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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re DIGGS, Minors. July 14, 2016

No. 331022 Macomb Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2014-000019-NA

Before: J ANSEN , P.J., and F ORT H OOD and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent C. Woods appeals as of right a circuit court order terminating her parental rights to the minor childre n pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). We affirm.

Respondent argues that the trial court erred because it did no t conduct the hearing on the supplemental petition for termin ation within the 42-day period required by MCR 3.977(F)(2). We disagree. This issue is unpreserved because it was not rais ed below. In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Unpreserved issues are revi ewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Utrera , 281 Mich App 1, 8; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). “Ge nerally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it aff ected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id . at 9.

MCR 3.977(F)(2) provides that onc e a supplemental petition for termination has been filed, the court is required to hold the hearing “within 42 day s after the filing of the supplemental petition,” although a 21-day extens ion may be granted for good cause shown. MCR 3.977(F)(2) and (H)(1)(b). Good cause is a l egally sufficient or substanti al reason. In re Utrera , 281 Mich App at 11.

A hearing on the first supplemental petition for termination w as scheduled for September 25, 2015, and respondent appeared. However, it was revealed th at the children’s father had not received proper service. The parties agreed that the existing petition would be dismissed, a new supplemental petition would be filed within 10 days, and a hear ing on the new petition would be held on November 20, 2015, which was more than 42 days from the last day of the 10-day period. The hearing proceede d as scheduled on November 20, but respondent did not attend.

Here, we conclude that respondent waived this claim of error b y agreeing to the hearing date. “This Court has defined ‘w aiver’ as ‘the intentional rel inquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ” People v Kowalski , 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011), quoting People v Carter , 462 Mich 206, 215-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). “One who waives his rights under a-2- rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivatio n of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.” Kowalski , 489 Mich at 503 (citation omitted). Because respondent agreed to have the first petition dismissed and refiled, and ag reed to the new hearing date in November 2015, she waived any error. Additionally, even assumi ng respondent had not waived this issue, she would not be entitled to relief. It is well-es tablished that the failure to hold a termination hearing within time limits established by the court rule is not grounds for reversal or dismissal of the termination order. In re Jackson , 199 Mich App 22, 28-29; 501 NW2d 182 (1993); In re Pardee
, 190 Mich App 243, 252; 475 NW2d 870 (1991).

Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred in f inding by a preponderance of the evidence that it w as in the minor child ren’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can term inate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); MCL 712A.19b(5). “ [W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews the court’s determ ination regarding the child’s b est interests for clear error. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 40. “In deciding whether termination is in t he child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the paren t, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the a dvantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Id. at 41-42 (internal citations omitted). The fact that a child is placed with a relative weighs against termination. Id . at 43.

The trial court found that respondent had visited the children on a regular basis, but otherwise had not completed the services required for reunifica tion and that significant barriers still remained, particularly with respect to safe and suitable housing and childcare in general. The children had been in care fo r a year and a half and needed permanency. Given the children’s young ages and the length of time they had been in care, that n eed outweighed whatever bond they had with respondent. The chi ldren were living with a rela tive who was able to provide the permanency they needed. The rel ative was willing to adopt the children, but did not want to work with the parents under a guardianship plan. The trial cou rt’s findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parent al rights was in the children ’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood /s/ Mark T. Boonstra