# Uradni list C 121/2012

| | ISSN 1977-1045
  doi:10.3000/19771045.C_2012.121.slv |
| --- | --- |
| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 121 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Zvezek 5526. april 2012 |

ISSN 1977-1045

doi:10.3000/19771045.C_2012.121.slv

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 121

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Zvezek 5526. april 2012

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| Obvestilo št. | Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Sporočila |
| | SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2012/C 121/01 | Odobritev državne pomoči v skladu s členoma 107 in 108 PDEU – Primeri, v katerih Komisija ne vloži ugovora (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2012/C 121/02 | Monetarni sporazum med Evropsko unijo in Republiko San Marino | 5 |
| 2012/C 121/03 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin) (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2012/C 121/04 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába) (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2012/C 121/05 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp) (
  1
  ) | 19 |

Obvestilo št.

Vsebina

Stran

II   Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2012/C 121/01

Odobritev državne pomoči v skladu s členoma 107 in 108 PDEU – Primeri, v katerih Komisija ne vloži ugovora (
  1
  )

1

1

2012/C 121/02

Monetarni sporazum med Evropsko unijo in Republiko San Marino

5

2012/C 121/03

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin) (
  1
  )

1

18

2012/C 121/04

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába) (
  1
  )

1

18

2012/C 121/05

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp) (
  1
  )

1

19

| | IV   Informacije |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2012/C 121/06 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 20 |
| 2012/C 121/07 | Sporočilo Komisije o postopku iz člena 1(4) Direktive Sveta 96/67/ES | 21 |
| | Računsko sodišče |
| 2012/C 121/08 | Posebno poročilo št. 4/2012 – Uporaba strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada za sofinanciranje prometne infrastrukture v morskih pristaniščih: uspešna naložba? | 24 |
| | INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM |
| | Nadzorni organ Efte |
| 2012/C 121/09 | Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o prodaji pravice občine Narvik do električne energije po znižani ceni družbi Narvik Energi AS (NEAS) v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča | 25 |

IV   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2012/C 121/06

Menjalni tečaji eura

20

2012/C 121/07

Sporočilo Komisije o postopku iz člena 1(4) Direktive Sveta 96/67/ES

21

Računsko sodišče

2012/C 121/08

Posebno poročilo št. 4/2012 – Uporaba strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada za sofinanciranje prometne infrastrukture v morskih pristaniščih: uspešna naložba?

24

INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorni organ Efte

2012/C 121/09

Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o prodaji pravice občine Narvik do električne energije po znižani ceni družbi Narvik Energi AS (NEAS) v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča

25

| | V   Objave |
| --- | --- |
| | UPRAVNI POSTOPKI |
| | Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 121/10 | Razpis javnega natečaja | 38 |
| | POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2012/C 121/11 | Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas) (
  1
  ) | 39 |

V   Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO)

2012/C 121/10

Razpis javnega natečaja

38

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

2012/C 121/11

Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas) (
  1
  )

1

39

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Besedilo velja za EGP |

---

(1)   Besedilo velja za EGP

1

| SL | |
| --- | --- |

SL

---

II Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/1

---

Odobritev državne pomoči v skladu s členoma 107 in 108 PDEU

Primeri, v katerih Komisija ne vloži ugovora

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2012/C 121/01

| Datum sprejetja odločitve | 22.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Referenčna številka državne pomoči | SA.30742 (N 137/10) |
| Država članica | Litva |
| Regija | Klaipėdos apskritis |
| Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca) | Klaipėdos keleivių ir krovinių terminalas |
| Pravna podlaga | Komisijos sprendimas K(2007) 3740 (2007 m. liepos 30 d.), patvirtinantis veiksmų programą „Ekonomikos augimas“ dėl Bendrijos paramos iš Europos regioninės plėtros fondo ir Sanglaudos fondo pagal Konvergencijos tikslą Lietuvos Respublikoje |
| Vrsta ukrepa | Individualna pomoč |
| Cilj | Sektorski razvoj, Regionalni razvoj |
| Oblika pomoči | Neposredna nepovratna sredstva |
| Proračun | 17 900 000 EUR |
| Intenzivnost | 65 % |
| Trajanje | 1.2.2011–31.12.2012 |
| Gospodarski sektorji | Promet |
| Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč | Susisiekimo ministerija |
| Gedimino Av. 17 |
| LT-01505 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Datum sprejetja odločitve

22.2.2012

Referenčna številka državne pomoči

SA.30742 (N 137/10)

Država članica

Litva

Regija

Klaipėdos apskritis

Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca)

Klaipėdos keleivių ir krovinių terminalas

Pravna podlaga

Komisijos sprendimas K(2007) 3740 (2007 m. liepos 30 d.), patvirtinantis veiksmų programą „Ekonomikos augimas“ dėl Bendrijos paramos iš Europos regioninės plėtros fondo ir Sanglaudos fondo pagal Konvergencijos tikslą Lietuvos Respublikoje

Vrsta ukrepa

Individualna pomoč

Cilj

Sektorski razvoj, Regionalni razvoj

Oblika pomoči

Neposredna nepovratna sredstva

Proračun

17 900 000 EUR

Intenzivnost

65 %

Trajanje

1.2.2011–31.12.2012

Gospodarski sektorji

Promet

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč

Susisiekimo ministerija

Gedimino Av. 17

LT-01505 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Drugi podatki

—

Verodostojno besedilo odločitve, iz katerega so bili odstranjeni vsi zaupni podatki, je na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_sl.htm

| Datum sprejetja odločitve | 28.3.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Referenčna številka državne pomoči | SA.33054 (12/N) |
| Država članica | Združeno kraljestvo |
| Regija | — |
| Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca) | Post Office Limited (POL): Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially viable network for the period 2012-2015 and the continuation of a working capital facility |
| Pravna podlaga | Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011, Postal Services Act 2000, Industrial Development Act 1982 |
| Vrsta ukrepa | Individualna pomoč |
| Cilj | Storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena |
| Oblika pomoči | Neposredna nepovratna sredstva |
| Proračun | Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 1 155 mio. GBP |
| Intenzivnost | — |
| Trajanje | 1.4.2012–31.3.2015 |
| Gospodarski sektorji | Pošta in telekomunikacije |
| Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč | Department for Business, Innovation and Skills |
| 1 Victoria Street |
| London |
| SW1H 0ET |
| UNITED KINGDOM |

Datum sprejetja odločitve

28.3.2012

Referenčna številka državne pomoči

SA.33054 (12/N)

Država članica

Združeno kraljestvo

Regija

—

Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca)

Post Office Limited (POL): Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially viable network for the period 2012-2015 and the continuation of a working capital facility

Pravna podlaga

Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011, Postal Services Act 2000, Industrial Development Act 1982

Vrsta ukrepa

Individualna pomoč

Cilj

Storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena

Oblika pomoči

Neposredna nepovratna sredstva

Proračun

Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 1 155 mio. GBP

Intenzivnost

—

Trajanje

1.4.2012–31.3.2015

Gospodarski sektorji

Pošta in telekomunikacije

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

1 Victoria Street

London

SW1H 0ET

UNITED KINGDOM

Drugi podatki

—

Verodostojno besedilo odločitve, iz katerega so bili odstranjeni vsi zaupni podatki, je na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_sl.htm

| Datum sprejetja odločitve | 23.1.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Referenčna številka državne pomoči | SA.33868 (11/N) |
| Država članica | Nemčija |
| Regija | Thüringen |
| Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca) | Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. 618/2007 — Deutschland
  Richtlinie des Freistaats Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung |
| Pravna podlaga | Richtlinie des Landes Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung |
| Vrsta ukrepa | Shema pomoči |
| Cilj | Raziskave in razvoj, Regionalni razvoj |
| Oblika pomoči | Neposredna nepovratna sredstva |
| Proračun | | Načrtovani letni izdatki 34,5 milijona EUR |

Datum sprejetja odločitve

23.1.2012

Referenčna številka državne pomoči

SA.33868 (11/N)

Država članica

Nemčija

Regija

Thüringen

Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca)

Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. 618/2007 — Deutschland

Richtlinie des Freistaats Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung

Pravna podlaga

Richtlinie des Landes Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung

Vrsta ukrepa

Shema pomoči

Cilj

Raziskave in razvoj, Regionalni razvoj

Oblika pomoči

Neposredna nepovratna sredstva

Proračun

Načrtovani letni izdatki 34,5 milijona EUR

| | Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 207 mio. EUR |
| --- | --- |

Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 207 mio. EUR

Intenzivnost

—

Trajanje

do 31.12.2013

Gospodarski sektorji

Vsi sektorji

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč

| Thüringer Aufbaubank |
| --- |
| Gorkistraße 9 |
| 99084 Erfurt |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Thüringer Aufbaubank

Gorkistraße 9

99084 Erfurt

DEUTSCHLAND

| Postfach 90 02 44 |
| --- |
| 99105 Erfurt |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Postfach 90 02 44

99105 Erfurt

DEUTSCHLAND

Drugi podatki

—

Verodostojno besedilo odločitve, iz katerega so bili odstranjeni vsi zaupni podatki, je na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_sl.htm

| Datum sprejetja odločitve | 22.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Referenčna številka državne pomoči | SA.34088 (11/N) |
| Država članica | Poljska |
| Regija | Zachodniopomorskie |
| Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca) | PKS w Świdwinie sp. z o.o. |
| Pravna podlaga | 1) | Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji – art. 56 ust. 1 pkt 2; |

Datum sprejetja odločitve

22.2.2012

Referenčna številka državne pomoči

SA.34088 (11/N)

Država članica

Poljska

Regija

Zachodniopomorskie

Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca)

PKS w Świdwinie sp. z o.o.

Pravna podlaga

1)

Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji – art. 56 ust. 1 pkt 2;

| 2) | Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji oraz ustawy, Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę o finansach publicznych – art. 5; |
| --- | --- |

2)

Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji oraz ustawy, Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę o finansach publicznych – art. 5;

| 3) | Rozporządzenie Ministra Skarbu Państwa z dnia 6 kwietnia 2007 r. w sprawie pomocy publicznej na ratowanie i restrukturyzację przedsiębiorców. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Rozporządzenie Ministra Skarbu Państwa z dnia 6 kwietnia 2007 r. w sprawie pomocy publicznej na ratowanie i restrukturyzację przedsiębiorców.

Vrsta ukrepa

Individualna pomoč

Cilj

Prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah

Oblika pomoči

Neposredna nepovratna sredstva

Proračun

Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 0,4 milijona PLN

Intenzivnost

50 %

Trajanje

do 31.12.2015

Gospodarski sektorji

Kopenski promet in transport po cevovodih

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč

| Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa |
| --- |
| ul. Krucza 36/Wspólna 6 |
| 00-522 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |
| http://www.msp.gov.pl/ |

Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa

ul. Krucza 36/Wspólna 6

00-522 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

http://www.msp.gov.pl/

Drugi podatki

—

Verodostojno besedilo odločitve, iz katerega so bili odstranjeni vsi zaupni podatki, je na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_sl.htm

| Datum sprejetja odločitve | 27.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| Referenčna številka državne pomoči | SA.34228 (12/N) |
| Država članica | Španija |
| Regija | País Vasco |
| Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca) | Subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de comunicación en euskera |
| Pravna podlaga | Borrador de Orden, de 21 de diciembre de 2011, de la Consejera de Cultura, por la que se regula y convoca la concesión de subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de la comunicación en euskera en el año 2012 (Convocatoria Hedabideak) |
| Vrsta ukrepa | Shema pomoči |
| Cilj | Promocija kulture |
| Oblika pomoči | Neposredna nepovratna sredstva |
| Proračun | | Načrtovani letni izdatki 4,875 milijona EUR |

Datum sprejetja odločitve

27.2.2012

Referenčna številka državne pomoči

SA.34228 (12/N)

Država članica

Španija

Regija

País Vasco

Naziv (in/ali ime upravičenca)

Subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de comunicación en euskera

Pravna podlaga

Borrador de Orden, de 21 de diciembre de 2011, de la Consejera de Cultura, por la que se regula y convoca la concesión de subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de la comunicación en euskera en el año 2012 (Convocatoria Hedabideak)

Vrsta ukrepa

Shema pomoči

Cilj

Promocija kulture

Oblika pomoči

Neposredna nepovratna sredstva

Proračun

Načrtovani letni izdatki 4,875 milijona EUR

| | Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 4,875 milijona EUR |
| --- | --- |

Skupni znesek načrtovane pomoči 4,875 milijona EUR

Intenzivnost

65 %

Trajanje

do 31.12.2012

Gospodarski sektorji

Mediji

Naziv in naslov organa, ki dodeli pomoč

| Dirección de Promoción del Euskera |
| --- |
| Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística |
| Departamento de Cultura |
| Gobierno Vasco |
| C/ Donostia, 1 |
| 01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz |
| Álava, País Vasco |
| ESPAÑA |

Dirección de Promoción del Euskera

Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística

Departamento de Cultura

Gobierno Vasco

C/ Donostia, 1

01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz

Álava, País Vasco

ESPAÑA

Drugi podatki

—

Verodostojno besedilo odločitve, iz katerega so bili odstranjeni vsi zaupni podatki, je na voljo na spletni strani:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_sl.htm

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| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/5

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MONETARNI SPORAZUM

med Evropsko unijo in Republiko San Marino

2012/C 121/02

EVROPSKA UNIJA

ter

REPUBLIKA SAN MARINO STA SE –

ob upoštevanju naslednjega:

| (1) | 1. januarja 1999 je v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 974/98 (1) z dne 3. maja 1998 euro nadomestil valute posameznih držav članic, ki sodelujejo v tretji fazi Ekonomske in monetarne unije, med katerimi je tudi Italija. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

1. januarja 1999 je v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 974/98 (1) z dne 3. maja 1998 euro nadomestil valute posameznih držav članic, ki sodelujejo v tretji fazi Ekonomske in monetarne unije, med katerimi je tudi Italija.

| (2) | Pred uvedbo eura sta Italija in Republika San Marino sklepali dvostranske sporazume o monetarnih zadevah, nazadnje konvencijo Convenzione monetaria tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica di San Marino, ki je bila sklenjena 21. decembra 1991. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pred uvedbo eura sta Italija in Republika San Marino sklepali dvostranske sporazume o monetarnih zadevah, nazadnje konvencijo Convenzione monetaria tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica di San Marino, ki je bila sklenjena 21. decembra 1991.

| (3) | V skladu z Izjavo št. 6, ki je priložena Sklepni listini Pogodbe o Evropski uniji, mora Skupnost omogočiti ponovna pogajanja o obstoječih ureditvah z Republiko San Marino, ki bi bila morda potrebna zaradi uvedbe enotne valute. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

V skladu z Izjavo št. 6, ki je priložena Sklepni listini Pogodbe o Evropski uniji, mora Skupnost omogočiti ponovna pogajanja o obstoječih ureditvah z Republiko San Marino, ki bi bila morda potrebna zaradi uvedbe enotne valute.

| (4) | Italijanska republika je 29. novembra 2000 v imenu Evropske skupnosti sklenila monetarni sporazum z Republiko San Marino (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Italijanska republika je 29. novembra 2000 v imenu Evropske skupnosti sklenila monetarni sporazum z Republiko San Marino (2).

| (5) | V skladu s tem monetarnim sporazumom Republika San Marino kot svojo uradno valuto uporablja euro ter eurobankovcem in eurokovancem podeljuje status zakonitega plačilnega sredstva. Zagotoviti mora, da se na njenem ozemlju uporabljajo pravila Evropske unije (EU) glede eurobankovcev in eurokovancev, vključno s tistimi, ki se nanašajo na zaščito pred ponarejanjem. Republika San Marino bo sprejela vse potrebne ukrepe za preprečevanje ponarejanja ter sodelovanje z Evropsko komisijo, Evropsko centralno banko (ECB) in Europolom. Do podpisa sporazuma o sodelovanju med Europolom in Republiko San Marino bo slednja z Europolom sodelovala preko organov Italije, pristojnih za to področje. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

V skladu s tem monetarnim sporazumom Republika San Marino kot svojo uradno valuto uporablja euro ter eurobankovcem in eurokovancem podeljuje status zakonitega plačilnega sredstva. Zagotoviti mora, da se na njenem ozemlju uporabljajo pravila Evropske unije (EU) glede eurobankovcev in eurokovancev, vključno s tistimi, ki se nanašajo na zaščito pred ponarejanjem. Republika San Marino bo sprejela vse potrebne ukrepe za preprečevanje ponarejanja ter sodelovanje z Evropsko komisijo, Evropsko centralno banko (ECB) in Europolom. Do podpisa sporazuma o sodelovanju med Europolom in Republiko San Marino bo slednja z Europolom sodelovala preko organov Italije, pristojnih za to področje.

| (6) | Republika San Marino mora zlasti upoštevati priporočila Projektne skupine za finančno ukrepanje (Financial Action Task Force – FATF), zlasti pozive FATF svojim članom in članom podobno zasnovanih regionalnih organov, naj izvajajo ustrezne protiukrepe proti jurisdikcijam z ugotovljeno visoko stopnjo tveganja. Republika San Marino, ki ima predstavnika v Odboru strokovnjakov za ocenjevanje ukrepov proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma, bo ustrezno upoštevala priporočila, ki so ali bodo podana v poročilih medsebojnega ocenjevanja za Republiko San Marino, z namenom izboljšanja svoje odzivnosti na pranje denarja. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Republika San Marino mora zlasti upoštevati priporočila Projektne skupine za finančno ukrepanje (Financial Action Task Force – FATF), zlasti pozive FATF svojim članom in članom podobno zasnovanih regionalnih organov, naj izvajajo ustrezne protiukrepe proti jurisdikcijam z ugotovljeno visoko stopnjo tveganja. Republika San Marino, ki ima predstavnika v Odboru strokovnjakov za ocenjevanje ukrepov proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma, bo ustrezno upoštevala priporočila, ki so ali bodo podana v poročilih medsebojnega ocenjevanja za Republiko San Marino, z namenom izboljšanja svoje odzivnosti na pranje denarja.

| (7) | Ta sporazum ECB in nacionalnim centralnim bankam ne nalaga nobenih obveznosti glede vključevanja finančnih instrumentov Republike San Marino na sezname sredstev, ki pridejo v poštev za operacije monetarne politike Evropskega sistema centralnih bank. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Ta sporazum ECB in nacionalnim centralnim bankam ne nalaga nobenih obveznosti glede vključevanja finančnih instrumentov Republike San Marino na sezname sredstev, ki pridejo v poštev za operacije monetarne politike Evropskega sistema centralnih bank.

| (8) | Bančni sektor Republike San Marino pričakuje tesnejše sodelovanje z bančnim sektorjem euroobmočja. Relevantna bančna in finančna zakonodaja EU, zakonodaja za preprečevanje pranja denarja, goljufij in ponarejanje nedenarnih plačilnih sredstev ter zahteve v zvezi s statističnim poročanjem bi se zato morale postopoma uvajati v Republiki San Marino, da bi se zagotovili bolj enakovredni konkurenčni pogoji. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Bančni sektor Republike San Marino pričakuje tesnejše sodelovanje z bančnim sektorjem euroobmočja. Relevantna bančna in finančna zakonodaja EU, zakonodaja za preprečevanje pranja denarja, goljufij in ponarejanje nedenarnih plačilnih sredstev ter zahteve v zvezi s statističnim poročanjem bi se zato morale postopoma uvajati v Republiki San Marino, da bi se zagotovili bolj enakovredni konkurenčni pogoji.

| (9) | Ustanoviti se mora skupni odbor, sestavljen iz predstavnikov Republike San Marino, Italijanske republike, Komisije in ECB, ki bi preučil uporabo tega sporazuma, določil letno zgornjo mejo za izdajo kovancev in ocenil ukrepe, ki jih sprejme Republika San Marino za izvajanje zadevne zakonodaje EU. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Ustanoviti se mora skupni odbor, sestavljen iz predstavnikov Republike San Marino, Italijanske republike, Komisije in ECB, ki bi preučil uporabo tega sporazuma, določil letno zgornjo mejo za izdajo kovancev in ocenil ukrepe, ki jih sprejme Republika San Marino za izvajanje zadevne zakonodaje EU.

| (10) | Sodišče Evropske unije mora biti sodni organ, pristojen za reševanje sporov, ki lahko nastanejo pri uporabi tega sporazuma – |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Sodišče Evropske unije mora biti sodni organ, pristojen za reševanje sporov, ki lahko nastanejo pri uporabi tega sporazuma –

DOGOVORILI:

Člen 1

Republika San Marino je upravičena do uporabe eura kot svoje uradne valute v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1103/97 z dne 17. junija 1997 o nekaterih določbah v zvezi z uvajanjem eura (3) ter Uredbo (ES) št. 974/98 z dne 3. maja 1998 o uvedbi eura. Republika San Marino eurobankovcem in eurokovancem podeli status zakonitega plačilnega sredstva.

Člen 2

Republika San Marino ne izda nobenih bankovcev, kovancev ali kakršnih koli denarnih nadomestkov, če pogoji takšne izdaje niso bili dogovorjeni z Evropsko unijo. Pogoji za izdajo eurokovancev od začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma naprej so določeni v naslednjih členih.

Člen 3

Letno zgornjo mejo (v denarni vrednosti) za eurokovance, ki jih izda Republika San Marino, izračuna Skupni odbor, ustanovljen s tem sporazumom, in sicer kot vsoto:

| — | fiksnega dela, katerega začetni znesek za prvo leto po dnevu začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma je določen na 2 600 000 EUR. Skupni odbor lahko na letni osnovi spremeni fiksni del, da bi bila upoštevana inflacija – na podlagi inflacije po HICP v Italiji – v zadnjih 12 mesecih, za katere so v trenutku priprave izračuna dostopni podatki – in morebitni pomembni trendi, ki vplivajo na trg zbiralcev eurokovancev; |
| --- | --- |

—

fiksnega dela, katerega začetni znesek za prvo leto po dnevu začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma je določen na 2 600 000 EUR. Skupni odbor lahko na letni osnovi spremeni fiksni del, da bi bila upoštevana inflacija – na podlagi inflacije po HICP v Italiji – v zadnjih 12 mesecih, za katere so v trenutku priprave izračuna dostopni podatki – in morebitni pomembni trendi, ki vplivajo na trg zbiralcev eurokovancev;

| — | in spremenljivega dela, ki se izračuna kot povprečje izdanih kovancev na prebivalca v Italijanski republiki v zadnjih 12 mesecih, za katere so dostopni podatki, pomnoženo s številom prebivalcev Republike San Marino. |
| --- | --- |

—

in spremenljivega dela, ki se izračuna kot povprečje izdanih kovancev na prebivalca v Italijanski republiki v zadnjih 12 mesecih, za katere so dostopni podatki, pomnoženo s številom prebivalcev Republike San Marino.

Člen 4

1.   Eurokovanci, ki jih izda Republika San Marino, so z vidika nominalne vrednosti, statusa zakonitega plačilnega sredstva, tehničnih značilnosti, umetniških elementov na skupni strani in skupnih umetniških elementov na nacionalni strani identični tistim, ki jih izdajajo države članice Evropske unije, ki so uvedle euro.

2.   Republika San Marino vnaprej sporoči osnutke nacionalne strani eurokovancev Komisiji, ki preveri njihovo skladnost s pravili EU.

Člen 5

1.   Eurokovance, ki jih izda Republika San Marino, kuje Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato v Italijanski republiki.

2.   Republika San Marino lahko z odstopanjem od odstavka 1 ob privolitvi skupnega odbora med kovnicami v Evropski uniji, ki kujejo eurokovance, izbere drugega izvajalca od tistega, ki je naveden v odstavku 1.

3.   Vsaj 70 % eurokovancev, namenjenih obtoku, bo v obtok danih po nominalni vrednosti v letu po dnevu začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma. Ta delež mora po treh letih znašati vsaj 80 %. Po izteku tega obdobja bo skupni odbor redno preverjal ustreznost tega deleža.

4.   Republika San Marino lahko izdaja zbirateljske eurokovance. Ti so vključeni v letno zgornjo mejo iz člena 3. Republika San Marino zbirateljske eurokovance izda v skladu s smernicami Evropske unije, določenimi za zbirateljske eurokovance, ki med drugim zahtevajo določitev tehničnih značilnosti, umetniških elementov in apoenov, ki omogočajo razlikovanje zbirateljskih eurokovancev od kovancev, namenjenih obtoku.

Člen 6

1.   Obseg eurokovancev, ki jih izda Republika San Marino, se doda obsegu kovancev, ki jih izda Italija, z namenom, da Evropska centralna banka odobri celoten obseg izdaje Italijanske republike v skladu s členom 128(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.

2.   Republika San Marino vsako leto najpozneje do 1. septembra Evropski komisiji in Italijanski republiki sporoči obseg in nominalno vrednost eurokovancev, ki jih namerava izdati v prihodnjem letu. Evropski komisiji sporoči tudi načrtovane pogoje izdaje teh kovancev, zlasti delež zbirateljskih kovancev in podrobne ukrepe za vpeljavo kovancev, namenjenih obtoku.

3.   Po podpisu tega sporazuma Republika San Marino posreduje podatke iz odstavka 2 za leto po dnevu začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma.

Člen 7

1.   Ta sporazum ne posega v pravico Republike San Marino do nadaljnjega izdajanja zlatnikov, denominiranih v skudih.

2.   Zbirateljski kovanci in zlatniki, denomanirani v skudih, ki jih izda Republika San Marino, ne veljajo za zakonito plačilno sredstvo v Evropski uniji.

Člen 8

1.   Republika San Marino se zavezuje, da bo z neposrednim prenosom ali morebitnimi enakovrednimi ukrepi naredila vse potrebno za izvajanje pravnih aktov EU in pravil, navedenih v Prilogi k temu sporazumu, na področju:

| (a) | eurobankovcev in eurokovancev; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

eurobankovcev in eurokovancev;

| (b) | bančne in finančne zakonodaje, zlasti v zvezi z dejavnostmi in nadzorom zadevnih institucij; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

bančne in finančne zakonodaje, zlasti v zvezi z dejavnostmi in nadzorom zadevnih institucij;

| (c) | preprečevanja pranja denarja, goljufij in ponarejanja gotovinskih in negotovinskih plačilnih sredstev, medalj in žetonov ter zahtev v zvezi s statističnim poročanjem. V zvezi z zakonodajo o zbiranju statističnih podatkov je potrebno v dogovoru z Evropsko centralno banko najpozneje 18 mesecev pred zahtevanim začetkom statističnega poročanja določiti podrobna pravila za izvajanje in tehnične prilagoditve (vključno z ustreznimi odstopanji ob upoštevanju posebnega statusa San Marina); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

preprečevanja pranja denarja, goljufij in ponarejanja gotovinskih in negotovinskih plačilnih sredstev, medalj in žetonov ter zahtev v zvezi s statističnim poročanjem. V zvezi z zakonodajo o zbiranju statističnih podatkov je potrebno v dogovoru z Evropsko centralno banko najpozneje 18 mesecev pred zahtevanim začetkom statističnega poročanja določiti podrobna pravila za izvajanje in tehnične prilagoditve (vključno z ustreznimi odstopanji ob upoštevanju posebnega statusa San Marina);

| (d) | ukrepov, ki so nujni za uporabo eura kot enotne valute, sprejetih na podlagi člena 133 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

ukrepov, ki so nujni za uporabo eura kot enotne valute, sprejetih na podlagi člena 133 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.

2.   Republika San Marino izvaja pravne akte in pravila iz odstavka 1 v skladu z roki iz Priloge, ki začnejo teči z dnevom začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma.

3.   Zgornja meja iz člena 3:

| (a) | se samodejno in začasno zmanjša za 1/3, če in kadar je bil rok iz te Priloge prekoračen, kar velja do sprejetja zadevnih pravnih aktov in pravil EU; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

se samodejno in začasno zmanjša za 1/3, če in kadar je bil rok iz te Priloge prekoračen, kar velja do sprejetja zadevnih pravnih aktov in pravil EU;

| (b) | se lahko začasno zmanjša za 1/2 na podlagi sklepa Sveta, sprejetega s kvalificirano večino na predlog Komisije in po preučitvi argumentov predstavnikov Republike San Marino, če in kadar Republiki San Marino več kot dve leti ne uspe izpolniti določb enega ali več pravnih aktov ali pravil EU, navedenih v Prilogi, ki jih je sprejela v dogovorjenih rokih. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

se lahko začasno zmanjša za 1/2 na podlagi sklepa Sveta, sprejetega s kvalificirano večino na predlog Komisije in po preučitvi argumentov predstavnikov Republike San Marino, če in kadar Republiki San Marino več kot dve leti ne uspe izpolniti določb enega ali več pravnih aktov ali pravil EU, navedenih v Prilogi, ki jih je sprejela v dogovorjenih rokih.

Zgornja meja se z enakim postopkom vrne na običajno raven takoj, ko Republika San Marino sprejme vse ustrezne ukrepe za odpravo težav, zaradi katerih je bilo začasno zmanjšanje uvedeno.

4.   Za lažje izvajanje relevantne zakonodaje EU lahko Republika San Marino za tehnično pomoč zaprosi osebe, ki sestavljajo delegacijo Evropske unije.

5.   Komisija spremeni Prilogo enkrat letno ali pogosteje, če se ji zdi primerno, da bi upoštevala nove relevantne pravne akte in pravila EU ter spremembe obstoječih. Skupni odbor potem določi primerne in razumne roke, do katerih mora Republika San Marino izvesti nove pravne akte in pravila, dodane v Prilogo.

6.   V izrednih primerih lahko skupni odbor roke iz Priloge spremeni.

7.   Posodobljena Priloga se objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.

Člen 9

Kreditne institucije in, kadar je to ustrezno, druge finančne institucije, pooblaščene za izvajanje svojih dejavnosti na območju Republike San Marino, imajo lahko dostop do medbančnih poravnav, plačilnih sistemov in sistemov poravnave vrednostnih papirjev v euroobmočju pod ustreznimi pogoji, ki jih določi Banka Italije v dogovoru z Evropsko centralno banko.

Člen 10

1.   Sodišče Evropske unije ima izključno pristojnost za reševanje vseh sporov med pogodbenicama, ki bi utegnili izhajati iz uporabe tega sporazuma in jih ni bilo mogoče rešiti v okviru skupnega odbora.

2.   Če Evropska unija, ki jo zastopa Evropska komisija in ki ukrepa na priporočilo delegacije EU v skupnem odboru, ali Republika San Marino meni, da druga pogodbenica ni izpolnila obveznosti iz tega sporazuma, lahko zadevo predloži Sodišču. Sodba Sodišča je za pogodbenici zavezujoča. Pogodbenici morata sprejeti potrebne ukrepe za upoštevanje sodbe v roku, ki ga v sodbi določi Sodišče.

Člen 11

1.   Ustanovi se skupni odbor. Sestavljajo ga predstavniki Republike San Marino in Evropske unije. Skupni odbor sprejme svoj poslovnik s konsenzom. Delegacija Evropske unije je sestavljena iz predstavnikov Evropske komisije in Italijanske republike ter predstavnikov Evropske centralne banke.

2.   Skupni odbor se sestane vsaj enkrat letno. Predsedstvo si vsakoletno izmenjujeta predstavnik Evropske unije in predstavnik Republike San Marino. Skupni odbor svoje odločitve sprejema soglasno.

3.   Skupni odbor izmenjuje mnenja in informacije ter sprejema odločitve iz členov 3, 5 in 8. Preuči ukrepe, ki jih sprejme Republika San Marino, in si prizadeva za rešitev vsakršnih sporov, ki izhajajo iz izvajanja tega sporazuma.

4.   Evropska unija kot prva predseduje skupnemu odboru, in sicer se njeno predsedovanje začne ob začetku veljavnosti tega sporazuma, ki je določen v členu 13.

Člen 12

Vsaka pogodbenica lahko ta sporazum prekine z enoletnim odpovednim rokom.

Člen 13

Ta sporazum začne veljati prvi dan meseca, ki sledi dnevu, ko se pogodbenici medsebojno uradno obvestita, da so bili postopki ratifikacije, sklenitve ali sprejetja zaključeni v skladu s pravili, ki jih pogodbenici uporabljata.

Člen 14

Monetarni sporazum z dne 29. novembra 2000 se razveljavi z datumom začetka veljavnosti tega sporazuma. Sklicevanje na sporazum z dne 29. novembra 2000 se razume kot sklicevanje na ta sporazum.

V Bruslju, 27. marca 2012, v dveh izvirnikih v angleškem jeziku.

Za Evropsko unijo

Olli REHN

Podpredsednik Evropske komisije, pristojen za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter euro

Za Republiko San Marino

Antonella MULARONI

Ministrica za zunanje zadeve

---

(1)  UL L 139, 11.5.1998, str. 1.

1

(2)  UL C 209, 27.7.2001, str. 1.

2

(3)  UL L 162, 19.6.1997, str. 1.

3

---

PRILOGA

| PRAVNE DOLOČBE, KI JIH JE TREBA IZVESTI | ROK ZA IZVEDBO
  (OD DNEVA ZAČETKA VELJAVNOSTI SPORAZUMA) |
| --- | --- |
| Preprečevanje pranja denarja |
| Direktiva 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. oktobra 2005 o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma (UL L 309, 25.11.2005, str. 15)
  spremenjena z: | Direktivo 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1) |

PRAVNE DOLOČBE, KI JIH JE TREBA IZVESTI

ROK ZA IZVEDBO

(OD DNEVA ZAČETKA VELJAVNOSTI SPORAZUMA)

Preprečevanje pranja denarja

Direktiva 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. oktobra 2005 o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma (UL L 309, 25.11.2005, str. 15)

spremenjena z:

Direktivo 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1)

| | Direktivo 2008/20/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2005/60/ES o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 46) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2008/20/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2005/60/ES o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 46)

| | Direktivo 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

dopolnjena s:

| | Sklepom Sveta 2007/845/PNZ z dne 6. decembra 2007 o sodelovanju med uradi za odvzem premoženjske koristi držav članic na področju sledenja in identifikacije premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivim dejanjem, ali drugega premoženja, povezanega s kaznivimi dejanji (UL L 332, 18.12.2007, str. 103) |
| --- | --- |

Sklepom Sveta 2007/845/PNZ z dne 6. decembra 2007 o sodelovanju med uradi za odvzem premoženjske koristi držav članic na področju sledenja in identifikacije premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivim dejanjem, ali drugega premoženja, povezanega s kaznivimi dejanji (UL L 332, 18.12.2007, str. 103)

| | Direktivo Komisije 2006/70/ES z dne 1. avgusta 2006 o določitvi izvedbenih ukrepov za Direktivo 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede opredelitve politično izpostavljene osebe in tehničnih meril za postopke poenostavljene dolžnosti skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete stranke ter izjeme na podlagi finančne dejavnosti, ki poteka zgolj občasno ali v omejenem obsegu (UL L 214, 4.8.2006, str. 29) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2006/70/ES z dne 1. avgusta 2006 o določitvi izvedbenih ukrepov za Direktivo 2005/60/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede opredelitve politično izpostavljene osebe in tehničnih meril za postopke poenostavljene dolžnosti skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete stranke ter izjeme na podlagi finančne dejavnosti, ki poteka zgolj občasno ali v omejenem obsegu (UL L 214, 4.8.2006, str. 29)

| | Uredbo (ES) št. 1781/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. novembra 2006 o podatkih o plačniku, ki spremljajo prenose denarnih sredstev (UL L 345, 8.12.2006, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Uredbo (ES) št. 1781/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. novembra 2006 o podatkih o plačniku, ki spremljajo prenose denarnih sredstev (UL L 345, 8.12.2006, str. 1)

| | Popravkom Uredbe (ES) št. 1781/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. novembra 2006 o podatkih o plačniku, ki spremljajo prenose denarnih sredstev (UL L 345, 8.12.2006) (UL L 323, 8.12.2007, str. 59) |
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Popravkom Uredbe (ES) št. 1781/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. novembra 2006 o podatkih o plačniku, ki spremljajo prenose denarnih sredstev (UL L 345, 8.12.2006) (UL L 323, 8.12.2007, str. 59)

| | Uredbo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1889/2005 z dne 26. oktobra 2005 o kontroli gotovine ob vstopu v Skupnost ali izstopu iz nje (UL L 309, 25.11.2005, str. 9) |
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Uredbo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (ES) št. 1889/2005 z dne 26. oktobra 2005 o kontroli gotovine ob vstopu v Skupnost ali izstopu iz nje (UL L 309, 25.11.2005, str. 9)

| | Okvirnim sklepom Sveta 2001/500/PNZ z dne 26 junija 2001 o pranju denarja, identifikaciji, sledenju, zamrznitvi, zasegu in zaplembi pripomočkov za kazniva dejanja in premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivim dejanjem (UL L 182, 5.7.2001, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Okvirnim sklepom Sveta 2001/500/PNZ z dne 26 junija 2001 o pranju denarja, identifikaciji, sledenju, zamrznitvi, zasegu in zaplembi pripomočkov za kazniva dejanja in premoženjske koristi, pridobljene s kaznivim dejanjem (UL L 182, 5.7.2001, str. 1)

1 leto

Sklep Sveta 2000/642/PNZ z dne 17. oktobra 2000 o dogovoru glede sodelovanja med enotami za finančni nadzor držav članic pri izmenjavi informacij (UL L 271, 24.10.2000, str. 4)

1 leto

Preprečevanje goljufij in ponarejanja

Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1338/2001 z dne 28. junija 2001 o določitvi ukrepov, potrebnih za zaščito evra pred ponarejanjem (UL L 181, 4.7.2001, str. 6)

spremenjena z:

Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 44/2009 z dne 18. decembra 2008 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1338/2001 o določitvi ukrepov, potrebnih za zaščito eura pred ponarejanjem (UL L 17, 22.1.2009, str. 1)

1 leto

Odločba Sveta 2003/861/ES z dne 8. decembra 2003 o analizi in sodelovanju v zvezi s ponarejenimi kovanci evra (UL L 325, 12.12.2003, str. 44)

1 leto

Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 2182/2004 z dne 6. decembra 2004 o medaljah in žetonih, podobnih eurokovancem (UL L 373, 21.12.2004, str. 1)

spremenjena z:

Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 46/2009 z dne 18. decembra 2008 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 2182/2004 o medaljah in žetonih, podobnih eurokovancem (UL L 17, 22.1.2009, str. 5)

1 leto

Okvirni sklep Sveta 2000/383/PNZ z dne 29. maja 2000 o povečanju zaščite s kaznimi in drugimi sankcijami za ponarejanje v zvezi z uvedbo evra (UL L 140, 14.6.2000, str. 1)

spremenjen z:

Okvirnim sklepom Sveta 2001/888/PNZ z dne 6. decembra 2001 o spremembi Okvirnega sklepa 2000/383/PNZ o povečanju zaščite s kaznimi in drugimi sankcijami za ponarejanje v zvezi z uvedbo evra (UL L 329, 14.12.2001, str. 3)

1 leto

Sklep Sveta 2001/887/PNZ z dne 6. decembra 2001 o zaščiti evra pred ponarejanjem (UL L 329, 14.12.2001, str. 1)

1 leto

Okvirni sklep Sveta 2001/413/PNZ z dne 28. maja 2001 o boju proti goljufiji in ponarejanju v zvezi z negotovinskimi plačilnimi sredstvi (UL L 149, 2.6.2001, str. 1)

1 leto

Pravila glede eurobankovcev in eurokovancev

Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 975/98 z dne 3. maja 1998 o apoenih in tehničnih specifikacijah eurokovancev namenjenih obtoku (UL L 139, 11.5.1998, str. 6)

spremenjena z:

Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 423/1999 z dne 22. februarja 1999 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 975/98 o apoenih in tehničnih specifikacijah eurokovancev, namenjenih obtoku (UL L 52, 27.2.1999, str. 2)

1 leto

Sklepi Sveta z dne 10. maja 1999 o kakovostnem upravljanju sistema eurokovancev

1 leto

Sklepi Sveta z dne 23. novembra 1998 in 5. novembra 2002 o zbirateljskih kovancih

1 leto

Priporočilo Komisije 2009/23/ES z dne 19. decembra 2008 o skupnih smernicah za nacionalne strani in izdajo eurokovancev, namenjenih obtoku, (C(2008) 8625) (UL L 9, 14.1.2009, str. 52)

1 leto

Sporočilo Komisije 2001/C 318/03 z dne 22. oktobra 2001 o zaščiti avtorskih pravic za motive na skupni strani eurokovancev (C(2001) 600 konč.) (UL C 318, 13.11.2001, str. 3)

1 leto

Uredba (EU) št. 1210/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. decembra 2010 o preverjanju pristnosti eurokovancev in ravnanju z eurokovanci, neprimernimi za obtok (UL L 339, 22.12.2010, str. 1)

1 leto

Smernica Evropske centralne banke ECB/2003/5 z dne 20. marca 2003 o uporabi ukrepov proti neskladnim reprodukcijam evro bankovcev ter o zamenjavi in jemanju evro bankovcev iz obtoka (UL L 78, 25.3.2003, str. 20)

1 leto

Sklep Evropske centralne banke ECB/2003/4 z dne 20. marca 2003 o apoenih, specifikacijah, reprodukciji, zamenjavi in jemanju evro bankovcev iz obtoka (UL L 78, 25.3.2003, str. 16)

1 leto

Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 2532/98 z dne 23. novembra 1998 o pooblastilih Evropske centralne banke za nalaganje sankcij (UL L 318, 27.11.1998, str. 4–7)

1 leto

ECB/2010/14. Sklep Evropske centralne banke z dne 16. septembra 2010 o preverjanju pristnosti in primernosti evro bankovcev ter njihovem ponovnem dajanju v obtok (UL L 267, 9.10.2010, str. 1)

1 leto

Bančna in finančna zakonodaja

Direktiva Komisije 2006/73/ES z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z organizacijskimi zahtevami in pogoji poslovanja investicijskih družb ter opredeljenimi izrazi za namene navedene direktive (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 26–58)

6 let

Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1287/2006 z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z obveznostmi vodenja evidenc za investicijske družbe, poročanjem o transakcijah, tržno preglednostjo, sprejemanjem finančnih instrumentov v trgovanje in pojmi, opredeljenimi v navedeni direktivi (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 1–25)

6 let

Direktiva 1997/5/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. januarja 1997 o čezmejnih nakazilih (UL L 43, 14.2.1997, str. 25–30)

6 let

Direktiva 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij (preoblikovano) (UL L 177, 30.6.2006, str. 201)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo 2008/23/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembi Direktive 2006/49/ES o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij, kar zadeva Komisiji podeljena izvedbena pooblastila (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 54) |
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Direktivo 2008/23/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembi Direktive 2006/49/ES o kapitalski ustreznosti investicijskih podjetij in kreditnih institucij, kar zadeva Komisiji podeljena izvedbena pooblastila (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 54)

| | Direktivo Komisije 2009/27/ES z dne 7. aprila 2009 o spremembi nekaterih prilog k Direktivi 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi s tehničnimi določbami glede upravljanja s tveganji (UL L 94, 8.4.2009, str. 97) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2009/27/ES z dne 7. aprila 2009 o spremembi nekaterih prilog k Direktivi 2006/49/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi s tehničnimi določbami glede upravljanja s tveganji (UL L 94, 8.4.2009, str. 97)

| | Direktivo 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 97) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 97)

| | Direktivo 2010/76/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za relistinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov (UL L 329, 14.12.2010, str. 3) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/76/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za relistinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov (UL L 329, 14.12.2010, str. 3)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

4 leta

Direktiva 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij (preoblikovano) (UL L 177, 30.6.2006, str. 1)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo Komisije 2007/18/ES z dne 27. marca 2007 o spremebi Direktive 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede izvzetja nekaterih institucij iz področje njene uporabe ali njihove vključitve v področje njene uporabe ter glede obravnave izpostavljenosti do multilateralnih razvojnih bank (UL L 87. 28.3.2007, str. 9) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2007/18/ES z dne 27. marca 2007 o spremebi Direktive 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede izvzetja nekaterih institucij iz področje njene uporabe ali njihove vključitve v področje njene uporabe ter glede obravnave izpostavljenosti do multilateralnih razvojnih bank (UL L 87. 28.3.2007, str. 9)

| | Direktivo 2007/44/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. septembra 2007 o spremembah Direktive Sveta 92/49/EGS in direktiv 2002/83/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2005/68/ES in 2006/48/ES glede postopkovnih pravil in ocenjevalnih meril za skrbno oceno pri pridobitvah in zvišanju deležev v finančnem sektorju (UL L 247, 21.9.2007, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2007/44/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. septembra 2007 o spremembah Direktive Sveta 92/49/EGS in direktiv 2002/83/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2005/68/ES in 2006/48/ES glede postopkovnih pravil in ocenjevalnih meril za skrbno oceno pri pridobitvah in zvišanju deležev v finančnem sektorju (UL L 247, 21.9.2007, str. 1)

| | Direktivo 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1)

| | Direktivo 2008/24/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2006/48/ES o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 81, 20.3.2008, str. 38) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2008/24/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2006/48/ES o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti kreditnih institucij glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 81, 20.3.2008, str. 38)

| | Direktivo Komisije 2009/83/ES z dne 27. julija 2009 o spremembi nekaterih prilog k Direktivi 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi s tehničnimi določbami glede upravljanja s tveganji (UL L 196, 28.7.2009, str. 14) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2009/83/ES z dne 27. julija 2009 o spremembi nekaterih prilog k Direktivi 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi s tehničnimi določbami glede upravljanja s tveganji (UL L 196, 28.7.2009, str. 14)

| | Direktivo 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7)

| | Direktivo 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 97) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 97)

| | Direktivo Komisije 2010/16/EU z dne 9. marca 2010 o spremembi Direktive 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede izvzetja določene institucije iz področja uporabe (UL L 60, 10.3.2010, str. 15) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2010/16/EU z dne 9. marca 2010 o spremembi Direktive 2006/48/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta glede izvzetja določene institucije iz področja uporabe (UL L 60, 10.3.2010, str. 15)

| | Direktivo 2010/76/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za relistinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov (UL L 329, 14.12.2010, str. 3) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/76/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za relistinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov (UL L 329, 14.12.2010, str. 3)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

4 leta

Direktiva 2009/110/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti ter nadzoru skrbnega in varnega poslovanja institucij za izdajo elektronskega denarja ter o spremembah direktiv 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES in razveljavitvi Direktive 2000/46/ES (UL L 267, 10.10.2009, str. 7)

4 leta

Direktiva 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007, str. 1)

Popravek Direktive 2007/64/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. novembra 2007 o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu in o spremembah direktiv 97/7/ES, 2002/65/ES, 2005/60/ES in 2006/48/ES ter o razveljavitvi Direktive 97/5/ES (UL L 319, 5.12.2007) (UL L 187, 18.7.2009, str. 5)

spremenjena z:

Direktivo 2009/111/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2007/64/ES glede bank, ki so odvisne od centralnih institucij, nekaterih postavk lastnih sredstev, velikih izpostavljenosti, nadzornih režimov in kriznega upravljanja (UL L 302, 17.11.2009, str. 97)

4 leta

Direktiva Sveta 86/635/EGS z dne 8. decembra 1986 o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij (UL L 372, 31.12.1986, str. 1)

Popravek Direktive Sveta 86/635/EGS z dne 8. decembra 1986 o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij (UL L 60, 3.3.1987, str. 17)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo 2001/65/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. septembra 2001 o spremembah Direktiv 78/660/EGS, 83/349/EGS in 86/635/EGS glede pravil vrednotenja za letne in konsolidirane računovodske izkaze nekaterih oblik družb kakor tudi bank in drugih finančnih institucij (UL L 283, 27.10.2001, str. 28) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2001/65/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 27. septembra 2001 o spremembah Direktiv 78/660/EGS, 83/349/EGS in 86/635/EGS glede pravil vrednotenja za letne in konsolidirane računovodske izkaze nekaterih oblik družb kakor tudi bank in drugih finančnih institucij (UL L 283, 27.10.2001, str. 28)

| | Direktivo 2003/51/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. junija 2003 o spremembah Direktiv 78/660/EGS, 83/349/EGS, 86/635/EGS in 91/674/EGS o letnih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb, bank in drugih finančnih institucij ter zavarovalnic (UL L 178, 17.7.2003, str. 16) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2003/51/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. junija 2003 o spremembah Direktiv 78/660/EGS, 83/349/EGS, 86/635/EGS in 91/674/EGS o letnih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb, bank in drugih finančnih institucij ter zavarovalnic (UL L 178, 17.7.2003, str. 16)

| | Direktivo 2006/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 78/660/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb, 83/349/EGS o konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih, 86/635/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij ter 91/674/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih zavarovalnic (UL L 224, 16.8.2006, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2006/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 14. junija 2006 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 78/660/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb, 83/349/EGS o konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih, 86/635/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih bank in drugih finančnih institucij ter 91/674/EGS o letnih računovodskih izkazih in konsolidiranih računovodskih izkazih zavarovalnic (UL L 224, 16.8.2006, str. 1)

4 leta

Direktiva 94/19/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 30. maja 1994 o sistemih zajamčenih vlog (UL L 135, 31.5.1994, str. 5)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2005/1/ES z dne 9. marca 2005 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 73/239/EGS, 85/611/EGS, 91/675/EGS, 92/49/EGS in 93/6/EGS ter direktiv 94/19/ES, 98/78/ES, 2000/12/ES, 2001/34/ES, 2002/83/ES in 2002/87/ES za vzpostavitev nove organizacijske strukture odborov za finančne storitve (UL L 79, 24.3.2005, str. 9) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2005/1/ES z dne 9. marca 2005 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 73/239/EGS, 85/611/EGS, 91/675/EGS, 92/49/EGS in 93/6/EGS ter direktiv 94/19/ES, 98/78/ES, 2000/12/ES, 2001/34/ES, 2002/83/ES in 2002/87/ES za vzpostavitev nove organizacijske strukture odborov za finančne storitve (UL L 79, 24.3.2005, str. 9)

| | Direktivo 2009/14/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o spremembah Direktive 94/19/ES o sistemih zajamčenih vlog glede stopnje kritja in rokov za izplačilo (UL L 68, 13.3.2009, str. 3) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/14/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o spremembah Direktive 94/19/ES o sistemih zajamčenih vlog glede stopnje kritja in rokov za izplačilo (UL L 68, 13.3.2009, str. 3)

4 leta

Direktiva 2001/24/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 4. aprila 2001 o reorganizaciji in prenehanju kreditnih institucij (UL L 125, 5.5.2001, str. 15)

6 let

Direktiva Sveta 98/117/EGS z dne 13. februarja 1989 o obveznostih podružnic, ustanovljenih v državi članici, ki pripadajo kreditnim in finančnim institucijam, s sedežem zunaj te države članice, glede objave letnih računovodskih izkazov (UL L 44, 16.2.1989, str. 40)

6 let

Direktiva 2002/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. decembra 2002 o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu, ki spreminja direktive Sveta 73/239/EGS, 79/267/EGS, 92/49/EGS, 92/96/EGS, 93/6/EGS in 93/22/EGS ter direktivi 98/78/ES in 2000/12/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 35, 11.2.2003, str.1)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2005/1/ES z dne 9. marca 2005 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 73/239/EGS, 85/611/EGS, 91/675/EGS, 92/49/EGS in 93/6/EGS ter direktiv 94/19/ES, 98/78/ES, 2000/12/ES, 2001/34/ES, 2002/83/ES in 2002/87/ES za vzpostavitev nove organizacijske strukture odborov za finančne storitve (UL L 79, 24.3.2005, str. 9) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 2005/1/ES z dne 9. marca 2005 o spremembi direktiv Sveta 73/239/EGS, 85/611/EGS, 91/675/EGS, 92/49/EGS in 93/6/EGS ter direktiv 94/19/ES, 98/78/ES, 2000/12/ES, 2001/34/ES, 2002/83/ES in 2002/87/ES za vzpostavitev nove organizacijske strukture odborov za finančne storitve (UL L 79, 24.3.2005, str. 9)

| | Direktivo 2008/25/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2002/87/ES o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 81. 20.3.2008, str. 40) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2008/25/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2002/87/ES o dopolnilnem nadzoru kreditnih institucij, zavarovalnic in investicijskih družb v finančnem konglomeratu, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 81. 20.3.2008, str. 40)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

6 let

Direktiva 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. aprila 2004 o trgih finančnih instrumentov in o spremembah direktiv Sveta 85/611/EGS, 93/6/EGS in Direktive 2000/12/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ter o razveljavitvi Direktive Sveta 93/22/EGS (UL L 145, 30.4.2004, str. 1)

Popravek Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. aprila 2004 o trgih finančnih instrumentov in o spremembah direktiv Sveta 85/611/EGS, 93/6/EGS in Direktive 2000/12/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ter o razveljavitvi Direktive Sveta 93/22/EGS (UL L 45, 16.2.2005 str. 18)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo 2006/31/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. aprila 2006 o spremembi Direktive 2004/39/ES o trgih finančnih instrumentov glede nekaterih rokov (UL L 114, 27.4.2006, str. 60) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2006/31/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. aprila 2006 o spremembi Direktive 2004/39/ES o trgih finančnih instrumentov glede nekaterih rokov (UL L 114, 27.4.2006, str. 60)

| | Direktivo 2007/44/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. septembra 2007 o spremembah Direktive Sveta 92/49/EGS in direktiv 2002/83/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2005/68/ES in 2006/48/ES glede postopkovnih pravil in ocenjevalnih meril za skrbno oceno pri pridobitvah in zvišanju deležev v finančnem sektorju UL L 247, 21.9.2007, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2007/44/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. septembra 2007 o spremembah Direktive Sveta 92/49/EGS in direktiv 2002/83/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2005/68/ES in 2006/48/ES glede postopkovnih pravil in ocenjevalnih meril za skrbno oceno pri pridobitvah in zvišanju deležev v finančnem sektorju UL L 247, 21.9.2007, str. 1)

| | Direktivo 2008/10/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2004/39/ES o trgih finančnih instrumentov, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 33) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2008/10/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2008 o spremembah Direktive 2004/39/ES o trgih finančnih instrumentov, glede Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil (UL L 76, 19.3.2008, str. 33)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

dopolnjena z:

| | Direktivo Komisije 2006/73/ES z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z organizacijskimi zahtevami in pogoji poslovanja investicijskih družb ter opredeljenimi izrazi za namene navedene direktive (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 26) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo Komisije 2006/73/ES z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z organizacijskimi zahtevami in pogoji poslovanja investicijskih družb ter opredeljenimi izrazi za namene navedene direktive (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 26)

| | Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 1287/2006 z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z obveznostmi vodenja evidenc za investicijske družbe, poročanjem o transakcijah, tržno preglednostjo, sprejemanjem finančnih instrumentov v trgovanje in pojmi, opredeljenimi v navedeni direktivi (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 1287/2006 z dne 10. avgusta 2006 o izvajanju Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta v zvezi z obveznostmi vodenja evidenc za investicijske družbe, poročanjem o transakcijah, tržno preglednostjo, sprejemanjem finančnih instrumentov v trgovanje in pojmi, opredeljenimi v navedeni direktivi (UL L 241, 2.9.2006, str. 1)

6 let

Uredba (ES) št. 924/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. septembra 2009 o čezmejnih plačilih v Skupnosti in razveljavitvi Uredbe (ES) št. 2560/2001 (UL L 266, 9.10.2009, str. 11)

6 let

Direktiva 2002/47/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 6. junija 2002 o dogovorih o finančnem zavarovanju (UL L 168, 27.6.2002, str. 43)

spremenjena z:

Direktivo 2009/44/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 6. maja 2009 o spremembi Direktive 98/26/ES o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev in Direktive 2002/47/ES o dogovorih o finančnem zavarovanju glede povezanih sistemov in bančnih posojil, UL L 146, 10.6.2009, str. 37

6 let

Priporočilo Komisije 97/489/ES z dne 30. julija 1997 glede transakcija z elektronskimi plačilnimi instrumenti in zlasti odnosa med izdajateljem in imetnikom (UL L 208, 2.8.1997, str. 52)

6 let

Direktiva 97/9/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 3. marca 1997 o odškodninskih shemah za vlagatelje (UL L 84, 26.3.1997, str. 22)

6 let

Direktiva 98/26/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. maja 1998 o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev (UL L 166, 11.6.1998, str. 45)

spremenjena z:

| | Direktivo 2009/44/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 6. maja 2009 o spremembi Direktive 98/26/ES o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev in Direktive 2002/47/ES o dogovorih o finančnem zavarovanju glede povezanih sistemov in bančnih posojil (UL L 146, 10.6.2009, str. 37) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2009/44/ES Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 6. maja 2009 o spremembi Direktive 98/26/ES o dokončnosti poravnave pri plačilih in sistemih poravnave vrednostnih papirjev in Direktive 2002/47/ES o dogovorih o finančnem zavarovanju glede povezanih sistemov in bančnih posojil (UL L 146, 10.6.2009, str. 37)

| | Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120) |
| --- | --- |

Direktivo 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

6 let

Direktiva 2010/78/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o spremembi direktiv 98/26/ES, 2002/87/ES, 2003/6/ES, 2003/41/ES, 2003/71/ES, 2004/39/ES, 2004/109/ES, 2005/60/ES, 2006/48/ES, 2006/49/ES in 2009/65/ES glede pristojnosti Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ), Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine) ter Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 120)

4 leta

Uredba (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski bančni organ) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/78/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 12)

4 leta

Uredba (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o ustanovitvi Evropskega nadzornega organa (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) in o spremembi Sklepa št. 716/2009/ES ter razveljavitvi Sklepa Komisije 2009/77/ES (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 84)

4 leta

Uredba (EU) št. 1092/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. novembra 2010 o makrobonitetnem nadzoru nad finančnim sistemom Evropske unije in ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 1)

4 leta

Uredba Sveta (EU) št. 1096/2010 z dne 17. novembra 2010 o dodelitvi posebnih nalog Evropski centralni banki v zvezi z delovanjem Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (UL L 331, 15.12.2010, str. 162)

4 leta

Zakonodaja o zbiranju statističnih podatkov (člen 6.1 mandata)

Uredba (ES) št. 25/2009 Evropske centralne banke z dne 19. decembra 2008 o bilanci stanja sektorja denarnih finančnih institucij (preoblikovano) (ECB/2008/32) (UL L 15, 20.1.2009, str. 14)

spremenjena z:

Uredbo (EU) št. 883/2011 z dne 25. avgusta 2011 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 25/2009 o bilanci stanja sektorja denarnih finančnih institucij (preoblikovano) (ECB/2008/32) (UL L 228, 3.9.2011, str. 13)

4 leta

Uredba (ES) št. 63/2002 Evropske centralne banke z dne 20. decembra 2001 o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2001/18) (UL L 10, 12.1.2002, str. 24)

spremenjena z:

| | Uredbo (EU) št. 674/2010 Evropske centralne banke z dne 23. julija 2010 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2010/7) (UL L 196, 28.7.2010, str. 23) |
| --- | --- |

Uredbo (EU) št. 674/2010 Evropske centralne banke z dne 23. julija 2010 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2010/7) (UL L 196, 28.7.2010, str. 23)

| | Uredbo (EU) št. 290/2009 Evropske centralne banke z dne 31. marca 2009 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2009/7) (UL L 94, 8.4.2009, str. 75) |
| --- | --- |

Uredbo (EU) št. 290/2009 Evropske centralne banke z dne 31. marca 2009 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2009/7) (UL L 94, 8.4.2009, str. 75)

| | Uredbo Evropske centralne banke (ES) št. 2181/2004, z dne 16. decembra 2004 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 2423/2001 (ECB/2001/13) o konsolidirani bilanci stanja v sektorju monetarnih finančnih institucij in Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2004/21) (UL L 371, 18.12.2004, str. 42) |
| --- | --- |

Uredbo Evropske centralne banke (ES) št. 2181/2004, z dne 16. decembra 2004 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 2423/2001 (ECB/2001/13) o konsolidirani bilanci stanja v sektorju monetarnih finančnih institucij in Uredbe (ES) št. 63/2002 (ECB/2001/18) o statistiki obrestnih mer, ki jih monetarne finančne institucije uporabljajo za vloge in posojila v razmerju do gospodinjstev in nefinančnih družb (ECB/2004/21) (UL L 371, 18.12.2004, str. 42)

4 leta

Smernica Evropske centralne banke ECB/2007/9 z dne 1. avgusta 2007 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (preoblikovano) (UL L 341, 27.12.2007, str. 1)

Popravek Smernice Evropske centralne banke ECB/2007/9 z dne 1. avgusta 2007 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (preoblikovano) (UL L 84, 26.3.2008, str. 393)

spremenjena s:

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2008/31 z dne 19. decembra 2008 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (preoblikovano) (UL L 53, 26.2.2009, str. 76) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2008/31 z dne 19. decembra 2008 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (preoblikovano) (UL L 53, 26.2.2009, str. 76)

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2009/23 z dne 4. decembra 2009 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (UL L 16, 21.1.2010, str. 6) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2009/23 z dne 4. decembra 2009 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (UL L 16, 21.1.2010, str. 6)

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2011/13 z dne 25. avgusta 2011 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (UL L 228, 3.9.2011, str. 37) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2011/13 z dne 25. avgusta 2011 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2007/9 o denarni statistiki, statistiki finančnih institucij in statistiki finančnih trgov (UL L 228, 3.9.2011, str. 37)

4 leta

Smernica Evropske centralne banke ECB/2002/7 z dne 21. novembra 2002 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 334, 11.12.2002, str. 24)

spremenjena s:

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2005/13 z dne 17. novembra 2005 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 30, 2.2.2006, str. 1) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2005/13 z dne 17. novembra 2005 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 30, 2.2.2006, str. 1)

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2006/6 z dne 20. aprila 2006 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 115, 28.4.2006, str. 46) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2006/6 z dne 20. aprila 2006 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 115, 28.4.2006, str. 46)

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2007/13 z dne 15. novembra 2007 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 311, 29.11.2007, str. 47) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2007/13 z dne 15. novembra 2007 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 311, 29.11.2007, str. 47)

| | Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2008/6 z dne 26. avgusta 2008 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 259, 27.9.2008, str. 12) |
| --- | --- |

Smernico Evropske centralne banke ECB/2008/6 z dne 26. avgusta 2008 o spremembah Smernice ECB/2002/7 o zahtevah Evropske centralne banke glede statističnega poročanja na področju četrtletnih finančnih računov (UL L 259, 27.9.2008, str. 12)

4 leta

---

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/18

---

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2012/C 121/03

Komisija se je 23. marca 2012 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6513. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6513. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

---

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/18

---

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2012/C 121/04

Komisija se je 11. aprila 2012 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6479. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6479. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

---

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/19

---

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2012/C 121/05

Komisija se je 17. aprila 2012 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6533. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32012M6533. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

---

IV Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/20 |
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Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

25. aprila 2012

2012/C 121/06

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,3206 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 107,35 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4399 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,81940 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 8,8958 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,2018 |
| ISK | islandska krona | |
| NOK | norveška krona | 7,5625 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka krona | 24,804 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 287,83 |
| LTL | litovski litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | latvijski lats | 0,6993 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,1738 |
| RON | romunski leu | 4,3765 |
| TRY | turška lira | 2,3417 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,2771 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,3016 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 10,2468 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,6217 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,6440 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 506,66 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 10,2555 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 8,3269 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,5325 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 12 149,96 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,0408 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 56,314 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 38,7490 |
| THB | tajski bat | 40,859 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 2,4784 |
| MXN | mehiški peso | 17,3461 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 69,3910 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,3206

JPY

japonski jen

107,35

DKK

danska krona

7,4399

GBP

funt šterling

0,81940

SEK

švedska krona

8,8958

CHF

švicarski frank

1,2018

ISK

islandska krona

NOK

norveška krona

7,5625

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

češka krona

24,804

HUF

madžarski forint

287,83

LTL

litovski litas

3,4528

LVL

latvijski lats

0,6993

PLN

poljski zlot

4,1738

RON

romunski leu

4,3765

TRY

turška lira

2,3417

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,2771

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,3016

HKD

hongkonški dolar

10,2468

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,6217

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,6440

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 506,66

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

10,2555

CNY

kitajski juan

8,3269

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,5325

IDR

indonezijska rupija

12 149,96

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,0408

PHP

filipinski peso

56,314

RUB

ruski rubelj

38,7490

THB

tajski bat

40,859

BRL

brazilski real

2,4784

MXN

mehiški peso

17,3461

INR

indijska rupija

69,3910

---

(1)  Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

---

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/21 |
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Sporočilo Komisije o postopku iz člena 1(4) Direktive Sveta 96/67/ES

2012/C 121/07

V skladu z določbami člena 1(4) Direktive Sveta 96/67/ES z dne 15. oktobra 1996 o dostopu do trga storitev zemeljske oskrbe na letališčih Skupnosti (1) mora Komisija informativno objaviti seznam letališč, navedenih v Direktivi.

| | Letališča, katerih letni promet je v letu 2010 večji od 2 milijonov potnikov ali 50 000 ton tovora | Druga letališča, ki so v letu 2010 odprta za komercialni promet |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Avstrija | Wien/Schwechat | Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck |
| Belgija | Brussels National, Charleroi–Brussels South, Liège–Bierset, Oostende–Brugge | Antwerpen, Kortrijk–Wevelgem |
| Bolgarija | Sofia | Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, Gorna Oriahovitsa |
| Ciper | Larnaka | Paphos |
| Češka | Praha/Ruzyně | Bmo/Tuřany, Karlovy Vary, Mnichovo Hradiště, Ostrava Mošnov, Pardubice, Olomouc, Benešov, Broumov, Břeclav, Bubovice, Česká Lípa, České Budějovice, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Havlíčkův Brod, Hodkovice nad Mohelkou, Hořice, Hosín, Hradec Králové, Hranice, Cheb, Chomutov, Chotěboř, Chrudim, Jaroměř, Jičín, Jihlava, Jindřichův Hradec, Kladno, Klatovy, Kolín, Krnov, Křižanov, Kyjov, Letkov, Letňany, Mariánské lázně, Medlánky, Mikulovice, Mladá Boleslav, Moravská Třebová, Most, Nové Město nad Metují, Panenský Týnec, Plasy, Podbořany, Policka, Příbram, Přibyslav, Rakovník, Raná, Roudnice, Sazená, Skuteč, Slaný, Soběslav, Staňkov, Strakonice, Strunkovice, Šumperk, Tábor, Točná, Toužím, Ústí nad Orlicí, Velké Pončí, Vlašim, Vrchlabí, Vysoké Mýto, Vyškov, Zábřeh, Zbraslavice, Žamberk |
| Danska | Letališče København, Letališče Billund | Letališče Aalborg, Letališče Aarhus, Letališče Esbjerg, Letališče Bornholm, Letališče Karup, Letališče Sønderborg, Letališče Thisted, Letališče Roskilde |
| Estonija | | Lennart Meri Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Kärdla, Kuressaare, |
| Finska | Helsinki–Vantaa | Enontekiö, Halli, Helsinki–Malmi, Ivalo, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kauhava, Kemi–Tornio, Kittilä, Kokkola–Pietarsaari, Kuopio, Kuusamo, Lappeenranta, Maarianhamina, Oulu, Pori, Savonlinna, Rovaniemi, Tampere–Pirkkala, Turku, Utti, Vaasa, Varkaus, Mikkeli, Seinäjoki |
| Francija | Paris–CDG, Paris–Orly, Nice–Côte d’Azur, Lyon–Saint Exupéry, Marseille–Provence, Toulouse–Blagnac, Bâle–Mulhouse, Bordeaux–Mérignac, Nantes–Atlantique, Beauvais–Tille | Pointe-à-Pitre–Le Raizet, Strasbourg Entzheim, Martinique Aimé Césaire, La Réunion Roland Garros, Montpellier–Méditerranée, Lille Lesquin, Ajaccio Napoléon Bonaparte, Bastia Poretta, Biarritz–Anglet–Bayonne, Brest–Bretagne, Pau Pyrénées, Hyères Le Palyvestre, Tarbes–Lourdes–Pyrénées, Grenoble Isère, Carcassonne, Rennes St Jacques, Perpignan–Rivesaltes, Figari Sud Corse, Cayenne Rochambeau, Clermont–Ferrand–Auvergne, Limoges, Calvi Ste Catherine, Bergerac Roumanière, Chambéry/Aix-les-Bains, Dzaoudzi Pamandzi, Metz Nancy Lorraine, St Martin Grand Case, Lorient–Lann–Bihoue, Nîmes/ArlesCamargue, La Rochelle Île de Ré, St Barthélémy, Dinard–Pleurtuit–St-Malo, Rodez Marcillac, St Pierre Pierrefonds, Quimper–Cornouaille, Tours–Val de Loire, Poitiers–Biard–Futuroscope, Paris Le Bourget, Caen Carpiquet, Béziers–Vias, Deauville Normandie, Annecy–Meythet, Le Havre Octeville, St Pierre–Pointe Blanche, Lannion, Avignon Caumont, Castres Mazamet, Angoulême, Agen La Garenne, Maripasoula, Rouen-Vallée de Seine, Aurillac Tronquières, Brive Souillac, St Etienne Bouthéon, Cannes Mandelieu, Miquelon, Saint Nazaire Montoir, Dijon Bourgogne |
| Nemčija | Berlin–Tegel, Schönefeld, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt-Main, Hahn, Hamburg, Hannover–Langenhagen, Köln–Bonn, Leipzig, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Weeze | Augsburg, Altenburg–Nobitz, Borkum, Braunschweig, Dortmund, Dresden, Erfurt, Friedrichshafen, Heringsdorf, Hof–Plauen, Karlsruhe–Baden-Baden, Kassel–Calden, Kiel–Holtenau, Lübeck–Blankensee, Mannheim City, Memmingen, Mönchengladbach, Münster–Osnabrück, Paderborn–Lippstadt, Saarbrücken–Ensheim, Rostock–Laage, Schwerin–Parchim, Siegerland, Westerland–Sylt, Zweibrücken (2) |
| Grčija | Atene, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos | Corfu–Kerkyra, Kos, Chania, Zante, Alexandroupoulis, Aktio, Araxos, Kalamata, Kalymnos, Kastoria, Kavala, Kozani, Aghialos, Astypalaia, Chios, Ioannina, Ikaria, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kefalonia, Kithira, Leros, Limnos, Mykonos, Milos, Mytilene, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Santorini, Syros, Sitia, Skiathos, Skyros |
| Madžarska | Budapest Ferihegy | Pécs–Pogány Repülőtér, Győr–Pér Repülőtér, Fly Balaton Repülőtér Sármellék, Letališče Debrecen |
| Irska | Letališče Dublin, Letališče Cork | Letališče Shannon, Letališče Donegal, Ireland West Airport Knock, Letališče Kerry, Letališče Galway, Letališče Sligo in Letališče Waterford |
| Italija | Roma–Fiumicino, Milano–Malpensa, Milano–Linate, Bergamo Orio al Serio, Venezia Tessera, Catania Fontanarossa, Napoli Capodichino, Bologna Borgo Panigale, Roma–Ciampino, Palermo Punta Raisi, Pisa San Giustio, Cagliari Elmas, Torino Caselle, Verona Villafranca, Bari Palese, Treviso | Firenze, Lametia Terme, Olbia, Alghero, Genova, Brindisi, Trapani, Trieste, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, Ancona, Pescara, Rimini, Parma, Brescia, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Cuneo, Perugia, Foggia, Crotone, Bolzano, Elba, Grosseto, Salerno, Albenga, Siena, Taranto, Tortoli |
| Latvija | Mednarodno letališče Riga | Letališče Liepaja, letališče Ventspils |
| Litva | | Mednarodno letališče Vilnius, Mednarodno letališče Palanga, Mednarodno letališče Kaunas, Vojaško letališče Siauliai |
| Luksemburg | Luxembourg Findel | |
| Malta | Mednarodno letališče Luqa–Malta | |
| Nizozemska | Amsterdam–Schiphol, Maastricht–Aachen, Eindhoven | Groningen–Eelde, Rotterdam |
| Poljska | Chopina w Warszawie, Kraków–Balice, Katowice–Pyrzowice, Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy | Wrocław–Strachowice, Poznań–Ławica, Łódź–Lublinek, Szczecin–Goleniów, Bydgoszcz–Szwederowo, Rzeszów–Jasionka, Zielona Góra–Babimost |
| Portugalska | Lisbona, Faro, Oporto, Madeira | Ponta Delgada, Porto Santo, Horta, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Pico, São Jorge, Flores, Corvo, Bragança, Vila Real, Cascais, Lajes. |
| Romunija | Mednarodno letališče Henri Coandă–București, Mednarodno letališče București Băneasa–Aurel Vlaicu | Mednarodno letališče Timișoara–Traian Vuia, Mednarodno letališče Mihail Kogălniceanu–Constanța, Letališče Arad, Letališče George Enescu–Bacău, Letališče Baia Mare, Letališče Cluj-Napoca, Letališče Craiova, Letališče Iași, Letališče Oradea, Letališče Satu Mare, Letališče Sibiu, Letališče Ștefan cel Mare–Suceava, Letališče Târgu Mureș–Transilvania, Letališče Tulcea–Delta Dunării, Letališče Tuzla |
| Slovaška | | Bratislava, Košice, Piešťany, Sliač, Poprad, Žilina |
| Slovenija | | Letališče Jožeta Pučnika Ljubljana, Letališče Edvarda Rusjana Maribor, Aerodrom Portorož |
| Španija | Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Madrid/Barajas, Málaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Tenerife Norte, Tenerife Sur, Valencia | Asturias, Coruña (A), Jerez, Murcia/San Javier, Reus, Vigo, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Albacete, Algeciras/Helipuerto Almería, Badajoz, Burgos, Ceuta/Helipuerto, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Madrid/Cuatro Vientos, Madrid/Torrejón, Gomera (La), Granada, Hierro (El), Huesca–Pirineos, León, Lleida/Alguaire, Logroño, Melilla, Palma (La), Pamplona, Sabadell, Salamanca, San Sebastián, Santander, Son Bonet, Valladolid |
| Švedska | Göteborg–Landvetter, Stockholm–Arlanda, Stockholm/Skavsta, Stockholm/Bromma | Arvidsjaur, Arvika, Borlänge, Eskilstuna, Falköping, Gällivare, Gällivare/Vassare, Gävle, Göteborg/Säve, Hagfors, Halmstad, Hemavan Tärnaby, Hultsfred–Vimmerby, Jönköping, Kalmar, Karlsborg, Karlskoga, Karlstad, Kiruna, Kiruna/Luosajärvi, Kramfors–Sollefteå, Kristianstad, Lidköping, Linköping/Malmen, Linköping/Saab, Ljungbyhed, Luleå/Kallax, Lycksele, Malmö/Sturup, Mora/Siljan, Norrköping/Kungsängen, Oskarshamn, Pajala–Ylläs, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skövde, Stockholm/Västerås, Storuman, Strömstad/Näsinge, Sundsvall–Härnösand, Sveg, Såtenäs, Söderhamn, Torsby/Fryklanda, Trollhättan–Vänesborg, Umeå, Uppsala, Vidsel, Vilhelmina, Visby, Växjö/Kronoberg, Åre–Östersund, Ängelholm, Örebro, Örnsköldsvik |
| Združeno kraljestvo | Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Luton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, Prestwick, East Midlands International, Southampton, Belfast International, London City, Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds Bradford | Barra, Benbecula, Biggin Hill, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Cambridge, Campbeltown, Cardiff Wales, City of Derry, Doncaster Sheffield, Durham Tees Valley, Exeter, Farnborough, Gloucestershire, Humberside, Inverness, Islay, Isles of Scilly, Kirkwall, Lands End, Lerwick, Lydd, Manston, Newquay, Norwich, Oxford, Penzance Heliport, Plymouth, Scatsa, Shoreham, Southend, Stornoway, Sumburgh, Tiree, Wick |

Letališča, katerih letni promet je v letu 2010 večji od 2 milijonov potnikov ali 50 000 ton tovora

Druga letališča, ki so v letu 2010 odprta za komercialni promet

Avstrija

Wien/Schwechat

Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck

Belgija

Brussels National, Charleroi–Brussels South, Liège–Bierset, Oostende–Brugge

Antwerpen, Kortrijk–Wevelgem

Bolgarija

Sofia

Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, Gorna Oriahovitsa

Ciper

Larnaka

Paphos

Češka

Praha/Ruzyně

Bmo/Tuřany, Karlovy Vary, Mnichovo Hradiště, Ostrava Mošnov, Pardubice, Olomouc, Benešov, Broumov, Břeclav, Bubovice, Česká Lípa, České Budějovice, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Havlíčkův Brod, Hodkovice nad Mohelkou, Hořice, Hosín, Hradec Králové, Hranice, Cheb, Chomutov, Chotěboř, Chrudim, Jaroměř, Jičín, Jihlava, Jindřichův Hradec, Kladno, Klatovy, Kolín, Krnov, Křižanov, Kyjov, Letkov, Letňany, Mariánské lázně, Medlánky, Mikulovice, Mladá Boleslav, Moravská Třebová, Most, Nové Město nad Metují, Panenský Týnec, Plasy, Podbořany, Policka, Příbram, Přibyslav, Rakovník, Raná, Roudnice, Sazená, Skuteč, Slaný, Soběslav, Staňkov, Strakonice, Strunkovice, Šumperk, Tábor, Točná, Toužím, Ústí nad Orlicí, Velké Pončí, Vlašim, Vrchlabí, Vysoké Mýto, Vyškov, Zábřeh, Zbraslavice, Žamberk

Danska

Letališče København, Letališče Billund

Letališče Aalborg, Letališče Aarhus, Letališče Esbjerg, Letališče Bornholm, Letališče Karup, Letališče Sønderborg, Letališče Thisted, Letališče Roskilde

Estonija

Lennart Meri Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Kärdla, Kuressaare,

Finska

Helsinki–Vantaa

Enontekiö, Halli, Helsinki–Malmi, Ivalo, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kauhava, Kemi–Tornio, Kittilä, Kokkola–Pietarsaari, Kuopio, Kuusamo, Lappeenranta, Maarianhamina, Oulu, Pori, Savonlinna, Rovaniemi, Tampere–Pirkkala, Turku, Utti, Vaasa, Varkaus, Mikkeli, Seinäjoki

Francija

Paris–CDG, Paris–Orly, Nice–Côte d’Azur, Lyon–Saint Exupéry, Marseille–Provence, Toulouse–Blagnac, Bâle–Mulhouse, Bordeaux–Mérignac, Nantes–Atlantique, Beauvais–Tille

Pointe-à-Pitre–Le Raizet, Strasbourg Entzheim, Martinique Aimé Césaire, La Réunion Roland Garros, Montpellier–Méditerranée, Lille Lesquin, Ajaccio Napoléon Bonaparte, Bastia Poretta, Biarritz–Anglet–Bayonne, Brest–Bretagne, Pau Pyrénées, Hyères Le Palyvestre, Tarbes–Lourdes–Pyrénées, Grenoble Isère, Carcassonne, Rennes St Jacques, Perpignan–Rivesaltes, Figari Sud Corse, Cayenne Rochambeau, Clermont–Ferrand–Auvergne, Limoges, Calvi Ste Catherine, Bergerac Roumanière, Chambéry/Aix-les-Bains, Dzaoudzi Pamandzi, Metz Nancy Lorraine, St Martin Grand Case, Lorient–Lann–Bihoue, Nîmes/ArlesCamargue, La Rochelle Île de Ré, St Barthélémy, Dinard–Pleurtuit–St-Malo, Rodez Marcillac, St Pierre Pierrefonds, Quimper–Cornouaille, Tours–Val de Loire, Poitiers–Biard–Futuroscope, Paris Le Bourget, Caen Carpiquet, Béziers–Vias, Deauville Normandie, Annecy–Meythet, Le Havre Octeville, St Pierre–Pointe Blanche, Lannion, Avignon Caumont, Castres Mazamet, Angoulême, Agen La Garenne, Maripasoula, Rouen-Vallée de Seine, Aurillac Tronquières, Brive Souillac, St Etienne Bouthéon, Cannes Mandelieu, Miquelon, Saint Nazaire Montoir, Dijon Bourgogne

Nemčija

Berlin–Tegel, Schönefeld, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt-Main, Hahn, Hamburg, Hannover–Langenhagen, Köln–Bonn, Leipzig, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Weeze

Augsburg, Altenburg–Nobitz, Borkum, Braunschweig, Dortmund, Dresden, Erfurt, Friedrichshafen, Heringsdorf, Hof–Plauen, Karlsruhe–Baden-Baden, Kassel–Calden, Kiel–Holtenau, Lübeck–Blankensee, Mannheim City, Memmingen, Mönchengladbach, Münster–Osnabrück, Paderborn–Lippstadt, Saarbrücken–Ensheim, Rostock–Laage, Schwerin–Parchim, Siegerland, Westerland–Sylt, Zweibrücken (2)

Grčija

Atene, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos

Corfu–Kerkyra, Kos, Chania, Zante, Alexandroupoulis, Aktio, Araxos, Kalamata, Kalymnos, Kastoria, Kavala, Kozani, Aghialos, Astypalaia, Chios, Ioannina, Ikaria, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kefalonia, Kithira, Leros, Limnos, Mykonos, Milos, Mytilene, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Santorini, Syros, Sitia, Skiathos, Skyros

Madžarska

Budapest Ferihegy

Pécs–Pogány Repülőtér, Győr–Pér Repülőtér, Fly Balaton Repülőtér Sármellék, Letališče Debrecen

Irska

Letališče Dublin, Letališče Cork

Letališče Shannon, Letališče Donegal, Ireland West Airport Knock, Letališče Kerry, Letališče Galway, Letališče Sligo in Letališče Waterford

Italija

Roma–Fiumicino, Milano–Malpensa, Milano–Linate, Bergamo Orio al Serio, Venezia Tessera, Catania Fontanarossa, Napoli Capodichino, Bologna Borgo Panigale, Roma–Ciampino, Palermo Punta Raisi, Pisa San Giustio, Cagliari Elmas, Torino Caselle, Verona Villafranca, Bari Palese, Treviso

Firenze, Lametia Terme, Olbia, Alghero, Genova, Brindisi, Trapani, Trieste, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, Ancona, Pescara, Rimini, Parma, Brescia, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Cuneo, Perugia, Foggia, Crotone, Bolzano, Elba, Grosseto, Salerno, Albenga, Siena, Taranto, Tortoli

Latvija

Mednarodno letališče Riga

Letališče Liepaja, letališče Ventspils

Litva

Mednarodno letališče Vilnius, Mednarodno letališče Palanga, Mednarodno letališče Kaunas, Vojaško letališče Siauliai

Luksemburg

Luxembourg Findel

Malta

Mednarodno letališče Luqa–Malta

Nizozemska

Amsterdam–Schiphol, Maastricht–Aachen, Eindhoven

Groningen–Eelde, Rotterdam

Poljska

Chopina w Warszawie, Kraków–Balice, Katowice–Pyrzowice, Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy

Wrocław–Strachowice, Poznań–Ławica, Łódź–Lublinek, Szczecin–Goleniów, Bydgoszcz–Szwederowo, Rzeszów–Jasionka, Zielona Góra–Babimost

Portugalska

Lisbona, Faro, Oporto, Madeira

Ponta Delgada, Porto Santo, Horta, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Pico, São Jorge, Flores, Corvo, Bragança, Vila Real, Cascais, Lajes.

Romunija

Mednarodno letališče Henri Coandă–București, Mednarodno letališče București Băneasa–Aurel Vlaicu

Mednarodno letališče Timișoara–Traian Vuia, Mednarodno letališče Mihail Kogălniceanu–Constanța, Letališče Arad, Letališče George Enescu–Bacău, Letališče Baia Mare, Letališče Cluj-Napoca, Letališče Craiova, Letališče Iași, Letališče Oradea, Letališče Satu Mare, Letališče Sibiu, Letališče Ștefan cel Mare–Suceava, Letališče Târgu Mureș–Transilvania, Letališče Tulcea–Delta Dunării, Letališče Tuzla

Slovaška

Bratislava, Košice, Piešťany, Sliač, Poprad, Žilina

Slovenija

Letališče Jožeta Pučnika Ljubljana, Letališče Edvarda Rusjana Maribor, Aerodrom Portorož

Španija

Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Madrid/Barajas, Málaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Tenerife Norte, Tenerife Sur, Valencia

Asturias, Coruña (A), Jerez, Murcia/San Javier, Reus, Vigo, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Albacete, Algeciras/Helipuerto Almería, Badajoz, Burgos, Ceuta/Helipuerto, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Madrid/Cuatro Vientos, Madrid/Torrejón, Gomera (La), Granada, Hierro (El), Huesca–Pirineos, León, Lleida/Alguaire, Logroño, Melilla, Palma (La), Pamplona, Sabadell, Salamanca, San Sebastián, Santander, Son Bonet, Valladolid

Švedska

Göteborg–Landvetter, Stockholm–Arlanda, Stockholm/Skavsta, Stockholm/Bromma

Arvidsjaur, Arvika, Borlänge, Eskilstuna, Falköping, Gällivare, Gällivare/Vassare, Gävle, Göteborg/Säve, Hagfors, Halmstad, Hemavan Tärnaby, Hultsfred–Vimmerby, Jönköping, Kalmar, Karlsborg, Karlskoga, Karlstad, Kiruna, Kiruna/Luosajärvi, Kramfors–Sollefteå, Kristianstad, Lidköping, Linköping/Malmen, Linköping/Saab, Ljungbyhed, Luleå/Kallax, Lycksele, Malmö/Sturup, Mora/Siljan, Norrköping/Kungsängen, Oskarshamn, Pajala–Ylläs, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skövde, Stockholm/Västerås, Storuman, Strömstad/Näsinge, Sundsvall–Härnösand, Sveg, Såtenäs, Söderhamn, Torsby/Fryklanda, Trollhättan–Vänesborg, Umeå, Uppsala, Vidsel, Vilhelmina, Visby, Växjö/Kronoberg, Åre–Östersund, Ängelholm, Örebro, Örnsköldsvik

Združeno kraljestvo

Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Luton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, Prestwick, East Midlands International, Southampton, Belfast International, London City, Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds Bradford

Barra, Benbecula, Biggin Hill, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Cambridge, Campbeltown, Cardiff Wales, City of Derry, Doncaster Sheffield, Durham Tees Valley, Exeter, Farnborough, Gloucestershire, Humberside, Inverness, Islay, Isles of Scilly, Kirkwall, Lands End, Lerwick, Lydd, Manston, Newquay, Norwich, Oxford, Penzance Heliport, Plymouth, Scatsa, Shoreham, Southend, Stornoway, Sumburgh, Tiree, Wick

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(1)  UL L 272, 25.10.1996, str. 36.

(2)  Letališča z letnim prometom manj kot 10 000 potnikov niso navedena.

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Računsko sodišče

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26.4.2012

SL

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C 121/24

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Posebno poročilo št. 4/2012 – Uporaba strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada za sofinanciranje prometne infrastrukture v morskih pristaniščih: uspešna naložba?

2012/C 121/08

Evropsko računsko sodišče vas obvešča, da je bilo pravkar objavljeno Posebno poročilo št. 4/2012 – Uporaba strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada za sofinanciranje prometne infrastrukture v morskih pristaniščih: uspešna naložba?

Poročilo lahko preberete na spletni strani Evropskega računskega sodišča ali si ga z nje prenesete: http://eca.europa.eu

Poročilo v tiskani različici lahko dobite brezplačno, če naslovite zahtevo na Računsko sodišče:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’ |
| 12, rue Alcide de Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| E-naslov: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Unit ‘Audit: Production of Reports’

12, rue Alcide de Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

E-naslov: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

ali tako, da izpolnite elektronsko naročilnico na spletni strani EU-Bookshop.

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INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorni organ Efte

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26.4.2012

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C 121/25

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Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o prodaji pravice občine Narvik do električne energije po znižani ceni družbi Narvik Energi AS („NEAS“) v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča

2012/C 121/09

Z Odločbo št. 393/11/COL z dne 14. decembra 2011 v verodostojnem jeziku na straneh, ki sledijo temu povzetku, je Nadzorni organ Efte začel postopek v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča. Norveškim organom je bil v vednost poslan izvod odločbe.

Nadzorni organ Efte poziva države Efte, države članice EU in zainteresirane strani, naj predložijo svoje pripombe o zadevnem ukrepu v enem mesecu od objave tega obvestila na naslednji naslov:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Pripombe se pošljejo norveškim organom. Zainteresirana stran, ki predloži pripombe, lahko pisno zaprosi za zaupno obravnavo svoje identitete in navede razloge za to.

POVZETEK

Postopek

Z dopisom z dne 7. januarja 2009 je bila vložena pritožba proti občini Narvik (v nadaljnjem besedilu: občina) v zvezi s prodajo pravice občine Narvik do električne energije po znižani ceni družbi Narvik Energi AS (v nadaljnjem besedilu: družba NEAS). Nadzorni organ je dopis prejel in evidentiral 14. januarja 2009 (ev. št. 504391).

Nadzorni organ je z dopisom z dne 16. julija 2009 (ev. št. 519710) od norveških organov zahteval dodatne informacije. Norveški organi so v dopisu z dne 2. oktobra 2009 (ev. št. 532247) poslali zahtevane informacije.

Ocena ukrepa

Občina Narvik in družba Narvik Energi AS sta dne 16. oktobra 2000 sklenili pogodbo, na podlagi katere je občina družbi NEAS prodala svojo pravico do električne energije po znižani ceni za obdobje 50 let in pol za 126 milijonov NOK. Nadzorni organ je ocenil verjetnost, da je bila transakcija izvedena v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu, tj. ali je občina pravico do električne energije po znižani ceni prodala po tržni ceni, ter ali bi bili cena in pogoji transakcije sprejemljivi za zasebnega vlagatelja, ki posluje v tržnem gospodarstvu.

Nadzorni organ ima pomisleke glede merila za primerjavo zadevne pogodbe. Poleg tega so obstajala znatna regulativna in tržna tveganja, ki bi lahko vplivala na ključne spremenljivke/predpostavke v modelih vrednotenja, ki so se uporabili pri oceni cene te pravice. Zato se ocene vrednosti zunanjih svetovalcev gibajo med 70 milijonov NOK in 145 milijonov NOK. Relativno širok razpon vrednosti bi lahko pomenil, da je dejanska tržna vrednost dobrine za obdobje 50 let negotova.

Nadzorni organ je poudaril tudi, da se ni organiziral noben odprt in konkurenčni razpisni postopek, niti pred niti po vključitvi klavzul o prilagoditvi cen v pogodbo.

Nadzorni organ poziva norveške organe, naj predložijo dovolj informacij, da dokažejo, da je bila pogodba sklenjena v skladu z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu in torej ni šlo za državno pomoč.

Zaključek

Glede na zgornje navedbe ima nadzorni organ pomisleke glede skladnosti pogodbe med občino in družbo NEAS z načelom vlagatelja v tržnem gospodarstvu ter na tej stopnji ne more izključiti možnosti, da omenjeni dogovor ne zajema državne pomoči v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP.

Nadzorni organ je zato sklenil sprožiti formalni postopek preiskave na podlagi člena 1(2) Sporazuma EGP. Zainteresirane strani lahko predložijo svoje pripombe v enem mesecu od datuma objave tega obvestila v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 393/11/COL

of 14 December 2011

to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3 SCA’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 13(1) of Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the Authority’s Decision of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (1).

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 7 January 2009, a complaint was filed against Narvik municipality (‘the municipality’) regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS (‘NEAS’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 January 2009 (Event No 504391). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 7 January 2009, a complaint was filed against Narvik municipality (‘the municipality’) regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS (‘NEAS’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 January 2009 (Event No 504391).

| (2) | By letter dated 16 July 2009 (Event No 519710), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 2 October 2009 (Event No 532247), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 16 July 2009 (Event No 519710), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 2 October 2009 (Event No 532247), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The complaint

| (3) | According to the complaint, on 16 October 2000 the municipality entered into a contract with NEAS for the sale of 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years. For this, NEAS paid the municipality one upfront lump sum of NOK 126 million. The contract, that was entered into after negotiation between the contracting parties and without a competitive tender procedure, contained no index adjustment or other price adjustment clauses. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

According to the complaint, on 16 October 2000 the municipality entered into a contract with NEAS for the sale of 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years. For this, NEAS paid the municipality one upfront lump sum of NOK 126 million. The contract, that was entered into after negotiation between the contracting parties and without a competitive tender procedure, contained no index adjustment or other price adjustment clauses.

| (4) | The complainant further alleges that the decision to enter into the contract was adopted by Narvik Municipal Council on the basis of incorrect and/or incomplete information. Allegedly expert reports critical of the duration of the contract and the inherent difficulty in establishing a market price for electricity were not disclosed to the Municipal Council prior to taking the decision to enter into the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The complainant further alleges that the decision to enter into the contract was adopted by Narvik Municipal Council on the basis of incorrect and/or incomplete information. Allegedly expert reports critical of the duration of the contract and the inherent difficulty in establishing a market price for electricity were not disclosed to the Municipal Council prior to taking the decision to enter into the contract.

| (5) | The complainant argues that the market price for the concession power over the contract period is significantly higher than NOK 126 million. Therefore the contract involves State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The complainant argues that the market price for the concession power over the contract period is significantly higher than NOK 126 million. Therefore the contract involves State aid.

| (6) | The contract that forms the subject of the complaint is entitled ‘Lease of concession power for a period of 50,5 years ...’ (2). However, throughout this Decision the Authority will refer to the contract as a contract of sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power. The Authority will, in its preliminary assessment, assess not only the contract but also all supplementary agreements to it, as well as any other circumstances surrounding and related to the sale. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The contract that forms the subject of the complaint is entitled ‘Lease of concession power for a period of 50,5 years ...’ (2). However, throughout this Decision the Authority will refer to the contract as a contract of sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power. The Authority will, in its preliminary assessment, assess not only the contract but also all supplementary agreements to it, as well as any other circumstances surrounding and related to the sale.

3.   Background

3.1.   
  Concession power regime

| (7) | Any municipality which has hydropower production within its borders is entitled to receive an annual amount of concession power from concessionaires for waterfall exploitation. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Any municipality which has hydropower production within its borders is entitled to receive an annual amount of concession power from concessionaires for waterfall exploitation.

| (8) | The system of concession power is laid down in Section 2(12) of the Industrial Licensing Act (3) and Section 12(15) of the Waterfalls Regulation Act (4). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The system of concession power is laid down in Section 2(12) of the Industrial Licensing Act (3) and Section 12(15) of the Waterfalls Regulation Act (4).

| (9) | Each municipality’s entitlement to concession power is decided on the basis of its ‘general electric power supply needs’ (5) and can be up to 10 per cent of a plant’s yearly production. The legal basis for the municipalities’ right to concession power, referred to above, states that municipalities may dispose of the concession power as they see fit (irrespective of the fact that the amount to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of their ‘general electric power supply needs’). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Each municipality’s entitlement to concession power is decided on the basis of its ‘general electric power supply needs’ (5) and can be up to 10 per cent of a plant’s yearly production. The legal basis for the municipalities’ right to concession power, referred to above, states that municipalities may dispose of the concession power as they see fit (irrespective of the fact that the amount to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of their ‘general electric power supply needs’).

| (10) | The price paid by the municipalities for the concession power is determined on an annual basis by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). The municipalities also carry the costs of feeding the concession power into the grid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The price paid by the municipalities for the concession power is determined on an annual basis by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). The municipalities also carry the costs of feeding the concession power into the grid.

| (11) | The majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019.

3.2.   
  Narvik municipality and the contract with Narvik Energi AS

| (12) | Narvik municipality is located in the county of Nordland. NEAS is a company that is active in the production and sale of electricity. NEAS was 100 per cent owned by the municipality until 2001, when the municipality reduced its ownership stake in the company to 50,01 per cent. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Narvik municipality is located in the county of Nordland. NEAS is a company that is active in the production and sale of electricity. NEAS was 100 per cent owned by the municipality until 2001, when the municipality reduced its ownership stake in the company to 50,01 per cent.

| (13) | In 1999, Narvik municipality had the right to purchase approximately 128 GWh of concession power annually. Approximately 10 per cent of this concession power was generated by NEAS, while the remaining 90 per cent was generated by other hydropower companies within the municipality (in which Narvik municipality had no stake). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In 1999, Narvik municipality had the right to purchase approximately 128 GWh of concession power annually. Approximately 10 per cent of this concession power was generated by NEAS, while the remaining 90 per cent was generated by other hydropower companies within the municipality (in which Narvik municipality had no stake).

| (14) | Historically, the municipality had sold its concession power to NEAS under short- or longer-term contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Historically, the municipality had sold its concession power to NEAS under short- or longer-term contracts.

| (15) | After the expiry of a three-year contract on 31 December 1998, the parties could not reach an agreement as to the prolongation of the contract. Until the concession power price for 1999 was published on 26 March 1999, the municipality therefore sold its concession power on a power exchange at spot prices. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

After the expiry of a three-year contract on 31 December 1998, the parties could not reach an agreement as to the prolongation of the contract. Until the concession power price for 1999 was published on 26 March 1999, the municipality therefore sold its concession power on a power exchange at spot prices.

| (16) | In March 1999, with knowledge of the concession power price for that year, the municipality arranged a tender procedure for the sale of its concession power for the remainder of 1999. On 30 March 1999, the Municipal Council sold this concession power to the highest bidder, Kraftinor, for a price of NOK 109,50/MWh. Since the municipality itself paid NOK 111,10/MWh plus feeding costs of NOK 20/MWh for the concession power, the municipality incurred a loss of approximately NOK 2,3 million under this contract (compared to a budgeted surplus of NOK 3,5 million). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In March 1999, with knowledge of the concession power price for that year, the municipality arranged a tender procedure for the sale of its concession power for the remainder of 1999. On 30 March 1999, the Municipal Council sold this concession power to the highest bidder, Kraftinor, for a price of NOK 109,50/MWh. Since the municipality itself paid NOK 111,10/MWh plus feeding costs of NOK 20/MWh for the concession power, the municipality incurred a loss of approximately NOK 2,3 million under this contract (compared to a budgeted surplus of NOK 3,5 million).

| (17) | According to the Norwegian authorities, electricity prices had been falling for several years and had reached their lowest point in 1998, but had picked up again in 1999. In 1999, the difference between concession power price and market price was, however, relatively small. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

According to the Norwegian authorities, electricity prices had been falling for several years and had reached their lowest point in 1998, but had picked up again in 1999. In 1999, the difference between concession power price and market price was, however, relatively small.

| (18) | Due to the volatile and relatively low electricity spot prices, it was decided in a Municipal Council meeting held on 30 March 1999 that a long-term strategy for the future handling of the municipality’s concession power was to be developed and presented to the Municipal Council in August 1999. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Due to the volatile and relatively low electricity spot prices, it was decided in a Municipal Council meeting held on 30 March 1999 that a long-term strategy for the future handling of the municipality’s concession power was to be developed and presented to the Municipal Council in August 1999.

| (19) | On 15 October 1999, the municipal administration proposed a strategy for the future handling of the concession power to the Municipal Council executive committee (‘Executive Committee’). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

On 15 October 1999, the municipal administration proposed a strategy for the future handling of the concession power to the Municipal Council executive committee (‘Executive Committee’).

| (20) | On 19 October 1999, the Executive Committee confirmed the proposal of the administration and recommended to the Municipal Council that the overall goal for handling the municipality’s concession power should be ‘to maximize return on a long-term basis in order to obtain a stable planning horizon with less uncertainty from year to year (6).’ The proposed strategy for achieving this goal had four elements:






  1. | Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return, however with adjustment clauses that give additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(20)

On 19 October 1999, the Executive Committee confirmed the proposal of the administration and recommended to the Municipal Council that the overall goal for handling the municipality’s concession power should be ‘to maximize return on a long-term basis in order to obtain a stable planning horizon with less uncertainty from year to year (6).’ The proposed strategy for achieving this goal had four elements:

1.

Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return, however with adjustment clauses that give additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period;

| 2. | Concession power is sold under different contracts of different lengths to diversify risk; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Concession power is sold under different contracts of different lengths to diversify risk;

| 3. | The mayor is granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council; and |
| --- | --- |

3.

The mayor is granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council; and

| 4. | Profits from the sale of the concession power is deposited into a fund to be dispersed according to decisions by the Municipal Council. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Profits from the sale of the concession power is deposited into a fund to be dispersed according to decisions by the Municipal Council.

| (21) | The strategy proposal was discussed on 25 November 1999 as Municipal Council Case 99/52 (‘Strategy for handling of concession power’). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The strategy proposal was discussed on 25 November 1999 as Municipal Council Case 99/52 (‘Strategy for handling of concession power’).

| (22) | The Municipal Council confirmed the recommendation of the Executive Committee with one adjustment, suggested by the mayor and confirmed by way of an amendment to the strategy: instead of the mayor being explicitly ‘granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council’, the final decision stated that ‘as a first step in executing this strategy, NEAS is invited to discuss their interest in the matter as outlined in their letter to the municipality dated 9 November (7).’ |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Municipal Council confirmed the recommendation of the Executive Committee with one adjustment, suggested by the mayor and confirmed by way of an amendment to the strategy: instead of the mayor being explicitly ‘granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council’, the final decision stated that ‘as a first step in executing this strategy, NEAS is invited to discuss their interest in the matter as outlined in their letter to the municipality dated 9 November (7).’

| (23) | The letter from NEAS dated 9 November questioned the proposed strategy of selling the concession power under different contracts of different lengths to spread risk. Instead, NEAS suggested one long-term contract (‘for example 50 years’ (8)) and was open to including a price adjustment clause in the contract with Narvik Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The letter from NEAS dated 9 November questioned the proposed strategy of selling the concession power under different contracts of different lengths to spread risk. Instead, NEAS suggested one long-term contract (‘for example 50 years’ (8)) and was open to including a price adjustment clause in the contract with Narvik Municipality.

| (24) | According to the documentation provided by the Norwegian authorities, NEAS had also proposed this type of contract earlier in the process. In a letter dated 15 April 1999, NEAS had approached the municipality stating its interest in entering into a long-term contract regarding the concession power, primarily through a purchase with an upfront lump sum payment, or alternatively as a long-term lease — suggested initially at 60 years — with annual payments to Narvik Municipality (9). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

According to the documentation provided by the Norwegian authorities, NEAS had also proposed this type of contract earlier in the process. In a letter dated 15 April 1999, NEAS had approached the municipality stating its interest in entering into a long-term contract regarding the concession power, primarily through a purchase with an upfront lump sum payment, or alternatively as a long-term lease — suggested initially at 60 years — with annual payments to Narvik Municipality (9).

| (25) | Aside from the issue of the concession power, there were also discussions about NEAS’ future role in the market, and the municipality’s role as the owner of NEAS (10). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Aside from the issue of the concession power, there were also discussions about NEAS’ future role in the market, and the municipality’s role as the owner of NEAS (10).

| (26) | According to the Norwegian authorities, NEAS was at the time observing extensive regional consolidation amongst power companies and the entry of national/international operators into local markets. NEAS needed to strengthen its equity base in order to acquire shares in other electricity companies, particularly Nordkraft AS. NEAS had also signed letters of intent with Hålogaland Kraft AS and Vesterålskraft AS, two local power companies, to form a regional production company and a regional energy transportation company. These changes were planned to take effect as of 1 January 2001. In order for NEAS to be able to complete these transactions with a combination of equity and borrowed capital, Narvik Municipality — NEAS’ sole owner — was expected to inject additional equity into NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

According to the Norwegian authorities, NEAS was at the time observing extensive regional consolidation amongst power companies and the entry of national/international operators into local markets. NEAS needed to strengthen its equity base in order to acquire shares in other electricity companies, particularly Nordkraft AS. NEAS had also signed letters of intent with Hålogaland Kraft AS and Vesterålskraft AS, two local power companies, to form a regional production company and a regional energy transportation company. These changes were planned to take effect as of 1 January 2001. In order for NEAS to be able to complete these transactions with a combination of equity and borrowed capital, Narvik Municipality — NEAS’ sole owner — was expected to inject additional equity into NEAS.

| (27) | On 16 December 1999, the Municipal Council discussed Case 99/65 (‘Sale of equity positions’). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

On 16 December 1999, the Municipal Council discussed Case 99/65 (‘Sale of equity positions’).

| (28) | In this meeting, the Municipal Council assessed both its ownership position in NEAS and the above-mentioned capital needs of NEAS. It was decided that the municipality’s ownership stake in NEAS, the capital needs of NEAS and the handling of concession power, should be assessed jointly by a negotiation team consisting of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the leader of the opposition, as well as the director, the deputy director and the head of procurement of the municipal administration (‘the negotiation team’). The negotiation team was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions in Cases 99/52 and 99/65, and to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this meeting, the Municipal Council assessed both its ownership position in NEAS and the above-mentioned capital needs of NEAS. It was decided that the municipality’s ownership stake in NEAS, the capital needs of NEAS and the handling of concession power, should be assessed jointly by a negotiation team consisting of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the leader of the opposition, as well as the director, the deputy director and the head of procurement of the municipal administration (‘the negotiation team’). The negotiation team was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions in Cases 99/52 and 99/65, and to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee.

| (29) | During the winter and spring of 2000, both the municipality and NEAS sought external advice concerning the valuation of the concession power, the implications of the municipality injecting capital into NEAS, as well as the municipality reducing its ownership position in NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

During the winter and spring of 2000, both the municipality and NEAS sought external advice concerning the valuation of the concession power, the implications of the municipality injecting capital into NEAS, as well as the municipality reducing its ownership position in NEAS.

| (30) | NEAS engaged Arthur Andersen (‘AA’) to make an assessment of the value of the concession power. AA’s report was delivered on 20 May 1999. It estimated a net present value (‘NPV’) of the concession power transferred for 50 years to be in the range of NOK 71,4-117,4 million with a base case value of NOK 87,7 million (11). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

NEAS engaged Arthur Andersen (‘AA’) to make an assessment of the value of the concession power. AA’s report was delivered on 20 May 1999. It estimated a net present value (‘NPV’) of the concession power transferred for 50 years to be in the range of NOK 71,4-117,4 million with a base case value of NOK 87,7 million (11).

| (31) | NEAS also commissioned a value assessment from Deloitte & Touche (‘DT’). In its report dated 3 May 2000, DT estimated the NPV of the concession power, again for 50 years, to be approximately NOK 110-130 million (12). |
| --- | --- |

(31)

NEAS also commissioned a value assessment from Deloitte & Touche (‘DT’). In its report dated 3 May 2000, DT estimated the NPV of the concession power, again for 50 years, to be approximately NOK 110-130 million (12).

| (32) | Narvik Municipality, on the other hand, initially asked Danske Securities (‘DS’) to assess whether Narvik Municipality should transfer its concession power to NEAS as a part of a restructuring process in NEAS, or if Narvik Municipality should sell the power independently. DS concluded, in a report dated 14 February 2000, that there were no economic or strategic reasons for transferring the concession power to NEAS. DS also — ‘on its own initiative’ (13) — made a value assessment of a 50-year contract, and concluded that such a contract had a value in the range of NOK 80-145 million. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Narvik Municipality, on the other hand, initially asked Danske Securities (‘DS’) to assess whether Narvik Municipality should transfer its concession power to NEAS as a part of a restructuring process in NEAS, or if Narvik Municipality should sell the power independently. DS concluded, in a report dated 14 February 2000, that there were no economic or strategic reasons for transferring the concession power to NEAS. DS also — ‘on its own initiative’ (13) — made a value assessment of a 50-year contract, and concluded that such a contract had a value in the range of NOK 80-145 million.

| (33) | DS was subsequently commissioned to perform a second assessment of the value of the concession power. In order to do so, it contacted three market participants — Statkraft SF, CBF Kraftmegling AS, and Norwegian Energy Brokers AS — and asked how they would value a 50-year concession power contract. Based on the responses, DS concluded, in a report dated 23 February 2000, that the NPV of the concession power was in the range of NOK 100-140 million (14). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

DS was subsequently commissioned to perform a second assessment of the value of the concession power. In order to do so, it contacted three market participants — Statkraft SF, CBF Kraftmegling AS, and Norwegian Energy Brokers AS — and asked how they would value a 50-year concession power contract. Based on the responses, DS concluded, in a report dated 23 February 2000, that the NPV of the concession power was in the range of NOK 100-140 million (14).

| (34) | In addition to external advice, there were also internal assessments made by the head of procurement at the municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In addition to external advice, there were also internal assessments made by the head of procurement at the municipality.

| (35) | In the first assessment presented to the Executive Committee in October 1999, he concluded that the overall risk for the municipality was high for long-term contracts defined as contracts between 10 and 40 years (15). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

In the first assessment presented to the Executive Committee in October 1999, he concluded that the overall risk for the municipality was high for long-term contracts defined as contracts between 10 and 40 years (15).

| (36) | In his second assessment, presented to the negotiation team on 16 March 2000, various options for handling the concession power were discussed. By this time, however, the negotiation team had narrowed the scope of his mandate (16). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In his second assessment, presented to the negotiation team on 16 March 2000, various options for handling the concession power were discussed. By this time, however, the negotiation team had narrowed the scope of his mandate (16).

| (37) | Notwithstanding this, in his second assessment, the head of procurement continued to focus on the importance of the length of the contract. His assessment of the marginal value of the entitlement to concession power over time was that ‘... to enter into a very long contract such as 50 years gives very little additional value for us as sellers compared to a shorter contract (for example 20 years with NOK 83 million) (17).’ After internal discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a long-term contract, the negotiation team made its recommendation to the Municipal Council: it recommended a contract with a duration of 50,5 years as appropriate to reduce the municipality’s risk and to provide a long-term planning horizon. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Notwithstanding this, in his second assessment, the head of procurement continued to focus on the importance of the length of the contract. His assessment of the marginal value of the entitlement to concession power over time was that ‘... to enter into a very long contract such as 50 years gives very little additional value for us as sellers compared to a shorter contract (for example 20 years with NOK 83 million) (17).’ After internal discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a long-term contract, the negotiation team made its recommendation to the Municipal Council: it recommended a contract with a duration of 50,5 years as appropriate to reduce the municipality’s risk and to provide a long-term planning horizon.

| (38) | On 22 May 2000, the Municipal Council decided that the municipality should sell its entitlement to concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years and reduce its ownership in NEAS by as much as 49 percent by the end of 2000 (18). From the information presented by the Norwegian Authorities, the above-mentioned independent expert reports were referred to in the memorandum distributed to the council members prior to taking the decision, but copies of the reports appear not to have been distributed (19). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

On 22 May 2000, the Municipal Council decided that the municipality should sell its entitlement to concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years and reduce its ownership in NEAS by as much as 49 percent by the end of 2000 (18). From the information presented by the Norwegian Authorities, the above-mentioned independent expert reports were referred to in the memorandum distributed to the council members prior to taking the decision, but copies of the reports appear not to have been distributed (19).

| (39) | The contract was entered into on 16 October 2000. The municipality sold its entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years for the price of NOK 126 million with all attached rights and obligations (20). No price adjustment mechanism was included in the contract, and the price was to be paid as one upfront lump sum. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The contract was entered into on 16 October 2000. The municipality sold its entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years for the price of NOK 126 million with all attached rights and obligations (20). No price adjustment mechanism was included in the contract, and the price was to be paid as one upfront lump sum.

| (40) | By a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2000, the parties agreed that NOK 60 million would be paid to the municipality in cash, whereas the remaining NOK 66 million was to be injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

By a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2000, the parties agreed that NOK 60 million would be paid to the municipality in cash, whereas the remaining NOK 66 million was to be injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.

| (41) | In 2001, the municipality reduced its ownership in NEAS to 50,01 per cent. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In 2001, the municipality reduced its ownership in NEAS to 50,01 per cent.

3.3.   
  Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (42) | The Norwegian Authorities are of the opinion that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms and that only the final arrangement regarding how the consideration was to be structured, as reflected in supplementary agreement of 29 November 2000, was influenced by the municipality’s ownership interest in NEAS. The Norwegian Authorities point out that according to the decision of the Municipal Council dated 25 November 1999, it was an absolute precondition for the conclusion of any agreement with NEAS that the power would be sold on market terms (21). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian Authorities are of the opinion that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms and that only the final arrangement regarding how the consideration was to be structured, as reflected in supplementary agreement of 29 November 2000, was influenced by the municipality’s ownership interest in NEAS. The Norwegian Authorities point out that according to the decision of the Municipal Council dated 25 November 1999, it was an absolute precondition for the conclusion of any agreement with NEAS that the power would be sold on market terms (21).

| (43) | Since there was considerable uncertainty associated with price developments on both the revenue and cost side, and since there was also certain political uncertainty associated with the concession power regime in general, a long-term contract was deemed to offer the best stability in relation to future revenues. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Since there was considerable uncertainty associated with price developments on both the revenue and cost side, and since there was also certain political uncertainty associated with the concession power regime in general, a long-term contract was deemed to offer the best stability in relation to future revenues.

| (44) | The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as one lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as one lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (45) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (46) | In the following, the Authority will assess the likelihood of whether the municipality has granted State aid to NEAS in connection with the sale of its entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years and at the price of NOK 126 million. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In the following, the Authority will assess the likelihood of whether the municipality has granted State aid to NEAS in connection with the sale of its entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years and at the price of NOK 126 million.

1.1.   
  Economic advantage

| (47) | When governments make financial transactions and investments, the European Court of Justice has stated that in order to confirm whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (22). In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Commission has developed the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor (23). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

When governments make financial transactions and investments, the European Court of Justice has stated that in order to confirm whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (22). In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Commission has developed the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor (23).

| (48) | If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price.

| (49) | In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power right, must enjoy a wide margin of discretion. However, while the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities to operate in the market on commercial terms, it should be assessed whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market investor. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power right, must enjoy a wide margin of discretion. However, while the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities to operate in the market on commercial terms, it should be assessed whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market investor.

| (50) | An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to the municipality at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Generally, an informed ex ante assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of State aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to the municipality at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Generally, an informed ex ante assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of State aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight.

| (51) | In the following, the Authority will therefore assess whether a private investor would have entered into a contract to sell the entitlement to 128 GWh of concession power, every year for 50,5 years, for one upfront lump sum payment of NOK 126 million, and without a competitive tender procedure and without including any price adjustment clauses in the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In the following, the Authority will therefore assess whether a private investor would have entered into a contract to sell the entitlement to 128 GWh of concession power, every year for 50,5 years, for one upfront lump sum payment of NOK 126 million, and without a competitive tender procedure and without including any price adjustment clauses in the contract.

| (52) | Throughout the preliminary assessment, the Authority will be mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into. From the information provided by the Norwegian Authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Throughout the preliminary assessment, the Authority will be mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into. From the information provided by the Norwegian Authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS.

1.1.1.   Contract for the sale of the municipality’s entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS

| (53) | As described in section 3.1 of Part I above, the concession power regime gives the municipality the right to purchase 128 GWh of concession power annually, at a price determined by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. This price is meant to reflect the long-term costs of a representative power plant, and is presumed in the long run to be lower than the average market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

As described in section 3.1 of Part I above, the concession power regime gives the municipality the right to purchase 128 GWh of concession power annually, at a price determined by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. This price is meant to reflect the long-term costs of a representative power plant, and is presumed in the long run to be lower than the average market prices.

| (54) | Municipalities may dispose of this concession power as they see fit, including using it for its own needs or selling the electricity in the market. Furthermore, the municipality can choose to sell the electricity in the spot market (24), or on the basis of short- or longer-term contracts. If the municipality decides to sell the electricity on short- or longer-term contracts it is necessary, in order to exclude State aid, to sell the electricity at market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Municipalities may dispose of this concession power as they see fit, including using it for its own needs or selling the electricity in the market. Furthermore, the municipality can choose to sell the electricity in the spot market (24), or on the basis of short- or longer-term contracts. If the municipality decides to sell the electricity on short- or longer-term contracts it is necessary, in order to exclude State aid, to sell the electricity at market terms.

| (55) | A point of departure would therefore be to identify any possible market prices (‘benchmark prices’) to which the contract in question could have been compared. Any benchmark price should, ideally, be based on contracts of similar type and duration (25). In this regard, the Authority observes that financial derivatives contracts (26) for the Nordic power markets, as offered by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, are limited to a maximum duration of six years (27). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

A point of departure would therefore be to identify any possible market prices (‘benchmark prices’) to which the contract in question could have been compared. Any benchmark price should, ideally, be based on contracts of similar type and duration (25). In this regard, the Authority observes that financial derivatives contracts (26) for the Nordic power markets, as offered by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, are limited to a maximum duration of six years (27).

| (56) | Reference can also be made to long-term power contracts entered into between electricity companies and energy intensive companies. These contracts are different from financial contracts and thus are not immediately comparable, but it is important to note that the duration of these contracts normally does not exceed 25-30 years, and they usually include price adjustment mechanisms. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Reference can also be made to long-term power contracts entered into between electricity companies and energy intensive companies. These contracts are different from financial contracts and thus are not immediately comparable, but it is important to note that the duration of these contracts normally does not exceed 25-30 years, and they usually include price adjustment mechanisms.

| (57) | It is not clear from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities whether or not there is a market — and thus benchmark prices — for contracts of similar type and duration as the contract in the present case. If there are no benchmark prices, and thus no well-functioning market for contracts of comparable type and duration, this may be an indication that buyers and/or sellers of concession power find the risk of entering into contracts of this duration too high. However, the long duration of the contract is in itself insufficient to establish that the transaction was not in line with the market economy investor principle. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

It is not clear from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities whether or not there is a market — and thus benchmark prices — for contracts of similar type and duration as the contract in the present case. If there are no benchmark prices, and thus no well-functioning market for contracts of comparable type and duration, this may be an indication that buyers and/or sellers of concession power find the risk of entering into contracts of this duration too high. However, the long duration of the contract is in itself insufficient to establish that the transaction was not in line with the market economy investor principle.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority must assess the risks and uncertainties involved in the contract in the present case, and ask whether or not these risks have been assessed by the municipality in a manner presumed acceptable to a market investor. In order to do so, it is appropriate to assess at least two sources of uncertainty/risk that affect the market price of the concession power entitlements: regulatory risks and market risks. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority must assess the risks and uncertainties involved in the contract in the present case, and ask whether or not these risks have been assessed by the municipality in a manner presumed acceptable to a market investor. In order to do so, it is appropriate to assess at least two sources of uncertainty/risk that affect the market price of the concession power entitlements: regulatory risks and market risks.

1.1.1.1.   Regulatory risks

| (59) | According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. A priori, it is not possible for the Authority to determine what, if any, changes may be made to the regime. However, it is evident that any changes that are made to the entitlements — such as increasing or decreasing the volume of the municipality’s concession power entitlements, changing how the concession power price is calculated or changing the structure of the right to concession power — may affect the market price of concession power entitlements. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. A priori, it is not possible for the Authority to determine what, if any, changes may be made to the regime. However, it is evident that any changes that are made to the entitlements — such as increasing or decreasing the volume of the municipality’s concession power entitlements, changing how the concession power price is calculated or changing the structure of the right to concession power — may affect the market price of concession power entitlements.

| (60) | This regulatory risk was identified by two external advisors consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the contract. The municipality instructed law firm Hjort DA (‘Hjort’) to assess inter alia the tax implications of selling the concession power entitlements. Hjort suggested that 50-year contracts are highly unusual, even for the energy sector, and argued that ‘there is therefore reason to be critical about the value judgments that are/will be made, will be able to capture the long period as is suggested (28).’ Hjort also stated that the actual volume of the concession power entitlement may change over time, and pointed to the regulatory risk involved in the review of the concessions. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

This regulatory risk was identified by two external advisors consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the contract. The municipality instructed law firm Hjort DA (‘Hjort’) to assess inter alia the tax implications of selling the concession power entitlements. Hjort suggested that 50-year contracts are highly unusual, even for the energy sector, and argued that ‘there is therefore reason to be critical about the value judgments that are/will be made, will be able to capture the long period as is suggested (28).’ Hjort also stated that the actual volume of the concession power entitlement may change over time, and pointed to the regulatory risk involved in the review of the concessions.

| (61) | The same risks were also reflected in a report from Danske Securities AS (‘DS’), which was commissioned by the municipality to perform a value assessment of the concession power entitlements (the second assessment referred to in section 3.2 of Part I above). DS asked three market participants to put a value on a 50-year concession power contract. It follows from the report that questions could be raised whether Statkraft SF would enter into an agreement longer than until 2019, when the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements were due for assessment, because of the risk inherent in this process (29). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The same risks were also reflected in a report from Danske Securities AS (‘DS’), which was commissioned by the municipality to perform a value assessment of the concession power entitlements (the second assessment referred to in section 3.2 of Part I above). DS asked three market participants to put a value on a 50-year concession power contract. It follows from the report that questions could be raised whether Statkraft SF would enter into an agreement longer than until 2019, when the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements were due for assessment, because of the risk inherent in this process (29).

| (62) | Given that 60 per cent of the contract period in the present case is beyond 2019, the market price of a long-term contract such as the one between the municipality and NEAS is exposed to regulatory risk. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the effects of this risk are ambiguous, ultimately depending on whether or not the changes may be favourable to the beneficiaries of the concession power entitlements. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Given that 60 per cent of the contract period in the present case is beyond 2019, the market price of a long-term contract such as the one between the municipality and NEAS is exposed to regulatory risk. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the effects of this risk are ambiguous, ultimately depending on whether or not the changes may be favourable to the beneficiaries of the concession power entitlements.

1.1.1.2.   Market risks

| (63) | In order to establish a market value of an entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power, with revenue and costs occurring 50 years into the future, a market investor would normally apply a discounted cash flow analysis (‘DCF’) method. This method projects future cash flows (revenues and costs) and discounts them, using a weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’) as a discount factor, to arrive at a net present value (‘NPV’) of the future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, this NPV would reflect the market price of the underlying asset. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In order to establish a market value of an entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power, with revenue and costs occurring 50 years into the future, a market investor would normally apply a discounted cash flow analysis (‘DCF’) method. This method projects future cash flows (revenues and costs) and discounts them, using a weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’) as a discount factor, to arrive at a net present value (‘NPV’) of the future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, this NPV would reflect the market price of the underlying asset.

| (64) | In the current case, there are in particular five variables that affect the NPV of the concession power entitlement: (i) the annual concession power cost, (ii) the cost of feeding electricity into the grid, (iii) the total volume of concession power, (iv) the market price of electricity, and (v) the discount factor. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

In the current case, there are in particular five variables that affect the NPV of the concession power entitlement: (i) the annual concession power cost, (ii) the cost of feeding electricity into the grid, (iii) the total volume of concession power, (iv) the market price of electricity, and (v) the discount factor.

| (65) | The first three variables — the annual concession power cost, the cost of feeding electricity into the grid and the total volume of concession power — are all exposed to the regulatory risk described above. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The first three variables — the annual concession power cost, the cost of feeding electricity into the grid and the total volume of concession power — are all exposed to the regulatory risk described above.

| (66) | As regards the first variable (the price of the concession power), it appears from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that this price is reasonably predictable. It is assumed that there will be limited, if any, real increases in the concession power price over the duration of the contract (30). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

As regards the first variable (the price of the concession power), it appears from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that this price is reasonably predictable. It is assumed that there will be limited, if any, real increases in the concession power price over the duration of the contract (30).

| (67) | Concerning the second variable (the cost of feeding the electricity into the grid), it is the Authority’s understanding that this cost has been relatively constant over time and is predicted to remain steady in real terms over time. In addition, this cost amounts to approximately NOK 0,02 per KWh, and is thus of lesser importance relative to the other variables when calculating the net present value. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Concerning the second variable (the cost of feeding the electricity into the grid), it is the Authority’s understanding that this cost has been relatively constant over time and is predicted to remain steady in real terms over time. In addition, this cost amounts to approximately NOK 0,02 per KWh, and is thus of lesser importance relative to the other variables when calculating the net present value.

| (68) | As for the third variable (the total volume of concession power available to the municipality), the municipality anticipates a continued right to 128 GWh annually for the foreseeable future, and a constant amount of electricity is also assumed in the valuation models developed by the external advisors. Concerning the volume of electricity, however, the Authority raises two specific questions:






  (i) | whether the contract in question was entered into on the basis of valuations of 128 GWh or 116 GWh (the latter being only the volume of concession power not generated by NEAS itself); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(68)

As for the third variable (the total volume of concession power available to the municipality), the municipality anticipates a continued right to 128 GWh annually for the foreseeable future, and a constant amount of electricity is also assumed in the valuation models developed by the external advisors. Concerning the volume of electricity, however, the Authority raises two specific questions:

(i)

whether the contract in question was entered into on the basis of valuations of 128 GWh or 116 GWh (the latter being only the volume of concession power not generated by NEAS itself); and

| (ii) | what volume was contractually sold by the municipality to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

what volume was contractually sold by the municipality to NEAS.

| (69) | As regards the first question, both the AA report and the first DT value assessment used 116 GWh, being the concession power generated by electricity companies other than NEAS. The value assessment by DS also used 116 GWh, and they explicitly stated in their final report that:
  ‘... [w]e have assumed a volume of 116 GWh, though we cannot understand the reason why concession power delivered by NEAS itself should not be included in the calculations (31).’ |
| --- | --- |

(69)

As regards the first question, both the AA report and the first DT value assessment used 116 GWh, being the concession power generated by electricity companies other than NEAS. The value assessment by DS also used 116 GWh, and they explicitly stated in their final report that:

‘... [w]e have assumed a volume of 116 GWh, though we cannot understand the reason why concession power delivered by NEAS itself should not be included in the calculations (31).’

| (70) | To illustrate this point, on 4 October 2000 (and thus just prior to signing the contract), NEAS had the value of the concession power reassessed by DT. By this point, DT had concluded that the value of the contract was NOK 150-170 million and not 110-130 million, as stated earlier in May 2000 (32). It appears that this change was partly due to the minor adjustment of some of the assumptions used in the NPV calculation (amongst others the discount factor and the electricity prices), but it was also updated to reflect the value of 128 GWh of concession power and not 116 GWh. This second report was not disclosed to the municipality prior to it entering into the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

To illustrate this point, on 4 October 2000 (and thus just prior to signing the contract), NEAS had the value of the concession power reassessed by DT. By this point, DT had concluded that the value of the contract was NOK 150-170 million and not 110-130 million, as stated earlier in May 2000 (32). It appears that this change was partly due to the minor adjustment of some of the assumptions used in the NPV calculation (amongst others the discount factor and the electricity prices), but it was also updated to reflect the value of 128 GWh of concession power and not 116 GWh. This second report was not disclosed to the municipality prior to it entering into the contract.

| (71) | If incorrect assumptions about the volume have been used when determining the price of the contract, approximately 12 GWh of concession power generated each year by NEAS appear to have been transferred to NEAS without any apparent remuneration to the municipality. An economic advantage could thus have been conferred upon NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

If incorrect assumptions about the volume have been used when determining the price of the contract, approximately 12 GWh of concession power generated each year by NEAS appear to have been transferred to NEAS without any apparent remuneration to the municipality. An economic advantage could thus have been conferred upon NEAS.

| (72) | As regards the second question, the Authority finds reason to point out an apparent uncertainty as regards how the risk of future changes in the volume of concession power would be handled between the contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards the second question, the Authority finds reason to point out an apparent uncertainty as regards how the risk of future changes in the volume of concession power would be handled between the contracting parties.

| (73) | Concession power is defined in the contract as the total volume of concession power to which the municipality is entitled from the three current concessionaires (Article 1) (33). This suggests that the risk of any changes in the volume is transferred to NEAS. However, it is stipulated in Article 2 that in total the concession power is 128 GWh annually, which leaves open the question of what happens if that volume of the concession power entitlement is increased or decreased in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Concession power is defined in the contract as the total volume of concession power to which the municipality is entitled from the three current concessionaires (Article 1) (33). This suggests that the risk of any changes in the volume is transferred to NEAS. However, it is stipulated in Article 2 that in total the concession power is 128 GWh annually, which leaves open the question of what happens if that volume of the concession power entitlement is increased or decreased in the future.

| (74) | The two remaining variables — i.e. the market price of electricity and the discount factor — greatly impact the net present value of the concession power entitlement. These two variables were identified by DT as the factors to which the value estimates of the entitlement were especially sensitive to marginal adjustments. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The two remaining variables — i.e. the market price of electricity and the discount factor — greatly impact the net present value of the concession power entitlement. These two variables were identified by DT as the factors to which the value estimates of the entitlement were especially sensitive to marginal adjustments.

| (75) | The fourth variable (the market price of electricity) is considered to be highly volatile, resulting in uncertainty about future price developments, in particular over time. This is reflected in the fact that the expert reports referred to above only project future electricity prices approximately 10 years forward, beyond which electricity prices are assumed constant in real terms (34). This uncertainty of future electricity prices is, as mentioned previously, also reflected in the fact that financial contracts on the Nordic power markets are limited to a maximum duration of six years. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The fourth variable (the market price of electricity) is considered to be highly volatile, resulting in uncertainty about future price developments, in particular over time. This is reflected in the fact that the expert reports referred to above only project future electricity prices approximately 10 years forward, beyond which electricity prices are assumed constant in real terms (34). This uncertainty of future electricity prices is, as mentioned previously, also reflected in the fact that financial contracts on the Nordic power markets are limited to a maximum duration of six years.

| (76) | The fifth variable (the discount rate) used in the present value calculations is the weighted average cost of capital, which is meant to capture the riskiness of the cash flows. The discount rate reflects both the time value of money (investors normally have a time preference and would rather have cash up front than having to wait, therefore they must be compensated for this delay), as well as a risk premium. Moreover, and similarly to the fourth variable (the market price of electricity), it may be difficult to accurately predict, for example, inflation and interest rates 50 years into the future (35). |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The fifth variable (the discount rate) used in the present value calculations is the weighted average cost of capital, which is meant to capture the riskiness of the cash flows. The discount rate reflects both the time value of money (investors normally have a time preference and would rather have cash up front than having to wait, therefore they must be compensated for this delay), as well as a risk premium. Moreover, and similarly to the fourth variable (the market price of electricity), it may be difficult to accurately predict, for example, inflation and interest rates 50 years into the future (35).

| (77) | To illustrate the importance of the above variables in the valuation process, DT estimated that a one per cent increase in the return on capital requirement (WACC) would reduce the value of the concession power entitlement by NOK 22 million, while a one per cent reduction in the return on capital requirement would increase the value by NOK 29 million (36). The value was also very sensitive to changes in electricity spot prices: a NOK 0,01 change in real spot prices over a 10 year period relative to the estimated prices in the model would change the value by NOK 16 million (37). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

To illustrate the importance of the above variables in the valuation process, DT estimated that a one per cent increase in the return on capital requirement (WACC) would reduce the value of the concession power entitlement by NOK 22 million, while a one per cent reduction in the return on capital requirement would increase the value by NOK 29 million (36). The value was also very sensitive to changes in electricity spot prices: a NOK 0,01 change in real spot prices over a 10 year period relative to the estimated prices in the model would change the value by NOK 16 million (37).

| (78) | As a result, the value estimates by the external advisors ranged from approximately NOK 70 million to NOK 145 million (38). The relatively large range indicates uncertainty about the actual market value of the concession power entitlement over a period of 50 years. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

As a result, the value estimates by the external advisors ranged from approximately NOK 70 million to NOK 145 million (38). The relatively large range indicates uncertainty about the actual market value of the concession power entitlement over a period of 50 years.

1.1.1.3.   Competitive tender ex ante and/or price adjustment clauses ex post (‘safety valves’)

| (79) | In the absence of benchmark prices against which the contract in question could be compared, and in light of the uncertainty concerning key variables/assumptions in the valuation models used to assess the value of the concession power entitlement, the Authority questions whether a market investor would have taken further steps to establish the market value. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

In the absence of benchmark prices against which the contract in question could be compared, and in light of the uncertainty concerning key variables/assumptions in the valuation models used to assess the value of the concession power entitlement, the Authority questions whether a market investor would have taken further steps to establish the market value.

| (80) | One way to increase the likelihood that the municipality sold the concession power at market prices would have been to use a competitive and unconditional tender procedure. A competitive bidding process would have allowed the market value of the concession power entitlement to be determined ex ante. Moreover, if the municipality allowed interested parties to make bids without stipulating a fixed duration, this would more likely have revealed the true market price of the underlying assets over the lifetime of the asset, which may have revealed whether a 50-year contract was the optimal length in order to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis (39).’ |
| --- | --- |

(80)

One way to increase the likelihood that the municipality sold the concession power at market prices would have been to use a competitive and unconditional tender procedure. A competitive bidding process would have allowed the market value of the concession power entitlement to be determined ex ante. Moreover, if the municipality allowed interested parties to make bids without stipulating a fixed duration, this would more likely have revealed the true market price of the underlying assets over the lifetime of the asset, which may have revealed whether a 50-year contract was the optimal length in order to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis (39).’

| (81) | The Authority has, in that regard, taken note of the decision by the Municipal Council of 25 November 1999, in which a competitive tender procedure was expected to be part of the strategy when selling the concession power rights:
  ‘Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return ... Concession power is sold under different contracts with different length to diversify risk.’ (underlining by the Authority) |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority has, in that regard, taken note of the decision by the Municipal Council of 25 November 1999, in which a competitive tender procedure was expected to be part of the strategy when selling the concession power rights:

‘Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return ... Concession power is sold under different contracts with different length to diversify risk.’ (underlining by the Authority)

| (82) | If the municipality had sold the entitlement to the highest bidder, potentially to a company other than NEAS, it would seem that the municipality would subsequently still have capital available to inject into NEAS, which was part of the reason for selling it in the first place. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

If the municipality had sold the entitlement to the highest bidder, potentially to a company other than NEAS, it would seem that the municipality would subsequently still have capital available to inject into NEAS, which was part of the reason for selling it in the first place.

| (83) | In addition to using a competitive tender process, another way to safeguard that the transaction was carried out at market terms would have been to require some form of price adjustment clause in the contract ex-post, to provide for potential fluctuations in electricity prices resulting in them deviating significantly from the forecasted prices used in the valuation models. This would also have been in line with the decision of 25 November 1999, that was the foundation of the transaction, in which it was stated that:
  ‘Concession power is sold ... with adjustment clauses that gives additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period.’ (underlining by the Authority) |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In addition to using a competitive tender process, another way to safeguard that the transaction was carried out at market terms would have been to require some form of price adjustment clause in the contract ex-post, to provide for potential fluctuations in electricity prices resulting in them deviating significantly from the forecasted prices used in the valuation models. This would also have been in line with the decision of 25 November 1999, that was the foundation of the transaction, in which it was stated that:

‘Concession power is sold ... with adjustment clauses that gives additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period.’ (underlining by the Authority)

| (84) | Accordingly, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the lack of competitive tender procedure and/or the insertion of price adjustment clauses in the contract entails that we cannot exclude that the transaction involved State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Accordingly, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the lack of competitive tender procedure and/or the insertion of price adjustment clauses in the contract entails that we cannot exclude that the transaction involved State aid.

1.1.1.4.   Conclusion

| (85) | In light of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority is in doubt whether the terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS concerning the sale of the entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years for the sum of NOK 126 million can be considered in line with the market economy investor principle. Therefore, the Authority cannot rule out that an advantage was granted to NEAS as a result of this transaction. If the entitlement was sold for a price below its market value, an economic advantage was granted to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In light of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority is in doubt whether the terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS concerning the sale of the entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years for the sum of NOK 126 million can be considered in line with the market economy investor principle. Therefore, the Authority cannot rule out that an advantage was granted to NEAS as a result of this transaction. If the entitlement was sold for a price below its market value, an economic advantage was granted to NEAS.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (86) | The Authority understands that the price of NOK 126 million was paid by NEAS to the Municipality of Narvik by way of NOK 60 million paid to the municipality in cash, and NOK 66 million injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority understands that the price of NOK 126 million was paid by NEAS to the Municipality of Narvik by way of NOK 60 million paid to the municipality in cash, and NOK 66 million injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.

| (87) | If the price NEAS paid for the entitlement was lower than the actual market price of the asset, the difference would represent foregone revenue for the municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

If the price NEAS paid for the entitlement was lower than the actual market price of the asset, the difference would represent foregone revenue for the municipality.

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (88) | A selective economic advantage is considered to exist when it is found that a measure does not apply generally to all the undertakings in an EEA State (40). In the present case, the aid measure appears to be selective in that it favours NEAS in comparison to other undertakings as only NEAS signed the contract with the municipality. The contract was the result of individual negotiations between the municipality and NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

A selective economic advantage is considered to exist when it is found that a measure does not apply generally to all the undertakings in an EEA State (40). In the present case, the aid measure appears to be selective in that it favours NEAS in comparison to other undertakings as only NEAS signed the contract with the municipality. The contract was the result of individual negotiations between the municipality and NEAS.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (89) | The measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement in order to be State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement in order to be State aid.

| (90) | A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of NEAS vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of production and sale of electricity. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) EEA for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of NEAS vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of production and sale of electricity. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) EEA for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled.

| (91) | According to a report by the power exchange Nord Pool (41), by the year 2000 there was a well-functioning Nordic power market. An effect on trade between the Contracting Parties as a result of the aid measure cannot, therefore, be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

According to a report by the power exchange Nord Pool (41), by the year 2000 there was a well-functioning Nordic power market. An effect on trade between the Contracting Parties as a result of the aid measure cannot, therefore, be excluded.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (92) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (93) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the contract between the municipality of Narvik and NEAS to the Authority. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the contract between the municipality of Narvik and NEAS to the Authority. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (94) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) EEA are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) EEA are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) EEA.

| (95) | Article 61(2) EEA is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) EEA apply to the present case. Furthermore, the aid does not appear to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, further to Article 61(3)(c) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Article 61(2) EEA is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) EEA apply to the present case. Furthermore, the aid does not appear to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, further to Article 61(3)(c) EEA.

| (96) | The Authority has so far not received any information that would indicate that the sale of concession power to NEAS is compatible with Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

The Authority has so far not received any information that would indicate that the sale of concession power to NEAS is compatible with Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (97) | On the basis of the facts and assessment above, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the contract relating to the sale by Narvik municipality of its entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that this measure can be regarded as complying with Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus doubts that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

On the basis of the facts and assessment above, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the contract relating to the sale by Narvik municipality of its entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that this measure can be regarded as complying with Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus doubts that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (98) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (99) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. The Authority specifically asks the Norwegian Authorities to reply to the two questions raised in paragraphs 68 to 73 of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. The Authority specifically asks the Norwegian Authorities to reply to the two questions raised in paragraphs 68 to 73 of this Decision.

| (100) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to NEAS.

| (101) | The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipient of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

| (102) | The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of law, |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, is initiated against Norway regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide, within one month of the notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 14 December 2011.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sverrir Haukur GUNNLAUGSSON

College Member

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(1)  Decision 195/04/COL, 14.7.2004 published in OJ C 139, 25.5.2006, p. 57 and EEA Supplement No 26, 25.5.2006, p. 1 as amended by Decision 319/05/COL, 14.12.2005 published in OJ C 286, 23.11.2006, p. 9 and EEA Supplement No 57, 23.11.2006, p. 31.

1

(2)  Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1: ‘Avtale mellom Narvik kommune og Narvik Energi AS om leie av konsesjonskraft for en periode av 50,5 år og om at konsesjonskraften anvendes som tinginnskudd ved aksjekapitalutvidelse i Narvik Energi AS.’

2

(3)  http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_16_of_14_-December_1917.pdf

3

(4)  http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_17%20of_14_-December_1917.pdf

4

(5)  According to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, this includes electric power for industry, agriculture and households, but not power for power intensive industries and wood conversion.

5

(6)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13: ‘Narvik kommunens konsesjonskraft håndteres ut fra hva som gir størst mulig avkastning på lang sikt. Målet er samtidig å gi kommunen en mer stabil planleggingshorisont gjennom å redusere usikkerheten fra år til år.’

6

(7)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

7

(8)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 12.

8

(9)  Event No 532249, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 7.

9

(10)  See footnote 8.

10

(11)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

11

(12)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 38 onwards.

12

(13)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 28.

13

(14)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 16 onwards.

14

(15)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 14 onwards.

15

(16)  His mandate was narrowed to only assessing, inter alia, risk, time to settlement, tax implications and profit maximization for three scenarios (all involving Narvik Municipality transferring the concession power right to NEAS for a 50-year period and Narvik Municipality reducing its ownership stake in NEAS from 100 per cent to 51 per cent).

16

inter alia

(17)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 27.

17

(18)  See footnote 11.

18

(19)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

19

(20)  Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

20

(21)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 22.

21

(22)  Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [2006] ECR I-3547, para. 60.

22

SFEI

La Poste

(23)  The market economy investor principle is described in more depth in the Authority’s guidelines for State aid to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector and public authorities holdings.

23

(24)  Spot market transactions through an electricity exchange are presumed not to include State aid because the market price is determined efficiently in a competitive market.

24

(25)  Namely, bilateral wholesale concession power contracts entered into prior to or around the same time.

25

(26)  Futures, forward, option and CfD.

26

(27)  http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/about/

27

(28)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 32.

28

(29)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 17.

29

(30)  Price is only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI) To illustrate this point, in their valuation model DT adjusted the concession power price with 75 per cent of CPI over the life of the contract in their base case, and simulated results at 50 and 100 per cent of CPI respectively, to assess the sensitivity of the value assessment to changes in this assumption.

30

(31)  See footnote 13.

31

(32)  Event No 532253, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

32

(33)  Statkraft SF, Nordkraft AS and NEAS.

33

(34)  Price only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI).

34

(35)  This is reflected in the fact that both SSB and the Norwegian Central Bank only make predictions on economic indicators such as inflation and interest rates approximately 5-10 years forward, see for example: http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/87289/Figurer_foredrag_reg_nett_11_11_2011.pdf

35

(36)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 41.

36

(37)  See footnote 32.

37

(38)  Excluding the last study by DT, which estimated a value in the range of NOK 150-170 million.

38

(39)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13. This would be important because the independent advisers involved in the valuation process only assessed the value of the concession power for a period of 50 years, and did not necessarily assess how to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis.’

39

(40)  Case C-256/97 DM Transport SA [1999] ECR I-3913, para. 27.

40

DM Transport SA

(41)  Nord Pool, ‘Trade at Nord Pool ASA’s financial market’, 8 March 2010, http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/digitalAssets/69/69445_tradenordpoolfinancialmarket.pdf

41

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V Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO)

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/38

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RAZPIS JAVNEGA NATEČAJA

2012/C 121/10

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO) organizira javni natečaj:

EPSO/AD/232/12 – vodja enote (AD 12) za bolgarski jezik na področju prevajanja pravnih besedil

Razpis natečaja je objavljen v Uradnem listu C 121 A, 26. aprila 2012, izključno v bolgarščini.

Dodatne informacije so na voljo na spletišču urada EPSO: http://eu-careers.eu

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POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

| 26.4.2012 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 121/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 121/39

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Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije

(Zadeva COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2012/C 121/11

| 1. | Komisija je 17. aprila 2012 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje AGC Glass Europe SA („AGC“, Belgija), ki je pod nadzorom podjetja Asahi Glass Co., Ltd („Asahi“, Japonska), z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe o združitvah skupni nadzor nad celotnima podjetjema Interpane International Glas GmbH (Nemčija) in Interpane Glass Holding AG (Švica) (skupaj „Interpane“). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija je 17. aprila 2012 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje AGC Glass Europe SA („AGC“, Belgija), ki je pod nadzorom podjetja Asahi Glass Co., Ltd („Asahi“, Japonska), z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) Uredbe o združitvah skupni nadzor nad celotnima podjetjema Interpane International Glas GmbH (Nemčija) in Interpane Glass Holding AG (Švica) (skupaj „Interpane“).

| 2. | Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:






  — | za AGC: proizvodnja in obdelava ravnega stekla za gradbeno, avtomobilsko in sončno industrijo ter specializirane gospodarske panoge, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:

—

za AGC: proizvodnja in obdelava ravnega stekla za gradbeno, avtomobilsko in sončno industrijo ter specializirane gospodarske panoge,

| — | za Asahi: steklo, elektronika, zasloni, kemikalije, keramika in druge dejavnosti, |
| --- | --- |

—

za Asahi: steklo, elektronika, zasloni, kemikalije, keramika in druge dejavnosti,

| — | za Interpane: proizvodnja in obdelava stekla, ki se uporablja za zgradbe. |
| --- | --- |

—

za Interpane: proizvodnja in obdelava stekla, ki se uporablja za zgradbe.

| 3. | Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi priglašena transakcija lahko spadala v področje uporabe Uredbe ES o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tej točki še ni sprejeta. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi priglašena transakcija lahko spadala v področje uporabe Uredbe ES o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tej točki še ni sprejeta.

| 4. | Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo svoje morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.
  Komisija mora prejeti pripombe najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe lahko pošljete Komisiji po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti z navedbo sklicne številke COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas na naslov:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo svoje morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.

Komisija mora prejeti pripombe najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe lahko pošljete Komisiji po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti z navedbo sklicne številke COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas na naslov:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1 (Uredba ES o združitvah).

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