### THE HONORABLE E. RICHARD WEBBER, United S tates District Judge 1 

### for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation. ___________ No. 96-2048

___________ Joanne M. Long, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of the Social Security * Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 13, 1996 Filed: March 6, 1997

___________ Before McM ILLIAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and WEBBER, District Judge. 1

___________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Joanne M. Long appeals the decision of the Social Securit y Commissioner (Commissioner) denying her Social Security benefits. Lon g argues that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantia l evidence because (1) the administrative law judg e (ALJ) erred by rejecting Long’s subjective complaints and (2) the Commissioner has not met he r burden of proof to show that Long can perform jobs that exist i n significant numbers in the national economy. We affirm.

### The Honorab le Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge 2 

### for the Southern District of Iowa. -2- I.
Long was born on October 7, 1950. S he has a high school equivalency degree and one year of college education. She was a drafting major at a community college and she has been on the Dean's list at least twice. In the past, Long has wo rked as a waste treatment plant attendant, fast-food worker, punch press operator, and printer. She has a verbal IQ of 91, a performance IQ of 117, and a full scale IQ of 96. Long is five feet and two inches tall, and she weighs approximately 200 pounds.
Long file d her application for Social Security disability insurance bene fits, pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C
. §§ 401-433 (1988) (Title II), on September 28, 1 990. She alleged that she has be en unable to work since May 1, 1986, because of depression an d anxiety, headaches, neck pain, and back pain. T he Commissioner denied her application.
Long appealed the Commissioner's decision to the district court, 2 which remanded Long's case to the Social Security Administration fo r further proceedings. After a supplemental hearing before an ALJ, Long's req uest for benefits was again denied because, discounting Long' s subjective complaints, the ALJ found that Long could perform jobs tha t exist in s ignificant numbers in the national economy. In making thi s fin ding, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert. Th e vocational expert testified that Long could work as a surveillance monitor , addresser, or document preparer, and that there are approximately 650 such jobs in Iowa and 30,000 such jobs nationwide. On appeal, the distric t court affirmed the ALJ's decision to deny disability benefits.

### -3- II.

We will uphold the Commissioner's decision to deny an applican t disability benefits if the decision is not based on legal error and i f the re is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support th e conclusio n that the claimant was not disabled. See Clark v. Chater , 7 5 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994)
. Substantial evidence exists if a reasonable mind would deem the evidence adequat e to support the conclusion. Clark , 75 F.3d at 416. While thi s Court will consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decisio n as well as evidence that supports the decision, we will not reverse "merel y because substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision." Johnson v. Chater , 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996).
To be eli gible for disability insurance benefits under Title II, an indivi dual must meet Title II's "earning requirement." 42 U.S.C
. §§ 416(i)(3)(B), 423(c)(1)(B). Long last met th is requirement on December 31, 1991. When an individual is no longer insur ed for Title II disability purposes, we will only consider an individual's medical condition as of th e date she was last insured. See, e.g., Bastian v. Schweiker , 712 F.2d 1278 , 1280 (8th Cir. 1983).

A.
Long argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her subjectiv e comp laints of disabling difficulties in reading and writing, disablin g depression and anxiety, and disabling headaches, neck pain, and back pain. In Polaski v. Heckler , 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent histor y omitted), we explained that:

The adjudicator must give full consideration to all of th e evidence presented relating to subjective complaint s, including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by thir d parties and treating and examining

### -4- physicians relating to such matters as: 1. the claimant's daily activities; 2. t he duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; 3. precipitating and aggravating factors; 4. dos age, effectiveness and side effects of medication; 5. functional restrictions.

Id. at 948. Using the Polaski factors, the ALJ delineated at length the
reasons why Long's subjective complaints had to be rejected. We agree wit h the ALJ's conclusion.

Lo ng's complaints of disabling difficulties in reading and writin g are contradicted by h er academic accomplishments and the daily activities that led to their achievement. Although testing has indicated that Long reads at a ninth-grade level, she has attained h er high school equivalency degree an d is currently enrolled as a drafting major at a communit y college. While she s ometimes takes as few as three credits per semester, she has taken as many as eight. Despite her frequent reliance on special services such as extr a tutoring and having her books read onto tape, Long has made the Dean's list at her community college on at least tw o occasions.
With res pect to Long's mental health complaints, she has been see n at the Vera French Community Mental Health Center (MHC) since July 1986. Her use of the therap y services provided by this facility has varied from sporadic to consistent. The MHC psychiatrist who monitored Long's progres s starting in October 1 988, Dr. Alice J. Harpring, indicated in her reports that Long has suffered from some mental health setbacks. However, Lon g herself has reported that taking the medication prozac has helped her
. Finally, Dr. Harpring's assessments reflect that overall Long has done wel l under treatment.

### -5- Long has only infrequently sought treatment for her physical health complaints. For example, she has sought the help of a chiropractor o n occasion and she has taken nonsteroidal, anti-inflammatory medication on
an as-need ed basis. She has testified to taking this medication ver y infrequently and could not be sure of the last t ime that she had taken it. We have noted that an individual's complaints of "functional limitations are inconsistent with her failure to take prescription pain medication or to seek regular medical treatment for her sympto ms." Ostronski v. Chater , 94 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1996).
Having considered these facts as well as the record as a whole, w e hold that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision to reject Long's subjective complaints. We acknowledge that some evidenc e exists for the opposite conclusion; however, we hold that substantia l evidence exists to support the ALJ's conclusion in the form of academi c achievements, improving mental health assessments, and infrequent use of pain medication.

B.
Long argu es that the Commissioner did not show that there are other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy that Long ca n perform. We disagree.
The Commissioner can rely on the tes timony of a vocational expert to carry her burden of proof of showing that jobs exist in the nationa l economy that a claimant can perform. See Evans v. Shalala , 21 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1994). To do this, the Commissioner may pose hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, the paramete rs of which do not have to include any alleged i mpairments that the ALJ has rejected as untrue. See House v. Shalala , 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1994).
To decide whether jobs exist in significant numbers, we

### -6-

consider, inter alia , the reliability of the cla imant's and the vocational expert's testimony. Ultimately, however, we lea ve this determination "'to the trial judge's common sense in weighing the statutory language a s applied to a particular claimant's factual situa tion.'" Jenkins v. Bowen , 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 ( 8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hall v. Bowen , 837 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1988)). Here, the vocational expert testified that Long is capable of performing any of the approximately 650 jobs in the fields of surveillance monitoring, addressing, and document preparation that exist in Iowa, or one of the 30,000 such jobs that exists nationwide. The ALJ found this to be a significant number, and we agree.
Long argu es that the vocational expert's testimony was insufficient because he used phrases that were equivocal. For example, at one point th e vocational expert said that there were "probably . . . about 400 statewide [jo bs]" for administrative support personnel and that "I think you'd b e lookin g at the possibility of someone doing surveillance monitor work. " Admin. R. at 387, reprinted in Appellant's Br. a t 31. Having reviewed the vocational expert's t estimony in its entirety, we are convinced that this language does not indicate that the expert was h edging or giving qualified
res ponses. Taken in context, these phrases merely demonstrate that th e vocati onal expert was aware that he was responding to hypothetica l questions with expert opinions. Thus, by relying on the vocationa l expert's testimony, the Commissioner met her burden of showing that Long is not disabled.

III.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm.

### -7- A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.