No. 86-518 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN THE MATTER OF 

M. J. P., Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Deer Lodge, 

The Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Allen Smith, Jr., Warm Springs, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Nick Rotering, Dept. of Institutions, Helena, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 13, 1987 

Decided: March 24, 1987 

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I 

75, Clerk dd 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

M.J.P. was involuntarily committed to the Montana State 

Hospital. Prior to the expiration of the commitment period, 

a petition was filed with the District Court of the Third 

Judicial District, Deer Lodge County, requesting M.J.P.'s 

commitment to be extended for a period not to exceed six 

months. After a hearing, the District Court extended the 

commitment for six months. M.J.P. appealed. We affirm. 

The issues are: 

1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the finding 

of the District Court that M.J.P. was seriously mentally ill 

as defined by S 53-21-102, MCA? 

2. Did the District Court err in committing M.J.P. to 

the Montana State Hospital rather than to a less restrictive 

community placement for the treatment of her mental illness? 

M.J.P. was committed to the Montana State Hospital 

(hospital) on May 7, 1986, primarily because of threats she 

had made on her treating psychologist's life. Pursuant to 

§ 53-21-128, MCA, the psychologist filed a petition on July 

24, 1986, requesting an extension of M.J.P.'s commitment for 

a period not to exceed six months. M.J.P. moved to dismiss 

the petition. 

The hearing on the petition was held on September 12, 

1986, and the psychologist testified regarding M.J.P.'s 

mental illness. The District Court found M.J.P. to be seriously mentally ill and extended her commitment to the hospital for a period of six months. M.J.P. appealed. 
I 

Was there sufficient evidence to support the finding of 

the District Court that M.J.P. was seriously mentally ill as 

defined by 5 53-21-102, MCA? 

In pertinent part, the definition of "seriously mentally 

ill" found at S 53-21-102(14), MCA, provides: 

"Seriously mentally ill" means suffering from a 

mental disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or injury to others or the imminent 

threat thereof or which has deprived the person 

afflicted of the ability to protect his life or 

health. . . . 

Simply put, the State must prove in this case that 

M. J.P. suffered from a mental disorder and that the mental 

disorder: (1) resulted in self-inflicted injury or injury to 

others; (2) resulted in the imminent threat of self-inflicted 

injury or injury to others; or (3) deprived her of the ability to protect her life or health. M.J.P. concedes in her 

brief that the State has proven to a reasonable medical 

certainty that she suffers from a mental disorder. The crux 

of the second element in this case is whether the evidence 

supported a finding that M.J.P. was an imminent threat to 

herself or others. 

The evidence consists of the testimony of M.J.P.'s 

psychologist and a written report submitted by him to the 

court prior to the hearing. That evidence shows that M.J.P. 

was dangerous to herself and others at the time she was 

admitted to the hospital in May 1986. At the time of her 

admission, M.J.P. was depressed and was making suicidal, as 

well as homicidal, threats. She admitted that if she were 

allowed to get out, she would buy a gun to kill her examining 

psychologist. In his report, her psychologist concluded: 
[M.J.P.] is seriously mentally ill and imminently 

dangerous to others. She has established a victim 

which happens to be this examiner and a method of 

doing me bodily harm, that being purchasing a gun 

and killing me. 

We conclude that the evidence presented does support a 

finding that M.J.P. was an imminent threat of physical injury 

to herself or others. We have considered M.J.P.'s argument 

that because the threats were made upon her admittance to the 

hospital in May and had not been repeated in the time period 

preceding the petition in July, the threats were not "imminent". However, we conclude that the threats were "sufficiently recent in time as to be material and relevant as to 

the respondent's present condition." Section 53-21-126(2), 

MCA. In addition, the psychologist testified that M.J.P. was 

on lithium, ascendin, premarin and a thyroid medication. He 

pointed out that the lithium and ascendin are the treatment 

strategies for the major depression she experiences. He 

further emphasized that she had been extremely resistant to 

any therapeutic intervention, including supervision. This 

testimony is a reasonable basis for the conclusion of the 

District Court that M.J.P. should be kept under supervision 

so that she would properly continue on her medication. We 

affirm the District Court on this issue. 

I1 

Did the District Court err in committing M.J.P. to the 

Montana State Hospital rather than to a less restrictive 

community placement for the treatment of her mental illness? 

M.J.P. maintains that the District Court erred in committing her to the hospital, citing S 53-21-127(2) (c), MCA, 

which provides: 
In determining which of the above alternatives to 

order, the court shall choose the least restrictive 

alternatives necessary to protect the respondent 

and the public and to permit effective treatment. 

The court shall consider and shall describe in its 

order what alternatives for treatment of the respondent are available, what alternatives were 

investigated, and why the investigated alternatives 

were not deemed suitable. 

M.J.P. argues that the testifying doctor's recommendation for 

the commitment to be extended six months was based on her 

being placed in a group home and then graduated into an 

apartment under supervision. Therefore, she argues, the 

testimony establishes the least restrictive environment for 

M.J.P. would have been a structured community placement, not 

the hospital. What M.J.P. fails to recognize is the doctor's 

recommendation in his written report of July 17, 1986: 

It is hereby recommended that [M.J.P.] be recommitted to Montana State Hospital for a period not to 

exceed six months. It is further recommended that 

if deemed appropriate, she be conditionally released to the structured supervision of the mental 

health center in Helena within the commitment 

period asked. 

The District Court committed M.J.P. to the hospital, but 

ordered that if the hospital staff believes she could be 

released on a conditional release during the six month extension, then she should be so released. The State points out 

that the District Court's plan ensures the patient will 

cooperate with local mental health authorities when she is 

released because that release is conditioned upon her cooperation. The cooperation referred to pertains to the patient 

taking her medication, participating in counseling, and any 

other conditions that may be necessary to prevent a relapse. 
After careful consideration, we conclude that the District Court did not err in committing M. J.P. to the Montana 

State Hospital. The court considered and rejected alternatives other than the commitment ordered. The requirements of 

§ 53-21-127, MCA, have been met. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: ,/ 

4' 

Chief Justice