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44–856 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–535

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 7, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

FEBRUARY 7, 2008

Page

Punaro, Maj. Gen. Arnold L., USMCR (Ret.) Chairman, Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves ............................................................................. 5

Stump, Maj. Gen. E. Gordon, ANG (Ret.), Commissioner, Commission on 

the National Guard and Reserves ...................................................................... 12

Lewis, Patricia L., Commissioner, Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves ................................................................................................................ 15

Ball, Hon. William L., III, Commissioner, Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves ......................................................................................................... 18

(III) 

(1)

THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 

THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Byrd, Reed, 

Akaka, Warner, Collins, Dole, Thune, Martinez, and Wicker. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Mary 

J. Kyle, legislative clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, 

counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff 

member. 

Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. 

Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Kevin A. Cronin, and 

Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni 

Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to 

Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. 

Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Cave and Sandra Luff, assistants 

to Senator Warner; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor 

IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to 

Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; 

and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The Senate Armed 

Services Committee meets today to receive the final report of the 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. 

We welcome our witnesses here today: Major General Arnold 

Punaro, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), who is 

2

chairman of the Commission and well known to this committee. 

His fellow commissioners here today are William Ball III, former 

Secretary of the Navy; Patricia Lewis, former professional staff 

member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Major General Gordon Stump, Air National Guard (Retired), who has also 

served with distinction as our Adjutant General in Michigan. We 

welcome and thank you all. The Nation owes you a debt for your 

willingness to take on this voluntary task. 

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established by a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2005 to assess the impact of the changing role of the 

National Guard and Reserves as they evolved from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force. This change had occurred without 

much public debate or a critical assessment of the significance of 

that change. 

The Commission was directed to address, first, the current and 

future roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserves; second, the capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves and the 

manner in which those components may be best used to support 

the military operations of the Armed Forces and the achievement 

of national security objectives, including homeland defense; third, 

the current and future organization and structure of the National 

Guard and Reserves; fourth, the organization and funding of training of the National Guard and Reserves; and, fifth, options for improving compensation and other benefits provided to members of 

the National Guard and Reserves and their families. 

While the Commission was in the process of addressing these 

issues, the Senate was simultaneously considering some significant 

proposals for enhancing the National Guard. To respond to that, 

Congress asked the Commission to add to its already full plate an 

examination, on a priority basis, of those new proposals. 

The Commission responded with a report on March 1, 2007. The 

Commission’s analysis and recommendations proved to be very 

helpful to Congress, as evidenced by the fact that most of the recommendations that required legislation are included in the recently 

enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. 

Some of the most significant provisions that were enacted are, first, 

elevating the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to four stars, and 

designating him as a principal advisor on National Guard matters 

to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs; next, establishing the National Guard Bureau as a joint activity of the Department of Defense (DOD), while, at the same 

time, enhancing the functions of the National Guard Bureau, and 

requiring the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to determine what military-unique capabilities 

DOD is required to provide in support of civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident. 

Now, although we’ve only had a few days to review this extensive 

report, we can already conclude that many of its 95 recommendations are very significant and far-reaching. The report contains, for 

instance, recommendations for creating a sustainable Operational 

Reserve; enhancing DOD’s role in the Homeland; creating a continuum of service, including personnel management, for an integrated total force; developing a ready, capable, and available OperVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
3

ational Reserve; supporting servicemembers, families, and employers; and reforming the organizations and institutions that support 

an Operational Reserve. 

The Commission also recommends significant changes to pay and 

benefits, some of which would apply to all military personnel. 

These recommendations include major changes to the military retirement system for both Active and Reserve military personnel. 

These proposals, and many others, will require extensive study by 

Congress, DOD, and a number of other agencies. 

The Commission’s report has drawn criticism from the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau, who assert that core elements of the report are flawed, and contend, contrary to the report, that DOD’s, 

‘‘catastrophic response capabilities are the best-funded, bestequipped, best-trained in the world.’’ The leaders of the Senate National Guard Caucus have issued a press release criticizing the report, saying that several recommendations, if implemented, would 

undermine the National Guard and hamper DOD’s ability to respond to domestic emergencies, alleging the Commission’s recommendations don’t give due credit to the superb performance, 

missions, and capabilities of the National Guard, and that the 

Commission calls for a retreat from the newly-enacted Guard empowerment reforms. 

So, members of the Commission, you’ve stirred up some discussion, to put it diplomatically. 

The Commission’s recommendations will now be reviewed by 

Congress and by DOD and the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

When the Commission submitted its March 1, 2007, report, its 

so-called ‘‘interim report,’’ DOD undertook a review of the Commission’s recommendations. This review proved to be very useful to 

Congress, and helped us to consider some of the issues that were 

pending. I know DOD will conduct a similar review of this report 

and its many recommendations. 

The Senate Armed Services Committee will not be the only committee to address the findings and recommendations that are contained in this report. I believe that the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Government Affairs will hold a hearing next week to 

explore the homeland security aspects of this report. We appreciate 

the courtesy of Senator Lieberman in sequencing these hearings. 

The Commission has tackled some very difficult issues of national importance. The Commission freely acknowledges that a 

number of its recommendations will require intensive study by 

Congress and the executive branch. The report will provide the vehicle for a very important debate. 

Again, we thank our witnesses and their fellow commissioners 

for taking on a very important, a very demanding, and a very controversial task. 

Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to join you in indicating 

that we are very grateful for the public service of this outstanding 

group of individuals, all of who are volunteers on this matter. 

4

I’d like to read a paragraph from their report. It states, ‘‘Our 

study has been informed by 17 days of public hearings involving 

115 witnesses, 52 Commission meetings, more than 850 interviews 

with officials and other subject-matter experts, including the current and former Secretaries of Defense and the current and former 

Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.’’ It goes 

on. 

That indicates, Mr. Chairman, that a lot of conscientious effort 

was put into this by these fine people, all of whom we’ve known 

for many years. 

I would also recommend that the record contain at some appropriate point the names of the other commissioners. 

Chairman LEVIN. The record will show the entire list of commissioners. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I’d make a further suggestion to 

the chair, I think the committee should take the initiative to invite 

comment from other entities, such as the National Guard Bureau, 

the Reserve organizations, and, indeed, DOD, such that the record 

reflects, with greater accuracy, and we just don’t rely on press conferences and press reports of those who had reason to challenge 

some of the findings of this commission. I think a full record is very 

important for the Senate, so I urge the chair that that be done. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner, thank you for that suggestion. 

One of two things, I think, will need to be done here. Either we 

will have a hearing, where those folks, and perhaps others, would 

be invited to comment, or we would adopt your suggestion about 

inviting them to give us their comments for the record. But, one 

or the other needs to be done, and will be done. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the chair. 

I will put the balance of my statement in the record, but I would 

like to make this one observation. As our committee considers this 

report, I’ve found myself thinking of the origin of the total-force 

concept, which is linked to our magnificent All-Volunteer Force. 

Not long after he took office, then-Secretary of Defense Melvin 

Laird—I was privileged to join DOD with him as a part of his team 

in the Navy secretariat—recommended that President Nixon appoint a Commission to determine the most practical means for ending the draft. The Gates Commission concluded that, ‘‘An All-Volunteer Force,’’ was a practical alternative to the draft, but this 

force would require greater reliance on the Reserve and the National Guard. Now, that prescient thought has certainly come to 

play in these conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The linkage between the total-force concept and the All-Volunteer Force is vital. Therefore, as we proceed in Congress to perhaps 

make such decisions regarding the need for, or absence of the need 

for, legislative language, we always want to keep an eye on that 

All-Volunteer Force. 

I thank the chair, and I’ll ask that the balance of my statement 

be placed in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming General Punaro, former Secretary of the Navy William Ball, Patricia Lewis, and Brigadier General Stump. I 

want to thank each of you, all of the Commissioners, your staff, and all those in 

5

the Department who assisted you, for your dedication and accomplishments. I have 

in mind your previous report from March 1, 2007, as well. That report contributed 

materially to our ability to complete the National Defense Authorization Act for the 

current fiscal year, and I thank you for your assistance with the analysis of the National Guard Empowerment Act proposals. 

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we be sure to enter into the record of these 

proceedings a list of all the names of those who contributed to the work of the Commission. 

The Commission has performed a valuable service in providing this comprehensive review of the manner in which the National Guard and Reserve has been used 

in the past and in challenging assumptions surrounding its role today. Such an 

independent review has long been needed, and I hope that the report and recommendations of the Commission will be a catalyst for change. 

As we consider this Commission’s report, I found myself thinking of the origins 

of the Total Force concept, which is linked to our magnificent All-Volunteer Force. 

Not long after taking office, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird recommended 

that President Nixon appoint a commission to determine the most practical means 

for ending the draft. The Gates Commission, headed by President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, concluded that an ‘‘All-Volunteer Force,’’ was a 

practical alternative to the draft, but this force would require greater reliance on 

the Reserve and the National Guard. The linkage between the Total Force concept 

and the All-Volunteer Force is important, and we must be careful to ensure that 

changes in the Total Force enhance the All-Volunteer Force. 

Independent reviews oftentimes generate energetic debate and even controversy 

and it would appear that you have met that standard. I appreciate the lengths you 

have gone to, General Punaro, to emphasize that your findings do not represent an 

effort to assign blame and to point out that the problems you identify have origins 

stretching back many years. 

With respect to the roles and the mission of the National Guard and the Reserve, 

and particularly with respect to the Nation’s preparedness for a catastrophic attack, 

I applaud your willingness to ask hard questions and to be dissatisfied by the answers you received and the conditions you found. The National Guard and all the 

Reserve components are critical to the defense of our Nation—your report puts that 

in focus, and I look forward to working with the Department of Defense and with 

my colleagues in the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee to 

make sure that we rapidly respond to your recommendations.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Chairman Punaro? 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMCR (RET.) 

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND 

RESERVES 

General PUNARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, 

members of the committee. Of course, it’s a pleasure for us to appear before the committee this morning to discuss the final report 

of our independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, titled ‘‘Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into 

a 21st-Century Operational Force.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask your consent that our full statement, 

as well as the executive summary of our final report, be entered 

into the record, and each of us will give a short verbal summary 

of some of the key areas of the report. 

Chairman LEVIN. That will be done. 

General PUNARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you indicated, and have already introduced our three fellow 

commissioners here this morning—Will Ball, Patty Lewis, and 

Major General Gordon Stump—each with an extraordinarily distinguished career and unique expertise in many of the subject matters 

addressed by the Commission. We’re here, as Senator Warner indicated, on behalf of our eight other fellow commissioners; we thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, and we thank the ranking member, Senator 

6

McCain, for the support you’ve given the Commission, the support 

we have received from your sister committees and the other committees of jurisdiction. The cooperation we’ve had from Congress, 

DOD, and the executive branch throughout our 21⁄2 years has been 

one of the most pleasant surprises. We know because there are a 

lot of commissions around town, and a lot of them doing a lot of 

good work, plus everybody has day-to-day busy schedules, but we 

could not have had better support from Congress and from DOD. 

The Commission would like to pay special tribute to Senator 

Warner, one of the principal architects of the legislation creating 

this Commission, who is, as we all know, retiring at the end of this 

Senate session. As we said in our transmittal letter to you, Mr. 

Chairman, and to the Secretary of Defense, Senator Warner is a 

true statesman, in the finest sense of the word. Bipartisanship and 

a tireless advocacy for a strong national defense have been the 

hallmarks of his long and remarkable career in service to this Nation. I would say, as a matter of personal privilege, Secretary Ball 

and I have served in the Navy and Marine Corps team, as did Senator Warner in his career in uniform. We had the privilege to be 

staffers on the Senate Armed Services Committee, working, not 

only with you, but with Senator Warner and other members of the 

committee, and we’re both Virginians, and we couldn’t be more 

proud of the service of our senior Senator from Virginia over these 

long and many years. The Commission adopted that sentiment, 

unanimously, and, I know it is shared by the members of the committee. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for making that reference, both 

here and in the report. I know that would be supported and acclaimed, and thoroughly agreed with by every Member of the U.S. 

Senate. 

Senator WARNER. I thank the Chair, and I thank the chairman 

of the Commission. I would want to note that Les Brownlee also 

was a part of my ability to achieve whatever record I had here. He 

is also a member of your Commission. 

General PUNARO. The Commission was chartered to identify and 

recommend changes in law and policy to ensure the National 

Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of our Nation, now and in the future. 

You, subsequently, Mr. Chairman, tasked us to study the advisability and feasibility of implementing the provisions of the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act. Our report of March 1, 2007, with the 23 recommendations, was acted on very quickly by Secretary of Defense 

Robert M. Gates and by Congress. In DOD, Secretary Gates initiated a very thorough and quick review, adopted 20 of the 23 recommendations, and the implementation of those recommendations 

is well underway in DOD. 

Congress also acted very quickly and decisively in those things 

that required statutory changes, and, in addition, some really good 

improvements came out of Congress on those recommendations in 

the recently-enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008. 

7

Both Congress and DOD were out of the blocks very quickly on 

that initial report. 

The 95 recommendations in our final report, submitted to you 

last Thursday, both addressed your initial charter and also engaged more deeply with issues addressed in the earlier report. Specifically, the concerns with respect to the sustainability of an Operational Guard and Reserve, and the currently, as the Commission 

indicated, disjointed planning and resourcing process to address 

threats in the Homeland. The statute specifically directed us to examine how best the Guard and Reserve could be used in roles in 

the Homeland. Some of our recommendations are new, some of 

them are recommending additional capabilities and involvement, as 

you directed us in the statute. 

In this report, as we did in the initial report, we really tried to 

zero in on the problems that needed to be fixed, and suggest solutions. We knew that not everyone was going to agree with all our 

recommendations. That never happens, and it shouldn’t happen. 

But, we wanted to make sure that we really had the problems correctly identified and no one could challenge that. We really focused 

in on that, and I think you will see, in the documentation of the 

backup in the report is backed up by official testimony, documents, 

et cetera. 

These issues are extremely complex. People of good character and 

conscience will disagree with the solutions. We believe your mandate to us was to report what we found, and that’s what we did. 

We also recognized that further analysis by DOD and Congress 

may lead to alternative solutions. We certainly encourage that. We 

encourage improvements and alternative remedies to our recommendations. Again, our focus is on fixing the problems, not on 

whose solutions are adopted. 

Fewer than half of our 95 recommendations actually require legislation. There are areas where DOD, if they agreed with them, 

could undertake a change in policies and regulations right away. 

They don’t have to wait on legislation. Congress could enact some 

immediate statutory changes, as well. 

Other recommendations, particularly in the area of personnel 

management, will take careful thought and analysis by DOD and 

Congress to determine how best they should be implemented in 

order to achieve the desired outcome. Even if Congress and DOD 

agree with all of these sweeping recommendations in personnel and 

benefits, they couldn’t all be dealt with this year. The Personnel 

Subcommittees, as good as they are, and the staff, as good as they 

are, these are not issues that lend themselves to action this year 

by either DOD or Congress. For example, when DOD revised the 

Defense Officer Personnel Management Act in the late 1970s, it 

took them 4 years to work on it. It took Congress 4 years to pass 

it. Hopefully, on these, it won’t take that long, but it’s certainly not 

something, Mr. Chairman, we believe, that Congress or DOD could 

address this year. But, what we would hope is once you did make 

changes, they would be phased in over a long period of time—a 

number of years for some, 20 years for others. Actually, that’s the 

best way to do these kind of changes. 

While they don’t lend themselves to legislative action, some of 

them, we think it would be important for Congress to establish a 

8

statutory framework for addressing all of the 95 recommendations. 

That would be very desirable, particularly given the transitions 

that are going to occur at the end of this year, both in the executive 

branch and Congress, so that there’s an ability for subsequent executive branch and subsequent Congresses to not have to start from 

scratch, but build on the good work that I know will already be 

done. 

We can’t emphasize too strongly that our recommendations are 

in no way a critique of officials currently serving in Congress or the 

Pentagon, or their predecessors in previous administrations or Congresses. We didn’t intend this to be a report card on anyone. Many 

of these problems have persisted for decades and have often 

seemed intractable; others are tied to the new and emerging 

threats that we face in this area. It’s understandable, given the 

operational commitments that have, by necessity, been a high priority, DOD has not been able to fully develop strategies for the 

Guard and Reserve that are focused many years in the future. 

They have made real progress in many areas since September 11. 

They’ve addressed the immediate challenges of recruiting and retention, made sure the mobilized Guard and Reserve units, when 

they go downrange, are fully trained and equipped, and made a 

down payment, even, on solving some of these complex personnel 

management issues. 

Funding for the Reserve components appears to be trending upward, and additional funding in the pipeline to improve the shortages, particularly in the Army National Guard. 

Again, it’s not a report card, because the statute did not focus us 

on how far we’ve come, Mr. Chairman; the statute spoke to us on 

how far we need to go to get to the desired end state. It’ll be up 

to the committee, Congress, and DOD to determine our snapshot 

in time, where we think we need to go, how much of that gap you 

are really committed to closing. We, of course, would argue we’d 

like to close the whole gap, but you may determine otherwise. We 

are not looking backwards, we are really looking at where we are 

today, where we need to go, and how do you close that gap. 

Senator Warner has already talked about the extensive number 

of hearings and analysis that we did. I want to emphasize, we 

didn’t just gather official wisdom here in Washington, we made a 

concerted effort to get outside the Beltway for field hearings, site 

visits, focus groups, talked to servicemembers, the same thing that 

members and the staff of this committee do everyday. We talked 

to families, employers, and many others. 

I want to add, Mr. Chairman, that the 12 members of this Commission had a total of 288 total years of military service in uniform, dating back to the Vietnam war and 186 additional years of 

nonmilitary government service, either in the Senate, in Congress, 

in the executive branch, and, of course, many years of private-sector experience. It was a very experienced group of individuals, that 

had a lot of personal experience in all the areas that we dealt with. 

Let me then close out my part of it, Mr. Chairman, by talking 

about what we believe to be the core recommendation in our report, 

which is conclusion number 1. 

Our conclusion number 1 states, in part, ‘‘The Nation requires an 

Operational Reserve Force.’’ We go along, then, in our recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ommendation number 1, to say, ‘‘Congress and DOD should explicitly acknowledge the need for, and create, an Operational Reserve 

Force. In order to place the Reserve components on a sustainable 

path as part of that force, Congress and DOD must modify existing 

laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organizational structures and Reserve component 

categories. These significant changes to law and policy are required 

if the Reserve components are to realize their full potential to serve 

this Nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are to be reversed. Moreover, the traditional capabilities of 

the Reserve components to serve as a Strategic Reserve Force must 

be expanded and strengthened.’’ 

Why did we come to that conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members 

of the committee? When we started, 21⁄2 years ago, many of us 

went to a conference that was sponsored by DOD, and at that conference, one of the members of the Joint Staff, Major General 

Thomas A. ‘‘Tommy’’ Dyches, USAF (Ret.), who was the Assistant 

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Matters, 

serving on Active Duty, made the statement, ‘‘We’re evolving to an 

Operational Guard and Reserve, and that makes a huge difference.’’ He said, ‘‘But we’ve changed none of the laws, rules, regulations, funding, training, equipping, all the things that would be 

required.’’ That was the conclusion of the Special Assistant to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. 

We were huge skeptics, Mr. Chairman, of this concept of an 

Operational Guard and Reserve. One of the reasons was, many 

members of the Commission had served in the Guard and Reserve. 

General Stump and I served in the Guard and Reserve when it was 

a Strategic Guard and Reserve, in the 1970s and early 1980s. We 

served in the Guard and Reserve as it began evolving into an Operational Guard and Reserve, starting with the first Gulf war, intensified during the decade of the 1990s, and certainly highly intensified after September 11, when over 600,000 members of our Guard 

and Reserve components had been called up, mobilized, sent forward, and an additional 68 million man days have served here at 

home, such as the 55,000 for the Guard in Hurricane Katrina. 

We’ve commanded units when it was strategic, and we’ve commanded units that were operational, and people should not underestimate the profound difference. You can be an operational unit 

and be in an operation; that doesn’t mean you’re an Operational 

Guard and Reserve. The whole nature of what you need to do, in 

terms of your training, your readiness, your equipping, your family 

support, your employer support, is profoundly different as an Operational Reserve than as a Strategic Reserve. 

We were huge skeptics that you could make those changes, and 

make it not only feasible, but sustainable. You can go do a lot of 

operations; that doesn’t mean it’s going to be sustainable over the 

long term. 

Three reasons, then, that we were converted from skeptics of to 

believers in an Operational Guard and Reserve. Again, this isn’t a 

conclusion that should be challenged by DOD; this is our core recommendation, because this is what DOD says they’re doing. Again, 

our point is, you may be doing it, but we haven’t made the fundaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
10

mental changes that are required to make it sustainable over the 

long term. 

Reason number 1 is that, meeting the force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, and meeting the commitments that the combatant commanders in the national command authorities required overseas 

and home, could not be done without the 600,000 Guard and Reserve personnel that have been mobilized. You’d have had to go 

back to the draft; there’s no question about it. We believe the draft 

is politically unacceptable. We believe it’s militarily undesirable. 

The Commission came to this conclusion because the All-Volunteer 

Force was never designed for sustained combat. 

In 1970, when the Gates Commission recommended eliminating 

the draft, and when we went to the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, 

it was well understood that the All-Volunteer Force was not designed for sustained combat. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) scenario, in the peak of the Cold War, if the Soviet 

Union, in the Warsaw Pact, were to attack NATO, we had a commitment to have 10 divisions in 10 days in NATO, then the Guard 

and Reserve, as a Strategic Reserve, would be mobilized, but they 

wouldn’t get into the parade for 6 to 8 months. You would have had 

to crank up the draft immediately, because you wouldn’t have had 

sufficient forces. That’s been well understood by military planners. 

We believe, without having this Guard and Reserve that’s able 

to be used, not only overseas, but here at home—the threats are 

not going to diminish and the requirement here at home is actually 

greater than it has been—we are going to need this fully-ready 

Guard and Reserve, with certain units able to respond on a moment’s notice. 

Second, the Guard and Reserve are uniquely well suited for some 

of these homeland missions, particularly the catastrophic missions 

that we face. While low probability, the adverse impact, particularly as your colleagues from the Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee know, who’ve delved into this matter extensively, as has this committee, the legislation creating the DHS 

recognized these threats. 

The Guard and Reserve units are geographically better suited 

than the Active units, from an operational standpoint. Forward deployed in over 5,000 communities across the country, many of them 

are first responders. As Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum has 

testified quite often, you can’t wait 72 or 92 hours, you have to be 

there right away. 

We need the Guard and Reserve, because we don’t want to go 

back to the draft. It’s the firebreak. We need the Guard and Reserve to deal with these homeland missions, so you do not need to 

basically build additional capacity in the Active Forces to have 

them be the primary homeland response force. 

Finally, the Guard and Reserve are a true bargain for the taxpayer. They’re, economically, a much better way of dealing with 

these homeland threats, and providing the insurance policy to augment and reinforce the Actives overseas. 

One of the things we looked at was the many myths about how 

much the Guard and Reserve cost. Not only did we do our own 

analysis, we asked the Pentagon to do an analysis, we went to the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), we went to the CongresVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
11

sional Budget Office, and we went to the Library of Congress. 

Every study came in showing that the Guard and Reserve are 

about 70 to 75 percent cheaper than having the equivalent capability in the Active component, no matter how you look at it. For 

7 to 9 percent of the DOD budget, the Guard and Reserve provide 

44 percent of the available manpower. GAO found that a drilling 

reservist received 15 percent of the amount of individual compensation—that’s both direct, indirect, and deferred—compared to the 

amount of an Active-Duty servicemember. Also an Active-Duty 

servicemember costs roughly $126,000; while a Guard or Reservist 

costs about $19,000 per individual. In fact, the Active Duty costs 

have doubled in the last 5 years. So the cost of the Active Duty, 

mainly because of the deferred benefits, is on a rapidly escalating 

path. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller, Dave Patterson (Principal Under Secretary of Defense), testified that Reserve component costs for personnel in operation and maintenance 

(O&M) were 20 to 29 percent of those for the Active component. 

The RAND Corporation actually costed out the price of maintaining 

a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in the National Guard compared to 

the Active Army, and it was 30 percent less for the Guard BCT 

compared to an Active BCT; for the same amount of money, you get 

three times the capability. Now, that doesn’t deal with the availability issue, but it’s really the economics. 

In the President’s budget—because people say, ‘‘Well, wait a 

minute, we have to buy their gear, we have to do this, we have to 

do that’’—if you look at the four major appropriations—personnel, 

O&M, procurement, and military construction—the Reserve component members cost 23 percent of what is spent on Active component servicemembers. 

Mr. Chairman, no matter how you slice it, the Guard and Reserve are a true bargain for the taxpayer. They are extremely well 

suited to pick up and beef up our capability to respond in the 

Homeland, as we need to do. We concluded we don’t have sufficient 

capability today. We believe you’re going to need this Operational 

Guard and Reserve, that’s sustainable, to be able to augment and 

reinforce the Active component overseas, and do these homeland 

missions that are so critically important. When the Guard, in particular, is going to be called into that fray, they need to be fully 

equipped, fully manned, fully trained, and fully ready, just like the 

82nd Airborne is for an overseas mission, to meet those kind of 

threats. 

That is our core conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that the Nation requires this Operational Reserve, and we need to make all those 

changes to make it happen. 

That concludes my comments, and I believe, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, General Stump is going to talk about our second main conclusion, which is enhancing DOD’s role in the Homeland. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General Stump? 

12

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. E. GORDON STUMP, ANG (RET.), 

COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD 

AND RESERVES 

General STUMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the committee members, for allowing us to testify. Personally, thank you 

for allowing me the opportunity to serve on this Commission. 

Prior to September 11, we, in the Homeland, were satisfied that 

we were safe, the Cold War was over. We had even gone to the 

measures of getting rid of air defense, and, just a couple of days 

prior to September 11, were going to completely eliminate those air 

defense responsibilities. Then came September 11. In 45 minutes, 

more people were killed than the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was 

a wake-up call. 

After that happened, we set up DHS and United States Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) to start addressing the issues of homeland security. The Commission looked at the roles and missions of 

the National Guard and Reserve as they fit into DHS and 

NORTHCOM, and have come up with several recommendations on 

how we can enhance DOD’s role and the National Guard’s role in 

these missions. 

The first of our recommendations is that Congress should codify 

DOD’s responsibility to provide civil support and specify that this 

is a core competency of DOD equal to—in priority—to its warfighting responsibilities. Legislation should specify that DOD will 

provide the bulk response to major catastrophes. 

Current statutes, like the Stafford Act, provide the authority, but 

not the responsibility, for this mission, and the statutory change of 

responsibility will ensure that DOD’s priorities shift, and that its 

commitment stays in place. 

When we have a major catastrophe, the only people who are 

going to be able to respond, when all of the local government and 

other people are unavailable, is DOD. We feel that if you put the 

statutory requirement in there for them to be responsible for support to civil authorities, it will make sure that they maintain that 

on their priority list. They have accepted the responsibility for 

homeland defense, and we feel that they should also be given the 

statutory requirement to provide the support to civil authorities. 

Our next conclusion is, ‘‘Consistent with their warfighting 

tasking responsibilities, the National Guard and Reserves should 

take the lead role in and form the backbone of DOD operations in 

the Homeland.’’ To me, having served as an Adjutant General for 

12 years, this is somewhat of a no-brainer. Regardless of what anybody does, the National Guard will be the first military force on the 

ground, no matter what happens. The Governor depends on their 

fire departments, their police department to handle the incidents, 

as far as they can go. They use all of their State resources. When 

they’re out of those State resources, they call up the National 

Guard. I knew if we had a huge snowstorm in the upper peninsula, 

or a fire somewhere, or a riot in Detroit, that the Governor would 

be calling me. To specify the National Guard then as a lead agency—and the Reserves—on the homeland defense mission makes 

sense. 

The National Guard has stepped up. Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and the National Guard 

13

Bureau attempt to distribute force structure throughout the States 

that covers the consequences of any problem that could come up in 

the State. They have recently stood up the National Guard Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Enhanced Response 

Force Packages, 17 of them. They are located in all of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency regions. These are packages that 

the National Guard, on its own, stood up, because they know that, 

when the time comes and there’s a major disaster, that they’re 

going to be called upon. Unfortunately, these are smaller packages, 

and can only respond for the first 72 hours, until we have a Federal response to follow on, to take care of what’s really going on, 

especially with a dirty bomb or a nuclear explosion. 

We also believe the majority of the billets at NORTHCOM should 

be filled by leaders and staff with Reserve qualifications and credentials, and that the commander and deputy commander be either 

a guardsman or a reservist. These are the same recommendations 

that we had in our March report. As for NORTHCOM, a majority 

of their resources that are going to be used in any of the disaster 

response are going to come from the Guard and Reserves. They’re 

also going to come from the Governors, and they’re going to come 

from the State response forces. We need people at NORTHCOM 

who understand the Guard and Reserve and understand how the 

State government works and how they respond to national disasters. All of these must be a coordinated effort between DHS, the 

Active Duty people, and the Guard and Reserve Forces. It has to 

be a combined effort to address the consequence management of 

some of these catastrophes. 

DHS should generate civil support requirements for DOD, and 

should validate them, and DOD should validate those requirements, as appropriate. 

I learned, in my early days as the Adjutant General, if I was 

looking for support for National Guard unfunded requirements, 

that’s when I came to you to talk about them. The first thing that 

you asked me was, ‘‘Well, how will this help the National Guard? 

How will it help the Active Duty? Does the National Guard Bureau 

support what you’re asking for? Has the Federal Government, 

through the Future Years Defense Plan, put this in the requirements list?’’ Before I could answer all of those questions, you would 

not consider any funding. 

We find that DHS needs to do the same thing. They need to identify the requirements for the homeland support mission. Those requirements have not been identified, and it’s very difficult for Congress, or anybody, to support the funds required if they don’t know 

what the requirements are. We feel that DHS should define the requirements for the homeland security and disaster response mission, they should send those requirements to DOD for validation, 

and then, after that, Congress can act upon filling those requirements. 

I’m sure that we’re all concerned about what’s happening on the 

Homeland, and, if those requirements are defined, that there will 

not be a problem in getting those resourced. 

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that forces identified as 

rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are manned, trained, 

and equipped to the highest levels of readiness. The Commission 

14

has found that the Nation is not prepared to handle a major catastrophe here in the United States. NORTHCOM has identified consequence management response forces which should be formed, 

trained, and ready to meet these disasters. There should be packages consisting of several thousand joint personnel from several 

units, identified and organized to perform the chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and explosive consequent management missions with capabilities including medical, decontamination, communications, logistics, transportation, and public affairs. These are 

forces that would follow on after the initial response that the National Guard has stood up on their own to handle these major catastrophes. These need to be stood up and resourced. 

DOD should develop protocols allowing Governors, under certain 

circumstances, to direct the efforts of Federal military forces within 

States responding to an emergency. This kind of arrangement 

should be worked on in advance to avoid confusion, and it can be 

done through a certified dual-hatted National Guard officer. This 

is a controversial recommendation, one which, in our March 1 report, was rejected by DOD, has been rejected by the members of 

NORTHCOM when we’ve discussed the situation with them, and 

even some commanders of the Reserve components. 

However, there is a program that is in place to train National 

Guard officers to be dual-hatted. These are people who have gone 

through a training program, where they can command title 10 and 

title 32 forces. At the G8 conference, a few years ago in Georgia, 

we set up a command where the National Guard was in charge, 

and it worked very effectively. When you have an emergency in a 

State, we need unity of command. We are not saying that the Governors are going to be in charge of the Active Duty or the title 10 

Reserve Forces, day in and day out. These should be prearranged 

protocols when a disaster comes up in the States. We need to have 

unity of command. The Governor of the State needs to be able to 

command and control all the forces that are working on the emergency or the response to that emergency in his or her State. 

We had testimony from the Governor of Delaware about this specific subject. I asked her if she would like to use the Army Reserve 

Forces in her State for responses to domestic emergencies, and she 

said, ‘‘Yes, as long as they’re under my command and control.’’ 

Today, 98 percent of all the emergencies are small and handled at 

the level of the Governors and the National Guard without the help 

of Federal forces. But, we have Reserve components that are within 

the States that are not used, because they’re title 10, and there is 

no way to activate those forces. 

This comes to another recommendation, where we would like to 

have authority for the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force 

to activate these Reserve components to help out in these State 

emergencies. The Governors would like to have those particular 

people, who are in the Reserve component, but in title 10, be able 

to report directly to them. 

Now, I would like to emphasize that one of the recommendations 

is to look at possible rebalancing of the National Guard and Reserve Forces once the requirements have been defined by DHS for 

the homeland security mission. In no way does this Commission 

recommend that the National Guard become strictly a homeland 

15

defense force. That’s a program which will not work. You can’t recruit, you can’t retain to it, we can’t help the Active Duty with 

their BCTs and cut down the deployment times, if, in fact, we start 

taking away some of the capabilities, which some people might say 

are not required, like a BCT, for the homeland security mission. I 

can tell you, the time that I was the Adjutant General of Michigan, 

I had 10,000 Army Guard soldiers in the State, and I had a combat 

brigade in my homeland security mission. I didn’t need the tanks, 

but I did need the organization, I needed the leadership, I needed 

the Humvees, I needed the communication networks, and so forth. 

We are not recommending that the National Guard get out of those 

particular dual-mission-type capabilities. 

With that, I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, we would 

turn to Patty Lewis, on the personnel issues. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Lewis? 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA L. LEWIS, COMMISSIONER, 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

this morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner, for the 

privilege of serving on this Commission. Thank you, Chairman 

Punaro, for allowing me to work with you a second stint. To my 

fellow commissioners, I highly respect and value the opportunity to 

interact with them. 

As the Chairman said, I will be addressing the personnel management issues for the future, and the creation of a continuum of 

service through managing an integrated total force. But, I want to 

assure the committee that, during the course of our work, we never 

lost focus of our most valuable resource, and that’s our people. 

Unfortunately, many of the personnel management strategies 

that currently exist are post-World War II, Cold War-era relics, 

and have not been updated to meet the challenges of managing 

new recruitment issues, management issues, and strategies for retaining our highly skilled and increasingly mobile workforce of the 

21st century. 

We believe that integrated total force management is the next 

phase of reforms required to achieve the enhanced military effectiveness envisioned by Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. We also believe 

integrated total force management is key to a successful Operational Force. 

A centerpiece of an Operational Force that is both feasible and 

sustainable is a true continuum of service. As generally understood, a continuum of service would facilitate the seamless transition of individual reservists on and off of Active Duty to meet mission requirements, and would permit different levels of participation by the servicemember over the course of a military career. 

In our report, the Commission makes specific concrete recommendations for changes to law and policy to bring about this 

true continuum of service. Two critical enablers of an enhanced 

continuum of service are a reduction in the number of duty 

16

statuses and implementation of an integrated pay and personnel 

system. Equally important, however, is an integrated personnel 

management system, when fully matured at some point in the future, would include an integrated promotion system, an integrated 

compensation system, and an integrated retirement system. 

We recognize that many of these changes will take time and will 

require further analysis, both by Congress and DOD. Our window 

for implementing changes of this magnitude is long term, a decade 

or even longer in some cases, while many of our recommendations 

can be acted on much more quickly, as Chairman Punaro mentioned. 

At the beginning of our review, the Commission reviewed DOD 

reports on personnel management and other government agencies 

and think-tanks reports on private-sector trends to assess the environment in which the Services must compete today and in the foreseeable future to recruit and retain high-quality young men and 

women. Our research led us to the conclusion that the mobility of 

young workers today, and more flexible employment relationships 

of the future, require significant changes to our personnel management policy. 

Our recommendations for managing an integrated total force include implementation of a long-overdue integrated pay and personnel system. Our second recommendation relates to a reduction 

in the duty statutes, from 29 current Reserve duty statuses to just 

2. Either you’re on Active Duty or not. 

I want to make crystal clear that this recommendation does not 

include any recommendation for a cut in Reserve pay. In fact, in 

making this suggestion, we relied on a March 2004 DOD report to 

Congress from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, which suggested a ‘‘participation pay’’ as the way to ensure no loss of pay for an individual servicemember. DOD’s 2004 

report emphasized that changing to a new Active Duty status system should not cause the individual reservist to suffer a reduction, 

either in the level of compensation or in retirement credit earned. 

Our report makes very clear that the Commission agreed with 

DOD’s position on both counts. 

The Commission also recommended a number of benefit enhancements that will put additional money in reservists’ pockets, including payment of basic allowance for housing, regardless of the 

length of the call or order to Active Duty, and reimbursement of 

costs for travel greater than 50 miles. 

We recommend transitioning to a more flexible promotion system, based on acquiring competencies, the individual servicemember’s knowledge, skills, and abilities, in lieu of the current 

time-based up-or-out system. 

Our next recommendation, we recognize, is a very sensitive one 

with regard to reform and creation of a single retirement system. 

I want to emphasize that our recommendations in this area propose voluntary participation in a new system for a period of time, 

and would be entirely prospective. That system would foster more 

flexible career paths, including earlier vesting, government contributions to a Thrift Savings Plan, and a significant retention 

bonus at critical decision points. It could be used as an enhanced 

force management tool. Clearly, it’s an area of great sensitivity, 

17

and we recommend a transition period and an evaluation of the 

level of interest in such a new program prior to any mandatory program change. 

Next, we recommend that Congress amend the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99–433) to now require 

Reserve component officers to be joint-qualified and, at the end of 

a 10-year transition period, to make such joint qualification a criterion for promotion to flag or general officer, like their Active Duty 

counterparts. 

To make this achievable, we recommend a number of changes to 

increase opportunities for Reserve component members to complete 

required joint professional military education and to fill joint billets. 

We also had a number of recommendations for supporting our 

servicemembers, their families, and employers. 

For the members, we recommend additional housing allowance 

and travel reimbursement. We also propose making it easier to use 

the Selected Reserve Montgomery GI Bill benefits, and we recommend a series of improvement in servicemember protections 

under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act and the Servicemember Civil Relief Act. 

For families, we recommend improved sources of information, 

better publicizing of the programs currently available, and increased funding and staffing for family support programs. 

For employers, the Commission recommends an enhanced role 

and additional resources for the National Committee for Employer 

Support of the Guard and Reserve. We propose that employers be 

given better access to senior leadership in DOD through an Employer Council, and we recommend a one-stop shopping point for 

information on government laws and programs that impact employers. 

In the area of healthcare, we recommend improvements to provide continuity of care for Reserve component family members who, 

upon activation, often find themselves suddenly military and no 

longer with access to the providers that they’ve developed relationships with. 

We recommend some systemic improvements to the TRICARE 

program to make it more user-friendly for Reserve component families, and to encourage greater participation by providers. 

To address continuity-of-care issues, we recommend that Reserve 

component members be offered the option to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan and that a stipend be offered, 

either to the Reserve component member or their employer, to assist with continuing private-sector coverage under the employer’s 

health plan. Both of these are designed to provide for continuity of 

care for those families. 

In the area of demobilization and transition assistance, we focused our recommendations on issues that seemed particularly 

problematic to National Guard and reservists returning to their civilian communities, often located at considerable distance from any 

military support network. We did not attempt to recreate the fine 

work done by the various senior-level review groups that have reported since last spring, or of Congress’s own landmark Wounded 

Warrior legislation. Instead, we recommended establishment of a 

18

Cabinet-level group to oversee implementation of these recommendations, coordinate interdepartmental concerns, and address 

funding issues within the Office of Management and Budget. 

Approximately half, I believe, of our Commission’s recommendations are related to the areas of personnel management and family 

support. So, we took a lot of time in these areas. Our people are 

important to us. 

I’m privileged to have been able to be a part of that. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Ms. Lewis. 

Mr. Ball? 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM L. BALL III, COMMISSIONER, 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

Mr. BALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I’ll be very brief. 

Chapter 4 of the full report, which is before you, addresses issues 

of readiness and developing a ready, capable, and available Operational Force. Our findings were that our Guard and Reserve units 

that are deployed in the Operational Force are at an extremely 

high state of readiness, but those units, once they return home, as 

this committee knows very well, are facing severe shortages in personnel, training, and equipment, and which has degraded and complicated the readiness of the units—the National Guard, especially—that have returned home. 

Our recommendations, to sum up just four of them, are: (1) to 

improve our readiness reporting system, as there is need for uniformity across the Services in readiness reporting; (2) that DOD 

should undertake a zero-based review of equipment requirements 

and the need for full-time support personnel to support and assist 

the National Guard; (3) more effective focus on medical and dental 

readiness, which we found to be a major issue in many of our National Guard and Reserve units; and finally, Mr. Chairman, (4) we 

strongly suggest the use of new tools for accessing National Guard 

and Reserve personnel, such as new types of contractual obligations that will simplify access to Guard and Reserve personnel as 

an integrated part of the Operational Force. 

To be brief, that’s my summary, Mr. Chairman. We’d be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I did not get the last of the statement. 

Chairman LEVIN. Please repeat that fourth point. 

Mr. BALL. I’m sorry, Senator Byrd. The last point, if I may elaborate briefly, was that utilizing the Operational Reserve raises the 

issue of access to, and availability of, our Guard and Reserve 

Forces. We think that access for routine employment of the Operational Reserve should not rely on statutory mobilization authorities under presidential selected call-ups. We think these authorities 

should be reserved for extreme circumstances only, so as to minimize unplanned disruptions in the careers and family lives of our 

reservists. We do recommend that the Services use contractual obligations, which clearly state annual commitments for training, and 

the dates and durations of activations and deployments, in advance, for operational missions. We think such agreements should 

19

be based on the projections for dwell time and activation length set 

forth in the policies enunciated last year by the Secretary of Defense. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, all. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Punaro, General 

Stump, Mr. Ball, and Ms. Lewis follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. ARNOLD L. PUNARO, USMCR (RET.); 

HON. WILLIAM L. BALL, III; PATRICIA L. LEWIS; AND MAJ. GEN. E. GORDON STUMP, ANG (RET.) 

It is a pleasure to appear before the committee this morning to discuss the final 

report of the independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, titled 

‘‘Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational 

Force.’’ I would ask unanimous consent that our full statement, as well as the executive summary of our final report, be entered in its entirety into the record. 

I am accompanied this morning by three fellow commissioners: Will Ball, Patty 

Lewis, and Gordon Stump. Each has had an extraordinarily distinguished career 

and possesses unique expertise in the subject matter addressed by the Commission. 

On behalf of our eight other fellow commissioners, whom we are representing, we 

want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, Senator McCain, for the 

support you have given to the Commission. We would like to pay special tribute to 

Senator Warner, one of the principal architects of the legislation creating the Commission, who will be retiring from the Senate at the end of this session. Senator 

Warner is a true statesman, in the finest sense of the word. Bipartisanship and tireless advocacy for a strong national defense have been the hallmarks of his long and 

remarkable career in service to the Nation. 

As established by section 513 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the Commission was chartered to identify and recommend changes in law and policy to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves 

are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of our Nation now and in the future. You subsequently 

tasked us to study the ‘‘advisability and feasibility of implementing’’ the provisions 

of the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment 

Act. That report—with 23 recommendations—was submitted on March 1. Defense 

Secretary Gates acted on it quickly and decisively. He conducted a thorough review 

and accepted, in large measure, 20 of its 23 recommendations on reforms to the National Guard and Reserves. Implementation of those recommendations is already 

underway within the Department. We are especially satisfied that Congress also 

acted quickly and decisively by incorporating most of the Commission’s recommendations in the recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008. 

The 95 recommendations in our final report both address your initial charter and 

also engage more deeply with issues addressed in the March 1 report, specifically 

our concerns with respect to the sustainability of an Operational Reserve and the 

currently disjointed planning and resourcing processes to address threats in the 

homeland. 

We have tried to identify the problems that need to be fixed and have suggested 

solutions. Many of these issues are extremely complex, and people of good character 

and conscience will disagree with some of the solutions we propose. We believe your 

mandate to us was to report what we found. We also recognize that further analysis 

by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress may lead to alternative remedies. We encourage these improvements or alternatives to our recommendations. 

The Commission’s focus is on fixing the problems. Fewer than half of our 95 recommendations require legislation. These are areas where DOD can undertake a 

change in policies and regulations right away, and Congress can enact some immediate statutory changes as well. Other recommendations, particularly in the area of 

personnel management, will take careful thought and analysis by DOD and Congress to determine how best they should be implemented in order to achieve the desired outcomes. They would require phased implementation over a lengthy period 

of time. 

I cannot emphasize too strongly that our recommendations are in no way a critique of officials currently serving in Congress or the Pentagon or of their predecessors in previous administrations. Many of these problems have persisted for decades and have often seemed intractable. Others are tied to new and emerging 

threats. It is understandable, given the operational commitments that have by necessity been its first priority, that DOD has not been able to fully develop strategies 

20

regarding the Guard and Reserves focused many years in the future. The Department has made real progress on many issues since September 11. For example, it 

has addressed the more immediate challenges associated with recruitment and retention in an increasingly difficult environment. It has ensured that mobilized 

Guard and Reserve units are fully trained and equipped prior to deployment. It has 

also made a down payment on addressing the complex personnel management 

issues it expects to confront the 21st century. 

Funding for the Reserve components is trending upward, and additional funding 

is in the pipeline to improve the equipment shortages particularly in the Army National Guard. 

As we prepared the report, we attempted to be both thorough and all-encompassing in the collection and analysis of data. We held 17 days of public hearings 

with 115 witnesses; had 52 Commission meetings; conducted more than 850 interviews with public officials and other subject matter experts, including current and 

former Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff; and examined thousands of documents. We didn’t just gather ‘‘official wisdom’’ in Washington; we made a concerted effort to get outside the Beltway for field 

hearings, site visits, and focus groups and talked to servicemembers, families, employers, and many others. I want to add, Mr. Chairman, that the 12 members of 

the Commission brought 288 total years of military service, 186 total years of nonmilitary government service, and many years of private-sector experience to this 

task. 

I. CREATING A SUSTAINABLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Historically, the National Guard and Reserves have functioned as a Strategic Reserve Force expected to be used to augment the Active Force only in the event of 

a major war, perhaps once in a generation or once in a lifetime. It was a Cold Warera model that assumed long lead times to train and prepare Reserve component 

forces to backfill active duty troops in response to the Russians rolling through 

Fulda Gap or a similar occurrence. That scenario began to change with the Reserve 

call-up for the first Gulf War, during the decade of the 1990s, and the employment 

of Reserve component forces has been dramatically different since September 11. 

The force resulting from this evolution has repeatedly been referred to as the ‘‘Operational Reserve,’’ and this transition to the Operational Reserve is highlighted in 

the DOD fiscal year 2009 summary budget report (see pp. 108–12). 

In our March 1 report, the Commission concluded that DOD had declared that 

we have an Operational Reserve without making all the changes necessary to make 

such a force sustainable. It was the Commission’s view that continued use of the 

Guard and Reserves in this manner was neither feasible nor sustainable over time 

without major changes to law and policy. As my colleagues with me today will confirm, the Commission debated at great length the issue of whether we need an 

Operational Reserve. We were particularly concerned that the notion of an Operational Reserve had occurred almost by default, as a result of the need for more 

forces than were available in the Active component. In our view, the Nation effectively backed into the Operational Reserve. Contrary to what some may expect, this 

demand for Reserve Forces will likely continue long after U.S. engagement in Iraq 

and Afghanistan diminishes, owing to the nature of the threats we will face in the 

future both at home and abroad. Yet, there has been no public debate within Congress or among the American people on this dramatic change. There has been no 

formal adoption of the Operational Reserve. Steps taken by DOD and Congress thus 

far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to sustain the 

Reserve components as a ready, rotational force that also retains necessary strategic 

elements and characteristics. 

The continuing challenges in recruiting, particularly for the Active Army, and the 

escalating cost of Active Duty manpower have raised questions about the long-term 

viability of the All-Volunteer Force, given likely future threats. Those disturbing 

trends were reconfirmed in your Personnel Subcommittee hearing on recruiting last 

week. The All-Volunteer Force was designed to keep up with peacetime operations: 

it was understood, when the Gates Commission released its report in 1970 recommending that a military dependent on draftees be replaced with an All-Volunteer 

Force, that such a force would not be able to deal with sustained combat. With their 

repeated use to augment the Active Forces in recent years, the Guard and Reserves 

have effectively prolonged the viability of the All-Volunteer Force, and prevented the 

need to return to the draft. 

Almost 600,000 individuals have been mobilized in support of the global war on 

terror. More than 40 percent of the Selected Reserve has served since September 

11. In 2006, reservists on Active Duty totaled 61.3 million man-days—the equivalent 

21

of almost 168,000 full-time personnel. In the absence of the 600,000 national 

guardsmen and reservists mobilized as an Operational Reserve, and those on additional duty for the homeland, the Nation would not have been able to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the force levels the commanders requested without a return to the draft. That reality—and its implications for the future—was the 

first reason the Commission endorsed continued reliance on an Operational National Guard and Reserve Force for both overseas and homeland missions. 

The second compelling reason for having an Operational Guard and Reserves is 

to address new threats in the homeland. We need to enhance DOD’s role in the 

homeland. The threats we face here at home are radically different than those we 

confronted at the peak of the Cold War. A terrorist’s use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a metropolitan area would cause a catastrophe to which only 

DOD could respond: no other organization has the necessary capacity, capability, 

command and control, communications equipment, and mass casualty response personnel and equipment. 

Finally, the economics of the Guard and Reserves support their continued operational use in augmenting the Active Forces overseas, as well as playing the lead 

role for DOD in addressing emerging threats in the homeland. Our analysis found 

that reservists are a best buy for the taxpayer. Quantitatively, by any metric, they 

are a cost-effective source of trained manpower, particularly as the cost of Active 

Duty manpower has grown exponentially in recent years. We consulted the Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOD Comptroller, and outside think tanks. There are many studies and lots of data, but they 

all come to the same conclusion, varying only slightly in their details. Our analysis 

of all the facts led us to the conclusion that the National Guard and Reserves are 

about 70 percent less expensive than the Active components. In the area of compensation, for example, according to the GAO, the per capita cost for an Active Duty 

servicemember was more than $126,000 in 2006. That compares to $19,000 per Reserve component member. 

On the qualitative side of the equation, reservists reside in and know their local 

communities, local officials, and local first responders. They bring unique civilianacquired skills that are particularly critical in the event of catastrophes in the 

homeland—whether natural or manmade. In this area, we believe they have a distinct advantage over the Active Forces. 

For all these reasons, the Commission found overwhelming evidence that the Nation requires an Operational Reserve Force for the foreseeable future to meet the 

threats both overseas and in the homeland. 

Notwithstanding our conclusion on the necessity of an Operational Reserve for the 

reasons just discussed, the Commission reiterates our March 1 concerns about sustainability. As our first recommendation in the final report declares, Congress and 

DOD must modify existing laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding mechanisms, personnel rules, pay categories, equipping, training, mobilization, organization structure, and Reserve component categories. The remainder 

of the report addresses those specific issues in much greater detail; it focuses on

• Enhancing DOD’s role in the homeland; 

• Creating a continuum of service by instituting personnel management for 

an integrated total force; 

• Developing a ready, capable, and available Operational Reserve; 

• Supporting servicemembers, families, and employers; and 

• Reforming the organizations and institutions that support an Operational 

Reserve. 

II. ENHANCING DOD’S ROLE IN THE HOMELAND

Today, the homeland is part of the battlefield, and the Federal Government must 

use all elements of national power to protect it. Dangers to the homeland include 

traditional military threats, such as conventional attacks on people and property, 

and more unorthodox ones, such as terrorist attacks. In addition, Hurricane Katrina 

and other recent devastating events have raised the public’s awareness of the hazards posed by catastrophic natural disasters. As a result of these threats to the 

homeland and the new awareness of the danger, protecting the homeland has become a greater priority for all levels of government. 

The two ways in which DOD contributes directly to homeland security are homeland defense and civil support. (DOD also contributes by neutralizing threats 

through military missions overseas.) Homeland defense is the military defense of 

the homeland, while civil support is DOD support to other agencies in the performance of their mission, which often includes homeland security. DOD views homeland 

defense as part of its core warfighting mission, and thus has taken on responsibility 

22

for it. DOD explicitly trains and equips its forces for homeland defense. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff’s document on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3–27, plainly 

states: ‘‘DOD is responsible for the [homeland defense] mission, and therefore leads 

the [homeland defense] response, with other departments and agencies in support 

of DOD efforts.’’ 

In contrast, DOD has viewed civil support as a ‘‘lesser included’’ mission and a 

lower priority. Although DOD has consistently stated in its policy documents, including the National Defense Strategy, that protecting the homeland is its most important function, the Department historically has not made civil support a priority. 

Rather, DOD has sought to perform civil support missions by relying primarily on 

‘‘dual-capable forces.’’ DOD’s Joint Publication 3–28, ‘‘Civil Support,’’ describes this 

policy: ‘‘[civil support] capabilities are derived from DOD warfighting capabilities 

that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions.’’ 

In our March 1 report, the Commission criticized as a ‘‘flawed assumption’’ DOD’s 

position that preparing for and responding to emergencies and disasters is simply 

a subset of another capability, and recommended that ‘‘the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, with the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements which DOD will be responsible for validating as appropriate’’ and 

which DOD should include in its programming and budgeting. 

Should a catastrophic event occur, DOD will be expected to respond rapidly and 

massively. It therefore must be manned, trained, and equipped to do so. This effort 

should include ensuring that all forces assigned to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive consequence management are fully 

budgeted for, sourced, manned, trained, and equipped. Because the nation has not 

adequately resourced its forces designated for response to weapons of mass destruction, it does not have sufficient trained, ready forces available for that mission. In 

our report, we call this an appalling gap, which puts the Nation and its citizens at 

greater risk. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must better define the requirement for capabilities it expects DOD to provide in responding to catastrophic 

incidents such as those in the 15 National Planning Scenarios. DOD must in turn 

include these requirements for civil support missions in its programming and budgeting process, and improve its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in 

the response to such major catastrophes. This responsibility should be equal in priority to its combat responsibilities, and the National Guard and Reserves are key 

elements of this effort. 

Following the publication of our March 1 report, the Secretary of Defense agreed 

that the Defense Department must begin to program and budget for civil support. 

This was a very favorable development. We know that the Secretary of Defense 

holds this to be a very high priority and has the Department working hard to fulfill 

this goal. 

Congress mandated in section 1815 of the recently enacted National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (‘‘Determination of Department of Defense Civil 

Support Requirements’’) that ‘‘the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, shall determine the military-unique capabilities 

needed to be provided by DOD to support civil authorities in an incident of national 

significance or a catastrophic incident.’’ Congress in the same section also mandated 

that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement a plan to fund civil support 

capabilities in DOD, and delineate the elements of the plan in DOD’s budget materials. Passage of this legislation was a significant step toward addressing the concerns raised by the Commission. 

Consistent with our conclusions and recommendations in March, the Commission 

recommends in our final report that DOD should be formally charged by Congress—

in statute—with the responsibility to provide support to civil authorities. The Commission believes that only such a statutory mandate will ensure that DOD, now and 

in the future, shifts its priorities and commits sufficient resources to planning, 

training, and exercising for such missions. This statutory mandate should have 

three elements. It should make clear that DOD has the responsibility to carry out 

civil support missions when called upon to do so; it should state that responding 

to natural or manmade disasters in the homeland is a core competency of DOD that 

is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities; and it should make clear that in 

the event of a major catastrophe incapacitating civilian government over a wide geographic area, DOD can be expected to provide the bulk of the response. 

The Commission further recommends that while homeland defense and civil support should remain total force responsibilities, ‘‘Congress should mandate that the 

National Guard and Reserves have the lead role in and form the backbone of DOD 

operations in the homeland. Furthermore, DOD should assign the National Guard 

23

and Reserves homeland defense and civil support as a core competency consistent 

with their required warfighting taskings and capabilities.’’ 

As the Commission states repeatedly in our final report, in increasing the priority 

of the civil support mission, both within the Department as a whole and for the National Guard and Reserves in particular, ‘‘the Department should not compromise 

the Reserve components’ ability to perform their warfighting responsibilities’’ (p. 96). 

In other words, the Commission does not suggest that the National Guard or any 

other Reserve component be converted into a domestic disaster response force, nor 

do we believe this would be the effect if our recommendations were implemented. 

Rather, we argue that DOD should use dual-capable forces as much as possible and 

undertake rebalancing, as appropriate—given the requirements for civil support discussed above—among the Active and Reserve components ‘‘to ensure that those capabilities useful for civil support reside, where practicable, in the Reserve components, and are readily accessible for civil support-related missions’’ (p. 96). The 

Commission was not in a position to determine what, if any, shifting of capabilities 

among components would in fact be appropriate, inasmuch as no civil support requirements have yet been generated by DHS. Since they have not yet been generated by DHS, DOD has not yet validated them. The overseas warfighting capabilities of the National Guard and Reserves will absolutely be required now and for the 

future, and the Commission’s recommendations in no way call that reality into question. 

Echoing our findings from the March 1 report, the Commission continues to find 

wanting the planning efforts of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command 

still does not adequately consider and plan for the utilization of all military components, active and Reserve (including the National Guard serving under the command of State Governors), in its planning, training, and exercising for support to 

civil authorities. Northern Command must incorporate personnel who have greater 

knowledge of National Guard and Reserve capabilities, strengths, and constraints 

and must assemble a cadre of experts on the intricacies of State and local governments, law enforcement, and emergency response. The Commission therefore reiterates the recommendation, originally made in March, that a majority of U.S. Northern Command’s billets, including those for its Service component commands, should 

be filled by leaders with Reserve qualifications and credentials. We also believe that 

the Reserve qualifications and credentials must be substantive—mere exposure to 

the Reserve components would be insufficient. 

Similarly, the Commission reiterates our recommendation that as part of its efforts to develop plans for consequence management and support to civil authorities, 

DOD should develop protocols to allow Governors to direct the efforts of Federal 

military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster. This direction may be accomplished through the Governor’s use of a dual-hatted military commander. We want to be clear what this recommendation does not entail. It does not 

in any way violate the President’s constitutional authority as the commander in 

chief over Federal forces contained in Article II of the Constitution, nor does it 

imply that all 50 State Governors would be routinely allowed access to Federal 

forces, and to suggest it does either of those things would be pure sophistry. Rather, 

relying on protocols arranged in advance of a disaster, it would allow the President 

for some defined period of time to ‘‘chop’’ a portion of his or her command authority 

over Federal forces—the portion for operational control—to a State’s Governor who 

is in charge of the disaster response. The Federal forces could be part of a joint Federal-State military task force commanded by an officer dual-hatted under Title 10 

and Title 32. The Commission believes that this is a more effective method to 

achieve unity of effort in the vast majority of disaster responses—efforts led by the 

Governor of a State—than the approach taken in Hurricane Katrina, when Title 10 

and National Guard forces responding in the Gulf Coast were under separate control. The Commission also believes that DOD has not offered a viable alternative 

to this recommendation. 

Finally, the Commission recommends that Congress amend the mobilization statutes to provide Service Secretaries the authority to involuntarily mobilize Federal 

Reserve components for up to 60 days in a 4-month period and up to 120 days in 

a 2-year period during or in response to imminent natural or manmade disasters. 

Under this proposal, access would be allowed to the Federal Reserve components for 

all-hazards response prior to or after a disaster similar to the access now available 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security with regard to the U.S. Coast Guard. No 

such statutory authority exists today. 

24

III. CREATING A CONTINUUM OF SERVICE: PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FOR AN

INTEGRATED TOTAL FORCE

DOD’s personnel management strategies and the laws, policies, and systems that 

support them were designed during the last century. They addressed the problems 

faced by the Armed Forces after World War II, and they responded to Cold War national security and force structure issues and to the demographics of the day. The 

21st century presents a completely different set of challenges for manpower planners. The services must recruit, train, and maintain a technologically advanced force 

at a time of ever-increasing competition for a shrinking pool of qualified individuals. 

At the outset, the Commission reviewed reports on private-sector trends to assess 

the environment in which the Services must compete today and in the foreseeable 

future to recruit and retain high-quality young men and women. In addition to acknowledging the current challenges posed by the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is also important to recognize changing workforce demographics and 

generational expectations. The career paths and career expectations of today’s young 

people—often called the ‘‘millennial’’ generation—are very different from those of 

their parents and grandparents. Department of Labor (DOL) projections indicate 

that technological advances and continually escalating competition will lead individuals to change jobs more frequently. That trend is already clear today. According 

to DOL data, in January 2006, the median job tenure for workers ages 55 to 64 was 

9.3 years; for those ages 25 to 34, it was 2.9 years. 

We also reviewed a number of military personnel management studies conducted 

by DOD, beginning with the Gates Commission in 1970, which laid out the framework for a post-conscription All-Volunteer Force. Some themes reoccur repeatedly, 

and several highlights of these DOD reviews are worth noting:

• The Gates Commission recommended increases in military pay and establishment of a salary system, increases in compensation for special skill sets, 

a vested retirement system, and use of lateral entry to capitalize on civilian-acquired skills. 

• The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resource Strategy in 

2000 recommended instituting a single, integrated personnel and logistics 

system for the Active and Reserve components, restructuring the pay system to emphasize pay for performance and skills, modifying the ‘‘up or out’’ 

promotion system for selected skilled personnel, and reforming the retirement system to include earlier vesting, a 401(k)-type option, and portable 

benefits. 

• The Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation (DACMC) in 

April 2006 recommended that the military compensation system focus on 

increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the system as a force management tool. Criticizing the military compensation system’s heavy reliance on 

deferred benefits, DACMC instead advocated more upfront compensation, 

including pay for performance. DACMC also recommended changes to the 

retirement system, including earlier vesting of a deferred retirement annuity, government contributions to a vested Thrift Savings Plan, significant 

retention bonuses at critical retention ‘‘gates,’’ and a transition payment for 

those leaving military service after the vesting point.

On the basis of our research, the Commission came to the inescapable conclusion 

that sustaining an Operational Reserve Force in the 21st century will require very 

different ways of doing business. We can no longer rely on personnel management 

laws, policies, and systems that are a relic of the Cold War era. DOD’s personnel 

management strategies must instead foster a continuum of service as part of an integrated total force. The phrase ‘‘continuum of service’’ appears frequently in testimony and documents, but with little explicit description of what actually constitutes 

such a continuum. As generally understood, a continuum of service would facilitate 

the seamless transition of individual reservists on and off of Active Duty to meet 

mission requirements and would permit different levels of participation by servicemembers over the course of a military career. We believe that integrated total force 

management is the next phase of reforms required to achieve the enhanced military 

effectiveness envisioned by Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department 

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 

In this report, the Commission makes specific, concrete recommendations for the 

changes to law and policy necessary to bring about a true continuum of service. Two 

critical enablers of an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction in the number 

of duty status categories and the implementation of an integrated pay and personnel 

system. Equally important, however, is an integrated personnel management system 

that, when fully mature at some point in the future, would include an integrated 

25

promotion system, integrated compensation system, and integrated retirement system. 

Critical Enablers 

Moving from Reserve status to Active Duty and back is often a nightmare for the 

Reserve component member and his or her family because the pay and personnel 

system is not integrated. The lack of an integrated pay and personnel system caused 

numerous problems in the first Gulf War. With the exception of the Marine Corps, 

which currently has an integrated system, the problem persists today. Reservists 

can find that their pay is inaccurate or their family members have been dropped 

out of the Defense Eligibility Enrollment System and so are ineligible for medical 

care. DOD has experienced delays, cost increases, and management problems in its 

more-than-a-decade-long effort to field the Defense Integrated Manpower Human 

Resources System, which is now receiving senior leadership attention within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We cannot recommend too strongly that DOD implement an integrated pay and personnel system as expeditiously as possible. The 

Commission took no position on the internal debate within DOD as to whether that 

new structure should be a single DOD-wide system or multiple systems operating 

as part of a larger enterprise architecture. 

Equally important is the need for duty status reform. The current plethora of 29 

or 32 duty statuses, depending on which report you read, is confusing and frustrating to both Reserve component members and their operational commanders. 

Servicemembers often encounter pay and benefit problems, including the maintenance of health care eligibility for their family members, when they transition between one or more duty status categories—being called to Active Duty for service 

in Iraq and then returning back to a drilling Reserve status, for example. Commanders may experience similar frustration when seeking to access, in a timely 

manner, Reserve component members needed to meet operational requirements. The 

current operational use of the Reserve component demands simplicity, compatibility, 

and administrative clarity to meet training and mission requirements and to promote a continuum of service. 

Under the simplified duty status system recommended by the Commission, there 

should be only two duty statuses: Reserve component members would either be on 

Active Duty or off Active Duty. This would be the case whether they were in a title 

10 or title 32 status. 

One sticking point in previous attempts to simplify duty status categories has 

been the difference between the pay and allowances received when the Reserve component member is either activated or in an Active Duty training status and the pay 

received for two drills per day when the member is in an inactive duty training status, a pay structure dating to 1920. As noted in DOD’s 2004 congressionally mandated Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review, ‘‘Transitioning to a system 

in which—like Active Duty members—a day of duty is a day of duty would make 

it much easier to employ Guard and Reserve members. It would also help to reduce 

the frustration experienced by combatant commanders when they want to employ 

Reserve component members.’’ The 2004 Reserve compensation review included 

analysis of a variable ‘‘participation pay’’ designed to prevent Reserve component 

members from losing out-of-pocket income under a system in which training is always treated as a day of Active Duty. That analysis also emphasized that changing 

to a new Active Duty status system should not cause the individual reservist to suffer a reduction in either the level of compensation received or retirement credit 

earned. The Commission fully concurs, as clearly stated in our report, that compensation for current servicemembers should not be reduced. Just to underscore 

that point, nothing in the Commission’s final report can or should be read as suggesting that reservist drill pay should be cut. Rather, as the report makes clear, we 

suggest alternative methods to simplify duty statuses while preserving reservists’ 

compensation in this area. In addition, we recommend a number of benefit enhancements, including to medical and family benefits, and increased reimbursement for 

travel and other expenses. 

A Competency-Based Promotion System 

The centerpiece of the Commission’s vision of integrated total force management 

is a revised promotion system that recognizes knowledge, skills, and abilities acquired over the course of a career as the primary criteria for promotion and that 

provides greater flexibility for participation at different levels of commitment across 

a military career. 

DOD’s current ‘‘up or out’’ promotion system was codified in 1947 to prevent a 

superannuated senior officer cohort from hindering military effectiveness, a problem 

observed at the outbreak of World War II. The Defense Officer Personnel ManageVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
26

ment Act of 1980 (DOPMA) and its follow-on Reserve component counterpart, the 

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act of 1994, updated the 1947 legislation 

but retained the up-or-out structure. In recent years, it has been criticized by numerous studies and experts as inflexible and as a Cold War-era relic. The up-or-out 

system under DOPMA is time-based: officers are considered by selection boards for 

promotion at certain ‘‘time’’ or years-of-service points during their careers. If twice 

non-selected for the next highest grade, or failed of selection, the officer is subject 

to involuntary separation or retirement—forced to move ‘‘up or out.’’ Such officers 

may be permitted by a selective continuation board to remain to meet service requirements, but they nonetheless bear the stigma of the label ‘‘failed of selection.’’ 

To remain competitive, officers must punch specific tickets at specific points in their 

careers. This time-based career management system prevents servicemembers from 

pursuing alternative career paths and penalizes their attempts to do so. Up or out 

instead pushes servicemembers out of the force when they are most experienced. 

A competency-based career management system, organized around the mastery of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities, would encourage more flexible career paths, thereby 

permitting longer assignments, greater opportunity for graduate education, timeouts for family responsibilities, the lateral entry of skilled professionals, and longer 

overall careers. Such changes better reflect the new career patterns in the private 

sector previously discussed and offer a framework to foster a true continuum of 

service. Under current law and policy, promotion boards rank officers on the basis 

of experience, demonstrated performance, and potential for success in the next 

grade. A competency-based system would rely on those same criteria but would use 

accumulated experience gained through assignments, education, and training to determine which officers are eligible for promotion. Such a system would allow officers 

to undertake additional or longer assignments or further their education without 

being at a disadvantage in relation to their peers. For some communities, the required skills, timing of promotions, and career length might change little from today’s norms. For the combat arms, for example, a Service might decide that the current framework is optimal because of the need for youth and vigor. Similarly, the 

services might make little change in the promotion timing for officers scheduled for 

a command/leadership track. 

To prevent stagnation, competency would need to be demonstrated for officers to 

continue in Service as well as to be promoted—in other words, ‘‘perform or out’’ in 

lieu of up or out. Their continuation would be determined by their continued employability by commands or agencies seeking their services. Transitioning to a competency-based system would also facilitate the development of a single personnel 

management system, which is essential to the effective management of an integrated 21st-century total force. 

Joint Duty and Joint Education 

In our March 1 report, the Commission considered the need to ensure that Reserve component officers have the opportunity to gain both joint experience and joint 

professional military education in order to be competitive for promotion to senior positions, including to combatant commands and senior joint and service positions. 

Such opportunity is a critical element of integrated total force management. In our 

March 1 report, we indicated that we would address this issue in greater detail in 

our final report and have done so. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated a program of joint qualification through education and experience for Active component 

officers seeking to be promoted to general and flag officer ranks. Although DOD was 

directed to establish a parallel system for the Reserves, in the subsequent 20 years 

progress has been very slow. In the meantime, after our extended commitment in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, many national guardsmen and reservists have acquired extensive joint duty experience in theater. Congress recognized the changed nature of 

joint duty in the Goldwater-Nichols Act amendments enacted in 2006. 

To foster greater joint opportunity, we recommend:

• That Congress amend Goldwater-Nichols to require Reserve component 

officers to also be ‘‘joint qualified’’ and, at the end of a 10-year transition, 

to make such joint qualification a criterion for promotion to general and 

flag officer, as is the case for their Active Duty counterparts. 

• That DOD improve opportunities for Reserve component officers to complete joint professional military education and recommend modifications to 

the system to make it more focused on the total force. 

• That Congress and DOD establish a career management system for Reserve component officers similar to the one currently in place for Active 

component officers to ensure that they have the opportunities to complete 

required education and joint duty. 

27

• That DOD ensure that assignment options afford Reserve component officers more opportunity to fill joint billets.

These changes will not only enhance the career opportunities of Reserve component officers but, more importantly, will ensure that the Nation is able to utilize 

their knowledge, skills, and abilities at the most senior levels of DOD leadership. 

An Integrated Retirement System 

Today there are two separate retirement systems: one for Active Duty and another for Reserve component members. As part of our vision of an integrated total 

force, the Commission recommends transitioning to a single retirement system. Numerous studies, beginning with the Gates Commission in 1970, have highlighted 

problems in the current military retirement structure. The Commission based our 

recommendations on achieving desired force management objectives—and also recognized the different career patterns of today’s young men and women. As a part 

of a single retirement system for both Active and Reserve components,

• We recommend modifications that will foster more flexible career paths—

including earlier vesting, government contributions to the Thrift Savings 

Plan, and significant retention bonuses at critical career decision points. 

• We also realize that any changes to retirement will happen incrementally 

over a period of time in the course of implementing other changes recommended by the Commission to achieve a more integrated total force.

We further recommend that no change in the retirement system be required of 

members of the current force, that current servicemembers be given the option of 

converting to the new system, and that there be a transition period for new entrants 

to give Congress time to review and evaluate what we believe will be the positive 

impact of the changes. We recognize that some of what we recommend is complicated and challenging, but believe that earlier vesting, government contributions 

to the Thrift Savings Plan, and other financial incentives are very much in line with 

the expectations of the young men and women the Services want to recruit and retain in the years ahead. 

IV. DEVELOPING A READY, CAPABLE, AND AVAILABLE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Readiness is a key determinant in the ability of the Reserve components to 

achieve their roles and missions both at home and abroad. Congress tasked the 

Commission to assess how effectively the organization and funding structures of the 

National Guard and Reserve are achieving operational and personnel readiness. An 

Operational Reserve requires a higher standard of readiness, for a greater duration, 

with less time to restore readiness levels between deployments. The Cold War-era 

model relied on a lengthy period of time—post-mobilization—to address training 

shortfalls, update equipment, and fix such problems as individual medical readiness. 

That framework is out of sync with the periodic and sustained rotational use of the 

National Guard and Reserves envisioned in the current manpower planning models, 

such as the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. ARFORGEN is instead 

designed to rely on a ‘‘train, mobilize, deploy’’ model that will require increasing levels of readiness for several years prior to deployment. Sustained operational use of 

the Reserve component will make it necessary to devise a very different way of 

doing business. 

The readiness of units and of individuals varies greatly among the services, and 

the differences relate largely to funding. In our March 1 report, we said that 88 percent of Army National Guard combat forces here in the United States were not 

ready. On the basis of information we received from DOD officials shortly before 

publication of our final report, we believe that this assessment of National Guard 

readiness remains accurate. In fact, the situation is a little worse. There are a number of improvements in the pipeline that should improve National Guard readiness 

in future years. But as Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey has testified 

in recent months, Army readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it. 

We recognize that most of the problems in this area are not new; they have arisen 

because Cold War policies and laws remain in effect while the Reserve components 

are being used in ways never envisioned when those policies were developed. Policies that allowed cascaded equipping and tiered readiness for the Army Reserve 

components resulted in those forces being largely ‘‘not ready’’ before September 11. 

That the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exacerbated readiness problems should 

come as no surprise. As mentioned earlier, with the exception of those Reserve 

Forces deployed or just getting ready to deploy, readiness of the Army Guard units 

at home in their States is extremely low. Their unreadiness leaves us at greater risk 

should the Nation suffer a catastrophic WMD attack on our homeland or a natural 

disaster inflicting greater damage than did Hurricane Katrina. We recommend in 

28

our report that National Guard and Reserve units employed operationally overseas 

and those required to be ready to respond domestically to a catastrophe be maintained at higher readiness levels than were routinely maintained in the past. 

To remedy the problems in this area we first recommend that the Department expand and improve on its readiness reporting system in ways that both provide operational planners more details and also answer the question ‘‘ready for what?’’ Today, 

in the readiness reporting system managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the standards by which all units are measured are determined by their wartime missions. They are not assessed for their capability to respond to crises here 

at home. The system we envision should be common across all Services and components, contain data from the individual through the major unit level, and report on 

readiness for a full spectrum of missions, including support to civil authorities. The 

Defense Readiness Reporting System currently being put into operation by the Department may be a start on the road to such a comprehensive system, but progress 

on its implementation has been slow. 

We also recommend that DOD conduct zero-based reviews of the Reserve components’ equipment and levels of full-time support personnel. Adequate levels of equipment are critical for realistic training, particularly as a unit moves into its force 

generation model deployment cycle. Equally critical are the full-time support personnel who both maintain that equipment and ensure that Reserve component units 

are trained to the standards the Active component expects from an Operational Reserve Force. We are familiar with current service plans to fund these areas, but we 

are skeptical that existing requirements, based on Cold War tables of organization 

and equipping, are accurate. The requirements for Reserve Forces employed operationally overseas and prepared to respond to catastrophes here at home will surely 

differ from those developed for a once-in-a-generation conflict against the Soviet 

Union. Most of the expense of funding the necessary equipment and personnel is 

already budgeted in service plans. The Army G–8, Lieutenant General Stephen M. 

Speakes, told us that current Army plans include full funding to equip Guard and 

Reserve units and meet full-time support requirements. We are recommending that 

these plans be modified in accordance with the zero-based reviews, and that funding 

for these requirements be accelerated. 

Individual medical readiness, particularly dental readiness, was a serious issue 

during mobilization for the first Gulf War. It has remained a significant problem 

for some Reserve components during mobilizations for Iraq and Afghanistan. New 

force generation models will provide much less time post-mobilization for needed 

fixes. As in the case of training, any remedial work will have to be completed premobilization. In the Commission’s view, ensuring individual medical readiness for 

an Operational Reserve Force is a corporate responsibility of DOD, as well as of the 

individual servicemember. We recommend a number of changes to ensure that Service Secretaries have the authority to provide the medical and dental screening and 

care necessary to make certain that servicemembers meet the applicable medical 

and dental standards for deployment. 

V. SUPPORTING MEMBERS, FAMILIES, AND EMPLOYERS

As we studied these complex areas, we tried to never lose focus on our most valuable resource—our people. During roundtable discussions, focus groups, and public 

hearings, the Commission was repeatedly reminded of the central role played by 

both family members and employers as Reserve component members make the crucial decision about whether to remain in the National Guard and Reserves. We 

made a concerted effort to get firsthand input from both groups, and many of our 

recommendations flow directly from that input. 

Families 

Unlike their Active Duty counterparts, many National Guard and Reserve families live at considerable distance from military bases and the services they provide. 

In addition, many National Guard and Reserve families are not familiar with the 

intricacies of the component parts of the military system—such as TRICARE, the 

military health care system, for example—and the learning curve can be fairly steep 

for these ‘‘suddenly military’’ families. 

We recommend that sources of information be improved, that those programs currently available be better publicized, and that funding and staffing for family support programs be increased. 

Employers 

The Commission recognizes the sacrifices that many employers, particularly small 

employers, have made in supporting their National Guard and Reserve employees 

when they are called up for duty. In the Commission’s view, it is time for a new 

29

and improved ‘‘compact with employers’’ that recognizes the vital role that employers play. 

The Commission recommends an enhanced role and additional resources for the 

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, proposes that 

employers be given better access to senior leadership in DOD through an Employer 

Council, and recommends that they be provided an access point offering one-stop 

shopping for specifics on government laws and programs affecting them so that they 

don’t find themselves in the position of one small business witness who told us that 

she had to turn to Google to find the information she needed. In addition, as discussed below, the Commission also views enhanced health care benefits for Reserve 

component members and their families as a part of the new compact with employers. 

Health Care 

During focus groups and hearings, participants expressed considerable frustration 

with the problems they encounter in using TRICARE, the military health care benefit. TRICARE itself offers excellent coverage, but the program can be difficult to 

understand for the first-time ‘‘suddenly military’’ user. In addition, in some locations 

family members can find it very difficult to find physicians and other health care 

providers willing to accept TRICARE because its levels of reimbursement seem too 

low or administrative requirements appear excessive. The Commission makes the 

following recommendations in this area:

• Congress should direct DOD to fix a number of long-standing TRICARE 

concerns that are particularly problematic for Reserve component families. 

DOD’s actions should include: (1) issuing updated, user-friendly information 

in easy-to-understand language for those who don’t ‘‘speak TRICARE,’’ as 

well as establishing an ombudsman office with a single toll-free number; 

and (2) simplifying TRICARE claims and reimbursement processes. 

• Reserve component members should be offered the option to participate 

in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), the health insurance program for Federal employees, which does not seem to be beset 

by the problems that have plagued TRICARE for years. 

• A stipend should be given as reimbursement for the cost of keeping the 

reservist’s family in the employer’s health insurance plan during a period 

of activation. Such a stipend could be provided in several ways. First, it 

could be made available directly to the servicemember as a nontaxable allowance, with the servicemember certifying (with substantiating documentation) that the allowance had been used for specific health care costs. 

Second, DOD could establish a mechanism to reimburse employers directly. 

Or third, Congress could enact a tax credit, in lieu of the current business 

tax deduction, for employer costs in providing continuing health care coverage when reservists are activated. The amount of the stipend would be 

an actuarially determined cost of the TRICARE benefit.

With the establishment of TRICARE Reserve Select, DOD has already begun to 

share a portion of the health care costs of participating Reserve component members 

and their families. The cost of health care is becoming a growing burden for many 

employers, particularly small employers who may find private health insurance for 

their employees increasingly unaffordable. The two additional options that the Commission recommends—allowing Reserve component members and their families to 

participate in the FEHBP and offering a stipend to help offset the costs of continuing employer-sponsored health insurance during activation—would represent a 

major component of an enhanced compact with employers and should encourage employers to hire reservists. 

VI. REFORMING THE ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS THAT SUPPORT AN

OPERATIONAL RESERVE

In the final chapter of our report, the Commission recommends organizational reforms that we believe are necessary in order to implement an integrated total force. 

Perhaps the most critical is a restructuring of Reserve component categories to reflect 21st century operational use. The current categories—the Ready Reserve, 

Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve—were created by the Armed Forces Reserve 

Act of 1952 and designed to provide a strategic force for a major war. The chart 

titled ‘‘Current Reserve Component Categories’’ depicts this confusing system. This 

structure was built around a scenario that allowed time for training before deployment, an assumption that allowed the force to be maintained at reduced levels of 

readiness. These antiquated Reserve component categories are not tied to mobilization statutes, nor do they reflect National Guard and Reserve units’ readiness for 

30

mobilization, their use on a predictable rotational basis, or their priority for 

resourcing. They do not support a continuum of service—the smooth and efficient 

movement of personnel along a spectrum from full-time duty to minimal Active 

Duty obligation, based on the needs of the Services and individual willingness to 

accept training time and activations. The chart titled ‘‘A Continuum Service Structure for the Active and Reserve Components’’ depicts key features of a continuum 

of service model on which DOD has done a considerable amount of excellent work. 

Finally, the Commission recommends a complete restructuring to better align the 

categories of Reserve service with projected operational use. The two major new categories, as depicted in the chart titled ‘‘Proposed Reserve Component Categories,’’ 

would be:

• The Operational Reserve Force, which would consist of present-day Selected 

Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees who would periodically 

serve Active Duty tours in rotation, supporting the total force both overseas and 

in the homeland. 

• The Strategic Reserve Force, which would have two subdivisions:

• The Strategic Ready Reserve Force, which would consist of current Selected Reserve units and individuals who are not scheduled for rotational 

tours of Active Duty as well as the most ready, operationally current, and 

willing members of today’s Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and retired 

servicemembers (both regular and Reserve). Unlike today’s IRR, the Strategic Ready Reserve would be managed to be readily accessible in a national emergency, or incentivized to volunteer for service with the Operational Reserve or Active component when required. 

• The Strategic Standby Reserve, which would consist of those current individual ready reservists and retired servicemembers (regular and Reserve) 

who are unlikely to be called on except in the most dire circumstances yet 

who still constitute a valuable pool of pretrained manpower worth tracking 

and managing.

The Commission also recommends a reorganization of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense that would structure the management of Reserve component issues along 

functional lines as part of the total force and would eliminate the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. 

CONCLUSION

Commissioners are honored to have been selected to undertake the most comprehensive, independent review of National Guard and Reserve Forces in the past 

60 years. Many of today’s profound challenges to the National Guard and Reserves 

will persist, notwithstanding force reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The need for 

major reforms is urgent regardless of the outcome of current conflicts. The Commission believes that the Nation must look past the immediate challenges and focus on 

the long-term future of the National Guard and Reserves and their role in protecting the United States’ vital national security interests at home and abroad. We 

have labored to identify and categorize the challenges that must be addressed, and 

have proffered a series of recommendations to address those challenges. We understand that responsibility for implementation now falls into the hands of Congress 

and the executive branch. We are confident that you will build on and improve upon 

our efforts. 

31


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[The Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves submitted to Congress and the Secretary of Defense dated 

January 31, 2008, is retained in committee files.]

Chairman LEVIN. We will have an 8-minute round for our first 

round of questions. 

Mr. Punaro, the report states that DOD should have civil support 

as a mission of equal importance to its combat responsibilities. It’s 

been long and universally held that the purpose of the Armed 

Forces of the United States is to deter war and, if deterrence fails, 

to engage and defeat the enemy in combat and to defend the Homeland. Now, how can civil support claim an equal importance without sacrificing this fundamental and this overarching purpose for 

the creation and sustainment of national Active and Reserve land, 

sea, and air forces? 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, the Commission doesn’t view 

this as an either/or situation. We believe, if you look at what DOD 

has articulated in its own documents, that they recognize homeland 

defense as part of providing for the common defense is equal in priority to the overseas mission. However, Congress has not directed 

that, statutorily; and, therefore, on occasion, it doesn’t get the priority that it deserves. 

We would suggest, from a Commission standpoint, respectfully, 

that if you have a National Guard personnel that’s required to go 

into a nuclear contaminated environment and protect the lives, citizens, property, and way of life, that’s equally as challenging and 

equally as much combat as a member of the 82nd Airborne that 

gets to deploy overseas, in his helmet and flak jacket and has to 

put a bayonet in the heart of a terrorist. We believe that the 

threats to the Homeland are equally as severe as some of the challenges we face overseas, and we don’t think you can make that 

kind of distinction anymore. In these catastrophic situations that 

we face here at home, this is a core responsibility of DOD. Everyone knows, nobody likes to talk about it, and we worry about it and 

certainly the Commission does not believe DOD should be the temporary manpower agency for every situation we face here at home. 

We’re talking about proscribing, particularly for these catastrophic 

situations—only our DOD has the command and control, the training, the equipping, the ability to do the deliberate planning, the 

ability to bring forces to bear, as required, for these kind of situations. There’s nobody else in government that can do it. Our view 

is, these things are just as devastating as any kind of combat situation you could face overseas, so it’s not a either/or, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it the Commission’s intent, in any way, that 

Guard or Reserve Forces be withheld from combat in order to preserve a capability to respond to a domestic emergency, such as hurricanes, tornados, floods, epidemics, attack, or so forth? 

General PUNARO. No, Mr. Chairman, it is not. I would like to ask 

the committee’s indulgence. If you would give me a minute to explain what we consider to be the continuum of service in the way 

the total force manpower pool could be managed in the future so 

that we can accommodate both the overseas requirements, as well 

as the back-home requirements, I think I might be able to give you 

a fuller answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, please proceed. 

128

General PUNARO. What we are recommending is a continuum of 

service. It’s in the charts at the back of your testimony. What we 

have today is, we have an Active-Duty Force of 1.4 million personnel, we have a Guard and Reserve Force of about 800,000 personnel in units, another 300,000 in the Individual Ready Reserve 

(IRR), about 1.9 million people in the retiree pool, and then we 

have the Selective Service system. We envision, in the future, moving from the traditional structure to a future structure, where 

you’d have people that are supporting missions full time and you’d 

have people that would be in variable categories, that might serve 

from anywhere from 40 days to 365 days. You’d have the traditional reservists that would serve in categories, like they do now 

with several weeks of training a year and several deployments a 

year. Then you’d have various new affiliation programs for varying 

degrees of time. 

The reason you need an integrated pay and personnel system, an 

integrated retirement system, an integrated management system—

if you go the last chart, please—is so our force planners, if they 

have a mission, if they have a requirement to meet a contingency 

overseas or a contingency here at home, they look at this total force 

pool of all this manpower. So we believe we should go to two new 

Reserve component categories and get away from the ones that 

were designed for the Cold War. You’d have an Operational Reserve Force, and DOD would put in that Operational Reserve Force 

and keep, at the highest level of readiness, those forces that they 

believe are required, for say a catastrophic incident here at home, 

those forces that are getting ready to deploy overseas and the individuals that are serving, for example, full time on the staff of 

NORTHCOM or some other command, or serving in the Pentagon. 

Then you’d have a Strategic Reserve Force. You’d have a Strategic 

Ready Reserve and a Strategic Standby Reserve. That Strategic 

Ready Reserve would be those units, perhaps, that just got back or 

aren’t needed in an immediate Homeland situation, or aren’t needed for a couple of years overseas. They’d be some of the 300,000 individuals in the IRR. People have an 8-year obligation, many serve 

only 4 years of Active Duty. The first 2 years they’re off Active 

Duty, their skills are very fresh, they would be in a Strategic 

Ready Reserve. The people that just retired would be in the Strategic Ready Reserve. Then, in the Standby Reserve would be those 

people that were towards the end of their IRR commitment or a 

much longer period of time in the retired pools. Then, if you absolutely couldn’t meet any of your requirements with all that personnel, you’d crank up the Selective Service system. 

DOD needs to look at all the incredibly trained, valuable resources. It costs the Army over $8 billion a year to train their new 

personnel. We need this viable Guard and Reserve for people that 

have that kind of investment to go and have a place where they 

can continue to serve. Eighty-five percent of the people that enlist 

in our military never retire, so this is a tremendous pool of trained 

personnel that the Nation needs to be able to draw on. 

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Byrd. 

Senator BYRD. Did I understand that to be 8 million or 8 billion? 

129

General PUNARO. Senator Byrd, the numbers are 1.3 million Active Duty personnel, 800,000 members of Reserve and Guard units, 

300,000 members of the IRR—these are individuals that have a remaining obligation to serve, but are not in a unit. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s the current situation. 

General PUNARO. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. General, would there be fewer people 

available for overseas duty, under your construction, than is currently the case? 

General PUNARO. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, if you could just keep your answers a little shorter. 

General PUNARO. Yes, sir. You would have to increase the size 

of the Guard, though, for these catastrophic missions. We don’t 

have those units today. You would basically be increasing the availability of the number. You wouldn’t be diverting current Guard 

units, you’d be creating new Guard units for the catastrophic missions. By the way, those same units could be used overseas in similar circumstances. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would the size of the Guard need to be increased, overall? 

General PUNARO. It would, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. To what number? 

General PUNARO. We can’t give you a number. General Blum has 

done a lot of work on this. They think they need three additional 

of these high-end packages for the weapons of mass destruction 

type of situations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, if you could just talk for a moment about 

the missions. You’re recommending that DOD shift capabilities 

that are needed for State-controlled missions to the Guard, and you 

recommend that capabilities that are needed for Federal missions 

be shifted from the National Guard to the Federal Reserve components or Active-Duty military. The bottom line is this. What kind 

of DOD missions would the National Guard perform if capabilities 

for Federal missions are transferred to the Federal Reserve components? Give us some examples of those missions that would be 

shifted. 

General PUNARO. I’m going to defer to General Stump on that, 

if he’s willing to take the handoff. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, he has his usual smile on. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. He’s always willing to give it a try. 

General STUMP. I’d like to give a quick response to your previous 

question, that being that the Enhanced Response Force Packages 

that the National Guard has stood up, those force packages draw 

from the resources that are in the National Guard at this time. If 

part of those resources are activated for a mission overseas, they 

would be backfilled by like units back here in the States. So, you 

always have the Enhanced Response Force Packages available, but 

if part of the packages are deployed, then the other units would 

backfill those packages. There probably would not be an instance 

where all of the capabilities of these Federal Response Force Packages would be required for deployment, there would always be 

room for backfill. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s no shift of missions, then? 

130

General STUMP. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, the card that’s been handed to me 

states that Senator Collins is next. However, Senator Warner told 

me that he wanted to yield his time to Senator Byrd. So, I’m going 

to override the blue card, and Senator Warner yields to Senator 

Byrd. 

Senator Byrd, it’s great to have you here. 

Senator BYRD. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have difficulty in going ahead of a lady. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLLINS. Please feel free, sir. I’m very honored to defer 

to you. You have a lot more seniority than I do. [Laughter.] 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, ma’am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Punaro, maintaining a force that can respond to homeland security and natural disasters, while maintaining its capability as an Operational Reserve to support the Active Forces, suggests that the National Guard and Reserves will have to be 

equipped and trained for multiple roles. Additionally, if the ActiveDuty military is to support the National Guard and Reserves as a 

homeland security and disaster response asset, they must also be 

trained, and they must also be equipped, to work in a domestic civilian environment. The changes in culture and the flexibility required to accomplish these tasks may be very daunting. What are 

the first steps that Congress should consider in making progress in 

this area? 

General PUNARO. Senator Byrd, I believe the Commission would 

agree with the premise of your questions completely. You have accurately and precisely described the current situation and what we 

need to do. 

We would say the two major things that have to happen to have 

this daunting cultural change occur is, one, Congress needs to have 

a full debate about whether or not we really want to have this 

Operational Guard and Reserve that would have a number of units 

that would be manned at a much higher level of readiness than 

they were as a Strategic Reserve, in terms of their personnel, their 

equipment, their equipment readiness, their training for these specialized missions, family support, and employer support. 

Conclusion: number one, Congress needs to adopt, upfront, 

whether they want to do this or not, and direct that in statute; 

and, number two, we believe that we need to enhance DOD’s role 

in the Homeland, and, by statute, level the requirement for civil 

support. The Guard and Reserve should have the lead in the 

Homeland because they’re closer operationally, they’re a lot more 

economical in a resting phase, and the Active Forces could augment 

and reinforce the Guard and Reserve, as required, just like the 

Guard and Reserve augment the Active Forces overseas. 

So if you were to adopt those two main conclusions, everything 

else would flow from that. If we don’t want to have an Operational 

Guard and Reserve that’s sustainable over the long term, and we 

don’t believe we need to beef up our capabilities to defend the 

Homeland, then a lot of other recommendations that we make, you 

probably wouldn’t need to do. We don’t see any alternative. We 

think there’s a compelling case to do that, based on the threats we 

face here at home and overseas. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. 

131

General Punaro, it is estimated that the cost of returning the National Guard to its pre-Iraq-war capacity, replacing lost and damaged equipment, may be as high as $54 billion, spelled with a ‘‘b’’ 

big billion—$54 billion. At the same time, the Active Services are 

also competing for resources to restore and modernize the force. 

The maintenance of the National Guard and Reserve, equipped and 

trained for multiple roles might also dramatically increase the estimated cost of equipping and training the Guard and Reserve. Am 

I clear? Shall I repeat that? Let me repeat that. 

The maintenance of a National Guard and Reserve equipped and 

trained for multiple roles might also dramatically increase the estimated cost of equipping and training the Guard and Reserve. How 

can Congress assure that there is adequate equipment available to 

ensure that the Guard and Reserve are operationally capable, 

while, at the same time, ensuring that the equipment needed within the United States is available in the locations needed when they 

are needed? Should Congress expect that the $54 billion—spelled 

with a ‘‘b,’’ large ‘‘b’’—$54-billion estimate will be inadequate to accomplish this goal? 

General PUNARO. Senator Byrd, again, you have very accurately 

described the current situation, in terms of the requirement for the 

funds. Our report indicates something in the order of $50 billion, 

and it probably is as high as you say it is, to replace equipment 

if you decided that we were going to, basically, replace everything 

in an as-is status—meaning, the units would have the same missions, need the same equipment. 

What we are suggesting, in the equipping area—and, by the way, 

Congress and DOD have provided significant enhancements, in 

terms of new equipment, not only in previous years, but also ongoing. As I recall, very briefly, Secretary Gates testified, before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday, that they have a very 

large downpayment—I believe it was in the neighborhood of $50 

billion—to beef up equipment for the Guard and Reserve over the 

next number of years. So, there’s a significant amount of money in 

the pipeline. 

What we recommend, however, is, when it comes to equipping—

and we believe those units that are needed for overseas missions 

and homeland missions have to be equipped at the C–1 or highest 

level of readiness for those that have an immediate mission. We 

don’t really know what the new requirements are. We do not have 

the new requirements from DHS for civil support. DOD hasn’t received them; and, of course, they certainly haven’t had an opportunity to validate them. We believe, before we start adding a lot 

of new money over and above things that are already in the pipeline, we should have a baseline review of requirements, both for 

civil support—whether the missions of those units are going to 

change, how much equipment is not going to come back—so we 

don’t spend money that doesn’t need to be spent. 

Whatever we spend to beef up the Guard and Reserve, the differential is still going to be very economical, compared to putting 

that same capability in the Active component. The Active-component personnel costs have doubled in the last 5 years. The Guard 

and Reserve have trended up slightly, but nowhere near as much. 

We still believe getting some of these capabilities, particularly for 

132

the Homeland, and particularly the insurance policy to augment 

overseas, is still a bargain for the taxpayer. 

Senator BYRD. General Punaro, thank you. 

My time has expired, I am informed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Byrd, very much. 

Before I call on Senator Collins—she’s been yielded to by Senator 

Warner, and is always gracious—let me welcome Senator Wicker. 

We gave you a welcome yesterday, in your absence. We noted 

why you could not make it—although you were looking forward to 

it and we were looking forward to greeting you—because of the tornados, which totally disrupted your travel. But, we just want to 

give you a welcome, on behalf of the committee. All members of 

this committee have come to know you, and we look forward to 

serving with you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator Warner, thank you so much for graciously allowing me 

to precede you. 

As I was listening to the excellent presentations of the members 

of this panel, I was reminded, very quickly, of the in-depth investigation that our Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee did into the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. Indeed, two of the staff members of the Commission came from the 

committee and brought with them a great deal of expertise in this 

area. 

The unity-of-command issues were very present in the response 

to Hurricane Katrina. I remember talking to the head of 

NORTHCOM at that time and discovering how little visibility he 

had into what the National Guard was doing throughout the Gulf 

Coast region. In fact, the Active Duty troops, in some cases, were 

unaware of the presence of National Guard units from other States 

who had come to respond. 

Major General Stump, I think you are right on the money on the 

unity-of-command issues, and the fact that those interfered with an 

effective response. I’m not sure I agree with the proposed solution 

of bringing those troops under the control of the Governor, but, certainly, you’ve identified a very real problem that hampered an effective response to Hurricane Katrina. 

The response to Hurricane Katrina is important, not just because 

it was a catastrophic natural disaster, but because the same kinds 

of capabilities and responses are going to be required in the event 

of a terrorist attack. That’s why I think the work you’re doing is 

so vital. 

This past July, at a hearing before our Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, General Blum and the Maine 

Adjutant General, Major General John W. Libby, both said that the 

current state of National Guard equipment and overall readiness 

would severely hamper the ability of States to quickly and effectively respond to a catastrophic natural disaster or a terrorist attack. They felt confident that they could handle the run-of-the-mill 

natural disaster, but we’re talking about a catastrophic event. 

I noted that, in testimony before your Commission last year, 

General Blum stated that 88 percent of the forces that come back 

133

from Iraq, that are members of units from the Army National 

Guard, are very poorly equipped. Those are his words. 

The GAO, last year, released a report that found that most National Guard leaders express concerns about having sufficient 

equipment to respond to a large-scale disaster. 

In our hearing, General Libby, the Maine Adjutant General, said 

that he was confident that he could speak for virtually the other 

53 States and territories in saying that, ‘‘We are not prepared to 

deal with those type of catastrophic events.’’ 

I believe that your conclusion that there’s an appalling gap in 

readiness is well substantiated by the evidence that you heard, and 

the testimony before our committee, and our committee’s investigation into the response to Hurricane Katrina. But, as you’re well 

aware, the Pentagon has been very aggressive in public press conferences in disputing that. In particular, Secretary Paul McHale, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, has pointed to the 53 certified Civil Support 

Teams within the National Guard as evidence of the ability to deal 

with catastrophic responses. 

I would like to hear your response to the Pentagon’s rebuttal to 

what I believe is very convincing and compelling evidence that, in 

fact, we are not prepared. I don’t know whether to start with Major 

General Stump or with the chairman. Major General Punaro? 

General PUNARO. Why don’t we have General Stump start first, 

and then I’ll give you our overall Commission perspective on it. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

General Stump? 

General STUMP. I would be very happy to handle that. 

Yes, there are 53 Civil Support Teams. These support teams only 

have 22 personnel on them, and they are there just to identify 

what sort of chemical, biological, or other substances might be 

present. They don’t have an ability to do the things like search and 

extraction, decontamination, medical, command and control—they 

have none of those resources. 

Now, the National Guard, with their chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield exposives (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages that they have set up—and Congress gave 

them some funding for additional equipment—can handle small responses. But, when you have a major disaster response, like a 

chemical, biological, or nuclear attack that takes out everything, 

the National Guard, the city and State governments, are not going 

to be able to handle those. I think NORTHCOM understands that 

this is a problem, that there is a gap in filling those particular missions, and have identified these CBRNE Consequence Management 

Response Forces, as they’re called, which would be large units, 

5,000 to 10,000 people in these units, that would come—would address these issues. Now, those have been identified, but not 

resourced or funded. We stand behind our recommendation that 

we’re not ready to handle those particular responses. 

I’m glad to hear that you agree with our finding on the unity of 

command. I still believe that there is no problem with cutting 

forces for a particular emergency, like Hurricane Katrina, for a 1- 

to 2-week period. The Active Duty was not there more than 7 to 

10 days, I believe, and the rest of the time, the National Guard was 

134

there for unity of command, so everybody knew what was going on. 

I believe command should be able to go to the Governor, because 

every single response that we have is going to start with the National Guard. It doesn’t matter what the government or anybody 

says, that’s just the way it is. The Governors say, ‘‘When something 

goes wrong, I want my National Guard there to handle the situation.’’ 

Now, in a small disaster—and Hurricane Katrina was a relatively small event, nothing like what would happen with a nuclear 

disaster—and the Governors know when they’re out of Schlitz. We 

have State pacts that are effective between the States, and a Governor can go to the National Guard Forces within four or five State 

regions, and that’s what the Governors do—even before they call on 

the Federal response forces—because they would rather have National Guard Forces which come from another State under their 

command and control than bring the Active Duty in and have 

somebody come in and say, ‘‘Okay, now we’re in charge.’’ So, I 

think the answer is, having these particular Active-Duty Forces 

chopped to the command and control under the Governor to these 

dual-hatted people who have been trained to do that, is an effective 

solution. 

General PUNARO. Senator Collins, there are two deficiencies. I 

think it’s really a matter of perspective. We made the point, we’re 

really looking at where we need to go, not how far we’ve come. 

We’d like to give great credit to DOD for what they’ve done and 

the changes they’ve made and the improvements they’ve made 

since September 11. Secretary McHale—I have tremendous respect 

for him—he served as my regimental commander when I was commanding general of the 4th Marine Division. He’s as hard a charger, go-to-the-sounds-of-the-guns person you’d find. But, all the great 

improvements that have occurred, if you look at these catastrophic 

scenarios, we have an extremely long way to go. We need to go 

ahead and, as General Stump said, we haven’t put resources 

against those high-end capabilities. So, that’s a gap and a deficiency that we believe should be filled to reduce this risk and to 

reduce the gap. 

The second thing is, on the command and control, take out the 

command and, who’s going to be in charge. Forget about whether 

it’s the Governor or it’s an Active Duty commander. The key in this 

area—and your committee and this committee has pointed it out—

is deliberate planning. It’s basically getting ready ahead of time. 

It’s coordination. It’s training. It’s DHS, NORTHCOM, the National 

Guard, and the State and local governments all working together. 

This is why we emphasizes so strongly that NORTHCOM should 

put as much energy and effort into developing the contingency 

plans for the homeland scenarios, particularly the high-end ones, 

that the Pacific Command does for the defense of the Korean Peninsula. General Stump and I had units that were in the war plans 

for the defense of the Korean Peninsula. Every unit knows who 

they are, where they are, what equipment to bring, when to show 

up at the deployment station, et cetera, et cetera. For these highend catastrophics, you need those same kind of contingency plans 

here in the United States. You work all this stuff out in advance. 

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Then, frankly, it probably doesn’t really matter who’s in charge, because it’s all figured out in advance. 

GAO, which was a tremendous help to our Commission throughout, has two reports, they’re getting ready to issue over the next 

couple of months, that talk about NORTHCOM’s current situation, 

in terms of working with the States and the Adjutants General to 

do this kind of advanced planning, and also, they have a report 

coming out, talking about NORTHCOM’s work with the interagency. I am very confident that they’re going to support the conclusions that we have made in this area. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to just pick up, General Punaro, on Senator Collin’s questioning. You state, and I quote, ‘‘It doesn’t matter who is in charge. 

It will all have been worked out in prior training.’’ 

Now, as a military man, you have to have an on-scene commander. Everybody has to know that individual is the boss, and 

you have to follow his instructions. I cannot take your oral statement, just now, that it doesn’t matter who’s in charge, and work 

it out against the military that you and I have been trained by for 

many years. 

General PUNARO. Senator Warner, you’re absolutely right, that 

was not what I intended to convey. I was saying that, for the purposes of discussion, to address Senator Collins’s issue, that the deliberate planning phase and the coordination phase is extremely 

important, and, as part of that, you could have agreements as to 

who’s in charge doing the initial phases, who’s in charge in the intermediate phases, who’s in charge in the latter phases. You can 

work these protocols out in advance. 

But, you’re absolutely correct, there has to be one person in 

charge, and right now the Federal Government would take on that 

role, in most situations of this nature, as it’s going to escalate very 

quickly. However, we argue, in the Commission, that we have these 

dual-capable commands, we have these National Guard personnel 

that are trained to also be in command of Active-Duty Forces. So 

you could have a situation where a certified dual-force commander 

could be the person initially in charge on the scene, and, if it had 

to be handed off to another commander, it could be. 

You’re absolutely right, Senator Warner. That’s the problem that 

we saw in Hurricane Katrina. Everybody was in charge, and nobody was in charge, and you can’t have that situation in one of 

these catastrophic scenarios. 

Senator WARNER. Since Hurricane Katrina, have we advanced, in 

our planning, to where we know what’s going to happen now? Now, 

you have to add that a lot of these natural disasters can be multiState situations, and we can’t have three Governors sitting down, 

trying to figure out who’s going to run the situation. It has to be 

a clear, predetermined, established chain of command. 

General PUNARO. Senator Warner, I’d like General Stump to 

jump in, here. But, I would say, we have not advanced as far in 

that area as we need to. 

Senator WARNER. We as a Nation? 

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General PUNARO. We, as a Nation, have not sorted out this 

‘‘who’s in charge’’ issue. 

Senator WARNER. All right. 

Now, General Stump—and, first, I must say, I’m quite impressed 

with your testimony and delivery. It’s obvious that you were carefully selected by the chairman. You all have a common affinity with 

Michigan. [Laughter.] 

But, quite apart from that nepotism, you’ve held up here on your 

own very well. [Laughter.] 

General STUMP. Thank you, sir. 

When you have a catastrophic event, one which takes out all of 

State government, or much of State government, and you have 

mass casualties, obviously DOD and the Active Duty will be in 

charge. It will be a transition——

Senator WARNER. Start right there. You have to determine 

whether or not, in fact, it has been taken out. 

General STUMP. That’s true. 

Senator WARNER. Just look at these pictures, this morning, of 

these tragic tornadoes and so forth just took out and there’s always 

the one house left standing, so there may be some elements of the 

State government standing, even though the Capitol went down. I 

can’t buy that. I have to figure out what we, Congress, has to do 

with our several sovereign States to sort this thing out. I’m thinking of it as a community that’s hit by a biological weapon, and you 

suddenly need about 5,000 hospital beds. You and I know, only 

Uncle Sam can deliver that. Once Uncle Sam is involved, they’re 

going to turn to the military to do that delivery of that quantum 

of beds, medical physicians, and doctors to come in and help these 

poor people. 

So, let’s figure out—you tell us what to do; as a Congress, there’s 

a good chance we’re going to try and do it. We have the ranking 

member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee right here, and I’m one of her subordinates down in the 

ranks of that committee, and I’m sure you’re going to go to work 

on this. 

General STUMP. If that were to happen, as I indicated before, the 

very first response would come from the State, the local police, the 

local firefighters, and the National Guard, because the Governor is 

going to say, ‘‘Now, wait a minute. I have been overwhelmed.’’ 

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

General STUMP. The National Guard will quickly determine that, 

‘‘Not only is this something that the State can’t handle, this is also 

something that we can’t handle, either.’’ 

Senator WARNER. All right. 

General STUMP. Now a response will go to NORTHCOM and to 

the President, that, ‘‘We need massive help from the Active Duty 

component.’’ 

Senator WARNER. Right. 

General STUMP. At that point in time, when those people show 

up, the transfer command would go to the Active Duty people to 

be in command and control, because they would have the majority 

of the forces there, and they would be conducting the operations. 

That scenario that we’re talking about now is going to be 1 to 

2 or 3 to 5 percent of what’s really going to happen in the future. 

137

Most of the time, we have scenarios, such as the World Trade Center or Hurricane Katrina, where it can be handled on the local 

level, with a little bit of help. But, when you get to the catastrophic 

events, as you have just described, it’s obvious that the Federal 

Government will have to be in control, because they will have the 

majority of the forces, and I’m sure that there will be no problem 

with the Governors yielding to their control. But, again, it’s dependent upon what that disaster in the scenario is. 

General PUNARO. Senator Warner, our point is, the bulk of the 

forces that respond—perhaps the Active Duty Commander is part 

of Joint Task Force Civil Support, which is NORTHCOM’s standing 

task force to roll in with command and control—should be Guard 

and Reserve units, because they’re already going to be there. So, 

again, these things can be planned, coordinated, and worked out in 

advance. The military has extensive procedures for transferring 

commands—phase lines and demarcation lines. They know how to 

do this. The problem is, nobody has sat down and sorted it all out. 

Senator WARNER. Now, wait a minute, you say, ‘‘Nobody has sat 

down and sorted it all out.’’ I gained the impression from General 

Stump that it had been sorted. 

General PUNARO. I think what I heard General Stump say is 

that, that’s his view of how it ought to happen; it doesn’t mean 

that’s been worked out that it will happen. 

Senator WARNER. General, help me out, here. 

General STUMP. Yes. What I’m saying is, that’s the way, in my 

opinion, it will happen. 

Senator WARNER. Oh. 

General STUMP. But have we set down a program and a plan to 

do that? No. 

Senator WARNER. Okay. Well, we’d better get on with it. 

General STUMP. Amen. 

Senator WARNER. We have to empower this Commission to stay 

and——[Laughter.] 

General PUNARO. That’s a negative, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

General STUMP. We’ve been here 21⁄2 years, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator WARNER. You’ve done a commendable job. 

Now look here, I have behind me, all of these well-trained officers of the United States military, and we’re having a little discussion, back here, and they’ve written out this rather complicated observation, in longhand, addressed to the role of the Governors, 

‘‘You’’—that’s the Punaro Commission here—‘‘have recommended 

that the Governors receive operational control of Active-Duty 

Forces under certain circumstances. This is different from command.’’—which those of us in the military understand—‘‘Please discuss the recommendation and distinguish between the two concepts.’’ 

Now, the reality is, when one of these tragic situations hit, nobody has time to sit down and debate whether we’re dealing with 

operational control or command. Now, we have to bring total clarity 

to this situation so that well-intentioned people can handle this situation, and we don’t watch the television of a Governor barking at 

a two-star or three-star general out of NORTHCOM and saying—

well, let’s drop it there. 

138

General PUNARO. Senator Warner, you’re absolutely correct, we 

don’t want a pickup game. After my many years of service on the 

Armed Services Committee, I’m not bold enough to go up against 

the esteemed staff directors and general counsels, particularly 

someone that has a lot more understanding of the law than I do. 

So I’m going to throw this one over to General Stump because he 

has the day-to-day practical experience of how this actually should 

work. 

General STUMP. What we’re saying is that the operational control—that if you have title 10 forces that are there for, say, Hurricane Katrina, that the Governor or the commander or the Adjutant 

General or the dual-hatted person would exercise operational control, assign missions so that they are coordinated with what the 

National Guard is doing, and they’re coordinated with what the Active Duty is doing, et cetera. Command—one of the definitions of 

‘‘command’’ would be that the disciplinary——

Senator WARNER. Execution. 

General STUMP. —those types of things—if there were a problem 

with a court-martial or something, that would remain under the 

control of the title 10 Active Duty chain of command, but the operations of these forces, what work they are actually doing, would 

come under the operational control of that person who is in charge 

of that particular incident. 

Senator WARNER. But your bottom line is, this has to be fixed. 

It is not clear now. 

General STUMP. Yes, sir, we agree, 100 percent on that. 

Senator WARNER. All right. We agree on that. 

General STUMP. That’s what the Commission recommends. 

Senator WARNER. Now, at this point, Mr. Chairman, I think I 

would like to put into the record NORTHCOM’s rather strong criticism of your work. This is beginning to build up our record here, 

but I think that’s important. 

Chairman LEVIN. This will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

139


207ful98.eps
140

Senator WARNER. General Punaro and valued friends on this 

Commission, I think you’ve done a wonderful job. The Commission 

is not worth its salt much if it didn’t stir up some sort of controversy. But, somehow, in my preliminary visits with you prior to 

the public issuance of the report, I specifically asked of you, informally, just conversationally, how has this checked out with DOD 


207ful99.eps 207fu100.eps
141

and the Reserve and Guard Bureau? I somehow got the assurance 

that things were in pretty good shape. Then we hit a small volcano 

when this situation rolled out into the public view. 

General PUNARO. Senator Warner, we had extensive coordination 

and consultation, not only with DOD, but with the relevant congressional committees, with stakeholders outside of government. 

We felt, from day one, it was very important to be as transparent 

as possible. We worked very directly with the Reserve component 

chiefs. During the course of those extensive consultations, particularly as we got close to sending the report to the printer for the 

final time, we made the rounds in DOD, including some of the senior people that are responsible for these areas. I would say, based 

on those consultations, we’re surprised at those comments. We 

think some of those comments are not accurate, but we are as surprised as you are, based on our extensive round of consultations. 

We didn’t hold anything back. 

Senator WARNER. My time has expired. 

But, what I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, is that we invite the 

Commission, before it expires. 

When do you expire? 

Chairman LEVIN. As soon as possible. [Laughter.] 

General PUNARO. As soon as possible, but, legally, the end of 

April. 

Senator WARNER. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we extend 

an invitation for them to put in, as we say in the law, a 

surrebuttal, which means you’ll have the opportunity to comment 

upon the criticism that, thus far, has been directed to you. 

General PUNARO. Thank you very much. We’d appreciate that. 

Again, I believe the GAO reports that come out, here in the next 

couple of months, are going to back us up pretty well on our observations on NORTHCOM. 

Senator WARNER. Again, we’re in an area where there are honest 

differences of opinion by people who are tremendous conscientious 

public servants. But, we have to make sure that, at some point 

time, General Stump writes the committee, ‘‘I am now satisfied 

that this matter has been clarified.’’ [Laughter.] 

General PUNARO. Again, Senator Warner, we want to give 

NORTHCOM tremendous credit for what they’ve done since they’ve 

been stood up. We’re looking forward, we’re not looking backwards. 

Senator WARNER. We’re figuring out the roadmap forward. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Speaking of coordination—according to my 

BlackBerry, the U.S. Capitol Police are assisting Amtrak Police 

and the D.C. Fire Department with a train accident at Union Station. I’m not sure how that directly applies to this discussion, but 

it does talk about, at least, coordination. 

Senator WARNER. Do you think the Senate will stop doing its 

business and all flee down there to help? 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope not. 

Senator Thune, I guess we’ll call on you next. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much to the panel for being here. Thank you for 

over 2 years of very hard work on this Commission and a report 

that, I’m sure, will, in your words, generate lively debate—I’m sure 

142

it already has today. But, I fully understand the strain that’s 

placed on our Guard and Reserve Forces since September 11th, as 

the men and women of South Dakota’s Guard units have been extremely busy around the world. Since that event, our men and 

women have been deployed to 36 countries on 6 different continents. Over 94 percent of South Dakota’s Army Guard personnel 

have deployed, and 75 percent of its Air National Guard units. In 

fact, the first company of the 189th Aviation Regiment and Black 

Hawk unit is on its fourth deployment since 2001. I’m proud to report that South Dakota is full of young and not-so-young patriots 

that have answered that call to duty, and, despite everything we’ve 

asked of them, they continue to answer the call. In fact, per capita, 

South Dakota ranks in the top 10 States in the number of total deployed servicemembers, and is within the top 5 States for recruiting and retention. 

I would also like to single out our South Dakota employers for 

recognition, who do an outstanding job of supporting our Guard 

and Reserve during deployments that present many difficulties 

within our communities. These fine people are our greatest resource. Therefore, I will focus my questions on the three components to keeping these personnel in the Service—the members, 

their families, and their employers. 

Our defense budget is already under immense strain, and many 

priorities are competing for a limited amount of resources; and, 

more and more, we’re having to look for cost-effective ways to implement important policy. I would open with this question, to anyone on the panel who would care to answer, and that is, in your 

view, what retention policies do you see that would be most efficient, in terms of our use of money? In other words, where do we 

get the most effect per dollar spent? 

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Creation and support of an Operational Reserve require some 

fundamental changes to our personnel policies and programs. We 

have taken some ideas that have been developed by DOD over 

time, and projected what the potential workforce of the future 

would look like and what would appeal to that generation of workers. We have determined that some significant personnel management changes need to occur. 

In that regard, our first would be a promotion system based on 

competency rather than time in grade. Our second is an integrated 

compensation system—the same system for the Active and Reserve 

component—and an integrated retirement system. 

Now, changes of this magnitude carry significant risk, and our 

people are our most valuable source, and we understand that. So, 

in these far-reaching proposals that we have suggested, for example, in retirement, we propose earlier a 10-year vesting period, a 

matched government contribution to a Thrift Savings Fund, bonuses at key gates in one’s career, to encourage retention. Those 

are significant changes, and that sort of change in the retirement 

system may have significant merit, or may not appeal to some specialties within our military departments; for example, potentially, 

combat arms. 

We would propose a transition period, where a new system would 

be offered. The old system would still be in place. We could assess 

143

the level of interest in a more portable, flexible benefit package. If 

that’s something that seems, as we believe it would, to be appealing to the force of the future, we recommend something of that nature. 

Certainly, the competency-based promotion system is also a very 

significant change, but we feel that there would be opportunities to 

retain people with a great deal of experience at a certain level. 

They’re happy functioning at that level, don’t need to move higher 

through the system, but we could value that experience, and reward it with that sort of system. 

I know that’s not a real specific answer, but our changes are 

something that are rather dramatic, over a period of time, to support a very different force of the future. 

General PUNARO. Could I add, sir, that there are some shortterm incentives, as well. We recommend some enhanced benefits in 

the medical readiness, the dental readiness, travel reimbursement, 

beefing up the GI Bill and educational benefits. There are seven or 

eight short-term benefits that you could apply to the Force today 

while you deliberate on these longer-term changes that will be required if you’re going to retain, over the long term, of the Operational Guard and Reserve. 

I would like to also say we have benefited from South Dakota on 

our Commission, because our deputy general counsel, Colonel Tony 

Sanchez, USARNG, comes from the South Dakota Army Guard. 

He’s a terrific guardsman, he’s a super counsel, very knowledgeable, and we really appreciated South Dakota’s Guard lending him 

to us for these past 2 years. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. We do what we can to help. 

I also was heartened to see one of your recommendations as easy 

and cost-effective to implement, such as the Web site that would 

give one-stop shopping to families for information on TRICARE and 

other complex programs. I guess, in the same vein, I would just ask 

a general question with regard to what policies you see as the most 

cost-effective ways to increase the way that we care for the families 

of members of the Guard? 

Ms. LEWIS. Yes, sir. Guard families have particular needs, as 

many don’t live near military bases and don’t have the support 

structure that the Active component does. They also face the challenge of becoming suddenly military when a member is activated, 

and their family does not have the same support infrastructure. So, 

they do have unique issues. 

We recommend enhancement of the current system. We recognize 

Military OneSource is a valuable Web-based information source, 

but we think that there needs to be additional information provided to those family members about the programs that are available to assist them. We also propose more funded support for fulltime support, at the unit level, for families, and a stronger role for 

the families in mobilization and demobilization initiatives. 

Would you like me to address employers, as well? 

Senator THUNE. That would be great, if you could. 

Ms. LEWIS. We recommended an enhanced role and additional resources for the National Committee for Employer Support of the 

Guard and Reserve. We elevate the access of employers by development of a council that would have direct access to senior leadership 

144

in DOD to convey employer issues. We recommend a one-stop-shopping point for information on government laws and programs that 

impact employers. 

We recognize they’re a full partner in supporting our Reserve 

component members. We’ve looked at some particular initiatives—

I would suggest, the healthcare initiatives, with the stipend. We 

recognize that employer benefits are costly, and, if there are ways 

that we can partner with the employer community to provide ongoing care for servicemembers’ families, that may be a positive initiative that would assist them, as well. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Ms. Lewis. 

One final question. It appears, evidently, my time is up. But, I 

would direct this to General Punaro. As the ranking member of the 

Senate Armed Services Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, I was a little shocked to read your assertion, that 88 

percent or worse of the Army National Guard combat forces here 

in the United States were not ready. I’m wondering what DOD 

says about this. Do they agree with your figures? What is the 

major problem here? Is that equipment? Is it training? Is it personnel? If you could, just, maybe hone in on that a little bit. 

General PUNARO. That is General Blum’s figure. We verified it 

with the Guard Bureau right before we went to final print. I don’t 

believe that one would be in dispute. It shouldn’t really be surprising, because, as General Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army, 

has said, we’re consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. 

So, when we reported last year in March that it was 88 percent not 

combat ready, those are the units that are back here at home, not 

the ones that are getting ready to deploy or are deployed. It’s a tad 

worse right now, at this point, for those units. It’s mainly due to 

their heavy formations, and a combination of the three major elements of readiness. It’s personnel availability, as well as personnel 

skills, it’s equipment availability, as well as equipment on hand, 

and it’s also training. 

This, I don’t think, is a figure that’s in dispute or in contention. 

Admiral Mullen, I believe, testified about this before the committee 

yesterday—understandable, given the treadmill that these units 

have been on. Obviously, for an Operational Guard and Reserve, 

you have to have a much different system of funding and 

prioritization if you’re going to have these units that are continuing 

to be used, more ready than they are under the kind of old system. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you all, again, very much for your good 

work, and I’m glad that Tony Sanchez could contribute to your efforts. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, to our panel and the commissioners, who have worked 

so hard and finally reported out in March last year, and have come 

forth with six major conclusions and with a little less than 100 recommendations—94, I think it was, that you finally reported out. 

It is good to know that you were working hard to try to set up 

an operational group for the 21st century, which includes the NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
145

tional Guard and the Reserves. I want to say all of this just to 

thank you for your work and what you’ve done, in doing that. 

General Punaro, it is critical—and I’m thinking about the adequate defense of the homeland areas—that we maintain the readiness of our Nation’s Guard and Reserve assets in order to ensure 

adequate homeland protection and response in the event of an attack or natural disaster. I understand that the Commission’s conclusion was that this capability for our Reserve Forces has been degraded, due to current operational demands. In my home State of 

Hawaii, maintaining this capability is a particular concern, due to 

the, of course, unique geography and time required to supply reinforcements, should a National Guard lack the resources or personnel needed in case of an emergency or natural disaster there. 

Assuming an inability, in the short term, to address some of the 

more complicated changes the Commission proposes to address the 

broad challenges facing the Guard and Reserves, my question to 

you is: What immediate actions need to be taken to ensure that a 

gap in protection of American lives and property in the Homeland 

does not exist? 

General PUNARO. Senator, we think the most immediate thing is 

a recognition of the high priority that the homeland missions 

should receive, and, therefore, strong DOD support. I would say, 

Secretary Gates has directed DOD to give these civil support requirements a much higher priority than they had in the past. So, 

the Secretary of Defense, in my judgment, has taken a very decisive step, after our report last March, to say, ‘‘These things need 

to be given a higher priority.’’ That means, if they have a higher 

priority in DOD, they will have a higher priority for funding and 

resourcing. For example, right now the Hawaii Guard has only 38 

percent of its critical dual-use equipment that it would need for a 

homeland situation. But, in the long-term, Congress is going to 

need to speak, statutorily, that these types of missions need to be 

given equal priority to the overseas missions. That’s the way it’s 

going to play out. 

Right now, because everybody is so operationally busy, it’s hard 

to get these units back up to speed, because we’re kind of on a 

treadmill. But, I think it really relates back to DOD recognizing 

that these missions at home need to enjoy a much higher priority 

now than they have in the past. Again, I believe Secretary Gates—

he’ll obviously have to speak for himself, because wording is very 

important here, and the counsels would want these things said in 

very precise terms, so we’re not creating too broad a mission for 

DOD. But, in simple terms, the civil support requirements have to 

be generated by DHS. DOD needs to take them, working with 

NORTHCOM, and working with the Guard Bureau, and make a 

determination, which of those are valid for DOD. The ones that are 

valid, then, need to be put into DOD’s resourcing process, and then, 

that’s how they’re going to get funded and that’s how the readiness 

is going to improve. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me further ask: Would you think that greater integration and collaboration of local and State law enforcement 

with DHS would help to address any short-term resource mismatch 

until DOD can assume a greater role? 

146

General PUNARO. Senator, we think that’s essential, and that’s 

one of the key reasons why DHS has to be the lead, and they need 

to look at these scenarios and say, ‘‘Okay, here’s one for the Justice 

Department, here’s one for the Department of Health and Human 

Services, here’s one for the Agriculture Department.’’ The answer 

to everything is not DOD. So, again, we emphasize this increased 

coordination and planning of everyone involved. Again, that’s the 

role of DHS, and we are not that encouraged that they are moving 

out as quickly as they need to be in playing that role of pulling everybody together and making sure all the assets are available. This 

is why we argue that Guard and Reserve units, particularly the 

title 10 Reserve units—if you have, for example—I don’t know what 

happened, in terms of a response in Tennessee, but I know, from 

personal experience—I guarantee you there are title 10 Reserve 

Forces whose personnel have come to the fray and helped out in 

these devastating tornados that have happened down in Tennessee—I guarantee you—because it’s the way it happens all the 

time. When the Amtrak train went off the trestle in Mobile, AL, 

and went into the water, the 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company 

of the United States Marine Corps’ 4th Marine Division, a Reserve 

Division, they had the rubber raiding rafts, they had the scuba 

gear, they were the first people on the scene, they were the first 

responders. They are our title 10 force. 

The American citizens, they don’t care whether it’s Active Duty, 

National Guard, Reserve, State police, local police, Federal police. 

The taxpayers are paying for every single bit of this capability. Our 

Nation owes it to our taxpayers to get all this coordinated and 

allow all this capability to be brought to bear in these domestic 

contingency situations, not just DOD. 

We would agree with you wholeheartedly on that. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

General Punaro, as we speak about NORTHCOM and the troops 

that would be assigned to that, one of the recommendations of the 

Commission is to substantially increase the number of Guard and 

Reserve billets at NORTHCOM, which has primary responsibility 

for, of course, defense of North America. By virtue of their familiarity with local communities, and combined with the cost of mobilization and—this seems to make them, really, the most of our personnel. My question to you is: What is the biggest obstacle in current DOD personnel management and staffing practices to achieving this desired status in the command? 

General PUNARO. That is really a tough question. I want to be 

very careful in the way I answer it, because the people at 

NORTHCOM, I guarantee you that most of them are Active Duty 

personnel. That command really grew out of the old command that 

had the North American Aerospace Defense Command mission—

and they get up, they come to work every day dedicated to the security of this Nation and put in long, long hours making sure they 

do everything they can to improve the situation. That’s not in question. 

The issue really is the experience, training, and culture. For example, Lieutenant General Blum, who’s the head of the Guard Bureau, everybody knows to be a very dynamic leader, a warrior. He’s 

led in combat, he’s led in peacetime. He understands civil support, 

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and he understands how to get 55,000 Guard personnel to the Gulf 

Coast, in Katrina. That didn’t come through NORTHCOM, that 

came out of the Guard Bureau. 

No one in their right mind would put General Blum in charge 

of a nuclear carrier battle group, because while he’s a great threestar general, he has no training, no experience, no frame of reference. 

Our thought is—NORTHCOM is a specialized command. It is a 

command that is focused on a very complex, very difficult mission, 

which is protecting the Homeland, particularly in scenarios that require interface with State and local government, with law enforcement, with first responders. Active Duty military personnel do not 

have the background and experience, they haven’t worked in that 

system, they don’t know what they don’t know. But Guard and Reserve personnel, they do this every single day. They are the emergency managers in the State. They are the hazardous-material coordinators in a local community. Therefore, it would make sense for 

NORTHCOM to have a lot more personnel like that on the staff in 

key roles. 

They are looking at that, but the preliminary decisions that we 

understand are going to be made don’t get them anywhere close to 

having the number of people they need, with the kind of experiences they need, to basically shift the culture and experience base 

of that command. 

That’s not a negative comment on the incredibly dedicated professional personnel and the commander that’s working there every 

day. Again, we would not put General Blum in charge of a carrier 

battle group. We need to put the people in these billets that have 

the years and years and years of training, experience, and ability 

to handle these new daunting missions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

kind words of welcome, both yesterday and this morning. I appreciate the opportunity of serving with you, and I thank the members 

of the panel for their testimony. 

I do find it interesting that the Commission was surprised at the 

degree of criticism that met the report. From some quarters, you 

would almost characterize it as a firestorm. I take it that the recommendation, General Punaro, was unanimous. Was it a unanimous recommendation of the Commission? 

General PUNARO. The ones that have drawn the criticism were 

unanimous. Over a 2-year period, we made 118 recommendations; 

117 of those recommendations were totally unanimous; and the 1 

to have the directors of the Air Guard and the Air Reserve be dualhatted, both under the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the 

military departments, not one that we’ve heard a lot of talk about 

yet, we had a dissent on that by one commissioner who has very, 

very good arguments against it, but the rest of the Commission 

supported it. 

Our report really is, in effect, totally unanimous, and on the ones 

that we’ve heard some criticism about—for example, saying that 

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the Commission is recommending turning the National Guard into 

a domestic response force only, we were quite surprised at that 

criticism, because, as General Stump, a member of the Air National 

Guard and an Adjutant General, said, that’s just absolutely not the 

case. So, that one was a very surprising comment to us. 

Again, on the core ones, of creating an Operational Reserve, enhancing DOD’s role in the Homeland, the one that Senator Collins 

identified, that we say it’s an appalling gap in our preparation for 

catastrophic, those were not only unanimous, they were ones that 

we sat down and thought about, long and hard, and debated, long 

and hard, and said, ‘‘We want to make sure that we can back up 

those comments.’’ 

Again, the extensive consultations that we had, particularly with 

the people that are responsible for some of these areas, some of the 

comments surprised us. 

I will say that we were very encouraged by Secretary Gates’ comments, before this Commission and before the House Armed Services Committee, where he said, ‘‘DOD has an open mind, going to 

take a hard look at it,’’ his comments, yesterday, did not reflect 

some of the initial statements made by some DOD spokesmen, who, 

perhaps, did not have a lot of time to read the details. 

Senator WICKER. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, says that, ‘‘This is sharply at 

odds with the position we have taken in our strategy for homeland 

defense and civil support, and that what the Commission is recommending is that the National Guard become a domestic disaster-response capability, exclusively. We think that’s wrong.’’ 

Do I understand that you, also, would think that is wrong, and 

your response is that that is, in fact, not the substance of the recommendations? 

General PUNARO. If that is, in fact, what our recommendations 

were, which they absolutely, totally aren’t, we would certainly 

make the same criticisms of our report that Secretary McHale did. 

But, that’s just as General Stump explained earlier, and so, I’m 

going to ask him to respond. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. I think you’ve given me the answer. I’m 

very much limited in time. 

General PUNARO. Okay. 

Senator WICKER. If General Stump would like to add to that for 

the record, he can. 

General Blum has been mentioned several times in testimony 

this morning. At this particular press conference, he was standing 

right next to Secretary McHale and said that if the recommendations were followed, ‘‘We would unhinge the Volunteer Force, and 

we would break the Total Force.’’ 

Let me just ask you—I served 4 years Active Duty in the United 

States Air Force. I was a judge advocate, and I can assure the 

members of the panel I didn’t do anything special. After that, I 

transferred directly into the Reserve, and retired, eventually, at the 

rank of Lieutenant Colonel. As I say, I was not a hero, in any 

sense, but I did have a chance to observe a lot. I was able to serve 

on Active Duty at an operational base. I was able to serve at a 

headquarters-type level, and then to serve for quite a while at a 

149

training base. During that time, I saw the development of this concept of Total Force, which seemed to me to be an excellent move. 

What is your understanding of the concept, General, of Total 

Force? What would be your response to this quote from the press, 

which may or may not be an accurate quote, from General Blum 

that we would ‘‘break the Total Force’’? 

General PUNARO. I was not aware of that quote from General 

Blum, and I hope it was misquoted, because, if it wasn’t misquoted, 

it would be at significant variance from General Blum’s own testimony before our Commission. 

Senator WICKER. You support the concept of Total Force? 

General PUNARO. Absolutely. 

Senator WICKER. You think, under the recommendation, that you 

would go forward? 

General PUNARO. We take the Total Force concept to its next 

level, we’re arguing for greater integration. I was there in the Reserve when the Total Force concept was developed by Melvin Laird, 

and it said that what we’re going to do is, when we have a requirement, we’re going to look to see which part of our force—Active, 

Guard, Reserve, IRR—can best fulfill those missions and would be 

most economical for the taxpayer, and we need to be more integrated. So over the continuum since then, we’ve become more and 

more integrated. We believe we need to take it to the next step. We 

believe you need a totally integrated and interchangeable Active 

and Reserve component. Use those parts that make the most sense 

for that particular mission, take into mind the fact that the Guard 

and Reserve may be more economical for certain missions than the 

Active component, and have the ability for an Active-Duty Force 

commander to surge up and down. 

I would say that no one is a greater adherent to the concept of 

Total Force than the members of the Commission. Again, I did not 

know General Blum made that comment, and I would hesitate to 

offer, but I certainly, if asked, could produce a lot of quotes from 

General Blum, not only in public, but in private, that I believe 

would be at significant variance with that comment, if it’s accurate. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

If I may have time for one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

Someone in the panel, if you would, describe your deliberation 

process as far as the recommendation with regard to the health 

benefits program, and, specifically, the recommendation, as I understand it, that we move to a Federal Employees Health Benefits 

Program instead of the TRICARE program. 

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify that, Senator 

Wicker. 

In no way do we think that the current TRICARE Reserves Select Program should be eliminated. We think it’s a very thoughtful 

and deliberate program that provides some excellent benefits to our 

Reserve component members. 

Many of those Reserve component members, though, live in areas 

away from the hub of where that support exists, around a military 

base, and, in those more isolated locations, often it’s challenging to 

find a TRICARE-standard provider. Our recommendations are not 

in lieu of existing programs, but actually are proposing to offer an 

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alternative that may provide a more comprehensive approach in 

areas where TRICARE access is more limited or challenging. 

The Federal Employee Health Benefit Program has a wide network, with a variety of plans throughout the country. We thought 

that might be a possible viable option for Reserve component family members. 

Also, our recommendations with regard to a stipend, we thought 

were important. We heard, from a number of focus groups that 

were populated by family members, Reserve component members, 

employers, and I was, quite frankly pleasantly surprised at the 

level of support that employers want to continue to provide to those 

families once those servicemembers are activated. They want to 

continue their private-sector plans and offer that continuity of care 

and minimize the disruption to those families. We thought it would 

be viable to explore a stipend, either to the servicemember or that 

employer, to assist in providing that continuity of care. 

But, I’m pleased to clarify, it was not at the exclusion of the existing excellent TRICARE Reserve Program. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, ma’am. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Wicker. 

Let me go back to some of the discussion about coordination. 

I don’t think that any lack of coordination is tolerable, in terms 

of responding to a domestic crisis. We don’t have to resolve some 

of the basic issues that you raise, it seems to me, in order to have 

coordination when it comes to a response to a catastrophic event. 

I don’t think the American people would tolerate, for 1 minute, response to any catastrophic event not being coordinated. I think 

they were appalled with Hurricane Katrina. We were. I remember 

some of the hearings, which Senator Collins, I believe, at the time, 

was chairing, relative to the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

In your report, you take up the issue of coordination, and you’re 

critical, I believe, of the lack of coordination now, and then you also 

make these other recommendations. 

Can’t we have a highly coordinated response plan right now, 

with the existing units, under the existing control, with the existing roles and missions that are assigned, both to Active Duty and 

Guard? Can’t we have a coordination plan, which is really solid, 

right now? 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, we should have such a plan. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any reason we can’t have it? 

General PUNARO. In our judgment, no. 

Chairman LEVIN. We don’t have to resolve all the fundamental 

issues and the directions that you’re talking about for the Guard 

missions and Active Duty and their missions, and giving missions 

at home a higher priority for the Guard, and so forth—we don’t 

have to resolve all of that in order to have coordination which is 

absolutely rock solid, would you agree with that? 

General PUNARO. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That coordination, you say, does not exist right 

now. 

General PUNARO. They will tell you they certainly are doing——

Chairman LEVIN. Not ‘‘they,’’ but what will you tell us? 

151

General PUNARO. We do not find the—again, we’re not looking 

back, we’re looking at the gap and looking forward. 

Chairman LEVIN. I mean now. 

General PUNARO. Right now, we do not have the level of coordination planning that we should have for these particularly highend situations. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Do you agree with that, by the way, 

General? 

General STUMP. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

General STUMP. There are 15 scenarios that have been proposed 

of disaster responses that can be out there, and we need to include 

not only the Guard and the Reserves, but the Active Duty and the 

Governors and the first responders, et cetera. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

General STUMP. That’s not there now. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ll just tell you flat out, there’s no excuse not 

to have that coordination now. I know that the Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee will be looking into this—I 

believe, next week. 

Again, I very much appreciate your and Senator Lieberman’s 

agreeing to this sequence of hearings. I hope you would pass that 

along to Senator Lieberman for me. 

That’s going to be intolerable, period. We’re going to have 

NORTHCOM in front of us in March, and we’re going to raise this 

issue with them. 

Now let’s talk about the future. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, as part of our consultations—

I won’t say with who, but with a very senior official at 

NORTHCOM—I suggested to that official that they would be answering these very questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, we also have these other basic questions, which we very 

properly raise. We want Guard units up to speed in terms of equipment and training. We want the missions that they have, particularly here at home, to be given a higher priority. I think that’s 

clear, that there’s greater threats now to the Homeland, that the 

Guard are in a very unique position to respond to. We ought to give 

them all the capability and equipment that are needed to respond 

to those kind of catastrophes here at home, so that they can respond to a greater number, a greater level of catastrophes without 

calling in the Active Duty folks. I think that’s right. That’s clear. 

We ought to do it. 

Who’s going to be in charge of those units is where you’re going 

to get into all kinds of political problems. The Governor is in charge 

of our National Guard. The 82nd Airborne’s called in, is the Governor going to be in charge of the 82nd Airborne, ultimately? I 

don’t think anyone here is proposing that. On the other hand, 

that’s the direction that you’re going, in essence, if you’re going to 

be putting a National Guard general in charge of Active-Duty 

Forces. Who’s in control of that National Guard general, the Adjutant General? It’s the Governor. So we have two alternatives here. 

You want a Governor in charge of the 82nd Airborne, that’s one, 

or you want an Active Duty general, who’s usually focused on other 

152

things, to be in charge of the domestic response? That’s the question you raise. General Punaro, that was the one you raise. 

To me, if it’s one or the other, I’d rather have the Active Duty 

general in charge of the National Guard response than I would to 

have a Governor commanding the 82nd Airborne, if that’s my option. I don’t think that is the only option. I think there may be a 

way, which you’ve discussed, which is to put some more National 

Guard folks up at NORTHCOM. But, still, you’d have to have a 

NORTHCOM commander who’s in command of those. But, nonetheless, if there’s a shortfall, in terms of that capability at 

NORTHCOM, which you allege there is a very serious shortfall, it 

seems to me that at least is a way of bringing in that capability, 

that experience, as you put it, to respond to disasters and local 

events, to bring that into NORTHCOM. At a minimum, it seems 

to me, that’s what we should be talking about. 

So, in terms of the coordination, that’s a short-term problem. 

General PUNARO. Mr. Chairman, if I could I mention that——

Chairman LEVIN. Please, yes. 

General PUNARO. You’ve hit on a very interesting and very important concept that we think has merit. That’s why I said it 

doesn’t have to be either/or, the Commander of NORTHCOM could 

be a Guard or Reserve person. General Pace testified before our 

Commission that there are people in the Guard and Reserve today 

that are totally capable of being the four-star commander of 

NORTHCOM. The component commands could be commanded by 

Reserves. For example, Army North doesn’t have to be commanded 

by a three-star Active-Duty general, it could be commanded by a 

three-star Guard general. The Marine Forces Reserve—Marine 

North—is commanded by a reservist, Lieutenant General Jack 

Bergman. So, when you start embedding the Guard and Reserve 

personnel in the NORTHCOM billets, either as the commanders or 

the planners or the J–1s or the J–3s, I think you’re going to begin 

to see these seams close in, and I think you’re going to see the kind 

of experience and coordination that all of us desire. That’s another 

thing that needs to be worked on. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ve just been handed a note that the commander of Joint Task Force Civil Support for NORTHCOM is a National Guard already. 

General PUNARO. Super. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that is already taking place. 

Without getting into these impossible-to-resolve political disputes, where every Governor and every four-star Active-Duty general is going to just [finger snap] go like that, we don’t need to wait 

for coordination, and there’s ways of achieving the experience factor in ways which don’t require us to do things which the public, 

I think, would not accept, nor should they. 

Now, I’m going to stop there, since everyone’s nodding their 

head. I think I’m ahead, I think I’ll stop with being ahead. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask two final questions. Ms. Lewis, many of us—

indeed, all of us—are very concerned about the stress that repeated 

and lengthy deployments have placed on our National Guard members, their families, and their employers. Many of the recommendaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
153

tions that you’ve made, as far as improving the retirement and 

healthcare and GI Bill benefits, speak to that concern. Obviously, 

all of us would like to see shorter deployments, which would help 

a great deal. 

The President, in his State of the Union Address, proposed some 

changes in educational benefits that would allow returning 

servicemembers, if they were not going to use the educational benefits, to transfer that benefit to their spouses or to their children. 

Did you, in the course of looking at the benefit package, take a look 

at that idea? 

Ms. LEWIS. Senator Collins, we did make some recommendations 

with the timeframe with which a member could use their Montgomery GI Bill benefits upon their return. As far as transferability, 

we did not make any particular recommendation in that regard. 

There are two factors that go into some of these benefit programs. One is whether they’re a recruiting tool, and one is whether 

they’re a retention tool. Certainly, transferability would aid in retention, but there is some question about transferability impacting 

future recruiting if a benefit was already accrued through a parent 

rather than a young person themselves. So, we didn’t make any 

particular recommendations in that regard. I know it’s a sensitive 

issue, and I know there’s a lot of appeal to allowing that transferability. But, we did make the extended access available for GI Bill 

benefits for the servicemember themselves, and then focused our 

other recommendations on longer-term tools that DOD could use 

for recruiting and retention, which would include a further evaluation of how to use educational benefits. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

The retirement changes, in particular, that your report recommends, are an issue that comes up time and time again when 

I talk to members of the Maine National Guard, so I appreciate 

having your recommendations in that area. 

Finally, General Punaro, I want to just clarify one last time for 

the record, part of your report that has created some confusion 

about what you see as the role of the National Guard for homeland 

security versus an Operational Force that is deployed in times of 

war. 

Your report states that the National Guard and Reserves should 

play the lead role in supporting DHS, other agencies, and States 

in response to major catastrophes. Then, in recommendation number 5, which is where I think the confusion has occurred, the language says that the Commission recommends shifting capabilities 

determined to be required for State-controlled response to domestic 

emergencies to the National Guard, and then shifting capabilities 

currently resident in the National Guard that are not required for 

its State missions, but are required for its Federal missions, either 

to the Federal Reserve components or to the Active-Duty military. 

I know the chairman brought up this language, too. It is this that 

has created some confusion, where people think that you’re saying, 

if you’re transferring the capabilities for Federal missions to the 

Active Duty or the Reserves, that you’re no longer envisioning the 

Guard being really part of the Total Force. That’s not what you’re 

saying, correct? 

154

General PUNARO. That is absolutely correct. I think we had in 

there somewhere, ‘‘as appropriate,’’ but it’s clear we did not word 

it as precisely as, probably, we should have. The concept really is—

and this is why we say it would not reduce, but rather enhance 

their warfighting capability—our Active-Duty military and the 

combatant commanders that basically control our operations overseas; they’re generally forward deployed. The Active-Duty military 

is the first to go overseas, beginning with the ones that are already 

there, as well as the immediate reinforcements. The Guard and Reserve, as required, augments and reinforces the Active component 

overseas, so they have the lead. This is not a command-and-control 

issue, it’s just a sequencing issue. 

For the Homeland, particularly those catastrophic situations, 

which, we would argue, are every bit as difficult as an overseas 

war, that the Guard and Reserve, because they are forward deployed in the continental United States in 5,000 communities, they 

have the command and control, they have the situation awareness, 

they have the geography, as well as the cost benefit of being at a 

resting phase when something isn’t going on—they should have the 

lead. That doesn’t mean they’re the only people, and that doesn’t 

mean that’s their exclusive mission; it’s really a question of sequencing the forces. 

If they can’t do it in a particular area, as the chairman has 

pointed out, and is NORTHCOM’s contingency plans with Joint 

Task Force Civil Support, the Active would roll in very quickly, 

bring in the augment and reinforcing, and you’d have what you 

need. It really is more of a sequencing issue, and then playing to 

the operational skills and geography of the various forces. 

The Guard is going to be relied on increasingly, not just at home, 

but overseas. There’s no way you can make up a gap that we have 

in what our requirements are with the Active component alone—

right now, 600,000, mobilized for the wars, another 68 million man 

days—if you tried to replicate in the Active Force the operational 

capability we have in our Guard and Reserve today, and put it all 

on Active Duty, it would cost close to a $1 trillion. That money 

doesn’t exist, and it wouldn’t make sense for the taxpayers, anyway. 

So we appreciate the opportunity to get very firmly on the record 

that we absolutely do not recommend converting the National 

Guard into a domestic crisis response force only. 

However, as DHS develops these requirements, as your committee and Congress have required by law, and the requirements 

come to DOD, DOD then will validate them, and if they agree with 

them, they’ll say, ‘‘Okay, we have this requirement. Who are we 

going to have satisfy this requirement? Is it going to be the Guard? 

Is it going to be the Army Reserve? Is it going to be the Active 

Army?’’ That’s what we mean by rebalancing. DOD may decide that 

they need to rebalance, and they may say, ‘‘We’re going to put 

every bit of it in the Guard, without taking anything away that 

they have now, or we may decide that it should go to the Army Reserve. For example, mass decontamination, DOD may decide that 

maybe that ought to be in the Guard instead of the title 10 force.’’ 

It’s really more of a force-structure thing, not a roles and mission 

change. 

155

I know you’ve been very tolerant, but this is so important, and, 

as you said, it’s created somewhat of a firestorm by misunderstanding. 

General Stump, did you want to add anything on that? 

General STUMP. I can understand your confusion, I feel the same 

when I read it and I look at it, but I know what our deliberations 

were and if you go through the reports, you will find—nowhere in 

the report do we identify any force structure which should be 

moved from the Guard to the Active Duty, because it’s only required for the overseas mission. 

My personal experience, in the State of Michigan I had 10,000 

Army National Guard people. I can tell you that I had every one 

of them on an assignment for a State mission. 

It was probably a poor choice of words, and I know it has caused 

some confusion, and we have had a lot of questions about that, because, immediately, they assume that, ‘‘Okay, because you don’t 

need tanks in your homeland security mission, therefore let’s get 

rid of Brigade Combat Teams.’’ Wrong, kimosabe. You need the Brigade Combat Teams for the State mission, because if you have a 

natural disaster and a catastrophe, you need the people, you need 

the Humvees, you need the communication equipment. 

Also, you can’t back down from where we are now on the Operational Reserve for those forces that are in the National Guard. If 

you take those out now, the Active Duty which are under a lot of 

stress now, would be even in more stress if we took those things 

out. 

Unfortunately, I think it was a poor choice of words. That’s not 

what we mean, and that’s not what we recommend. I would defy 

somebody to define what those requirements are in the National 

Guard that you cannot use for the homeland mission. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

I think it was important to clarify that issue. I was confident 

that was not what you meant. But, when my staff was confident 

that was what you meant, I realized that there was considerable 

confusion over that. I think this hearing has clarified that. 

As I recall, at one point one-third of the soldiers in Iraq, at the 

high point, were National Guard or Reserves, so there’s no way 

that you could take away that capability, dedicate it solely to 

homeland defense and domestic preparedness issues. You just 

couldn’t do it, for the reasons that Chairman Punaro has said. But, 

I did want to clarify that for the record. 

I do think that our reliance—and, I would argue, over-reliance—

on the Guard and Reserves in Iraq and Afghanistan does require 

us to rethink the issues that your commission has spent 21⁄2 years 

looking at. The benefit recommendations, the recruitment and retention issues, the competency versus time and service issues, are 

all extremely valuable to our deliberations. 

Finally, as Senator Levin has mentioned, Senator Lieberman and 

I will be following up on this in our committee, which Senator 

Levin is the senior member of, as well—in fact, he could be chairman if he wanted to, I believe—and we are going to continue to 

pursue this. I think the work we did, in looking at Hurricane 

Katrina, was very helpful in giving us a base understanding, and 

you’ve certainly built on it. Thank you for your work. 

156

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for an excellent hearing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

I think we have clarified a number of issues here this morning. 

There has to be a greater focus inside the Guard on the new 

threats. They have to be given the capability, the equipment, the 

training to address these new threats. They’re of a higher level 

than they’ve ever been, domestically. We need to have this coordination in place between our Reserve Forces and our Active-Duty 

Forces. There’s no reason why that coordination should not be 

there now. I’m sure NORTHCOM feels that it is there now; they’ve 

made statements to that effect. But, we will be able to press them 

when they come here in March. 

What we’ll do is this, we will ask all of the various entities that 

have a interest in this matter to give us their comments on your 

Commission’s report. We’ll ask them for that by the middle of 

March. You go out of existence, April—what day? 

General PUNARO. End of April, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. End of April. If we got comments in by, let’s 

say, March 15, would that give you enough time to respond with 

any comments? 

General PUNARO. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think that was Senator Warner’s 

suggestion, that you have that opportunity. 

We will send out the report to the entities that would have an 

interest in it—surely, the agencies that have that kind of an interest, and a number of other entities and organizations—and provided these responses to the committee—and then give you the opportunity, for 30 days or so, to comment on their comments. 

Again, our thanks to all of you for a very stimulating report. It’s 

important that these issues be raised. You’ve raised them with intelligence and experience. They’ve stirred up a lot of reaction, 

which is your intent. We look forward to the reaction, because 

you’ve raised some important issues that need to be addressed. 

With that, we will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

1. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, your report suggests that requirements for military equipment needed for emergency situations should be set by the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), rather than by the Guard itself. DHS’s response to the 

Hurricane Katrina disaster did little to instill confidence in its operational capabilities. Furthermore, DHS, as your report points out, has little in-house military expertise. It seems to me that our military experts would be better positioned to know 

their own equipment requirements. Why should DHS be entrusted with this responsibility? 

General PUNARO. By statute and executive order, DHS is the lead Federal agency 

for homeland security, including the planning for most forms of consequence management. While the Department of Defense (DOD) and its component elements, 

such as the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), play important roles in homeland security, it is the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, acting through the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), who is tasked with the responsibility of coordinating national preparedness 

efforts. A significant portion of this task lies in assessing preparedness for emergencies, identifying the gaps between Federal and State capabilities, and recommending programs and activities that could address such gaps. He or she must also 

determine which of several supporting Federal agencies, including DOD, should provide the capabilities required in emergency response plans. This responsibility is asVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00160 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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signed to the Secretary of DHS in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 and 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Legislation in 2006 transferred the Secretary’s 

responsibility to the newly reconfigured FEMA, an agency placed under DHS in 

2002. 

As a result of its centrality in national preparedness efforts, DHS is the Federal 

agency assigned the responsibility to assess from a national perspective the response capabilities present in Federal, State, and local government. Therefore, it is 

the agency with the expertise and the responsibility to inform DOD of which capabilities DOD will be expected to provide in response to a catastrophe. DHS is in the 

best position to generate civil support requirements, which DOD would then validate as appropriate. 

For these reasons, in our March 1, 2007, report to Congress, the Commission recommended (Recommendation #1) that ‘‘The Secretary of Homeland Security, with 

the assistance of the Secretary of Defense, should generate civil support requirements, which DOD will be responsible for validating as appropriate.’’ 

As you suggest, a key factor in DHS’s ability to generate civil support requirements is its familiarity with DOD and its capabilities. For this reason, the Commission also recommended in our March 1 report (Recommendation #2) that ‘‘The DOD 

(including combatant commands and the NGB) and DHS Headquarters should exchange representatives to improve the knowledge, training, and exercising; and to 

assist the Secretary of Homeland Security with generating requirements for military 

civil support missions.’’ The Commission recommended that the plan to exchange 

personnel be implemented ‘‘within 180 days.’’ In our final report (Appendix 8), the 

Commission concluded there had been ‘‘insufficient progress to date’’ on implementing this recommendation.

LINE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

2. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, currently, when responding to a domestic emergency, the National Guard reports directly to the State Governor through its State 

adjutant general. If interoperability is achieved, do you envision a situation where 

the DOD assets report to the State adjutant general to maintain a clear line of command to the Governor? 

General PUNARO. In our March 1 report and our final report, the Commission recommended that as part of their planning efforts, DOD and the States develop protocols to allow Governors to exercise operational control over Federal military forces 

under certain limited circumstances. They could do so by using a dual-hatted National Guard commander. The Commission believes that if enacted, this proposal 

would clarify chains of command during crises. Depending on the particular scenario, and the capabilities required to respond, the Commission does envision that 

Federal (title 10) assets could, via these protocols, report to the State adjutant general in a line of control to the Governor without compromising the President’s authorities as Commander in Chief.

3. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, do you envision that DOD, when called upon, 

will report to a State Governor independently or do you envision that DOD assets 

will report to the Commander in Chief? 

General PUNARO. The Commission’s proposal envisions Governors exercising operational control over Federal forces under certain, limited circumstances pursuant to 

agreements entered into ahead of time between particular States and DOD. The 

President would retain formal command of title 10 forces, with operational control 

being ‘‘chopped’’ to Governors for a crisis by agreement of the President. The Commission analogizes this relationship to foreign commanders exercising operational 

control over United States forces (discussed on page 111 of the final report). In that 

situation, the President retains formal command over United States forces, even 

though they may be subject to the operational control of a foreign commander under 

defined circumstances.

4. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, in order to prepare for a situation where a 

State Governor might need to take control of DOD assets, a legal framework needs 

to be addressed by Congress. How would you recommend Congress proceed in establishing this framework? 

General PUNARO. In the Joint Explanatory Statement to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181), the Conferees 

tasked:

‘‘the Secretary of Defense, as part of the response planning required by 

this provision, to address the nature of command relationships under which 

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1 Joint Explanatory Statement to Conference Report 110–477, on H.R. 1585, NDAA for Fiscal 

Year 2008, December 6, 2007, p. 326.

troops will operate during particular contingencies and ensure, as recommended by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, that 

necessary agreements are entered into as soon as practicable.’’ 1

While the Commission would encourage Congress to further support this recommendation, it believes that this recommendation can be implemented consistent 

with current law.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE SUPPORT

5. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, many of the family and medical support services necessary during periods of sustained and repeated operational deployments are 

available at the home bases of military personnel, but not available in the dispersed 

areas from which the National Guard and Reserve are drawn. Base realignment and 

closure exacerbates this problem since the numbers of active bases are decreasing 

and the locations of the remaining bases are more widely dispersed. Further, repeated sustained deployments result in greater strains on the ability of Guard and 

Reserve service men and women to keep their jobs and retain their homes—something that is not an issue for the Active Forces. What specific actions do you recommend Congress take in order to make sure that the National Guard and Reserve 

members, who are bearing a great deal of the burden of defending this country, are 

able to return to their civilian lives without suffering considerable economic injury? 

General PUNARO. The Commission has made several recommendations to address 

these concerns in our final report. The Commission was particularly attuned to the 

unique problems that face Reserve component members and their families who live 

at a considerable distance from military installations and their on-base facilities, 

such as family service center and military treatment facilities. Our final report addresses problems that Reserve component families can encounter in obtaining upto-date, user-friendly information about TRICARE and in finding a provider willing 

to take TRICARE. Our health care recommendations (#61–63) focus on enhancing 

continuity of care for families. We propose a major new initiative—a stipend for the 

employer to continue covering the reservist’s family in the employer’s health insurance plan during the period of activation—in Recommendation #63. 

Similarly, the Commission through hearings, roundtable discussions, and focus 

groups delved into the unique challenges facing ‘‘suddenly military’’ Reserve component families who often live at a considerable distance from military facilities, and 

Recommendations #64–67 seek to improve the level of resourcing and services available to family members. 

Employers are an extremely important part of the equation, and in Recommendations #68–72, the Commission made a number of proposals to enhance DOD’s compact with employers. These include creating a more visible, higher-level role for the 

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, establishing 

an employer advisory council to provide direct input to the Secretary of Defense, and 

improving the Small Business Administration’s Military Reservist Economic Injury 

Disaster Loan program. 

In Recommendations #55–59, the Commission endorsed changes to the Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 and the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, which are designed to protect the employment and 

legal rights of Reserve component members both while they are activated and upon 

their return to civil society. 

In the area of military compensation and benefits, Recommendations #52–54 propose further legislative action in the areas of housing allowances, travel reimbursement, and educational benefits. The Commission urges that Congress take up and 

implement these recommendations as soon as practicable.

6. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, many of the recommendations in the report affect Active-Duty Forces as well as the Reserve and National Guard components, 

such as increasing the number of joint duty billets, consolidating the Active and Reserve pay and personnel systems, simplifying the number and pay of various duty 

statuses, and consolidating Active and Reserve component retirement systems. 

Overall, many of the recommendations seem designed to make National Guard and 

Reserve Forces more like part-time Active Duty personnel than separate forces with 

their own missions and organizations. Do you have any concerns that these proposed reforms turn the ‘‘Operational Reserve’’ into operational forces, making it too 

easy to call them into full-time status? 

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General PUNARO. As discussed in our report, the National Guard and Reserves 

are already used in an operational manner. Because of a number of factors, current 

and long-term operational requirements necessitate heavy reliance on the Guard 

and Reserves for missions both at home and overseas. In 2006, for example, the 

service provided by reservists was the equivalent of maintaining almost 168,000 additional full-time troops. The Commission found that the National Guard and Reserves provide such capabilities while maintaining strategic depth in an extremely 

cost-effective manner. As discussed in Chapter I of the final report, we are very concerned that the current use of the Reserves is not sustainable unless significant 

changes are made to the underlying laws, rules, regulations, pay, personnel, and 

other systems related to the Reserve components. The recommendations of our report are intended to ensure that continued operational usage of the Reserve components is supported by a framework of laws, policies, and structures that will make 

such use sustainable for the long-term.

7. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, during both the brief 1991 Persian Gulf War 

and the current sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has been unable to carry out combat deployments without significant reliance on National 

Guard and Reserve components—despite the fact that our Active military force exceeds 1.3 million personnel and many traditionally military support roles are now 

being performed by civilian contractors. Your report notes that ‘‘there is no reasonable alternative to the Nation’s continuing increased reliance on its Reserve components for missions at home and abroad, as part of an operational force.’’ While I realize that the focus of the Commission was to assess the role of the National Guard 

and Reserve, should we also revisit the issue of the capacity of the Active Forces 

as currently structured to perform their combat mission? 

General PUNARO. Chapter I of our report notes the inevitability of continued reliance on our Reserve Forces. Increasing the capacity or restructuring the Active components to avoid such dependence on the Reserve components is unaffordable and 

likely not even feasible because of the demographics and recruiting challenges. The 

Commission believes that strong, ready, Operational Reserve components, fully integrated within their Services, are good for the national security and beneficial to our 

Nation for many reasons. Evaluating the structure and capabilities of the Armed 

Forces, both Active and Reserve, is a continuous process in the changing security 

environment our Nation faces. Our report recommends some rebalancing between 

components, mainly to align homeland capabilities with the units best situated to 

respond to domestic emergencies. We do not recommend rebalancing to reduce reliance on the Reserve Forces for overseas warfighting, which, as we have pointed out, 

would not be beneficial even if it were feasible.

RANKING OF RECOMMENDATIONS

8. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, the final report is an extremely complex offering of problems in search of creative solutions that the Commission suggests may 

take a multi-year effort. Did the Commission consider assigning some rank ordering 

of its recommendations to assist Congress in addressing the most critical issues 

first? 

General PUNARO. The recommendations in our report are designed to create the 

structures of law and policy that will support the Operational Reserve use that by 

necessity has evolved and is in place today. Some of our recommendations may be 

implemented quite rapidly via policy changes at DOD or within the Services. The 

Commission would welcome the opportunity to provide the committee with our 

breakdown of those recommendations that can be implemented via the NDAA for 

Fiscal Year 2009, and our view of how best to create a legislative framework to address those that are more complex and would require years of study and thorough 

vetting before the statutory changes necessary to implement them can be made.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

9. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, recommendation #26 states that ‘‘Congress 

should cease to manage DOD manpower levels by using authorized end strengths. 

DOD should budget for—and Congress should fund—personnel, Active and Reserve, 

based on requirements and needed capabilities.’’ I would remind you that Article I, 

Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to ‘‘provide for organizing, 

arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may 

be employed in the service of the United States. . .’’ Why, if you have specific sugVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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gestions or recommendations for determining required end strengths, would the law 

not require you to make them to Congress? 

General PUNARO. The Commission’s Recommendation #26 is fully consistent with 

the Constitution. Recommendation #26 proposes that Congress no longer manage 

military manpower levels by end strength. DOD prepares the annual budget request 

for military personnel using average, rather than end, strength levels for each Service and component. Congress appropriates on the basis of average strength levels, 

making whatever adjustments to the budget request that it deems appropriate. Average strength reflects DOD’s projected utilization of military manpower across the 

entire fiscal year. End strength, by contrast, captures a single, one-day point in 

time—September 30—which may or may not accurately reflect projected force levels 

and funding required across the entire fiscal year. In recommending the elimination 

of a constraint that can result in management inefficiencies, the Commission was 

in no way suggesting that Congress should reduce its role in overseeing force size 

and funding. In formulating this recommendation, the Commission kept in mind 

Congress’s earlier action to prohibit DOD from using end strength as a basis for 

managing DOD civilian employees (10 U.S.C. § 129); DOD civilians are to be managed instead by required workload and available funding. The Commission is simply 

recommending that Congress adopt a similar framework for military personnel, with 

levels determined by requirements and needed capabilities. Within this framework, 

Congress would continue to exercise full oversight over the military manpower 

budget and could require DOD to submit whatever additional budget justification 

materials that Congress deemed appropriate.

PAY CHANGE RECOMMENDATION

10. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, in the early responses to the release of the 

report, there seems to be significant misunderstanding of the Commission’s intent 

regarding changes to the pay of members of the Guard and Reserve resulting from 

reorganization of status. Could you clarify in simple terms exactly what impact your 

recommendation #22 would have on a drilling Guard or Reserve member in terms 

of number of days worked and pay received? 

General PUNARO. Please see the answer to question 11, below.

11. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, can you contrast the two elements of your recommendation #22, specifically the number of days worked and pay received with the 

current pay system? 

General PUNARO. For inactive duty training, Reserve component members perform 

two 4-hour drills per inactive duty training day. For each drill period, they receive 

1 day’s basic pay, which is the same as 1 day’s basic pay for an Active Duty 

servicemember of equal rank and years of service. For a drill weekend, a Reserve 

component member completes four drill periods over the 2-day period and therefore 

receives 4 days of basic pay for his or her grade and years of service. This drill pay 

structure dates back to 1920. 

Active Duty servicemembers, by contrast, receive 1 day’s basic pay for each day 

worked, but they also receive a basic allowance for housing and basic allowance for 

subsistence, neither of which is available to Reserve component members for inactive duty training. 

As a part of duty status simplification, the Commission recommends reducing the 

number of duty status categories from 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) duty. 

The current plethora of duty statuses is confusing and frustrating to both Reserve 

component members and their operational commanders. Under the simplified duty 

status structure put forth in Recommendation #22, inactive duty training would now 

be Active Duty and Reserve component members would receive a day’s pay (i.e., 

basic pay, basic allowance for housing, and basic allowance for subsistence) just as 

do their Active Duty counterparts, rather than pay for two drills. 

The key to accomplishing this change is to ensure that individual servicemembers 

do not lose money in the changeover, since the amount currently paid for two drills 

per duty day is greater than a day’s pay for an Active Duty member, even after the 

subsistence and housing allowances are added to the latter. The amount of the difference varies by rank, marital status, and years of service. This pay difference is 

one reason that previous attempts to simplify duty statuses have not succeeded. In 

a congressionally mandated 2004 report on Reserve compensation, DOD provided its 

analysis of a variable ‘‘participation pay’’ as a mechanism to prevent a Reserve component member from losing out-of-pocket income as a result of such a duty status 

simplification. The DOD report emphasized that changing to a new Active Duty status system should not cause the individual reservist to suffer a reduction in either 

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the level of compensation received or retirement credit earned. The Commission 

shares the Department’s concern, and Recommendation #22 states clearly that the 

change from drill pay to an Active Duty pay system should not reduce compensation 

for current servicemembers. After some period of ‘‘save pay’’ for the current force, 

Congress then may wish to replace an incentive or participation pay with other 

changes to the compensation system. 

Nothing in the Commission’s final report can or should be read as suggesting that 

reservist drill pay should be cut. Rather, as the report makes clear, the Commission 

suggested alternative methods to simplify duty statuses while preserving reservists’ 

compensation in this area. In addition, the Commission recommended a number of 

benefit enhancements, including to medical and family benefits, and increased reimbursement for travel and other expenses.

EFFICIENCY REPORTS

12. Senator BYRD. General Punaro, based on your report, Recommendation #2, 

embracing significant actions to ‘‘empower’’ the NGB and its Chief, do you believe 

your Recommendation #94 is consistent with your earlier efforts? Put more simply, 

who would write the efficiency reports of the directors of the Army and Air National 

Guard? 

General PUNARO. The Commission believes that Recommendation #94 is fully consistent with our other recommendations, including those made in our March 1, 

2007, report. In the 2008 NDAA, Congress increased to four stars the rank of the 

Chief of the NGB and increased the responsibilities of that position, making its 

holder an advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters related to the National 

Guard forces in non-Federal status. Congress thus made certain that the CNGB 

would retain the ability to influence decisions regarding such matters and to ensure 

that the needs of States and their Governors are addressed in policies formulated 

by the Secretary of Defense. The CNGB also retains direct lines of communication 

to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and their Chiefs of Staff. At the same 

time, placing National Guard leaders on the staffs of the Service Chiefs of Staff 

would ensure that those same policies are carried out at a lower level in the Department and that the National Guard components are provided the resources they require to perform effectively in both their State and Federal roles. We believe this 

to be the best approach to solving the problems we identify; we emphasize, however, 

that what is most important is not how the problems are solved but that they are 

solved as soon as possible. 

Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendation that the CNGB’s position be elevated to a four-star rank was based not on the Chief’s role as a supervisor of general 

officers but rather on careful analysis of the magnitude and complexity of the combined duties and responsibilities required to be performed, and the significance of 

the decisions made, by the Chief of the NGB. The proposal contained in Recommendation #94 does not relieve the Chief of his or her varied and significant duties; rather, it provides the Chief with two advisors who are embedded in the Active 

Army and Air Force organizations. 

If the Directors of the Army and Air National Guard were assigned to their Service Chiefs of Staff, they would continue to advise the Chief of the NGB as well. At 

the same time, the NGB would remain the liaison for non-Federal missions, particularly the homeland-related missions executed by the National Guard. By law, the 

director of the joint staff of the NGB is selected by the Secretary of Defense to perform ‘‘such duties as may be prescribed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.’’ 

Through this continued statutory relationship, the NGB joint staff director—and 

joint staff—would continue to assist the Chief of the Bureau in his or her role as 

an advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces. Thus, the 

Chief’s ability to execute the duties of the office would not be impeded. 

Neither Army (Army Regulation 623–3, ‘‘Evaluation Reporting System,’’ August 

10, 2007) nor Air Force (Air Force Instruction 36–2406, ‘‘Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems,’’ April 15, 2005) regulations require performance reports for officers 

above the grade of major general. The directors hold the rank of lieutenant general, 

and it is the Commission’s understanding that they are not given performance evaluations. 

Of the 95 recommendations included in the Commission’s final report, this was 

the only one not adopted unanimously. Commissioner Gordon Stump addressed the 

exact question posed above in ‘‘Additional View,’’ included as Appendix 1 in the report. He sees this recommendation as:

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‘‘inconsistent with the Commission’s March recommendation that the position of the Chief of the NGB be elevated from lieutenant general to general. Such elevation to a higher grade makes complete sense for a position 

whose holder has responsibility for the integration of two service Reserve 

components as well as a host of emerging joint functions pertaining to 

homeland defense and support to civil authorities in a new era of military 

conflict. It makes no sense, however, for an officer who no longer supervises 

the directors for title 10 functions and has no budget authority or say on 

force structure allocation for the Army or Air National Guard.’’ 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

POST-DEPLOYMENT HEALTH REASSESSMENTS

13. Senator AKAKA. General Punaro, one of the recommendations of the Commission is for DOD to be more proactive and accurate in tracking the status of postdeployment health reassessments of returning Guard and Reserve personnel. This 

includes ensuring every member has completed the assessment within the statutory 

90–180 days, and effective follow up by the Services especially with regard to mental health issues. Given the findings of the Commission that there were disparities 

among the Services as to the effectiveness of tracking and follow-up, and that the 

Office of Secretary of Defense has not provided guidance on this issue, what specific 

suggestions would you have for improvement in DOD oversight of this problem so 

that our returning military members are properly cared for? 

General PUNARO. The Commission makes several recommendations in this regard. 

Congress may wish to (1) enact freestanding statutory language or amend 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1074f (medical tracking system for members deployed overseas) to require the Secretary of Defense to: (a) conduct a post-deployment medical reassessment within no 

more than 90–180 days of deactivation; and (b) include a requirement to track this 

reassessment as part of the recordkeeping required by subsection 1074f(c); (2) enact 

statutory language directing the Comptroller to report on the extent to which the 

Services have met the 90- to 180-day requirement and include any recommendations 

for ways to improve the process; and (3) enact statutory language requiring the Secretary of Defense to prescribe uniform guidance to the Services in determining required follow-up by providers on responses to mental health questions on the PostDeployment Health Assessment and directing the Comptroller General to evaluate 

whether the Services are following the Secretary’s guidance and to identify any 

areas that require further attention. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

GOVERNOR CONTROL OF FEDERAL FORCES

14. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, could you outline your rationale for Recommendation #7, which suggests giving Governors operational control of Federal forces in their State when responding 

to a disaster or incident within that State? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. There is no established process whereby Governors can gain operational control over Federal military 

assets within a State to respond to emergencies. Under existing procedures, if a 

major crisis occurs in a State where both Federal and non-Federal (National Guard 

under State control) forces provide civil support, military assistance is coordinated 

in two ways. NORTHCOM controls the movement of title 10 Active and Reserve 

Forces into the State and maintains command and control over them through a joint 

task force. Simultaneously, States, often with the assistance of the NGB, coordinate 

the movement of National Guard Forces in title 32 status; once they are in a State, 

on the basis of agreements between the States, they are commanded by the Governor as if they were National Guard Forces of that State. This dual coordination 

leads to two separate chains of command for military forces in the State. One chain 

of command leads from title 10 forces through NORTHCOM to the President, while 

another leads to the Governor. Although the Governor may request assistance from 

title 10 military forces within the State, he or she does not have the authority to 

direct them. The Commission believes that these two separate chains of command 

can cause confusion and undercut unity of effort. 

The guiding principle of emergency management doctrine in the United States is 

that problems should be solved at the lowest level possible. Therefore, unless their 

use would compromise national security, all military resources that may be needed 

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to respond to a contingency—whether National Guard (in-State Active Duty of title 

32) or Active Duty or Reserve (in title 10), and whether within the affected State 

or in another State—should be included in the State’s emergency response planning. 

As part of that planning, Federal and State authorities should develop policies and 

procedures regarding the nature of the command relationship under which the 

troops will operate during particular contingencies. These agreements should be entered into before the crisis, rather than in an ad hoc manner while lives and property are at stake—as happened after Hurricane Katrina. 

This recommendation requires no changes to existing statutes. Current military 

doctrine explicitly allows members of the United States Armed Forces to serve 

under the operational control of foreign commanders, with the President retaining 

ultimate command over U.S. forces. If the command relationship with the President 

can be maintained while American troops are operating under the control of foreign 

commanders, we see no convincing reason why it cannot be maintained while troops 

are under the control of a State Governor acting through the adjutant general. Governors routinely command National Guard troops from another State in a disaster 

response. Again, if Governors can be trusted to command National Guard soldiers 

from their own State or from other States, as customarily occurs in disaster response, then they can be trusted to command Federal Active and Reserve component forces as well. 

The assignment of Active Duty personnel to title 32 National Guard commands 

is not novel. Federal law specifically authorizes that both enlisted members and 

commissioned officers may be detailed for duty with a State National Guard. In fact, 

title 10 officers detailed in this fashion may accept a commission in the National 

Guard. Federal forces under the control of a Governor would still be subject to the 

same restrictions placed on the title 10 military, such as Posse Comitatus law enforcement restrictions. 

We are not suggesting that it is necessary for Federal military forces to be involved in a response under all circumstances or for all disasters. However, when 

Federal military capabilities are needed to respond to an emergency, their involvement should not alter the fundamental approach that guides emergency management. The fact that a particular capability needed for the response resides in a Federal Active Duty or Reserve unit should not be an impediment to its use to preserve 

life or property. In most instances, such Federal military forces should operate 

under the direction of State officials. 

One way to effect such an operation is through the use of dual-hatted commanders, who simultaneously hold ranks in the State National Guard and the Federal, title 10 military. They are therefore able to command both Federal and State 

forces simultaneously. The Commission finds that dual-hatting has been a useful 

tool in coordinating Federal and State civil support missions and, as discussed 

above, suggests that it be expanded for use in appropriate circumstances. 

However, dual-hatted command is not a panacea for coordinating Federal and 

State military capabilities in civil support activities. As long as there are two chains 

of command passing through that one commander—one from the President and one 

from the Governor—the potential for confusion and conflict exists. This reality 

makes it imperative that State and Federal authorities agree in advance about the 

full range of circumstances under which Federal forces would be subject to State 

command. 

Therefore, State and Federal officials should plan cooperatively for those situations in which Federal forces could be under the direction of a Governor. This planning requires resolving a number of issues, such as who pays for the use of Federal 

assets in a response and what the precise nature of the command relationship will 

be. 

Since the President exercises ultimate Federal command authority over Federal 

troops, title 10 forces cannot be formally turned over to a Governor in all respects. 

However, there are established command relationships that would allow the National Guard officer to ‘‘command’’ title 10 troops with the consent of both the President and the Governor. If the President, or the President’s designee, agrees to do 

this, an order would be issued placing the title 10 forces under the operational or 

tactical control of the Governor. 

In a temporary situation such as a disaster response, a military organization 

could be ‘‘attached’’ to another organization for ‘‘operational’’ or ‘‘tactical’’ purposes, 

with ‘‘administrative control,’’ including disciplinary authority, being retained by the 

parent organization. Such divisions between operational, tactical, and administrative control are commonplace in the military operating environment. If a title 32 

commander were exercising control over title 10 forces, this division of authority 

would avoid having the title 32 commander exercise disciplinary (Uniform Code of 

Military Justice) authority over his or her title 10 subordinates.

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15. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, you note in your report that DOD opposes the recommendation on giving 

Governors operational control of Federal forces in their State when responding to 

a disaster or incident within the State. Why does DOD oppose this recommendation? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. This is a question 

better addressed to the Department. We refer you to the news briefing given by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Tom Hall, on May 16, 2007 (a transcript is available at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3962) for an explanation of DOD’s opposition to the Commission’s proposal. The Commission does not believe that the Department’s position 

has merit. 


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HOMELAND MISSIONS VERSUS COMBAT MISSIONS

16. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, in reviewing your recommendations, there is heavy emphasis on the homeland security mission. Accordingly, in your recommendations you suggest that the 

DOD should be directed by Congress through law to take homeland defense as their 

mission. In addition, your recommendations designate the National Guard as the 

primary homeland security force. Are you saying that the Guard’s primary mission 

should be homeland security? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. No. The Commission 

believes that homeland defense and civil support should be a core competency of the 

National Guard and Reserves consistent with their required warfighting taskings 

and capabilities. However, the Commission also believes that unless and until Congress formally assigns to DOD responsibility for conducting civil support missions, 

DOD will not adequately plan, program, and budget for that responsibility. Similarly, unless and until Congress defines the role that the National Guard and Reserves should play in providing support to civil authorities responding to domestic 

crises, the Commission believes that DOD will not adequately plan, program, and 

budget for that role.


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17. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, how should DOD balance requirements for homeland operations and overseas deployments? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission believes that homeland operations and overseas combat are responsibilities that are 

equal in priority. DOD must be fully prepared to protect American lives and property in the Homeland and must (and can) do so without compromising its overseas 

missions. The Commission believes that DOD should balance these requirements 

through the programming and budgeting process called for in § 1815 of the NDAA 

for Fiscal Year 2008, Chapter III.A (pp. 39–54) of the Commission’s March 1 report, 

and Chapter II (pp. 89–112) of the final report.

18. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, is it realistic for Guard units to train for both homeland and overseas missions? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. Yes. The United 

States military must be prepared to respond to threats and crises in the Homeland. 

As the National Guard and Reserves already have a tremendous amount of homeland-related capability residing in them and are located throughout the country, 

they are the best-positioned to lead this mission within DOD. They will be heavily 

relied on for use in homeland operations. This makes it essential that they are prepared to respond to domestic crises.

19. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, do units need to focus exclusively on either homeland operations or overseas 

missions? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission anticipates that most units will remain deployable for either overseas or homeland 

missions, but anticipates that some specialized capabilities will be developed to 

focus exclusively on homeland-related missions. The Commission notes that there is 

precedent for such specialization in the Armed Forces. For example, the National 

Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) are specialized units geared toward operations in the Homeland.

20. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, if units should not be trained for both homeland and overseas missions, how 

should DOD determine how many Guard and Reserve Forces are needed for homeland defense verses civil support missions exclusively? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission believes that while some units probably will be focused exclusively on the Homeland, 

most DOD capabilities will be available for both homeland and overseas operations. 

The Commission believes that the homeland and overseas missions are of equal priority and they should compete for resources through the DOD programming and 

budgeting process, consistent with § 1815 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, Chapter III.A (pp. 39–54) of the Commission’s March 1 report, and Chapter II (pp. 89–

112) of the final report.

NORTHERN COMMAND STAFFING

21. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, in recommendation #4, which outlines your thoughts on Guard and Reserve 

staffing at NORTHCOM, you argue that there is a need for senior leadership at 

NORTHCOM to have Guard and Reserve experience. What do you consider a ‘‘significant percentage’’ of NORTHCOM’s billets that should be Guard and Reserve? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission believes that a majority of NORTHCOM’s billets, including those of its Service components, should be filled by leaders and staff with Reserve qualifications and credentials. This was the Commission’s recommendation in our March 1, 2007, report to 

Congress, and it continues to be the Commission’s recommendation. Servicemembers serving in these billets do not necessarily have to be Reserve component 

members, but they must have Reserve qualifications and credentials.

22. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, why do you consider it necessary to have Guard and Reserve leadership at 

NORTHCOM? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission believes that NORTHCOM does not adequately consider and utilize all military comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00175 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ponents—Active and Reserve, including the National Guard—in planning, training, 

and exercising and in the conduct of military operations while in support of a Governor, in support of another lead Federal agency, or in the defense of America. The 

Commission believes that more must be done to integrate the Reserve components 

into NORTHCOM. Having more national guardsmen and reservists fill key leadership positions at NORTHCOM is an essential first step. NORTHCOM must incorporate personnel who have greater knowledge of National Guard and Reserve capabilities, strengths, and constraints and must assemble a cadre of experts on the intricacies of State and local government, law enforcement, and emergency response. 

Such knowledge currently resides in the National Guard and Reserves yet remains 

untapped and unintegrated, in disparate commands. A larger percentage of reservists on the staff and in key leadership positions would provide NORTHCOM with 

greater insight into the unique skills and strengths available in the Reserve Forces. 

Increasing the numbers of members of the National Guard and Reserves within the 

Service components of NORTHCOM would ensure that those preparing and coordinating homeland missions will consider the unique contributions of the Reserve 

component. In most disaster responses, NORTHCOM will be providing assistance to 

States and augmenting State resources, including National Guard Forces operating 

under the command of a State Governor. Therefore, it is critical that NORTHCOM 

personnel understand how they can add value to those efforts to save lives and 

property. In a minority of instances, in the most grave circumstances, NORTHCOM 

will be the combatant command for all forces, including regular military forces, title 

10 Reserve Forces, and Federalized National Guard Forces, all operating under the 

command and control of the President. The Commission believes that the leadership 

of NORTHCOM must have Reserve qualifications and credentials in order to plan 

for these scenarios as well.

TRAINING

23. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, one of your recommendations states that the Secretary of Defense should 

ensure that forces identified as rapid responders to domestic catastrophes are 

manned, trained, and equipped to the highest levels of readiness. Since all the mission operational requirements have not been defined, how do we determine how to 

properly train these critical forces? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. This recommendation applies both to present forces and those forces yet to be developed. DOD has 

several forces and force packages that have currently been tasked with being rapid 

responders to domestic crises, such as the WMD–CSTs, Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFPs), and CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces. In addition, the 

Commission anticipates the development of future units focused on domestic crisis 

response. The Commission believes both categories of forces should be manned, 

trained, and equipped to the highest levels of readiness.

INTERAGENCY AND INTERFORCES COOPERATION

24. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, what are your thoughts about the Air Force Reserve and National Guard 

performing ‘‘in lieu of taskings’’ for the Army, in order to meet mission requirements 

for the global war on terrorism, which falls outside the purview of both of their required missions? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. Our Commission did 

not specifically study these ‘‘in lieu of taskings,’’ but they are further evidence of 

the growing need to support National Guard and Reserve Forces for their employment in operational roles that were never envisioned when the current laws and 

policies that regulate the Reserves were established during the Cold War. They also 

spotlight the utility of maintaining structure in the Reserves that, in a cost-effective 

manner, provides the depth and flexibility required to respond to unplanned requirements.

FUNDING

25. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st century operational force as you outline in the report will be very expensive. At a time when 

DOD is facing huge bills for the cost of resetting the force after Iraq and AfghaniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:30 Oct 14, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\44856.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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stan, and to recapitalize generally, how should DOD determine what priority to put 

on funding for the Reserve component in the face of so many other competing priorities? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission believes the Nation should avoid the kind of shortsighted policy decisions made after 

past conflicts that left the military ill-prepared for the next conflict, and should instead focus on where the best value for the taxpayer can be achieved in an evertightening fiscal environment. Properly resourced, National Guard and Reserve personnel can, and should, constitute a larger percentage of the Nation’s operational 

military manpower, and they can do so at a lower overall cost. 

As the Commission’s analysis makes clear, no feasible alternative to a continued 

reliance on the Reserves exists. Indeed, the increasing cost of personnel, and the 

challenges of recruiting and retaining qualified individuals, will, we believe, inevitably lead to reductions in the size of the Active Force. This shrinking of the Active 

Force will necessarily be accompanied by increased reliance on Reserve Forces for 

operations, particularly for homeland missions, and by greater integration of the Reserves with the Active component. 

As is pointed out in the Commission’s final report, there are significant cost advantages for the Reserves that should drive policymaking in coming years, when 

pressure on the forces from current conflicts will have abated. Even taking into account the additional funding required to implement the recommendations in our 

final report and transform the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st century 

operational force, the Commission believes that the National Guard and Reserves 

will remain a significant value for the Nation.

TASKING

26. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, what are your thoughts on the recommendation that places nearly all civil 

support capabilities within the National Guard, while moving wartime missions to 

the Federal military? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. Please see the response below to question #27.

27. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, if enacted, how would the volunteer force address the recommendation that 

places nearly all civil support capabilities within the National Guard and wartime 

missions with the Federal military in order to remain sustainable and combat 

ready? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. The Commission 

does not recommend making the National Guard exclusively a civil support force, 

and would urge Congress to oppose such a proposal if it were offered. Instead, the 

Commission recommends that as part of the requirements generation process, DOD 

assess the capabilities present in the various components of the armed services, determine which best could be used to fulfill civil support requirements, and rebalance, as appropriate, among the components to meet those requirements. On the 

basis of the requirements generated, DOD should determine what, if any, capabilities should be shifted to the National Guard, to the Federal Reserve components, 

or to the Active component. The Commission did not offer an opinion on specific capabilities that should be shifted, because the requirements have not yet been determined. But the Commission did state clearly that any such rebalancing should not 

compromise the Reserve components’ warfighting missions. The Commission wishes 

to reemphasize that we are not proposing what specific rebalancing should actually 

take place. Rather, we are recommending that once the civil support requirements 

are generated and validated, DOD should determine whether it would be beneficial 

to rebalance military capabilities among the components to make best use of scarce 

military resources in performing their overseas and domestic missions.

28. Senator BEN NELSON. General Punaro, Mr. Ball, Ms. Lewis, and General 

Stump, how would the recommendation that places nearly all civil support capabilities within the National Guard and wartime missions with the Active military affect 

the operational tempo for the global war on terrorism and future conflicts? 

General PUNARO, Mr. BALL, Ms. LEWIS, and General STUMP. Again, as discussed 

above, the Commission recommends only that the allocation of civil support capabilities among the various components be examined to determine whether they are organized in the most efficient manner. The recommendations in our March 1, 2007, 

report and those of our final report call for collaborative planning between DHS, 

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DOD, and other Federal agencies and coordination with State emergency planners. 

Such plans would have to ensure that operational employment of Reserve Forces 

overseas and domestic plans for their use during emergencies do not conflict. The 

Commission has reviewed Army force generation plans, for example, that rely on 

Reserve component forces for Homeland response in year 5 of their 6-year operational cycle. Year 6 would be deployment overseas with no planned availability for 

the Homeland. We envision very little acceleration of operational tempo due to increasing reliance on Reserve component forces for civil support. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

GUARD AND RESERVE REINTEGRATION PROGRAM

29. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Ball and Ms. Lewis, in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2008 I worked with several other Senators to introduce and enact the Yellow Ribbon 

Reintegration Program which establishes a program to assist Guard and Reserve 

personnel, and their families, in readjusting after a deployment. The program addresses such issues as reemployment, health care, family transition, marriage counseling, and many other issues. Are you familiar with this program and, if so, what 

is your assessment of it? 

Mr. BALL and Ms. LEWIS. The Commission is familiar with the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program and believes it offers valuable and timely assistance to both 

servicemembers and their families. In our final report, we recommend that a single 

standard of reintegration care should be provided to all those who serve on extended 

or multiple deployments regardless of their Service or Reserve component category 

(Individual Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, or individual mobilization augmentee). 

The Commission strongly supports the current Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, and agreed with Congress’s decision to expand the program to cover all members of the Reserve components and their families.

30. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Ball and Ms. Lewis, how could we better shape it to 

serve our returning citizen soldiers? 

Mr. BALL and Ms. LEWIS. In our final report, the Commission recommends that 

Congress provide the funding necessary to ensure the program’s success. Congress 

may want to enact directive statutory language to the Secretary of Defense to issue 

policy guidance to the Services to include funding for the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program within their base budgets for the Reserve components.

RETIREMENT

31. Senator CHAMBLISS. Ms. Lewis, I have been active over the last several years 

on the issue of changing the Reserve retirement system, and I note that the Commission makes several recommendations in this area, specifically, that the Active 

and Reserve components have an integrated retirement system; that the age for receipt of a military retirement annuity should be 62 for servicemembers who serve 

at least 10 years, 60 for members who serve at least 20 years, and 57 for members 

who serve for at least 30 years; and that members could receive their annuity at 

an earlier age, although it would be reduced. What, in your opinion, are the benefits 

of this construct for the Active and Reserve retirement system? 

Ms. LEWIS. An integrated retirement system is one of the component parts of the 

Commission’s vision of integrated total force management for a diverse, highly mobile, technologically savvy 21st century military force. Integrated total force management will facilitate a true continuum of service that permits differing levels of 

commitment across a military career. In the Commission’s view, integrated total 

force management is a critical component of the continued operational use of the 

Reserve component. 

In our final report, the Commission makes specific recommendations for the 

changes to law and policy necessary to bring about a true continuum of service. Two 

critical enablers of an enhanced continuum of service are a reduction in the number 

of duty status categories and the implementation of an integrated pay and personnel 

system. Equally important, however, is an integrated personnel management system 

that, when fully mature at some point in the future, would include an integrated 

promotion system, integrated compensation system, and integrated retirement system.

32. Senator CHAMBLISS. Ms. Lewis, are you concerned that the retirement system, 

as you have proposed it, may provide a disincentive for people to join the Active 

175

Force in favor of joining the Guard or Reserve since they would receive their annuity at the same age irrespective of being in the Active or Reserve Force? 

Ms. LEWIS. The Commission’s retirement proposal would provide greater equity 

to the large proportion of enlisted personnel, Active and Reserve, who never qualify 

for a 20-year retirement annuity. This change should serve as an incentive for more 

servicemembers to remain through 10 years of service, rather than leaving after 

their initial term of enlistment or the end of their obligated service. The ultimate 

retirement annuity for an Active Duty member would still be substantially more 

than that of a reservist because of the significantly higher level of participation 

across a military career. Similarly, ‘‘gate pays,’’ matching Thrift Savings Plan contributions, or other upfront retention incentives would reflect the level of participation of the individual servicemember, which in most cases would be much greater 

for the Active component member.

MISSION AREAS

33. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Punaro and Mr. Ball, what is your reaction to 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s idea of moving mission areas in the Guard and Reserve that 

are most often used, such as infantry, military police, and civil affairs, from the Reserve components into the Active Force? 

General PUNARO and Mr. BALL. These rebalancing actions you mention were 

taken very early in response to the emerging requirements of the war in Iraq. Certain characteristics of some of these capabilities make them among the most logical 

mission sets for the Reserve components. For example, civil affairs and military police skills are highly correlated with civilian-gained experience. Continuing longterm requirements for these very capabilities have demonstrated the utility of maintaining structure and wartime capacity for them in the Reserves.

34. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Punaro and Mr. Ball, in your opinion would moving mission areas most often used in Guard and Reserve to Active Force provide 

a disincentive for people to join the Guard and Reserve because they would know 

that they would always be on the ‘‘second string’’ and not a part of the truly important missions, or do you think this approach would enhance readiness by ensuring 

those in high demand career fields are always available? 

General PUNARO and Mr. BALL. This approach to rebalancing is not desirable. Rebalancing to try to avoid reliance on the Reserve components would most likely be 

unfeasible as well as costly. The Commission believes that creating a truly integrated total force, and providing opportunities for service along a continuum from 

full-time to Operational Reserve to strategic, wartime-only roles, is the most suitable way to balance forces in the future. As stated in our report, operational employment of the Reserve components is appropriate, helps keep both Active and Reserve 

Forces strong, and benefits the Nation.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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