United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Technology, and Homeland Security, 

Committee on the Judiciary, United 

States Senate

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

Actions Are Needed to 

Improve Management of 

the Expansion Process, 

and to Assess and Mitigate 

Program Risks 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

 

GAO-08-1142T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 24, 2008

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM

Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the 

Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate 

Highlights of GAO-08-1142T, a testimony Program Risks

before the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 

Security, Committee on the Judiciary, 

United States Senate 

The Visa Waiver Program, which 

enables citizens of participating

countries to travel to the United

States without first obtaining a 

visa, has many benefits, but also

has risks. In 2006, GAO found the 

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) needed to improve efforts to 

assess and mitigate these risks. In 

August 2007, Congress passed the 

9/11 Act, which provides DHS the 

authority to consider expanding the 

program to countries whose shortterm business and tourism visa 

refusal rates were between 3 and 

10 percent in the prior fiscal year, if 

certain conditions are met. This 

testimony discusses GAO’s recent 

report on the Visa Waiver Program.

Specifically, it examines DHS’s 

process for expanding the Visa 

Waiver Program and evaluates the 

extent to which DHS is assessing 

and mitigating program risks. GAO 

reviewed relevant laws and

procedures; and interviewed 

agency officials in Washington, 

D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight

aspiring and three Visa Waiver

Program countries.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommended that DHS 

establish a more transparent 

process for Visa Waiver Program 

expansion, and improve and 

monitor overstay rates for current 

and aspiring program countries.

DHS generally agreed with GAO’s

recommendations. The Department 

of Justice (Justice) discussed the 

importance of lost and stolen 

passport reporting, but did not 

comment on GAO’s

recommendations. 

The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver

Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a 

transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard 

operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before 

countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of State 

(State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS created 

confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program countries. U.S. 

embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult to 

explain the expansion process to foreign counterparts and manage their 

expectations. State officials said it was difficult to explain to countries with 

fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in 

joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating

with them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had 

refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). 

Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security enhancements during the 

expansion negotiations, including agreements with several aspiring countries 

on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a

more transparent process is needed to guide future program expansion. 

DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa 

Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal rates 

between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must make two certifications. First, DHS must 

certify that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign 

nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified that 

DHS’s plan to meet this provision will not help mitigate program risks because 

it does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their 

authorized period of stay (overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its 

methodology for meeting this provision. Second, DHS must certify that the 

Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver

travelers in advance of their travel is “fully operational.” While DHS has not 

announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA 

authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12,

2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to 

countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after it makes these two 

certifications, and after the countries have met the required conditions, but 

before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver Program. For DHS to maintain 

its authority to admit certain countries into the program, it must incorporate 

biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 

2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several 

unresolved issues. In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries’ overstay 

rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. 

Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from GAO’s 2006 

report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol’s lost and 

stolen passport database, but has not fully implemented others. Implementing

the remaining recommendations is important as DHS moves to expand both 

the program and the department’s oversight responsibilities. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-1142T. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 
September 24, 2008 

Chairman Feinstein and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss our recent report on the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) oversight of the Visa Waiver Program and 

executive branch’s plans to expand the program by the end of 2008.

1

 The 

Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 participating countries to 

travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less 

without first obtaining a visa from U.S. embassies and consulates.2

 The 

program has many benefits, including facilitating international travel for 

millions of foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States each year. 

However, as we have reported,3

 the program also poses inherent security, 

law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks to the United States. In 

September 2007, the Director of National Intelligence testified that al 

Qaeda is recruiting Europeans because most of them do not require a visa 

to enter the United States. Effective oversight of the Visa Waiver Program 

is essential to finding the right balance between facilitating legitimate 

travel and screening for potential terrorists, criminals, and others who may

pose law enforcement and illegal immigration concerns. 

The executive branch aims to expand the Visa Waiver Program to 

countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and to South Korea. According to 

DHS, some of these countries are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have

high expectations that they will join the program due to their close 

economic, political, and military ties to the United States. In August 2007,

Congress passed legislation that allows DHS to consider admitting 

countries with business and tourism visas refusal rates4

 between 3 percent

and 10 percent, that otherwise meet the program’s requirements, if the 

 1

GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the 

Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks, GAO-08-967 (Washington,

D.C.: Sept. 15, 2008). 

2

The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark,

Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, 

Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore,

Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 

3

GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa

Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

4

The refusal rate refers only to the temporary business and tourism visa applications that 

are denied as a percentage of the total temporary business and tourism visa applications

for nationals of that country. 

Page 1 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
countries meet certain conditions, such as cooperating with the United 

States on counterterrorism initiatives.5

 Previously, only countries with 

refusal rates below 3 percent in the prior fiscal year qualified to be 

considered for admission. Before DHS can exercise this new authority, the 

legislation—referred to as the “9/11 Act”—requires that the department 

complete certain actions aimed at enhancing security of the Visa Waiver 

Program. 

My testimony today will summarize our observations on the (1) process 

DHS is following to admit countries into the Visa Waiver Program and (2) 

actions taken to assess and mitigate potential risks in the program. These 

observations are derived from our review of the Visa Waiver Program 

based on a request from this subcommittee. In conducting this work, we 

reviewed laws governing the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion, and

relevant regulations and agency operating procedures, as well as our prior 

reports and testimonies. We met with several DHS component agencies 

and offices,6

 including the Visa Waiver Program Office, which is 

responsible for oversight of Visa Waiver Program requirements. In 

addition, we interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), 

the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the 

Department of Justice (Justice).7

 We also spoke with officials at U.S. 

embassies in three current and eight aspiring Visa Waiver Program 

countries. We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to

September 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

 5

See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 

No. 110-53. 

6

Specifically, we met with officials from DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and

Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). 

7

In particular, we met with officials in Justice’s Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau, 

which facilitates international law enforcement cooperation among the United States and 

Interpol and its other member countries. 

Page 2 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver 

Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a 

transparent process. The department did not follow its own November 

2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth the key milestones 

that DHS and aspiring countries must meet before additional countries are 

admitted into the program. As a result, State, Justice, and U.S. embassy 

officials stated that DHS created confusion among its interagency partners 

and aspiring visa waiver countries. Absent clear direction from DHS, U.S. 

embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult

to explain the expansion process to their foreign counterparts and manage 

their expectations about when those countries might be admitted into the 

Visa Waiver Program. Furthermore, State officials said it was difficult to 

explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent 

that have signaled interest in joining the Visa Waiver Program (such as 

Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with them. DHS is, 

however, negotiating with several countries that had fiscal year 2007 visa 

refusal rates above the 10 percent ceiling (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and 

Slovakia), with the expectation that fiscal year 2008 rates will be below 

this ceiling. Nevertheless, DHS achieved some security enhancements to 

the Visa Waiver Program during expansion negotiations, including new 

agreements with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport 

reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed, however, that a more 

transparent process is needed to guide any future consideration of 

program expansion. In acknowledging weaknesses in the expansion 

process, DHS’s Assistant Secretary for Policy Development said that DHS 

did not have a clear process at the outset of negotiations in late 2007, in 

part because the department lacked prior experience in expanding the 

Visa Waiver Program and because the program’s legislative requirements 

had changed in August of that year. 

Summary 

DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa 

Waiver Program. In particular, DHS has not yet met two key certification 

requirements in the 9/11 Act that would allow DHS to consider admitting 

additional countries to the program with refusal rates between 3 percent 

and 10 percent. First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of 

not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In 

February 2008, we testified that DHS’s plan to meet this provision will not 

demonstrate improvements in the air exit system and will not help the 

department mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver Program, because the plan

does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond 

their authorized period of stay (referred to as “overstays”). Second, DHS 

must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) 

for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is “fully 

Page 3 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
operational.” DHS has not yet announced when it plans to make this 

certification; however, ESTA became available on a voluntary basis on 

August 1, 2008, and DHS anticipates that ESTA authorizations will be 

required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009. 8

 DHS 

determined that the law permits it to expand the program to countries 

with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent after it makes the two 

9/11 Act certifications, and after the countries have met certain conditions, 

but before ESTA is mandatory for all VWP travelers. DHS may face 

challenges in implementing ESTA, such as adequately informing the public 

and travel industry about the system. In addition, for DHS to maintain its 

authority to admit certain countries into the program, the 9/11 Act requires 

that the air exit system also incorporate biometric indicators (such as 

fingerprints) by July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this 

timeline due to several unresolved issues. In addition, DHS does not fully

consider countries’ overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks 

in the Visa Waiver Program because the department’s overstay data have

weaknesses, according to the Visa Waiver Program Office. 

To improve management of the Visa Waiver Program and better assess and 

mitigate risks associated with it, we recommended in our report that DHS 

establish a clear process, in coordination with State and Justice, for 

program expansion that would include the criteria used to determine 

which countries will be considered for expansion and timelines for 

nominating countries, security assessments of aspiring countries, and 

negotiation of any bilateral agreements to implement the program’s 

legislative requirements. In addition, we recommended that DHS designate 

an office with responsibility for developing overstay rate information for 

the Visa Waiver Program, explore cost-effective actions to further improve 

these data’s reliability, and use these validated data to help evaluate 

whether current or aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries pose a 

potential illegal immigration risk to the United States. DHS either agreed 

with, or stated that it was taking steps to implement, all of our 

recommendations. 

 8

According to DHS, ESTA will be implemented as a mandatory program for all visa waiver 

travelers 60 days after publication of a notice in the Federal Register. DHS anticipates 

issuing that notice in November 2008, for implementation of the mandatory ESTA 

requirements on January 12, 2009. 

Page 4 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
In 2007, almost 13 million citizens9

 from 27 countries entered the United 

States under the Visa Waiver Program. In February 2005, President Bush 

announced that DHS and State would develop a strategy, or “Road Map 

Initiative,” to clarify the statutory requirements for designation as a 

participating country. DHS and State are consulting with 13 “Road Map” 

countries seeking admission into the Visa Waiver Program—Bulgaria, 

Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 

Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea. 

Background 

In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with 

the authority to consider admitting into the Visa Waiver Program countries 

that otherwise meet the program requirements, but have refusal rates 

between 3 percent and 10 percent, provided the countries meet certain 

conditions. For example, before being admitted to the program, the 

countries must demonstrate a sustained reduction in refusal rates, and 

must be cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism 

initiatives, information sharing, and the prevention of terrorist travel, 

among other things. In addition, DHS must also complete two actions 

aimed at enhancing the security of the program.10 Specifically, DHS must 

certify the following to Congress: 

• A system is in place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 

percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports. While this 

system will initially be biographic only, Congress required the eventual

implementation of a biometric exit system at U.S. airports. If the biometric 

air exit system is not in place by July 1, 2009, the flexibility that DHS may 

obtain to consider admitting countries with refusal rates between 3 

percent and 10 percent will be suspended until the system is in place. 

• An electronic travel authorization system is “fully operational.” This 

system would require nationals from Visa Waiver Program countries to 

provide the United States with biographical information before boarding a 

U.S.-bound flight to determine the eligibility of, and whether there exists a 

law enforcement or security risk in permitting, the foreign national to 

travel to the United States under the program. To the extent possible, 

according to DHS, applicants would find out almost immediately whether 

 9

This figure does not account for multiple admissions into the United States under the Visa 

Waiver Program by the same individual. 

10Section 711 of the 9/11 Act specifically grants DHS the authority to waive the 3 percent

refusal rate requirement for countries—up to a maximum of 10 percent—provided those 

countries meet other security requirements. 

Page 5 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
their travel has been authorized, or if their application has been rejected11, 

in which case they are ineligible to travel to the United States under the 

Visa Waiver Program.12

DHS has not followed a transparent process for admitting new countries 

to the program, which has created confusion among U.S. agencies and 

officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and among countries seeking

to join the Visa Waiver Program. During the expansion negotiations, DHS 

has achieved some security enhancements. 

We found that the Visa Waiver Program Office has not followed its own 

standard operating procedures, completed in November 2007, which set 

forth the key milestones that DHS and aspiring countries must meet before 

additional countries are admitted into the program. According to the 

standard procedures, State should submit to DHS a formal, written 

nomination for a particular country, after which DHS is to lead an 

interagency team to conduct an in-country, comprehensive review of the 

impact of the country’s admission into the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. 

security, law enforcement, and immigration interests. Figure 1 depicts the 

standard procedures that the program office established to guide 

expansion of the Visa Waiver Program compared with DHS’s actions since 

August 2007. Although State has only nominated one country—Greece—

DHS has nonetheless conducted security reviews for countries that State 

has not yet nominated—Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 

Lithuania, Slovakia, and South Korea. According to State officials, until 

DHS has implemented the required provisions of the 9/11 Act, and 

countries have met all of the Visa Waiver Program’s statutory 

Executive Branch Is 

Moving Quickly to 

Expand the Visa 

Waiver Program

without a Transparent 

Process

DHS Has Not Followed a 

Transparent Process for 

Visa Waiver Program

Expansion 

 11In addition to receiving an authorization or rejection notice upon submitting an ESTA

application, the applicant may also receive a response noting that the application is 

pending. 

12ESTA authorizations will be valid for up to 2 years and will allow the individual to travel 

to the United States repeatedly within that period. In some circumstances, such as when a

passport has expired or a traveler has changed his or her name, the traveler must apply for 

a new ESTA.

Page 6 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
requirements, State does not plan to nominate any other countries. DHS’s 

Assistant Secretary for Policy Development told us that the department 

had determined that it would not follow the standard operating 

procedures during these expansion negotiations and, thus, had to “make 

up the process as it went along,” in part because DHS had never expanded

the program before and because Congress significantly changed the 

program’s legislative requirements in August 2007. 

Page 7 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Figure 1: Comparison of DHS’s Process to Expand the Visa Waiver Program against the Standard Operating Procedures for 

Expansion 

Sept.

2007 2008

Aug. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

Standard Visa Waiver Program Expansion Process

DHS Expansion Process

State submits a formal 

nomination of an individual 

country to DHS

DHS conducts a comprehensive review 

of the nominated country, which 

includes an in-country site visit

DHS completes comprehensive 

country review and submits it

to Congress

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS data; Art Explosion images.

Lithuania 12.9%

Visa refusal rate,

Country fiscal year 2007

Slovakia 12.0%

Latvia 11.8%

Hungary 10.3%

10 percent

Nomination

Memorandum of understanding (MOU)

DHS’s standard operating procedures do not include signing MOUs

In-country site visit

Czech

Republic 6.7%

South

Korea

4.4%

Estonia 4.0%

Malta 2.7%

Greece 1.6%

DHS goal 

to admit 

new 

countries

Page 8 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
State and Justice officials told us that the lack of a transparent timeline 

and requirements for Visa Waiver Program expansion has led to confusion 

among U.S. agencies in headquarters’ offices and at U.S. embassies 

overseas, as well as foreign governments seeking to join the program. For 

example, DHS’s standard procedures were not updated to account for the 

department’s plans to sign with each of the aspiring Visa Waiver Program 

countries separate memorandums of understanding (MOU) that lay out the 

new legislative requirements from the 9/11 Act. According to DHS, while 

not required by the act, the U.S. government is seeking to negotiate MOUs 

with current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries to help put the 

legislative provisions in place. DHS has not yet signed MOUs with any 

current program countries; the department intends to complete 

negotiations with existing program countries by October 2009. As 

indicated in figure 1, DHS signed MOUs with aspiring countries before 

conducting in-country site visits. As of June 2008, DHS had signed MOUs 

with eight Road Map countries. However, State and Justice officials told us 

that DHS had not been clear in communicating these steps to aspiring and 

current program countries and U.S. embassy officials in several Road Map 

countries told us that it had been difficult to explain the expansion 

process to their foreign counterparts and to manage their expectations 

about when those countries might be admitted into the Visa Waiver 

Program. In response to our request, in late April 2008, DHS provided us 

with an outline of the department’s completed and remaining actions for 

expanding the Visa Waiver Program by the end of the year. DHS officials 

stated that this outline could be a first step in providing guidance for all 

stakeholders should the program be expanded again in the future. 

However, this outline does not include criteria for selecting countries 

under consideration for admission into the program other than the 13 

Road Map countries. 

The U.S. government is only considering the Road Map countries for 

potential admission into the program in 2008 because the United States 

began formal discussions with these 13 countries several years ago, not 

due to the application of clearly defined requirements. DHS is negotiating 

with 4 Road Map countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates over 10 

percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia), with the expectation 

that fiscal year 2008 refusal rates for these countries will fall below 10 

percent. State officials told us that they lacked a clear rationale to explain

to other aspiring, non-Road Map countries with refusal rates under 10 

percent (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) that they will not be considered in 

2008 due to the executive branch’s plans to expand the program first to 

countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and South Korea. (Figure 2 

shows the fiscal year 2007 refusal rates for the 13 Road Map countries.) 

Page 9 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Figure 2: Short-term Business and Tourism Visa Refusal Rates, by Country, Fiscal Year 2007 

0

10

20

30

40

Greece 1.6%

Cyprus 1.8%

Angola

Antigua/Barbuda

Azerbaijan

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Botswana

Bulgaria – 14.3%

Hungary – 10.3%

Kazakhstan

Kiribati

Argentina 

Barbados

Brazil

Chile

Taiwan

Croatia

Algeria

Belarus

Belize

Bolivia

Central African Republic

Chad

China

Colombia

Comoros

Romania – 37.7%

Percentage

40 percent

30 percent

20 percent

10 percent

3 percent

Malta 2.7%

Bahrain

Hong Kong

Israel

Qatar

Czech Republic – 6.7%

Estonia – 4%

Kuwait

Macau

Malaysia

Namibia 

Oman

Marshall Islands

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

South Korea – 4.4%

The Bahamas

Latvia – 11.8%

Lithuania – 12.9%

Madagascar

Mauritius

Mozambique

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

North Korea

Russia

Seychelles

Slovakia – 12%

Suriname

Swaziland

Thailand

Turkey

Tuvalu

Uruguay

Venezuela

Costa Rica

Djibouti

Dominica

Ecuador

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Grenada

India

Kyrgyzstan

Lebanon

Libya

Maldives

Morocco

Panama

Poland – 25.2%

Samoa

Serbia and Montenegro

Sri Lanka

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Tanzania

Tunisia

Vanuatu

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

“Road Map” initiative countries

Note: DHS may consider adding to the Visa Waiver Program countries with refusal rates below 3

percent in the prior fiscal year, without meeting the two certification requirements in the 9/11 Act.

Page 10 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
According to DHS, it could not wait until all statutory requirements were 

officially met before beginning bilateral negotiations with Road Map 

countries, because doing so would not allow sufficient time to add the 

countries by the end of 2008. DHS plans to complete the security reviews 

and sign MOUs with Road Map countries by the fall of 2008. If these and all 

other statutory provisions are completed—including countries’ 

achievement of refusal rates below 10 percent—State indicated that it will 

then formally nominate the countries. However, DHS has acknowledged 

that if it and the aspiring countries cannot meet all of the program’s 

statutory requirements, the United States will not admit additional 

countries into the program. In such an event, the U.S. government could 

face political and diplomatic repercussions given the expectations raised 

that many of the Road Map countries will be admitted in 2008. DHS, State,

and Justice officials acknowledged that following a more transparent 

process would be useful in the future as additional countries seek to join 

the program. 

DHS Has Achieved Some 

Results in Visa Waiver 

Expansion Negotiations 

DHS’s expansion negotiations with current and aspiring Visa Waiver 

Program countries have led to commitments from countries to improve 

information sharing processes with the United States. For example, by 

signing MOUs, eight aspiring countries have signaled their intent to 

comply with the program’s statutory provision to report to the United 

States or Interpol in a timely manner the loss or theft of passports—a key 

vulnerability in the Visa Waiver Program. In addition, as a result of 

ongoing visa waiver negotiations with the South Korean government, in 

January 2008, DHS initiated the Immigration Advisory Program at Incheon 

International Airport in South Korea to help prevent terrorists and other 

high-risk travelers from boarding commercial aircraft bound for the United 

States.13

 13According to CBP, the Immigration Advisory Program aims to enhance the safety of air

travel by, among other things, reducing the number of improperly documented passengers 

traveling from or through a country to the United States. As of August 2008, the program 

operates in airports in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Frankfurt, Germany; London, England 

(Heathrow Airport and Gatwick Airport); Manchester, England; Madrid, Spain; Seoul, 

South Korea; Tokyo, Japan; and Warsaw, Poland. 

Page 11 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
As of July 2008, DHS has not yet implemented key certification

requirements in the 9/11 Act necessary for expanding the Visa Waiver 

Program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent. In 

addition, the Visa Waiver Program Office does not fully consider data on 

overstay rates for current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries, 

even though doing so is integral to meeting a statutory requirement for 

continued eligibility in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has not yet 

fully implemented some of the recommendations from our 2006 report 

aimed at improving efforts to assess and mitigate program risks. 

DHS Has Not Fully 

Developed Tools 

Aimed at Assessing 

and Mitigating Risks 

in the Visa Waiver 

Program 

DHS Has Not yet 

Implemented Key Security 

Provisions of 9/11 Act That 

Are Necessary to Admit 

Certain Countries into the 

Visa Waiver Program

On February 28, 2008, we testified that DHS’s plan for certifying that it can 

verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals from U.S. airports 

will not help the department mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver Program.14

Furthermore, DHS will face a number of challenges in implementing ESTA 

by January 2009. Finally, it is unlikely that DHS will implement a biometric 

air exit system before July 2009, due to opposition from the airline 

industry. 

As we have previously mentioned, the 9/11 Act requires that DHS certify 

that a system is in place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 

percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports. An air exit

system that facilitates the development of overstay rate data is important 

to managing potential risks in expanding the Visa Waiver Program. In 

December 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records, reported by

airlines,15 of visitors departing the country to the department’s existing 

records of any prior arrivals, immigration status changes,16 or prior 

departures from the United States. In February 2008, we testified that this 

methodology will not demonstrate improvements in the air exit system 

and will not help the department mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver 

Program. At the time of our testimony, DHS had confirmed that it planned

to employ a methodology that begins with departure records. 

Plan to Verify the Air Departure 

of Foreign Nationals Will Not 

Help DHS Mitigate Program 

Risks 

 14GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland Security’s Plan

to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-08-458T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2008).

15Air carriers transmit visitor manifest information, which is obtained directly from

government-issued passports, to CBP.

16This includes changes and extensions of the visits of lawfully admitted, nonimmigrant 

foreign nationals. 

Page 12 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
We identified a number of weaknesses with the approach DHS confirmed 

in December 2007. In particular, DHS’s methodology will not inform 

overall or country-specific overstay rates, which are key factors in 

determining illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Also, 

DHS’s methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if 

those foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond

their authorized periods of admission—useful data for oversight of the 

Visa Waiver Program and its expansion. As we previously testified, an 

alternate approach would be to track air arrivals from a given point in time 

and determine whether those foreign nationals have potentially

overstayed.17 Figure 3 compares DHS’s plan to match visitor records using 

departure data as a starting point with a methodology that would use 

arrival data as a starting point. An air exit system that facilitates the 

development of overstay rate data is important to managing potential risks 

in expanding the Visa Waiver Program. We found that DHS’s planned 

methodology for meeting the “97 percent provision” so it can move 

forward with program expansion will not demonstrate improvements in 

the air exit system or help the department identify overstays or develop 

overstay rates. As of July 2008, DHS had not yet certified this provision nor 

had it finalized a methodology to meet the provision. 

 17This could include foreign nationals who departed after their authorized period of 

admission expired, as well as those foreign nationals who may have remained in the 

country as overstays.

Page 13 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Figure 3: DHS’s Current Plan to Meet Air Exit System Provision Omits Those Who Remain in the United States 

Page 14 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 

DHS’s Planned Implementation 

of ESTA by January 2009 Will 

Face Challenges 

status

departures

change

arrivals

manifest

Sources: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data; Map Resources (maps); Nova Development and Ingram 

Publishing (clip art).

DHS’s plan uses

departure data as starting point

Alternative approach uses

arrival data as starting point

• Who has departed by air

• Who has potentially overstayed

Arrival data matched against subsequent 

records of those foreign nationals, which 

will inform DHS of:

Foreign nationals arrive

Using air departure manifest 

records, DHS reports that it can 

match not less than 97 percent of 

departure records to records of 

prior:

• Arrivals

• Departures

• Change of status

Foreign nationals depart by air
In the 9/11 Act conference report,18 Congress agreed on the need for 

significant security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program and to the

implementation of ESTA prior to permitting DHS to admit new countries 

into the program with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent. According 

to DHS, ESTA will allow DHS to identify potential ineligible visa waiver 

travelers before they embark on a U.S.-bound carrier. DHS also stated that

by recommending that travelers submit ESTA applications 72 hours in 

advance of their departure, CBP will have additional time to screen visa 

waiver travelers destined for the United States. 

DHS must follow several steps in implementing ESTA (see fig. 4). The 9/11 

Act requires that DHS must certify both the 97 percent air exit system and 

ESTA as fully operational before the department can consider expanding 

the Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal rates between 3 percent

and 10 percent. In June 2008, DHS announced in the Federal Register that 

it anticipates that all visa waiver travelers will be required to obtain ESTA 

authorization for visa waiver travel to the United States after January 12,

2009. DHS stated that if it admits an additional country prior to January 12,

2009, it will require that visa waiver travelers from that country obtain 

ESTA authorizations immediately. For example, if Estonia was admitted 

into the program on October 10, 2008, citizens of that country would be 

required to begin using ESTA on that date; however, visa waiver travelers 

from existing program countries would not be required to obtain approval 

through ESTA until January 12, 2009, more than three months later. Figure

4 illustrates the steps that DHS must follow to implement ESTA. 

 18Conference Report on H.R. 1, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act of 2007, July 25, 2007.

Page 15 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Figure 4: DHS’s Anticipated ESTA Implementation Timeline 

June July Aug. Sept. Nov. Oct. Dec. Jan.

August 1, 2008:

ESTA operational in 

English

June 9, 2008:

DHS announced 

plans for the 

Electronic System 

for Travel 

Authorization 

(ESTA) in the 

Federal Register

October 15, 2008:

ESTA operational 

in additional 

languages

End of 2008:

DHS anticipates 

expanding the Visa 

Waiver Program

Source: GAO.

Early October 2008:

Fiscal year 2008 

refusal rate data 

available

Early November 2008:

DHS anticipates 

publishing final notice 

for ESTA in the Federal 

Register 

January 12, 2009:

DHS anticipates 

ESTA authorization 

to be mandatory for 

all visa waiver 

travelers

We identified four potential challenges to DHS’s planned implementation 

of ESTA by January 12, 2009. These challenges include the following: 

• DHS has a limited time frame to adequately inform U.S. embassies in 

Visa Waiver Program countries and the public about ESTA. U.S. embassy 

officials in current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries told us that 

the United States will need to ensure that there is sufficient time to inform 

travelers, airlines, and the travel industry of ESTA requirements and 

implementation timelines. However, DHS’s announcement in June 2008 

accelerated the timeline for ESTA implementation in current visa waiver 

countries. According to a senior U.S. official at one embassy, DHS had 

previously confirmed that the department did not plan to require ESTA 

authorization for travelers from this country until the summer of 2009 or 

later. Following the June 2008 announcement, a senior U.S. embassy 

official in another country told us that DHS did not give the embassy 

adequate advance notice—to prepare translated materials, brief journalists 

from the major media, prepare the embassy Web site, or set up a meeting 

with travel and tourism professionals to discuss the implications of ESTA 

requirements—before publishing the interim final rule for ESTA. DHS 

officials told us that the department is currently working on an outreach

strategy to ensure that travelers are aware of the ESTA requirement. 

• Impact on air and sea carriers could be significant. DHS estimates that 8 

U.S.-based air carriers and 11 sea carriers, as well as 35 foreign-based air 

Page 16 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
carriers and 5 sea carriers, will be affected by ESTA requirements for visa 

waiver travelers. On the basis of DHS’s analysis, ESTA could cost the 

carriers about $137 million to $1.1 billion over the next 10 years, 

depending on how the carriers decide to assist the passengers. DHS has 

noted that these costs to carriers are not compulsory because the carriers 

are not required to apply for an ESTA authorization on behalf of their visa 

waiver travelers. 

• ESTA could increase consular workload. In May 2008, we reported that 

State officials and officials at U.S. embassies in current Visa Waiver 

Program countries are concerned with how ESTA implementation will 

affect consular workload.19 We reported that if 1 to 3 percent of current 

Visa Waiver Program travelers came to U.S. embassies for visas, it could 

greatly increase visa demand at some locations, which could significantly 

disrupt visa operations and possibly overwhelm current staffing and 

facilities. 

• Developing a user-friendly ESTA could be difficult. Although the ESTA 

Web site will be operational in a number of languages by October 15, 2008, 

ESTA will only allow travelers to fill out the application in English, as with 

CBP’s paper-based form. During our site visits, embassy officials also 

expressed concerns that some Visa Waiver Program travelers do not have

Internet access and, thus, will face difficulties in submitting their 

information to ESTA.20 Implementing a user-friendly ESTA is essential, 

especially for those travelers who do not have Internet access or are not 

familiar with submitting forms online. 

A third provision of the 9/11 Act requires that DHS implement a biometric 

air exit system before July 1, 2009, or else the department’s authority to 

waive the 3 percent refusal rate requirement—and thereby consider 

admitting countries with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent—

will be suspended until this system is in place. In March 2008, DHS 

testified that US-VISIT will begin deploying biometric exit procedures in 

fiscal year 2009. According to the system’s proposed rule released in April 

2008, air and sea carriers are to collect, store, and transmit to DHS 

travelers’ biometrics. During the public comment period on the proposed 

Implementation of Biometric 

Air Exit System before July 

2009 Will Be Difficult 

 19See GAO, Border Security: State Department Should Plan for Potentially Significant 

Staffing and Facilities Shortfalls Caused by Changes in the Visa Waiver Program, 

GAO-08-623 (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008). 

20According to DHS, ESTA is designed to allow third parties to file applications on behalf of 

another person. 

Page 17 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
rule, airlines, Members of Congress, and other stakeholders have raised 

concerns about DHS’s proposal, and resolving these concerns could take 

considerable time. For example, the airline industry strongly opposes 

DHS’s plans to require airline personnel to collect digital fingerprints of 

travelers departing the United States because it believes it is a public 

sector function. We have issued a series of reports on the US-VISIT 

program indicating that there is no clear schedule for implementation of 

the exit portion of the system, and that DHS will encounter difficulties in 

implementing the system by July 2009.

21 Although DHS program officials 

stated that DHS is on track to implement the biometric exit system by July 

2009, it is unlikely that DHS will meet this timeline. We are currently 

reviewing DHS’s proposed rule and plan to report later this year on our 

findings. 

Some DHS components have expanded efforts to identify citizens who 

enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program and then overstay

their authorized period of admission. In 2004, US-VISIT established the 

Data Integrity Group, which develops data on potential overstays by 

comparing foreign nationals’ arrival records with departure records from 

U.S. airports and sea ports. US-VISIT provides this data to ICE, CBP, and 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, as well as to State’s consular 

officers to aid in visa adjudication. In fiscal year 2007, ICE’s Compliance 

Enforcement Unit received more than 12,300 overstay leads from the Data 

Integrity Group. On the basis of concerns that Visa Waiver Program 

travelers could be overstaying, ICE has requested that US-VISIT place 

additional emphasis on identifying potential overstays from program 

countries. In turn, ICE has received funding to establish a Visa Waiver 

Enforcement Program within the Compliance Enforcement Unit to 

investigate the additional leads from US-VISIT. However, DHS is not fully

monitoring compliance with a legislative provision that requires a 

disqualification rate (this calculation includes overstays) of less than 3.5 

DHS Does Not Fully 

Consider Overstay Rates to 

Assess the Illegal 

Immigration Risks of the 

Visa Waiver Program

 21GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain 

Unclear, GAO-07-1044T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007); Border Security: US-VISIT

Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of 

Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006).

Page 18 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
percent for a country to participate in the Visa Waiver Program.22

Monitoring these data is a longstanding statutory requirement for the Visa 

Waiver Program. We have testified that the inability of the U.S. 

government to track the status of visitors in the country, to identify those 

who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to use these data to 

compute overstay rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the 

oversight of the Visa Waiver Program.23 DHS’s Visa Waiver Program Office 

reported that it does not monitor country overstay rates as part of its 

mandated, biennial assessment process for current visa waiver countries 

because of weaknesses in US-VISIT’s data. 24

Since 2004, however, the Data Integrity Group has worked to improve the 

accuracy of US-VISIT’s overstay data and can undertake additional 

analyses to further validate these data. For example, the group conducts 

analyses, by hand, of computer-generated overstay records to determine 

whether individuals identified as overstays by the computer matches are 

indeed overstays. In addition, US-VISIT analysts can search up to 12 

additional databases to verify whether a potential overstay may, in fact, be

in the country illegally. While it receives periodic reporting on potential 

overstays from US-VISIT, the Visa Waiver Program Office has not 

requested that the Data Integrity Group provide validated overstay rate 

estimates from visa waiver or Road Map countries since 2005. Although 

DHS has not designated an office with the responsibility of developing 

such data for the purposes of the Visa Waiver Program, US-VISIT officials

told us that, with the appropriate resources, they could provide more 

reliable overstay data and estimated rates by country to the Visa Waiver 

Program Office, with support from other DHS components, such as the 

Office of Immigration Statistics. For example, the Visa Waiver Program 

 22The disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal year, of (1) those nationals of the

country who were admitted as nonimmigrants and violated the terms of their admission—

this would include overstays—and (2) the number of foreign nationals who were denied

admission upon arrival in the United States, compared with the total number of nationals of 

that country who applied for admission as nonimmigrant visitors during the same period.

According to the visa waiver statute, the country must be terminated at the beginning of 

the 2d fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the determination of the disqualification 

rate was made. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(f). 

23For more than 10 years, we have recommended the collection of departure information 

and the development of estimates of overstays by air. See GAO/PEMD-93-25 and 

GAO/PEMD-95-20. 

24According to DHS officials, the mandated country assessments include a placeholder for

data on overstay rates, but this data is not included in the 2003-2004 or 2005-2006 

assessments. 

Page 19 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Office could request additional analysis for countries where the 

preliminary, computer-generated overstay rates raised concerns about 

illegal immigration risks in the program. These resulting estimates would 

be substantially more accurate than the computer-generated overstay 

rates. However, the resulting estimates would not include data on 

departures at land ports of entry and, as we have previously mentioned, 

airline departure data have weaknesses.25

In July 2006, we reported that the process for assessing and mitigating 

risks in the Visa Waiver Program had weaknesses, and that DHS was not 

equipped with sufficient resources to effectively monitor the program’s 

risks.26 To address these weaknesses, we recommended that DHS take a 

number of actions to better assess and mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver 

Program. As shown in table 1, DHS has taken actions to implement some 

of our recommendations, but still needs to fully implement others. In 

particular, DHS has provided the Visa Waiver Program Office with 

additional resources since our 2006 report. In addition, DHS, in 

coordination with the U.S. National Central Bureau, has initiated a system 

that allows DHS to screen foreign nationals’ arriving at all U.S. 

international airports against Interpol’s database of lost and stolen travel 

documents before arriving in the country. Results to date illustrate that the 

system identifies two to three instances of fraudulent passports per 

month. According to the National Central Bureau, Interpol’s database has 

intercepted passports that were not identified by DHS’s other screening 

systems. 

DHS Has Implemented 

Many of GAO’s Prior 

Recommendations Aimed 

at Improving Efforts to 

Assess and Mitigate Risks 

in the Visa Waiver Program 

 25Due to limitations in DHS’s data, U.S. VISIT officials also noted that some individuals that

appear in DHS’s systems as being in country legally may actually be overstays, and that

country-specific information is not available for about 2 percent of records. 

26GAO-06-854.

Page 20 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
Table 1: Status of Prior GAO Recommendations

Recommendation 

Not 

implemented

Partially 

implemented Implemented

Provide additional resources to strengthen the Visa Waiver Program Office. X 

Finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for the biennial country 

assessments and provide these protocols to stakeholders at relevant agencies at 

headquarters and overseas. These protocols should provide timelines for the entire 

assessment process, including the role of a site visit, an explanation of the clearance 

process, and deadlines for completion. 

X

Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including the identification of visa-waiver 

points of contact at U.S. embassies, for all 27 participating countries; and establish 

protocols, in coordination with the appropriate headquarters offices, for direct 

communication between points of contact at overseas posts and DHS’s Visa Waiver 

Program Office. 

X

Require periodic updates from points of contact at posts in countries where there are 

law enforcement or security concerns relevant to the Visa Waiver Program. 

X

Provide complete copies of the most recent country assessments to relevant 

stakeholders in headquarters and overseas posts. 

X

Require that all Visa Waiver Program countries provide the United States and Interpol 

with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen, blank and issued passports. 

X

Develop and communicate clear standard operating procedures for the reporting of lost 

and stolen blank and issued passports, including a definition of timely reporting and to 

whom in the U.S. government countries should report. 

X

Develop and implement a plan to make Interpol’s stolen travel document database 

automatically available during primary inspection at U.S. ports of entry. 

X

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data and GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa

Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).

While DHS has taken action on many of our recommendations, it has not 

fully implemented others. We recommended that DHS require that all Visa 

Waiver Program countries provide the United States and Interpol with 

non-biographical data from lost or stolen issued and blank passports. 

According to DHS, all current and aspiring visa waiver countries report 

lost and stolen passport information to Interpol, and many report to the 

United States. The 9/11 Act requires agreements between the United States

and Visa Waiver Program countries on the reporting of lost and stolen 

passports within strict time limits; however, none of the current visa 

waiver countries have established lost and stolen passport reporting 

agreements by signing MOUs with DHS. DHS also still needs to fully 

implement our recommendations to create real-time monitoring 

arrangements, establish protocols for direct communication with contacts 

at overseas posts, and require periodic updates from these contacts. For 

example, while the Visa Waiver Program Office has recently begun 

communicating and disseminating relevant program information regularly

Page 21 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 
with U.S. embassy points of contact at Visa Waiver Program posts, officials 

at other Visa Waiver Program posts reported that they had little contact 

with the office and were not regularly informed of security concerns or 

developments surrounding the program. 

In closing, the executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa

Waiver Program in 2008 to allies in Central and Eastern Europe and South 

Korea, after the countries have met certain requirements and DHS has 

completed and certified key security requirements in the 9/11 Act. 

However, DHS has not followed a transparent process for expanding the 

program, thereby causing confusion among other U.S. agencies and 

embassies overseas. The lack of a clear process could bring about political 

repercussions if countries are not admitted to the program in 2008, as 

expected. In addition, DHS is not fully assessing a critical illegal 

immigration risk of the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion since it 

does not consider overstay data in its security assessments of current and 

aspiring countries. DHS should determine what additional data and 

refinements of these data are necessary to ensure that it can assess and 

mitigate this potential risk to the United States. Finally, DHS still needs to 

take actions to fully implement our prior recommendations in light of 

plans to expand the program. 

Chairman Feinstein, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have at this time. 

For further information about this statement, please contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. In addition, John Brummet, Assistant Director; Teresa 

Abruzzo; Kathryn Bernet; Joseph Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Etana Finkler; 

Eric Larson; and Mary Moutsos made key contributions to this statement. 

Page 22 GAO-08-1142T Visa Waiver Program 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

(320635) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, DC 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER