# Hong Kong - United States Department of State

- Hong Kong’s National Security Law Trial Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Hong Kong&#8217;s National Security Law Trial				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Hong Kong&#8217;s National Security Law Trial																																		Press Statement																														May 31, 2024																																							The United States is deeply concerned by the guilty verdicts announced in the National Security Law trial of pro-democracy organizers in Hong Kong. &nbsp;The defendants were&nbsp;subjected to a politically motivated prosecution&nbsp;and jailed simply for peacefully participating in political activities protected under the Basic Law of Hong Kong. &nbsp;In response, the Department of State is taking steps to impose new visa restrictions on PRC and Hong Kong officials responsible for implementing the National Security Law, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.&nbsp;Instead of imposing harsh sentences that would further erode confidence in Hong Kong&#8217;s judicial system, Hong Kong authorities should immediately release these unjustly detained individuals. &nbsp;We urge the PRC government and Hong Kong authorities to uphold Hong Kong’s judicial independence, cease the use of vague national security laws to curb peaceful dissent, and restore the openness that was so crucial to Hong Kong’s vitality and competitiveness as an international business hub.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																																Criminal Justice																															Hong Kong																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Hong Kong HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborChina (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)&#8230;Hong Kong				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet): Hong Kong																																																																																												 In this section										/																							Read a Section: Hong Kong																																													Read a Section: Hong Kong																															EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							Read a Section: Hong Kong				China | Tibet | Macau																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY						    																						Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. According to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region, except in matters of defense and foreign affairs, Hong Kong should have a high degree of autonomy. During the year, the central government of the People’s Republic of China continued to dismantle Hong Kong’s political freedoms and autonomy in violation of these commitments.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary arrest and detention; serious problems regarding the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals outside of Hong Kong; arbitrary interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists and censorship; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and on the right to leave the territory; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government restrictions on domestic and international human rights organizations; and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including coercive actions against independent trade unions and arrests of labor activists.The government took few credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																											Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of such abuse.In addition to oversight by the Office of the Ombudsman, the Independent Police Complaints Council was also responsible for investigating alleged corruption or abuses by police. Human rights activists observed the Complaints Council was overwhelmingly dominated by pro-government figures and legislators, most of whom had no professional training in law and human rights, which activists said detracted from its effectiveness and credibility.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						There were reports of prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.Abusive Physical Conditions: In June a Washington Post report based on first-hand interviews of prison guards and former detainees in juvenile detention facilities reported prison authorities used “deradicalization” programs to create a feeling of hopelessness among juvenile prisoners who had participated in political protests, including children. In the report, one detainee asserted that officers struck them with wooden sticks if they could not recall a list of 19 prison regulations, and that he had witnessed guards using their elbows to strike prisoners at a sensitive part of their back, as well as kneeing inmates in their thighs.Administration: The government was required to investigate allegations of problematic conditions and document the results in a publicly accessible manner; the Office of the Ombudsman, an independent statutory body appointed directly by the chief executive, investigated such allegations.Independent Monitoring: The government generally permitted legislators and justices of the peace to conduct prison visits. Justices of the peace could make suggestions and comments on matters, such as physical conditions, overcrowding, staff improvement, training and recreational programs and activities, and other matters affecting the welfare of inmates.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law generally prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of that person’s arrest or detention in court, but the Hong Kong Police Force continued to make arbitrary arrests and detentions under the National Security Law (NSL) and other legislation. According to the New Zealand-based Human Rights Measurement Initiative, freedom from arbitrary arrest was in the “bad” range, with a score of 4.8 on a scale of 10.Although the SAR and People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed the NSL was not retroactive, international observers noted the police force’s National Security Department, created by the NSL, used its sweeping investigative powers to find evidence of “sedition” or other crimes predating the law’s enactment and to charge individuals under both the NSL and colonial-era sedition law. In March, a Hong Kong student who was studying in Japan, Yuen Ching-ting, was arrested on charges of “inciting Hong Kong independence” by publishing allegedly “seditious” posts online while abroad. According to a court document, some of those posts were made between September 2018 and the July 2020 implementation of the NSL. She reportedly made those posts while abroad but was arrested when she returned to the SAR to renew her identity card. She was granted bail with strict conditions, including not being allowed to possess electronic devices with social media applications or to join chat groups with more than five persons. She pleaded guilty on October 26 and was sentenced on November 3 to two months in prison.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Police generally apprehended suspects openly when they observed them committing a crime or with warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by a duly authorized official. Police were also required to charge or release arrested suspects promptly. The government respected this requirement and generally brought arrested persons before a judicial officer within 48 hours. Detainees were generally informed promptly of potential charges against them. There was a functioning bail system that allowed persons not charged to post bail to be released from detention pending the filing of charges. Such “police bail” included requirements the arrestee submit to monthly check-ins at a police station. There was no defined period under the law within which the government was required to file charges. Interviews of suspects had to be videotaped.Under the NSL, police could require individuals arrested in connection with offenses the government designated as involving national security to surrender their travel documents while investigations were continuing, even if they were not formally charged. Police exercised this authority in numerous NSL cases.In cases the government designated as involving “national security,” most democracy activists were denied bail, and the threshold for bail was more stringent than for other offenses. Bail conditions under the NSL placed the burden of proof on the defendant to convince the judge he or she would not “continue to commit acts endangering national security.” NSL or other national security-related cases were adjudicated only by national security judges specially designated by the chief executive. Courts previously denied bail to defendants in such cases because of routine interactions with foreign diplomats or journalists. An October report by the Center for Asian Law at Georgetown University highlighted the “alarming number of remand prisoners” and the “arbitrary nature of some bail rulings” in non-NSL cases against pro-democracy protesters.In cases where bail was granted, human rights groups noted defendants were frequently subject to strict restrictions on their freedoms of expression and association as a condition of their bail.Authorities generally allowed detainees access to a lawyer of their choice, but the law did not allow this as a right. The Legal Aid system did not permit defendants who received legal aid to choose their own counsel. Instead, the Legal Aid Department assigned lawyers to these defendants. Some lawyers, activists, and experts criticized the action for restricting defendants’ right to the counsel of their choice and limiting activists’ abilities to challenge authorities’ actions. In January, the Legal Aid Department rejected senior counsels nominated by five defendants, including former pro-democracy lawmaker and NSL 47 defendant Leung Kwok-hung, who was charged with alleged “conspiracy to subvert state power.”In May, the Legislative Council unanimously passed the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Bill 2023, which authorized the chief executive to decide whether overseas counsel could take part in NSL cases. According to the legislation, local courts could only grant an application to admit an overseas lawyer, who was not otherwise qualified to practice in the SAR, after the chief executive granted permission. The Legislative Council passed the bill after multiple court rulings blocked the government’s attempt to prevent London-based barrister Tim Owen from representing democracy advocate Jimmy Lai in his NSL trial. On May 19, a court ultimately rejected Lai’s appeal, blocking Owen from representing him in the trial.Some lawmakers and legal experts raised concerns these former protesters were still subject to legal consequences even if the government did not formally charge them with a crime. For example, lawmaker Gary Zhang expressed concern some protesters were denied entry to mainland China or failed to renew home return permits when attempting to cross the border into mainland China. Another legal expert expressed concern these former protesters were “stuck in limbo,” emphasizing some still had to regularly report to police as conditions of bail. Some former protesters told media the prolonged legal process was psychologically distressing. Others noted problems finding a job because some employers were unwilling to hire applicants with a criminal record or attending university because some schools expelled former protesters.Arbitrary Arrests: In March, Elizabeth Tang-Yin Ngor, former chief executive of the disbanded Confederation of Trade Unions, was arrested and charged with collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security after visiting her husband, activist Lee-Cheuk-yan, in jail. Lee was awaiting trial on “inciting subversion” charges after he led the disbanded Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China. He was sentenced in December 2021 to 20 months in prison for inciting subversion for his involvement in three unauthorized rallies during 2019 protests.While sedition was not covered by the NSL, the government had increased prosecutions under a colonial-era sedition law since the NSL entered into force in 2020. As of September 11, 29 persons were sentenced for sedition involving various activities since the NSL entered into force, including Lorie Lai Man-ling, Melody Yeung, Sidney Ng, Samuel Chan, and Fong Tsz-ho, who were each convicted of sedition and sentenced to 19 months in prison for publishing a series of children’s books the government deemed “seditious.” Most arrested and charged with sedition were denied bail under the NSL’s particularly stringent bail conditions.Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was an increasing problem, particularly for those arrested on NSL or related charges. An October report by the Georgetown Center for Asian Law found pretrial detention rates had increased significantly in since 2020. Some human rights groups called pretrial detention in national security cases a form of indefinite detention without trial that could last for months or years, or a form of extrajudicial punishment. In some cases, pro-democracy activists were denied bail and detained for longer than the maximum sentence for the charge they faced.According to online news outlet Independent Media, as of July 3, of the 155 persons charged with national security-related offenses since the NSL’s implementation, 112 (72 percent) were denied bail, and of the 34 charged only under colonial era sedition law, 28 (82 percent) were denied bail. Despite Court of Final Appeal guidance that judges arrange for NSL cases to be heard as soon as possible to preserve the defendants from prolonged pretrial detention, defendants found guilty under the NSL waited an average of 467 days in detention before sentencing.Many defendants in national security-related cases spent prolonged periods of time in pretrial detention. For example, the NSL trial for Chow Hang-Tung had yet to be scheduled, and she had been denied bail after being arrested in 2021. Before his NSL trial began on December 18, democracy advocate Jimmy Lai spent more than 1,000 days in detention. In the “NSL 47” trial of former lawmakers and democracy advocates charged in connection with the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election, at least 32 of the 34 defendants were in pretrial detention for more than 700 days before their trial began on February 6.Media reported more than 6,000 protesters arrested during the 2019 protests still had not been charged. According to an October report from Georgetown University’s Center for Asian Law, some of these defendants were denied bail for months or even years as they awaited trial.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										Although the law generally provided for an independent judiciary, the NSL limited this independence in cases the government designated as involving national security. These limits did not apply to commercial legal cases. Human rights groups expressed concern defendants charged in national security cases could be denied due process and a fair and public trial and could face extradition to the mainland for trial.Other actions by SAR and PRC authorities threatened judicial independence. Due to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s (NPCSC) exclusive interpretive authority over the law, SAR courts could not rule on the constitutionality of the NSL, declare any of its provisions unconstitutional, or review the NSL based on incompatibility with the Basic Law or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Numerous legal experts assessed the NPCSC’s late December 2022 interpretation of the NSL as expanding the chief executive’s authority over the judiciary in national security cases.In July, the Legislative Council passed the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 2023, which broadened the Department of Justice’s power to appeal not-guilty verdicts in nonjury NSL trials. Under the new rules, the case would be reheard, and the prosecution could ask the court to order the defendant jailed pending appeal.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary largely enforced this right. Defendants had the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them and the right to a trial without undue delay, but these rights, notably the latter, were not always upheld.Defendants were presumed innocent, except in official corruption cases: a sitting or former government official who maintained a standard of living above that commensurate with that person’s official income or who controlled monies or property disproportionate to the official’s income was by law considered guilty of an offense unless the official could satisfactorily explain the discrepancy. The courts upheld this ordinance.All trials, except at the magistrate and district court levels and certain NSL cases, were by jury. Under the NSL, SAR authorities could direct that a panel of three specially designated national security judges hear a case instead of a jury.Trials of the 47 defendants charged with subversion under the NSL for their involvement in the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election, of Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai, and of three former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China were all heard before a panel of judges. The government cited alleged “involvement of foreign elements” and the “risk of perverting the course of justice if the trial is conducted with a jury” as justification for not allowing a jury trial. As of December, no NSL cases had been tried by jury since the law was imposed in 2020.In multiple national security-related cases, defendants and their lawyers argued prosecutors repeatedly delayed turning over documents to the defense, hampering defendants’ ability to prepare for court hearings. In February, during the trial of Stand News editors on allegations of publishing “seditious” materials, lead prosecutor Laura Ng presented four boxes of documents the defense had not had a chance to review as evidence, saying it would provide context to the alleged offense. Judge Kwok Wing Kin ruled the evidence admissible despite objections from the defense.Under the NSL, the chief executive provided a list of judges eligible to hear cases SAR authorities designated as involving national security, including offenses under the NSL and the colonial-era sedition law. Some human rights groups and legal experts described this provision, which enabled SAR authorities to handpick the pool of judges to hear national security cases, as inconsistent with judicial independence.The NPCSC, not a SAR-based judicial or elected body, determined how the NSL was interpreted. The NPCSC had the power, in cases involving foreign countries, serious (but undefined) situations, or major and imminent threats to national security, to extradite suspects to the mainland and hold trials behind closed doors.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						SAR authorities detained and imprisoned a growing number of individuals because of expressed and, in some cases, presumed political views and participation in nonviolent political activities. According to the most recent data published by the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department, at the end of 2022, 522 persons were jailed at the city’s correctional institutions for NSL violations or involvement in 2019 protests, a 26 percent increase from 2021.Local and international observers noted that with few exceptions, those charged with NSL violations, sedition, or unauthorized assembly were peacefully exercising freedoms of expression, political participation, assembly, and association provided for in the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.																										f. Transnational Repression										By the terms of the NSL, SAR authorities and the central government claimed jurisdiction over any individual, regardless of nationality and location, deemed to be engaged in one of the four vaguely defined criminal activities under the NSL: secession, subversion, terrorist activities, or collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security. Authorities took steps to assert these claims.In July, national security police issued arrest warrants for eight democracy activists living in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia – former lawmakers Nathan Law, Ted Hui and Dennis Kwok, lawyer Kevin Yam, unionist Mung Siu-tat, and activists Finn Lau, Anna Kwok, and Elmer Yuen – for alleged national security offences, including foreign collusion and incitement to secession. The SAR government offered a reward of one million Hong Kong dollars (HK$) ($128,000) for information leading to the arrest of each activist. Chief Executive John Lee stressed the move would send the world a “strong message” about the NSL’s extraterritorial reach and stated SAR authorities would go “to the ends of the earth” if needed to arrest the eight activists. Police questioned the eight’s family members and acquaintances in Hong Kong, which some human rights organizations criticized as harassment aimed at silencing and intimidating the diaspora.In December, national security police issued additional arrest warrants for five more democracy activists living in the United States and the United Kingdom: Frances Hui, Joey Siu, Simon Cheng, Johnny Fok, and Tony Choi. Amnesty International condemned the additional bounties and the government for using a “brazen tactic” to silence dissent globally.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion: Some activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other observers alleged mainland authorities engaged in surveillance and harassment of individuals from Hong Kong but living in other countries. For example, in August, the government of Canada stated the PRC collected information on and targeted Canadian lawmaker Michael Chong, whose family resided in Hong Kong, with an online disinformation operation after Chong sponsored a motion to condemn China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										SAR authorities froze bank accounts of former lawmakers, civil society groups, and other political targets. The government froze assets belonging to several suspects in NSL and sedition-related trials, including assets worth nearly 500 million HK$ ($638 million) from jailed democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, 60 million HK$ ($7.66 million) from the shuttered Stand News, and 2.2 million HK$ ($281,000) from the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. On December 15, according to the South China Morning Post’s online news site myNEWS, the Hong Kong government amended Article 43 of the NSL allowing the government to freeze assets of suspects involved in national security cases until legal proceedings concluded, removing an earlier limit that capped the period at two years unless the High Court authorized an extension.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but there were multiple reports the SAR government failed to respect these prohibitions, including reports PRC central government security services and the Beijing-mandated Office for Safeguarding National Security monitored pro-democracy and human rights activists and journalists in the SAR. Some of those arrested for alleged national security-related offenses were required to forfeit personal mobile phones and computer devices before they were formally charged. Police made repeated requests to technology companies for access to individuals’ private correspondence without warrants, which were not required under the NSL.Technology companies, activists, and private citizens increasingly raised concerns about alleged government infringement on the rights to privacy and personal data protection. For example, the law allowed the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data to seize and access any electronic devices in premises being searched without a warrant if authorities suspected a doxing-related offense was or could have been committed. In May, however, media highlighted a doxing website targeting thousands of journalists and pro-democracy activists – and that released identity card numbers, headshots, home addresses, and telephone numbers – remained online.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										Despite provisions of the Basic Law and government claims, the PRC and SAR governments increasingly encroached upon freedom of expression. The SAR government continued to prosecute individuals under the NSL, colonial-era sedition legislation, and other laws for engaging in peaceful political expression.Freedom of Expression: There were legal restrictions on the ability of individuals to criticize the government publicly without reprisal. There were several incidents in which SAR authorities arrested and prosecuted individuals for speech critical of the SAR or central government, which it characterized as “inciting hatred against the government” or “promoting feelings of ill will or enmity between different classes” in violation of a colonial-era sedition law. Authorities also continued to prosecute individuals for speech alleged to promote subversion or secession in violation of the NSL. Prosecutors argued in multiple court hearings the phrase “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times,” a common slogan of the 2019 pro-democracy protests, contained an inherent meaning of support for independence, a change in the SAR’s constitutional status, or both. In April, SAR Director of Public Prosecutions Maggie Yang cautioned the public that “words can be used as weapons,” and warned individuals would be held legally accountable for words that incited others to commit serious offenses.In June, the government requested an injunction banning the song “Glory to Hong Kong,” which many scholars and activists argued violated protections for freedom of expression enshrined in the Basic Law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the NSL itself. On July 28, the High Court blocked the injunction, but the government appealed the decision; the case was adjourned until after the new year.In January, national security police arrested six individuals for publishing allegedly seditious works related to 2019 protests; three of whom were charged and jailed for five to 10 months after pleading guilty to selling copies of one such book, including Alan Keung, founder of the independent media outlet Free HK Media. In May, national security police seized the “Pillar of Shame,” a monument commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, from Hong Kong University Kadoorie Center in Yuen Long, where the statue had been stored since its removal from public view in 2021. Police declined to comment on a media report authorities might seek to arrest the Danish sculptor who created the statue, saying only, “We will act based on the situation and take action according to law.” In September, police invoked a colonial offense of “importing seditious publications” for the first time to charge a man who received 18 copies of Sheep Village, a picture book an SAR court ruled was seditious.New and existing requirements for electoral candidacy and for taking the oath of office also limited free speech in the political arena. The law required all elected officials to swear an oath of allegiance and to adhere to undefined “patriotic” standards with respect to the PRC and SAR. SAR authorities previously disqualified candidates for office when their oaths were deemed “invalid,” without explanation or the possibility of appeal.The government required all civil servants to swear an oath of allegiance to the SAR in accordance with the law. According to media reports, civil servants could lose their jobs if they refused to swear the oath and could face criminal charges, including under the NSL, if they later engaged in behavior, including speech while off duty, deemed to violate the oath.Legislation passed in 2021 prohibited inciting others not to vote in elections or to cast blank ballots. Convicted violators were subject to up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine. Legal experts described the legislation as disproportionate and not in line with common legal norms that criminalized incitement only when the behavior incited was itself illegal.On December 4, the Independent Commission Against Corruption arrested and charged a man for allegedly posting calls on social media to boycott the December 10 district council elections. On December 5, a court issued an arrest warrant for news commentator Wong Sai-chak, based in Germany, after he published an online video urging residents to boycott the elections. The commission stated the revised election law had extraterritorial effect and applied to all conduct regarding an SAR election. On election day, December 10, the commission arrested three more individuals for the same offense.SAR legislation prohibited acts deemed to abuse or desecrate the PRC flag or anthem, including acts online. In July, a court convicted and sentenced a photographer to three months in jail for “insulting” the PRC national anthem by replacing it with the protest song “Glory to Hong Kong” in an online video.The government restricted freedom of speech in academic and cultural settings on political grounds. National security was a part of the SAR government-approved curriculum at all levels. All public schools had to follow the official curriculum, limit political expression and activities on school campuses, and submit periodic reports regarding their implementation of national security education. Activists decried the guidelines for restricting freedom of expression on campuses. Some Roman Catholic and other Christian observers expressed concerns authorities’ mandatory national security curriculum and removal of books from public libraries limited freedom of expression at private religious schools.Academics reported Beijing-controlled media outlets attacked and harassed academic personnel for their research and writings as well as their perceived political positions. SAR authorities also influenced academic appointments based on the perceived political orientation or past affiliations of scholars. Public libraries, schools, and universities culled their holdings, including archives, to comply with the NSL; it was unclear if this was based on a request from SAR officials or if the institutions chose to self-censor. Hong Kong University required library users to register to access “Special Collections” containing books about the Tiananmen Square massacre and others written by local democracy advocates. The Hong Kong Public Library required special registration to access microfilm collections on the Tiananmen Square events.The law allowed SAR authorities to revoke a film’s license if it was “found to be contrary to national security interests.” Those convicted of releasing an unlicensed film were liable for up to three years’ imprisonment.Violence and Harassment: The Foreign Correspondents’ Club and the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association each released surveys in July showing most members believed press freedom in the city had declined since October 2021. Respondents cited the causes as the NSL, SAR government enforcement actions and the less tangible pressures it applied to ensure national security, and the overall chilling effect of those factors on free expression in the city.Journalists were subjected to intimidation by local and central authorities for their reporting. According to a Reporters Without Borders report in May, the media environment in the SAR was “difficult,” with 12 journalists detained.In June, an appeals court blocked jailed democracy advocate and former publisher Jimmy Lai’s bid to challenge, in the SAR’s highest court, a court-issued warrant that authorized national security police to scrutinize the contents of his mobile phones seized during his arrest in 2020. Lai argued the phones contained journalistic materials and that such searches could have a “chilling effect” on press freedom.On September 25, Ronson Chan, Hong Kong Journalists’ Association chairperson and Channel C reporter, was sentenced to five days in prison for failing to hand in his personal identification card to police in September 2022 while reporting. The following day, Reporters Without Borders, which identified 11 journalists and one media worker in detention, denounced the sentence. Two freelance journalists were denied entry to the SAR for reasons they believed to be related to their prior reporting on the 2019 protests or the political situation.More than 150 foreign news outlets received complaint letters from the SAR government during the year citing their articles and editorials about the local government, the NSL, and major events in the SAR. These letters, often under the name of the chief executive or other high-level officials, characterized the reporting and editorials as “grossly biased,” “groundless allegations,” or as having “reached new levels of nastiness.” In February, pro-Beijing Oriental Daily News accused police of “pressing the media” after the newspaper received a letter from police accusing it of criticizing police in “a biased and derisive manner.”Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, including Online Media: Reports of media self-censorship and suspected content control continued.The operating space for independent media continued to shrink. The SAR targeted independent media that expressed views it construed as not pro-government. SAR authorities continued prosecutions of former executives and editors of the shuttered Apple Daily and Stand News on national security-related 2021 charges. The verdict in Stand News former executives’ trial was not announced as of year’s end.In May, political cartoonist Wong Kei-kwan (aka “Zunzi”), who published satirical takes on current affairs and public policies since 1983, revealed his comic strip was suspended by local newspaper Ming Pao following repeated complaints from senior government officials. The Hong Kong Journalists’ Association stated the incident showed that the city “could not tolerate critical voices” and that the room for free speech had “narrowed further.” All publications by Zunzi were also removed from public libraries.In June, Citizens’ Radio, a pro-democracy radio station founded in 2005 by former lawmaker Tsang Kin-shing, ceased operations after Tsang said the Hang Seng Bank froze the station’s bank account.Pressure on media was reflected in a rise in self-censorship. In May, the city’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club, which suspended its annual Human Right Press Awards in 2022 after hosting it for 25 years, issued a set of guidelines for the club’s and club members’ statements on press freedom matters. These guidelines included seeking legal advice and contacting government departments ahead of publication.																Internet Freedom						While internet access remained widespread and generally open – apart from several blocked websites and blogs associated with pro-democracy activists and human rights NGOs – local authorities increasingly criminalized online speech. The NSL and its implementing regulations granted extensive powers to police to order the blocking and removal of content by message publishers, platform service providers, hosting service providers, and network service providers. Police could also intercept communications or conduct covert surveillance upon approval of the chief executive. When investigating NSL violations, police could also require a person who published information or opinions or the relevant service provider to provide information on the end users.In June, the government applied for a court injunction to ban playing the protest song “Glory to Hong Kong” after Google refused authorities’ request to remove the song from search results. The High Court blocked the injunction on July 28, but the government appealed the decision.Under antidoxing law, SAR authorities could fine or arrest locally based staff of online platforms that did not comply with user information or content takedown orders. Meta and Google reported denying the SAR government’s user information and content takedown orders that did not meet their companies’ policies. The most recent transparency report published by Google revealed the SAR government submitted 72 requests to remove content in the first six months of the year, the highest number since 2011 when records began. The government requested Google remove five documentaries about imprisoned democracy activists from YouTube and an allegedly “seditious” children’s book from Google Sites, arguing the content posed a threat to national security. Google denied these requests.Several websites with Hong Kong human rights-related content were blocked in the SAR. Lawyer and human rights activist Samuel Bickett reported September 21 that his Substack blog Hong Kong Law and Policy was blocked.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but SAR authorities did not respect those rights, especially for individuals and organizations associated with the pro-democracy movement. Early in the year, the government continued to cite COVID-19 pandemic health concerns as reasons for restricting public gatherings, although it made exceptions for events involving government officials and pro-Beijing groups. The government lifted COVID-19 restrictions in March.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The government effectively banned peaceful assembly for political purposes, sometimes citing public health or safety concerns.In January, SAR Secretary for Security Chris Tang claimed authorities had not approved any demonstrations in three years because of COVID-19 health concerns. Organizers of any rallies of more than 50 persons or protests of more than 30 participants had to apply for a letter of no objection from police or risk prosecution.In March, police approved the city’s first rally since the lifting of COVID-19 restriction, allowing a protest of a reclamation plan, but the government required all participants to march without masks and limited participation to 100 persons, all of whom had to wear a number tag.In April, the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions canceled its April 29 Labor Day rally, which it held annually prior to the 2020 pandemic, citing its failure to obtain a letter of no objection from police. The police did not offer a reason for not issuing the letter.In June, police arrested at least 23 individuals on the 34th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in what media described as an effort to thwart attempts to commemorate the event. Security Chief Chris Tang warned authorities would take “resolute action” against anyone taking advantage of “a special occasion” to threaten national security by promoting independence or seeking to subvert state power.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for freedom of association, but the government did not respect the law. Authorities investigated and forced the closure of any group they deemed a national security concern. SAR officials and pro-Beijing media continued to harass and intimidate NGOs affiliated with the pro-democracy movement, including labor unions and professional associations.By law, any person convicted of claiming to be an officer of a banned group could be sentenced to a maximum of three years in prison and fined. Those convicted of providing meeting space or other aid to a banned group could also be sentenced to fines and imprisonment.Under the NSL, police could require any group that was deemed a “foreign agent” to provide information on its activities, personnel, and finances, with a maximum prison sentence of six months for failure to comply. In March, three former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, including prominent democracy activist and barrister Chow Hang-tung, were sentenced to more than four months in prison for not complying with a national security policy request for group information. European Union spokesperson Nabila Massrali described the sentencing as “another example of the authorities abusing legislation to suppress fundamental freedoms.”In August, national security police arrested 10 persons associated with the defunct “612 Humanitarian Fund,” including activist Bobo Yip, on allegations of “conspiracy to collude with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” and “inciting rioting.” Five trustees of the fund – Cardinal Joseph Zen, senior counsel Margaret Ng, former lawmaker Cyd Ho, scholar Hui Po-keung, and singer Denise Ho – as well as the fund’s former secretary, Sze Ching-wee, were convicted of failing to register the fund under the city’s societies ordinance and fined a modest amount.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; the government, however, sometimes confiscated travel documents and enforced travel bans for democracy activists and opposition politicians facing charges. Authorities forced some individuals, including foreign nationals, who were arrested under the NSL but not charged and were on police bail, to surrender their travel documents as a condition for bail.Foreign Travel: Some media reports indicated authorities maintained an exit ban “watchlist” of residents who would be intercepted if they attempted to leave the SAR. In July, police arrested (detained for questioning, according to a police statement) Chu Yan-ho, a former officer of the disbanded political group Demosisto, at Hong Kong International Airport on suspicion of financially aiding activists abroad. He was subsequently charged under the NSL – along with six other men, some also associated with Demosisto – with conspiracy to collude with foreign forces.Immigration law, according to legal scholars, NGOs, and refugee advocates, empowered authorities to bar anyone, without a court order, from entering or leaving the territory. In June, a Japanese freelance journalist known for covering 2019 protests was reportedly barred from entering the SAR without explanation. In August, a professor of photography who also covered the 2019 protests told media he was denied entry into the SAR for a second time since 2020.Persons born in Hong Kong prior to 1997 could receive a British National (Overseas) passport that granted some rights but not the right to live in the United Kingdom. After 2020, the United Kingdom granted these persons residency rights and a path to citizenship. The PRC and SAR subsequently refused to recognize the British National (Overseas) Passport as an identity or travel document.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, or other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, but the government had established a system for providing limited protection to persons who would be subject to torture or other abuses in their home country.The government used the term “nonrefoulement claim” to refer to a claim for protection against deportation. Persons subjected to deportation could file a nonrefoulement claim if they either arrived without proper authorization or had overstayed the terms of their initial admission. Filing such a claim could result in a period of detention followed by release on recognizance. Activists and refugee rights groups expressed concerns regarding the quality of adjudications and the very low rate of approved claims, fewer than 1 percent. Denied claimants could appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. The government did not publish the board’s decisions, a practice that the Hong Kong Bar Association noted created concerns regarding the consistency and transparency of decisions. If the board refused the appeal, claimants could file an application for leave to apply for judicial review. Refugees and asylum seekers were required to appear periodically before the Immigration Department, which caused school disruptions for some refugee children.The law barred persons seeking asylum from entering the territory, limited the time in which a person could file a nonrefoulement claim, and in some cases limited these individuals’ access to interpretation. Activists said the amendment raised concerns about refugees’ rights and well-being. Rules passed in December 2022 allowed authorities to expel persons awaiting appeals court rulings on rejected nonrefoulement applications. According to media, 27 persons were removed as a result, with another 1,100 vulnerable to immediate deportation.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Activists, legal experts, and media reports indicated persons seeking refugee status faced discrimination and were frequent targets of negative commentary by some political parties and media organizations. Activists noted immigration detention became a more common practice, especially before deportation for those whose asylum claims were rejected.A Hong Kong Free Press report in March highlighted legal experts who accused the government of being “hostile” to nonrefoulement claimants, noting rules allowed the government to deport claimants whose appeals were still pending, forcing them to pursue their appeal from outside the SAR. Another legal expert cited in the report emphasized that the rules allowed the government to justify lengthier detentions for asylum seekers. The report also stated former detainees at immigration detention centers alleged poor conditions, lengthy solitary confinement, and even violent beatings, but the government denied these accusations.Employment: “Nonrefoulement claimants” had no right to work while their claims were under review, and they had to rely on social welfare stipends and charities. An NGO reported this made some claimants vulnerable to trafficking. The government commonly, albeit on a case-by-case basis, granted permission to work for those granted nonrefoulement protection and persons awaiting UN High Commissioner for Refugees resettlement.Access to Basic Services: NGOs and social workers stated refugees had a difficult time accessing medical assistance or, prior to the lifting of restrictions, understanding COVID-19 related information due to language barriers. According to an October 28 report in the South China Morning Post, two NGOs, the Hong Kong Dignity Institute and Christian Action, raised concerns about seriously ill foreigners and refugee claimants who were unable to access medical care. Social workers from these NGOs said claimants could access basic services, but they expressed concern regarding lack of access to urgent, life-saving interventions. A Hospital Authority spokesperson stated nonrefoulement claimants were not eligible for subsidized treatment in public hospitals.Temporary Protection: Persons whose claims for “nonrefoulement” were substantiated did not obtain permanent resident status in the SAR. Instead, the SAR government referred them to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for possible recognition as refugees and resettlement in a third country. In some cases, individuals waited years in the SAR before being resettled.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The Basic Law limited the ability of residents to change their government in free and fair periodic elections. Subsequent decisions in 2021 by the NPCSC further limited this ability, in contradiction to provisions in the Basic Law.Voters did not enjoy universal suffrage in elections for the chief executive or equal suffrage in Legislative Council elections. Under PRC-imposed changes to the electoral system, all candidates for chief executive and Legislative Council seats were required to pass through a labyrinthine application process for vetting their “patriotic” bona fides, ensuring only candidates vetted and approved by Beijing were allowed to hold office at any level. Only members of the Election Committee (EC) were entitled to nominate or vote for chief executive candidates.Under the electoral system, voters directly elected 20 of the expanded Legislative Council’s 90 seats, or 22 percent, in contrast to 2016, when voters directly elected 40 of the 70 seats (57 percent). Forty seats were selected by the EC directly, while 30 were selected as representatives of “functional constituencies” for various economic and social sectors.Under the Basic Law, only the SAR government, not members of the legislature, could introduce bills that affected public expenditure, the political structure, or government policy.The SAR sent 36 deputies to the PRC National People’s Congress and had approximately 200 delegates in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, bodies that operated under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party and did not enjoy legislative independence. The approval of the chief executive, two-thirds of the Legislative Council, and two-thirds of the SAR’s delegates to the National People’s Congress were required to place an amendment to the Basic Law on the National People’s Congress agenda, which had the sole power to amend the Basic Law.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: District Council elections were held on December 10, but new election rules severely limited the role of voters and the eventual role of directly elected representatives. Most notably, the proportion of seats elected by the public was reduced from nearly 95 percent to less than 20 percent. The great majority of members were appointed by the chief executive or selected by government-appointed district committees. All candidates had to secure nominations by members of regional committees to run for election. No candidates from pro-democracy or independent parties were able to secure nominations and therefore were not able to stand for election; more than 90 percent of new district councilors came from the government-appointed committees responsible for nominating candidates. Candidates from the Hong Kong Democratic Party, the largest pro-democracy party; the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood; and the self-described non-establishment party Third Side all sought nominations but failed to receive enough support in the nominating committees to run for election. Voter turnout in the elections (27.5 percent) hit a record low, far below the record high in 2019 (71.2 percent), when pro-democracy candidates won by a landslide. All elected district counselors were also subject to the loyalty conditions and related scrutiny described above.In May 2022, John Lee was selected as chief executive, winning 1,416 of the 1,424 valid votes cast by the Beijing-dominated EC. Lee was the only candidate to run after the PRC central government indicated it would not support any other nominations.In December 2021 elections for the Legislative Council, pro-Beijing candidates won 89 of the 90 seats; one non-establishment moderate won a seat for the social welfare functional constituency. None of the major pro-democracy parties fielded candidates. Approximately 1.3 million voters cast ballots in the election, a record low turnout rate of 30.2 percent, compared to the average turnout of 51 percent in the six Legislative Council elections since the handover. Approximately 2 percent of ballots cast were blank or otherwise invalid, a record high.September 2021 elections for seats in the EC, the first after the PRC’s overhaul of the SAR’s political system, by design produced a near-unanimous sweep for pro-Beijing candidates. More than 1,100 of the 1,500 seats in the expanded EC were predetermined and not up for election. For the few competitive seats, regulations limited the franchise and moved the SAR further from the one-person, one-vote principle. Only one nominally independent candidate was elected to any of those seats. The 2021 contest further limited the number of voters eligible to cast ballots to fewer than 5,000 individuals, 97 percent fewer than in 2016.Political Parties and Political Participation: Since the imposition of the NSL, numerous leaders of pro-democracy political parties, protest organizing groups, and civil society organizations were arrested for their involvement in nonviolent political activities. For example, 47 pro-democracy politicians and activists, including former members of the Legislative Council and elected local District Council members, faced charges of conspiracy to commit subversion under the NSL for their involvement in the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election. No political party was subjected to an outright ban during the year, but pro-democracy political parties and organizations faced significant obstacles or disbanded themselves following the imposition of the NSL because of reported pressure from SAR authorities, including concern they or their members would be subjected to political repression, and due to fundraising difficulties. For example, the Hong Kong Democratic Party had to cancel an annual fundraising dinner after two restaurants meant to host the event canceled at the last minute. The Democratic Party chairperson stated he believed the restaurants canceled due to “external pressure.” In May, the Civic Party, a pro-democracy party founded in 2006, announced it would disband. In June, another opposition group, the League of Social Democrats, revealed the HSBC bank had terminated the party’s accounts without explanation.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.Corruption: For additional information about corruption, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups reported increasing government scrutiny, harassment, and restrictions. Authorities used the NSL to force organizations expressing criticism of the PRC to cease operations, self-censor, or change operational procedures to protect their staff. The forced disbandment of multiple trade unions and other organizations created a chilling effect on remaining groups that were historically critical of the central government.PRC and SAR officials repeatedly accused local and international NGOs that alleged human rights abuses in the SAR of “sowing discord.”In August, 10 persons were arrested on charges of “foreign collusion,” for their work with the defunct (since 2021) 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund, which provided legal and medical support for protesters arrested during the 2019 protests. The government also accused the fund of inciting riots. Police accused the 10 individuals of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces for allegedly taking donations from organizations abroad to help groups that supported persons in exile or promoted sanctions against Hong Kong. The NGO Hong Kong Center for Human Rights cited it as an example of how authorities “weaponized” security laws against human rights defenders. The NGO described the accusations of incitement to riot as “absurd” and maintained human rights provisions in the NSL were proving ineffective.Government Human Rights Bodies: There was an Office of the Ombudsman and an Equal Opportunities Commission. The government recruited commissioners to represent both offices through a professional search committee, which solicited applications and vetted candidates. Commissioners were independent. Both organizations operated without interference from the SAR government and published critical findings in their areas of responsibility. NGOs stated the Equal Opportunities Commission had limited governmental support and a narrow mandate that did not allow for deep investigations.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape against women, including spousal rape, but did not explicitly criminalize rape against men.Activists expressed concern rape was underreported, especially within ethnic minority communities.The law did not directly criminalize domestic violence, but the government regarded domestic violence against women as a serious concern. Abusers could be criminally charged under laws on offenses against the person, sexual assault, and child mistreatment, depending on which act constituted domestic violence. The government effectively prosecuted violators using existing criminal law. The law allowed survivors to seek a three-month injunction, extendable to six months, against an abuser. This injunction could be applied in cases of abuse between spouses, heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants, former spouses or cohabitants, and immediate and extended family members. It protected survivors younger than 18, allowing them to apply for an injunction in their own name, with the assistance of an adult guardian, against abuse by parents, siblings, and specified immediate and extended family members. The law also empowered courts to require abusers to attend an antiviolence program. In cases in which the abuser caused bodily harm, the court could attach an arrest warrant to an existing injunction and extend the validity of both injunctions and arrest warrants to two years.Government programs provided intervention, counseling, and assistance to domestic violence survivors and abusers.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibited sexual harassment based on sex, marital status, and pregnancy. The law applied to both men and women, and police generally enforced it effectively. There were multiple reports, however, of sexual harassment in housing, the workplace, and universities.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination based on sex or pregnancy status, and the SAR implemented policies to safeguard the rights and interests of women, including antidiscrimination laws. There were debates, however, concerning whether the framework in place provided adequate protection for women. Women enjoyed the same legal status and rights as men. By law, the Equal Opportunities Commission worked towards the elimination of discrimination and harassment as well as to promote equal opportunity for men and women.Although the government generally enforced relevant law, women reportedly faced discrimination in employment, salary, welfare, inheritance, and promotion. As of August, approximately 37 percent of complaints filed with the Equal Opportunity Commission were related to sex discrimination. Women filed most sexual harassment complaints. In addition, foreign domestic workers faced discrimination based on disability (health) and family status (pregnancy).Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization by government authorities.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis, for survivors of sexual violence.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination; the Equal Opportunity Commission oversaw implementation and enforcement of the law. The commission maintained a hotline for inquiries and complaints of racial discrimination. Although ethnic Chinese accounted for most of the population, the SAR was a multiethnic society, with persons from multiple ethnic groups recognized as permanent residents with full legal rights. Although the government took steps to reduce it, there were frequent reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities; the law did not clearly cover racial discrimination occurring during law enforcement activity.Observers concurred discrimination against ethnic minorities happened in many settings including in schools, homes, hospitals, and banks, in public transportation, in retail and personal services, and in catering services, among others. The most common types of discrimination were nonphysical mistreatment or refusal of services.Persons born in mainland China also experienced frequent discrimination. In March, the Equal Opportunities Commission informed SAR lawmakers it was partnering with the government to address discrimination, harassment, and vilification of persons from mainland China. Commission Chairperson Ricky Chu stated there was no increase in official complaints or enquiries involving discrimination against mainland citizens since border restrictions were lifted in January, but he highlighted social media reports of alleged discrimination. In May, a video circulated on social media of Cathay Pacific flight attendants allegedly mistreating a mainland passenger. Cathay Pacific issued a statement apologizing for the incident and reiterated employees had to respect customers from all backgrounds and cultures.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The law mandated protection for survivors of child abuse (battery, assault, neglect, abandonment, and sexual exploitation), and the government enforced the law.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of marriage was 16 for both girls and boys. In addition, parents’ written consent was required for marriage before age 21.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the commercial sexual exploitation of children and procuring children for commercial sex. The age of consent was 16. By law, a person convicted of having “unlawful sexual intercourse” with a person younger than 16 was subject to five years’ imprisonment, while unlawful sexual intercourse with a person younger than 13 carried a sentence of life imprisonment. The law allowed for the prosecution of certain sexual offenses, including those against minors, committed outside the SAR. The law made it an offense to possess, produce, copy, import, or export pornography involving a child or to publish or cause to be published any advertisement that conveyed, or was likely to be understood as conveying, the message that a person published or intended to publish child pornography. Authorities enforced the law. The penalty for creation, publication, or advertisement of child sexual abuse material was eight years’ imprisonment, while possession carried a penalty of five years’ imprisonment.																																				Antisemitism										The active Jewish community numbered approximately 2,500 persons. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. Seemingly neutral laws were not disproportionally applied against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.Violence and Harassment: Reports of violence against LGBTQI+ individuals were rare, and civil society organizations generally assessed the police response as adequate. On June 2, a lesbian couple were stabbed and killed in a shopping mall. Police promptly investigated the incident, arrested the attacker, Szeto Sing-kwong, and charged him with two counts of murder. The government separately charged another man, Lee Chi-wai, with two counts of incitement to wound after Lee posted messages on Facebook that lauded the double murder, and a court ordered Lee’s confinement for two months in a psychiatric hospital. Both opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants were able to apply for injunctive relief in cases of domestic violence.Discrimination: No law prohibited companies or individuals from discriminating on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, and expression, or sex characteristics. Opposition to LGBTQI+ equality was deeply entrenched among certain cultural conservatives and those who believed LGBTQI+ equality was an imposed western value. In September, the Court of Final Appeal ruled the government’s refusal to extend same-sex marriage rights was in violation of its positive obligation under Article 14 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. The court gave the government two years to comply with the order and establish a framework to legally recognize same-sex relationships.A court ruled September 15 that both women in a lesbian couple should have parental status over their child born via “reciprocal in vitro fertilization.”On October 24, a court ruled same-sex couples had equal rights under the city’s inheritance laws; the government appealed the decision.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was available for persons older than 18; the individual had to provide proof of both a psychiatric evaluation and gender-affirming surgery. In February, the Court of Final Appeal unanimously decided to end the policy of barring transgender persons from changing the gender shown on identity cards unless they underwent gender-affirming surgery, declaring such a requirement violated their rights and was therefore unconstitutional.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: So-called conversion therapy practices were not legally prohibited. According to a 2021 study by LGBTQI+ NGO The Society of True Light, approximately 20 percent of local gay and lesbian persons attempted to change their sexual orientations by various means, including conversion therapy, and were encouraged to do so by mental health practitioners. In May, the Hong Kong Psychological Society issued a position paper that called on local psychologists to abandon conversion therapy, deeming it “harmful and unethical.” This statement was binding only for members of the Psychological Society. Medically unnecessary and irreversible so-called gender normalization surgeries were performed on intersex children. The government did not maintain statistics on intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no reports of such restrictions for LGBTQI+ individuals or groups. In November, Hong Kong became the first city in Asia to co-host the international Gay Games competition.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, and the government generally enforced these provisions. The government took action to investigate and punish those responsible for violence or abuses against persons with disabilities. The government generally implemented laws and programs that provided persons with disabilities access to education, employment, the judicial system, and health services. The government implemented laws and programs to provide persons with disabilities access to transportation, information, communications, and buildings, although there were reports of some restrictions. The law called for improved building access and provided for sanctions against those who discriminated; compliance was limited.Some human rights activists observed services for persons with disabilities were often unavailable and declared policies were not implemented or the law was too limited, and its implementation did not promote equal opportunity. For example, while the law required construction or major renovations of government and large public buildings to include access for persons with disabilities, enforcement was sporadic, particularly in restaurants, shopping malls, pharmacies, and grocery stores.The law provided for children with special educational needs to have equal opportunity in accessing education. According to the government, more than 90 percent of students with special needs attended mainstream schools, and the remaining students with severe disabilities attended special schools.The Social Welfare Department provided training and vocational rehabilitation services to assist persons with disabilities, offered subsidized resident-care services for persons deemed unable to live independently, offered preschool services to children with disabilities, and provided community support services for persons with mental disabilities, their families, and other residents interested in improving their mental health.Unemployment among adults with disabilities, in part due to discrimination and insufficient government support, remained a serious problem.The government responded to reports of violence against or abuse of persons with disabilities, including of domestic violence or abuse. A committee composed of NGOs and government departments handled cases of domestic abuse of women and children with disabilities.NGOs reported they continued to face impediments applying for international funding and offering training for disability-related programs, partly due to NSL foreign-collusion provisions.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of workers to form and join unions, but SAR and PRC authorities took repeated actions that violated the principle of union independence. The law did not protect the right to collective bargaining or obligate employers to bargain. The law prohibited civil servants from bargaining collectively.The law protected the right to strike, subject to certain limits; these were not excessive. The law prohibited firing an employee for participating in a strike and voided any section of an employment contract that punished a worker for striking. The commissioner of police had broad authority to control and direct public gatherings, including strikes, in the interest of national security or public safety.By law, an employer could not fire, penalize, or discriminate against employees who exercised their union rights and could not prevent or deter them from exercising such rights. Penalties for violations of laws protecting union and related worker rights included fines as well as legal damages paid to workers. Penalties were commensurate with those under other laws involving the denial of civil rights. The law was not effectively enforced. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.The government used provisions of the NSL, the Societies Ordinance, and the Trade Union Ordinance to repress independent unions and their confederations. NGOs played a role in promoting worker rights. Some labor groups expressed concern that increased scrutiny of NGO funding under the NSL hurt labor unions and worker rights organizations.In February, the International Trade Union Confederation condemned the significant regression of union rights in Hong Kong, including a wave of union dissolutions and state-run media attacks on the Professional Teachers’ Union, the Confederation of Trade Unions, and the Journalists’ Association. Unions expressed concern regarding the safety of their members and their ability to operate freely under the NSL, which some labor groups reported had increased scrutiny on funding for NGOs.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited the worst forms of child labor. Regulations prohibited employment of children younger than 15 in any industrial establishment. Children younger than 13 were prohibited from taking up employment in all economic sectors. Children 13 or older could be employed in nonindustrial establishments, subject to certain requirements, such as parental written consent and proof the child completed required schooling.The Labor Department effectively enforced these laws and regularly inspected workplaces to enforce compliance with the regulations. Penalties for child labor law violations, generally a civil offense, included fines and legal damages but were not commensurate with those for analogous serious criminal offenses, such as kidnapping. Penalties were regularly applied against violators.There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The statutory minimum wage increased in May, but it remained below the poverty line for an average-sized household. The law did not regulate working hours, paid weekly rest, rest breaks, or compulsory overtime for most employees. The law regulated working hours for persons ages 15-17 in the industrial sector, allowing them to work no more than eight hours per day (between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.), no more than six days per week, and requiring a 30-minute break after five contiguous hours of work. Several labor groups reported employers expected employees to work extremely long hours and called for legislation to address that concern. Foreign domestic workers were excluded from the statutory hourly minimum wage and often faced extremely long working hours (12 to 16 hours a day). They were often expected to be on call 24 hours a day, a condition exacerbated by the compulsory live-in requirement.Occupational Safety and Health: The law included occupational safety and health (OSH) standards for various industries. The law provided for standards that were appropriate for the main industries in the economy. The law made enterprise and delivery agencies responsible for occupational injuries to temporary workers. OSH laws allowed workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. Employers were required to report any injuries sustained by their employees in work-related accidents.The Occupational Safety and Health Branch of the Labor Department was responsible for promoting safety and health, identifying unsafe conditions, enforcing safety management legislation, and formulating and implementing policy generally. Inspectors could make unannounced inspections and initiate investigations and prosecutions; they were generally responsive to complaints from workers. In April, the Legislative Council passed a bill increasing penalties for occupational safety violations following some fatal accidents in the industrial sector. The SAR government reported approximately 20 similar cases per year over the last 10 years.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Labor Department was responsible for enforcing wage and working hour laws as well as OSH standards in conjunction with the labor agencies of local authorities. The government effectively enforced the law; the number of labor inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance. Labor inspectors had the authority to conduct unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions. Penalties for violations of wage laws or OSH standards included fines, damages, and workers’ compensation payments. These penalties were commensurate with those for similar offenses. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. The Labor Tribunal adjudicated disputes involving nonpayment or underpayment of wages and wrongful dismissal. The Labor Tribunal presented several barriers to domestic workers, such as prolonged court cases and high court fees, which discouraged them from seeking justice. Interpretation services for foreign domestic workers were limited.There were no data on the informal sector.																																				    							View report by:																				Hong Kong											Macau											Tibet																										On This Page				search													>																										Read a Section: Hong Kong																EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																								Hong Kong
- 2024 Hong Kong Policy Act Report HomeBureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;2024 Hong Kong Policy Act Report				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										2024 Hong Kong Policy Act Report																																		Report																														March 29, 2024																																							Report to Congress onConditions in Hong Kong of Interest to the United StatesSection 1256 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (PL 115-232) (22 U.S.C. 5731)Consistent with sections 205 and 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “Act”) (22 U.S.C. 5725 and 5731) and section 7043(g)(3)(C) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. K, P.L. 117-328), the Department submits this report and the enclosed certification on conditions in Hong Kong from February 2023 through December 2023 (“covered period”).SummaryThe Department of State assesses that during the covered period, the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took new actions that directly threaten U.S. interests in Hong Kong and that are inconsistent with the Basic Law and the PRC’s obligation pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 (“Sino-British Joint Declaration”) to allow Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy.  There remain key differences between Hong Kong and mainland China in some areas, including commercial and trade policy, internet freedom, and freedom of religion, but PRC and Hong Kong authorities continued to use “national security” as a broad and vague basis to undermine the rule of law and protected rights and freedoms.  Authorities further restricted direct voting.  In the Certification of Hong Kong’s Treatment under U.S. Laws, the Secretary of State certified that Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities, under the supervision of the PRC central government, used the central government-imposed 2020 National Security Law (NSL) to further erode the rule of law in Hong Kong and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in Hong Kong, as well as to harass and intimidate individuals outside of its borders.&nbsp; In July and December, the Hong Kong Police Force issued bounties on overseas democracy advocates, attempting to enforce the NSL outside of Hong Kong’s borders.&nbsp; Within the special administrative region, authorities undermined the rights of defendants in cases designated as involving national security. &nbsp;Hong Kong authorities arrested and prosecuted people for peaceful political expression critical of the local and central governments, including for posting and forwarding social media posts.&nbsp; Hong Kong and PRC authorities continued to target civil society groups, activists, media companies and journalists, political parties, labor unions, academics, student groups, and other people and organizations that the government accused of being connected to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement or otherwise critical of the local or central government.&nbsp; Hong Kong authorities undermined media freedom by continuing the prosecutions of journalists and restricting access to information. &nbsp;PRC authorities denied people in Hong Kong a meaningful role in the city’s governance, administering new rules that significantly limited the number of directly elected District Councilors and introducing a new nominating process that effectively barred independent and non-establishment candidates from running for office.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;In December 2022, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued its first “interpretation” of the NSL stating that the Chief Executive and Committee for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong have the authority to issue legally binding certificates and decisions on issues related to national security that are not subject to judicial review.&nbsp; In May 2023, the Legislative Council passed a law affirming this interpretation, allowing the Chief Executive to restrict overseas lawyers from participating in NSL cases, which further undermines the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary.These actions and others contributed to the Department of State’s assessment and the Secretary of State’s certification.Impact on Democratic Institutions and Universal SuffrageDuring the covered period, PRC and Hong Kong authorities deliberately acted to restrict the ability of Hong Kong voters to elect representatives of their choosing.&nbsp; PRC and Hong Kong officials played an unprecedented role in shaping the outcome of District Council elections held on December 10, 2023.&nbsp;New election rules in 2023 severely limited the role of voters, the ability of candidates to run for office, and the eventual role of directly elected representatives.&nbsp; Most notably, the proportion of district councilors elected by the public was reduced from nearly 95 percent to less than 20 percent.&nbsp; The majority of district councilors were appointed by the Chief Executive or selected by government-appointed district committees.&nbsp; All candidates had to secure nominations by members of regional committees to stand for election.&nbsp; No candidates from pro-democracy or independent parties secured nominations and therefore did not stand for election, and more than 90 percent of new district councilors came from the government-appointed committees responsible for nominating candidates.&nbsp; Voter turnout in December 10 District Council elections (27.5 percent) hit a record low, beating the previous record for low turnout in 1988 (30.3 percent) and far below the record high in 2019 (71.2 percent), when pro-democracy candidates won by a landslide.&nbsp; &nbsp;Pro-Beijing politicians occupied the office of the Chief Executive and all but one of the 90 seats in the Legislative Council during the covered period, after electoral changes in 2021 drastically reduced the number of seats filled by direct election and required all candidates running for the Council to receive the approval of the Beijing-dominated Hong Kong Election Committee.  Hong Kong authorities took no actions during this period to advance the election of all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, which, as with the election of the Chief Executive, the Basic Law describes as its “ultimate aim.”Activists and local media reported that since the electoral changes, the Legislative Council and District Councilors have become less responsive to public input, particularly from marginalized and underrepresented groups.Impact on Police and Security FunctionsHong Kong authorities used the NSL, which the NPCSC imposed on Hong Kong in June 2020, to conduct politically motivated arrests and prosecutions against people and groups expressing views critical of the PRC or Hong Kong authorities or affiliated with the pro-democracy movement. &nbsp;During the covered period, based on publicly available information, authorities arrested at least 35 people in connection with alleged offenses that Hong Kong authorities designated as involving “national security,” including pursuant to the colonial-era statute on “sedition” and the offenses listed in the NSL (secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security).&nbsp; According to public reports, authorities filed charges against at least seven individuals in connection with alleged “national security”-designated offenses.&nbsp; During the covered period, at least five individuals were found guilty of violating the NSL or the sedition statute at trial, and none were acquitted, while at least 42 individuals pled guilty to violating the NSL or the sedition statute.&nbsp; This includes 31 of the 47 former politicians and activists charged with conspiracy to commit subversion for their involvement in the July 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election who pled guilty to that charge.&nbsp; With few exceptions, the individuals arrested and prosecuted were exercising freedoms guaranteed in the Basic Law and recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.The NSL grants the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) broad authorities to conduct wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and searches without warrants in national security-related cases, and to require internet service providers to provide or delete information relevant to these cases.&nbsp; During the covered period, there were credible reports that PRC security services and the Office of Safeguarding National Security monitored pro-democracy and human rights activists as well as journalists in Hong Kong.&nbsp;The Hong Kong government applied the NSL extraterritorially to target activists for exercising free speech.&nbsp; In July 2023, the HKPF announced arrest warrants and bounties of more than $127,000 each targeting eight democracy advocates living in the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia.&nbsp; On December 14, 2023, the HKPF announced arrest warrants and bounties targeting five additional activists living in the United States and the UK, including a U.S. citizen.&nbsp; The HKPF regularly questioned Hong Kong-based family members and acquaintances of overseas activists. &nbsp;The Hong Kong police’s surveillance of pro-democracy activists continued even after convicted offenders were released from prison.&nbsp; Pro-democracy student activist Tony Chung announced in December 2023 that he had fled Hong Kong to seek asylum in the UK.&nbsp; Chung had finished his three-and-a-half-year jail term in June 2023 after being convicted of multiple charges under the NSL, including “committing secession,” as well as a sedition charge for “conspiracy to publish seditious publications.”&nbsp; Chung told media he was under “intense surveillance” after being released from prison, and said he was required to report to national security police every two to four weeks.&nbsp; He said police compelled him to become a paid informant and provide information on fellow activists.&nbsp; He also said he signed a confidential declaration that restricted him from disclosing his interactions with national security police to any third parties, including a lawyer.In December 2023, the Hong Kong government amended NSL implementation rules to expand its powers to seize assets.&nbsp; The NSL authorizes the Chief Executive to formulate implementation details without the need for scrutiny by the Legislative Council.&nbsp; The amendment allowed the Secretary of Security to freeze property of anyone convicted of national security offenses until the conclusion of that individual’s legal proceedings.Impact on Judicial Independence and the Rule of LawThe Sino-British Joint Declaration, as well as Hong Kong’s Basic Law, provide for an independent judiciary in Hong Kong, but during the covered period, PRC and Hong Kong authorities took actions that eroded the Hong Kong judiciary’s independence and ability to uphold the rule of law in cases that Hong Kong authorities designated as involving national security.&nbsp; In cases where authorities assert a nexus with national security, there is little to no expectation of a fair trial or associated fair trial guarantees and other applicable legal protections.&nbsp; In April 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers warned that the NSL could undermine the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary, noting a lack of due process guarantees.&nbsp; The UN special rapporteur recommended the PRC review and reconsider the NSL in Hong Kong to comply with the PRC’s international human rights obligations.The NSL states that only the NPCSC – not Hong Kong courts – has the power to interpret the NSL, and any such interpretations are not subject to review in Hong Kong’s courts.&nbsp; The Hong Kong government and the PRC NPCSC intervened in democracy advocate Jimmy Lai’s judicial proceedings, issuing the first “interpretation” of the NSL in 2022 to deny the defendant his choice of legal representation.&nbsp; In December 2022, the NPCSC issued its first “interpretation” of the NSL stating that the Chief Executive and Committee for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong have the authority to issue legally binding certificates and decisions on issues related to national security that are not subject to judicial review.&nbsp; The interpretation effectively empowered the Hong Kong executive branch to overturn or preempt judicial decisions related to national security, which experts noted can include topics such as finance, culture, or energy.&nbsp; In May 2023, the Legislative Council passed a law affirming this interpretation, allowing the Chief Executive to restrict overseas lawyers from participating in NSL cases, which further undermined the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary.&nbsp; On May 19, a court rejected Lai’s appeal, blocking his lawyer from representing him in his NSL trial, which began on December 18.&nbsp;Under the NSL, defendants charged with national security-related offenses may not be granted bail unless a judge has sufficient grounds to believe the defendant or suspect will not continue to commit acts endangering national security.  Unlike in other criminal cases, it is the defendants’ burden to demonstrate that they will not continue to commit acts endangering national security.  Under this standard, many defendants charged under the NSL remain in custody months or years after their initial detention.  In dozens of cases during the covered period, pro-democracy activists were denied bail and held in pre-trial detention for years without trial.  Some human rights groups called pre-trial detention in national security-designated cases a “form of indefinite detention without trial.”  An October 2023 report by the Center for Asian Law at Georgetown University highlighted Hong Kong’s “alarming number of remand prisoners” and the “arbitrary nature of some bail rulings” in non-NSL cases against pro-democracy protestors.  In cases where bail was granted, human rights groups noted defendants were frequently subjected to strict restrictions on their freedoms of expression and association as a condition of their bail. Local authorities implemented an NSL provision requiring that the Hong Kong Chief Executive establish a list of judges to handle any cases concerning national security-related offenses.&nbsp; Although Hong Kong’s judiciary selects the specific judge(s) from this list to hear any individual case, legal scholars argued this unprecedented involvement of the Chief Executive weakens Hong Kong’s judicial independence.&nbsp; During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities continued to refuse to disclose the membership of this list of judges or the criteria under which they were selected.Under the NSL, Hong Kong authorities may direct that a panel of three specially designated national security judges will hear a case instead of a jury.&nbsp; The government dispensed with jury trials and used a three-judge panel to oversee NSL trials during the covered period, including the cases of the 47&nbsp;politicians and activists charged with subversion for their involvement in the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election; of&nbsp;Apple Daily&nbsp;founder Jimmy Lai; and of three former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, which organized the city’s formerly annual June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre vigil, with the permission and consent of the Hong Kong government. &nbsp;Authorities continued to employ similar NSL legal procedures – such as waiving a trial by jury – in cases with non-NSL charges, such as sedition and commercial fraud.In 2021, the Hong Kong government removed defendants’ right to choose their own legal counsel in cases where they receive government-funded legal aid.&nbsp; Instead, the Hong Kong Legal Aid Department assigns lawyers, who may be susceptible to influence by Hong Kong authorities, to these cases.&nbsp; Some defendants in NSL cases have declined legal aid during the covered period for this reason, instead paying to hire their own lawyers or choosing to represent themselves.The NSL provision that authorizes the Office for Safeguarding National Security to exercise jurisdiction over a case and for the Supreme People’s Court in mainland China to designate a court to adjudicate it was not used during the covered period.Impact on Freedom of Speech or ExpressionAlthough Hong Kong law provides protections for freedom of speech, the Hong Kong government arrested and prosecuted individuals under the NSL or sedition law for speech critical of the PRC or Hong Kong government or their policies.&nbsp; Hong Kong officials characterized this type of speech as “inciting hatred against the government” or “promoting feelings of ill will or enmity between different classes.”&nbsp; During the covered period, several individuals were charged with sedition for actions ranging from posting on social media, to importing a children’s book, to wearing a shirt with slogans related to the 2019 pro-democracy protest movement.In March 2023, a Hong Kong student, Yuen Ching-ting, was arrested on charges of “inciting Hong Kong independence” for publishing allegedly “seditious” posts online while studying in Japan.&nbsp; According to a court document, some of those posts were made before the July 2020 implementation of the NSL, dating back to September 2018.&nbsp; Police arrested Ms. Yuen when she returned to Hong Kong to renew her identity card.&nbsp; She was granted bail with strict conditions, including not being allowed to possess electronic devices with social media applications or to join chat groups with more than five people.&nbsp; She pleaded guilty on October 26 and was sentenced on November 3 to two months in prison.In November 2023, Hong Kong police arrested a man for allegedly wearing “seditious” clothing at the airport.&nbsp; According to a government statement, he was charged with committing an act with “seditious intention” and “possessing seditious publications.”&nbsp; He was denied bail and remanded in custody.&nbsp; Media reported he was wearing a shirt with the phrases “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times,” which prosecutors argued contained an inherent meaning of support for Hong Kong independence.Hong Kong authorities prosecuted people for possessing books that they claimed included “seditious content.”&nbsp; In September 2023, police invoked a colonial offense of “importing seditious publications” for the first time to charge a man who received 18 copies of “Sheep Village,” a children’s picture book a Hong Kong court previously ruled was seditious.In May 2023, national security police seized the “Pillar of Shame,” an artwork commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, from the Hong Kong University Kadoorie Centre in Yuen Long, where the statue has been stored since its removal from public view in 2021.&nbsp; Hong Kong police declined to comment on a media report that authorities might seek to arrest the Danish sculptor who created the “Pillar of Shame,” saying only, “we will act based on the situation, and take action according to law.”&nbsp;Hong Kong legislation prohibits acts deemed to abuse or desecrate the PRC flag or anthem, including acts online, as well as inciting others not to vote in elections or to cast blank ballots.&nbsp; During the covered period, the Hong Kong government arrested and prosecuted individuals under this legislation.&nbsp; For example, on December 4, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong’s anti-corruption watchdog, arrested and charged a man for allegedly posting calls on social media to boycott the election.&nbsp; A Hong Kong court on December 5 issued an arrest warrant for Germany-based news commentator Wong Sai-chak after he published an online video urging Hong Kong residents to boycott District Council elections.&nbsp; The ICAC also arrested three individuals on election day for the same offense, which warrants a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment and a fine of $25,500 upon conviction.&nbsp; Separately, police also arrested four people on election day for allegedly planning to protest outside a polling station where Chief Executive John Lee was expected to cast his vote.&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Impact on Freedom of the PressThe Basic Law provides for freedom of the press, which is also guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, but PRC and Hong Kong authorities repeatedly violated and undermined this freedom.&nbsp; Hong Kong authorities targeted media that expressed views or reported news it construed as not pro-government.&nbsp; The Foreign Correspondents’ Club and the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) each released surveys in July 2023 showing most members believed press freedom in the city has declined since the most recent surveys in October 2021.&nbsp; Respondents cited the causes as:&nbsp; the NSL; Hong Kong government enforcement actions and the less-tangible pressures it applied to ensure national security; and the overall chilling effect of those factors on free expression in the city.&nbsp; Moreover, Reporters Without Borders now ranks Hong Kong’s press freedom as 140 out of the 180 countries and territories evaluated.&nbsp; Widespread reports of media self-censorship and suspected content control continued.Hong Kong authorities continued the prosecution of former editors and executives of now-closed independent media outlets&nbsp;Apple Daily&nbsp;and&nbsp;Stand News&nbsp;under Hong Kong’s sedition law, and prosecuted Jimmy Lai and other former&nbsp;Apple Daily&nbsp;executives and editors under the NSL.&nbsp; During the trial of two former&nbsp;Stand News&nbsp;editors, prosecutors argued that the newspaper committed sedition by publishing articles about and commentaries by prominent pro-democracy political figures, including candidates in the 2020 unofficial pan-democratic primary election and former lawmakers now in exile overseas.&nbsp; The trial continued through the end of the covered period.During the covered period, Apple Daily&nbsp;founder Jimmy Lai pled not guilty to sedition and foreign collusion charges.&nbsp; After more than 1,000 days in jail, Lai’s NSL trial began in December.&nbsp; Government prosecutors cited Lai’s public videos, opinion columns, and postings on Twitter (now called X) – most of which pre-dated the 2020 NSL – as evidence, prompting criticism from many that the Hong Kong government was criminalizing journalism.&nbsp; As evidence, the government also cited Lai’s personal communications found by searching his mobile phones, which had been the subject of previous litigation. &nbsp;PRC and Hong Kong officials, as well as Beijing-controlled media, repeatedly criticized the HKJA during the covered period and accused the organization of potential NSL violations.&nbsp; In September 2023, Ronson Chan, HKJA chairperson and Channel C reporter, was sentenced to five days in prison for failing to present his ID to police while reporting in September 2022.&nbsp; The following day, Reporters Without Borders denounced the sentence.&nbsp; During 2023, two freelance journalists were denied entry to Hong Kong for reasons they believed to be related to their prior reporting on the 2019 protests or Hong Kong’s political situation.More than 150 foreign news outlets received complaint letters from the Hong Kong government during the year, citing articles and editorials about the local government, the NSL, and major events in Hong Kong.&nbsp; These letters, often under the name of the Chief Executive or other high-level officials, characterized the reporting and editorials as “grossly biased,” “groundless allegations,” or as having “reached new levels of nastiness.”&nbsp; In February 2023, pro-Beijing media outlet Oriental Daily News accused the police of “pressing the media” after the newspaper received a letter from the police accusing it of criticizing police in “a biased and derisive manner.”In May 2023, local newspaper Ming Pao announced without explanation that it suspended publication of content by prominent political cartoonist Wong Kei-kwan (known as “Zunzi”).&nbsp; Since 1983, Zunzi had published satirical comics in Ming Pao about Hong Kong affairs, including the NSL and electoral reform.&nbsp; Several Hong Kong officials, including Chief Secretary Eric Chan, Secretary for Security Chris Tang, and Secretary for Home and Youth Affairs Alice Mak, publicly criticized Zunzi’s cartoons as “misleading” or “biased.”&nbsp; The HKJA said the incident showed that the city “could not tolerate critical voices” and that the room for free speech had “narrowed further.”&nbsp; All publications by Zunzi were also removed from public libraries.In May 2023, local online news platform Transit Jam ceased operations.&nbsp; The outlet was established in 2020 and reported on local transportation and infrastructure issues.&nbsp; The announcement came days after pro-Beijing media attacked Transit Jam owner James Ockenden, alleging that Ockenden’s protest during&nbsp;Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Xia Baolong’s April visit was orchestrated by external forces, and accused Ockenden of publishing “anti-government posts” on the online outlet and social media.In June 2023, Citizens’ Radio, a pro-democracy radio station founded in 2005 by former lawmaker Tsang Kin-shing, ceased operations after Tsang said the Hang Seng Bank froze the station’s bank account.The Hong Kong government limited journalists’ access to information during the covered period.&nbsp; In March 2023, journalist Bao Choy successfully appealed her conviction for improperly accessing a government vehicle registration database while researching an investigative report into mob-linked violence in 2019.&nbsp; In January 2024, the Hong Kong government announced a new mechanism requiring journalists to write to apply, with full justification, to obtain the registration information, whereupon the transport commissioner will decide whether the application involves “significant public interest.”&nbsp; Several journalists, including the HKJA chairperson, claimed the revamped arrangement was contrary to freedom of speech and press freedom as guaranteed by the Basic Law and the constitution, as local media relied on car registration searches to conduct investigative reporting.&nbsp; Government pressure on media contributed to a rise in self-censorship. &nbsp;In May 2023, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, which suspended its annual Human Right Press Awards in 2022 after hosting it for 25 years, issued a set of guidelines for the club’s and club members’ statements on press freedom issues.&nbsp; These guidelines include seeking legal advice and contacting the Hong Kong government ahead of publication.&nbsp;Impact on Internet FreedomWhile internet access remained widespread and generally open, local authorities charged people engaged in online political speech with criminal offenses and otherwise deterred free speech online and in electronic communications.&nbsp; Hong Kong authorities did not generally disrupt open access to the internet, but there were numerous reports that Hong Kong authorities, exercising powers granted by the NSL, required private companies to block access to certain websites, provide user information, and remove political content.&nbsp; For example, in September 2023, lawyer and human rights activist Samuel Bickett’s Substack blog Hong Kong Law and Policy became inaccessible from Hong Kong.&nbsp;The NSL and its implementing regulations grant extensive powers to police to order the blocking and removal of content by message publishers, platform service providers, hosting service providers, and network service providers.&nbsp; Police can also intercept communications or conduct covert surveillance upon approval of the Chief Executive.&nbsp; When investigating NSL violations, police may also require a person who published information or opinions or the relevant service provider to provide information on the end users.&nbsp; While internet access remained widespread and generally open, local authorities charged individuals who engaged in online political speech, and otherwise deterred free speech online and in electronic communications. &nbsp;Under Hong Kong anti-doxing laws, local officials have the authority to fine online platforms that do not comply with user information or content takedown orders and to arrest their Hong Kong-based staff. &nbsp;A Google transparency report showed the Hong Kong government submitted 72 requests to remove content in the first six months of 2023, the highest number since Google started publishing such data in 2011.&nbsp; Over two-thirds of these requests were initiated by the Hong Kong police.&nbsp; Content targeted for removal included the popular protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” as well as five documentaries on YouTube about imprisoned democracy activists and an allegedly “seditious” children’s book “Sheep’s Village.”&nbsp; According to the report, Google denied these requests. &nbsp;In June, the government applied for a court injunction to ban online dissemination of “Glory to Hong Kong” after Google refused authorities’ request to remove the song from search results.&nbsp; The High Court blocked the injunction on July 28, but the government appealed the decision, and another hearing is scheduled for 2024.Impact on Freedom of AssemblyHong Kong law provides for protection of freedom of assembly, but Hong Kong authorities violated this right during the covered period, especially for individuals associated with the pro-democracy movement.&nbsp; Under Hong Kong law, organizers of public meetings and demonstrations are required to apply for a “letter of no objection” from police, but the police did not issue any such letters to groups not affiliated with the PRC or Hong Kong governments during the covered period, effectively banning all non-government sanctioned protests.&nbsp; Until COVID-19 restrictions were lifted in March 2023, authorities cited such restrictions to refuse authorization for assemblies, although civil rights organizations said the intent of the denials was aimed at preventing political gatherings rather than promoting public health. &nbsp;In March 2023, police approved the city’s first rally since the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions, allowing a protest of a reclamation plan, but the government required all participants to march without masks (and therefore be more publicly visible) and limited participation to 100 persons, all of whom had to wear a number tag.In April 2023, the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions canceled its planned April 29 Labor Day rally, which it held annually prior to the 2020 pandemic, citing its failure to obtain a letter of no objection from police.&nbsp; The police did not offer a reason for not issuing the letter.In June 2023, police arrested at least 23 people on the 34th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in what media described as an effort to thwart attempts to commemorate the event.&nbsp; The Hong Kong government has not authorized the annual candlelight vigil to be held in Victoria Park since 2019.&nbsp; Security Chief Chris Tang warned authorities would take “resolute action” against anyone taking advantage of “a special occasion” to threaten national security by promoting Hong Kong independence or seeking to subvert state power.Throughout the reporting period, however, Hong Kong police authorized multiple small protests outside of the U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong and Macau to express views against the United States.&nbsp; Protestors included representatives from Hong Kong’s largest political party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the New People’s Party, and the Federation of Trade Unions.&nbsp;&nbsp;Impact on Freedom of AssociationPRC and Hong Kong authorities disregarded freedom of association, a right enshrined in the Basic Law PRC and Hong Kong authorities used threats, investigations, arrests, asset freezes, and other actions to force the closure of groups they deemed a “national security” concern for their involvement in the pro-democracy movement.&nbsp; Many groups cited increasing legal risks following the imposition of the NSL. Hong Kong authorities used police investigations to place pressure on the family and acquaintances of overseas democracy advocates.&nbsp;Hong Kong authorities continued to use the NSL, the Societies Ordinance, and the Trade Union Ordinance to repress independent unions and other civil society groups.&nbsp; In February 2023, the International Trade Union Confederation condemned the significant regression of union rights in Hong Kong, including a wave of union dissolutions and state-run media attacks on the Confederation of Trade Unions and the HKJA.&nbsp; Unions expressed concern about the safety of their members and their ability to operate freely under the NSL, which some labor groups reported has increased scrutiny on funding for nongovernmental organizations.Under the regulations implementing the NSL, Hong Kong police may require any group that is considered a “foreign agent” to provide information on its activities, personnel, and finances, with a maximum prison sentence of six months for failure to comply.&nbsp; In March 2023, three former leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, including prominent democracy activist and barrister Chow Hang-tung, were convicted and sentenced to more than four months in prison for not complying with a national security policy request for more information.&nbsp; EU spokesperson Nabila Massrali described the sentencing as “another example of the authorities abusing legislation to suppress fundamental freedoms.”&nbsp;In May, the Civic Party, a pro-democracy party founded in 2006, announced it would disband.&nbsp; Another opposition group, the League of Social Democrats, revealed in June that a bank had terminated the party’s accounts without explanation.In August, national security police arrested 10 persons associated with the defunct “612 Humanitarian Fund,” on allegations of “conspiracy to collude with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” and “inciting rioting.” &nbsp;Beijing-controlled media outlets in Hong Kong regularly accused organizations, including political parties and civil society groups, of being “anti-China” or violating the NSL because of their dissenting political opinions.&nbsp;Impact on Freedom of MovementHong Kong law, including the Basic Law, provides for freedom of movement within Hong Kong, as well as the freedom to travel, to enter or leave Hong Kong, and to emigrate, but during the covered period, the government restricted enjoyment of this right for certain individuals.&nbsp; Hong Kong law enforcement nevertheless continued to use a provision of the NSL to seize travel documents from democracy activists and opposition politicians arrested under the NSL, even without filing charges.According to local media reports, Hong Kong authorities maintain an exit ban “watchlist” of residents who will be intercepted if they attempt to leave Hong Kong, and many former activists and protestors who have been arrested are not allowed to depart Hong Kong as a condition of their bail.&nbsp;On December 4, Agnes Chow announced on social media she would not return to Hong Kong.&nbsp; Chow, a pro-democracy activist and founding member of the now disbanded Demosisto political party, told media that Hong Kong authorities confiscated her passport and closely monitored her movements as conditions of her bail after she was arrested in 2020 for allegedly colluding with foreign forces.&nbsp; She said that the Hong Kong government only allowed her to depart Hong Kong and study abroad in Canada in September 2023 after she participated in a one-day trip to mainland China with Hong Kong police.&nbsp; She said that police officers took her to a “patriotic” exhibition showcasing China’s achievements, and she toured the headquarters of technology firm Tencent.&nbsp; Chow said police also required her to write and sign several letters, including one thanking Hong Kong authorities.&nbsp; On December 29, police publicly condemned Chow for failing to report to authorities and confirmed she is now on the police’s wanted list. &nbsp;There were reports that authorities denied entry to individuals based on their perceived links to the 2019 pro-democracy protests and international human rights organizations.&nbsp; A Japanese street musician performing under the name “Mr. Wally” disclosed on social media that he was interrogated for two hours by immigration officers upon arriving at Hong Kong International Airport in June 2023, and he was ultimately refused entry and deported to Japan the following day.&nbsp; In August, authorities refused to allow a photographer from the United States to enter Hong Kong, without giving an explanation.&nbsp; The photographer told media he suspected the Hong Kong government had “blacklisted” him because he had photographed and staged an exhibition of 2019 pro-democracy protests. &nbsp;Impact on Education and Academic FreedomDuring the covered period, Hong Kong authorities restricted expression in schools and universities, threatened and penalized teachers and academics who expressed dissenting opinions, and reformed curriculum to include “national security education.”In accordance with the NSL, the Hong Kong Education Bureau implemented a national security education curriculum at all grade levels in government-funded schools, as well as, to a lesser extent, in international and private schools.&nbsp; Under Education Bureau guidelines, schools are required to prevent and suppress any curriculum and activities that are in breach of the NSL, the Basic Law, or other Hong Kong law; to limit political expression and activities on school campuses; and to support periodic reports regarding their implementation of “national security education.”&nbsp; Education Bureau guidelines for primary and secondary school teachers bars them from encouraging speech that “violates the social order” and from promoting “biased values,” and requires teachers to have a “correct understanding” of the NSL.As of the 2022-2023 academic year, all eight publicly funded universities in Hong Kong require undergraduate students, including international students, to complete mandatory “national security” courses to graduate, according to government documents.&nbsp; At least three private universities will also require the courses.Public libraries, schools, and universities culled their holdings, including archives, to comply with the NSL.&nbsp; Hong Kong University required library users to register to access “Special Collections” containing books about the Tiananmen Square massacre and others written by Hong Kong democracy advocates.&nbsp; The Hong Kong Public Library required special registration to access microfilm collections on the Tiananmen Square massacre.In September 2023, the V-Dem Institute, a research organization based in Sweden, released a report on academic freedom that found Hong Kong ranked 152 out of 179 countries in 2022.&nbsp; According to the organization’s academic freedom index, Hong Kong’s score has gradually declined from its peak (0.89) in 1997 to a new low (0.23) in 2022.&nbsp; The index ranges from 0 to 1, with the higher the index, the higher the degree of academic freedom.&nbsp; It rates five factors, including freedom of “research and teaching,” “academic exchange and dissemination,” “institutional autonomy,” “campus integrity,” and “academic and cultural expression.”In October, Chinese University of Hong Kong fired history professor Rowena He after the Hong Kong government denied her work visa renewal.&nbsp; Professor He, a Canadian citizen and scholar of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, told media her visa denial was an attack on intellectual freedom and expressed concern it would have a chilling effect on other Hong Kong academics.&nbsp; The Hong Kong government removed He’s book “Tiananmen Exiles: Voices of the Struggle for Democracy in China” from Hong Kong public libraries in May. &nbsp;In November, the Legislative Council passed a bill to reform Chinese University of Hong Kong’s (CUHK) governing council, reducing the number and influence of university staff and academics, and increasing the number of external members.&nbsp; When debating the bill, Bill Tang, one of three lawmakers on the university’s governing council who initiated the bill, cited clashes between protestors and police at CUHK during 2019 protests as one of the justifications for the reform. &nbsp;Impact on Freedom of Religion or BeliefHong Kong authorities generally respected freedom of religion or belief.&nbsp; During the covered period, most religious leaders and advocates stated the NSL did not negatively impact religious practitioners’ ability to worship without government interference.&nbsp; However, religious leaders reported that they increasingly practice self-censorship, including by avoiding political topics in their sermons and not appointing clergy deemed to be critical of the government.&nbsp; In 2022, the Diocese of Hong Kong’s Justice and Peace Commission, which had organized annual masses commemorating victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre June 4 masses could violate the NSL and announced no Catholic churches in the city would hold memorial masses.&nbsp; Hong Kong authorities arrested and prosecuted religious leaders for activities and nonviolent political expression related to the pro-democracy movement.&nbsp; As of the end of 2023, the trial of Cardinal Joseph Zen, the former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, and an outspoken defender of civil rights in Hong Kong and mainland China, on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” remained pending.&nbsp; In August, national security police arrested 10 persons associated with the defunct “612 Humanitarian Fund,” of which Zen was a trustee, on allegations of “conspiracy to collude with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” and “inciting rioting.”&nbsp; Some religious leaders, including Zen himself, described these arrests as connected to these people’s political activities rather than their religious roles.&nbsp; However, activists and other religious figures expressed fears that the arrests could further discourage religious leaders and organizations from speaking out on political issues.According to the November 2023 report from Hong Kong Watch, some religious leaders said religious schools in Hong Kong, under pressure from the government, were “diluting religious education” due to new NSL and “patriotic” education mandates.Impact on U.S.-Hong Kong ExchangesU.S. institutions conducted a wide range of nongovernmental academic, cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges with Hong Kong counterparts.&nbsp; Public and private universities in Hong Kong offer opportunities for students to study in the United States, including semester-long reciprocal exchanges with U.S. universities as well as joint degree and group exchanges organized through academic departments.&nbsp; U.S. Department of State professional-level exchanges are returning to pre-pandemic levels, with the exception of the U.S.-Hong Kong/Macau Fulbright exchange program, which remains suspended by E.O. 13936.Impact on U.S. CitizensIn 2023, an estimated 84,000 U.S. citizens lived in Hong Kong.&nbsp; That number has rebounded to approximately the same number as before the COVID-19 pandemic.&nbsp; Since the imposition of the NSL in June 2020, the PRC increasingly exercised police and security power in Hong Kong, subjecting U.S. citizens who are publicly critical of the PRC to a heightened risk of arrest, detention, expulsion, or prosecution in Hong Kong.&nbsp; The Department of State has highlighted these risks to U.S. citizens in its Travel Advisories for Hong Kong.&nbsp; Some U.S. citizens with ties to people or organizations that have been critical of the Hong Kong or PRC central governments were held and questioned by immigration authorities upon entering Hong Kong regarding their local contacts and refused entry into Hong Kong.&nbsp; For some teachers, national security education policies have led to restrictions on academic freedom.U.S.-Hong Kong Cooperation and AgreementsThe United States and Hong Kong continue to maintain several bilateral agreements regarding issues such as taxation, parcel delivery, and air transportation services.&nbsp; In 2020, Hong Kong authorities notified the U.S. government of their purported suspension of an agreement concerning mutual legal assistance in criminal affairs. &nbsp;During the covered period, the Hong Kong government ignored or denied pending official requests the U.S. government had made for mutual legal assistance under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and UN Convention against Corruption, and the U.S. government made no new requests under these conventions.&nbsp; U.S. law enforcement had very limited official engagement with the HKPF National Security Department during the covered period.&nbsp; U.S. law enforcement agencies made efforts to liaise with Hong Kong law enforcement counterparts and had limited cooperation in the fields of counter trafficking in persons, trade fraud, wildlife trafficking, child exploitation, drug trafficking, intellectual property rights theft, financial crimes, and money laundering.Sanctions EngagementThe United States communicated with Hong Kong authorities through demarches and notifications on issues involving sanctions implementation, including with respect to actions taken by the Department of the Treasury against several Hong Kong-registered entities under sanctions authorities related to China, Russia, and Iran.&nbsp; While the Hong Kong government maintained during the covered period that it would only implement UN sanctions, not “unilateral” sanctions such as U.S. designations, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has clarified for banks that while they are under no legal obligation to observe foreign government unilateral sanctions, banks need to establish and implement policies for their Hong Kong businesses that are informed by a thorough assessment of any legal, business, and commercial risks involved. &nbsp;Actions Taken by the U.S. GovernmentSince the imposition of the NSL in June 2020, the U.S. government has imposed financial sanctions on 42 PRC and Hong Kong officials under E.O. 13936, 39 of whom were identified pursuant to section 5(a) of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, in connection with actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong. Under Section 7 of the E.O., those designated for financial sanctions and their immediate family members are also subject to visa restrictions.&nbsp; The U.S. government has also taken steps to impose visa restrictions on numerous PRC officials and their immediate family members under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, similarly for their involvement in the undermining of Hong Kong’s autonomy.&nbsp; The U.S. government did not impose sanctions on any new individuals under these authorities during the covered period. &nbsp;At various times during the covered period, in response to PRC and Hong Kong authorities’ actions, the United States issued statements, often with likeminded partners, raising concerns and calling for those authorities to respect&nbsp;Hong Kong’s promised high degree of autonomy.&nbsp; In July 2023, the Department of State released its annual Investment Climate Statement for Hong Kong, which highlighted the increased risks to U.S. business operations and activities as a result of the PRC’s actions to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and rule of law.&nbsp; The Department of Commerce also highlighted these risks in its Country Commercial Guide.Officials from the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau regularly attended court hearings and trials of defendants charged with offenses designated as involving “national security” alongside representatives from a broad range of concerned countries.&nbsp; The U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau maintains a list, based on publicly available sources, of all people and organizations in Hong Kong arrested, charged, or found guilty in connection with offenses designated as involving “national security.”Areas of Remaining AutonomyEven though the PRC continued its efforts to erode the rights and freedoms it promised for Hong Kong under the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration, key policy differences remained between Hong Kong and mainland China, including in the areas of commercial and trade policy, internet access, and freedom of religion.Hong Kong continued to exercise authority in the implementation of commercial agreements and practiced free and open trade, with negligible tariff or non-tariff barriers.&nbsp; Commercial and civil aspects of the Hong Kong legal system continued to be based on common-law traditions, though the continued enforcement of the NSL, as well as the NPCSC’s December 2022 interpretation of the NSL, raised serious concerns about the judicial system’s continued independence.&nbsp; Hong Kong’s extensive body of commercial and company law generally follows that of the United Kingdom, including the common law and rules of equity.&nbsp; Most statutory law is made locally.&nbsp; The local court system provides for effective enforcement of contracts, dispute settlement, and protection of rights.&nbsp; Foreign and domestic companies register under the same rules and are subject to the same set of business regulations.&nbsp; Property rights were well-protected in law and practice.&nbsp; Hong Kong maintained its own currency, pegged to the U.S. dollar.&nbsp; The Hong Kong Monetary Authority set monetary policy autonomously from the People’s Bank of China, and Hong Kong’s financial regulators continued to act independently from their mainland China counterparts.Hong Kong sets its own data regulations and does not have any broad data localization requirements.&nbsp; Under mainland China’s cross-border data transfer requirements, Hong Kong is considered outside of China and is treated the same as foreign jurisdictions.The Hong Kong government appears to have wide latitude in setting policies on climate and green finance, and the city has set climate disclosure requirements that are stricter than mainland China’s and aligned with international best practices.Hong Kong continues to have separate representation from mainland China in a number of international organizations and multilateral entities, including the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Olympic Committee, and the World Trade Organization, and participates autonomously in various green finance multilateral fora.&nbsp; The extent to which PRC authorities influence Hong Kong votes and actions in these bodies remains unclear.Export ControlsSince December 23, 2020, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has reviewed transactions involving Hong Kong under the same export control policy as any other PRC destination.&nbsp; Between February 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023, BIS identified and designated 39 entities located in Hong Kong that provided support for a foreign military acting contrary to U.S. foreign policy and national security.&nbsp; As a result, a BIS license is required for certain exports, reexports, and in-country transfers when a party has knowledge that a military end user is a party to the transaction (e.g., as purchaser, intermediate consignee, ultimate consignee, or end user).Hong Kong Policy Act FindingsE.O. 13936, issued in July 2020 to address the suspension of the application of Section 201(a) of the Hong Kong Policy Act to certain U.S. laws, remains in effect.&nbsp; There were no terminations under section 202(d) or determinations under section 201(b) of the Act during the covered period.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																								Hong Kong																																Hong Kong Autonomy Act Update																																							Human Rights																																																					Human Rights and Democracy
- Hong Kong Policy Act Report Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOver the past year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued to take actions against Hong Kong’s promised high degree of autonomy, democratic institutions, and rights and freedoms. This includes Hong Kong authorities’ recent enactment of legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which has broad and vaguely defined provisions regarding “sedition,” “state secrets,” and interactions with foreign entities. These provisions could both be used to eliminate dissent inside Hong Kong and applied outside of its borders as part of the PRC’s ongoing campaign of transnational repression.Each year, the Department of State submits to Congress the Hong Kong Policy Act Report and accompanying certification. This year, I have again certified that Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. laws in the same manner as the laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. This year’s report catalogs the intensifying repression and ongoing crackdown by PRC and Hong Kong authorities on civil society, media, and dissenting voices, including through the issuance of bounties and arrest warrants for more than a dozen pro-democracy activists living outside Hong Kong. In response, the Department of State is announcing that it is taking steps to impose new visa restrictions on multiple Hong Kong officials responsible for the intensifying crackdown on rights and freedoms, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.We are committed to continuing to work with Congress and the international community to stand with the people in Hong Kong in calling for the restoration of Hong Kongers’ protected rights and freedoms, the immediate release of those unjustly detained or imprisoned under the National Security Law, and respect for the rule of law.
- Department Press Briefing – March 19, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 19, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 19, 2024																																																					March 19, 2024																																																								12:39 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Sorry for being a couple minutes tardy. I apologize. I don’t have anything off the top today, so Shaun, you want to take us off?QUESTION: Sure. I’m sure most of you want to talk about Gaza first, but first can I just ask you about Hong Kong?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: The – in Hong Kong, there’s the approval by the legislature of the security law. Some rights groups have said this will further clamp down on free expression, on media freedom. Does the United States have a reaction or any preview of things it might to do as a result of this?MR PATEL: Certainly, Shaun. We believe that these kinds of actions have the potential to accelerate the closing of Hong Kong’s once open society. We’re alarmed by the sweeping and what we interpret as vaguely defined provisions laid out in their Article 23 legislation. We think that this was fast-tracked through the nondemocratically elected legislative council after a truncated public comment period. We also believe that a lot of the phrasing and crimes that are outlined are poorly defined and incredibly vague. They use phrases such as external interference, which is incredibly vague. So we’re analyzing this legislation, and we are taking a look at what the potential risk could be to not just U.S. citizens but other American interests that we might have.QUESTION: Sure. I just want to follow up on that.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: We’re hearing calls, particularly from the Hill, for the U.S. to stop treating Hong Kong entirely as a separate entity, that it’s been more integrated into the PRC. Is there any policy change do you think that will happen as a result of this? Any &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t want to speculate or go down any rabbit hole of a sort of potential outcome, Shaun, but what I can say is that we’re not going to hesitate to call out those responsible for the erosion of Hong Kong’s promised autonomy. And when we see things like this that happen, we won’t hesitate to not use our voice but, should the circumstances require it, use other actions that the United States has at its disposal. But I am not in a place or – to announce any policy change or anything like that.QUESTION: Sure. Let me switch to Gaza unless anybody else wants to talk about Hong Kong. The – a few things. But the UN Human Rights Chief, Mr. Türk, said today that Israel may be using food or a lack of food as a weapon of war, which, of course, would be a war crime. Does the U.S. have a reaction to his remarks?MR PATEL: So let me just say that is not something that we have observed or witnessed, but we continue to be deeply concerned about the report that’s indicating that famine is imminent in Gaza. This report makes clear that the amount of aid reaching the people in Gaza is insufficient and that more needs to be done. We need to redouble our efforts to ensure that aid can get to the places that it needs to go, both – you heard me talk about this a little bit yesterday – via land routes, via air drops, and this forthcoming maritime corridor as well.There is a lot of work that needs to be done to ensure that this kind of aid can get to the kind of places that it needs to go. I will just also add though, Shaun, that yesterday we saw 69 trucks enter via Rafah. In response to, I believe, Simon’s question yesterday, I spoke about an 18-truck convoy making its way from the south to the north. And we’ve also seen reports of 182 trucks entering yesterday via Kerem Shalom. These are all helpful metrics and good steps in the right direction, but to echo again what I said yesterday, more needs to be done to help address this stark and devasting reality in Gaza right now.QUESTION: Just to follow up on that &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Of course, you mentioned things are being done – to include by the United States – to alleviate the situation, but why is it that the U.S. disagrees with the assessment of Mr. Türk that there is – that it’s – that it’s being used as a weapon of war?MR PATEL: Because we’re seeing aid and food and these kinds of provisions enter Gaza. They – they are not entering at the rate or clip that they need to be, they are not entering fast enough, they are not getting to the places that they need to go, and that’s why we’ve called for more. But I’m not – I am not in a place to offer any kind of like legal or geopolitical assessment, and it’s certainly not one that we have seen or characterized.QUESTION: Just one more before I turn it over to colleagues.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: But I was wondering if you have any follow-up on the conversation we had yesterday about the UNRWA Chief, Mr. Lazzarini. Do you have anything more to say? Yesterday, you said that you’re basically deferring comment on it. Does the United States see anything abnormal about him not being let in?MR PATEL: So as it relates to the specific incident, I will let the United Nations and Israel speak to that specifically. But to just say more broadly, all regional governments need to do what is necessary to enable the humanitarian response, and this, of course, includes allowing the free movement of international staff and the freedom of this movement to help with that kind of response. Commissioner General Lazzarini and UN staff, our belief is that they should be able to visit UNRWA’s fields of operation, including in Gaza. And we’re going to continue to work with the Government of Israel to rapidly approve all requested visas for UN and NGO workers in an expeditious fashion.QUESTION: Actually, that’s really specific. I mean, the – so I mean, is there a call for Israel to rapidly to approve Mr. Lazzarini’s entry?MR PATEL: Again, I don’t want to speak to that situation in specificity because I am not aware of the circumstances of what transpired and why he was specifically denied entry. But I will just echo again that we believe that the free movement of international workers is a key part of the humanitarian response and that Mr. Lazzarini and his staff we believe should be able to assess their operations. And so we’re going to continue to work with the Government of Israel and other appropriate interlocutors to push for that to happen.Simon.QUESTION: Can we come to – so the call between the President and Prime Minister Netanyahu yesterday, obviously the White House but this speaks to broader U.S. policy.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: So you’ve sort of talked about – well, it’s been talked about from this podium the – that the offensive in Rafah would be disastrous, and that it seems to be the warning has even made even more strongly on this call yesterday. But Prime Minister Netanyahu said today they’re determined to complete an elimination of the Hamas battalions in Rafah; there’s no way to do that except by going in on the ground. So do you have any response to basically this pushback to what the U.S. Government is trying to tell the Israelis?MR PATEL: It should come as no surprise that when it comes to this we are just squarely in a different place and have a different viewpoint than our Israeli partners. You saw National Security Advisor Sullivan speak about this a little bit yesterday, but I will also note that in this very same call President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to have their teams meet, for them to meet soon here in Washington, to exchange views and discuss alternative approaches that would target the key elements of Hamas, help secure the Egypt-Gaza border, and do so without a major ground operation in Rafah. We continue to feel quite strongly that such an operation in Rafah, where there are more than a million people seeking refuge, a region that continues to be a key conduit for the entrance of humanitarian aid, that doing something like that without a credible and clear plan is something that – without a plan that also doesn’t address for the various humanitarian pieces would be a disaster. And we hope that through this mechanism our officials will be able to discuss some of these issues in greater detail and find a path forward.QUESTION: So in that mechanism there will be – what you’re saying is the U.S. will have some suggestions of how – basically Netanyahu is saying it’s not possible to do it without a ground operation. You’re saying it is.MR PATEL: We will &#8212;QUESTION: So you’re going to give them ideas on how to do &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t want to get ahead of the process here, Simon. We’ll have an exchange of views with them and discuss approaches that we think are in line with our shared objective of degrading Hamas and ensuring that October 7th can no longer be repeated while simultaneously also being cognizant, mindful, respectful of the more than a million people seeking refuge in Rafah and being mindful of the important conduit that Rafah continues to be for humanitarian aid.QUESTION: Are you able to say when that meeting is going to take place?MR PATEL: I don’t have any scheduling updates at this moment.Yeah, Camilla.QUESTION: Thank you. Also just going back to what National Security Advisor Sullivan was talking about yesterday, he implied that there hasn’t been a response from Israel on the President’s national security memorandum. I was wondering whether you could confirm whether or not Israel has responded with a letter to that effect and if you could give us a bit more information on the what next, when they respond?MR PATEL: Sure. So as it relates to individual countries and their communications with us as it relates to the national security memorandum, I will defer to those other countries to speak to those pieces. I don’t want to get into those details on an internal processes from here, nor do I want to speak for other countries.But as you all recall, this was signed on February 8th, and as laid out quite clearly in the text of the national security memorandum, there are 45 days for countries to offer an assurance via a letter as it relates to the provision of U.S. lethal assistance. And in that time, after receiving that assurance, the United States also, through close coordination with the interagency as well as close consultation with our relevant embassies and consulates, will take a look at that certification that is provided to us.QUESTION: Can you confirm as to whether or not Israel has responded?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to speak to individual countries as it relates to an entire memorandum.Go ahead, Gillian.QUESTION: Haiti? A couple questions?MR PATEL: Can I see if anybody else has anything on Gaza, and then I’ll come back to you?Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Just following up on what Shaun was asking on the famine, you’re saying you don’t see that famine is imminent in Gaza?MR PATEL: That is literally not what I said, Said.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: I think in the very first thing I said in response to Shaun’s question is that we are &#8212;QUESTION: I’m just trying to understand it. Maybe I couldn’t hear.MR PATEL: The question was from – you can actually just read the transcript if you want to see what Shaun’s specific question was. But let me just echo again we are deeply concerned about the report that indicate that famine in – imminent in Gaza.QUESTION: Thank you. Because there was actually a report by Samantha Power saying that it is imminent, so glad you clarified that.MR PATEL: I think it was a press release.QUESTION: I have a couple other questions. The Wall Street Journal reported that Israel is going to expropriate, or steal as they called it, 60 percent of Gaza for a buffer zone. Is that something that you’re aware of or is that something that would be acceptable to the administration, considering that the administration said time and again that Gaza should not be reduced in size?MR PATEL: That’s absolutely right. You have heard me and the Secretary and Matt be very clear that there must be no reduction in territory of Gaza, that Israel needs to comply with international law in any measures it takes to defend itself, and it needs to take every feasible step to protect civilian harm. We certainly appreciate Israel’s need for security, especially since October 7th, but again, let me just be very clear that there can be no reduction in territory of Gaza.QUESTION: So the administration would never agree to the concept of a buffer zone?MR PATEL: That is not something – that is the kind of thing that would run contrary to the – one of the key principles that Secretary Blinken laid out in Tokyo last fall – or last winter.QUESTION: There was also an article in The Washington Post that said that the President and the administration, they knew very well early on, in the meeting on the 27th of October, that Israel was purposely targeting Palestinian civilians. Are you aware of that report? Have you seen it?MR PATEL: I – I am just not going to comment on any hearsay, Said. We have been very clear with our Israeli partners that they need to do more to improve its deconfliction mechanisms, that more must be done to minimize civilian casualties, and more needs to be done to protect the well-being of Palestinian civilians. And that’s something that we’ll continue to echo and raise with them at every opportunity.QUESTION: So you think that the administration was surprised by the amount of civilian casualties, was unaware that the Israelis were targeting purposely &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m just not going to – I’m not going to engage in reporting that is hearsay and rooted in internal deliberative assessments.QUESTION: And lastly, now, you said that you want to make sure – the administration wants to make sure that October 7th could never be repeated again, because it’s – it falls under Israel’s right to defend itself and all that stuff. Now, we know that – it’s been reported in the last couple days – that the Israelis have distributed something like 100,000 pieces of small arms to settlers, around settlers, to basically defend themselves. My question to you: Do Palestinians have the right to defend themselves? And in what form should the Palestinians defend themselves?MR PATEL: Are you talking about in the – in what context are you speaking about, Said?QUESTION: I’m saying that the Palestinians are being assaulted time and time and time again. I mean, Israel attacked Gaza – unlike what many people like to think, that the whole issue began on October 7, Israel has struck Gaza &#8212;MR PATEL: When we talk about &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; time and time again for decades before that, right.MR PATEL: Let me just say two things, Said. When we talk about Israel having the right to defend itself and Israel having the right to security, what we’re talking about is defending itself from terrorist groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who have a track record of carrying out terrorist attacks on the people of Israel as recently as – I’d point you no further than October 7th.When it comes to the expansions of settlements and activities from settlers which we find insightful, dangerous, reckless, we have not parsed our words. I recall just a number of weeks ago in which the Secretary spoke quite clearly about our viewpoint that we find the expansion of settlements to be inconsistent with international law. We believe that these kinds of activities run contrary to Israel’s security, and they run contrary to what we hope is a shared goal of a two-state solution, where Israelis and Palestinians can have equal measures of justice and peace and security. And that’s what we’re going to continue to work towards.QUESTION: What about the – what about the military raids night after night that go in with half-tracks and sometimes helicopters, Apache helicopters, and so on, and even with drones and armed assaults and so on? Do they have the right to defend themselves against such military assaults?MR PATEL: Said, what we’re talking about is – you’re using examples of our partners in Israel conducting legitimate security operations that are in the interest of their self-defense and the interest of security.All right. Anything else on Gaza? Go ahead, and then I promise I will get to you, Gillian. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. There was a Washington Post investigation published today about the killing of our freelancers, Al Jazeera freelancers, in Gaza: Mustafa and Hamza. And they – Washington Post also sought the help of experts in this investigation, and they found out that the reasons the Israelis give for this – it happens in January 7th – is not consistent with evidence that they found. I don’t know if you saw this report. But it shows, according to Washington Post, that there was no Israeli military presence around them, both of them. They were alone; they were conducting a story for us. And they were targeted and killed both in January 7.And I remember – I was in Tel Aviv at that time, but I remember you were – Matt was asked here in this room about if they reached to the Israeli partners for clarification, and he said that they – you did. And I’m asking you here: did you hear back from them?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates for you. First, let me just say, though – you heard me talk a little bit about this yesterday – we believe that journalists and the right to free speech needs to be protected, and especially in the situation in the context of what’s happening in Gaza, journalism is more important than ever. I will also say that we’ve been crystal clear that Israel needs to treat all detainees humanely and with dignity and in full accordance with international law.Go ahead.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: On Gaza?QUESTION: Yes, on Gaza.MR PATEL: Okay. All right.QUESTION: Vedant, why you are talking publicly about your disagreement with the Israeli? And this is a departure from your policy. Is it because you don’t have any kind of leverage? Is it – what are you trying to tell us?MR PATEL: Have you been to any State Department briefings in the past couple months?QUESTION: Yes, I have been, yes.MR PATEL: Are you sure?QUESTION: I mean, not – I’m not talking about this month. I’m talking lately. At the beginning you were very reluctant in talking publicly about your disagreement.MR MILLER: That’s – that’s – that’s not true. That – I would just respectfully disagree with the premise of your question. Dating back to October, we have been clear-eyed about a couple things. First, we have been clear-eyed that Israel has every right to defend itself, that Israel’s right to security is something that we agree with. We also agree with every step must be possible – every step must be taken to degrade Hamas so such an event like October 7th can’t be repeated.We also, when it has come to the provision of humanitarian aid, when we’ve talked about the protection and well-being of Palestinian civilians, and even recently in the context of Rafah, when we have had disagreements on policy, disagreements on course of action, we’ve not hesitated to say those and raise those privately. But when we’re asked about them in this briefing room or when the Secretary takes questions from you, we have not hesitated to make our point of view from the United States of America, from the State Department crystal clear.QUESTION: Just I want to clarify why I’m asking this question. Because yesterday Jake Sullivan, when he was laying down the arguments why the administration doesn’t support a military operation in Rafah, he said instead for – the Israeli – instead of stabilizing areas, they are planning. This kind of criticism didn’t come publicly this way before.MR PATEL: I’m not sure that I would interpret – I saw the National Security Advisor’s comments as well. I’m not sure I would categorize those as criticisms, either. Look, in the context of what we believe needs to happen with Rafah, we just have a different viewpoint. We have a different strategic viewpoint on what we believe is necessary to help target the key elements of Hamas. And our goal is, through this meeting that the prime minister and President Biden spoke about on their call, we hope that we’ll be able to have an exchange of views and discuss an alternative approach that, like I said, will target the key elements of Hamas, secure this border in the Rafah area, but also not negatively impact the more than a million people who are seeking refuge in the area, not negatively impact the important work that’s being done to further enhance the flow of humanitarian aid.Anything else on Gaza before I go back to Gillian, who has been patiently waiting? On Gaza? Okay, go ahead.QUESTION: Two quick questions &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; on the aid drops.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Question number one. U.S. officials have said that the rations air dropped in Gaza are pork-free, but I wanted to ask was it &#8212;MR PATEL: Are what?QUESTION: Pork-free, like there’s no pork products. But I wanted to ask: Was it ensured that all of the food provided was halal, including preservatives and such? And then question number two is it also seems that the packaging was labeled in English – was there any Arabic language material provided in those aid rations, including food names and instructions &#8212;MR PATEL: I – so as it relates to both of your questions, I just – as it relates to both of your questions, I don’t have the technical level of detail. I will just say if we’ve previously stated that they – that these rations are pork-free, I would have no reason not to say that that’s accurate. And in all of these circumstances, we try to be incredibly mindful of the local culture and food customs when it comes to these things. But I’m happy to check with the team if we have a more specific answer we can give you.Gillian, go ahead.QUESTION: Republican of Florida Cory Mills saying today that he – his office has evacuated 23 Americans out of the capital in Haiti. I’m wondering if that is something that was coordinated with the State Department, if it’s an action that you support.MR PATEL: So look, we are relieved when any American citizen is able to make its way to safety. We of course closely coordinate with Congress on a number of issues, but I will just note that operations like these that are sort of done deviating from formal State Department operations, they can be high-risk. We’re talking about a country that’s been a Level 4 Do Not Travel country since 2020. And so we want to make sure that we are not – that actions that are taken are not further inciting additional risk or putting individuals into harm’s way. But again, we find it welcome news when any American citizen makes its way to safety.I will just note from the State Department’s perspective, you’re aware of the operation that was conducted over the weekend that was able to facilitate the safe departure of over 30 U.S. citizens. We continue to explore options that we have at our disposal when it comes to American citizens interested in departing Haiti from specifically the Port-au-Prince area, and we’ll remain in touch with American citizens who have expressed an interest in staying in touch with the embassy and learning about options through not just our Crisis Intake Form, but Smart Traveler and the other mechanisms we have at our disposal.QUESTION: Yesterday you had said that nearly a thousand people have registered through the portal, the website. Any update on those numbers, or Americans generally in Haiti, today?MR PATEL: So that – so for – let me say two things. First, when we talk about individual – the population of people who register, we have to remember we’re – not everyone who registers with this form or contacts us necessarily is requesting departure assistance. Some just want to stay in touch with the embassy; some just want to see what information we have to share with them, advice on how they may be able to remain safely, and to potentially stay in touch if they choose to potentially depart in the future.Like in any country around the world, we do not ask American citizens to register with the U.S. Government when they travel abroad, so numbers of how many American citizens are in X amount of country is always – they always vary and they’re constantly changing. But the embassy uses estimates from Smart Traveler enrollments and from other measures to have a rough number to work with.I will note that in terms of our crisis intake form, the number continues to be approaching a thousand, and we’ll continue to remain in touch with those American citizens to answer any questions that they might have.QUESTION: Thank you. Last question. You mentioned yesterday that there was going to be some action today or communication today with adoption agencies. We’ve been hearing from, like, American parents who say that they have adopted children who are stuck in Haiti; they’re unable to get them out because maybe they don’t have their U.S. citizenship yet or visas. Any more specific information on what State is doing on that front?MR PATEL: I don&#8217;t have more specific information. We are continuing to communicate with adoption agencies as well as prospective families regarding recent developments and assessing the situation as it unfolds. We’re working with the Haitian Government to figure out what options are for children at the various stages in the adoption process, and we’re working through individual inquiries as well as working and collaborating closely with adoption service partners. But I don&#8217;t have a more specific breakdown to offer to you.As you know, there are limited consular services available, given the conditions in the country. But this is something that we’re continuing to work through. We recognize how difficult this situation might be. And we encourage prospective parents to remain in regular contact not just with us through our embassy channels, but also through their adoption service providers. And we encourage everybody to enroll in Smart Traveler to continue to stay up to date, as the situation on the ground is quite fluid.Anything else on Haiti before we move away? Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On those departure options from Port-au-Prince, potential departure options I should say – we’re in contact with Americans who’ve received communication from the State Department that there might be helicopter air lifts leaving the capital city for the Dominican Republic. Do you have any updates on that?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speak in specificity to these options, just given operational security. But I would just say that, as I’ve just said, we are exploring options for American citizens to depart Haiti from Port-au-Prince to Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic. From there, American citizens would be responsible for their own onward travel to the United States from Santo Domingo. And we’re continuing to look at what options might make sense and what will make the most sense for the impacted American citizens. And we, of course – as this is a very fluid situation on the ground, as more develops, we’ll continue to stay in touch with the impacted folks.QUESTION: And just a quick follow.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On the humanitarian condition, of course it remains very dire and it’s getting worse.MR PATEL: Of course.QUESTION: We’ve seen reports that the capital city may be completely out of food in the next week or so. Is the U.S. doing anything to enable aid to move into Haiti right now?MR PATEL: So for those of you that joined us in Kingston, Jamaica last Monday, the Secretary announced an additional $33 million in humanitarian aid. I believe our colleagues at the White House followed that announcement up later in the week for some additional funding that was announced to help address the humanitarian situation in Haiti. The situation is dire, and every day matters.And that is why we are hoping, as soon as possible, our partners at CARICOM, in close coordination with this forthcoming transitional presidential council, announce the members of the council, of who the makeup of that group will be, so that they can take on the very important task of selecting an interim prime minister who can help seek out stability on the ground, work closely with our Kenyan partners on the deployment of the multinational security force, and we’ll take this process step by step.QUESTION: Follow up briefly on that?MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just the – and you mentioned it yesterday as well, the transitional council. Do you have any update? I know CARICOM is in lead, but any update on this?MR PATEL: I don’t at this point. Again, we’ve been coordinating closely with our partners in CARICOM and its chairman, President Ali of Guyana. I don&#8217;t have any updates for you, but our hope continues to be that this transitional presidential council is announced as soon as possible. We believe that it is vital to paving the way to not just free and fair elections, but the deployment of this MSS as well.People I – I saw you saw your hand up on Haiti. Good? Okay. Anything else on Haiti before we move to something else?All right. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: A few questions from me, starting on Russia.MR PATEL: Can we just – let’s do a couple, so we can get to your friends. (Laughter.)QUESTION: The Secretary issued a statement on Russian election. He stopped short calling it undemocratic. Isn’t it a bit soft assessment, given all the violations, Russian crimes that he depicted in the very statement?MR PATEL: I would not read too much into the word choice, Alex. We believe this to be an undemocratic process. I said so yesterday. It’s something that I know the Secretary agrees with.QUESTION: On the occupied territories, Matt told us last week that the U.S. will use all their available tools to punish those who serve as election observers for the Kremlin’s sham election in occupied territories of Ukraine. I know you don’t telegraph any sanctions, but are you guys working on it? And secondly, is it going to be limited with Ukraine only, or you will also consider election observers who served in Georgia’s and Moldova’s occupied territories?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to preview actions, but I just want to use this opportunity to echo that all of those territories, we believe them to be Ukraine.QUESTION: On the Ukrainian front, does the Secretary agree with his European colleagues – most notably the EU Commission Chair Michel, and also previously French President Macron – that Europe needs to be prepared for war?MR PATEL: Sorry, I didn’t understand the first part of your question.QUESTION: That Europe needs to be prepared for war if it needs peace. These statements have been recently reflected by European leaders. Does the Secretary agree with that approach?MR PATEL: So look, we have been very clear that the U.S. is not going to send troops to fight in Ukraine, and NATO secretary general has also ruled out sending any NATO troops to fight in Ukraine. We believe that the most immediate and helpful path forward to stop Putin’s aggression would be for the House of Representatives to pass the national security supplemental so our Ukrainian partners have the weapons and ammunition they need to defend themselves, and they’ll continue to fight courageously to defend their democracy and to push back against this infringement on their territorial integrity and sovereignty.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up from me on the &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: I’ll – okay. Okay, okay. Go ahead.QUESTION: On South Caucasus.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Armenian prime minister today was quoted as saying that quick border demarcation needed to avoid a war. How alarmed are you right now, given this statement?MR PATEL: Look, this is an issue that we are continuing to pay close attention to. It’s something that not just the Secretary but Assistant Secretary O’Brien as well as Senior Coordinator Bono are continuing to focus on, engaging with appropriate interlocutors. I don’t have an update for you, though, beyond that.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Patel. Only two questions, please.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: One question is about these two innocent kids that just got some relief from Pakistani courts today, and the public of Pakistan believes that this administration has a big role in it. These two kids had no money to pay their tuition fee when they were 16, 18 years old, and then just a couple of years later, then they had almost 500 million rupees. They were the children of prime minister – former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. They just got finally acquitted today in the corruption case that was registered against them after Panama Papers.Does the U.S. not feel bad that such corrupt people are back to Pakistan to rule again? And at the same time, Ambassador Blome is meeting the Pakistani finance minister about the economic situation of Pakistan. These are two very contradictory things happening in Pakistan.MR PATEL: So first, I just don’t really have anything for you on a Pakistani court case. That is an internal matter for Pakistan. What I will say, though, is I – and we spoke a little bit about this yesterday in discussing Ambassador Blome’s bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Sharif. There is a number of issues that I’m sure he looks forward to discussing with the finance minister, and so I will let our team in Islamabad speak more about that at its conclusion.QUESTION: Just one &#8212;MR PATEL: No, no, no.QUESTION: Just one more, sir.MR PATEL: Okay, go ahead.QUESTION: Today there is a hearing in Congress on Afghanistan. As you know, Pakistan and Afghanistan had a tussle yesterday. And I have been raising this &#8212;MR PATEL: Which I spoke to.QUESTION: And I have been raising this issue of Taliban expansionism with Matt quite a bit at – today the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the next-door province to Afghanistan, just got non-bailable arrest warrants for their raids that happened on some military installations. Do you think such situation is still not – you – that this current administration is not seeing this, what is happening in Pakistan, is giving room to the Taliban expansionism in the region?MR PATEL: Well, look, we’ve been very clear about the fact that we do not want Afghanistan to be a – be or become a safe haven for terrorism. And when it comes to counterterrorism cooperation with our Pakistani partners, that’s something we engage with them on quite regularly in – as – including other important bilateral consultations with them as well.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Yeah. On Niger, do you have any updates on the talks with authorities in Niger?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates for you. Again, we are remaining in touch with the CNSP and seeking additional clarification of their comments, as well as discussing potential next steps. I will just reiterate what I said yesterday, is that this was at the conclusion of a meeting with senior U.S. officials as part of a delegation who were meeting to discuss a number of areas, but also making it quite clear that we believed that the CNSP was heading down a path that we just disagree with and took a lot of issues.QUESTION: And on Cuba, what’s your understanding of what’s going on there? Did you track any demonstrations?MR PATEL: So I spoke a little bit about this yesterday, Michel. We are continuing to monitor the situation closely. There are protests across several cities in Cuba that were calling for electricity, food, and fundamental freedoms, and we are urging the Cuban Government to refrain from violence and unjust detentions and calling on authorities to respect Cuban citizens’ rights for peaceful assembly.QUESTION: And do you support the demonstration – demonstrators there?MR PATEL: We stand with the Cuban people and continue to support their demands of human rights, freedom, prosperity, and a future for greater dignity.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Russian foreign intelligence chief Naryshkin said today that France is preparing to deploy 2,000 troops to Odesa in Ukraine in the coming days, and there are even some media reports that France has already deployed them to Romania and they are about to cross the border to Odesa from Romania. Do you see this move as an escalation in the conflict, and do you support it or not?MR PATEL: Well, first I would just say I would take anything that – coming from Russian officials with a grain of salt. Secondly, this is something for our French partners to speak to. If true, I will just echo what I just said to Alex, that President Biden has been incredibly clear that the United States is not prepared to send troops to Ukraine, and that is something that the NATO secretary general has also echoed as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: One more. One more.MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room a little bit. Go ahead.QUESTION: Could you please elaborate on Thomas West’s trip to UAE and India? Is he meeting the Taliban officials this time?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check with the team and get back to you.QUESTION: Second, tomorrow is the first day of new year in Afghanistan, and normally schools are open for the kids, but this is third year girls are banned from school. Is the U.S. pushing this topics, including the other topics, with their meeting with the Taliban officials?And last question – I’m repeating my last week’s question – could you please give us some information that the Taliban officials are asking for those military airplanes that they were taking to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 2001 when Kabul collapsed? They says this belongs to Afghanistan, but U.S. is not allowing them to be brought back to Afghanistan. What’s the U.S. stance on this issue?MR PATEL: On the last question, I don’t have an update for you, but I’m happy to check with the team.And on your first question, look, the fair treatment of Afghan women and girls continues to be our – one of our highest priorities when it comes to our engagements on policy as it relates to Afghanistan. We also believe that this is something that should be important to the so-called Taliban government and think that it is vital when talking about their own stated desire for international recognition. And so the fact that this is another year in which Afghan women and girls don’t have access to these kinds of schools, it’s heartbreaking and it’s troubling.Goyal, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Two questions, please. One, as far as elections in Russia and Pakistan, both were widely reported in the media and criticized by their citizens because there was no opposition in Russia and there was no opposition in Pakistan or opposition leader is still in jail. So what’s the difference between the two elections?MR PATEL: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear the &#8212;QUESTION: Election in Russia, election in Pakistan.MR PATEL: Well, the – I would take a little bit of issue with comparing both of those democratic processes. One, I will just say that Pakistan’s a country that has a little bit more of a robust media landscape open for dissenting ideas and opinions. But ultimately, this – the point is, Goyal, is that these are decisions that should be made by the people of these countries, and the people of these countries should have choices. They should have access to information that will help inform their decision-making when it comes to who they want to lead their country and the direction that they want to take their country in. And I will just say that as it relates to Russia, there is a clear track record of media suppression, of silencing dissenting voices.Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Second one, sir.MR PATEL: Oh sorry, go ahead.QUESTION: Sorry. Sorry for the &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: As far as China is concerned, I have been saying this for the last over 25 years that one day, some day, China will be a national security threat to the United States, and today we are hearing from every angle how much China is threat to the national security today, and we’re talking about TikTok and many other things that are stealings and copying and everything is going on against the United States as far as national security is concerned.MR PATEL: So, Goyal, let me just say that when it comes to our relations with the PRC – you’ve heard the Secretary say this – we want to ensure that we are taking steps to hold the PRC accountable for actions that we find to be coercive, that – actions that we find to be destabilizing, destabilizing not just in the Indo-Pacific region but also around the world more broadly. And we won’t hesitate to take appropriate actions to hold them accountable.I will also just note, though, that in the areas like climate cooperation, in areas like addressing the synthetic opioid crisis, we think that there are avenues for cooperation with the PRC. You’re seeing a direct result of that at least in the synthetic opioid space as a direct result of President Biden’s summit with President Xi in San Francisco.So beyond that, ultimately, Goyal, our approach to this is that this is a relationship we want to manage responsibly because that is what is expected of international powers.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Shaun.QUESTION: Sure. Could I ask you two things about specific – Kosovo. The president of Kosovo says that there’s an agreement on what she has described as a U.S. proposal to use euros for Serbian payments to Serbs in Kosovo as opposed to dinars. Is that something you can &#8212;MR PATEL: Are you referring to the EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels, or &#8212;QUESTION: Sort of, yeah.MR PATEL: Yeah. So &#8212;QUESTION: She said that Gabriel Escobar was there and headed a &#8212;MR PATEL: So I will just say broadly – and I’m happy to check with the team on your specific question about euros – but these are talks that we welcome. And they are taking place within the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels today, and they include a discussion of the new Central Bank of Kosovo’s currency regulations, and these – we believe that these discussions should continue with urgency. The EU-facilitated dialogue is the proper channel for resolving these issues related to the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.We’ve also been clear in expressing our concerns that this new regulation that restricts the import and use of the Serbian dinar in Kosovo – we’ve expressed some concerns about this, and we’ve also reiterated our calls to both Kosovo and Serbia to de-escalate tensions.QUESTION: Okay. So discussions are continuing with the Serbians?MR PATEL: Exactly.QUESTION: Can I just – something completely different.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know it’s a few days old, but the South African foreign minister is in town. The opposition in South Africa had written a letter to the Secretary asking for election observers – I’m not sure if State directly does that – but election observers for the upcoming elections there, and of course the ANC was – and the government were critical of that. Does the U.S. have a stance on whether there’s a point of sending U.S. observers to the election in South Africa?MR PATEL: I will have to check on the team with that, Shaun.All right, thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 1:24 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								China																								Cuba																								France																								Haiti																								Hong Kong																								Israel																								Kosovo																								Niger																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Serbia																								Ukraine
- Hong Kong’s Proposed Article 23 Legislation Further Undermines “One Country, Two Systems” Framework Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is closely monitoring Hong Kong’s development of national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law and its implications for U.S. citizens, investments, and companies operating in Hong Kong.&nbsp; We are particularly concerned by Hong Kong authorities’ proposal to adopt broad and vague definitions of “state secrets” and “external interference” that could be used to eliminate dissent through the fear of arrest and detention.We are also concerned that Hong Kong authorities will apply Article 23 extraterritorially in their ongoing campaign of transnational repression to intimidate and restrict the free speech of U.S. citizens and residents.&nbsp;Article 23 risks compounding the 2020 National Security Law that has curtailed the rights and freedoms of people in Hong Kong.&nbsp; Enacting additional national security legislation with vaguely defined provisions and purported extraterritorial reach would further violate the PRC’s international commitments and undermine the “One Country, Two Systems” framework.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Hong Kong																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Media Freedom Coalition Statement on the Second Anniversary of the Closure of Stand News and Media Freedom in Hong Kong Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was signed by the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.Begin text: The undersigned members of the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC) remain deeply concerned at the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese authorities’ continued attacks on freedom of the press and their suppression of independent local media in Hong Kong.Local media have intensified self-censorship since the imposition of the National Security Law in June 2020. Prosecutions of media workers in connection with sedition legislation have increased. Use of these laws to suppress journalism undermines Hong Kong’s autonomy and the rights and freedoms of the people in Hong Kong as promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and guaranteed in the Basic Law. The Hong Kong authorities’ prolonged prosecutions of journalists like the Stand News team and publishers such as Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai creates a chilling effect on others in the press and media. They come against the backdrop of loss of editorial independence, the barring of journalists seeking to cover government press briefings and the removal of material from public broadcasting archives. Freedom of the press has been central to Hong Kong’s success for many years. Curtailing the space for free expression of alternative views weakens vital checks and balances on executive power. The free flow and exchange of opinions and information is vital to Hong Kong’s people, business and international reputation. We urge the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities to abide by their international human rights commitments and legal obligations and to preserve Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and respect for universal rights and freedoms. The member countries of the MFC will always defend media freedom and freedom of expression. The member countries of the MFC will continue to stand up for those who are targeted simply for exercising their human rights. End text.						Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								China																								Hong Kong																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Press Freedom
- Department Press Briefing – December 18, 2023 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; December 18, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; December 18, 2023																																																					December 18, 2023																																																								1:28 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. I will start with a &#8212;QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR MILLER: Thank you.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: He’s in a good mood. I’ll start with a few opening comments. I’d like to start, as I said, with an update on our work to increase the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza.On Sunday, Kerem Shalom – a crossing between Israel and Gaza – opened for the first time for the movement of aid into Gaza. The opening of this additional crossing, which we had been working to achieve for some time, will alleviate the strain on Rafah and dramatically expand the amount of aid flowing to innocent Palestinian civilians who need it most.Second, for the first time since October 7th, trucks carrying commercial goods moved into Gaza on Saturday. Additional commercial trucks are planned to enter Gaza today, and we hope to see this channel solidified and expanded over the coming days. It is a critical step towards improving the lives of the Palestinian people in Gaza that we see not just humanitarian aid delivered, but also commercial goods that can be sold in stores and markets.These two important steps forward came as the result of intensive diplomacy conducted by Secretary Blinken, Special Envoy David Satterfield, and others across the United States Government, who have worked not just to open channels for the delivery of food, water, and medicine to Palestinians, but also to ensure the amount of assistance that flows through those channels is sustained.While this weekend’s breakthroughs are important, they are also not – by themselves not sufficient. We will continue to work closely with the governments of Israel, Egypt, and partner countries in the region to further increase the humanitarian assistance flowing into Gaza to address the needs of the Palestinian people.With that, Matt.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. Well, wouldn’t – you say that opening Kerem Shalom improves the lives of the Palestinians in Gaza, but wouldn’t not killing them improve the lives of Palestinians in Gaza?MR MILLER: I think Hamas surrendering and – could – and stopping using them &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you know that that’s not going to happen.MR MILLER: Well, stopping – there’s no reason why it can’t happen. I mean, as much as people call on Israel to take steps, Hamas has – bears responsibility here.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: And Hamas stopping using them as human shields when Israel is trying to target Hamas for the attacks it conducted on October 7th would also do a great deal to protect innocent Palestinian civilians.QUESTION: Right, but you would accept – you would accept, wouldn’t you, that it doesn’t matter how much humanitarian aid is going in if everyone’s dead?MR MILLER: It is a very difficult situation we are in right now. We are trying to accomplish two things. Number one, to minimize civilian harm, to work with the Israel Government and the Israeli military on steps that they can take to protect civilians, including establishing deconfliction sites, and also to get humanitarian assistance in. That is also important to ensure that the Palestinian civilians who are there have food, water, medicine, other critical needs.QUESTION: Okay. Well, this was all in lead-up to a question that I was originally going to ask before you opened with that, which is: How are you guys going to vote on this UN Security Council resolution today?MR MILLER: We are working through with countries on the Security Council right now what the final text of that resolution will be, and I don’t have anything I can speak to now, I think some three and a half hours before the vote.QUESTION: Do you think that there is any way that there could be language negotiated that would allow you to vote for it rather – or is abstention the best that anyone can hope for?MR MILLER: So there was a previous Security Council resolution around a month ago that we voted for that relates to the conflict in Gaza. So we are always trying to get to a place where there is language that we agree with, that other Security Council members agree with. But right now, when we’re in the middle of the negotiation process, I wouldn’t want to speculate or (inaudible).QUESTION: All right. You don’t want to handicap it and see where – where does it look right now?MR MILLER: No, I think I’ll wait and see how the vote &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: &#8212; how it goes later today.QUESTION: All right. Thank you.MR MILLER: It will depend on, of course, what the final status of the language is.Shaun.QUESTION: Could I just clarify one thing in that? You said several hours before the vote. You are expecting a vote today. Some are saying that the vote could be postponed to another day.MR MILLER: It was our expectation. Of course it could always be postponed.QUESTION: Sure, sure.MR MILLER: That was the original plan, for it to be today, but of course it could be postponed.QUESTION: Could I just ask you a little bit more about the commercial trucks that you were mentioning?MR MILLER: Sure.QUESTION: Is that because of the entry way of – the second point, Kerem Shalom, or is that through Rafah?MR MILLER: No, they’re through Rafah, actually.QUESTION: Through Rafah?MR MILLER: It’s a – these are two separate measures that we were trying to achieve: one, to get Kerem Shalom open so we alleviate what has become kind of a difficult situation at Rafah with the amount of trucks that can get through, but also to the warehouses that are on the Rafah side; and two, commercial trucks – getting commercial traffic reflowing means that you have an additional source of assistance coming in – or it’s not assistance, it’s food and other goods – so you’re not just relying on UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations to deliver critical goods.QUESTION: Is there just a little bit more detail you can offer about that in terms of what the commercial trucks are delivering, who is supervising it, which commercial entities are &#8212;MR MILLER: Not that I can do from here, but happy to get back to you, but it is for the most part food.Yeah, Humeyra.QUESTION: Matt, just on CIA chief Bill Burns has met with the Qatari prime minister on the hostages. I’m wondering if there is anything you can offer on that? Is there nay renewed optimism for a new deal on the hostages?MR MILLER: So we would absolutely look to achieve a new humanitarian pause that would allow the release of hostages. The first one was a major priority for the United States. We worked to achieve it across a number of different channels. And of course that humanitarian pause was successful in securing the release of more than a hundred hostages, and increased humanitarian assistance moving into Gaza, because once you have sustained pauses, humanitarian assistance that gets into Gaza can more safely and easily move around to the people that actually need it.So we would absolutely support reaching a deal to achieve those positive outcomes again, but I very much wouldn’t want to handicap it. We had a pause that was working well and Hamas reneged on the commitments it had made and launched terrorist attacks and refused to release hostages that it had agreed to do. And that led to the collapse of the first pause. So I never want to bet on Hamas’s good faith, but we absolutely will try to pursue a resolution here.QUESTION: Right. And on what Matt was saying, U.S. has put in a lot of diplomacy on trying to get the Israelis to put in more protections for civilians. And Secretary was there and he departed from Israel December the 1st, and then after southern Gaza offensive has started, and you guys have been sort of reluctant to weigh in on how Israel has conducted the southern Gaza offensive. You said it’s too early to make an assessment, so would you like to make an assessment right now on, like &#8212;MR MILLER: So since I said that, you have seen – you have seen – sorry to interrupt if there was &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: Since I’ve said that, you’ve seen the Secretary come out and say that there is very clearly a gap between intent and results, and that we’ve seen Israel express an intent to minimize civilian casualties, but we continue to see too many Palestinians die. And so that’s why we continue to engage with them on additional measures they can take on deconfliction sites, on doing everything within their power to minimize civilian harm.QUESTION: Right. So that was what I was getting at. Have you seen over the past couple of days – because, I mean, Jake Sullivan was there and Secretary Austin is there as well, and they’re sort of making this a priority. Have you seen over the past couple of days any assurance, anything new, any new plan from the Israelis to suggest that there is going to be much more concrete steps in place to ensure civilian protection?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to the meetings that the National Security Advisor had –White House, of course, can speak to those – and I’m not going to speak to the meetings that the Secretary of Defense just concluded today. His team can obviously – who are with him on the ground in Israel can obviously speak to those in more detail. What I will say is that we continue to engage with them on the importance of taking concrete steps to minimize civilian harm, and that includes predictable pauses so people know when they can move around. It includes deconfliction sites so people know that there are places they can be where they’re – they will not be fired on.So we will continue to have those conversations. But as I said at the beginning, we do also have to remember that Hamas could make all of this easier if they would come out from hiding behind civilians and surrender, put down their arms, and stop putting civilians in the way of this – or in the middle of this very difficult situation.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR MILLER: I’ll come to you – I’ll come to you next, Said.Go ahead, Barbara.QUESTION: Thank you. Do you see any substantive difference between the UK and German call for a sustainable ceasefire and the U.S. position, which my understanding is that the war should not end until Hamas’s military capability and leadership have been destroyed?MR MILLER: So I will say what – I read that that piece by the German and British foreign ministers. I saw very clearly they said that they do not support a ceasefire now because Israel has a legitimate right to defend itself and take action against a terrorist organization that has said it wants to continue to carry out attacks like the attacks of October 7th, but they would support at some point a sustainable ceasefire.I will say on behalf of the United States, we, of course, want this conflict to end, and we want it to end in a way that ensures the security of the Israeli people, that ensures the security of the Palestinian people. And ultimately, we think ending the conflict and leaving the plotters who planned the October 7th attacks in place to continue carrying out attacks, to continue plotting against innocent civilians in Israel, is not in the security interests of Israel, but it’s not – also not in the security interests of the Palestinian people, and it’s not in the security interests of anyone in the region.So while we of course want to achieve an end to the fighting as soon as possible, we think that it’s important that the Israeli Government be able to continue to carry out the campaign which has a very legitimate objective, which is to ensure that Hamas cannot continue to carry out attacks as it did on October 7th. The status quo that existed before October 7th obviously did not produce peace for Israel or the Palestinian people, and we think returning to that is not a positive step forward for the region.QUESTION: So it sounds like you’re saying you basically – there’s more that you agree on than disagree on in terms of the calling for a ceasefire, the UK and German – it sounds like you think you’re on the same page.MR MILLER: Again, I – you can characterize my remarks how you’d like. I would repeat what I just said. We have had close coordination with the German and British governments and will continue to do so, but as I said, I took notice of the line in that piece where they very clearly said they are not calling for an immediate ceasefire for the same reasons that I just articulated.QUESTION: And one more question. Have you seen anything more from the Israelis about their claims of a major command and control center under Shifa Hospital? It was one of the things that they were putting forward in terms of explaining why so many civilians were being killed and why the hospitals were being targeted or being caught in the line of crossfire. They did end up coming out with, I think, a bunker and a tunnel and a couple of guns, but it didn’t really add up to what they had been advertising in terms of Hamas directing its operations from underneath hospitals. Obviously, they have a huge, sophisticated tunnel system. We saw some of that at Erez at the weekend. But the fact that Hamas is directing its operations from under hospitals and therefore they become part of the war – so have you see anything more convincing from the Israelis than what they put out?MR MILLER: Let me say a few things about that. Number one, we had evidence that Hamas was operating underneath al-Shifa Hospital before Israel attacked, and made that clear before Israel launched its operation in the vicinity of the hospital that we had seen evidence and believed it to be true; and we stand by that evidence.Number two, we did see – we’ve seen things that the Israeli Government has shown to us. We’ve seen the information that they’ve made public that do show bunkers underneath the hospital, that show tunnels underneath the hospital, and show recovered weapons from the hospital.The third thing I will say is one of the reasons Hamas has an extensive tunnel network in the first place is so when Israel is targeting any one site, that they can move underground to extricate themselves from that site and make it to safety. That is the entire reason that they built this tunnel network.The fourth thing I will say is I don’t think anyone should expect that a Hamas command and control center is going to look like the White House Situation Room. It’s a terrorist organization who is hiding itself underground behind civilians. And I think to expect that it was going to look like what you see from a modern government is just not – I don’t think that’s &#8212;QUESTION: Well, if the Israelis really said &#8212;MR MILLER: Oh, just let me finish. I don’t think is a realistic expectation. But that said, we are confident, and remain confident both based on what we knew before the operation, what we’ve seen since the operation, that Hamas was using al-Shifa as a command and control post, as it uses other civilian sites to hide terrorist infrastructure, to hide weapons, to hide fighters, and ultimately to use civilians as human shields.QUESTION: Right, just – I would just add that, as you know, the Israeli did release these videos beforehand showing how sophisticated it all was, and it wasn’t quite what they came up with.MR MILLER: You can judge for yourself the – what we saw versus that – I think it was a – it wasn’t really a video, it was an animation, I think – beforehand. But what we saw and what we knew to be the case before the operation at al-Shifa confirmed to us that yes, Hamas was using it as a command and control center.QUESTION: Can I just ask one more question?MR MILLER: Let me just – because that’s – let me go to Said. I said I’d come to you.QUESTION: Thank you. Now, we know that because the Israeli – former Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, said that we built this tunnel way back in the ‘80s.MR MILLER: I believe he &#8212;QUESTION: It’s not the &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on, hold on. No, no, no. Don’t – Said, if you’re going to say something, I get to respond. He said that they built the bunker.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: I don’t think he said that he expected that bunker to be used by fighters as – where civilians are on top as human shields. Those are very – just because you build something doesn’t mean you expect it to be used by a terrorist organization hiding behind civilians. So it doesn’t really matter who built the initial bunker.QUESTION: Well, I think the evidence is quite thin on that. But anyway, let me &#8212;MR MILLER: All right. So again, I can’t let that go by. I can’t let that go by without saying something. If you believe the evidence is quite thin, fine. But we remain quite convinced about what al-Shifa was used for, and I will say we saw the cache of weapons, saw the cache of ammunition, and ultimately, as I said, are quite confident based on what we know that Hamas was operating under that hospital &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: &#8212; which, again, I don’t think is a very controversial statement. I think it’s pretty well established. Remember we did have that exchange where you asked me to send articles, and I sent you the articles?QUESTION: You did. You did. Okay.MR MILLER: Not from the U.S. Government but from independent news outlets documenting it.QUESTION: How about – do you have any evidence at all that any of the supplies that the U.S. put into Gaza pre-October 7th were used in the – or this administration, previous administrations, were used?MR MILLER: Supplies? In what &#8212;QUESTION: Well, construction material. That kind of thing.MR MILLER: Not that I have seen, no.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;QUESTION: No. So none of the money and none of – none of the money and none of the &#8212;MR MILLER: Not that I have seen, no.QUESTION: &#8212; the supplies that went in &#8212;MR MILLER: Not that I – go ahead.QUESTION: Can I – may I just follow up on my questions? Now, you said that Israel’s goal – a legitimate goal, as you called it – is to make sure that Hamas is unable to conduct anything similar to October. But I thought the stated goals early on were to decapitate Hamas, hunt its leaders, and basically really – free the hostages and have a new regime. Have they achieved that? So are we shifting goals now?MR MILLER: We are not shifting goals. Obviously, they have not achieved the release of all the hostages, which again, as I said before, is not –QUESTION: Or any of them. Or any of them. Or any of them by – I’m saying –MR MILLER: There have been over a hundred hostages – hold it – hostages released.QUESTION: With negotiations, but not by force.MR MILLER: Right. They did also execute a military operation quite early on where they rescued – rescued a hostage.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: But I don’t think Hamas – I don’t think we should put Hamas’s – the fact that Hamas continues to hold civilians hostage on the Israeli Government.QUESTION: Right. I mean, I’m not &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s Hamas that bears responsibility for that.QUESTION: Okay, all right. I wanted to ask you also – you said that nothing short of Hamas surrender – that’s the suggestion – would end this conflict. That’s in response to –MR MILLER: So again, that’s not the suggestion.QUESTION: All right. Let me rephrase &#8212;MR MILLER: That’s not what I said. So go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. In response to Matt, you said that – when he said that stopping the bombing could also save Palestinian lives or something to that effect, and you said Hamas could surrender and end it. Right? So nothing short of Hamas’ total surrender could end the bombing. That’s what I – I just wanted you to clarify this point.MR MILLER: No, that is not what I said. We have made – I have made clear before that Israel is conducting legitimate military objectives that we believe are achievable.QUESTION: Okay. Right.MR MILLER: And capturing or killing the senior leadership of Hamas is achievable, but it’s not the only way to achieve that. And my point of – in saying that about Hamas surrendering is that for all the questions we get, legitimate questions that we are happy to answer about Israel’s military activities, it is Hamas that started this conflict, it is Hamas that hides behind civilians, and it is Hamas that could end it today if the people who were responsible for the murder of 1,200 civilians would come out and take responsibility for their actions and surrender and stop hiding behind civilians as human shields.QUESTION: Okay. Well, first of all, the 1,200 includes 311 soldiers that Israel suggested, not – so they’re not all civilians. But anyway –MR MILLER: I didn’t &#8212;QUESTION: That’s what they said.MR MILLER: I don’t believe the murder of civilians on October 7th was justified either.QUESTION: No, no, I’m with you. I’m just saying &#8212;MR MILLER: That is just – I don’t think we need to caveat it.QUESTION: Right, okay. But let me ask you something. How would this surrender take shape? Because Hamas is not an army. It’s not like – we’re not going to see what we saw, let’s say, the Iraqis do in that famous tent and so on, or what the Japanese did on board of an American ship. So how would this surrender take shape? Would all fighters need to come out and lay their arms – all of them? We don’t know how many of them – maybe 10,000, whatever – so they come and they say, now we surrender? Is that the shape that – is that the form of surrender that you are asking?MR MILLER: So let me give you a start. Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, could come up from his tunnel today, could lay down his arms and surrender himself and take responsibility. Now, I don’t have any notion that he is about to do that.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: He hasn’t shown that the – that he cares one whit for the Palestinian public up to date. So I have no reason to believe he would do that. But I make the point to again reinforce that Hamas does bear some responsibility, a great deal of responsibility, for what happened here as the person who started this conflict in the first place, or the entity that started the conflict.QUESTION: And my last question on the journalists, the number of journalists. A lot of journalists have been killed, maybe 90, and so on. Do you have any doubt that Israel intentionally targets journalists?MR MILLER: So we have not seen evidence that Israel &#8212;QUESTION: So &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: Usual rule, let me finish. We have not seen any evidence that Israel is intentionally targeting journalists. Obviously, we have seen a number, dozens of journalists, die as a result of this conflict. Saw one, Samer Abudaqa, from Al Jazeera &#8212;QUESTION: Right. Right.MR MILLER: – who was just killed in recent days.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: And as we have said before, we mourn every journalist who has given their life in covering this conflict, in bringing information to the American public and to people all around the world. We think the work that the free press does is critical to democracy, especially in conflict zones where, unfortunately, far too many do pay this sacrifice, and our condolences go out to all of their families.And in other – and there are cases where, when we have seen actions that we thought warranted, we have raised questions with the Israeli Government and sought more information. You saw us do that with respect to the Reuters journalist who was killed in Lebanon. And we will continue to do so, and we will continue to encourage Israel to comply with their own rules of engagement and comply with international humanitarian law. And whenever – if we ever see signs that they are not, we will of course be very clear about that with them.QUESTION: Can I follow up on – can I follow up on &#8212;QUESTION: So on Samer &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead. Let me – last one, Said, because there are a lot of other people &#8212;QUESTION: Last one, yeah. Samer – you mentioned Samer Abudaqa. I mean, he was bleeding there for like six hours, and they sent in a group to retrieve him. They were all shot. So they knew exactly where he was and what – he was bleeding right there and trying – people are trying to reach and retrieve him. And they – the Israeli army disallowed them from doing that. So wouldn’t that be intentional?MR MILLER: So again, as always, it’s very difficult for me to comment from specific facts here. We’re in an extremely challenging information space when you see different accounts about activities on the ground. But as I said, we continue to be clear with Israel that they must comply with all international humanitarian law.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Follow-up on the journalists.QUESTION: One more on this.MR MILLER: No. I already – go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. So a video of an Israeli soldier attacking and beating an Anadolu photographer, Mustafa Alkharouf, in East Jerusalem while he was covering Friday prayers, while he was doing his job, went viral last week on social media. First of all, have you seen that video, and do you have any reactions to that? And after that video showing that an Israeli soldier attacking a journalist with a camera doing his job, isn’t it a sign that Israel is, like, knowingly and deliberately attacking journalists?MR MILLER: So let me say one statement at the start that is a general statement, not with – not specific to this incident, then I’ll speak with – specific to this incident. One thing as a general statement is one of the things that we expect of our military and we expect of militaries around the world is that if individual soldiers commit acts that are not in keeping with the rules of engagement or in violation of international humanitarian law, that those acts be investigated and, if appropriate, the responsible parties held accountable. And that is one of the differences, we think, between professional militaries in democracies, in the free world, and how we expect them to operate. So it is unfortunately true that you will often see individual soldiers, individual units commit acts that are inappropriate, that violate rules of engagement and can violate the laws of war, and what we expect is that the Israeli military or any other militaries – we expect of our own military – take the appropriate actions when they see such behavior.With respect to this specific incident, I did see the videos. We are deeply concerned by the disturbing images of the use of force against a journalist that was depicted in those videos, and we think it’s appropriate that those – that the video be investigated and, if the facts support it, that the – that the people involved be held accountable.QUESTION: Just one more follow-up on that. Israeli National Security Minister Ben-Gvir in a Twitter post on Saturday expressed support for the officer in the beating of my colleague, Mustafa Alkharouf, and promised to return the officer to work as soon as possible. Have you seen that comment and do you have any reaction?MR MILLER: I have not seen that comment. I don’t have anything beyond what I said a moment ago.QUESTION: On the journalist &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go – Heba, go ahead.QUESTION: Just – you said you sought information on the killing of the – of a Reuters videographer in Lebanon, Issam Abdallah. Did you get what you asked for? And also, did you seek information regarding Al Jazeera cameraman?MR MILLER: So with respect to the journalist in Lebanon, what Israel told us is that they are investigating the matter. We think that’s obviously the appropriate thing for – to do. I don’t have a readout of their conversations with respect to the journalist in Gaza.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Thank you so much. Jahanzaib Ali from ARY News. Sir, Pakistani army chief and ISA chief was here in town. They met with Secretary Blinken. Can you share some details about that meeting?MR MILLER: I don’t have any specific readout, other than that, as you know, he was in Washington to meet with a number of officials, including officials here at the State Department, including officials at the Pentagon and elsewhere. Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and a NATO partner. We look forward to partnering with them on regional security and defense cooperation, and that’s the – what was the substance of the meetings last &#8212;QUESTION: Sir, the Pakistani army chief is at the center of criticism for – for his involvement in politics. Sir, you always talk about democratic values and freedom of speech. What are you going to say about those who are trying to disrupt the political system of Pakistan?MR MILLER: So we continue to support free, fair elections in Pakistan. That is the – and engage with Pakistan on a bilateral basis to discuss our support for free and fair elections. As I’ve said before, we don’t take a position as it comes to – when it comes to political parties in Pakistan, and we will engage with the leaders that the Pakistani people select.QUESTION: Follow-up, please &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead. Go ahead. No, no, stop. I’m going to – I’ll work my way around.QUESTION: Well, speaking of free and fair elections, did I miss a statement congratulating El-Sisi on his victory in Egypt?MR MILLER: There has not been one yet.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Do you plan one?MR MILLER: There hasn’t been one yet.QUESTION: Thank you. On the intent of Israelis to minimize civilian casualties, a few days ago, a mother and a daughter were sheltering inside Gaza’s only Catholic church, and they were – and they died, and also three Israeli hostages were killed even though they were shirtless and they were waving, like, a white cloth. How is it possible that this is, like, mistakenly shot, even though they were, like, just holding a white cloth?MR MILLER: So I will say with respect to the death of those three hostages, obviously it’s a tragic incident, extremely unfortunate, as it is tragic when any civilian is killed. And I will say we noted the comments by the Israeli defense chief, who came out and reiterated after that shooting that he fully expects everyone in the Israeli military to act within the rules of engagement. He said that those shootings were outside of the Israeli rules of engagement, and that goes to the point I was making a moment ago about what we expect from a professional military in a democracy, which is when there are actions that are inappropriate, that violate the rules, that violate the laws of war, that those militaries take actions to investigate them and actions, if appropriate &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, but there are too many actions &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold on – to hold people accountable. Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, but there are too many actions lately. Like, why did they bomb a church, a Catholic church? Why would they target a Catholic church where two – where a mother and her daughter were killed?MR MILLER: So I will say as always it’s very tough for me to speak to specific incidents in – when oftentimes there will be disputed facts. We did see those reports. We were quite concerned by them. We’ve been raising those concerns directly with the Israeli Government. One of the things that we have advocated from the beginning of this conflict is deconfliction sites to ensure that schools and churches and hospitals are not attacked. And when we have concerns, we will continue to raise them with the Israeli Government.QUESTION: And do you have &#8212;MR MILLER: One more and then I’ll go &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, do you have any update on the situation on the border of Lebanon de-escalation?MR MILLER: I don’t, other than that it continues to be a priority for us to ensure that this conflict does not widen. Go ahead. I’ll come to you next, Alex.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: There’s a provision in the new NDAA that allows the U.S. to prosecute foreign officials accused of bribery. Is this something the State Departments supports? Are you concerned that it could encourage foreign governments to reciprocate and prosecute Americans?MR MILLER: I just don’t have a comment from here on what is still draft legislation.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. The U.S. signed a DCA with Finland this morning. And the Secretary announced that there will be another one with Denmark later this week. We, of course, also witnessed earlier this month you had DCA with Sweden. How concerned is the Secretary about the threats coming from Russia against these countries, particularly Putin pointing at Finland and Sweden over the weekend, saying that there was no trouble but there will be?MR MILLER: I would say that we continue to be concerned about Russia’s aggression broadly. And one of the things you’ve heard the President say is that one of the – that the reason why it is so important that we support Ukraine is that we don’t assess that Putin would be satisfied and would stop at Ukraine if he were able to ultimately conquer Ukraine and subjugate it to Russia. And so we – and I will say you have countries in Europe express this same concern. It’s not a secret, I think, that, that was one of the motivating factors for Finland to join NATO and for Sweden to seek to join NATO. And so I wouldn’t characterize our level of concern with respect to any of these individual countries. I will just say you’ve seen a Russia that has shown an – a willingness and an eagerness to use its military to conquer its neighbors by force, so of course we want to take to try to deter that.QUESTION: Thank you. And when it comes to measures against Russia, do you have any comment on EU’s – today’s decision on a 12th sanctions package against Russia? Do you support it? Are you encouraged by &#8212;MR MILLER: So we have coordinated with the EU on those sanctions, as we have with the EU on sanctions since the outset of this conflict. We continue to work with the EU and with the G7 and our other partners around the world to ensure that the sanctions we have imposed are tightened and we seek out and hold accountable those who try to evade our sanctions and impose new sanctions if we do see the ones we have being eroded in any way, and we’ll continue to do that.QUESTION: Thank you. Can you please come back to me later on &#8212;MR MILLER: Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: No promises, Alex. There’s a lot of people.QUESTION: Just to interject briefly &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have anything to say about the Serbian elections? The opposition is crying foul. Do you have anything to say about the – either the result or about the process?MR MILLER: So we are reviewing the OSCE’s preliminary findings and conclusions with respect to this election. We welcome the opportunity to continue working with Serbia’s next government to strengthen democratic governance and rule of law and to advance regional stability, continue economic growth, and accelerate progress on Serbia’s path to EU membership.QUESTION: Okay. But as for the allegations from the opposition about irregularities &#8212;MR MILLER: The OSCE has issued preliminary findings and conclusions, not their final findings, and we are reviewing those. And I wouldn’t want to comment while that review is ongoing.QUESTION: Serbia.MR MILLER: Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. One on North Korea, one on China. Regarding North Korea’s ICBM launches, North Korea criticized the United States and South Korea NCG – I mean Nuclear Consultative Group – meeting after launching a long-range ICBM yesterday. How will the United States respond to this? And what are the result of United States analyst of North Korea’s missile launches so far?MR MILLER: The United States strongly condemns the DPRK’s December 17th and 18th ballistic missile launches, including the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. These launches are in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions. They pose a threat to the DPRK’s neighbors and undermine regional security. We urge all countries to condemn these violations and to fully implement relevant UN Security Council resolutions which are in place to impede the DPRK’s unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs.QUESTION: Chinese foreign minister and North Korea’s vice foreign minister met in Beijing yesterday, the day North Korea launched its ICBM, to discuss strengthen strategic cooperation between China and North Korea. How do you view the solidarity between China and North Korea, which is tolerating North Korea’s ICBM launches?MR MILLER: So one of the things that Secretary Blinken has discussed with his Chinese counterparts in his meetings over the last six months now is that we do believe that there is a constructive role that China could play to try to constrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and we would welcome playing that role and we will continue to urge them to do so.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt.MR MILLER: I’ll come to you next. Go ahead.QUESTION: Like with Ukraine, will the U.S. support Israel for however long it needs?MR MILLER: We have said that we are going to continue to stand by Israel. They are a longtime ally of the United States, and we will continue to support them in what we think is a justifiable campaign to respond to brutal terrorist attacks and ensure that they can never be repeated.QUESTION: With the latest in Yemen, is the administration considering redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist group?MR MILLER: So we have said that we are considering that step. I don’t have any updates on it.QUESTION: And finally, a series of emails circulated on January 21st, 2016 among key National Security Council and State Department officials working on Ukraine policy that indicated that you were shocked to learn that then-Vice President Biden had on December 7, 2015 abruptly reversed standing U.S. policy and made firing special prosecutor Viktor Shokin a prerequisite for Ukraine receiving a billion dollars in U.S.-backed IMF loans.It appears that those emails – they only learned about Biden’s actions as a result of a news report in Ukraine of a – in a Ukrainian media outlet. Why were these officials who were involved in the day-to-day policy analyses and development on Ukraine issues kept in the dark about Biden’s action, which The Washington Post described earlier this year as, quote/unquote, “calling an audible”?MR MILLER: I don’t have any specific response to that allegation. There has been a lot said about this matter going back for years. I will let the White House continue to take &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; to respond specifically to it.QUESTION: Matt? Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Two questions, please.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you. One, as far as U.S.-India relations are concerned, how would you review the 2023 between the two countries’ diplomatic relations and other relations? Also, how are the relations between Secretary Blinken and the Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar?MR MILLER: So I would say that the Secretary has a close, productive working relationship with his counterpart. We have welcomed him here in the past couple months, and of course, the Secretary has traveled to India twice just since September, I believe it is. President Biden has traveled to India this year. India is a major partner of ours, one whom this administration has focused a great deal of time and attention to working with, and we’ll continue to do so in the new year.QUESTION: Okay. And second, sir, Prime Minister Modi is very famous among global leaders, including here in the U.S. – President Biden among others – and also in the Middle East, Arab nations, and, of course, with Russia.What I’m asking you is: What India or Prime Minister Modi can do more to bring – end these two wars, Israel’s war against terrorist Hamas and Russia’s war against Ukraine?MR MILLER: So I would say that – that we would welcome India’s constructive engagement in these two matters, as we welcome constructive engagement from countries around the world.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.QUESTION: Can I ask a question on Sweden?MR MILLER: Go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: I asked you Thursday on the issue of Sweden, the problem with Türkiye. And yesterday the Secretary called the foreign minister of Türkiye on this issue, as I – as we understand from your announcement. But also, the president of Türkiye says, and I quote, that he expects American Government to approve at the same time the sale of F-16 jets to Ankara in exchange for ratifying Sweden’s bid to join the NATO Alliance.First, can you tell us if the Secretary and Mr. Fidan discussed the issue of F-16 yesterday? And second, do you accept the proposal by the president – the president of Türkiye?MR MILLER: Well, I’m certainly not going to negotiate in public about these matters. I will say that we have made clear that we support the sale of F-16s to Türkiye. Secretary Blinken made that clear again in his call, as we have made clear for some time now. But as we’ve said, there are people on the Hill who have linked that sale to Sweden’s accession to NATO, and we need to see that accession as soon as possible.QUESTION: Question on Jimmy Lai &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. Given that Secretary Blinken expects a peaceful Palestinian Authority to coexist with Israel, despite the fact that the Meir Amit Center, in its review of more – a thousand Palestinian Authority textbooks, does not find one book that even mentions one word about peace, does the U.S. approve of the fact that UNRWA takes – that’s the UN agency UNRWA – takes its textbooks directly from the Palestinian Authority without any supervision? And if so, where does Secretary Blinken get his optimism? And I had a follow-up.MR MILLER: Well, I would say certainly we – you’ve heard us say that we believe the Palestinian Authority can be revamped, it can be revitalized. We don’t agree with everything that the Palestinian Authority does, just as we don’t agree with things that others around – everything that others around the world do. But we have seen the Palestinian Authority play a very constructive role in the aftermath of October 7th in maintaining stability in the West Bank. And we believe that a path forward at the end of this conflict is for the Palestinian Authority, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to exercise a leadership role in a reunited West Bank and Gaza.QUESTION: Okay. In light of our federal law that – the Taylor Force Act that prohibits the government from sending American tax – taxpayer dollars to the Palestinian Authority until it stops supporting terrorism. Why does Secretary Blinken’s response to continued U.S. funding the Palestinian Authority – that continues their pay-to-slay program that encourages terrorist attacks against persons living in and visiting the State of Israel in direct violation of our Taylor Force Act?MR MILLER: We comply fully with the Taylor Force Act. As I said, we do also believe that the Palestinian Authority has to play a leadership role moving forward. The – there is going to be an end to this conflict at some point, and at the end of this conflict there needs to be an answer to the question of who governs Gaza, who governs the West Bank. And that question needs to be ultimately determined by the Palestinian people. And right now the Palestinian Authority is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and we will look to them to play that role.QUESTION: Well, fair – I just want to ask: How are we complying with the Taylor Force Act?MR MILLER: We comply with all of its various rules and regulations.QUESTION: Okay, thank you very much &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Two questions. One: Last week 21 Pakistani soldiers were killed by the Taliban. The weapons they were using were the American weapons which President Biden’s left in Afghanistan, worth billions of dollars. And I raised this question here before as well: What’s the State Department reaction to that, an ally getting killed by their weapon? That’s my first question, if you have any reaction to that.MR MILLER: So we express our condolences to those who lost their lives.QUESTION: And second, right now the trend from Afghanistan, which for last eight years – again – heroin is something that I continuously – to raise questions about since last many years. Now the trend is that they believe that heroin is bad but opium is okay. So the opium is going to China, and from China it’s coming to the U.S. This is the new trend. While the U.S. was in Afghanistan, it did not do much, in my opinion, about stopping that trade, and that trade continues to happen, and that opium gets to turn into heroin and it lands in the street of the United States the most.What more reactions, what more actions is the U.S. going to do about it?MR MILLER: So I would say that the primary – not the sole, but the primary responsibility for investigating and policing international drug trafficking rests, of course, with the Justice Department, and I would let them – let them speak to that. But we do – at the State Department here, do play a role through our diplomatic engagements in pressing countries to do more to crack down on the trafficking of narcotics that have killed so many Americans, and we’ll continue to do so.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Matthew, good afternoon. I’d like to take you to Hong Kong. Jimmy Lai’s trial now underway. I saw the State Department’s statement on it just the other day condemning the prosecution. That said, does the State Department believe Jimmy Lai has any chance at all of getting a fair trial in what many are calling a sham trial?MR MILLER: So I would say that we do strongly condemn the prosecution of Jimmy Lai, a pro-democracy advocate and media owner. He’s been prosecuted under the national security law that Beijing imposed on Hong Kong. We call for his immediate and unconditional release. And yes, of course we have deep concerns about the deterioration in protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong, and that includes the rule of law.QUESTION: Do you think your call for his immediate release will be answered?MR MILLER: I will just say that we will make clear our position; we will make clear our priorities. We don’t think he should have been detained in the first place and we think he should be released immediately.QUESTION: And one more quickly. He’s a devout Catholic. U.S. Catholic bishops have called for his release. How much of a role, if any, do you believe his Catholic faith played in China targeting him?MR MILLER: Again, I wouldn’t want to – I wouldn’t want to speculate about that, but I’d say that we do think he very much is being targeted for the pro-democracy actions that he’s taken and should be released immediately.QUESTION: Could I have a follow-up just quickly?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: There were some calls particularly from the Hill to change the status of Hong Kong’s missions in the United States. They have diplomatic – this predates the crackdown. Does the administration have a stance on that?MR MILLER: Let me take that back.QUESTION: Sure.QUESTION: May I?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. What can we expect in the Kosovo talks during the U.S. election year of 2024, specifically given that the establishment of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities have not been formed and despite the explicit stance of the U.S. that this is a legally binding obligation for Prime Minister Albin Kurti to establish that?MR MILLER: I’m going to have to take that one back as well and get you an answer.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Let me – Alex, let me go to you, then we’ll go back there and then we’ll finish up.QUESTION: And sorry, Matt, I have two questions. Today marks two months since Alsu Kurmasheva’s arrest. Russia’s independent human rights group, Memorial, designated her as a political prisoner. Do you agree with that assessment?MR MILLER: I will say that we – I’m not going to speak to that assessment, but I will say that we continue to call for her – we continue to engage with the Russian Government to seek more information on her case.QUESTION: Any update on designating her arrest &#8212;MR MILLER: No.QUESTION: And one on Azerbaijan, if I may. The opposition figure – leading opposition figure, Tofig Yagublu, got arrested over the weekend in light of ongoing crackdown against critics ahead of the election. What was your reaction, and any position do you have on the snap elections in the country?MR MILLER: So the recent trend of detaining journalists, civil society activists, and opposition figures in Azerbaijan is deeply troubling. Over a dozen such figures have been detained in just the last month. It’s unacceptable, and we will continue to urge the Azerbaijani Government to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all, including those exercising freedom of expression, as well as call for the expeditious release of all those who were – have been – who have been unjustly detained.QUESTION: Thanks so much.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Thank you very much. Two questions for Israel-Gaza. First of all, the Biden administration repeatedly made it clear that the United States opposes Gaza controlled by Hamas, and says Gaza should be governed by the revitalized Palestinian Authority. So the United States is in contact with Ramallah? And last week, Mr. Jake Sullivan was in Ramallah to – and Secretary Blinken visited Ramallah and talked with the Palestinian Authority leadership there. So is there a plan for Palestinian Authority ruling Gaza Strip – like, for example, sending a representative to Gaza Strip after the war?MR MILLER: I think we are putting the cart a little bit before the horse here. We’re – Israel is still conducting major military operations. But we do continue to discuss these questions and many others as it relates to post-conflict governance with the Palestinian Authority, with the Government of Israel, and with other countries in the region.QUESTION: A follow-up, please.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The United States is also against the Israel reoccupation of Gaza. You made it clear from that podium, and the Biden administration made it clear from different levels. And the United States expects Israel to leave Gaza after the conflict ends. So beyond the wishes and expectations, the United States is the first country on Earth who’s able to convince Israel what to do or what not to do. I’m not suggesting that you are telling Israel what to do and what not to do, but you are able to do so. So can the United States give assurances to the world that Israel will leave Gaza after the conflict and Israel will not decide or determine the future of Gaza unilaterally?MR MILLER: What I can give you assurances is what the United States will do, and that is to continue to make clear that there cannot be a reoccupation of Gaza. Yes, there will need to be some transition period at the end of this conflict so there is not a security vacuum on the ground. But ultimately, as the Secretary has been very clear and the President has been very clear, there cannot be a reoccupation of Gaza. And I would say that ultimately, this goes to a different – different but related point that I was making earlier: that is not just in the interests of the Palestinian people, but we believe it’s in the interest of the Israeli people as well.With that &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: So I just want – I wanted two things.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I’ll be very brief. On your choice of words – one regarding Israel and one regarding the Palestinian Authority. You said in an answer to an earlier question that Israel is a, quote/unquote, longstanding “ally of the United States.” Now, Israel is many things. It’s a friend. It’s a strategic partner. But there is no alliance between the &#8212;MR MILLER: Partner. Partner.QUESTION: So you haven’t changed &#8212;MR MILLER: Point taken. Partner.QUESTION: You haven’t slipped “ally” in officially, capital A?MR MILLER: Partner. Partner. Thank you for the edit and preventing me from having to put an asterisk in the transcript now. (Laughter.)QUESTION: And then on the – for the PA, you said in response to two questions that the Palestinian Authority is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. What – how do you come to that assessment? When was the last time the PA was elected?MR MILLER: It was – I don’t know – some – it was in the 2000s, I believe. They are the representative of the Palestinian people and they are &#8212;QUESTION: As you know, the Palestinian Authority is – particularly President Abbas is deeply unpopular with the Palestinian people.MR MILLER: And we believe that we should see &#8212;QUESTION: But you still think that they are the legitimate &#8212;MR MILLER: They are &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that they speak for all Palestinians?MR MILLER: I don’t think there is any one government &#8212;QUESTION: Except for Hamas.MR MILLER: &#8212; that speaks for every member of its community, of its &#8212;QUESTION: Well, no, I know, but they &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; of its constituency.QUESTION: But they are the legitimate – that they are – but you do believe that they are the ones who can act or who should be acting on behalf of the Palestinian people?MR MILLER: Yes, a revamped, revitalized Palestinian Authority.QUESTION: Okay. Well, what about the current one?MR MILLER: Well, it is &#8212;QUESTION: That is un-revamped and un-revitalized.MR MILLER: Well, the current Palestinian Authority, with reforms, with revitalization. Yes.QUESTION: Well, but – yeah, but what – now, who represents the Palestinian people? I mean, obviously you &#8212;MR MILLER: The Palestinian Authority does. The Palestinian &#8212;QUESTION: Even though it’s not revitalized and revamped?MR MILLER: They are – well, what I am referring to when I talk about a revamped, revitalized Palestinian Authority is for a Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza, you are going to have to see a revitalization just in terms of presence.QUESTION: Yeah, but – well, okay.MR MILLER: They don’t have the forces to &#8212;QUESTION: Does that mean that they have – there has to be an election to &#8212;MR MILLER: We would – we support free and fair elections. I think you can’t really have an election in the &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Well, the last Palestinian election free and fair – free and fair was in Gaza, and Hamas won.MR MILLER: And we support free and fair elections going forward. I think you can’t hold an election in the middle of a conflict, obviously. There needs to be a transition process to establish that.QUESTION: Tell that to Assad.MR MILLER: But that’s what we support for the Palestinian people as we do for anyone in the world.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: All right. Thanks.(The briefing was concluded at 2:17 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Azerbaijan																								China																								Finland																								Germany																								Hong Kong																								India																								Israel																								Kosovo																								Lebanon																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Serbia																								Sweden																								Turkey																								Ukraine																								United Kingdom																								Yemen
- Trial of Jimmy Lai Under the Hong Kong National Security Law Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States condemns the prosecution of pro-democracy advocate and media owner Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong under the PRC-imposed National Security Law. Lai has been held in pre-trial detention for more than 1,000 days, and Hong Kong and Beijing authorities have denied him his choice of legal representation.We urge Beijing and Hong Kong authorities to respect press freedom in Hong Kong. Actions that stifle press freedom and restrict the free flow of information – as well as Beijing and local authorities’ changes to Hong Kong’s electoral system that reduce direct voting and preclude independent and pro-democracy party candidates from participating – have undermined Hong Kong’s democratic institutions and harmed Hong Kong’s reputation as an international business and financial hub.We call on Hong Kong authorities to immediately release Jimmy Lai and all others imprisoned for defending their rights.
- On Hong Kong Authorities’ Transnational Repression Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateBy announcing National Security Law charges and a list of cash awards that unjustly target overseas democracy advocates, including a U.S. citizen and other individuals based in the United States, Hong Kong authorities display their disregard for international norms and human rights in Hong Kong and the deterioration of that city’s once proud tradition of respecting the rule of law.We strongly oppose any efforts to intimidate and silence individuals who choose to make the United States their home and will not waver in standing up for those who are targeted simply for exercising their human rights. The United States rejects the PRC’s attempt to use these cash awards to threaten and harass those advocating for freedom and democracy, and we urge Hong Kong authorities to respect the protected rights and freedoms enumerated in the Basic Law.We encourage the international community to join us in condemning this act of transnational repression. The United States remains committed to defending the rights and freedoms of all people and calls on the PRC to act in a manner consistent with its international commitments and legal obligations.