DDDDDRAFT 

GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 8, 2008 

The Honorable Robert M. Gates 

The Secretary of Defense 

Subject: DOD Systems Modernization: Maintaining Effective Communication Is 

Needed to Help Ensure the Army’s Successful Deployment of the Defense Integrated 

Military Human Resources System 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has had long-standing, serious problems with its 

numerous military component-unique personnel and pay systems, including 

accurately paying its military personnel on time and monitoring and tracking them to, 

from, and within their duty stations. For example, in the early 1990s, Army Reserve 

and National Guard troops received inaccurate or late pay and benefits after serving 

in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.1

 We previously reported that the lack 

of integration among DOD’s multiple military personnel and pay systems, among 

other things, caused these and similar errors.2

 To address these and other problems, 

in February 1998, DOD initiated a program to design and implement the Defense 

Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS). DIMHRS is intended to 

provide a joint, integrated, standardized personnel and pay system for all military 

components (including active and reserve components). In November 2004, DOD 

accepted the design of the first phase of DIMHRS for personnel and pay functions 

and then proceeded with development of the system. Meanwhile, as we reported in 

2006,3

 some Army Reserve and National Guard troops continued to receive inaccurate 

pay resulting in part from a lack of integration in Army personnel and pay systems. 

Furthermore, personnel and pay problems have been exacerbated by the hundreds of 

thousands of military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, whose families 

depend on receiving accurate and timely pay, in addition to DOD’s need to track 

military personnel in and out of theater. DOD is concurrently working with the Army, 

Air Force, and Navy, but the Army is to be the first to deploy DIMHRS. Therefore, we 

focused our review on DOD’s plans to deliver the system to the Army for deployment. 

DOD has planned five DIMHRS deployment dates for the Army with the most recent 

one scheduled in March 2009. Four of the deployment dates were postponed—April 

2006, April 2008, July 2008, and October 2008. As of April 2008, DOD moved the 

 

1

 For the purposes of this report, Army refers to active Army. 

2

 GAO, Financial Management: Defense’s System for Army Military Payroll Is Unreliable,

GAO/AIMD-93-32 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1993). 3

 GAO, Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of Hostile Fire and Hardship 

Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers Assigned to 

Fort Bragg, GAO-06-384R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006).
October date to March 2009. The other services are to follow the Army’s deployment, 

but their dates remain undetermined as of June 2008. In addition, DOD estimates the 

cost for DIMHRS through fiscal year 2009 to be approximately $1 billion.4

DIMHRS uses software referred to as a commercial-off-the-shelf product. According 

to DIMHRS program officials, including the Deputy Director of the Business 

Transformation Agency, the product will address all military component 

requirements. The DIMHRS program office works with the components to make

changes to their related business processes and adopt the commercial-off-the-shelf 

capabilities and processes as long as the changes do not result in inefficiencies or 

adversely affect mission or servicemembers and their families. 

In February 2005, we reported that because DOD was not managing the DIMHRS 

program effectively, including its requirements, it was at increased risk of not 

delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time.5

 In that report, we

noted that the shortcomings in DOD’s efforts to effectively manage DIMHRS 

requirements were attributed to a number of causes, including DOD’s long-standing 

cultural resistance to departmentwide solutions. These shortcomings left DOD 

without adequate assurance that the requirements would accurately reflect the end 

users’, including the Army’s, needs. Since our 2005 report, we have monitored DOD’s 

progress in managing the DIMHRS program under the authority of the Comptroller 

General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Specifically for this report, our 

objective was to determine to what extent DOD has effectively communicated the 

DIMHRS’s capabilities to the Army in order for the Army to prepare for deployment 

of the system in March 2009. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, such as the 

system requirements documents,6

 the Army feasibility assessment of DIMHRS and 

requirements review, schedule, acquisition strategy, minutes from governance 

meetings, program status reports, and prior GAO reports. To augment our review of 

these documents, we interviewed officials from DOD’s Business Transformation 

Agency, which is responsible for, among other things, leading and coordinating 

business transformation efforts, such as the DIMHRS program, across the 

department; the Enterprise Program Management Office-DIMHRS (called the 

DIMHRS program office in this report), which is responsible for, among other things, 

acquiring and implementing DIMHRS; and the Office of Personnel and Readiness 

Information Management, which, among other things, provides functional oversight 

for Human Resources Management and ensures that all requirements are consistent 

with the enterprise requirements. We also interviewed DIMHRS program officials 

from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Department of the Army. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2007 to July 2008 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

 4

 According to DOD, as of March 31, 2008, it had spent approximately $766 million on the program, and 

it estimates spending an additional $286 million through fiscal year 2009. It does not include costs 

incurred by the Air Force from October 2007 through March 2008, the Marine Corps from fiscal year

2007 through March 2008, and the Navy since program inception. 5

 GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military Human Capital Program 

Needs Additional Improvements, GAO-05-189 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2005). 6

 The system requirements document, also known as the system subsystem specification document, is

broken down into individual business processes that must be in place within DIMHRS. 

Page 2 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Summary 

DOD has taken some recent steps to improve communications with the Army about 

DIMHRS’s capabilities in an effort to better prepare the Army for deployment of the 

system in March 2009. However, Army officials still have some concerns about the 

extent to which Army requirements are being incorporated into DIMHRS. In addition, 

DOD has not established a clear, well-defined process for maintaining effective 

communications to better prepare the Army to deploy DIMHRS. Effective 

communication is a key federal internal control standard that calls for 

communications to constantly flow down, across, and up the organization to help it 

achieve all of its objectives.7

 Such communication would improve the Army’s 

understanding of what the system will deliver thus enabling the Army to better design 

and implement effective business processes to work with DIMHRS. The Army has 

had problems receiving assurance from DOD about the extent to which its 

requirements would be included in DIMHRS. For example, in September 2007, when 

the Army compared versions 3.0 and 3.1 of the system requirements document, it 

noted that DOD’s DIMHRS program office had not effectively communicated with the 

Army the rationale or negotiated the acceptance of the Army’s requirements that 

were dropped, changed, or both, which were agreed upon in version 3.0. During the 

Army’s review of version 3.1, it identified and submitted 717 issues for DOD to 

resolve. Furthermore, when communicating changes for version 3.1, the format made 

it difficult for the Army to perform its comparative analysis. Army officials said that 

when the DIMHRS program office does not effectively communicate to them the 

differences between its requirements and the system, they have difficulty conducting 

a gap analysis between the system’s planned capabilities and their own requirements. 

The gap analysis forms the basis upon which the Army can determine whether it 

needs to develop or adjust its business processes prior to deploying DIMHRS. 

DOD recently took steps to improve its communications with the Army about 

DIMHRS’s capabilities and its impact on Army requirements. For example, in May 

2008, the DIMHRS program office began to meet with Army officials to discuss the 

development of a formal process of delivering and adjudicating the documented 

updates to the design; this includes the differences between the Army’s 

requirements—documented need of what a particular product or service should be or 

do—and the DIMHRS’s requirements, which are documented in the system 

requirements document. According to Army officials, with respect to version 3.2, they 

identified 311 issues with 98 issues remaining in July 2008, which the DIMHRS 

program office is working to resolve. Additionally, in April 2008, the DIMHRS 

program office shared more detailed information about DIMHRS’s capabilities 

through activities, such as demonstrations of the system capabilities. Moreover, the 

Deputy Director of the Business Transformation Agency stated that moving the 

deployment date to March 2009 allowed the DIMHRS program office and the Army 

 7

 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington,

D.C. November 1999). 

Page 3 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
the time to communicate about DIMHRS’s capabilities. Although these steps have 

been taken, DOD has not developed and documented a clearly defined process for 

maintaining effective communications of the differences between DIMHRS’s 

capabilities and Army requirements. Without a clearly defined process for 

maintaining effective communications, the Army may not be effectively prepared to 

deploy the system when scheduled, and DOD may deliver a system that will require 

extensive and expensive investments. Therefore, we recommend that you direct the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop a clearly defined process for maintaining 

effective communications of the differences between DIMHRS’s capabilities and 

Army requirements to help ensure that the Army will have adequate time to prepare 

for deployment of the system. In commenting on a draft of this report, the 

department concurred with this recommendation. The department’s comments are 

discussed in detail in a later section of this report. DOD’s written comments are 

reprinted in enclosure I. 

Background 

Following reports of pay issues, in late 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology established a Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Military Personnel Information Management to advise the Secretary of Defense on 

the best strategy to support military personnel and pay functions. In its August 1996 

report, the task force concluded that “the present situation, in which the Services 

develop and maintain multiple Service-unique military personnel and pay systems, 

has led to significant functional shortcomings (particularly in the joint arena) and 

excessive costs for system development and maintenance for the Department of 

Defense.” The task force recommended that DOD “move to a single, all-Service and 

all-component, fully integrated personnel and pay system, with common core 

software.” 

In response to the task force’s recommendation, DOD initiated the DIMHRS program 

in February 1998. DIMHRS will be Web based and uses a commercial-off-the-shelf 

product. DIMHRS is intended to be a joint, integrated, standardized personnel and 

pay system for all components of the military services, including active and reserve 

components. According to DOD, the program will provide improved processes and 

deliver timely and accurate pay and benefits to all servicemembers and their families, 

anytime and anywhere. Specifically, DIMHRS is intended to provide (1) accurate and 

timely personnel data, (2) standard data for comparison across the services and other 

components, (3) tracking information on reservists for both pay and service credit, 

(4) tracking information on military personnel in and out of theater, and 

(5) integrated personnel and pay functions. 

The acquisition of DIMHRS was interrupted from July 2005 through December 

2005 in order to assess its feasibility. In 2005, DOD had planned for the Army to 

deploy DIMHRS in the third quarter of fiscal year 2006 and the other services to 

deploy it in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The department had estimated 

that the program would cost $601 million from inception through fiscal year 2009. 

However, due to concerns raised by the military services, in July 2005, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed a strategic pause whereby the military services 

discontinued developmental activities for DIMHRS in order to determine the 

continued viability of the DIMHRS program. According to DIMHRS officials—

Page 4 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
including the Director of Human Capital Management Integration, Office of the 

Under Secretary of the Army—the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy completed 

their feasibility assessments of DIMHRS using the Army’s configured solution as 

the baseline. Based on the results of the Army’s assessment completed in October 

2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December 2005 directed Army program 

officials to proceed with the acquisition of DIMHRS as the first military service to 

implement the program. 

Initially, DOD planned to acquire and deploy DIMHRS in three functionality-based 

phases: (1) military personnel and payroll, (2) military manpower, and (3) military 

training. However, after the strategic pause, DOD planned to acquire and deploy 

DIMHRS in one phase, which would include functionality for military personnel 

and payroll. DOD officials stated that this functionality would also include 

essential manpower and training requirements. 

In addition, during the Army’s feasibility assessment of DIMHRS, the Army identified 

business processes that needed to be integrated with, or adapted to, the capabilities 

of DIMHRS. In order to define, revise, and validate the designs of these business 

processes, the Army entered the design, development, and analysis phase—intended 

to collect the complete set of personnel and pay requirements necessary for the Army 

to deploy DIMHRS. This phase was part of the Army Requirements Review—intended 

to ensure that the DIMHRS design adequately covers the Army’s requirements. During 

the design, development, and analysis phase, Army focus groups reviewed current 

Army business processes to identify the requirements that would be used to define 

the revised business processes as part of DIMHRS. Specifically, the Army analyzed 

129 business processes and documented gaps between Army personnel and pay 

processes and the DIMHRS application. The Army DIMHRS program office delivered 

the Army documentation that was captured during the design, development, and 

analysis phase incrementally to the developer/integrator contractor of DIMHRS for 

consideration. The contractor redeveloped the Army’s detailed business processes 

into designs for each individual business process. These designs were sent to the 

Army for review. The Army DIMHRS program office has accepted the design 

packages documenting the incorporation of baseline Army requirements into 

DIMHRS. According to DOD, a key product was developed during the design, 

development, and analysis process―the system requirements document. This 

document is broken down into individual business processes that must be in place 

within DIMHRS for the system to meet the requirements specified in the DIMHRS 

Operational Requirements Document.8

 

In February 2005,9 we reported that DOD faced significant management challenges 

with DIMHRS, a major system acquisition program that is expected to lead to major 

changes in the processing of military personnel and pay. Until these challenges were 

addressed, the system was at increased risk of not providing expected capabilities 

and benefits on time and within budget. We made several recommendations aimed at 

improving the department’s oversight of the program with which DOD generally 

 8

The Operational Requirements Document is a tool used by managers responsible for defining system 

capabilities needed to satisfy the mission needs of DIMHRS. This document is intended to guide the

scope of the DIMHRS program. 9

GAO-05-189.

Page 5 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
agreed, and DOD stated that it was already performing some of the best practices 

contained in our recommendations. Since our 2005 report, we testified in November 

2006 that, among other things, in response to our recommendation to establish an 

integrated governance structure, DOD had established a steering committee that 

includes representatives from the services.10

Figure 1 depicts a chronology of events for the DIMHRS program. 

Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events for the DIMHRS Program 

a

The system requirements document is broken down into individual business processes that must be in place 

within DIMHRS for the system to meet the requirements specified in the DIMHRS Operational Requirements 

Document. 

DOD Has Recently Taken Some Steps to Share DIMHRS Capabilities with the 

Army but Has Not Established a Clearly Defined Process for Maintaining 

Effective Communications 

DOD does not have a clearly defined process to routinely communicate with the 

Army about the extent to which the Army’s requirements—documented need of what 

a particular product or service should be or do—will be incorporated into DIMHRS, 

although DOD has improved some aspects of its communications recently. Effective 

communication is a key federal internal control standard that calls for 

communications to constantly flow down, across, and up the organization to help it 

achieve all of its objectives.11 Standards encourage maintaining effective 

communication throughout an organization. DOD’s Enterprise Program Management 

Office for DIMHRS, also known as the DIMHRS program office,12 developed the 

DIMHRS project management plan, which states that the DIMHRS Program Manager 

is responsible for ensuring required liaison activities are accomplished with 

 10 GAO, Defense Business Transformation: A Comprehensive Plan, Integrated Efforts, and Sustained 

Leadership Are Needed to Assure Success, GAO-07-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov.16, 2006). 11 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 12 The DIMHRS program office is responsible for, among other things, acquiring and implementing 

DIMHRS. 

Page 6 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
stakeholders. This could include ensuring that the DIMHRS program office effectively 

communicates the system capabilities of DIMHRS with the Army. Such 

communication would facilitate the Army’s understanding of what the system will 

deliver thus enabling the Army to better design and implement effective business 

processes to work with DIMHRS. 

The Army has had problems receiving assurance from DOD about the extent to which 

its requirements would be included in DIMHRS. DOD has submitted versions 3.0, 3.1, 

and 3.2 of the system requirements document (e.g., the document that captures the 

business processes that must be in place within DIMHRS for the system to meet 

requirements specified in the DIMHRS Operational Requirements Document) to the 

Army for review. For example, in September 2007, when the Army compared versions 

3.0 and 3.1 of the system requirements document, it noted that the DIMHRS program 

office had not effectively communicated with the Army the rationale or negotiated 

acceptance of the Army’s requirements that were dropped, changed, or both and 

were agreed upon in version 3.0. During the Army’s review of version 3.1, it identified 

717 issues and submitted them to the DIMHRS program office to be resolved. 

According to the Army, a few of the issues it identified in September 2007 remain 

unresolved in version 3.1 as of July 2008. 

In addition, when the DIMHRS program office communicated changes in DIMHRS 

requirements in version 3.1 to the Army, the Army had difficulty tracking those 

changes between versions 3.0 and 3.1 because the information was provided in a 

format that made it difficult for the Army to extract the information needed to 

perform its comparative analysis. DOD’s developer/integrator contractor that 

manages the system requirements and changes between the various versions of the 

system requirements document uses a requirements management tool, which

facilitates its ability to track changes between the various versions of the system 

requirements document as the system requirements are changed over time. However, 

when the DIMHRS program office provided the information derived from this tool to 

the Army, the Army received the information in a format that made it difficult for the 

Army to extract the information it needed to compare changes to its requirements. 

The Army tracked thousands of requirements manually between versions 3.0 and 3.1 

of the system requirements document. Army officials said that this effort took time 

and may not have been accurate or comprehensive. Subsequently, the DIMHRS 

program office sent a summary of the changes to the Army; however, by the time the 

Army received the summary of changes, it had already completed its comparative 

analysis of them. Army officials said that if the DIMHRS program office had provided 

timely access to the summary of changes, they could have performed the analysis 

with 100 percent certainty. According to Army officials, when the DIMHRS program 

office does not enable the Army to understand the differences between the Army’s 

requirements and the system, the Army has difficulty conducting a gap analysis—

determining the difference between what is needed and what is available—between 

the system’s planned capabilities and its requirements. The Army relies on this gap 

analysis to form the basis upon which it can determine whether it needs to develop or 

adjust its business processes prior to deploying DIMHRS. 

In April 2008, after the program’s schedule was revised and approved, the DIMHRS 

program office took steps to improve its communications with the Army about 

DIMHRS’s capabilities and its impact on Army requirements. Specifically, the Deputy 

Page 7 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Director of the Business Transformation Agency stated that moving the deployment 

date to March 2009 allowed the DIMHRS program office and the Army the time to 

communicate about DIMHRS’s capabilities and the impact the change in deployment 

date has on Army’s preparation for deploying DIMHRS, including the Army’s 

requirements. As part of its communication efforts, in April 2008, the DIMHRS 

program office provided the Army with demonstrations of the system capabilities. 

These demonstrations alleviated some of the Army’s uncertainty about DIMHRS by 

giving it more access to the functionality of DIMHRS through activities such as “Try 

DIMHRS” and “See DIMHRS” demonstrations.13 The DIMHRS Program Manager 

stated that these activities were not intended to be comprehensive because DIMHRS 

was still under development at that point in time. 

In addition, according to Army officials, in May 2008, the DIMHRS program office 

began to meet with Army officials to discuss the development of a formal process of 

delivering and adjudicating the documented updates to the design; this included the 

differences between the Army’s requirements and the DIMHRS’s requirements, which 

are documented in the system requirements document. In February 2008, when the 

DIMHRS program office released version 3.2 of the system requirements document to 

the Army, the Army identified 311 issues with 98 issues remaining in July 2008, which 

the DIMHRS program office is working to resolve. According to DIMHRS program 

office officials, during its review of version 3.2 with the Army, they discussed the fact 

that the notification process for changes made to the system requirements document 

needed to be improved. The DIMHRS program office stated that it is modifying the 

process to ensure that the services receive formal notification of documented 

changes whenever the changes impact system requirements by preparing and sending 

out a summary of the changes to the services. Although DOD is working to improve 

its communications of DIMHRS’s capabilities, it has not developed and documented a 

clearly defined process for maintaining effective communications of the differences 

between DIMHRS’s capabilities and Army requirements. 

According to the DIMHRS program office, the deployment date for DIMHRS was 

changed from October 2008 to March 2009 primarily because it had not conducted 

adequate testing of the system’s performance on payroll processing. However, the 

Army raised several concerns, including (1) whether DOD will effectively 

communicate changes to system requirements and provide the Army with 

information that helps it determine the gaps between its requirements and DIMHRS’s 

capabilities and (2) the lack of timely communication of the summary information 

derived from the requirements management tool, which would facilitate the Army’s 

ability to identify changes needed to adapt its business processes and adequately 

prepare for DIMHRS. DOD does not have a clearly defined process that ensures 

effective communication will be maintained throughout the process for deploying the 

system. Having such a process would help ensure that the Army has a better 

understanding of the differences between its requirements and the system. Without 

 13 The DIMHRS program office developed (1) an instructor-led lab called “Try DIMHRS” that allows

Army personnel to practice hands-on navigation through DIMHRS to conduct routine Army human

resources functions and (2) a weekly event using Defense Connect Online technology called “See

DIMHRS” that allows personnel to view Army human resources instructor-led scenarios with

explanations over the Web.

Page 8 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
addressing these weaknesses, deployment of DIMHRS may result in a system that will 

require extensive and expensive investments. 

Conclusions 

DOD planned for the Army to deploy DIMHRS over 2 years ago, and has postponed 

deployment four times with deployment now scheduled for March 2009. Although 

DOD has taken steps to improve its communication of DIMHRS requirements to the 

Army, the Army continues to have concerns, including a lack of (1) assurance that 

Army requirements are covered in DIMHRS and (2) timely access to summary 

information on system requirements changes. In addition, it is too early to determine 

if DOD will continue to communicate with the Army about the differences between 

DIMHRS’s capabilities and the Army requirements since DOD only began making 

improvements in April 2008 and has not established a clearly defined and 

documented process for maintaining this communication. Without effective 

communication, the Army has difficulty performing the gap analyses needed to 

determine which business processes to develop or adjust as it prepares for 

deployment of DIMHRS. If the Army does not have system information in time to 

adjust its business processes, the Army may not be prepared to deploy the system or 

may deploy it prematurely, which could affect servicemembers’ pay. DOD’s efforts to

improve its communications with the Army regarding the DIMHRS program’s system 

capabilities does not include clearly defining and documenting a process that 

maintains effective communications of the differences between DIMHRS’s 

capabilities and Army requirements. DOD has committed the Army to deploy 

DIMHRS in March 2009 as a result of postponing its October 2008 date. However, 

without DOD establishing a clearly defined process for maintaining effective, timely 

communications, the Army may not be prepared to deploy the system when 

scheduled, and DOD may deliver a system that will require extensive and expensive 

investments. 

Recommendation for Executive Action 

To help address the Army’s needs and minimize extensive and expensive fixes to 

DIMHRS, we recommend that you direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop 

and document a clearly defined process for maintaining effective communications of 

the differences between DIMHRS’s capabilities and Army requirements to help

ensure that the Army will have adequate time to prepare for deployment of the 

system. 

Agency Comments 

The department concurred with our recommendation that the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense develop and document a clearly defined process for maintaining effective 

communications of the differences between DIMHRS’s capabilities and Army 

requirements to help ensure that the Army will have adequate time to prepare for 

deployment of the system. In response to this recommendation, DOD stated in its 

comments that as the focus of the DIMHRS program shifts from application 

development to deployment, a recently formed Tiger Team—which is composed of 

representatives from the Business Transformation Agency, the Army, and the 

Page 9 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service—will, among other things, bolster the 

department’s current communication efforts and assist with the Army’s preparedness 

for DIMHRS deployment as well as the service delivery model after deployment. This 

will further enhance the department’s communication efforts and will encourage the 

prompt resolution of issues that emerge due to potential differences between 

DIMHRS’s capabilities and Army requirements. The process described above is 

captured in a draft charter for the Tiger Team that will be staffed, and the charter will 

be presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense no later than the end of System 

Acceptance Testing for DIMHRS. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in enclosure 

I. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the House and Senate Armed Services and 

Appropriations Committees; House Committee on Government Reform; Senate 

Committee on Governmental Affairs; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 

and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We will also make copies 

available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in

enclosure II. 

Sincerely yours, 

Brenda S. Farrell 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures - 2

Page 10 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Enclosure I 

Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 11 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Page 12 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Enclosure II 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact 

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov 

 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the individual named above, Grace Coleman, Karen N. Harms, 

Susannah Hawthorne, LaToya King, Rebecca Shea, Matthew Spiers, Robin Wagner, 

Jose Watkins, and Angela Watson made key contributions to this report. 

Page 13 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Related GAO Products 

Military Personnel: Navy Has Not Provided Adequate Justification For Its Decision 

to Invest in MCTFS. GAO-07-1139R. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2007. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007.

Military Pay: Inadequate Controls for Stopping Overpayments of Hostile Fire and 

Hardship Duty Pay to Over 200 Sick or Injured Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve Soldiers Assigned to Fort Bragg. GAO-06-384R. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 

2006. 

Defense Management: Foundational Steps Being Taken to Manage DOD Business 

Systems Modernization, but Much Remains to be Accomplished to Effect True 

Business Transformation. GAO-06-234T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. 

Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel 

Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers. GAO-05-400T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 16, 2005. 

Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured 

Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers. GAO-05-125. Washington, D.C.: 

February 17, 2005. 

Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured 

Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers. GAO-05-322T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 17, 2005. 

DOD Systems Modernization: Management of Integrated Military Human Capital 

Program Needs Additional Improvements. GAO-05-189. Washington, D.C.: 

February 11, 2005. 

Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel 

Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers. GAO-05-79. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2005. 

Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced 

Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-911. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2004. 

Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced 

Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-990T. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004. 

Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty 

Experienced Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-413T. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 

2004. 

Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty 

Experienced Significant Pay Problems. GAO-04-89. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 

2003. 

Page 14 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
Military Personnel: DFAS Has Not Met All Information Technology Requirements 

for Its New Pay System. GAO-04-149R. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2003. 

Financial Management: Defense’s System for Army Military Payroll Is Unreliable. 

GAO/AIMD-93-32. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1993. 

Defense Health Care: Quality Assurance Process Needed to Improve Force Health 

Protection and Surveillance. GAO-03-1041. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003. 

(350927) 

Page 15 GAO-08-927R DOD Systems Modernization 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, DC 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER