my good friend, our Ranking Member,

the distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Everett, for any

comments he may have.

Mr. Everett.

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STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you for

your leadership in calling this hearing that we all have a great interest in. And I want to join you in welcoming our panel.

Let me start by thanking you for your dedication and your service and also to the hard working men and women at DOE and

NNSA. It has been a demanding year for DOE and NNSA.

I want to publicly thank Mr. D’Agostino. This committee has a

great deal of respect for Ambassador Brooks. And in his absence,

we appreciate the leadership that you have given and that you

have provided to NNSA and its workforce. I hope you will soon

have some help at the helm.

Bill Ostendorff has served this committee as counsel for over

three years. He has earned the respect of members across both

sides of the aisle. And personally he has come to be one of my most

trusted advisers. While I hate to lose our colleague, I know NNSA

will gain a man of great principle and integrity.

I believe nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in our Nation’s strategic deterrent for years to come. And as long as there

are other countries in the world that seek to acquire and develop

their own nuclear capabilities, we will need to stay one step ahead

in our knowledge of how they work and how to prevent their proliferation. This demands that we sustain our nuclear capability infrastructure and expertise in the foreseeable future.

With the Cold War generation beginning to retire, we must also

ensure that our capabilities and know-how does not retire with

them. This is why I look at the initiatives like Complex Transformation and RRW as critically important to the long-term stability of our nuclear capabilities.

The fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects a great deal of

thought and hard work. However, as we work through the authorization process, we have a responsibility to address some important

issues that I would like to ask the witnesses to discuss today.

Mr. D’Agostino, I would like to highlight a few areas that I am

specifically interested in hearing about today: the way ahead for

the RRW program and specifically, activities planned in fiscal year

2008.

I want to thank you and General Cartwright for briefing the

chairman and myself and our appropriations colleagues on RRW

earlier this month. The more you can do in communicating how

RRW meets the objectives laid out by Congress in our 2006 authorization bill, the more informed our decision making process becomes.

Progress is being made to transform the nuclear weapons complex to achieve the responsible infrastructure required for the future and the extent to which transformation of the complex is independent specifically of RRW decisions.

It is my understanding that outyear funding for Complex Transformation is not included in this year’s budget request. However,

I would ask NNSA to come back to Congress once further details

are developed and infrastructure decisions are made.

4

Last, progress in the consolidation and disposition of nuclear material, including the status of the MOX fuel facility project and the

impact of the continuing resolution, not just on MOX, but the larger security and financial costs of not consolidating nuclear materials in the near term.

Secretary Rispoli, I am particularly interested in hearing the following: progress in the disposition of special nuclear materials and

radioactive tank waste. Consolidation of nuclear materials across

the complex is a key component of this transformation.

And then on the security concerns of our complex, we continue

to be deeply troubled by the security breaches across the complex

that compromise our Nation’s national security.

And, Mr. Secretary, discussing those, I would like to hear about

Federal oversight of security and NNSA sites—are we making

progress? Do we have personnel and the resources provided to do

efficient oversight?

Your thoughts on the how the Department approaches and implements the design, basis, theory, criteria, and how the Department balances its investments and physical and cyber security—

are we doing enough in the area of risk analysis to ensure that the

taxpayers are getting a good return on each dollar invested in security?

DOE and NNSA have had significant issues in front of them, and

all must be addressed within a relatively flat budget line. Within

this relatively flat line, NNSA will start work on the RRW program, transform the nuclear weapons complex, continue non-proliferation efforts, consolidate and dispose of special nuclear materials, and continue to provide the highest level of safety and security that our nation’s nuclear weapons demand.

Thank you all, again, for being with us here today.

Madam Chairman, I again thank you for your leadership in calling this important meeting. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett. And I would like to echo

your comments about Bill Ostendorff, who has served this committee very ably for more than three years.

Bill, I hope the Senate provides you with swift confirmation. And

I look forward to working with you in your new post. The NNSA

will be very strong with you on their team.

Gentlemen, the floor is yours.

I do want to note that we will observe the five-minute rule during our opening statements, as well as during the question-and-answer period. We have all seen and read your prepared testimony.

Thank you for getting it up to the Hill in a timely basis. So if you

would like to simply summarize or hit a few highlights, we welcome that.

And, Administrator D’Agostino, why don’t you start off?

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ACTING UNDER

SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

ACCOMPANIED BY; HON. WILL TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Madam Chairman, thank you very much.

5

I am Tom D’Agostino, the Acting Administrator for the National

Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, and Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.

I am accompanied today by Will Tobey, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation.

And I also have in the room a number of our future leaders sitting probably in the back there somewhere getting an opportunity

to see how we work firsthand. And it is very important for them

to see this. And I am excited that they are here.

The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for the NNSA is

$9.4 billion.

It supports three basic national security missions. The first is to

assure the safety, security, and reliability of our nation’s nuclear

weapons stockpile while at the same time transforming that stockpile and the infrastructure itself. The second is to reduce the threat

posed by nuclear proliferation. And the third is to provide reliable

and safe nuclear reactor propulsion systems for the United States

Navy.

I am pleased to report that stockpile stewardship is working.

This program has proven its ability to successfully sustain the

stockpile and the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear arsenal without the need to conduct an underground test for over a

decade.

In order to meet the long-term objectives, we have developed a

vision and strategy that is consistent with the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which is described in our Complex 2030 vision

statement that was provided to Congress late last year.

Many actions to transform the size and operations of the complex, transform the stockpile, and drive the science and technology

base are well under way: reducing the number of sites with category 1 and 2 special nuclear material and consolidating such material within the remaining sites, maintaining the accelerated rate

of dismantlements, retired warhead dismantlements, reconstituting

the Nation’s nuclear weapon pit production capability, and reviving

our ability to extract tritium for use in the stockpile at the new

tritium extraction facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

Our decision to pursue the RRW, Reliable Replacement Warhead

strategy is not the result of a failure from stockpile stewardship,

as some have suggested. It is a reflection actually upon its success.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program has revealed the need to pursue this strategy.

Moreover, aggressive pursuit of the new scientific tools already

in use and being developed under stockpile stewardship is essential, not only to sustain the existing stockpile as long as they are

needed, but also for our efforts to design, develop, and produce replacement warheads that are safer, more reliable, and cost effective

over the long term without nuclear testing.

I would like to emphasize that our recent announcement to direct

the selection of a baseline design for further study, it was not an

announcement for a decision to actually build replacement warheads. Over the next 9 to 12 months our plans include to develop

a detailed cost, scope, and schedule baseline for the Reliable Replacement Warhead for the Trident submarine launch.

6

With this baseline, we will be able to develop the details necessary for us to evaluate a decision to reduce the number of life extensions and request authorization and appropriation to proceed

with full-scale engineering development for RRW. We will work

very closely with Congress as we move forward to ensure that we

proceed in a solid, steady, and measured manner.

One of the major benefits of the RRW approach is that it reinforces our non-proliferation commitments and objectives. The RRW

strategy will allow us to increase our warhead dismantlement rate,

sending a strong message to the world that we are taking meaningful steps toward further stockpile reductions.

Additionally, increased long-term confidence in the credibility of

the U.S. nuclear deterrent will assure allies and obviate any need

for them to develop and field their own nuclear forces. Finally, the

improved security features of RRW will prevent unauthorized use

should a warhead ever fall into the hands of a terrorist.

In the area of defense non-proliferation, NNSA has worked with

over 100 international partners to detect, prevent, and reverse proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Securing and reducing the quantity of nuclear and radiological materials, bolstering border security overseas, strengthening the international nonproliferation export control regimes, and conducting cutting edge

research and development into nuclear detection technologies are

key mission areas of this office.

Meeting our commitment under the Bratislava Agreement to conclude security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the

end of 2008 is our highest priority during this upcoming fiscal year.

As a result of our efforts to accelerate this work in the wake of 9/

11 and the momentum created by the Bratislava process, we are

well-positioned to successfully reach this milestone on schedule and

in the fiscal year 2008 timeframe.

In addition to our work with Russia, some of the highlights in

the fiscal year 2008 budget include completing the installation of

radiation detection monitors at ports in Belgium, Oman, and the

Dominican Republic, continuing the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

project to eventually dispose of surplus United States plutonium

and supporting the U.S. role in international non-proliferation efforts such as the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.

There is an effective synergy between the NNSA’s weapons activities and non-proliferation. For example, we have dismantled

more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988. Operationally deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads will not exceed

1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

In 2003, the Department of Energy completed dismantlement of

most of its non-strategic nuclear weapons limiting our stockpile of

these systems to one-tenth of the Cold War levels. In May 2004,

President Bush approved a plan that will cut the United States

stockpile by almost one-half from the 2001 level. And by the end

of 2012, the Department’s efforts will have reduced the stockpile to

its smallest level in many, many decades.

And in addition to weapon dismantlement, the Department is

making tremendous progress to reduce and to eliminate fissile material made surplus to defense requirements. I am confident that

7

the NNSA is headed in the right direction in the coming fiscal

year.

This concludes my statement. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino can be found in the

Appendix on page 35.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

Secretary Rispoli.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Secretary RISPOLI. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Madam Chairman, Congressman Everett, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to answer your questions

on the fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Environmental Management program. I want to thank you and your subcommittee for

your continuing support.

As you know, the EM program has solved a number of cleanup

challenges, including Rocky Flats, Fernald, major facilities that

possess significant quantities of plutonium and uranium that at

one time seemed unanswerable. In addition, we have completed the

EM responsibilities for cleanup at active DOE sites such as the

Lawrence Livermore National Lab’s (LLNL) main site.

We are making progress on many other complex challenges that

our program still faces. We have been able to achieve notable results through risk reduction and prioritization and the judicious

use of the resources that the Congress entrusts to us on behalf of

the American people. I would like to quickly run through some

posters showing some of EM’s recent cleanup successes and key accomplishments.

The first one is the Rocky Flats poster; before and after pictures

of the site, which is adjacent to the Denver suburbs. We cleaned

this site up 14 months ahead of contract schedule. And it is in the

process of being transitioned to the Department of the Interior. I

would like to point out that this site had over 3.6 million gross

square feet to be demolished and to make it look the way it does

today to be turned into a natural wildlife refuge.

At Fernald on January 19th, Secretary Bodman and I traveled

to Southeastern Ohio with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Administrator Johnson to celebrate the cleanup of Fernald as well

as two other sites. At Fernald, contamination poses a significant

threat to the underlying drinking water aquifer. The photo you see

today shows that the site is converted to parkland, wetlands, and

prairie. And you will note also there is a 75-acre disposal cell, kind

of like a landfill for the lower radioactivity waste that was put on

site.

At the same ceremony we celebrated the closure of Columbus in

Ashtabula. The Columbus site is 31 acres. It is owned by the

Battelle Memorial Institute. It was used for atomic energy research

and development over the years and is now ready for re-use by its

owner. Similarly, the 42-acre Ashtabula site, also in private ownership, is available for commercial re-use.

8

The next photograph is of Miamisburg, Ohio closure project, also

possessed nuclear materials. You can see the transformation of this

site after most of those buildings were decontaminated, decommissioned, and removed. In the photo you will actually see that there

are three other buildings that are remaining. And that is because

this site is being worked into a reuse scheme with a local economic

development organization. So you can see that they are taking advantage of some of the buildings.

The next picture is Oak Ridge, the Melton Valley site. It is a portion of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Over 600,000 tons of rock and

2 million cubic yards of soil were removed. The Savannah River Tarea is the next photo. There were 28 buildings on this site that

were taken away. Significant risk reduction because the site, this

T-area, is very close to the Savannah River.

The next photo shows a historic landmark for us. It is the arrival

of the first remote handled trans-uranic waste to arrive at the

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. Our permit was

granted by the state recently after working with the state and the

EPA. And we have now completed a number of shipments from

Idaho to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant of this remote handled

waste.

The next photo is the K-east area. These are the famous K-basins at the Hanford site, which we really need to get emptied because of the threat they pose to the Columbia River. You can see

on the left side of the photo the spent fuel down through 22 feet

of water on top of the spent fuel. The challenges were enormous in

getting the remnants, the deteriorated fuel that we call sludge and

debris, out of there. That process has been going very well. As you

can see, the workers in the center and the photo are looking down

through the water on the right hand side with the cleanup.

And the last photo I have for you is a very significant one as

well. Thanks to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of

2005, Section 3116, we have the authority for the Secretary to

make a determination on closure of tanks with just residual waste

left in them. And this photo shows at Thanksgiving week of 2006

the process that was used using a pumper truck to actually grout

the first three tanks at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) facility.

Madam Chairman, these cleanup successes were accomplished by

the collaboration of DOE, Congress, state and national regulatory

agencies, Indian nations, and the communities focusing on a common vision. These completions and accomplishments should be recognized as results derived from partnerships founded on mutual respect and collaboration. The results being delivered by the programs’ risk reduction and prioritization strategy are proving that

linking safety, performance, cleanup, and closure can lead to significant outcomes.

The task is complex. We face multiple challenges of having to develop and deploy new technologies as we proceed. We recognized

our regulatory commitments. We focus on urgent risks. And we are

improving project performance and incorporating new project scope.

As in many of these projects, we discover contamination that is far

greater than had been anticipated. But our ingenuity and hard

work are achieving progress for us.

9

First and foremost, safety is our top priority. We continue to

maintain and demand the highest safety performance. Every worker deserves to go home as healthy as they were when they came

to work in the morning.

One of my goals is that at least 90 percent of our project portfolios will meet or beat our cost and schedule targets. We have

been conducting quarterly performance, face-to-face reviews of all

of our projects with our leadership team.

I am happy to tell you that we are showing measurable improvement. But we have yet to realize the full potential of implementing

our management systems. We will continue our focus on risk management principles to identify project uncertainties, develop mitigation measures, and incorporate risk management into our every

day business.

EM’s 2008 request for Defense Environmental Management Activities is $5.36 billion. In keeping with the principles of reducing

risk and environmental liabilities, our 2008 request will support

the following priority activities: stabilizing radioactive tank waste

in preparation for treatment, about 37 percent of our defense request; storing and safeguarding nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel, about 19 percent of our 2008 request; dispositioning

trans-uranic low-level and solid waste, about 16 percent of our

2008 request; and remediating major areas of our sites, D&Ding,

decontaminating and decommissioning, excess facilities, about 19

percent of our request.

Examples of milestones and planned activities by site-specific

categories are included in my formal statement that I request be

accepted for the record. Per your request, I have got updates on the

Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, the Salt Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River, and plans for special nuclear material

consolidation throughout the DOE weapons complex in that written

testimony.

The budget request reflects decisions to focus funding on activities we have identified to reduce the highest risks we face. Some

of these decisions are not driven by existing client agreements.

Therefore, this budget request does not cover some of the lower

risk reducing activities that are covered by existing compliance

agreements.

Madam Chairman and members of this subcommittee, I assure

you we will continue to work with your subcommittee and our regulators in implementing our risk reduction approach to ensure the

best possible protection for the public. Challenges lie ahead. We are

focused on our objectives and our strategy: safety, performance,

cleanup, and closure that underpin our actions and initiatives.

I look forward to continuing to work with this subcommittee and

the Congress to address your concerns and interests. And I will be

pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rispoli can be found in the

Appendix on page 61.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Without objection, all of your statements will be submitted for

the record.

And, Mr. Podonsky.

10

STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY

AND SECURITY OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman Tauscher and

Ranking Member Everett and members of the subcommittee. I

want to thank you for inviting me to testify on the Department of

Energy’s 2008 budget request for the Office of Health, Safety and

Security, HSS.

On October 1, 2006, Secretary Bodman created the Office of HSS

to integrate Department of Energy’s headquarters level functions

for health, safety, environment, and security into one united office.

We provide the Department with effective and consistent policy development, technical assistance, education and training, complexwide independent oversight and enforcement for these important

programs. We also address Department-wide, cross-cutting issues,

enhanced collaboration and sharing of technical expertise and increased accountability for worker health, safety, and security responsibilities.

Our 2008 budget request includes the funding needed to ensure

continuance and complete coverage for all health, safety, environment, and security functions. As the Department’s central organization responsible for health, safety and environment, and security,

HSS provides corporate level leadership and strategic vision to coordinate and integrate these programs. As the chief health, safety,

and security officer, I advise the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary on a wide range of matters related to these important disciplines across the complex.

We work very closely with my colleagues to my right on all levels

of environment safety, health, safeguards and security. The HSS

budget request for 2008 of $428 million includes $328 million for

health, safety, and security programs and around $100 million for

program direction. The details of this request are provided, obviously, in the formal budget request.

However, in summary, the health, safety, and security programs

that will continue will include such things as policy standards and

guidance issued to ensure that workers and the public and the environment are adequately protected from the hazards of DOE activities; programs to improve worker nuclear facility safety that

protect the public and the environment; programs that support domestic health studies and including the former worker program

and studies to investigate and identify work-related injury and illnesses in the DOE worker population and populations surrounding

the DOE sites.

We also conduct international health studies to support radiation

health effects research in Japan, the Marshall Islands, Russia, and

Spain, efforts to support the implementation of the Department of

Labor’s (DOL) Energy Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. We work closely with DOL, National Institute

for Occupational Safety (NIOSH), and the President’s Advisory

Board on Radiation Worker Protection by making sure that they

have access to all the records they need to support claims filed by

DOE contractors.

The development of maintenance and proficiency and competence

of DOE’s safety and security professionals throughout the DepartVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:21 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037319 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-37\079290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
11

ment of Energy is also run out of our Albuquerque National Training Center.

This request also provides for testing and deployment of new

technologies, Mr. Everett, to deal with known security

vulnerabilities as an alternative to security increases in manpower.

It provides for classification activities to ensure the Department

meets its statutory responsibility in implementing the U.S. Government-wide program to classify and declassify nuclear weapons-related technology and also to classify other information that is critical to the national security and background investigations as well

as associated with providing access authorizations to DOE Federal

and contractor personnel throughout the DOE complex.

My management team and I are aware of the vital role and significant responsibility HSS has to ensure that the health, safety,

and security functions of the Department are, in fact, strengthened

by this new office. To meet this commitment, one of our major priorities following the creation of the office is to institutionalize our

activities.

In the interest of time, I will shorten my oral statement and just

say, Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, HSS

was created at the direction of Secretary Bodman to strengthen

worker health, safety and security functions within the Department. This was a bold and courageous move. And we know time

will demonstrate a significant positive change in the way the Department manages.

Since its creation six months ago, we believe we have made significant strides toward improving the health and safety and security functions of the Department. And in this light, with your permission, Madam Chairwoman, I would like to submit for the record

a list of HSS accomplishments during the first six months.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Without objection.

Mr. PODONSKY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky can be found in the

Appendix on page 72.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Podonsky.

Before we begin the questions, Administrator D’Agostino, I see

that in addition to our witnesses, NNSA Deputy Administrator for

Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation, Will Tobey, is with you today.

And, Mr. Tobey, it is always good to see you. And thank you for

your service.

If you choose, Administrator D’Agostino, if you would like to have

Mr. Tobey join you at the table, he can drag his chair right over

and sit next to you, if you would like, if he is interested in perhaps

answering some questions about non-proliferation.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. We will have him do that. Thank you very

much, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We are very mobile here. You have to drag your

own chair over.

I would also like to thank you, Administrator D’Agostino, for

bringing some of your young leaders up to the Hill with you. If we

have a chance after the hearing, I am sure members would like to

say hello to them.

Let me, on behalf of the committee, thank them for their service

to their country and for the very hard work I know that they do

12

at the NNSA. And hope, frankly, that they will stay in the Government and continue to do this work. It is very necessary to have

smart, young people join the Government and do this very hard

work.

So thank you for your service.

I have two questions to begin. One is about the Reliable Replacement Warhead, and the other is about non-proliferation programs.

Administrator D’Agostino, as you know, this summer we had a

very important study released talking about the length of life of

plutonium pits. And I think that for some of us it was not a surprise to find out that the early designers were much more conservative than many of us even knew that they were. Even though they

claimed to be conservative, we all believed that they were doing the

right thing in putting all of these different kinds of protections in

the weapons that they were designing and building.

But I guess my question is, if we are actually living now with

plutonium pits that have a half-life significantly longer than we expected, could we use the pits that are coming out of dismantled

weapons or in systems that we have chosen to not use any longer

and have them effectively be a new component for the Reliable Replacement Warheads? And might that avoid us needing to manufacture new pits, which is a concern that I think many of us have?

Not only would a pit facility be very expensive, but it would be

controversial. And I think that this approach might be particularly

useful in replacing the weapons currently designed to be delivered

by a bomber or a cruise missile.

My second question is really about the non-proliferation efforts

that the NNSA has had as a hallmark for many years. I am really

concerned about the fiscal year 2008 budget request being below

the 2007 request. And, you know, I think that we have to understand that it is not only the 9/11 Commission, but we generally accept that the biggest threat to the United States is the proliferation

of Weapons of Mass Destruction, material, and know-how.

And not a single non-proliferation program has been increased

for the fiscal year 2008 budget. So I know that this is a big issue

for NNSA. And a lot of outstanding work is done. But I guess I

would like to know if there are unmet needs or unfulfilled requirements that could be met if you had additional funding.

If you could expand a little on what those would be, and I would

also like to have you submit something for the record on that.

Thank you.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Madam Chairman, I will take the first

question. I will ask my colleague to address the second question,

if that is okay.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Absolutely.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Your question was on pit re-use, as I understand it. And it is a very good question. It is one that we have

thought about within the—not only within the NNSA, but also with

our discussions with our colleagues in the Defense Department.

One of the elements of the Reliable Replacement Warhead approach is to bring in features that allow intrinsic surety. Surety is

a term for safety, security, and use control. And the pit is the heart

of the matter in many respects as it relates to intrinsic surety.

13

And so, the many pits that we have built in the 1950’s, 1960’s,

1970’s and 1980’s, the vast majority do not have this feature associated without them. And without getting into classified, I would be

glad to talk to the committee in a closed session to provide a little

bit more technical detail.

But from the standpoint of looking at reliable replacement concepts to address the majority of our current nuclear deterrent,

which currently resides with our submarine launched missiles and

warhead systems, that pit reuse would be very difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate in. And that is not the approach that we

have taken.

However, we are looking at—and as you know, the Nuclear

Weapons Council did agree with our reliable replacement strategy

as an alternative to the life extension strategy for the whole nuclear deterrent. And there are opportunities, I believe, where we

can take our newest pits, for example, those few that have these

features that account, and actually incorporate those. In fact, that

is what we want to study. We will be taking a look at that particular question in 2007 and in 2008 and see how we can take advantage of that.

My goal would be to make sure this Nation doesn’t develop a capability that it doesn’t need. We don’t want to build a white elephant. We want to build a capability that is going to satisfy the

Nation’s need for the smallest stockpile and smallest size complex

to address the deterrent needs in the future. And over-building a

pit capability is certainly a very expensive proposition, has some

political ramifications and also has implications on our workforce.

As you know, right now our country does not have a sustainable

pit capability. And we are developing a capability at Los Alamos

to build up to ten pits per year this fiscal year. That is on one of

my main items on our getting the job done list.

The Los Alamos National Security has that challenge. It is not

just about doing it once, though. They have to have the laboratory

maintain that over a number of years. And they have that challenge and marker out there, too, to get up to 30 to 50 pits per year.

And a real question that I am looking at from a strategic standpoint is where is the knee in the curve between 50 pits per year

and what we understand are current requirements from the DOD

at about 125 per year. Is there a breakpoint where we can say the

Nation—if we can get that requirement down to a certain level, the

Nation will not have to invest in a multi-billion dollar facility but

will be able to look at its interim capability to satisfy its long-term

needs along with pit reuse.

As you understand, it is a very complicated balance of multiple

variables. I am committed to looking at all of those and putting

them in a way that is the most financially and programmatically

responsible.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Administrator D’Agostino, before we go to Mr.

Tobey, I think what we will do is we will try to set up a classified

hearing before the break. If we can’t, we will do it in April.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sure.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Because I think that that sweet spot that you are

talking about is really the difference between having an indigenous

capability and building a multi-billion-dollar facility. And I think

14

that we are very interested in understanding what the 2008 RRW

studies will do to come to an answer more quickly than I think

many of us expect we know right now.

Thank you.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, ma’am. I will turn it over to Will.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Tobey.

Mr. TOBEY. Madam Chairman——

Ms. TAUSCHER. Non-proliferation.

Mr. TOBEY. First of all, let me say I deeply appreciate your support and the support of other members for both our mission and

our budget.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome.

Mr. TOBEY. And I agree completely with your characterization of

the importance of our mission. I guess by way of answer, I would

only add a few points of what I believe are important context.

First of all, I would note that our budget has roughly doubled

since September 11, 2001. So it is up off a significant amount.

Second, we have had some notable successes. We are beginning

to complete our mission in a couple of areas. For example, the materials control protection and accountability work in Russia and

elsewhere and also the elimination of weapons-grade plutonium

production also in Russia. Those programs are reduced about $145

million in the budget request.

And that reduction is simply a reflection of the fact that we are

accomplishing our work and it is beginning—we are beginning to

have concluded the mission. So given our relatively flat overall

budget, the amount of work that we can do elsewhere has actually

increased.

Finally, I would note that I believe that the non-proliferation

budget is not the only place in which important non-proliferation

work will be done within the Department of Energy. And in particular, I would point to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

(GNEP) Program that has been proposed by the President.

I believe that it has at least four possible major non-proliferation

objectives. First of all, it will reduce the incentives on other nations

to indigenously produce nuclear material. Second, it should allow

us to draw down stocks of separated plutonium. Third, it should

advance proliferation-resistant reactor technology. And fourth, it

should advance safeguards technology.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Tobey.

I am happy to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. D’Agostino, tell me again about the pits not having incorporated into them the mechanisms that we want. They do not have

the mechanisms incorporated into them that would allow us to use

these old pits. But then there is a date forward that we do have

pits that could probably be used. Or did I misunderstand you?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, I think you got that right. There are because of the multiple systems that we had had in the Cold War

stockpile—and as you know, we have taken apart significant numbers of these warheads and are currently storing in these pits. Pits

were made differently. They have different thicknesses. Some of

them have features that will allow us to feel very safe if they get

into the wrong hands. But the majority do not.

15

And those more modern pits, if you will, for some of the systems

that were designed and produced in the 1980’s—visit Rocky Flats

in the 1980’s, some of those pits have features that we like. They

are small numbers. I mean, certainly relative to the overall stockpile.

And what we would like to do is examine those pits, those small

numbers of pits as potential pits that would be used in future Reliable Replacement Warhead concepts. For example, if we were looking at providing reliable replacement concepts into a bomb, we

would look primarily to one of those pits that we already know has

these features. And assuming the shape is not a problem, then we

would use that particular pit in that system because it would have,

again, offset further expense.

A warhead on top of a ballistic missile is a little bit of a different

animal because of the constraints associated with the size. And

therefore, we had to kind of start from the ground up on that particular system. And we didn’t have enough of those old other pits.

The features themselves are classified but important for you to

understand. And I will be glad to provide a little bit more in a

closed session on that.

Mr. EVERETT. There have been some suggestions from some that

we do not need to proceed on RRW because of this. But it seems

to me—and I had an experience last Saturday. I went to Lowe’s in

my old 1982 Bronco to pick up something. It has a new engine in

it, which I will compare to the pit.

I came out of Lowe’s, and I tried to start the thing, and I could

get nothing out of the ignition. The battery was okay. I could tell

that because the lights were on. That is about as much as I know

about mechanics.

As it turns out, that old body in the steering column there is a

part in there that locks the ignition and unlocks the ignition and

also locks the transmission. And it was broke. And I would just like

to say that it seems to me that we do need the RRW and that hopefully there is some supply of those pits that can be used.

However, the chairman’s position is quite clear about building a

multi-billion-dollar or a billion-dollar-plus facility. It is going to be

both politically controversial and expensive.

And I think your comment about moving slowly is the right one.

However, I would also say that I think the complex issue that we

should go ahead and proceed with RRW before we settle the complex issue. I don’t think one should be tied to the other. I think

moving slowly on both of them would be good.

Let me talk about MOX just a moment. Is it an alternative to

what we are currently doing?

Mr. TOBEY. The Department looked at literally dozens of alternatives in its initial contemplation of this problem. And while there

are other things that could be done in narrowing that field, MOX

was found to be the solution that was ultimately the lowest cost

with the least risk.

Mr. EVERETT. The one that I have read recently about turning

this into glass and storing it—could you explain that to me a little

bit and why it is not the way to proceed?

16

Mr. TOBEY. Certainly. Although you may also want to seek the

views of Mr. Rispoli, who has facilities that are relevant to this

question.

It is my understanding that—and this was reported to the Congress last October—that of three main possible alternatives pursuing the MOX program, vitrification program for simply storing the

material, MOX was not significantly different than the vitrification

program, but that it would entail substantially less technological

and potentially, therefore, financial risk. And it was ultimately

cheaper than simply continuing to store the material.

Now, there is a relatively small amount of material that will be

put into glass that is different from MOX and is unsuitable for the

MOX program. But that——

Mr. EVERETT. Impure plutonium?

Mr. TOBEY. Pardon me?

Mr. EVERETT. Impure plutonium?

Mr. TOBEY. Impure plutonium, yes. But it is my understanding

that that process cannot be scaled effectively to dispose of the 34

metric tons (MT) of plutonium that we intend to dispose of through

the MOX program. And I believe Mr. Rispoli can give you a more

detailed answer on the reasons for that.

Mr. EVERETT. Please.

Secretary RISPOLI. Congressman Everett, at the Savannah River

Site, which would be the location to consolidate and dispose of this

special nuclear material and plutonium, and MOX is one component of that. The MOX project is one component. The other two

components belong within my program.

And they are a plutonium vitrification facility, which would

glassify it, as you have referred to. And also we have an old 1950’s

canyon that still operates. It is a very large building that would

process some smaller amount, much smaller amount of plutonium

and other special nuclear materials.

The plutonium vitrification project is a very modest project that

would actually be installed in the basement of an existing building

where the material itself is stored. It would produce glass cans that

are about the size of a Coca-Cola can. And these glass cans of plutonium would then be embedded in the larger, existing process that

vitrifies the other high-level waste at the Savannah River Site for

eventual disposition at the Yucca Mountain repository. So that is

the plan for the 13 metric—up to 13 metric tons that would not be

suitable to go through the MOX process because of the impurities

in it.

Now, we have looked in the past, as Mr. Tobey said. There were

dozens of alternatives evaluated. But for the higher purity product,

in the past there was a look at how could that be handled. And it

was determined that because of the radioactivity levels and the

way that these radio nucleis react that vitrification would not necessarily be the best approach.

And it would have to be a completely different concept. In other

words, we in Environmental Management, were we to handle more

than that up to 13 metric tons we would likely have to design and

build an entirely different facility that would take plutonium and

put it into ceramic pucks for eventual disposition. So it would wind

up being a completely different approach than what we have today.

17

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Iowa,

Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I need to be brought up to speed on some of these things since

I am a new member. And I apologize to my fellow members here

for asking some fairly basic questions.

But, first of all, why do we call it the Reliable Replacement Warhead?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, the authorization language gets us started in that direction. And I think the actual title is the right one.

The key word—every word is important here. ‘‘Replacement’’ is

important because it denotes that this is not a new warhead, some

new capability, some new military capability. It is actually a replacement of an existing warhead, a warhead that the country via

the Nuclear Weapons Council and, two, the Administration, have

deemed as important to maintain in our stockpile.

Now, we could always have a good discussion on size of the

stockpile and composition of the stockpile. And we should get into

that discussion, probably not in public like this, but in our closed

session. But it is the idea that we want to make sure that this does

not add new capabilities to our nuclear deterrent. That is very important.

‘‘Reliable’’ is a word that can mean many things. But in many

respects it is to denote that one of the main things that concerns

us is to reduce the likelihood of underground testing for a sustainable deterrent.

Our current Cold War systems were designed in a completely different time. They were designed in a time when we were designing

and building warheads continually and warheads would rarely remain in the stockpile for more than 20 years. We never worried

about age because we always knew we would be building a new

one, for example. So that was never a feature.

And consequently, because of the large numbers of warheads and

the perceived threat at the time during the Cold War and actual

threat at the time, we felt the Nation needed large numbers and

wanted to put out lots of yield. And so, our systems were designed

with tight margins.

So we are in a completely different world now. We don’t want

new capabilities. But we want newer warheads. And we want to be

able to take apart as many warheads as we can that we don’t need.

And so, what we want to do is have a warhead that is reliable

from the standpoint of ensuring that we keep further away from

underground testing by adding more material, changing the design

process a little bit. We want to make sure that it is reliable from

the standpoint of impact on our workforce and the environment.

We know a lot more now than we did 30 years ago on impacts to

the environment.

I will give you a quick example, if I could, if you would allow me.

What we are doing is a radioactive liquid waste treatment facility

at Los Alamos. We now have added a feature to that facility which

didn’t exist in the past, of zero liquid discharge. We want absolutely no discharge, liquid discharge into the environment. It is

18

very important to not only the workers in the area, but the Native

American tribes that exist and kind of encircle the Los Alamos site.

So these features—pursuing this reliable approach and a replacement approach allow us to bring new things in.

One thing, if I may add, is our security environment has significantly changed since the Cold War. We are in a completely different situation since 9/11. We are much more concerned about, I

believe now, about terrorist use or non-nation state actors acquiring material or warheads themselves.

And we want to take advantage of this increased space in this

design area to actually add these features to these warheads that

will essentially render them like a block of wood, if you will, if it

was sitting here in the room, useless to any one of us if we were

a terrorist.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can I just ask another one? As far as developing

new weapons in the future, obviously we don’t know what our security environment is going to be like 5 years, 10 years, 15, 20 years

down the line.

But do you foresee this being the last weapon that is developed,

the last nuclear weapons developed by the United States, at least

for quite some time, maybe decades?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Well, this particular design—it is the same

weapon, but a different design to achieve the same result. We have

a number of other weapons systems that we would look—as part

of transforming the stockpile itself. The stockpile isn’t completely

transformed until we take all of those other weapons systems and

use these same concepts to them.

So we are looking ahead to figure out this is what we need to

come back to with the details, figure out how quickly can we,

should we transform the stockpile. Are there actually fewer numbers of weapons in the stockpile and in the reserve? Are the different types—can we reduce the number of types of warheads that

we have in the stockpile? I think the answer to all those questions

is yes.

The key is getting ourselves the details first, communicating the

details to you. And in many respects, that is why we want to approach transforming the stockpile in kind of a sound step by step

process with Congress to make sure that what we don’t do is

overstep in any one direction and we are heading in the right direction where we have—where we meet the President’s, and I believe

the country’s needs to have the smallest stockpile consistent with

our national security needs.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The gentleman’s time is expired.

I am happy to yield to Mr. Thornberry for five minutes.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. D’Agostino, we had General Cartwright with us recently.

And essentially he told us that rather than manage the stockpile

by inventory, i.e., having huge numbers of weapons so that if there

is a problem in one, you have a bunch over here that you can use,

that the approach going forward should be RRW, which will have

the features you mentioned with safety, security, and use control

19

and so forth and also a responsive infrastructure so that if a problem is detected, you can get on it and fix it and deal with it.

I guess one of the nagging concerns I have is that in the past,

infrastructure has been something that has been very cyclical. We

would spend a lot of money making up, and then we would neglect.

And so, it was something of a rollercoaster.

To work the way that General Cartwright described, we can’t do

that in the future. And so, I guess I wonder as you look ahead,

what sort of discipline is there to make sure that the infrastructure—and I don’t mean just the buildings, obviously. It is the expertise that goes with it.

What sort of discipline can we build in to make sure that we

don’t go through these cycles, that it stays at a high state of readiness so that we can drastically reduce the number of weapons and

be able to deal with situations that come up?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sir, that is a very good question. I think the

discipline starts with defining a vision that is a vision for national

security, nuclear deterrence that is fairly steady, if you will.

In other words, it is not partisan in nature. It transcends, whether Administrations—if once we get past this question of whether

the Nation will need a nuclear deterrent, shouldn’t have a nuclear

deterrent or not, which is a very important question to ask, then

it is the question of how do we go forward.

General Cartwright is absolutely correct that we do want our deterrent, to the extent that we can, largely resident in our infrastructure. And we suffered in the 1990’s of neglecting, if you will,

essentially our production complex, in some respects, because of the

dramatic changes that have happened when the wall came down

and incorporating no underground testing.

So the key, I believe, is a vision and a strategy that makes sense

to the program folks in whatever Administration is in charge,

makes sense to Congress, who authorizes and appropriates, makes

sense to the American people and establish that stability.

One of the things that has helped is this discipline of square footage, for example, if we are just talking about buildings. I forget exactly when, but in the past, Congress talked about no increase in

square footage and so mandated essentially if you are going to

build a square foot, then a square foot has to come off.

That has actually helped us quite a bit because it has looked at

making sure that the amount of capability and infrastructure we

build is reasonable and responsive because when you build a

square foot, you have to maintain a square foot. There is a lifecycle cost to it.

We submitted a plan to Congress called our 2030 plan. It is the

details on February 1st. And it talks to what I have described as

essentially a one-quarter to one-third reduction in square footage

while continually exercising our infrastructure and our workforce.

That is what we need to put in details, in effect, and show you exactly how we can reduce square footage.

Mr. THORNBERRY. So in the five-year budget projections that you

have given us so far, is this responsive infrastructure or the plan

that you submitted on February 1st included in there yet?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is?

20

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, it is. What we decided to do is not call

out responsive infrastructure as a separate budget line or as a separate activity because we want to make sure that the program

folks, effectively our laboratories and plants that have to implement, see responsive infrastructure and reducing the size of our

footprint on the United States as something that is inherent within

their program.

Now, I can point out to you specific areas where it is. And given

enough time, I will be glad to do that. And if you would like, I can

do that now.

Mr. THORNBERRY. No, that is okay.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay.

Mr. THORNBERRY. My time is short. Let me just ask you, if I can,

just one other brief question.

For a number of years, we have had Life Extension Programs.

Are those kind of on hold while we sort through the RRW as far

as at least new Life Extension Programs?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right now we have two life extensions under

way. The answer is no, they are not on hold.

Mr. THORNBERRY. So we are going to complete what you had already planned to do?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think we will actually be looking at how to

transition. The life extensions take a number of years. The W–76

will take many, many years to go through because of the numbers.

And what we will do is look at this transition point. When we know

that RRW is viable and we have congressional authorization to proceed, we will look to tail off and transition away from life extensions.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Okay, thank you.

Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The gentleman yields back.

I am happy to yield five minutes to Mr. Larsen of Washington.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Secretary Rispoli, if you could put your Hanford hat on a little

bit to get you prepped for these questions here. I was out a few

weeks back visiting the site and well-welcomed by the community,

well-welcomed by the folks at DOE and enjoyed very much the tour

I was able to have. The folks are doing a great job out there.

A few concerns came to my mind, though, later on. The first

question I want to ask you is with now, I think, three acting managers at Hanford with some recent retirements, very recent retirements and the fact that there are three or four prime contracts

that will be out for bid on a variety of missions out there, how is

DOE going to adequately handle the responsibility without permanent managers and what are you doing to ensure that you are getting—that you will have permanent managers in place to be able

to handle these procurements?

Secretary RISPOLI. There is no doubt, Mr. Larsen, that that is a

real challenge for us. I mean, for the Environmental Management

program, these are two very, very large sites. And as you know, the

Hanford Reservation from the environmental management program

in the 2008 budget it is about $2 billion going to that location,

which is the largest in our complex.

21

I think that the bright side of the story is that the acting manager behind Roy Schepens, who actually did retire and he has responsibility for the Waste Treatment Plant as well as the major

tank farm, liquid tank waste, is Ms. Shirley Olinger, who has been

his deputy for quite some time now. She is a very, very competent

professional. And I have a very high degree of confidence in her

ability to do this.

In the meantime, we have an active recruiting process going on

for the replacement for Mr. Schepens. That is a recruiting process

that is ongoing right now.

On the other side of the house, Mr. Keith Kline has not yet retired. He is due to retire at the end of May after 34 years of stellar

Federal service, a fine gentleman. And his deputy, Mike Weiss,

who perhaps you also know, will be the acting manager until we

begin that process. We have begun the initial paperwork, but we

have not yet advertised for his replacement.

Again, there is no doubt it will be a challenge. But I think the

bright news is that Shirley Olinger and Mike Weiss are not new

to the scene. They have both been in their respective positions.

They know what they are doing. And I have a great degree of confidence in their ability.

Mr. LARSEN. Well, that is good to hear because as you go through

the transition, certainly we want folks working with your acting

managers to know that they have that confidence from above so

that the work doesn’t get slowed down for any reason, any other

reason. Let us put it that way.

Also a few questions about milestones, if I could. Based on the

2008 request, your office estimates that approximately 40 to 50

Federal facility agreements or consent order milestones are at risk

in fiscal year 2008. And these include milestones at Los Alamos,

Oak Ridge, Hanford and Savannah River.

What actions is the Department taking to mitigate the risk of

missing cleanup milestones, something I know in Washington state

we watch very closely? And what financial or other penalties might

the Department face for failing to meet its compliance milestones?

Secretary RISPOLI. Well, if I may, as the subcommittee members

are, I am sure, aware, almost all or all of our cleanup efforts involve regulatory agreements with the state, with the EPA, with

regulatory agencies. And agreements, such as a tri-party agreement in Washington, or other forms of agreement are the norm.

And generally they all do have milestones.

Built into those agreements is the ability to renegotiate milestones, to set new milestones and to reprioritize with the mutual

dialogue of the DOE and the regulator. For example, at Hanford

when we began that tri-party agreement (TPA), there were only

about 160 milestones. Today there are 1,400 or so milestones. So

you can see that it is a living document. The number of milestones

has changed dramatically.

There have been 440 changes to those milestones. And we have

completed 900 of them at a very high success rate. I think about

96 percent were met in accordance with the schedule.

So the way that we look at what we are doing where we know

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tive milestones will be for us to re-enter dialogue with the regulators in those states.

And by the way, we have already contacted the regulators in all

those states to discuss how we can rerack these milestones to focus

the resources that we have asked for from the Congress that the

Congress entrusts to us to get the greatest risk reduction within

the dollars that we have.

Mr. LARSEN. So you have described a process that at the end

there you kind of came to the answer to the question, that how you

mitigate those risks is that you are, in fact, right now going back

to the other parties in your various agreements and asking already

to renegotiate some of those milestones.

Secretary RISPOLI. Absolutely.

I would also tell you that I talked with Jay Manning, who is the

head of the Department of Ecology, often. Our two agencies are in

dialogue and have been in dialogue toward looking at all of the future milestones in any event because, as you know, the Waste

Treatment Plant, not to do with money, but having to do with

issues that have arisen, will itself cause us to miss a number of

milestones on the tank farm and the liquid waste side.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Secretary RISPOLI. So we already have an ongoing dialogue with

the Department of Ecology in the State of Washington to do exactly

that. And we would look at a similar approach with the regulators

in the other states.

Mr. LARSEN. Madam Chairwoman, I don’t want to break Secretary Rispoli’s stride here. I have one more question on Hanford,

if I could.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Go ahead.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks.

And this really bounces off your last point about the Waste

Treatment Plant. The supplemental technology to Hanford’s Waste

Treatment Plant is needed to treat the high volumes of low-activity

tank waste. In fact, the WTP plant is only designed, I think, to

deal with half of the low-activity waste.

And last year the concept of the demonstration bulk vit system

was pursued for this purpose. DOE recently conducted an independent technical review to the proposed design. And no funds are

requested for this system in the 2008 budget.

So what findings did DOE make during the Department’s independent technical review? And does the Department anticipate

changing course to a different technology to deal with the other

half of the low-activity waste?

Secretary RISPOLI. Congressman Larsen, that is correct. The

Waste Treatment Plant is sized to handle 100 percent of the highlevel waste, but only 50 percent of the low-activity waste.

Since I was sworn in, we have been working under the idea that

the most likely candidate for supplemental technology would be

bulk vitrification. We are still working with our prime and sub-contractor to attain a successful test of that process.

They have done some engineering scale, one-sixth scale. They

have a full-size mockup out there I am sure you have seen.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

23

Secretary RISPOLI. But the technical review that we did actually

found about 19 technical issues. I won’t go through them. I can certainly provide them for the record. But the one that is the most——

Mr. LARSEN. Could you provide those for the record?

Secretary RISPOLI. Yes, sir, I would be happy to do that.

The one that is most troubling, but I think we expect to see

whether it can be solved, is that technesium would migrate to the

surface. And therefore, the whole concept of vitrifying the waste

into glass would be lost because a contaminant would migrate to

the surface.

Now, the contractor has proposed several changes. For example,

originally they were going to use local, I will call it, Hanford dirt

to make the glass. And now they are going to use an engineered

product as you would in a regular Waste Treatment Plant. They

are changing the formulation and the approach to that particular

issue. And they plan to do a test of that this summer.

We were able, with the Continuing Resolution—you know, the

Environmental Management Defense Account had extra funds in

it. So we were able to provide a small amount to them for the current fiscal year to enable them to round out and complete that test.

We still don’t have a—the contractor has still not submitted to us

a cost and schedule that we can independently audit because of

these technical issues that still need to be resolved.

I still believe that this bulk vitrification is a viable technology.

I think that we are in a position where we should know shortly

whether or not this is the best technology. I would point out to you,

though, just for the record that the cost to build an entire new lowactivity Waste Treatment Plant with a very mature design is about

$3.2 billion in a life cycle sense.

The bulk vit, which is still in a planning phase, is about the $2.6

billion range. So the tipping point may not in the end be the technology. It may be the cost because you have to cover all the safety

concerns. You have to protect the workers. You have to protect it,

you know, from vapors becoming freed. So we still have to work

through those issues. And it is both technology and cost as we go

forward to make our decision.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chairwoman.

Secretary RISPOLI. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome.

Mr. Podonsky, I would like to make sure that you have your trip

to the Hill worthwhile so you can answer some questions for us.

Mr. PODONSKY. I have enjoyed the questions so far.

Ms. TAUSCHER. They have done a pretty good job. Let us see how

you do.

I think the committee and the Congress is generally concerned

about the increasing cost of compliance with the 2005 Design Basis

Threat. And we have to balance that with growing cyber security

threats. And I think we are worried about the smaller allocation

of resources against cyber.

And considering that this is an unclassified setting—and give us

a hint if you need to talk to us in a classified setting. We are happy

to set that up.

24

But can you kind of walk us through how the NNSA weighs the

vulnerabilities associated with the physical threats to the complex

versus the cyber, and how resources are allocated?

Mr. PODONSKY. The November 2005 Design Basis Threat that

Deputy Secretary Sell issued first and foremost—and I obviously

won’t go into classified. But first of all, the Design Basis Threat is

a performance metric at the high end of the threat scale. And it

is advised by the intelligence community (IC) as to the information

they have. So it is not a threat statement in and of itself, but a

metric.

And what the NNSA has done, as well as the other sites in the

Department, they have weighed how do we address this policy and

yet still not cost all the expensive dollars that were involved? And

part of it is they have partnered with us, HSS, in applying new

technologies. And I mentioned in my opening statement that the

technologies are serving as what we call force multipliers. So that

allows you to not have to increase the guard force, which is very

expensive to do.

And as we see in today’s environment, an increased guard force

is no real defense against the tactics of the suicide bomber or the

truck bomb or the improvised explosive device (IED) on the side of

the road. So NNSA has deployed a number of technologies that we

have partnered with them at a number of their sites, at Y–12, at

Livermore. And we see the security costs stabilizing and yet becoming more effective in terms of how they manage the risk of the

threat.

One other point I would like to add is that one of the things the

Department has just now in the last two years started to do better—and that is strategize on how to respond to the threat. In

years past—and we have all seen, I am sure the Congress has noticed, the subcommittee has paid attention to the number of security incidents at the Department.

What the Department is doing is changing its strategy so that

instead of responding, for example, at one of our sites like responding to a bank robbery, they are being much more tactical and using

military tactics. And that is why we also have another piece that

I would love to talk to this subcommittee in a classified setting on

the elite force and some of the other capabilities.

But we have seen the NNSA as well as the rest of the Department taking a much-needed analytical approach to applying security resources and diminishing budgets.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The subcommittee will have you in a classified

setting as soon as we can. I think we are interested in understanding how we leverage a static state of gates and guards with all

kinds of new technology.

And, Administrator D’Agostino, I know that you are very interested in this piece, too.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes.

Ms. TAUSCHER. And I think we need to have an update for it.

And I think we also are significantly interested in the personnel

security issues that have plagued the complex and, you know, create embarrassing situations that deteriorate what many of us believe is a very heightened sense of security that we have in the

post-September 11th environment.

25

And it is almost counterintuitive that everybody should be aware

of certainly the optics and the performance against these very significant demands to be secure with what we consider to be now

some people’s just complete lack of appreciation for, not only how

things look, but what the law is and what their responsibilities for

their job are.

If you could quickly just talk about the Complex Transformation

and materials consolidation plans that we would hope will help

achieve compliance with the DBT.

Mr. PODONSKY. The nuclear material consolidation is actually

chaired up by Assistant Secretary Rispoli’s deputy. But I would tell

you that from our perspective from an independent oversight level

in the policy is that this is a marked needed change in the Department.

We saw back during Secretary Watkin’s time back in the 1990’s

where a consolidation, Congressman Larsen, up in Hanford saved

tremendous security costs when they consolidated the material.

And I know that principle assistant deputy secretary under Assistant Secretary Rispoli has the consolidation committee moving. And

they are diligently working.

I haven’t seen the work product to date. But that will make quite

a difference when you change the footprint of the Department, as

we saw up at Hanford in 1991.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.

Mr. Everett, do you have a second round of questions?

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

Mr. D’Agostino, this committee kind of decoupled MOX from the

Soviet or Russian plutonium disposition plans. Will MOX go forward regardless of what the Russians do?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I will answer that and I will ask my deputy as

well to contribute. I wouldn’t go so far to say ‘‘regardless of what

the Russians are doing.’’ It is important that we understand the

plutonium disposition plans that the Russians have. They are looking at a different approach rather than the—as I understand it—

they are looking at a different approach rather than the MOX approach.

And so, what we plan to do is move forward diligently. I think

MOX is going to address the 34 metric tons that we are concerned

about right now. And we are going to pay a fair amount of attention to the plan that we get from the Russians in addressing exactly their specific strategy.

Will.

Mr. TOBEY. I would note a couple things.

First, I think there are good reasons to move forward with the

MOX program for our own reasons, for U.S. reasons. Once this material is disposed of, 34 metric tons of plutonium, we will under no

circumstances be susceptible to diversion to terrorism or other proliferation-related concerns.

Second, we will avoid the costs associated with continuing to

store the material, which over a 50-year life cycle—and that is the

sort of time scale you have to consider when you are talking about

plutonium—is the most expensive of all the alternatives.

And third, it will allow the Department to continue with some of

the consolidation efforts that others have alluded to here.

26

I think with respect to Russia and their plan, something I would

note would be a point that I believe Secretary Bodman made that

while there can’t be an absolute guarantee that proceeding with

the U.S. MOX program will guarantee that the Russians will fulfill

their commitment, we know that not proceeding with the U.S. program will only diminish the chances that Russia will pursue its

program. And we also believe that it is very important for Russia

to dispose of its 34 metric tons of plutonium for important non-proliferation reasons.

Mr. EVERETT. This has been going on a number of years, though.

Do we have any indication why Russia is not moving forward, other

than the fact that as usual there are technical difficulties?

Mr. TOBEY. I think the reasons for that have probably changed

over the years. I think Russia has changed its ideas about what exactly it wants to do with that material. I was in Moscow last week

with Deputy Secretary Sell. And we pressed them very hard on

their disposition program.

They have, I think, for the first time begun to talk about alternatives that we think are technically and financially credible and

given an indication that Russia would be willing to pay a substantial portion of the costs.

So while I completely understand there is legitimate frustration

with the pace of progress in Russia, I am hopeful that some of the

signs that we saw may indicate that Russia is willing to move forward.

Mr. EVERETT. Secretary Rispoli, what constraints or agreements

exist with states, specifically South Carolina, Washington, and

Idaho, for long-term plutonium storage?

Secretary RISPOLI. The agreements that we have with the State

of South Carolina—and some of these are even stronger than

agreements—are that any plutonium that we bring into the state

has to have a disposition path. And as I mentioned earlier, the current plan is that MOX would handle the material that these two

gentlemen have discussed.

In my program, we have this small scale plutonium vitrification

facility that would handle up to 13 metric tons and some other miscellaneous materials that would go through this H-Canyon. I think

actually one of the greatest impacts on the state as well as the Nation would be that if we had to regroup at this point and go back

and look at other technologies other than MOX such as the ceramic

pucks that I talked about earlier, we would set back the disposition

of plutonium in the state by probably at least 4 to 6 years and extend the processing life by 10 to 15 years more.

And it is even further complicated because it is not clear that

those ceramic pucks that we would have that we would have

enough other waste to put them into to protect that product from

a proliferation risk. So there are many, many issues that make this

very, very complex. And I think that right now the plan that we

have with MOX doing the 35 metric tons, the plutonium vit plant

doing 13 metric tons and the H-Canyon doing the smaller amounts

is a very viable plan.

And, again, it is driven by technology. But it is also driven by

the reality that we would set all of this back many, many years if

we don’t press on with solving this problem.

27

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Actually I was interested in the questions

along the same line. But let me move to the other Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program.

Have you seen a change in attitude by the Russians on our cooperative efforts in the past few years? Are they becoming less willing

to cooperate with us? Or are they happy to take whatever as long

as we pay for it?

Mr. TOBEY. I think the most significant change I would point to

was the one that resulted in the Bratislava Accord between Presidents Bush and Putin, which added several facilities to the list of

facilities that we are doing work on and also accelerated our

progress so that we would finish it by 2008.

We have also noted there were several facilities that Russia has

now agreed for us to do work on that is reflected in our fiscal year

2007 supplemental request. I think to some extent that reflects a

recognition on the Russians’ part that our work will be coming to

a close and that it is important that we get it all done on time, consistent with Bratislava.

The final thing that I would add is that the Russians are pretty

candid about—at least they have been with me—about how during

the 1990’s they faced a situation of severe need of humanitarian requirements to keep people from doing things that weren’t in our interests. But things have changed in Russia now. And they want to

be seen and really should be treated as partners rather than beneficiaries.

Mr. THORNBERRY. So are you satisfied with the level of cooperation Russia’s shown us and specifically in MPC&A?

Mr. TOBEY. I would say generally satisfied. That doesn’t mean

that there aren’t points of difference. And we fairly aggressively try

and pursue U.S. interests. But on the whole, our interests are

aligned with those of Russia in terms of securing materials.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Getting back a little bit to the chair’s question,

if you could have any amount of money to spend on non-proliferation, how would you spend it now to reduce the chance of a nuclear

weapon getting in the wrong hands?

Mr. TOBEY. Well, as you know, of course, I do support the President’s budget. But I would answer your question in two ways. Empirically where we have chosen to increase the budget through supplemental requests, we have focused on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which allows us to recover radiological sources

throughout the world and also to refuel reactors with low enriched

uranium and also some of our megaports programs, which is a second line of defense.

Maybe if I could add a strategic layer to that, I would say that

most of our programs, as you know, were designed to deal with the

threat from the former Soviet Union. That work, I think, was wellconceived and is generally well-executed. But in some cases, in

most cases, it is coming to an end where we are achieving what we

set out to do.

At the same time, we need to face emerging threats. And those

threats now come from places largely outside of the former Soviet

28

Union. And the programs that are most suitable for dealing with

those threats are the ones that I earlier referred to.

Mr. THORNBERRY. So the two programs we have that you have

mentioned you think are the best place for us to spend our efforts

now as the former Soviet Union efforts trail off?

Mr. TOBEY. I think that is right. I think the Global Threat Reduction Initiative conducts important work outside the former Soviet Union. And the same is true with second line of defense.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I hope you all are thinking of all possibilities. Obviously, you know, I think most all of us would agree

there is no more important thing our Federal Government could do

than to prevent a nuclear weapon from getting in the wrong hands.

And I just hope we are looking at it in a broad fashion.

Let me just go back to MOX for just a second because I was trying to remember, I thought I had seen some sort of press report,

and I have got some reference here to some internal DOE memo

that says vitrification could be built at—there would be significant

cost savings to vitrify it all rather than do the MOX facility. Does

that ring any bells?

Mr. TOBEY. Yes, I believe that that refers to the vitrification

process that Mr. Rispoli was referring to, which to summarize what

maybe we both have said——

Mr. THORNBERRY. Just the leftovers, not the whole——

Mr. TOBEY [continuing]. Is a much smaller scale process applying

to up to 13 tons. And I would note that I believe that they actually

hope to do as much as possible through MOX.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay.

Mr. TOBEY. And that it is not scalable to them.

Mr. THORNBERRY. If I could just make a closing request. I think

you all have outlined very well multiple considerations for MOX,

including the political situation, cost, all the alternatives. Just let

none of us delude ourselves that we are somehow going—we are

going to cause the Russians to take some step that is not in their

national interest. It may be in our national interest to go ahead

with MOX as planned. It may not be.

We need to be wide-eyed about the costs. But one of the disadvantages of being around here for a while is you remember when

we—things, the reason we started it was to lock arm in arm with

the Russians so that we would march down this path together to

dispose of an equal amount of plutonium. And the fact is they ain’t

playing. And they don’t intend to play.

Now, I don’t know, you all may know, exactly what path they

want to get across. But I think it is very important for us to look

at what is in our national interest and not pretend that we are

doing something that will influence the Russians when they are, I

think, clearly going to do whatever they think is in their national

interest.

Now, we might shade that a little bit if we paid enough of the

bill. But I just encourage you to be wide-eyed and candid in talking

with us about it. Because, as I say, some of us are old enough to

remember how this thing started.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.

Ms. TAUSCHER. And some of us are even older, Mr. Thornberry.

29

I just want to highlight what Mr. Thornberry is saying. I can remember that we settled on MOX, at least at the moment, because

that is what the Russians, we believed, were going to—that is

where they were going to play. And at that time also they needed

our financial help. And I think we all understand now that Russia

has had a phenomenal energy windfall and no longer have to be

on scholarship for this program.

But apparently even the fact that they have got their own money

and we settled on something that they wanted to do in MOX, they

still don’t want to play. And I think Mr. Thornberry and I think

the committee generally feels as if we need to do this for ourselves.

And although this was not only a cooperative issue, this was what

we believed to be an increased opportunity for security because we

were particularly worried about Russian plutonium. We still have

those concerns. We still have problems of our own that we have to

finish.

I am going to take this time to close the hearing. It is 11:30.

I want to first of all thank Administrator D’Agostino, Secretary

Rispoli and Mr. Podonsky. Your written testimony was very comprehensive. We appreciate getting it on time.

Mr. Tobey, the White House has called. They would like you to

stay on the Hill and testify about the budget for the rest of the day

in numerous other committees. [Laughter.]

They appreciate your comments. But we are happy to have you

here. We appreciate all the work you do in non-proliferation.

And we are happy to have the many young leaders here from the

NNSA. And we thank you all for being here.

I do believe we are going to take you up on the offer, specifically

Mr. Podonsky and Mr. D’Agostino, to have some classified hearings

in the next few weeks, briefings in the next few weeks on those

issues that we touched upon.

And this hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 20, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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MARCH 20, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act placed limitations

on the availability of some funds for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

at Hanford, based on two conditions: first, that no more than 90% of the funds may

be used until the secretary certifies that the DCMA has recommended the earned

value management system for acceptance; and second, no funds may be used for

procurement of critical equipment for the High Level Waste Facility or

Pretreatment facility until the secretary certifies that the final seismic and ground

motion criteria have been approved.

What progress has been made to date on these two requirements? Will both be

met in time to avoid the consequences of the funding limitations?

Secretary RISPOLI. The Department is working toward certification of the Earned

Value Management System (EVMS) by the end of FY 2007. In November 2006 the

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) conducted a certification audit of

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) EVMS and identified eight

findings. In February 2007 the WTP contractor, Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), submitted their Corrective Action Plan to DCMA. In March 2007 DCMA indicated that,

with minor revisions, the Corrective Action Plan resolves 7 of the 8 findings. For

the 8th, there are issues which must be addressed between the agencies.

To address this issue, the Department has engaged an independent external private firm (Tecolote Research, Inc), to assist in the resolution process. Tecolote Research, Inc., is a nationally recognized firm that specializes in EVMS training and

evaluation in accordance with the national standard for EVMS (American National

Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance Standard 748–98, Earned Value

Management Standards, May 1998). In May 2007, this firm completed an evaluation

of the contractor’s EVMS and indicated the Corrective Action Plan, with one minor

revision, was acceptable in addressing the Corrective Action Requests. Further,

based on the contractor completing necessary actions to implement the Corrective

Action Plan, the firm estimated they could recommend acceptance of the contractor’s

EVMS by July 2007. While the Department continues to follow the language in the

FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act and work toward certification using

DCMA, we believe that there is a fundamental difference in thinking that cannot

be overcome by the statutory deadline.

Final Seismic and Ground Motion Criteria

In FY 2005 construction of the High-level Waste (HLW) and Pretreatment (PT)

facilities was curtailed due to concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board (DNFSB) about seismic design criteria for the facility resulting from

identification of sedimentary interbeds within the basalt framework. In response to

these concerns, and to ensure conservatism in design, on an interim basis, DOE increased the ground motion criteria for seismic design by 40 percent to account for

ground motion uncertainties. DOE subsequently incorporated this revised ground

motion (RGM) in the structural design criteria for the WTP.

DOE retained the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to oversee the drilling of one

corehole and three deep boreholes, below the WTP Project construction site, to conduct testing to confirm the geophysical properties of the layers of bedrock below the

WTP. A final report is scheduled for summer 2007 concerning the margin of conservatism in the revised ground motion criteria used for the WTP design.

Ms. TAUSCHER. A supplemental technology to Hanford’s WTP is needed to treat

high volumes of low-activity tank waste. Last year, the concept of a Demonstration

Bulk Vitrification System was being pursued for this purpose, and DOE recently

conducted an independent technical review of the proposed design. No funds are requested for this system in the FY 2008 budget.

What findings did DOE make during the Department’s independent technical review of the proposed design for the system?

Secretary RISPOLI. The independent technical review of the Demonstration Bulk

Vitrification System (DBVS) found no fatal flaws (i.e., issues which could not be resolved), but 19 technical issues were identified that could result in a failure of the

DBVS to satisfy mission or safety requirements unless addressed; 26 areas of concern were also identified which could result in a change to design or require addiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:21 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037319 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-37\079290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
90

tional testing; and 13 suggested improvements were identified. These results have

been documented in a report (RPP–31314, issued September 28, 2006), and are

available as a public document at (http://www.hanford.gov/orp/uploadfiles/DBVSERP%20Final%20Report.pdf).

The key findings can be summarized as follows:

• additional cold testing is needed to underpin design and operations before radioactive feed is introduced;

• the mixer-dryer and off-gas systems need special attention in the next project

phase, as most of the project has focused on the in-container vitrification process;

• system complexity should be reduced to enhance operability and availability;

• process sampling and monitoring plans should be improved to assure that essential operational and needed R&D data from test runs are captured;

• a better understanding of the process flowsheet chemistry is critical to reliability, troubleshooting and recovery from problems during operation;

• the feed compositions to be tested should reflect the spectrum of wastes expected to be processed by bulk vitrification so that comparison to other supplemental treatment alternatives can be made;

• potential nuclear safety issues, including confinement strategy, implementation of Integrated Safety Management, and response to off-normal events,

need to be resolved before startup of radioactive waste processing;

• bulk vitrified waste needs to ensure that designs and specifications meet the

required codes and standards; and

• the process to identify and manage risks should be improved and effectively

utilized in future stages of the project.

A response plan has been developed and is currently being implemented to address the areas of concern and suggested improvements.

Ms. TAUSCHER. A supplemental technology to Hanford’s WTP is needed to treat

high volumes of low-activity tank waste. Last year, the concept of a Demonstration

Bulk Vitrification System was being pursued for this purpose, and DOE recently

conducted an independent technical review of the proposed design. No funds are requested for this system in the FY 2008 budget.

Does the Department anticipate changing course to a different technology?

Secretary RISPOLI. The Department is preparing a system study which will evaluate the potential for two other proposed technologies to assist with the immobilization of the low-activity fraction waste. These two technologies are cast stone and

steam reforming. With the completion of this study and additional field tests to be

completed for the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System in the summer 2007,

and the completion of a National Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact

Statement, the Department will determine its preferred alternative future technologies to be pursued.

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the President’s budget request for EM for FY 2008 is approved,

both the Savannah River Site and the Hanford Site might be unable to meet cleanup milestones agreed upon with their respective states.

What financial or other penalties might the Department face for failing to meet

these compliance milestones?

Secretary RISPOLI. The President’s budget request will allow the Department to

meet all enforceable milestones due at the Savannah River Site in FY 2008. At Hanford, the Department’s funding priority is to meet the technical and management

challenges posed by construction of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.

The proposed funding allocation at Hanford may place some milestones at risk. The

Department is reviewing work plans and working with the State of Washington to

look for efficiencies that will allow it to meet all of its regulatory commitments.

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the President’s budget request for EM for FY 2008 is approved,

both the Savannah River Site and the Hanford Site might be unable to meet cleanup milestones agreed upon with their respective states.

What efforts is the Department making to mitigate this risk?

Secretary RISPOLI. The President’s budget request will allow the Department to

meet all enforceable milestones due at the Savannah River Site in FY 2008. At Hanford, the Department’s funding priority is to meet the technical and management

challenges posed by construction of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant.

The proposed funding allocation at Hanford may place some milestones at risk. The

Department is reviewing work plans and working with the State of Washington to

look for efficiencies that will allow it to meet all of its regulatory commitments.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recently sent a letter

expressing concern over incomplete status of the geotechnical site evaluation for the

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Salt Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site as the program nears

Milestone-2.

What is the Department doing to address the Safety Board’s concerns?

Secretary RISPOLI. In the February 9, 2007, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management’s response to the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board

(DNFSB), he noted that the preliminary design of the Salt Waste Processing Facility

(SWPF) must provide a sound basis for the final design. Further, he stated DOE

would not proceed with the next Critical Decision until the geotechnical and structural issues were adequately resolved. Actions taken to address the issues have included the strengthening of the contractor’s geotechnical and structural engineering

capabilities by the hiring of recognized technical experts. Additionally, DOE acquired its own technical experts. Finally, DOE directed the contractor to perform

the geotechnical engineering analysis of the SWPF using existing site methodologies. These actions have been completed and the Department briefed the DNFSB

on May 9, 2007 on the revised structural and analysis approach. On May 11, 2007,

the Department transmitted a letter to the DNFSB requesting that it acknowledge

that the work to date sufficiently addresses the concerns of the January 2007

DNFSB letter to proceed with final analyses and design.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How has the interaction between the Safety Board and DOE

changed as a result of lessons learned from the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant?

Secretary RISPOLI. One of the key facility safety issues identified by the Defense

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) was

whether the design was sufficiently robust to accommodate uncertainties in seismic

design criteria. One of the mechanisms instituted there to address that uncertainty

was establishment of a peer review team that reviewed the development of seismic

design criteria and structural design, to assist in dialogue with the DNFSB to address their concerns with the WTP. That team consisted of members recognized by

the DNFSB as national experts in this area. Some key technical experts who are

members of that peer review team were brought in as technical experts on the Department’s Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) at the Savannah River Site. DOE

established weekly phone calls with DNFSB staff, involving these key experts, to

ensure that interactions between the two agencies promoted a prompt path forward

for resolution of the DNFSB issues with the SWPF.

In the Conference Report supporting the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization

Act, DNFSB and DOE were tasked to prepare a joint report to the congressional

defense committees on ways to improve timeliness of issue resolution. That effort

has promoted enhanced dialogue between DOE and DNFSB staff to identify ways

to improve DNFSB identification of issues related to safety during the design process, communication of those issues to DOE, and management and closure of the

issues. The staffs meet on at least a biweekly basis and are using that opportunity

to look at other enhancements in DNFSB and DOE interaction. The report that will

document these improvements is expected during the summer of 2007. In the interim, the DNFSB is to prepare a quarterly report to the same congressional committees to identify and report the status of significant unresolved issues. To provide

DNFSB an update on the actions being taken to address issues it identified in its

first report, DOE briefed DNFSB staff on April 26, 2007.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Savannah River Site (SRS) has agreed to accept and process 34

metric tons of excess plutonium for the Department as part of the 2000 Fissile Materials Disposition Agreement between the U.S. and Russia. Beyond the 34 metric

tons, DOE stores additional quantities of surplus plutonium at Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Hanford as well as SRS.

Please describe DOE plans for consolidation of surplus plutonium currently stored

throughout the complex, including a description of:

a. the facilities, existing or planned, necessary to dispose of the 34 metric tons

of plutonium covered by the 2000 Fissile Materials Disposition Agreement; and

b. the facilities, existing or planned, necessary to dispose of the surplus plutonium

stored throughout the complex but not covered by the 2000 Fissile Materials Disposition Agreement (i.e., over and above the 34 metric tons).

Secretary RISPOLI. The Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (NMDCCC), chartered by the Secretary to address the Department’s critical nuclear material consolidation and disposition issues, has completed

an Implementation Plan for Consolidation and Disposition of Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium. That plan recommends consolidating all of Hanford’s surplus, nonpit, weapons-usable plutonium-239, and some of the plutonium-239 currently stored

at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, to the Savannah

River Site (SRS), subject to review under the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), and compliance with other application law. The proposed consolidation of

this material to SRS would reduce the risk posed to our workers, the public and

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the environment by continued storage at Hanford and elsewhere; enhance security

by having fewer storage locations; and result in avoiding the expenditure of about

$200 million at Hanford for construction of a new storage facility that complies with

the latest security requirements and an additional $70 million a year thereafter to

operate that facility and provide security. Activities to accomplish the implementation plan are reflected in our fiscal year 2008 congressional budget request; however, final decisions regarding consolidation have not yet been made and will be

subject to review under NEPA and compliance with applicable law.

The 34 metric tons of plutonium covered by the 2000 Fissile Materials Disposition

Agreement are currently planned to be disposed of using the Mixed-Oxide (MOX)

Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, and the

Waste Solidification Building, which facilities are planned to be constructed and operated at SRS, to fabricate MOX reactor fuel for use in commercial nuclear power

plants.

Under DOE’s proposed approach, which is subject to review under NEPA, the surplus plutonium not covered by the 2000 Fissile Materials Disposition Agreement is

currently planned to be immobilized using the proposed small-scale Plutonium Disposition project at SRS and by processing in the H-Canyon facilities currently operating at SRS. Subject to review under NEPA, up to 13 metric tons of surplus, nonpit, weapons-usable plutonium would be vitrified. Of this 13 metric tons of surplus

plutonium, approximately two metric tons would be disposed of by processing in the

H-Canyon, then vitrified through the Defense Waste Processing Facility.

DOE is also currently evaluating the cost and technical feasibility of alternatives

(including increased quantities of plutonium being processed through MOX and HCanyon) that would reduce or possibly eliminate the need for the small-scale Plutonium Vitrification process.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How would those plans change if the MOX facility at SRS is not

constructed?

Secretary RISPOLI. If the MOX facility is not constructed, then: (1) U.S. national

security and non-proliferation objectives would not be met, (2) U.S. obligations

under the 2000 U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

would not be met, (3) Russia would not be encouraged to dispose of its surplus

weapons plutonium, and (4) upgrades would be needed at Pantex to continue to

store the surplus nuclear weapons pits.

DOE currently plans to disposition surplus weapons usable (pit and non-pit) plutonium through the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX), proposed Plutonium Vitrification Disposition Facility and H-Canyon facilities. All of the surplus plutonium

in pits and some of the non-pit plutonium would be dispositioned in MOX. If the

MOX facility is not constructed at SRS, DOE would likely plan to continue to store

surplus nuclear weapons pits. Continued storage of pits at Pantex would require

construction and operation of additional storage facilities to support a larger than

anticipated pit inventory and would also require security upgrades to existing facilities that will cost approximately $75 million. In addition, the U.S. Treasury would

forego approximately two billion dollars in revenues (in constant 2006 dollars) from

the sale of MOX fuel and low-enriched uranium derived from nuclear weapon pits.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can you elaborate on the sorts of reductions made possible by risk

management and technology?

Mr. PODONSKY. Risk management is an integral component to managing the implementation of the Design Basis Threat (DBT). Two of the more prominent examples of risk management include: avoiding the expenditure of security funds on facilities with a limited life-span, and attempting to implement the DBT on antiquated facilities. The closure of facilities through the disposition of material represents the most effective means of managing safeguards and security costs. Therefore, rather than fully implementing the DBT and possibly impacting closure activities, security funding can be appropriately allocated based on the projected life-cycle

of the facility (e.g., Sandia National Laboratories). Likewise, rather than attempting

to retrofit antiquated facilities, which typically require manpower-intensive solutions with significant capital and recurring costs, the Department is pursuing technology based security solutions (e.g., Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility

at Y–12) that fully integrate security in the operational design.

We expect that the deployment of innovative security technologies will continue

to help DOE, including NNSA, sites reduce the need to hire additional manpower

resources to protect Departmental facilities. We also expect these deployments to

make the existing security forces more survivable and effective, offering the potential for additional cost avoidances. For example, long range detection and assessment technologies such as radar and thermal scanning systems have proven to be

more effective at detecting an approaching adversary than the current method of

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tive force perimeter patrol casualties and mitigates the need to hire additional patrols to perform the same function to mitigate the 2005 DBT. The added flexibility

in response time provided by the advanced detection and assessment systems also

permits employees to be safely evacuated from vaults in a timely manner so that

active denial capabilities can be engaged to prevent an adversary from accomplishing its mission. These system modifications, integrated with the site’s training, tactics and procedures, are expected to make the defensive posture of sites less sensitive to future fluctuations in the DBT.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is the NNSA continuing to employ such techniques to further refine actions required to reach compliance with the 2005 DBT?

Mr. PODONSKY. Yes. HSS is working closely with NNSA to deploy the latest available security technologies in a manner that is expected to result in continued cost

avoidances as they work to mitigate the 2005 DBT. Examples of technologies being

explored include remotely-operated weapon systems to improve the effectiveness and

survivability of protective forces, vehicle barrier and detection systems positioned at

locations outside of current protected areas at SNM facilities and protective forces

outside to extend the standoff distance, and armored vehicles equipped with externally mounted weapons that are controlled from within the vehicle, providing protection to the protective force while engaging potential adversaries away from their

intended target. Risk management is an integral part of selecting the appropriate

technologies and optimizing the balance between system effectiveness and recurring

costs, and we expect that NNSA will continue to practice good risk management

techniques in the effort to mitigate the 2005 DBT.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What plans, if any, does DOE have to revisit the 2005 DBT?

Mr. PODONSKY. The Department’s DBT Policy is reviewed on an annual basis, or

sooner if there are significant changes in the threat environment. The DBT Task

Force recently completed an extensive review of the DBT, which resulted in a January 2007 decision by the Deputy Secretary to maintain the 2005 DBT as the longterm security planning metric for the Department.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How does NNSA weigh the vulnerabilities associated with the

physical security of the weapons complex on the one hand, and the cyber security

of the complex on the other?

Mr. PODONSKY. Potential consequences are at the heart of our vulnerability assessment of the threats confronting NNSA. Our first priority has been, and will remain, to protect against the loss or loss of control of nuclear weapons and Special

Nuclear Material (SNM). The consequences associated with the loss of control over

these assets would be so dire to our national security that they clearly justify the

large investments in physical and cyber security necessary to implement and maintain protection programs to defeat the most determined adversary. We understand

the need to provide strong security for the diverse activities and information resident in NNSA operations. While no security program can ever be ‘‘unbreakable,’’

NNSA is confident that it is addressing worst-case vulnerabilities and that the security programs, both physical and cyber, remain capable of providing the levels of security demanded by our national security mission.

The security program requirements for physical and cyber are determined largely

by Departmental policy developed in response to vulnerability assessments conducted by the NNSA programs. This assessment information is integrated, consolidated and quantified, where possible, to facilitate analysis of the threat and provide

insight into risks to our physical and cyber security postures. Prioritization of investments to address high-risk vulnerabilities is accomplished annually, first by the

physical and cyber security program managers in light of DOE and NNSA program

guidance and multi-year program plans. Then, integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual Programming phase of NNSA’s Planning, Programming,

Budgeting and Evaluation process, where all NNSA program priorities are evaluated and balanced within our five-year funding targets.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How does NNSA prioritize its investment in physical and cyber

security?

Mr. PODONSKY. Physical and cyber security are two separate subprograms within

the Safeguards and Security GPRA Unit and managed separately by NNSA’s Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA’s Chief Information

Officer. Prioritization of investments for these programs is accomplished by the individual program managers with respect to DOE/NNSA program guidance and multiyear program plans. Integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual

programming phase of NNSA’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation

process, where all NNSA program priorities are evaluated and balanced within our

five-year funding targets.

Using a risk management approach, NNSA makes its investment decisions on the

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tected. This ‘‘graded’’ approach works to ensure that assets with the highest adverse

consequences from loss, such as the loss of control of a nuclear weapon, receive the

resources needed to provide the highest level of security. While mitigation of adverse consequences has been the backbone of our prioritization approach, NNSA

continues to balance the risks to information and cyber security against the heavy

demands of physically protecting nuclear assets. This balanced approach ensures

that the necessary funding is applied to all security programs, to provide the highest

levels of security.

Ms. TAUSCHER. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition have slowed in recent

years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S. and Russia delayed work, and

more recently as Congress has expressed reservations about proceeding with construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS).

When does the NNSA currently plan to begin construction of the MOX facility?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Public

Law 110–5, prohibits the Department from making available funds for construction

activities for the MOX facility until August 1, 2007. DOE is taking prudent actions

to minimize the impact of this delay and to be prepared to start construction on August 1, 2007, consistent with the Public Law.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How much time and cost has the delay imposed by the FY 2007

Continuing Resolution added to construction of the facility?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The prohibition from making funds available for construction activities until August 1, 2007 contained in the Revised Continuing Appropriations

Resolution, 2007, Public Law 110–5, resulted in a $115 million increase in the

project’s overall baseline cost from $4.7 billion to $4.8 billion. The schedule that was

provided to Congress in December 2006 has been revised. The MOX facility is now

scheduled to begin producing MOX fuel in September 2016, and to produce one metric ton of MOX fuel by September 2017, instead of beginning fuel production in

March 2016, and producing one metric ton of MOX fuel in March 2017 as had been

reported to Congress in December 2006. The revised cost and schedule baseline has

been independently reviewed and validated by Burns and Roe. The Department is

taking actions to minimize the impact of this delay and enable construction of the

MOX facility to begin on August 1, 2007, consistent with the Public Law.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In what sequence will the MOX facility and the separate Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) become operational?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The MOX facility is scheduled to begin operations in September

2016, and the Department currently plans for PDCF to become operational in 2019.

However, the PDCF cost and schedule baseline is still in a preliminary stage and

has not yet been independently reviewed or validated.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Are there risks to the operation of the MOX facility if the PDCF

does not become operational when the MOX plant goes on line? Why or why not?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In the interim before PDCF comes online, the MOX facility will

use plutonium oxide feedstock produced at the Los Alamos National Laboratory as

well as several tons of existing plutonium feedstock material, which is currently

stored at the Savannah River Site. The availability of this material minimizes the

risk to MOX facility operations.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Within the past week, reports have surfaced of an internal DOE

memo suggesting that a vitrification facility could be built at SRS, capable of processing 13 metric tons of plutonium, for between $300 and $500 million. Instead of

construction the MOX Facility, could DOE dispose of all 34 metric tons of plutonium

stipulated in the 2000 Agreement through this Plutonium Vitrification facility?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No. There are several technical reasons why the proposed smallscale Plutonium Vitrification process (which would be located in the basement of KReactor) could not be used to dispose of the full 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium.

Vitrifying up to 13 metric tons of plutonium in lanthanide borosilicate glass would

be manageable because the process will limit worker radiation exposure to levels

well within acceptable limits. However, managing worker radiation exposure becomes problematic for much greater quantities of plutonium. Therefore, DOE would

have to consider using ceramic immobilization instead.

However, the amount of time needed to immobilize in ceramic form an additional

34 metric tons of surplus plutonium with high level waste would extend beyond the

planned operating life of the Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah

River Site. Further, an insufficient quantity of high-activity waste remains to be

processed at the Defense Waste Processing Facility to immobilize an additional 34

metric tons. Moreover, Russia would likely not regard immobilization as consistent

with the 2000 Plutonium Disposition Agreement.

Russia considers immobilization to be another form of storage since it does not

degrade the plutonium so that it cannot be reused in nuclear weapons, as does irradiation in a nuclear reactor (MOX approach).

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Ms. TAUSCHER. Even if a larger vitrification facility would be needed, would the

cost of that larger facility be equal to the cost of building the MOX Fuel Fabrication

Facility, currently estimated at $4.7 billion?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A vitrification/immobilization program capable of addressing 40

or more metric tons would require a new stand-alone facility with remote handling

capabilities due to the cumulative radiation levels, worker safety, security concerns

and size limitations. DOE’s 2006 study of plutonium disposition alternatives (including ceramic immobilization) concluded that cost is not a discriminating factor among

the disposition alternatives, i.e. the cost estimates for immobilization and MOX were

roughly similar. However, the cost estimate for ceramic immobilization is highly uncertain because ceramic immobilization is an immature technology that would require significant research and development and design work before the cost could

be estimated with reasonable assurance. In contrast, the cost estimate of the MOX

Facility has a high degree of certainty because the design is over 90% complete and

MOX technology has been in widespread use for decades. Other factors impacting

cost estimates for the ceramic immobilization alternative include the continued high

cost of storing the materials during the extended research and development period

and the insufficient quantity of high level waste available at the Savannah River

Site to immobilize a larger quantity of surplus plutonium.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Has DOE assessed the difference in cost between an expanded vitrification capability and the planned MOX facility?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As I stated above, DOE completed a study of plutonium disposition alternatives last year, which concluded that cost is not a discriminating factor

among disposition alternatives.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The most serious threat to U.S. national security is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acquisition of such weapons by terrorists.

Yet the 9–11 commission gave the government a ‘‘D’’ grade on our efforts to address

these threats, and found that the prevention of WMD terrorism must be an urgent

national security priority that warrants a maximum effort. Are there unmet needs

or unfulfilled requirements that could be met with additional funding?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Since September 11, 2001, the DOE nuclear non-proliferation

budget has roughly doubled. The FY 2008 request for defense nuclear non-proliferation totals $1.673 billion, a slight decrease from the FY 2007 operating level. This

reduction is the result of NNSA achieving and approaching important milestones in

our nuclear security work in Russia, including the completion of major security upgrades at several sites under the International Nuclear Materials Protection and

Cooperation program (MPC&A) and the anticipated end of construction of a fossil

fuel plant in Seversk by the end of calendar year 2008 under the Elimination of

Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) Program. The FY 2008 request was accompanied by a supplemental request for $50 million to support the Megaports program and Global Threat Reduction Initiative. The $30

million for the Megaports program will implement the program at ports where

agreements were recently signed (e.g., Colombia, Panama, and Mexico) and in anticipation of agreements that will be signed shortly (Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia,

Jordan, and Japan). The FY 2008 supplemental request for $20M in supplemental

funding for GTRI is needed to accelerate and expand security upgrades on vulnerable high-priority radiological sites overseas.

Moreover, the DOE budget contains a substantial request for the Global Nuclear

Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP supports U.S. non-proliferation objectives in a

number of ways including: (1) diminishing incentives for states to pursue indigenous

enrichment and reprocessing programs; (2) deploying technology allowing us to reduce stocks of separated plutonium; (3) advancing proliferation-resistant reactor

technology; and (4) advancing safeguards technology.

With our FY 2008 request and the supplemental request, we feel that requirements are met.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Despite Congress calling attention to this problem years ago,

uncosted and unobligated balances persist among the NNSA non-proliferation programs. What specifically is NNSA doing to address this issue and as a result increase the effectiveness of its non-proliferation programs and activities?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We are eager to spend appropriated funds to advance our nonproliferation policies and programs. At the same time, we owe it to the American

taxpayer to verify that work has been properly completed before paying for it. Looking at costs alone, I agree that the uncosted balances for many of the Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation programs have been high. However, if you take into account

the nature of our work in over 90 countries around the world, NNSA’s record in

uncosted and unobligated balances is good. Contracts with entities working in Russia and the former Soviet Union, for example, do not follow normal obligation and

costing patterns, due to the time it can take to negotiate a contract, complete work

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in a remote area, gain site access in order to review and accept the work prior to

final payment, and meet export control requirements.

A significant amount of NNSA’s unobligated funds lies in the fissile materials disposition program, which had been held up due to the absence of liability protection

for U.S. work in Russia. A liability protocol was signed in 2006 and we hope that

this situation will soon be improved. If the fissile material disposition project were

removed from the calculation, there is only $6 million unobligated out of a budget

of $1.7 billion.

In the area of uncosted balances, NNSA has made progress. For example, NNSA

has accelerated its work in Russia under the Bratislava Initiative, which has resulted in approximately $150M within the last twelve months in contracts signed

with our Russian counterparts. This will improve our uncosted balance figures. Additionally, in the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program, we

have changed payment methods to institutes, resulting in an 80% increase on costing of funds.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The 9–11 Commission found that much remains to be done to secure weapons-grade nuclear materials. Nuclear materials throughout the former Soviet Union still lack effective security protection, and many nuclear reactors

throughout the world contain enough HEU to fashion a nuclear device but lack even

basic security features.

What more could the NNSA be doing in both the International Nuclear Materials

Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) program and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to address the 9–11 Commission’s concerns?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is working hard to secure weapons-grade nuclear materials. In the area of MPC&A, NNSA is working aggressively to complete the

MPC&A work with Rosatom and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense by the

2008 deadline established at the Bratislava Summit. At this time, NNSA has secured 175 of 210 buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in the Russian

Federation, and has completed MPC&A upgrades at 50 of 73 warhead sites. The

program is also responsible for the downblending of 8.4 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. NNSA has only been denied access to two locations in the Russian

Federation where it would like to upgrade the existing MPC&A programs.

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) programs have also done much to secure both nuclear and radiological materials. For example, GTRI already has or is

planning to do threat reduction work in more than 90 countries, working with and

through the IAEA, foreign governments, and other international partners to reduce

and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials. In addition, GTRI now

has legislative authority to enter into agreements to accept contributions from foreign governments and others for international threat reduction work. In the past

three years, GTRI has greatly accelerated and expanded threat reduction efforts.

GTRI has accelerated the rate of HEU-to-LEU reactor conversions from the historical rate of 1.5 per year to 5 conversions in FY 2006 alone as well as expanding the

scope of the reactor conversion program from 106 to 129 reactors. GTRI has accelerated the rate of U.S. radiological recoveries from about 1,100 per year to over 2,100

per year, and accelerated the rate of international site security upgrades of radiological material from 35 per year to over 200 per year. Additionally, GTRI recently

awarded to three small business teams a $100M, 5-year contract to conduct threat

reduction work more efficiently and cost effectively.

Finally, with approval of the supplemental request of an additional $20 million

in FY 2008, GTRI would remove an additional 45 Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) in the Far East and Northern Sea Routes in Russia, secure up to

10 radiological sites and recover orphan radiological sources in China in support of

the 2008 Olympic Games, and secure additional radiological sites in Pakistan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Kenya.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How much more time and funding does NNSA need to do to secure all currently unsecured weapons-grade nuclear material around the world?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Office of International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation will meet the 2008 deadline for securing weapons-grade nuclear material

established at the Bratislava Summit. The FY 2008 budget provides the resources

necessary to complete the work on this timeline, assuming that the request for an

additional $49 million is allocated in the FY 2007 supplemental budget request.

With regard to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s (GTRI) programs to secure

nuclear and radiological materials, and consistent with the FY 2008 Budget Request, GTRI plans to: (1) convert 129 research reactors from HEU to LEU use by

2018; (2) remove or dispose of about 4,923 kilograms of nuclear material (HEU and

plutonium) from civilian sites, enough material for 200 crude nuclear weapons, by

2013; (3) remove 31,700 excess U.S. radiological sources totaling about 450,000 curies, enough for 2,255 radiological dirty bombs, by 2020; (4) complete the safe and

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secure long-term storage of 3,000 kilograms of plutonium and 10,000 kilograms of

HEU, enough material to make 775 crude nuclear weapons, from the BN–350 reactor in Kazakhstan by 2010; and (5) protect more than 3,300 high-priority radiological sites totaling about 50 million curies, enough for 50,000 radiological dirty bombs,

by 2028. GTRI threat reduction actions are mostly scalable and could be accelerated

with additional funding, as identified in the FY 2008 request for an additional $20

million in supplemental funding.

Ms. TAUSCHER. NNSA’s Non-proliferation and Verification R&D Program is the

sole remaining U.S. government capability for long-term nuclear non-proliferation

R&D and other critical work that keeps the U.S. on the technological cutting edge.

However, it is also thinly staffed and supports many U.S. government entities outside of NNSA. Nevertheless, the FY 2008 budget request for the program is below

the FY 2007 request.

What more can NNSA do to expand and strengthen this program, particularly to

develop the capacity to detect nuclear material origin, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing; and significantly increase the qualified scientific workforce in

this area?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA strongly supports the non-proliferation research and development program. Integral to this work is a vigorous emphasis on long-term basic

and applied research toward detection of foreign production of enriched uranium

and plutonium, as well as radiation detection. NNSA actively works to integrate all

phases of its R&D in these areas with other U.S. government R&D organizations

to ensure that the maximum benefit is obtained for every research dollar, thereby

providing cutting edge technology for NNSA needs, as well as that of other parts

of the U.S. Government. An area that has gained particular emphasis in the past

two years, and will expand in FY 2008, is basic research in the academic community

that not only directly supports NNSA non-proliferation missions, but also provides

critical support to academic programs that are training the next generation of nonproliferation researchers.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) program

offers tremendous opportunity for more robust activity that is urgent given the

WMD proliferation concerns we face today. The NIS program includes activities to

address emerging proliferation concerns in North Korea and Iran; engagement on

non-proliferation with the Russia, China, India and other states; inter-agency participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); cooperation on international safeguards and

export controls in South Asia and the Middle East; efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to international agreements and regimes; and the establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that

may arise.

Why is the FY 2008 request for NIS below the FY 2007 request?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The decrease in the Non-proliferation and International Security

budget from FY 2007 to FY 2008 reflects the completion of Russian scientist redirection projects under the Nuclear Cities Initiative, an element of the Global Initiatives

for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. GIPP will continue to work in the

former Soviet Union and elsewhere to prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise

by redirecting scientists and personnel with WMD ‘know-how’, into sustained, nonmilitary employment. The reduction also reflects improved efficiencies in implementation of the Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency program.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What more can NNSA be doing to strengthen this critical program?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA recognizes that nuclear proliferation is a global threat,

evidenced by developments such as the A.Q. Khan illicit procurement network and

the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. NNSA is working to address this

threat, and help realize the non-proliferation benefits of GNEP and other new initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. To address these

new challenges and opportunities, NNSA plans to devote increased resources in FY

2008 to facilitate the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear energy; review

ways to strengthen international nuclear safeguards; prevent illicit trafficking in

nuclear and nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology; address urgent

threats posed by proliferant states; and provide technical and policy support to U.S.

Government initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation worldwide. This increased emphasis will augment NIS export control, commodity identification, safeguards, and physical protection cooperation programs, and involve new

international partners in regions of proliferation concern.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In addition to programs in Russia, where else in the world is

NNSA looking to expand its non-proliferation programs, and what programs is it

pursuing in these regions?

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Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NIS program engages more than 60 countries and is expanding its non-proliferation efforts across the globe. In support of the Department’s

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), NIS will extend its non-proliferation

outreach activities to potential GNEP collaborators worldwide. Principally through

our International Safeguards Engagement Program and IAEA safeguards support

efforts, we will collaborate with international partners to develop and implement

new safeguards systems and technologies for advanced fuel cycle concepts, such as

those envisioned under GNEP. We also will engage nascent nuclear energy states

to help develop the infrastructure required to support the safe and secure use of nuclear energy and other peaceful applications of nuclear technology, particularly in

Asia and the Middle East. Our International Non-proliferation Export Control Program (INECP) is expanding its export control assistance and Commodity Identification Training to new partners in Europe, the Middle East, South East Asia and

Latin America. Finally, the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program

is engaging former WMD scientists in Libya and Iraq on civilian technical projects,

including efforts to re-build the Iraqi science and technology infrastructure.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Relations between the U.S. and Russia appear to be deteriorating

in some respects, but at the same time vulnerabilities remain in Russia’s large nuclear and chemical infrastructure that could be exploited by terrorists. What is

NNSA doing to ensure that as it expands the scope of its non-proliferation programs

globally, existing non-proliferation programs with Russia remain a cooperative endeavor and the U.S.-Russia non-proliferation partnership continues to address remaining work in Russia and other possible opportunities for non-proliferation cooperation?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is very serious about its non-proliferation relationship

with Russia, and is taking action to ensure that non-proliferation work already completed in Russia is sustained, and the lessons learned through our work with Russia

are applied to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NNSA and the

Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) are working on a plan [agreement reached after hearing, on April 10] to sustain and maintain security upgrades

installed at Russian nuclear material sites over the last 14 years. The NNSA

Rosatom plan outlines specific details for how the upgrades will be sustained so that

they can be transitioned to sole Russian support for the future, as mandated by U.S.

law. It covers sustainability at nuclear material sites. Separate discussions are currently underway to sustain the work performed at sites with nuclear weapons. Additionally, NNSA’s scientist engagement program, the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP), continues its focus on matching Russian scientists from the

former Soviet weapons complex with private industry to give them tools for sustainable employment outside of the weapons sector.

Just before the July 2006 St. Petersburg G8 Summit, Presidents Bush and Putin

announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to strengthen cooperation worldwide on nuclear materials security and to prevent terrorist acts involving nuclear or radioactive substances. In essence, the initiative is designed to

take the lessons learned through U.S.-Russia cooperation and apply them world

wide. The Global Initiative, which now boasts 13 members, is a force multiplier

which takes the non-proliferation expertise of one country and shares it with all

members.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The NNSA recently announced that it has selected a design produced by Lawrence Livermore National Lab in the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) design competition. The LLNL design is based in part on a family of plutonium pits that has been previously tested. The competing design from Los Alamos

National Lab (LANL) was not similarly based on previously tested pits, but did rely

on data from previous tests. Although the LLNL design was selected, NNSA has indicated it will continue evaluation of certain components of the LANL design.

Why is NNSA proceeding with further evaluation of the LANL design? What, if

any plans, does NNSA currently have for the LANL design components that will be

evaluated?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Some features of the New Mexico Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) design, submitted by the team from Los Alamos National Laboratory

and Sandia National Laboratories, were deemed highly innovative. These features

will be developed in parallel with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory effort and as they mature, they will be evaluated for potential insertion into the RRW

design through use of a rigorous change control process, for further work for potential use in future applications, or canceled.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The NNSA recently announced that it has selected a design produced by Lawrence Livermore National Lab in the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) design competition. The LLNL design is based in part on a family of plutonium pits that has been previously tested. The competing design from Los Alamos

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National Lab (LANL) was not similarly based on previously tested pits, but did rely

on data from previous tests. Although the LLNL design was selected, NNSA has indicated it will continue evaluation of certain components of the LANL design.

How will NNSA manage the Phase 2a study of the LLNL design that is proposed

for FY 2008? What are the respective roles of LANL and LLNL?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The National Nuclear security Administration (NNSA) will use

a phase-gate process to manage the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Phase

2A study. A phase-gate is a project management control tool placed at the end of

each phase for the purpose of determining if the project is ready to proceed to the

next phase. NNSA has embarked on an effort to identify lower level gates for its

activities within each phase so as to instill additional project management rigor and

discipline. This effort is modeled after commercial industry, which uses this approach to drive shorter development and production times, results in reduced component and assembly costs, and reduces cost and schedule overruns.

The roles of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for the first RRW are warhead design, qualification, and

certification without underground testing. Los Alamos National Laboratory’s

(LANL) role is to lead the independent peer review team and participate in development of technologies and advanced science analysis for potential insertion in the future stockpile. Additionally, the pit manufacturing facility at LANL will implement

the manufacturing process for the RRW pit and then manufacture them.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The NNSA recently announced that it has selected a design produced by Lawrence Livermore National Lab in the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) design competition. The LLNL design is based in part on a family of plutonium pits that has been previously tested. The competing design from Los Alamos

National Lab (LANL) was not similarly based on previously tested pits, but did rely

on data from previous tests. Although the LLNL design was selected, NNSA has indicated it will continue evaluation of certain components of the LANL design.

While the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act authorized activity on the

so called ‘‘RRW–2,’’ the FY 2008 budget request identifies no funding for any such

activity. Does NNSA have any plans to conduct any work—conceptual or otherwise—on RRW–2 in FY 2008?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. On November 30, 2006, the Nuclear Weapons Council authorized

a Phase 1 Concept Study to consider replacement concepts for aging air-delivered

nuclear weapons. The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)–2 Phase 1 Concept

Study was initiated at the request of the United States Air Force as a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy study. The study began in the second

quarter of FY 2007 and is to be completed twelve months after kickoff. The RRW–

2 Concept Study will continue into 2008, with a projected completion date in the

second quarter of FY 2008. The FY 2008 cost of the concept study, approximately

$2 million, is part of the RRW program and funding line.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The NNSA recently announced that it has selected a design produced by Lawrence Livermore National Lab in the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) design competition. The LLNL design is based in part on a family of plutonium pits that has been previously tested. The competing design from Los Alamos

National Lab (LANL) was not similarly based on previously tested pits, but did rely

on data from previous tests. Although the LLNL design was selected, NNSA has indicated it will continue evaluation of certain components of the LANL design.

Is there any work being done on RRW–2 in the current fiscal year (FY 2007)?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. On November 30, 2006, the Nuclear Weapons Council authorized a Phase 1 Concept Study to consider replacement concepts for aging airdelivered nuclear weapons.

The RRW–2 Phase 1 Concept Study was initiated at the request of the United

States Air Force as a joint Department of Defense and Department of Energy study.

The study began in the second quarter of fiscal year 2007 and is to be completed

12 months after kickoff. The objectives of the concept study are to look at options

that provide sufficient operational flexibility as replacement weapons for the current

classes of air-delivered nuclear weapons, maintain effectiveness with improved margin, enhance end-to-end surety themes (safety, security, and use control), and, increase efficiencies and reduce costs across the nuclear complex. A technical goal is

to design a warhead that could replace more than one type and avoid the need to

conduct life extension programs on legacy systems.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The FY 2008 request for Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition

of $52.3 million is $22.7 million below the FY 2007 request. NNSA budget justification documents describe the decrease as reflecting the completion of capital improvements and other non-recurring investments at Pantex.

Will the amount of dismantlement work at Pantex in FY 2008 be less than, equal

to, or greater than the amount of dismantlement work in FY 2007?

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Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The amount of dismantlement work at Pantex in FY 2008 is

planned to be comparable to that performed in FY 2007. Prior year funding provided

capability and capacity to perform an increase in dismantlement workload and a

comparable investment for capacity is not needed annually. Numerically, in FY 2008

we plan to perform a slightly reduced number of dismantlement operations compared to FY 2007. This is due to a change in the mix of weapon programs, with

some dismantlements requiring more time and labor per weapon compared to those

types being dismantled now. With the requested funding, the FY 2008 planned

quantities still exceed those listed in the FY 2006 Dismantlement Report to Congress.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The FY 2008 request for Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition of $52.3 million is $22.7 million below the FY 2007 request. NNSA budget justification documents describe the decrease as reflecting the completion of capital improvements and other non-recurring investments at Pantex.

In terms of dismantlement work, is the Pantex plant operating at capacity?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In terms of dismantlement work, the Pantex Plant is operating

at the allocated dismantlement capacity which is consistent with the FY 2006 Dismantlement Report to Congress. Overall, the National Nuclear Security Administration balances available technicians, equipment, facilities, transportation, and storage in accomplishing all of its workload including Life Extension Programs, weapon

surveillance, and the dismantlement program.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Complex 2030 report NNSA submitted to the congressional

defense committees on January 31, 2007, notes that NNSA will seek to maintain

a relatively level Directed Stockpile Work budget and will rely on reductions in legacy weapon requirements, (e.g., number of future Life Extension Programs (LEPs)

and stockpile size/composition) to pay in part for the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) program.

If such reductions will pay ‘‘in part’’ for RRW, from where will NNSA draw the

remainder of the required funds?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The remainder of funds required to support the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program will be made available through the

reprioritization of other existing Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) and Campaign programs and their associated funding profiles and budgets. The DSW and Campaign

programs that will be eliminated or reduced in favor of RRW would otherwise be

used to support maintenance, surveillance and refurbishment of legacy stockpile

systems.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Complex 2030 report NNSA submitted to the congressional

defense committees on January 31, 2007, notes that NNSA will seek to maintain

a relatively level Directed Stockpile Work budget and will rely on reductions in legacy weapon requirements, (e.g., number of future Life Extension Programs (LEPs)

and stockpile size/composition) to pay in part for the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) program.

Will transformation of the nuclear weapons complex be required regardless of

what happens with RRW? To what extent is complex transformation dependent on

RRW?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We need to transform the nuclear weapons complex to meet the

Nuclear Posture Review responsive infrastructure goals whether we proceed with

RRW concepts or retain legacy designs. Many aspects of infrastructure transformation (e.g., consolidating special nuclear materials, establishing a supply chain

management center, and improving business practices) are independent of stockpile

composition. Likewise, portions of NNSA’s production infrastructure are outdated

and require modernization regardless of the composition of the stockpile. RRW concepts enable production infrastructure optimization because some specific capabilities (e.g., beryllium part manufacturing) do not have to be retained and RRW safety

and security design features facilitate improved operational efficiency. Defined requirements on the pace of stockpile transformation would enable better informed decisions on production capacities, and design features enable better informed decisions on capabilities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The report on Complex 2030 notes that NNSA will use savings

from consolidation of special nuclear material (SNM), reduction of square footage,

consolidation of capabilities, productivity improvements, and reductions in future

legacy weapons LEPs to fund transformation, but adds that ‘‘most cost reductions

take years to be realized thus greatly slowing the potential rate of transformation

especially for costly nuclear facilities. Investment is required to reduce total square

footage.’’

Since most cost savings will not materialize for several years—such as cost savings from downsizing the Y–12 and Kansas City plants—how will NNSA fund nearterm transformation requirements?

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Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA plans to achieve transformation to Complex 2030 through

existing programs and management structure, and, to the extend practicable, within

projected funding levels.

We are reinvesting savings that are being produced immediately through several

of our on-going management initiatives, such as e-commerce and consolidating procurements among contractors. If major new facilities are justified, incremental funding requests for capital projects will be supported by business case analyses.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How does NNSA weigh the vulnerabilities associated with the

physical security of the weapons complex on the one hand, and the cyber security

of the complex on the other?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Potential consequences are at the heart of our vulnerability assessment of the threats confronting NNSA. Our first priority has been, and will remain, to protect against the loss or loss of control of nuclear weapons and Special

Nuclear Material (SNM). The consequences associated with the loss of control over

these assets would be so dire to our national security that they clearly justify the

large investments in physical and cyber security necessary to implement and maintain protection programs to defeat the most determined adversary. We understand

the need to provide strong security for the diverse activities and information resident in NNSA operations. While no security program can ever be ‘‘unbreakable,’’

NNSA is confident that it is addressing worst-case vulnerabilities and that the security programs, both physical and cyber, remain capable of providing the levels of security demanded by our national security mission.

The security program requirements for physical and cyber are determined largely

by Departmental policy developed in response to vulnerability assessments conducted by the NNSA program. This assessment information is integrated, consolidated and quantified, where possible, to facilitate analysis of the threat and provide

insight into risks to our physical and cyber security postures. Prioritization of investments to address high-risk vulnerabilities is accomplished annually, first by the

physical and cyber security program managers in light of DOE and NNSA program

guidance and multi-year program plans. Then, integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual Programming phase of NNSA’s Planning, Programming,

Budgeting and Evaluation process, where all NNSA program priorities are evaluated and balanced within our five-year funding targets.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How does NNSA prioritize its investment in physical and cyber

security?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Physical and cyber security are two separate subprograms within the Safeguards and Security GPRA Unit and managed separately by NNSA’s Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA’s Chief Information Officer. Prioritization of investments for these programs is accomplished by the

individual program managers with respect to DOE/NNSA program guidance and

multi-year program plans. Integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual programming phase of NNSA’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation process, where all NNSA program priorities are evaluated and balanced

within our five-year funding targets.

Using a risk management approach, NNSA makes its investment decisions on the

basis of the potential adverse consequences associated with the assets being protected. This ‘‘graded’’ approach works to ensure that assets with the highest adverse

consequences from loss, such as the loss of control of a nuclear weapon, receive the

resources needed to provide the highest level of security. While mitigation of adverse consequences has been the backbone of our prioritization approach, NNSA

continues to balance the risks to information and cyber security against the heavy

demands of physically protecting nuclear assets. This balanced approach ensures

that the necessary funding is applied to all security programs, to provide the highest

levels of security.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. What is the anticipated non-proliferation unobligated, uncommitted,

and unexpended balances for FY07? What have been prior year balances?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO.

Fiscal Year 2007 Balances

Projected unobligated balances for FY 2007 total approximately $50M. This $50M

in unobligated funds is for the Russian plutonium disposition program (Note: This

figure does not include $151M set aside in the past by Senator Domenici for Russian

plutonium disposition). These funds have been held up due to the lack of liability

protection for U.S. work in Russia. A liability protocol was signed in 2006 and we

are hopeful that this situation will soon be improved.

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Projected uncommitted balances for Operating funds total $242M, 11% of the

DNN budget. Projected uncommitted balances for construction projects total $387M.

$380M of this uncommitted balance is for the U.S. MOX program, which is awaiting

an August decision on the start of construction. The remaining $7M is for PNNL

area, which is awaiting CD–2 approval.

Unexpended balance projections are not available at this time due to implementation delays related to the extended Continuing Resolution. We will provide this figure to Congress as soon as possible.

Prior Year Balances

In FY 2006, uncommitted funds totaled $345M or 12.8% of DNN’s budget and unexpended funds totaled $1.3B. In FY 2005, uncommitted funds totaled $369M or

15.5% of DNN’s budget and unexpended funds totaled $956M. For both FY 2006 and

FY 2005, unobligated funds totaled less than 1% (Note: This figure does not include

the $151M set aside in the past by Senator Domenici for Russian plutonium disposition). Over the past three fiscal years, DNN has improved efficiency and continued

to bring down the percentage of uncommitted funds.

Mr. EVERETT. What are the challenges NNSA faces in obligating and expending

defense nuclear non-proliferation programs in foreign nations?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A significant amount of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation’s

(DNN) unobligated funds, projected to be approximately $50M at the end of FY

2007, lie in the fissile materials disposition program, which had been held up due

to the lack of liability protection for U.S. work in Russia. With the signing of a liability protocol in 2006, we are hopeful that this situation will soon be improved.

If the fissile material disposition project were removed from the calculation, there

is only $6 million unobligated out of a budget of $1.7 billion.

The Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation program currently works in over 90 countries, which impacts the time necessary to expend funds. The amount of time necessary to sign a contract with a foreign partner can be considerable. For example,

contracts with entities working in Russia and other states of the former Soviet

Union do not follow normal obligation and costing patterns, due to the time it can

take to negotiate a contract, complete work in a remote area, gain site access in

order to review and accept the work prior to final payment, and meet export control

requirements. Overall, it typically can take between 18–24 months to fully expend

funds.

Mr. EVERETT. How will progress in Russian plutonium disposition factor into U.S.

plutonium disposition plans and the U.S. proceeding with MOX?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (the 2000 Agreement) requires that the United States and Russia implement

their disposition programs ‘‘in parallel to the extent practicable.’’ This provision does

not require that our programs be inflexibly linked or tied to each other in a manner

that impedes progress or adversely affects costs. The Russian program for disposing

of 34 metric tons of plutonium as MOX fuel may proceed in a future direction different than the United States (e.g., reactor type, fuel fabrication method, disposition

schedule), given the differing regulatory regimes, policies and infrastructures in the

United States and Russia.

Constructing and operating a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah

River Site for disposing of surplus plutonium is in the U.S. national interest and

consistent with national security and non-proliferation objectives. Doing so will convert plutonium into forms not readily usable for weapons, and will encourage Russia

to dispose of 34 metric tons of its excess weapons plutonium in accordance with the

2000 U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. Proceeding

with the U.S. MOX program will also help reduce storage costs for nuclear materials, reduce safeguards and security costs, and support the Department’s efforts to

consolidate nuclear materials throughout the Relaxing Cold War design constraints,

which maximized yield to weight ratios, allows for the design of replacement components that are easier to manufacture, are safer and more secure, eliminate environmentally dangerous materials, and increase design margins, thus ensuring longterm confidence in reliability and a correspondingly reduced chance we would ever

need to carry out another nuclear test. Reliable Replacement Warhead designs will

provide more favorable reliability and performance margins than those currently in

the stockpile, and will be less sensitive to aging effects and manufacturing

variances.

Mr. EVERETT. What are the quantitative risks of not going forward with RRW?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Today’s nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable. However,

the warheads are aging and are on average over 20 years old. The stockpile was

largely designed and built during the Cold War for a Cold War enemy.

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The current approach to stockpile sustainment relies on extending the life of warheads, first fielded in the 1970s, with technologies that are increasingly difficult and

costly to remanufacture to original specifications. This approach has risks. The longterm implications of successive refurbishments of Cold War legacy warheads must

be considered. Each refurbishment takes us further from the tested configurations

of these highly optimized systems, raising concerns about our ability to ensure

stockpile confidence over the long term without requiring a return to underground

nuclear testing.

The directors of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National

Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories have alerted us to these concerns.

The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command also shares these concerns based on

analysis provided by his Strategic Advisory Group’s Stockpile Assessment Team.

A long-term strategy based on extending the life of legacy warheads leaves the

U.S. heavily reliant on a limited number of aging warhead types for its nuclear deterrent and does not adequately exercise the infrastructure and scientists, engineers, and technicians needed for a responsive infrastructure. As a result of this

strategy, the U.S. maintains a ‘‘hedge’’ of non-deployed warheads to mitigate the

risks of geopolitical or technological surprise. This strategy also limits our ability

to introduce modern surety features to improve the safety and security of the stockpile.

Mr. EVERETT. To be clear, what RRW activities are planned with the money requested for FY08?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The FY 2008 request funds the Reliable Replacement Warhead

(RRW) RRW–1 Phase 2A study and the RRW–2 concept study. For RRW–1, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) intent is to develop high fidelity

baseline schedules and cost estimates. For RRW–2, requirements and concepts

(paper studies) will be evaluated and documented. The laboratories will further refine the concept design and work with the plants concurrently during the RRW–1

Phase 2A Study to support a sound planning effort. This activity will include: some

revising and extending of the selected design, analyzing and scheduling the required

development work, planning and executing any required peer reviews, developing

the detail cost estimate. As an example the certification plan will be prepared in

detail including identifying and scheduling the hydrodynamic experiments required

and computational analyses necessary for certification. Some computations and

some technology experiments will be performed during the study to assure that the

project scope is correctly assessed. NNSA will return to Congress at the appropriate

time to seek both authorization and appropriations to proceed into the engineering

development phase, if the Nuclear Weapons Council decides to proceed with development of the RRW.

Mr. EVERETT. How will NNSA and DOD measure progress in the RRW design and

development? And, what criteria will NNSA and DOD use to permit the RRW to

move from system design and development to production?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Defense will use standard project management tools to manage and measure progress of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Phase-gate lifecycle processes will be utilized with Change Control (Cost, Schedule, and Scope),

Risk Management, Requirements Management, Integrated Schedule, and Earned

Value to add more discipline to project management.

The Navy and the National Nuclear Security Administration will monitor

progress against schedules, costs and milestones on a regular basis, with quarterly

formal reviews.

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) will review evidence that the system meets

requirements, that the design qualification and certification activities are complete,

and that the production processes are qualified and ready to produce parts. If the

NWC recommends and the President decides to put RRW into the nuclear weapons

stockpile, authorization for quantity production would be sought from the NWC. We

will work with Congress at the appropriate stages to seek authorization and appropriations.

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