U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

69–534 CC WASHINGTON : 2001

GAO ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES JUDICIAL

AND POLICE REFORM ASSISTANCE IN HAITI

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

Serial No. 106–183

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

[VACANCY]

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

CALEB MCCARRY, Professional Staff Member

LIBERTY DUNN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESS

Page

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,

National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office ............................................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 28

Jess T. Ford .............................................................................................................. 30

(1)

GAO ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES JUDICIAL AND POLICE REFORM ASSISTANCE IN

HAITI

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

This morning we will hear testimony from the General Accounting Office regarding the preliminary results of GAO’s review of

United States assistance that we have been providing to Haiti’s

justice system.

On September 19, 1994, President Clinton ordered 20,000 American troops to go to Haiti to restore the democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. These men and

women from our armed forces were directed into harm’s way to uphold the rule of law. The purpose of this hearing is to examine just

what Haiti’s governmental leaders have done since 1994 to further

the rule of law with our assistance.

Between 1995 and 1999, our government has provided $97 million in bilateral assistance to Haiti’s justice system. Some $65 million of that money was directed to training and equipping the Haitian National Police.

Haiti’s judicial system has been exceedingly weak and subject to

manipulation. Drug traffickers and persons implicated in political

killings have been enjoying impunity. Opponents of Haiti’s current

government have, from time to time, been kept in jail despite judicial orders for their release. Many more Haitians languish behind

bars waiting for trials that may never happen.

United States judicial reform in Haiti has foundered in a sea of

the Haitian Government’s indifference. Haiti’s leaders simply do

not have the political will to pursue meaningful judicial reform. Apparently they prefer to manipulate the justice system and extract

wealth from their country’s state owned monopolies.

The recent election process revealed how completely the Haitian

National Police has been politicized by the ruling Lavalas Family

party. In the run up to the May 21 elections, some 15 persons,

principally from opposition political parties, were murdered. Police

have made no progress in resolving those crimes.

2

Prior to and after the election, violent street demonstrations

were staged by the governing Lavalas Family party. On a number

of occasions, the police just stood by and failed to protect peaceful

opposition rallies from those pro-government vigilantes.

After the polls closed on election day, police officers were seen

carting away election returns. Immediately following the election,

a large number of opposition politicians were arbitrarily arrested

by the U.S. trained police.

Last year, the Lavalas Family party led protests seeking the

ouster of police director Pierre Denize and State Security Secretary

Robert Manuel. Mr. Manuel was forced to resign and fled Haiti in

October 1999. Subsequently, the HNP’s Inspector General, Eucher

Joseph, was forced to quit his post.

Major narcotics traffickers have been operating freely in Haiti.

The Administration has now decertified Haiti with a waiver for 2

consecutive years. Drug corruption of Haitian officials is a serious

problem that needs to be dealt with directly and honestly.

In a rare bit of good news earlier this month, four police officers

implicated in a May 28, 1999 killing of 11 people in a Port-auPrince slum were convicted and sentenced to 3 years in prison.

This is an important precedent. Without an independent police Inspector General and a justice system with integrity, however, this

judgment will likely stand as an isolated exception.

The creation of the Haitian National Police gave us all hope that

Haitians would be able to count on a professional, apolitical police

force to foster a climate of security that would allow the Haitian

economy to recover and to grow. Sadly, the initial work that was

done by the Administration to recruit and train a cadre of competent police officers has been severely undermined.

The Haitian National Police has become a largely ineffective law

enforcement organization. Absent fundamental changes to reverse

corruption and politization, no amount of United States assistance

is going to be able to restore credibility to the Haitian National Police.

At this time I would like to recognize the Ranking Minority

Member of our Committee, the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.

Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Clearly I think everybody who has been watching Haiti is disappointed at the electoral process. The sad fact that our poorest

neighbors in this hemisphere have continued to suffer and be deprived of democratic opportunities, free and fair elections and a

better standard of living is something of great frustration.

I think that the Congress has not necessarily been the most helpful in forming a Haiti policy. Clearly the failures within Haiti are

the leading cause, but it is clear to me that America and other democracies in the hemisphere have to continue to make every effort

to establish a civil order, to establish a political process and an

economy that gives more Haitians an opportunity to participate.

So while all of us are frustrated by the continued lack of democratic progress in Haiti, I do think that Congress needs to play a

more positive role in trying to maintain a commitment to developing those things that we speak of so often.

3

You know, we spent a half a century with a large military force

in Germany to make sure that it was not overrun, and I think we

do not need a large military force and billions of dollars to try and

help Haiti, but we do have to have a sustained effort, and hopefully

we will see that in a bipartisan manner.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief

because I am anxious to hear the testimony from these witnesses.

I think it is really important that we put events in Haiti in a historical context. Some of what you stated in your opening remarks

I agree with, some of which I disagree with, but without the benefit

of a historical context I think we do a disservice to those that are

interested in this particular issue.

Prior to 1995, much of what occurred in Haiti was remarkable

in its degree of human rights violations, human rights abuses, and

the reality of an entire population being terrorized. While there is

much to criticize currently in Haiti, whatever is happening in Haiti

today is better than what it was in the 1980’s and during the coup

years up to 1994. I think it is important for us to recognize that.

I share the frustration that has been articulated by many. I happened to be an observer during the elections that occurred on May

21. It was obvious to the observers during the course of that particular weekend that those elections were essentially valid and legitimate elections.

It was clear that Fanmi Lavalas had in most districts a significant plurality, but, true to Haiti’s history, it is a zero-sum game,

unfortunately, when it comes to democracy, and all this interested

or shall I say objective observers criticized the tabulation of those

particular results. There is international unanimity when it comes

to the conclusion that the tabulation of the votes that were counted

in Haiti violated the Haitian electoral law.

I consider that one of the most significant tragedies in the history of Haiti because for one brief moment there was an opportunity to change Haitian history, to change the history of a people

that are the most impoverished in this hemisphere and among the

most impoverished in this world. Only if. Only if.

It was close, but victory was snatched away by an attitude, a

zero-sum game, the winner take all mentality that has characterized Haitian politics during the course of its 200 year history. How

sad. How sad. To use the football metaphor, we were in the red

zone. We were 2 yards from a touchdown which would have allowed—which I am absolutely convinced would have led to an irrefutable conclusion by the international community that this election

would have been fair, free, and sure there were some administrative foul ups, but it was fundamentally a fair election.

I think that is truly sad, and unfortunately the leading figures

in Haiti today in terms of Haitian politics failed to exercise the

leadership that was so necessary. It could have happened, but let’s

go forward, and I yield back.

[Pause.]

I am just informed that the Chairman left, so we will be in recess

until the Chairman returns unless the gentlelady from California

has a statement.

4

We will be in recess until Chairman Gilman returns. I am told

it will be 2 minutes, so put on your stopwatch, and we will see how

accurate that is.

[Recess.]

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will resume. I regret the

delay. We had some floor business to take care of.

Mr. Hilliard.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am very interested in what our panel has to say today, but

I would like to echo what Congressman Delahunt has said about

the historical perspective.

I was elected in 1992 to the U.S. Congress, and at that time

Aristide had been disposed. I was one of those that took part in the

negotiations in trying to get Aristide back to Haiti, and I remember

some of the promises that were made by this country.

One of them that stands out in my mind was one that really

sealed the deal of Aristide returning to Haiti with the commitment

that he would not seek reelection the next term, and that the

United States, I forgot the exact amount of moneys in terms of millions, would pay that amount of money to rebuild roads and to hire

persons who at that time were unemployed and were a big factor

in the problems that Haiti was experiencing.

That money never came, so the economy was never revived.

Those workers were never employed, so during the final months of

Aristide’s Administration the economy never received the injection

that it should have and that we had hoped for to get Haiti back

on the road. Of course, he did not seek reelection.

Since that time, there has been a great deal of problems with

trying to get funds to Haiti, commitments that have been made by

the United States, because of a couple Senators not allowing funds

or legislation to go forward dealing with Haiti.

Haiti has had many problems since then. Some of the problems

are of its own making, but I think that we failed Haiti and we

failed the Haitian people and we failed to seize upon an opportunity to export democracy to Haiti. No matter what is said by the

panel this morning, there is very little that the United States can

do to reconcile its failings of the past in relationship to not keeping

its commitment to Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I am interested in

hearing what the panelists have to say.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hilliard.

Do any other Members seek—Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to associate myself with Congressman Hilliard’s remarks, and I also just want to add to that with regard to the judicial reform. It has disappointed Congress and disappointed many

Haitians, but even with all of the difficulties with the elections,

United States withdrawal from the reform process and also the

United States withdrawal from Haiti, I do not think we are really

helping move forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I look forward to listening to the panelists to determine really what is going on in

terms of the judicial reform process and what, if anything, we can

do to make it better.

5

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

I just want to note that we received a press statement this morning that the Organization of American States announced yesterday

that it is going to facilitate a dialogue in Haiti among the country’s

political forces and civil society. I think that is encouraging.

However, the full and transparent resolution of the actions that

have de-legitimized the May 21 elections is only part of what

should be on the agenda. A new credible and competent electoral

authority is truly needed. Among other steps, real action to reverse

corruption and politization of the Haitian National Police should be

at the top of the agenda.

Let us now proceed with our hearing. On April 8, a group of violent protesters, some of whom were reportedly returning from the

government organized funeral of slain journalist Jean Pierre

Dominique, ransacked and burned the headquarters of the Confederation for Democratic Unity, KID, an opposition political party

that is led by former Port-au-Prince Mayor Evans Paul.

Opposition leaders, expecting trouble on the day of Mr.

Dominique’s funeral, had implored the police chief to provide protection. When American Embassy officials learned of this attack,

they immediately telephoned the Director General of the Haitian

National Police and asked him to intervene and protect the opposition. Nevertheless, administration officials confirmed that although

the Haiti National Police were present, they did not move quickly

to intervene to stop this attack on the opposition headquarters

building.

Before proceeding with our panel of witnesses, we will see the

videotape of that incident. Members of the Committee will be able

to see the gates of the opposition headquarters broken down by the

mob. The video shows the police standing idly by.

After the opposition headquarters was already in flames, the

video shows Haitian National Police in riot gear slowly approaching, but not passing beyond the gates in front of the burning building. Finally, the video shows the police allowing persons running

away from the building to leave the scene of the crime.

I am going to ask Mr. Whittaker if he would display the video.

[Videotape shown.]

Chairman GILMAN. We will now proceed with our witness. Mr.

Ford.

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary

results of our review of the United States assistance provided to

the Haitian justice system. I am accompanied today by two of my

colleagues, Ms. Virginia Hughes and Mr. Juan Tapia-Videla, who

led our team in this particular evaluation.

In September 1994, the United States and other countries intervened militarily into Haiti to restore the democratically elected

government that had been overthrown by the Haitian military in

September 1991. Before this intervention, the Haitian military conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:23 Feb 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\69534 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
6

trolled the police and the judicial sector. Military and political cronies dominated these institutions, and the military influenced the

appointments of magistrates and the decisions made by them.

These justice institutions were widely regarded as ineffective and

corrupt.

After the intervention of the United States stepping in to provide

assistance to the Haitian justice system, both the police and the judicial sector aimed at developing a professional civilian police force,

enhancing the effectiveness of the existing judicial organizations

and improving the Haitian people’s access to justice.

This assistance also aimed at supporting a broad reform of the

judicial sector that the Haitian Government intended to pursue

over time. The objectives of this assistance program were consistent with United States justice assistance objectives in other

Latin America countries.

As you know, United States assistance to the judicial sector was

suspended in July 2000 because the United States was not able to

negotiate an agreement with the Haitian Government for continuing this type of effort. As of September 2000, most of the

United States assistance to the Haitian police has stopped due to

congressional concerns about the events surrounding the May 2000

Haitian parliamentary and local elections.

The U.S. Department of State is currently reassessing several aspects of the United States relationship with Haiti based on concerns about how votes were counted in the Haitian May 2000 parliamentary elections.

My statement today is based on work we are currently conducting for this Committee and for the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee. First, I will discuss the results of the United States assistance that has been provided to the Haitian police and the judicial sector and some of the major problems that continue to affect

these justice institutions. Second, I will discuss the primary factors

that have affected the success of this assistance.

Our work is based on meetings with officials with the U.S. Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International

Development, U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S. agencies. To examine the results of this assistance, in June 2000 we sent a team into

Haiti to observe firsthand the conditions on the ground and to meet

with government officials, donor officials and others about the situation in Haiti. We also performed an extensive review of program

documentation over the last 5 years of this effort. We expect to

issue our report sometime in October 2000.

Over the past 6 fiscal years, the United States has provided

about $97 million in assistance to help Haiti establish its first civilian controlled police force and improve aspects of the judicial sector. About $70 million of the assistance helped Haiti recruit, train,

organize and equip a basic police force, including specialized units

such as an anti-narcotics unit, a special investigation unit and the

Haitian Coast Guard.

During the same period, the United States provided approximately $27 million in assistance that led to improvements in the

training of magistrates and prosecutors, the management practices

of judicial institutions and access to the Haitian people to the justice systems. However, despite these achievements, the police force

7

has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement responsibilities, and recent events suggest that politization has compromised the force according to U.S. and other donor officials.

The judicial sector has also had serious weaknesses, according to

these officials. The sector has not undergone major reform and as

a result lacks independence from the executive branch and has outdated legal codes and cumbersome judicial procedures.

Furthermore, the judicial institutions have personnel shortages,

inadequate infrastructure and equipment, vehicles, legal texts and

other types of supplies. They have an ineffective internal oversight

organization that is unable to stem corruption. Overall, these institutions provide justice services to only a small segment of the population because the institutions rely heavily in judicial proceedings

on the use of French, rather than Creole, which is the majority language of the population.

A key factor affecting the lack of success of United States assistance has been the Haitian Government’s lack of commitment to addressing the major problems of its police and judicial institutions.

United States assistance to the police has been impeded because

the Haitian Government has not acted to strengthen the police organization by filling the current vacancy of the Inspector General,

by providing human and physical resources needed to develop an

effective police force, by supporting vigorously police investigations

of serious crimes and to keep the police force out of politics.

United States assistance to the judicial sector has been largely

undercut because the Haitian Government has not followed

through with many of the broad reforms that are needed, has not

assumed responsibility for adopting many of these improvements,

and has not provided the physical and human resources needed to

operate effectively.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER [presiding]. Excuse me. Do you have any additional statements?

Mr. FORD. That was a summary of my statement.

Mr. BALLENGER. I wonder if a copy was available.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, Mr. Chairman, out of respect for yourself

I will defer to the Chair to go first.

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, having come in late to the discussion, the

one question that comes to my mind is are we still committing

money to the operation, this assistance in Haiti? Do we still give

them financial assistance on these matters?

Mr. FORD. My understanding is we are still providing some form

of assistance primarily to the Haitian Coast Guard. The DEA still

has a presence there and is working with the Haitians, but most

of the police assistance and the judicial assistance has been

stopped.

Mr. BALLENGER. Did you say DEA?

Mr. FORD. Yes. The DEA works on counter narcotics activities,

and they do work with the Haitian counterparts and also with the

Haitian Coast Guard.

8

Mr. BALLENGER. From what we hear, though, it is not terribly effective; at least the amount of drugs that seem to be coming

through Haiti are rather substantial amounts, but to your

understanding——

Mr. FORD. Yes. According to the State Department’s most recent

report on drug trafficking activities in Haiti, they indicated there

has been I believe for 1999 the report had a 24 percent increase

in drug trafficking activities in Haiti.

Our conversations at the Embassy clearly indicated that narcotics trafficking is a major problem in Haiti today, and there is a

concern on both the government’s part and our Embassy about

where we may be headed in terms of narcotics problems in Haiti.

Mr. BALLENGER. Could you tell me what steps other donors such

as Canada, who we sometimes disagree with, are taking with regard to the assistance of the Haitian National Police and the Haiti

judiciary?

Mr. FORD. Yes. Canada has also been a major donor to the Haitian police over the last 5 years. They have worked in concert with

our agency in terms of developing programs there.

Our understanding is that they also have some concerns regarding the commitment of the Haitian Government to enhancing their

police. We understand that they have an agreement with the Haitians to continue the police academy, which we had been helping

to fund for the last 5 years. We understand that the Canadians

have reached an agreement with the Haitians to maintain the police academy, so that is a positive sign.

With regard to the other donors, I believe the French have a

small effort in the judicial sector, and UNDP has also supported

some judicial reform activity in Haiti.

Mr. BALLENGER. Does the GAO have any recommendations stemming from this review that you can share with us?

Mr. FORD. We are currently in the process of finalizing our report. We currently believe that, if the U.S. Government determines

that it wants to reinvigorate our program in Haiti with regard to

either the police and/or the judiciary, there ought to be more strict

conditionality applied in terms of the agreement.

We have seen in work we have done in other countries in Latin

America over the years on rule of law activities that unless you

have the political will of the government, it is very difficult to have

any kind of real meaningful major reform with either the police

and/or the judiciary.

Certainly our programs in El Salvador have been generally successful because the government there has made a conscious effort

to support the police and to make some judicial reforms.

We are currently thinking in terms of perhaps suggesting that,

if we are going to continue there, we need to have more strict conditions apply to our assistance so that we have an active partnership with the Haitian Government.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, you refer to this lack of political will, the lack of commitment. I think it is important at least for me to understand the

intent of or the import rather of that particular phrase.

9

Do you mean that it is a resistance to change or simply inaction

in terms of the necessary changes in the law of a commitment of

resources, because I think that is very important to understand.

Mr. FORD. Yes. Let me see if I can help you out with that. First

of all, as you acknowledged in your opening statement, Haiti is the

poorest country in the western hemisphere. They do have limited

financial resources that they can invoke to many things on the island, including support for police and judicial reform, so we recognize that, and we believe that context needs to be—will be included

in our report.

We also think that the Haitians in some respects have backtracked on some initiatives that we think are important and that

we think are a sign that maybe they have not been fully committed

to the effort.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Such as?

Mr. FORD. A fine example would be the Inspector General’s office. The Inspector General that had been there up until May before he left the country had been involved in investigations which

resulted in 1,100 police officers being released from the force.

There has been no replacement made for the Inspector General,

according to the Embassy officials we talked to on our trip down

there. There are no active investigations underway currently on the

island, so that is a sign to us that perhaps some of the political

commitment that we would like to see on the part of the government just is not there at this point in time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just point out again that Haiti is a nation that needs everything simultaneously. I think it is very important for the American people to understand that, and from May

until September hopefully that appointment would have been

made, but I would suggest that it is not egregious.

I was disappointed in the fact that Mr. Josef made a decision to

leave as I had confidence in his integrity, and I think, as you indicate, his record speaks for itself. At the same time, I think we have

a certain responsibility to acknowledge, too, that it was the U.S.

Congress that put a hold on so-called MICIUIH funding, which

would have allowed monitoring of exactly the kind of abuses and

allegations that Mr. Josef and the Inspector General’s office was responsible for.

Would you agree with that statement? Are you aware of the hold

on the MICIUIH funding?

Mr. FORD. I guess we are not familiar with that specific hold, but

let me comment on a couple of other things. That was one example.

I think there are other examples where the Haitian Government

just has not stepped to the plate in certain areas.

In the area of judicial reform, there has been no movement to

changing their legal codes, and they are still operating with——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt you again, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, I do not want to appear to be an apologist

for the Haitian Government because that is not my perspective, but

at the same time you said you are unaware of the hold on the

MICIUIH. Well, I would suggest that it is very important that

GAO put that into its report and to understand that context.

10

At the same time, the lack of a parliament certainly creates, I

would suggest, an overwhelming impediment to the passage of legislation that we are discussing about that you are indicating is necessary to effect the kind of judicial reform that I think we would

all embrace.

Again, the linchpin of that was the elections that occurred in

May and subsequently in July, and obviously there is a Presidential election, so again I think it is important to put it in that

particular context, but again I have read your preliminary report,

and you refer constantly in there, and I think accurately so, to lack

of resources.

I also think it is important to understand that we often hear in

Congress the amount of billions—I think it is $2.5 billion—that the

United States has expended in terms of Haiti. I think it is important to stress that that $2 billion most of it, was allocated to the

invasion, if you will, of some 20,000 American troops back in 1994

to restore democracy and also the processing of refugees in

Guantanemo so that they could return to their homeland without

fear of being assassinated and murdered and oppressed by the government.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Delahunt, I do not know how strict they run

the rules here, but the red light is on.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They are very loose.

Mr. BALLENGER. OK. You can have a little more time then.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I figured because you are such a dear friend, I

figured I could take advantage of you.

In terms of again let me get back to the political level. In your

conversations with DEA, in your conversations with the U.S. Coast

Guard, what have they prescribed to you in terms of their relationships with law enforcement officials relevant to drug investigations?

Do they describe it as a failure to cooperate or simply the fact

that the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard are

totally undermanned, totally lack the necessary resources and give

and confer upon the DEA and the Coast Guard wide latitude in our

own efforts to interdict drugs and to deal with the issue of Haiti

and drug trafficking?

Mr. FORD. Well, I can tell you that based on our conversations

with DEA and the law enforcement establishment at the Embassy

that that is one of the positive areas in Haiti; that in fact they do

have a very good relationship with the Haitian Coast Guard. The

problem is they do not have the assets and the resources.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. Well, this is the point I am trying to

make, Mr. Ford. In your conversations with the DEA, what do they

describe as the albeit somewhat primitive and close to futile efforts

of the Haitian National Police, the so-called anti-narcotics squad?

It is understaffed. It is undermanned, but it is trying. Is that a fair

statement?

I do not want to put words in your mouth, but I know that I have

spoken in Port-au-Prince to our DEA, and that is the information

they give to me.

Mr. FORD. No. I do not disagree with that. They told us that, you

know, they generally have good cooperation with those units, but

they are undermanned. They do not have equipment. They cannot

11

get out to where the problem is and so their effectiveness is limited.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They do not even in some cases, you know, have

uniforms.

Mr. FORD. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, that is the reality of Haiti. Is there much

to criticize? Yes, but does it translate into what you described as

political will by just simply a total lack of resources and ineptitude

and, unfortunately, elections that did not resolve, at least to the

satisfaction of the international community, many of the issues surrounding democratic institutions in Haiti?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Mr. BALLENGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. You are welcome. I will not say you were encroaching on my time since you are a good friend.

Mr. Ford, I assume since you are from GAO you are an accountant?

Mr. FORD. Not by background. I am not an accountant, no.

Mr. COOKSEY. What are you by background and education?

Mr. FORD. My expertise is in the area of international affairs.

Mr. COOKSEY. So you went to college and got a degree in international issues?

Mr. FORD. That is right.

Mr. COOKSEY. OK. I was going to ask you some accounting questions, but I will not. I will ask you some international issues questions. I will ask you some international issues questions.

The issue here is rule of law, if I am not mistaken, and I am not

a lawyer. In my review of geography, my memory of geography, the

island there is called Hispaniola. Is that not correct?

Mr. FORD. That is correct.

Mr. COOKSEY. And part of that island is Haiti, and the other part

of the island is the Dominican Republic? Is that correct?

Mr. FORD. That is correct.

Mr. COOKSEY. Where do you have the best rule of law, the most

effective rules of law, in Haiti or the Dominican Republic? I know

it is not very good in either place, but which is better? Which is

better of the two?

Mr. FORD. You know, we did not do an assessment on that particular assignment. However, I will—— Mr. COOKSEY. I can tell you are a politician.

Mr. FORD [continuing]. Tell you that based on work we have done

in the past I would say the Dominican Republic has generally a

better system.

Mr. COOKSEY. It is my understanding that they at least deliver

services to the people, electricity, water and so forth. Haiti has

electricity a couple hours a day. What is the explanation for that?

Do you have any, since you have a background in international relations?

Mr. FORD. Well, OK. I am not an expert on either of these, but

let me tell you what I know a little bit about. Haiti has not had

a democratic form of government for 200 years prior to I guess you

could say 1991, and then we had to invade there to put President

Aristide back in power, so they do not have a tradition of democVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:23 Feb 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\69534 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
12

racy there. The Dominican Republic does not have much of a tradition of democracy either.

Different cultures. You know, Haiti, the vast majority of the population speak Creole. You know, the upper class speaks French,

and they do not have a Hispanic society as in the Dominican Republic, so you have the different culture, different mind set there.

Both of these countries are developing countries. Both of them

have major problems economically. They have major problems with

poverty. We have aid programs, have developed aid programs in

both countries, or we had up until recently in Haiti at least on the

justice side. You know, they both have some similar characteristics.

Mr. COOKSEY. Have you put an equal amount of money in both

places? Not you and me, but the taxpayers.

Mr. FORD. I do not have the dollar amount for Dominican Republic.

Mr. COOKSEY. Let me go back and review a little bit more geography. The Virgin Islands. If my memory is correct, there is an

American Virgin Islands and a British Virgin Islands. Where do

you have the best rule of law there, the British Virgin Islands or

American Virgin Islands?

Mr. FORD. I really cannot answer that. I mean, I know that the

United States—— Mr. COOKSEY. Would my friend, Mr. Delahunt, who is an attorney, like to answer that? Who has the best rule of law? What I am

driving at is where is there rule of law and where does it work and

why does it work?

In the BVI, for example, there was a hurricane that went

through there a few years ago. In the American Virgin Islands

there was total chaos. There were people that were down there that

were on vacation, and they were worried about their survival because there was total chaos in the streets. Where is there the better rule of law and why?

He is afraid to answer. He is walking away.

Mr. FORD. I am not in a position to answer that. I can tell you

that the U.S. Virgin Islands is a U.S. territory and is subject to

U.S. laws with some exceptions, so they are under our system.

I am not familiar with the British Virgin Islands in terms of

what type of system they have.

Mr. COOKSEY. I have been to both places and, you know, things

were fine when I was in both places.

Well, my concern is about the man and woman on the street. As

a physician, and I am not an accountant either, I was trained to

take care, and just as I grew up in my household my parents believed we should take care of the weakest members of our society.

But in some of these societies the weakest members are the ones

that suffer the most, and the strongest are the politicians, and they

end up using and abusing the system. They use and abuse the people.

That is true in this country. It is true in the American Virgin Islands and, unfortunately, I am afraid it is true in Haiti, so what

do we do and how do we find a better solution?

I was in Sierra Leone in July. You do not really have time for

me to tell you what I found there. It is the same situation. Incidentally, I met with some of the children there that have committed

13

murders. I mean, one guy, a 15-year-old, admitted killing 85 people. He was a former member of the RUF, and he switched over.

These are kids that are—of course, I am 6′3′′, and they are about

5′3′′, but they speak Creole, too, so I am looking for the common

thread.

What is the common thread where there is security, where there

is rule of law, and what is the common thread where there is no

security and where there is no rule of law, and how do we use

American taxpayers’ dollars to help the weakest members of society

because I do not really care or give a you know what about the political leaders, and apparently there is some bad political leaders

in all these places.

Do you want to comment on that, or do you disagree? Do you

have a diplomatic international relations response?

Mr. FORD. I certainly would agree with you, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. It is more fun when you disagree with me.

Mr. FORD. I think that creating a westernized style of justice in

developing countries is an extremely difficult task. It takes years

of effort.

As I have pointed out earlier in my statement, we have done

some work in some other countries where we have been more successful. In our view, we were more successful because there would

seem to be more commitment on the part of the government to support the effort.

That seems to be a common thread in what we have seen and

what we have done in the past, but it takes years of effort, and

there has to be a commitment to provide that form of justice, particularly for the mass of the population. They have to feel like their

government will treat them with some form of protection and respect and welfare. If they do not have that, then you do not have

rule of law.

Mr. COOKSEY. My closing comment, Mr. Chairman, is that in all

these places I go and visit I find that the man and woman on the

street generally are kind, gentle, sensitive people that want to put

a roof over their children’s head, their family’s head, educate their

children, feed and provide for their children.

The problem is bullies, and there are bullies in every one of these

areas that I have talked about. If there is one thing that I hate it

is bullies. I do not care whether they are in Burma or Haiti or the

American Virgin Islands or Sierra Leone or the Congo.

If we are going to start doing something, if we are truly interested in human rights and truly interested in helping the weakest

members of society, why do we not have the courage as a country

to go in and just take out the bullies with whatever we have to do,

but take out the bullies because they are the ones that are creating

the problems. They are the ones that are killing people, maiming

people, using and abusing them.

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Lee. Sorry to keep you waiting.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back to the video that we saw earlier and just

ask a question with regard to what is your assessment or our government’s assessment of why the riot control police did not step in?

What is our analysis of that? Was it they did not want to? They

14

did not want to use excessive force? They just wanted to see the

destruction occur? Is there an official kind of position on that?

Mr. FORD. I really do not know the answer to that. I can tell you

that one of the things we were told when we were down in Haiti

was that command and control of the police from the—it is a highly

centralized command and control structure and that the police in

the field generally are reacting to problems. They do not normally

do anything unless they are directed by some higher authority to

take action.

Now, I do not know in this particular case what the situation is.

We were not privy to what exactly transpired in terms of who decided what they would do. Our understanding is that that was basically the riot control police, and we do not know what direction

they had at that time.

Ms. LEE. So this was actually the first time you had seen the

video?

Mr. FORD. No. I had seen that video before.

Ms. LEE. Had you?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Ms. LEE. Let me just ask you just a general question with regard

to the Haitian people. Are they becoming more central? More desperate? What has been their response to the current state of affairs, and then what do you see as the ramifications of the total

withdrawal of United States support from Haiti?

Mr. FORD. Again, I can give you some anecdotal responses. I can

say that our team that went to Haiti met with a number of Haitian

officials who are magistrates, judges working at medium to lower

levels of the bureaucracy over there and that many of them had a

deep concern about what was happening in Haiti and that many

of them wanted to do their job, but they felt for a variety of reasons, in some cases threats to their lives, in some cases lack of resources. They just were not able to really do what they thought

they could do to help the country.

Now, that is anecdotal. Whether that represents everybody in

Haiti I cannot really comment on. There have been some polls

taken that we have seen in our research that showed that the Haitian population in general does not have a high regard say for the

police force in general, but there is a clear sense at least from the

people we talked to who were actually on the ground working there

that they want to do it.

They want to do what they were trained to do, but they either

do not have the resources, or they operate under constraints that

do not always exist in this country.

Ms. LEE. So complete U.S. withdrawal of support means fewer

resources?

Mr. FORD. Well, currently as I mentioned earlier, we do not have

an active program with the exception of some support we are providing to the Coast Guard, so we do not have an active program

there.

What is going to happen with the efforts that we paid for earlier

in terms of whether they will be sustained, there are some signs

that they are lost, particularly on the judicial side. There are some

positive things we saw; the magistrate school. Apparently the Haitian Government is still supporting that, although at a lower level.

15

The police academy. The Canadians are supporting some of that

program, but everything else that we paid for, who knows whether

it will be sustained.

At this point it is not clear whether or not those institutions and

those things we paid for in the past will still be there say a year

from now.

Ms. LEE. So do we then have any concern for the sustainment

of these institutions and for some of these reforms to be—— Mr. FORD. Absolutely.

Ms. LEE [continuing]. Institutionalized, and then how do we ensure that if we are withdrawing it or if we have withdrawn it?

Mr. FORD. Well, I think again from where we sit, our view is that

when we decide—if we decide to continue or develop a new program, we need to have more of a partnership with the Haitian Government to make sure that whatever we end up paying for, that

investment is not lost. I think that that is the critical point.

We are not in a position to say whether or not we ought to have

a new program there or not, but certainly if we do have one we

think that we ought to have a partnership that makes sure that

the investment pays off and is not lost.

Ms. LEE. Well, in many areas of the world we do have those kind

of partnerships, and I do not know why we did not insist on that

with Haiti. Is there a reason, or is there just—— Mr. FORD. I cannot speak for the Administration. I mean, you

will have to ask them that. There is certainly a concern—there is

no doubt about that—that we need to do something in Haiti.

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, ladies

and gentlemen, for being here, Mr. Ford, Ms. Hughes and Mr.

Tapia-Videla.

Mr. Ford, all the questions have gone to you. Maybe you want

to try to answer this, or maybe you would like to pass it on. You

know there are certain issues here. One that is probably the most

important is the attitude of the Haitian Government. The second,

obviously, is the effect of the police, and the third is in terms of

the judicial system itself.

I see on the next to the last page here in this Appendix No. 1

on page 12, the aid to administration of the justice program went

from 1993 to 2000, and out of a total of $93 million that $11 million or actually let’s say roughly $14 million was given to the

former administration, the one called Chechi. What did Chechi actually do?

It seems to me in reading over the information that a lot of this

was directed toward the judicial system, and only $11 million out

of this $93 million, or actually you can take a look at the figures

on page 65, was devoted to them. What did they do?

Mr. FORD. In the case of the Chechi program, which operated I

believe from 1996 to 1999, you can almost tell what they did by

reading the captions, but they implemented—— Mr. HOUGHTON. No. I see that.

Mr. FORD [continuing]. A case registration system.

Mr. HOUGHTON. And anybody can read that.

Mr. FORD. Right.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Case registering and——

16

Mr. FORD. Right.

Mr. HOUGHTON [continuing]. Case monitoring. I mean, what did

they do?

Mr. FORD. OK. What they basically did was they tried to get the

judicial system in Haiti, and there are four tiers of it to help them

to develop the basic tools for a justice system where you could

track, for example, its prisoners to make sure that you know where

they are. They monitor what they are doing.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Did they put that in place?

Mr. FORD. Yes, they did.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So all those things they did in terms of education, case registering, entering other technical equipment systems, have been done?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. HOUGHTON. I see. Did they have a sign off report at the end?

Did they say, you know, you asked us to do this; it has cost us

$11.5 million, here is what we think ought to be done?

Mr. FORD. After this program was over, and this program was

funded by the Department of Justice, they wanted to continue the

effort.

Our understanding is that last summer negotiations were underway between our government and the Haitian Government to extend this effort so that the effort would be sustained. What we

were told was that they could not reach agreement on how to move

forward, and as a result of that——

Mr. HOUGHTON. Is it because of conditions down there or negotiations with our funding agencies?

Mr. FORD. I believe it was negotiations with our people and the

Haitian Government and the Minister of Justice.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So that the people down in Haiti did not want

them to come in and do the things they were suggesting to do?

Mr. FORD. We understand that there were differences in views

about what the direction of the program should be.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, you know, this gets to the core question—

you are damned if you do, you are damned if you do not. You are

damned if you pull out. You are damned if you stay.

Of course, the overall umbrella issue is really the attitude of the

Haitian Government. Even if you essentially came back and specific things, in terms of case registering and court management,

were approved, why would you want to spend more money on this?

Granted, it is needed, but if the attitude of the government is such

that it is the back of your hand.

Mr. FORD. Well, I think that is a fair question. That is our point.

Our point is you need to have an active partner that is going to

sustain the effort, and I think that is what we need to see with regard to any type of program.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So all these things, whether it is police management, whether it is training, whether it is the corruption, whether

it is the specifics in terms of the legal program, it all depends upon

the governmental support.

Now, did you make any suggestions in your overview of what we

ought to do in terms of that overall broader issue?

17

Mr. FORD. Our primary suggestion really is going to be geared

toward establishing a more specific quid pro quo for the type of aid

that we provide. That is basically where we are going.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So if that condition exists and this is not something you want to get into, if you had your druthers, if you had the

money, would you still go ahead and do some of these things?

Mr. FORD. I think these things are—I think that there is no

doubt in our minds and on the part of the people at the Embassy

that all of these are useful things that ought to be done in Haiti.

I do not think there is any disagreement about whether these

things were beneficial to society there. They would be, but they

need to be maintained and sustained.

Mr. HOUGHTON. So you would go ahead and make sure the procedures from the judicial standpoint were there, that the language

has now been translated to Creole and all those things? You think

that it is still building the base so when the attitude of the government changes you will have something to work on? Is that right?

Mr. FORD. I think you have to have—when you say the attitude

of the government, I think you need to have a commitment on the

part of the government’s part to support it. If you have that commitment, we can make progress.

Mr. HOUGHTON. How do you explain that to the American people? I mean, these are huge dollars. You know, that is a lot of

money. How do you explain that?

Mr. FORD. Well, again, we began these programs. In the first 2

or 3 years the government of Haiti supported the effort, and then

for reasons that are not known to me anyway that level of commitment seems to have dissipated to some extent, so I think, we have

to have an agreement with the government that they are going to

support the efforts.

They did in the beginning, and there was a lot of success. We

trained 6,500 police officers. There were a lot of things that we did

that were useful, but they need to be sustained. The government

has to support them.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Can I just ask one final question, and then I will

stop here?

Mr. COOKSEY [presiding]. Sure. You can have—— Mr. HOUGHTON. No, no, no. I just want to ask—— Mr. COOKSEY. OK.

Mr. HOUGHTON [continuing]. One more question.

Mr. COOKSEY. We always defer to those of you from the northeast.

Mr. HOUGHTON. If you were to ask the Canadians, for example,

what are we going to do, what are we going to do together, would

their answer be your answer, or would there be a difference?

Mr. FORD. We talked to the Canadians, and my personal view is

I think they would agree with what we have had to say here. They

want their investment, their assistance, to be effective just like we

do, and I believe that they also feel that there has to be some commitment on the part of the government for their programs to work.

They were in a partnership with us in terms of helping to develop the police, so we had similar ambitions in terms of what we

wanted to achieve.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much.

18

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I am sorry that I was

not here to listen to your testimony. I was looking through the

written testimony.

As you know, because I am from South Florida what happens in

Haiti has an immediate and profound effect on all of us in our communities, so the reforms and the democracy and the infrastructure

and all the positive changes that we all want to make in Haiti have

a really almost domestic concerns for us in South Florida.

How optimistic are you, based on your GAO assessment of the

assistance that has already gone into Haiti for judicial and police

reform, that things can get turned around; that the funds will be

used in a better way; and that with all of the changes taking place

in Haiti now that they have turned the corner and are on the right

route, because what we hear are nothing but negative news about

the latest developments?

How optimistic or pessimistic are you that our U.S. dollars that

we have funneled over there will have laid the proper groundwork

for a true democracy and true reforms to take place on that troubled island?

Mr. FORD. Well, all I can do is mirror what we were told by our

U.S. officials down there. There is a deep concern about the direction of Haiti in terms of the government.

I think you have a Presidential election coming up. Until the political situation in Haiti is sorted out, it is difficult to determine

where we go from here. I think that is the view of the Administration at this point.

I think there is a deep concern on everyone’s part. I think that

at least the people we have talked to want Haiti to succeed. They

want there to be progress there, but right now everything is kind

of up in the air, frankly.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Anyone else want to speak to that?

Thank you.

Mr. COOKSEY. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Can I ask you a question? If my memory is correct,

have we not had some testimony that there is a listening station

in Cuba that can listen to all the conversations in the southeast

United States and maybe a lot of the United States, say our telephone calls, our military transmissions? Is that correct?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. It is targeted to the United States, and

it deals with mostly economic and military espionage. It is in

Louvdes, Cuba, and there is a minor one more close by as well. It

is a Russian intelligence facility, one of the most sophisticated listening stations in the world.

Mr. COOKSEY. OK. My question to you then is if there is an entity like that that listens to our radio transmissions and telephone

transmissions and your telephone transmissions, should there not

be a comparable source of information, and we may not get it from

the Cubans, but I bet there is someone in our government that

could be listed as indeed listening to the phone conversations and

the transmission of the people in Haiti. Would you think that is a

safe assumption, Mr. Ford?

19

Mr. FORD. I really cannot comment on that, sir. I do not have the

expertise on that question.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, let’s just assume there is. OK. Next question.

If there is a way to listen to what is going on in the Aristide government, the Lavalas Family party, and we learn that some of the

people in that government, in that party that only has one candidate for president this November, is involved with the drug trade

should we have some additional concerns in the United States

about how effectively our money is being spent down there, or

should we just ignore it? Should we blow it off? That is an easy

question.

Mr. FORD. Well, yes. If we have evidence that there is something

of that nature going on, obviously we need to take action against

it, but, you know, I do not know anything about that.

Mr. COOKSEY. OK. Do you think that we were justified in taking

Noriega out in Panama when we had evidence that he was involved

in the drug trade?

Mr. FORD. Well, GAO does not have a view on that, sir. I can tell

you that, you know, if we did.

Mr. COOKSEY. You were probably a student in international relations when that occurred.

Mr. FORD. I have my own views on that, sir, but they do not represent necessarily GAO’s views so it probably would be better for

me not to answer that.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, the question I am driving at is if we have

intelligence that indicates that people in this government have a

reason, more reason, to hold onto the reins of government other

than just oppressing their people, other than just raping and pillaging that country, other than taking our tax dollars and probably

not using them very effectively, the other reason can be that they

are involved in the drug trade.

Would that be reason for us to take action or for the GAO to take

action? Do you think the GAO would have a recommendation or

opinion on that?

Mr. FORD. Well, I think that specific instance I believe is already

covered by law, as I recall. I think there is a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act that basically requires us to cutoff aid.

Mr. COOKSEY. Good. Let’s say we can get information from the

Cubans. We can get it from our intelligence agency. It is my understanding there was a report in one of our local newspapers that

documented that the members of the Aristide government are involved in drug trade. Do you think the newspaper is a good source

of information?

Mr. FORD. Do I think the newspaper is a good source of information? Not necessarily, no.

Mr. COOKSEY. So you think the radio intercepts or some other

type of intelligence activity to get that? Do you think that information is out there?

Mr. FORD. I really do not know, sir.

Mr. COOKSEY. What if I told you that that information is out

there and has been provided to the leadership of the Democratic

party and the leadership of the Republican party, and it has been

suppressed or ignored, information that indeed the leadership of

this government is up to their ears in drug trade, and that is probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:23 Feb 13, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\69534 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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ably one reason they are trying to hang onto power because they

are making money?

This is just a question. I am not making an assertion. I am not

up here with a newspaper, sir. I am just asking the question. It is

a hypothetical question,—— Mr. FORD. OK. Well, let me—— Mr. COOKSEY [continuing]. So you can give me a hypothetical answer.

Mr. FORD. Let me say something here, sir. I have a little information on this, but I cannot comment on it in an open setting so

let me just say that right now. The information I have available

I cannot talk about in an open setting.

Mr. COOKSEY. OK. Well, I am concerned again about what is

going on down there. I am concerned about the people, and I think

that the Americans truly have a desire to help the people out in

Haiti, but I just do not see any reason that we should continue to

help out the bad guys.

The Chairman is here. Do you have any comments or questions,

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman for taking

on the Chair while I was on the floor on some other legislation.

Has the Administration conditioned its aid to the Haitian judicial

system or the Haitian National Police on any areas? Have the Haitians met any such conditionality if there have been such conditions?

Mr. FORD. In terms of the previous programs, the information we

have indicates that we did not have any real formal type of conditionality.

We did have a—signed an agreement with regard to the narcotics

unit having to do with personnel levels, but that is the only instance we are aware of programmatically of any conditions being

put on the Haitian Government.

Chairman GILMAN. Your opening statement refers to signs of

politization in the police during the recent election process. Can

you specify the incidents that you were referring to?

Mr. FORD. Again based on information provided to us by the Embassy and the State Department, there were some incidents where

the police either were passive in terms of taking action against

demonstrators, and there also are reports that after the election

there were some arrests of opposition leaders on the part of the police.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you have any recommendations of what

we can or should be doing to beef up the police process in Haiti?

Mr. FORD. Again as I noted earlier, we believe that there should

be stronger conditionality put on any future assistance to try to ensure that the government of Haiti not only supports the assistance

we provide, but also there will be some semblance of sustainability.

Chairman GILMAN. What sort of conditionality would you suggest?

Mr. FORD. Well, again I am not a program person so, you know,

I am not the best person to answer that. I think it is basically an

agreement that if we are going to provide training for the police

and we are going to support the police academy that there be a

quid pro quo on the part of the Haitian Government to support

21

that effort; if we want to have an Inspector General that that office

be maintained and that they have a credible individual in that office. Things of that nature I think ought to be included in these

types of agreements.

Chairman GILMAN. Director Ford, have the Canadians curtailed

their assistance to the police?

Mr. FORD. The information we have is that the Canadians have

reduced their overall assistance to Haiti to the police and to the judicial system. However, they are still supporting the police academy. They have apparently reached agreement with the Haitian

Government to continue to fund the training academy there, so

there is some ongoing activity.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

By quid pro quo, Mr. Ford, are you suggesting—let me see if I

understand it because we have been discussing sustaining these

programs. I concur. I think what we are seeing is an attrition, first

of all, in the number of police personnel. I think the numbers were

initially 6,500. Now, according to Embassy personnel, it is anywhere between 3,000 and 4,000.

So I think what you are talking about is a commitment that the

necessary funding during the course of the budgetary process of the

Haitian Government reflect a resources commitment to increase

the numbers back to 7,500, along with appropriate training as was

initially done several years ago.

Is that what you are talking about as a quid pro quo?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. A financial commitment—— Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. As well as the training component?

Mr. FORD. Yes. I think there needs to be those two things. I also

think that we should try to get the Haitian Government to also

make some major political reforms. We mentioned earlier the legal

codes. These kinds of things are considered to be essential to have.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. As you said, I think you said just several

minutes ago once the political issues are resolved, once there is a

government in place, that is when these particular issues have to

be addressed.

You would acknowledge, presumably, that we have had no government for almost 2 years now, and clearly there is a question as

to the legitimacy of the May election. I find myself more in agreement than in disagreement with the Chairman and others who

have raised the issue, but I think it is important to understand in

the larger context that there is no government.

I think it is important to understand, too, that in the aftermath

of the coup years everything was starting from scratch. You would

acknowledge that.

Mr. FORD. Yes, we do.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, absolutely from scratch.

I think it was Mr. Cooksey that raised the issue on the videotape

we saw. What conclusions do you reach after observing the videotape?

Mr. FORD. That tape?

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Mr. DELAHUNT. That tape.

Mr. FORD. I am not a police officer. To me, you would expect normal police to go in and not allow somebody to go in and burn a

house down, so I find that troubling.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right, but, you know, what I found—let me tell

you what I noticed is that there were five or six police and a crowd

of several hundred. I cannot reach a particular conclusion. I do not

know whether they were waiting for reinforcements. I do not know

whether they felt threatened or intimidated by the crowd. I do not

know their level of training.

A statement was made about rioters exiting the grounds and not

being arrested by the police. I do not have any evidence to indicate

whether those were the rioters or those were the individuals that

were in that residence. They may or may not have been inquired

upon upon exiting. I do not know that. I find it difficult to reach

any particular conclusion.

Again, I think that we have to be careful in reaching conclusions.

The Department of Justice recently was embarrassed because of a

case involving our national security with Dr. Wen Ho Lee when he

was charged with 60 particular indictments after presumably a

professional, thorough investigation and 59 of them were dismissed.

I would suggest you be very, very careful in reaching conclusions.

Accept the facts and the data. Let’s not just draw inferences that

prove to be false and mislead us into drafting or embracing a policy

that maybe does a disservice to American national interests.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. COOKSEY. I would like to ask the people over in the video

area if it would be possible to replay that video as we are having

this discussion and project it maybe on the screen—— Chairman GILMAN. Before we do that—— Mr. COOKSEY [continuing]. And then continue our discussion.

Chairman GILMAN. Before we do that, if you will take just a moment? I have just a few more questions.

Mr. Ford, with regard to the judicial system, I understand there

is a contracting agency that is supposed to help improve Haiti’s judicial system. Is that correct?

Mr. FORD. I believe there were several different efforts on the

way. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. How much did we expend in trying to improve the judicial system?

Mr. FORD. Well, Congressman Gilman, if you have our report

there and turn to page 12 of the appendix, it has an outline there.

Chairman GILMAN. Just tell us how much it is.

Mr. FORD. It is $26.7 million.

Chairman GILMAN. And what were the accomplishments of that

expenditure?

Mr. FORD. At the beginning there were several accomplishments.

We established the magistrate school, which is still there. It is still

being funded by the Haitian Government. We also provided a significant amount of training to prosecutors and other judges. We established case registration systems.

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Unfortunately, the information we had when we visited Haiti is

that many of those efforts have not been sustained, so the only

thing that appears to be still up and running at this point in time

is the magistrate school.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you give me an assessment then of the

judicial system? Is it effective? Are there problems present?

Mr. FORD. Yes. There are significant problems, which we outline

in our statement.

Again, we need to point out that our assistance was meant to attack certain problems there. It was not going to resolve the overall

judicial problems in Haiti. Some major problems with legal reform

need to be dealt with.

I think the assistance we provided attempted to put in place

more trained judges, more trained prosecutors so that better investigations could occur and that they could track cases and that type

of thing. It is the first step of what needs to be done. A lot more

needs to be done in Haiti.

Chairman GILMAN. So has any of that been adopted? Has there

been any success at all in our initiatives of trying to improve the

judicial system?

Mr. FORD. Well, the people that got trained are still there. Some

of them are still there. I mean, as I mentioned earlier, anecdotally

many of them want to do their job better, but they face a lot of restraints. A lot of them do not have the supplies. They do not have

equipment.

It is a very difficult environment for them to operate there, but

those people are still there, and they still have the school in place.

They are still training some magistrates, so there are some things

that are still happening.

Chairman GILMAN. You earlier mentioned a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits U.S. assistance to persons corrupted by narcotics trafficking. Could you spell out what provision

that is?

Mr. FORD. I am told that that is Section 487 and 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Chairman GILMAN. Has our government invoked that provision

at all?

Mr. FORD. One of those provisions is the drug certification provision, which has been waived the last 2 years by the President.

The other provision, on section 487, I am not familiar as to

whether or not that has ever been applied. We do not think it has,

but I am not positive on that.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. At this time we will comply with

the request by Dr. Cooksey, and I will ask our assistants to replay

the video we played earlier that showed the attack on the

political——

[Videotape shown.]

Mr. COOKSEY. Do you feel having an independent and strong judiciary—do you feel that having a strong judiciary would do more

to solve these problems and bring about rule of law than anything

else?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that it is absolutely critical. I think that

the problem that the Haitian Government has to deal with is budget priorities and limited resources.

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I mean, when we talk about what happens within the judiciary,

do not visualize a picture where computers are available because

the problem is one of are pencils and paper available. I mean, this

is a society that is best described as primitive, lacking in any resources. Is there corruption? Sure, there is corruption. Are there

overwhelming problems? Yes.

Like I mentioned in my opening remarks, I am profoundly disappointed with what occurred in the aftermath of the May election

in terms of the tabulation because I believe there was an historic

opportunity to transform the direction that this nation could take

into the new millennium.

I really, genuinely believe that, and the leadership of Haiti failed

to meet this historic responsibility, an historic responsibility.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

One last question, Mr. Ford, and then I will turn to Dr. Cooksey.

What were the circumstances surrounding the departure of the

Inspector General of the Haitian National Police, the deciding factor on why the Inspector General left the Haitian National Police?

Mr. FORD. Well, I can only tell you what we were told by the people at the Embassy. I think in late 1999 the Secretary of State for

Public Safety, Mr. Manuel, left his position, and we were told that

he had been threatened.

Chairman GILMAN. Who threatened him?

Mr. FORD. That I do not know. He had received threats is what

we were told. We were also told that a similar situation may have

led to the IG resigning.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Delahunt, our colleague, who I really like and

I think is one of the real gentlemen on your side, Congressman

Conyers, had asked me earlier this year to go down to the elections, and I agreed to go. Then I got the message we were not going

because indeed the elections were going to be on the up and up.

Do you think that we should consider going down for the next

elections?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I did go down with Mr. Conyers, and, as

I have indicated to colleagues privately, I, along with Mr. Conyers,

had an opportunity to visit some 19 voting areas.

What we saw was remarkable, particularly for Haiti. There was

incredible enthusiasm. The turnout was approximately 60 percent.

The police were there acting appropriately and professionally. People were excited. There were foul ups, administrative delays. People were not being paid, but by and large we felt very positive

about the elections themselves.

That sentiment was echoed by observers from all over the world,

from Canada, from the Organization of American States. The problem occurred in the aftermath of the election.

Let me just make a footnote at this point. It was clear to me that

Fanmi Lavalas would have secured a plurality in almost all of the

Senatorial districts. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the election—we were there for the counting of the ballots, by the way, and

again it was done I believe in a fair and appropriate way. It was

in the aftermath of the election that the government I think inappropriately and illegally tabulated those ballots in a way that secured a majority rather than a plurality for Fanmi Lavalas.

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My point about going almost to the point where it could be considered a historical watershed in Haitian history was lost, but as

we look forward we are going to deal with this particular government. I would not opine as to whether we should attend the election in November, which is for the executive, which is the election

for president, but I would point out, and I think we have to reflect

on this.

I know that you and I and Chairman Gilman support approximately $3 billion, in excess of $3 billion of foreign assistance every

year to Egypt. The Egyptian Parliament is controlled by the party

of President Mubarak with 97 percent.

Now, there has been over the course of time considerable debate

as to whether elections in Egypt are fair and free, and people

whom I know you and I both respect would indicate that no, they

are not free and fair, so I think that we have to be careful in singling out a particular country and beginning the process of disengagement that I think would have negative implications for the

national interest of the United States.

Mr. COOKSEY. One followup question. This is a rhetorical question/comment. Do you think the attendance at this hearing of the

entire International Relations Committee is a reflection of the interest in Haiti? I am afraid to hear an answer.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, let me respond. Today is a very busy

day with Members on the floor, Members in other areas, so I do

not think it is a fair indication because there is a great deal of interest in Haiti’s future. A number of us have joined together from

time to time to go to Haiti to try to assess what is there.

Mr. Delahunt and yourself are indications of some of the people

taking the time, but there are a number of Members who have expressed a strong desire to see Haiti find a way to pull itself up by

its bootstraps.

One last question. Mr. Delahunt raised the question about the

police not detaining anyone, but is it not a rule pretty much among

police that you detain potential witnesses, even possible defendants

leaving the scene of an attack, to get some information? Here we

see no one being interrogated or questioned. They are running

away from the scene of the fire.

Mr. Delahunt, you may want to comment.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I do not know if you are directing that question

to Mr. Ford.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I am asking both Mr. Ford and yourself. What should be the role with regard to police in that kind of

a situation?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think the first priority, of course, would

be the personal safety of the police officers involved.

Chairman GILMAN. Again, I did not see anyone attacking any of

the police.

Mr. DELAHUNT. No. I understand, but, of course, we also saw

that police were far outnumbered by those that were rioting. Clearly the situation was chaotic.

I am sure—I have absolutely no doubt—that the police were concerned about their personal safety. I also have no doubt that their

training is inadequate, and I also have no doubt that they probably

were very, very scared about what was occurring.

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They were aware that some of those rioters—we had heard gunshots. Now, we do not know where those gunshots came from, but

given the numbers that I saw I cannot reach a conclusion. I just

simply cannot reach any fair conclusion.

You know, I think reasonable people can draw inferences that

contradict each other, but I do not think we have hard evidence

here that we can reach proper conclusions.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ford, do you want to comment on the action by the police under these circumstances?

Mr. FORD. Again, my colleague, who is a former police officer,

has told me that basic police practice would be to stop and interview people in a situation like that.

Again, we are not privy to the entire circumstances of what was

shown on that video, so, we do not know overall whether or not the

police were told not to do anything or whatever.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ford, let me interrupt you a moment.

Was there a full investigation of the destruction of the police headquarters by the police? Does anyone know that?

Mr. FORD. To our knowledge, there was not.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ford, the president of the Electoral

Council in Haiti was forced to leave Haiti in fear of his life in conditions similar to the Inspector General leaving. He had stated that

when it was made clear to him what could happen if he did not

make the improper report on the election, he asked for asylum in

an Embassy and to protect him as he left the country.

Can you tell us? Have you talked to him, or have you reviewed

that situation at all?

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, we did not talk to that individual, so

we do not have any information about that particular incident.

Chairman GILMAN. Did you look into the question of why he left

Haiti under protection by the Embassy?

Mr. FORD. In his case, no.

Chairman GILMAN. All right. If there are no other questions, I

want to thank our panelists for being here today and for helping

us to shed some light on the situation. We hope that as a result

of your review we can help make a better life for those in Haiti who

are struggling to find a way.

Thank you very much. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m. the Committee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

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