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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Samantha R. Blocher, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 4, 2020. No. S-19-1076.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial 

grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower 

court’s determination.

3. Speedy Trial. If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of 

the time for trial as provided for in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 

2016), as extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to 

his or her absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other 

offense required by law to be joined with that offense.

4. ____. To calculate the deadline for trial under the speedy trial statutes, a 

court must exclude the day the State filed the information, count forward 

6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016).

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori 

A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.

Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Jordan Osborne 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

02/26/2021 08:08 AM CST
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

Samantha R. Blocher was arrested in Lancaster County and 

charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine. 

The day before her pretrial docket call, Blocher was arrested 

in Douglas County for shoplifting. Blocher did not appear for 

her Lancaster County docket call, and the district court issued 

a bench warrant for Blocher’s arrest.

Blocher was arrested on the warrant by authorities at Douglas 

County Department of Corrections, but was not returned to 

Lancaster County. She was eventually convicted and sentenced 

for the shoplifting charge in Douglas County. After serving her 

sentence in Douglas County, Lancaster County sheriff’s deputies took custody of Blocher and transported her to Lancaster 

County. Blocher was again ordered to appear for a pretrial 

docket call. She filed a motion to discharge, which was denied. 

Blocher appeals.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the time 

Blocher spent incarcerated in Douglas County was properly 

attributable to Blocher for purposes of her speedy trial rights. 

The district court found that it was. We affirm the decision of 

the district court.

BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2019, Blocher was charged by information 

with possession of methamphetamine, a Class IV felony. She 

filed several pretrial motions on February 11, and those motions 

were disposed of by the district court on February 19.

Blocher was ordered to appear for a jury docket call on April 

17, 2019, but on April 16, Blocher was arrested for shoplifting in Douglas County. As a result, Blocher did not appear at 

the pretrial hearing in Lancaster County and a bench warrant 

was sought. That warrant was issued on April 19. Blocher 

was arrested on the warrant by authorities at Douglas County 

Department of Corrections on April 21, but was not transported 

back to Lancaster County.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

Blocher was eventually convicted in Douglas County of 

third-offense shoplifting, a Class IV felony, and sentenced to 

jail time, most of it already served. She served the remainder of her sentence. Immediately upon release on July 11, 

2019, Blocher was arrested by Lancaster County sheriff’s 

deputies and transported to Lancaster County. A bond hearing 

was held on July 16. At that hearing, the Lancaster County 

District Court waived its earlier finding that Blocher had forfeited her bond, reasoning that Blocher had been in custody in 

Douglas County.

On August 7, 2019, Blocher was ordered to appear in 

Lancaster County on August 21 for a docket call hearing 

in preparation for trial set during the jury term beginning 

September 9. On August 16, Blocher filed a motion for absolute discharge. A hearing was held, after which the district court 

issued a written order denying the motion. Blocher appeals.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Blocher assigns, restated, that the Lancaster County District 

Court erred in excluding from her speedy trial calculation the 

time she spent incarcerated while awaiting charges in Douglas 

County and while serving her sentence, and in turn denying 

her motion for discharge.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether 

charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly 

erroneous. 1

[2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which 

an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s 

determination. 2

1 State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (2019).

2 Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

ANALYSIS

[3] The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. 

Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016). 3 Section 

29-1207(1) provides that “[e]very person indicted or informed 

against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six 

months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this 

section.” If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial as provided for in § 29-1207, as 

extended by excluded periods, he or she shall be entitled to his 

or her absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any 

other offense required by law to be joined with that offense. 4

[4] To calculate the deadline for trial under the speedy trial 

statutes, a court must exclude the day the State filed the information, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add 

any time excluded under § 29-1207(4). 5 Section 29-1207(4) 

provides in relevant part:

The following periods shall be excluded in computing the 

time for trial:

(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited 

to, an examination and hearing on competency and the 

period during which he or she is incompetent to stand 

trial; the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial 

motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress 

evidence, motions to quash the indictment or information, demurrers and pleas in abatement, and motions for 

a change of venue; and the time consumed in the trial of 

other charges against the defendant;

. . . .

(d) The period of delay resulting from the absence or 

unavailability of the defendant.

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

We have held that a defendant who is given notice to appear 

for trial and fails to do so is absent or unavailable for purposes 

of § 29-1207(4)(d). In such a case, the time from the failure 

to appear until the “next reasonably available trial date” after 

the defendant reappears is attributable to the defendant. 6 A trial 

date within 6 months of the reappearance of the defendant is 

presumed to be reasonable. 7

The information in Lancaster County was filed against 

Blocher on February 7, 2019, so the State initially had until 

August 7 to bring Blocher to trial. But the State and Blocher 

agree that Blocher had filed pretrial motions on February 

11. Those motions were disposed of on February 19. Under 

§ 29-1207(4)(a), this delay of 8 days was attributable to 

Blocher and pushed the date by which the State had to try her 

until August 15.

Blocher was ordered to appear for a pretrial docket call 

on April 17, 2019. She did not appear. On appeal, Blocher 

argues that she was ordered to appear unless “incarcerated” 

and that because she had been arrested and was confined in 

Douglas County, she therefore was not absent or unavailable. 

Blocher further asserts that even if she was absent or unavailable, the time spent in Douglas County was not attributable to 

her, because Lancaster County was aware of her presence in 

Douglas County and did not do enough to ensure her presence 

at trial.

We turn first to Blocher’s assertion that she was not absent 

or unavailable on April 17, 2019. The record shows that 

on April 3, the district court filed its order to appear at a 

docket call. That filing consisted of a cover letter that ordered 

“[a]ll defendants (except those incarcerated)” to appear. It also 

included a list of those individuals on the docket call which 

separately denoted those that were incarcerated. The filing 

6 See State v. Petty, 269 Neb. 205, 213, 691 N.W.2d 101, 107 (2005). See, 

also, State v. McKenna, 228 Neb. 29, 421 N.W.2d 19 (1988).

7 See Petty, supra note 6.
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307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

ended by noting that “[t]he defendant can only be excused from 

appearing at docket call upon order of the Court.” Blocher’s 

name is listed and is not separately denoted as incarcerated. 

Nor does Blocher argue that she did not receive notice that she 

was to attend. 8 We conclude that when Blocher failed to appear, 

she was absent or unavailable for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(d). 

At least on these facts, her arrest in Douglas County did not act 

to relieve her of her responsibility to appear.

We turn next to Blocher’s assertion that even if she was 

initially absent or unavailable, that time is nevertheless unattributable to her, because Lancaster County “did not prove 

that it took any efforts to secure [her] appearance and that 

such efforts were unsuccessful, or that such efforts would have 

been futile.” 9

We disagree that on these facts, Lancaster County did not 

make any effort to secure Blocher’s presence. The record shows 

that upon Blocher’s failure to appear, a warrant was ordered 

for her arrest. That warrant was actually issued the next day 

and was served on Blocher 2 days later. At that time, Blocher 

was arrested by authorities at Douglas County Department 

of Corrections, but remained in Douglas County until the 

charges against her there were concluded and she finished 

serving her sentence. Blocher was immediately taken into 

custody by Lancaster County authorities and transported to 

Lancaster County.

Blocher asserts only that she was charged, not by an individual county, but by the State, and that as such, it was 

within the power of Lancaster County to have her returned to 

Lancaster County for trial. But she directs us to no authority 

that would support the conclusion that one county in Nebraska 

may require another county to transfer custody of a defendant, 

and our research has revealed none.

8 See, e.g., State v. Richter, 240 Neb. 223, 481 N.W.2d 200 (1992).

9 Brief for appellant at 8.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

307 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

Moreover, while there is no Nebraska case law directly on 

point, we have said, under similar facts but in the context of a 

constitutional speedy trial analysis, that requiring a county to 

take steps to secure the presence of defendant “ignores the fact 

that such action could have affected his availability for pretrial 

proceedings and trial on the . . . charges [pending in another 

county], resulting in the delay of their disposition.” 10

The record shows that the State, acting through the Lancaster 

County Attorney, sought a bench warrant, which was issued 

within a few days after Blocher’s failure to appear. Blocher 

was arrested on that warrant a few days after it was issued. The 

warrant was eventually returned on July 12, 2019, noting that 

Lancaster County had taken custody of Blocher on July 11, as 

soon as she was released from her sentence in Douglas County. 

At that time, Blocher was returned to Lancaster County. We 

conclude that on these facts, Lancaster County acted with sufficient diligence to secure Blocher’s presence.

We are not persuaded by Blocher’s reliance on State v. 

Steele,

 11 because we find it distinguishable. In Steele, the 

defendant was out on bond on charges in Lancaster County, 

when a warrant was issued for his arrest in Colorado. Lancaster 

County arrested him on that warrant and later voluntarily 

returned the defendant to Colorado. However, the county 

failed to lodge a detainer against the defendant. In this case, 

though, Lancaster County did not voluntarily transfer custody 

to Douglas County, nor did it fail to take any necessary legal 

steps to secure Blocher’s return.

Finally, we observe that while the district court relied on 

§ 29-1207(4)(d) to support the entire time between Blocher’s 

arrest and eventual release in Douglas County, at least a 

portion of that time period would also appear to be properly excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a), which excludes “[t]he 

10 State v. Tucker, 259 Neb. 225, 232, 609 N.W.2d 306, 312 (2000).

11 State v. Steele, 261 Neb. 541, 624 N.W.2d 1 (2001).
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STATE v. BLOCHER

Cite as 307 Neb. 874

period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning 

the defendant, including, but not limited to . . . the time consumed in the trial of other charges against the defendant.”

While Blocher pled no contest to the charge in Douglas 

County and so did not go to trial, she was incarcerated during the pendency of charges against her in Douglas County. 

Broadly construed, § 29-1207(4)(a) applies to proceedings in 

the pending case as well as to proceedings in other pending 

cases; in addition, the plain language envisions that the periods 

of delay are not limited to those listed.

The district court did not err in excluding the time period 

from April 17, 2019, until the September 9 trial date. That 

trial date was within 6 months of Blocher’s reappearance in 

Lancaster County and presumed to be the next reasonably 

available trial date. In turn, the district court did not err in 

denying Blocher’s motion to discharge.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.