# Bolivia - United States Department of State

- Special Envoy Finkenauer’s Travel to Bolivia and Mexico Office of the SpokespersonThe U.S. Department of State Special Envoy for Global Youth Issues Abby Finkenauer will travel to Bolivia and Mexico from May 8-14, 2024, to communicate the work of the State Department and emphasize the United States&#8217; commitment to fostering youth leadership and cooperation in the Americas.In Bolivia, Special Envoy Finkenauer will connect with youth and young professionals through a series of engagements focused on education, leadership, and civic engagement. She will engage with students at local universities, visit an &#8220;Inglés Yes!&#8221; classroom to meet with recipients of a U.S. Embassy La Paz-supported English scholarship program, and join a panel discussion on digital violence.In Mexico, Special Envoy Finkenauer will reinforce the United States&#8217; commitment to youth development through discussions with alumni of the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative (YLAI). She will also engage with the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE) and visit the Boys and Girls Club in Ecatepec to learn about their programs and discuss opportunities for collaboration.For more information on the trip, follow along on Instagram, X, and Facebook.
- Bolivia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Bolivia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bolivia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Bolivia during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government agents; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and femicide; and trafficking in persons, including forced labor.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human abuses, but its approach was politicized.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited all forms of torture, coercion, and physical and emotional violence, but there were reports government officials employed them.Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported police investigations relied heavily on torture to procure information and extract confessions. Most abuses reportedly occurred while officials were transferring detainees to police facilities or holding persons in detention. According to reports from NGOs engaged with prison populations, the most common forms of torture for men and women detainees included rape, gang rape by guards, sensory deprivation, use of improvised tear gas chambers, tasers, asphyxiation, verbal abuse, and threats of violence.On August 27, the family of Marco Antonio Aramayo filed a case alleging torture and humiliation Aramayo suffered during his imprisonment. Aramayo, who had accused government officials of corruption, died in April 2022 after spending seven years in preventive detention in 56 different prisons. A September 2022 NGO report held numerous police officers, judges, and government officials responsible for torturing Aramayo while in prison. His lawyer explained that, among many other documents, the complaint was supported by an Institute of Therapy and Research study on the consequences of torture and state violence. Various public officials belonging to the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) political party were charged in the case, but none had been detained, tried, or convicted as of November.Police impunity was a significant problem due to corruption and politicization of the judicial system. Mechanisms to investigate abuse were rarely utilized or enforced. Investigations frequently were not completed due to payoffs to investigators from the persons being investigated.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prisons were overcrowded and lacked adequate medical services, resulting in harsh and life-threatening conditions. Violence was pervasive due to inadequate internal security.Abusive Physical Conditions: Prison overcrowding was a problem. According to the government’s penitentiary agency, prison facilities were at more than 200 percent of designed capacity; 66 percent of the inmates were in preventive detention.One medical doctor attended to prisoners in each prison twice a month. Although medical services were free, prisons rarely had medications on hand. Dermatoses and tuberculosis were prevalent due to the cramped sleeping quarters and lack of medicine. Incarcerated pregnant women lacked access to obstetric services. The law permitted children younger than age six to live with an incarcerated mother, under “safe and regulated conditions.” Older children sometimes resided in detention centers with incarcerated mothers, despite unsafe conditions.Violence in prisons and detention centers was ubiquitous due to inadequate internal security. Abuses perpetrated by penitentiary officials included systematic intimidation, rape, psychological mistreatment, extortion, torture, sex trafficking, and threats of death. There were reports of rape and sexual assault committed by authorities and by other inmates. Women inmates experienced sexual harassment and assault on a regular basis, and some were forced to pay extortion fees to avoid being raped. Observers noted rampant rape and other forms of gender-based violence, as well as a culture of silence that suppressed reporting gender-based violence due to fear of retaliation.The law set juvenile detention ages as 14 to 16 and required juvenile offenders to be held in facilities separate from the general prison population to facilitate rehabilitation; however, many offenders remained in juvenile facilities long after they reached adulthood. Adult inmates and police reportedly abused juvenile prisoners.Corruption was pervasive. A prisoner’s ability to pay bribes often determined physical security, cell size, visiting privileges, ability to attend court hearings, day-pass eligibility, and place and length of confinement.Administration: Authorities generally did not investigate credible allegations of mistreatment. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, prisoners could submit complaints to a commission of district judges for investigation, but due to fear of retaliation by prison authorities, they frequently did not do so.Independent Monitoring: The government generally permitted monitoring by independent observers such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, local NGOs, judges, faith-based organizations, legislators, and media. The government did not permit journalists, NGOs, and religious leaders to visit some high-visibility prisoners, including Santa Cruz Governor Luis Camacho and former interim President Jeanine Áñez.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, but the government did not always respect the law. The law provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law required that police obtain an arrest warrant from a prosecutor and that a judge substantiate the warrant within eight hours of an arrest. Police did not strictly adhere to these time restrictions, except in cases in which the government specifically ordered adherence. The law mandated that a detainee appear before a judge within 24 hours (except under a declared state of siege, during which a detainee could be held for 48 hours), at which time the judge was required to determine the appropriateness of continued pretrial detention or release on bail. The judge was required to order the detainee’s release if the prosecutor failed to show sufficient grounds for arrest. The government allowed suspects to select their own lawyers, and it provided a lawyer from the Public Defender’s Office if the suspect requested one. Public defenders were generally overburdened and limited in their ability to provide adequate, timely legal assistance. While bail was permitted, most detainees were placed in pretrial detention or could not afford to post bail. Several legal experts noted pretrial detention was the rule rather than the exception.Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, but the government did not always respect the law. International human rights groups noted several potentially politically motivated cases initiated by the government that resulted in arbitrary arrest, all against opponents of the government or members of the previous government. The high-profile arrest in December 2022 and detention of Santa Cruz Governor Camacho was considered by human rights groups to be politically motivated, and lawyers commented there were nearly daily reports of arbitrary arrests of individuals without due process.Pretrial Detention: Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Complex legal procedures, large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, executive interference, corruption, shortage of public defenders, and inadequate case-tracking mechanisms contributed to trial delays that lengthened pretrial detention and kept many suspects detained beyond the legal limits for the completion of a trial or the presentation of formal charges.The law afforded judges the authority to order pretrial detention if there was a high probability a suspect had committed a crime, if evidence existed the accused sought to obstruct the investigation process, or if a suspect was considered a flight risk. If a suspect was not detained, a judge could order significant restrictions on the suspect’s movements.The law stated no one could be detained for more than 18 months without formal charges. If after 18 months the prosecutor did not present formal charges and conclude the investigatory phase, the detainee could request release by a judge. The judge was required to order the detainee’s release, but the charges against the detainee were not dropped. By law, the investigatory phase and trial phase of a case could not exceed 36 months combined. The law allowed a trial extension if the delays in the process were due to the defense.Many defense attorneys intentionally did not attend hearings to delay trial proceedings and ultimately avoided a final sentencing, either at the request of their clients or due to high caseloads.In April, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights highlighted the Áñez and Camacho cases as examples of the “structural problems” in the administration of justice, such as the generalized use of preventive detention.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary was overburdened and vulnerable to undue influence by the executive and legislative branches. The judiciary was also the subject of multiple allegations of corruption. Authorities generally respected court orders, but on several occasions, they pressured judges to change verdicts. Judges and prosecutors sometimes practiced self-censorship when issuing rulings to avoid becoming the target of verbal and legal harassment by the government.The judiciary faced numerous problems. NGOs asserted the funds budgeted for the judiciary were insufficient to assure equal and efficient justice, in addition to reliance on underpaid, overburdened public prosecutors, which led to serious judicial backlogs. Justice officials were vulnerable to bribery and corruption, according to credible observers, including legal experts. In June, the domestic human rights NGO Fundación Construir issued its Report on the State of Justice in Bolivia, which highlighted problems in the judicial system, including political pressure, lack of resources, and lack of judicial access, especially in rural areas.Lawsuits were frequently used to intimidate opposition lawmakers. Observers noted there was a clear pattern between opposition figures speaking out against the government and shortly thereafter being pressed with charges or called to testify in court. Once tensions between the government and the opposition figure subsided, legal proceedings became dormant until the next clash. Former interim President Áñez had eight trials pending while she was in prison. Romulo Calvo, former president of the Pro Santa Cruz Committee, a regional civilian organization, had nine trials pending. In addition to 14 lawsuits dating from his time as Minister of Public Works under former interim President Áñez, La Paz Mayor Ivan Arias was placed under house arrest on November 14 for an investigation of political violence. By contrast, few if any prominent ruling party leaders faced criminal charges despite well-documented evidence of wrongdoing reported by investigative journalists. Observers described this discrepancy as another example of the politicization of the judicial system by the government.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial without undue delay, but the government did not always respect the law.In April, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in its preliminary report that public defenders were not available throughout the country, which raised significant concerns regarding equitable access to justice and corruption in the judicial system.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of more than 300 political prisoners as of November. The government denied there were any political prisoners, only persons who had committed crimes. According to human rights observers, the number of detainees was due in part to lack of judicial independence and abuse of preventive detention. For example, former Director of Immigration Marcel Rivas was declared innocent in his first case regarding an immigration matter, but he received a minimum sentence for an administrative fault concerning immigration alerts in a second case. While serving that sentence, the Prosecutor’s Office opened a third case against Rivas, which further delayed his release from prison. Santa Cruz Governor Camacho was in preventive detention at a maximum-security prison in La Paz. Authorities offered various justifications for Camacho’s arrest but ultimately stated he remained detained because of his role in the 2019 political crisis, which the government described as a “coup.” Human Rights Watch stated the justification for Camacho’s preventive detention was “very fragile.”Former interim President Áñez was sentenced in June 2022 following a controversial trial that many observers found inconsistent with the rule of law and due process. The constitution stated that sitting and former presidents were entitled to an impeachment trial – versus a regular criminal trial – for acts committed in office. The government, however, pursued regular criminal proceedings against Áñez. She remained in prison, and the judicial system imposed additional periods of pretrial detention for the remaining cases. Human rights groups expressed concern the arrests and detentions of Camacho and Áñez were politically motivated. Human Rights Watch reported it saw no evidence to support the vague charges of terrorism, sedition, and conspiracy.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government sidelined one of its most prominent human rights critics, Amparo Carvajal, by creating a parallel organization to Carvajal’s independent Permanent Human Rights Assembly of Bolivia (APDHB) and having the national tax office transfer control of APDHB’s finances to the new, government-affiliated organization. The move effectively disabled Carvajal’s ability to manage the country’s largest human rights NGO, which she cofounded in 1974. Carvajal protested by holding a 51-day vigil outside the building where she and her supporters gathered to block access by MAS supporters seeking to take over the building.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but there were reports of hidden cameras inside the prison cell of Santa Cruz Governor Camacho during visits with his wife.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										While the constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, the government did not respect this right and retaliated against media outlets expressing dissenting opinions.Freedom of Expression: Some media outlets reported the government pressured and intimidated them to report favorably regarding government policies by withholding government advertising and imposing steep taxes. Media also reported instances of pressure from the government to reveal their sources. The National Press Association and the Association of Journalists of La Paz demanded concrete measures from the government to protect the work and safety of journalists.On June 20, the Association of Journalists of La Paz reported that digital attacks, created by government-associated teams of “digital warriors,” targeting independent media outlets were frequent. The Facebook page of Radio Network Erbol was hacked on February 12, with hackers sharing explicit images and messages from the page, causing reputational damage to the outlet.On June 29, leading La Paz independent newspaper Página Siete closed, citing it had been overwhelmed by economic problems and government pressure, including excessive audits and recurring fines.The 2022-2023 Chapultepec Index report Journalism under Multidimensional Violence noted freedom of expression decreased during the year. The report, which assessed institutional actions regarding freedom of expression and press in 22 countries in the Americas, noted the country shifted from “partially restricted” to “highly restricted” following the closure of the newspaper Página Siete, physical attacks on journalists, impunity in justice cases, and cyberbullying.Violence and Harassment: Journalists faced threats and harassment. Journalist organizations reiterated requests for the protection of journalists. In a public statement, the National Association of Journalists and departmental (regional) journalist associations denounced an increase in harassment, pressure, and abuse against journalists, specifically citing the closure of Página Siete and three radio stations in Los Yungas.On January 10, during a protest called by the National Committee for the Defense of Democracy against the arrest of Santa Cruz Governor Camacho, more than 10 journalists covering the protest were attacked, including a journalist who sustained a partial loss of hearing from fireworks and a camera operator injured by a rock.On May 7, independent journalist Andrés Gómez reported on alleged corruption involving Minister of Environment and Water Juan Santos Cruz. Gómez subsequently reported being harassed on social media.During the last week of July, three journalists were threatened for reporting on drug trafficking topics. Journalists for the digital magazine Contacto Bolivia and the television broadcaster Asociación Teledifusora Boliviana were threatened via WhatsApp for their reporting on the case of alleged Uruguayan drug trafficker Sebastián Marset. On July 26, a journalist for the newspaper El Deber also received threats for reporting on drug trafficking.Previously reported cases of threats and violence were unaddressed. The Journalists Support and Protection Network provided assistance to journalists, including political cartoonist Abecor, who reported receiving threats via social media in 2022. The cases of journalists kidnapped while covering a land dispute in Las Londras were paralyzed in lower courts.Women journalists faced attacks and threats due to their gender. News Agency Fides reported, “Once the government unleashes a campaign against these women journalists, it is fueled by so-called digital warriors through social networks and backed by MAS supporters.” According to the domestic NGO Unitas (National Union of Institutions for Social Action Work), the number of denunciations of threats and attacks against women journalists increased, with 14 cases reported through May. A woman journalist from Santa Cruz who led the digital news portal Cobertura Digital reported having received threats against herself and members of her family. She temporarily closed the portal due to fear.There were also reports of media being attacked by protesters and police as they covered protests. On January 9, the MAS-aligned former candidate for ombudsman, Pascual Mamani Marca, released a video on TikTok inciting persons to burn down Santa Cruz-based television outlet UNITEL and kill UNITEL journalists. Following the incident, the National Association of Journalists issued a statement condemning social media threats against media. There were no arrests.In November, media reported threats and attacks while covering protests by mining cooperatives in La Paz. Six journalists and a photojournalist from national and international outlets suffered physical violence and verbal threats while covering a mobilization by mining cooperatives in the National Service of Protected Areas. The National Association of Journalists issued a statement on November 7 condemning the violence, indicating, “This fact adds to the serious threats to freedom of expression and the press that continue with impunity due to the negligence of the authorities who fail to fulfill their responsibility to protect the security of journalists in the conduct their work.” According to a November 8 joint statement from the National Association of Journalists and the Association of Journalists of La Paz, seven Popular Radio Television journalists reporting on the miners’ protests were threatened and prohibited from continuing their reporting.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: In addition to fear of prosecution and harassment, journalists sometimes practiced self-censorship due to fear of losing their jobs or losing access to government sources.By law, the government was required to provide goods and services to all media outlets in a nondiscriminatory manner, but at times the government did not purchase advertisements in certain media outlets because they were considered opposed to the government’s policy positions.Media outlets alleged the government pressured news organizations to report favorably on government policies. Media outlets also alleged the government retaliated against news organizations that did not comply with that pressure.Libel/Slander Laws: Defamation was a criminal offense and punishable with a monetary fine. As of October, there were no reports defamation laws were used to restrict public discussion or retaliate against journalists.																Internet Freedom						There was no evidence the government restricted or disrupted access to the internet or censored online content. There were allegations, however, that the government supported “digital warriors” who attacked independent media. According to some reports, there were two million fake accounts that targeted individuals or media seen to be antigovernment.On June 18, the Facebook page portal of Cabildeo Digital, a domestic digital media outlet that carried investigative reporting critical of the government, was allegedly hacked by so-called digital warriors recruited and trained by MAS-led government officials to create pages, profiles, and groups on the internet to spread government propaganda. Cabildeo reported it lost 220,000 Facebook followers as a result of the hack. NGOs noted that “digital warriors” harassed journalists and independent media with impunity.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. The government did not always respect the right of peaceful assembly.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						While the law required a permit for most demonstrations, the government rarely enforced the provision, and most protesters demonstrated without obtaining permits.In January, there were protests in Santa Cruz due to Governor Camacho’s arrest. During the protests, police detained some children longer than 48 hours without bringing them before a judge. Media reported the children showed signs of brutality suffered during detention. Media reported the children were prohibited from participating in future protests.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.In-country Movement: The law prohibited domestic air travel and bank transactions for up to three months as a penalty for persons who did not vote in a national election.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: International electoral observation missions and domestic electoral observation organizations characterized the most recent elections as free, fair, and transparent.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Women participating in politics faced violence and harassment. The president of the Association of Councilors of Bolivia reported that between January and May, there were 110 cases of harassment and political violence against elected women councilors and mayors.On June 13, the Ombudsperson’s Office expressed concern for acts of harassment and political violence against Cochabamba Councilwoman Claudia Flores and Santa Cruz Department Assembly woman Muriel Cruz. Press reported Cruz, a MAS party member, was knocked to the ground, punched, kicked, and hit with sticks by activists opposed to having alternate assembly members from the Guaraní people.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: On May 16, Minister of Environment and Water Santos Cruz was accused of receiving $2.7 million in bribes from companies that were awarded with projects from his ministry. In almost three years of Luis Arce’s government, four ministers were accused in corruption cases.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions and publish their findings. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders such as Waldo Albarracin and Amparo Carvajal were harassed by the government. Waldo Albarracin’s house was burned by MAS supporters during the 2019 political crisis, and in 2021 he left the country due to fear for his life. Albarracin’s family was informed by the Prosecutor’s Office that the MAS supporters involved in the burning of his house would not be held accountable for their actions.The National Association of Journalists of Bolivia and the nine departmental associations of journalists opposed the violent takeover of APDHB’s national headquarters in June, stating the occupation of the APDHB headquarters constituted “a violation against civil society organizations that defend human rights.” According to press reports, the assault on the building was attributed to Remberto Cruz, a MAS official who led the occupation and coordinated with police officers to close the doors of the building and forcibly expel activists working there, some on human rights cases against the government.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: In December 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights closed its local offices because the government did not renew its mandate to work in the country. The United Nations was negotiating an agreement with the government to reopen, but as of October no progress had been reported.Government Human Rights Bodies: The constitution established a human rights ombudsperson, subject to confirmation by both houses of congress, with a six-year term. The ombudsperson was charged with defending and promoting human rights, specifically defending citizens against government abuses. The constitution gave the ombudsperson the right to propose legislation and recommend modifications to laws and government policies. Civil society groups and several political figures contended the ombudsperson lacked independence from the central government and was not effective in advocating for human rights.Both houses of congress had human rights committees that proposed laws and policies to promote and protect human rights. Congress did not approve or propose any legislation related to human rights during the year.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law established penalties of imprisonment for 15 to 20 years for the rape of an adult (man or woman), including spousal and domestic or intimate partner rape and so-called corrective rape of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons, but it was rarely enforced.The law prohibited domestic violence, but it too was rarely enforced. Domestic abuse resulting in injury was punishable by three to six years’ imprisonment, and the penalty for serious physical or psychological injury was five to 12 years in prison.Lack of training regarding the law and slow judicial processes, among other factors, hindered full implementation of the law, according to the UN Entity on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and human rights groups. The law criminalized femicide and stipulated a sentence of 30 years in prison. Activists stated corruption, a lack of adequate crime scene investigations, a lack of specialized prosecutors, and a dysfunctional, underfunded judiciary hampered convictions for femicide.A 2014 law called for the construction of women’s shelters in each of the country’s nine departments, but as of year’s end not all departments had shelters. Human rights activists said the shelters for domestic violence survivors were not well staffed, did not promise anonymity, and could not provide protection from abusers. Activists said shelters mixed vulnerable women, girls, juvenile delinquents, human trafficking victims, sexual abuse survivors, and children with mental-health problems.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law considered sexual harassment a criminal offense punishable by up to eight years’ imprisonment. There were no comprehensive reports on the extent of sexual harassment, but observers generally acknowledged it was widespread and said the law was rarely enforced.Discrimination: The law provided for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, but women generally did not enjoy a social status equal to that of men. The government did not enforce the law effectively.While the minimum wage law treated men and women equally, women generally earned less than men for equal work. Antidiscrimination laws were not uniformly or effectively implemented to protect women from harassment and political violence. The law prohibited women from working at night (with exceptions) and from performing tasks that were “dangerous, unhealthy, heavy, or that harm their morals or good customs.” The government did not enforce the law effectively.Formal-sector labor laws provided women with a shorter workweek, maternity benefits, breastfeeding hours, permission to work fewer hours, and more holidays than men. Critics contended these gender-based laws encouraged companies to give preference to men in hiring.Low-wage workers in domestic service were predominantly women. Approximately 40 percent of them received a salary that was less than the national minimum wage and worked without a contract, health insurance, or other relevant benefits.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Civil society representatives noted that information on accessing reproductive health could be difficult to obtain in rural areas due to lack of medical infrastructure.The law provided for access to contraceptives, but according to the reproductive rights organization Marie Stopes International-Bolivia, many public health-care providers refused to provide the service and stigmatized patients who requested contraceptives. Some providers required the consent of an adult woman’s husband or other male family member before providing her with contraceptives and would not provide contraceptives to adolescents without parental consent. Misinformation and social taboos made women hesitant to seek contraceptives.Lack of access to quality medical care in remote areas adversely affected access to skilled health-care attendance during pregnancy and birth. In addition, many Indigenous women feared that their cultural traditions regarding who should be present at the birth, treatment of the placenta, and treatment of the umbilical cord would not be respected if they gave birth in a hospital or clinic.The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, including emergency contraception; postexposure prophylaxis was not available. These services were more readily available in urban areas. Rural areas lacked access and frequently relied on mobile health centers such as those provided by Marie Stopes International.According to the Pan American Health Organization, the maternal mortality rate was 160.9 per 100,000 live births in 2020, the most recent year for which data was available. It reported more than one-third of maternal deaths were caused by obstetric hemorrhage, usually postpartum.The maternal mortality rate was higher among Indigenous women due to lack of access to adequate medical services.Girls in rural areas lacked access to menstrual hygiene products, which affected their attendance in school. The law prohibited schools from expelling pregnant girls.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination by public and private institutions and banned racist and discriminatory ideas through media. The government made little effort to address such discrimination. Afro-Bolivians in rural areas experienced the same types of problems and discrimination as Indigenous persons who lived in those areas. Afro-Bolivian community leaders reported employment discrimination was common and public officials, particularly police, discriminated in the provision of services. Afro-Bolivians also reported widespread use of discriminatory language.																																				Indigenous Peoples										Indigenous lands were not fully demarcated, and land reform was a major political problem. Historically, some Indigenous persons shared lands collectively under the ayllu (traditional form of a community) system, which did not receive legal recognition during the transition to private property laws. Despite laws mandating reallocation and titling of lands, recognition and demarcation of Indigenous lands were not completed.Many Indigenous groups were well represented in government and politics but suffered a disproportionately large share of poverty and unemployment. Government educational and health services were unavailable to many Indigenous groups living in remote areas.Indigenous groups living in the country’s eastern lowlands were not well represented in government or by elected representatives. These Indigenous groups resided in four departments: Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, and Pando. They included several ethnic and linguistic groups that were distinct from the Aymara and Quechua Indigenous groups of the highland plateau region. Leaders of the lowlands Indigenous communities described growing anger and frustration with the national government for continuing land policies developed under former President Evo Morales, including deforestation of traditional, often sacred, and protected lands to expand coca plantings. A prominent Indigenous leader said the government supported mining and hydrocarbon exploitation of lands without consulting Indigenous populations. The leader also noted a campaign of intimidation and harassment to silence defenders of Indigenous rights.Mercury contamination from gold mining in the Amazon basin impacted Indigenous communities. In July, research carried out by the Central Indigenous Peoples of La Paz revealed that approximately three quarters of 302 individuals from 36 Indigenous communities of the Ese Ejja, Tsimanes, Mosetenes, Leco, Uchupiamona, and Tacana persons contained mercury levels higher than the limit established by the World Health Organization. The study indicated individuals with the highest concentration of mercury in their bodies were found closest to large-scale mining activities where mercury was used to extract gold. In addition, the Ese Ejja and Mosetenes communities, due to their reliance on fish as a main source of protein, had high levels of mercury even though they lived remotely in the forest far away from mining activities.																																				Children										Child Abuse: The penal code defined infanticide as the killing of a child younger than 13. Rape of a child younger than 14 carried a penalty of 20 to 25 years’ imprisonment. The government did not enforce the law effectively.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum age for marriage was 14 for girls and 16 for boys. Parents or guardians needed to approve marriages between adolescents younger than 18. The government enforced the law effectively.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the sale, grooming, or use of children for commercial sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking, and such acts were punishable with prison sentences of 15 to 20 years; however, such activities were a serious problem. The law also prohibited child pornography, punishable with sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison. The government generally enforced the law.The age of consensual sex was 18. The penalty for statutory rape of an adolescent age 14 to 17 was three to six years in prison. The penalty for having sex with a child younger than age 14 was 20 to 25 years in prison. Consensual relationships between adolescents older than 12 were exempt from this sanction if there was no age difference of more than three years between them and no violence or intimidation was committed.On January 19, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the country responsible for the violation of the rights to humane treatment, judicial guarantees, private and family life, equality before the law, judicial protection, and children’s rights in the case of a girl age 15 who was raped by a family member. The court found the judicial system failed to investigate the sexual violence suffered by the girl or to conduct the criminal process, as well as the existence of revictimizing practices during the judicial process.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish population numbered fewer than 180. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults. Seemingly neutral laws (e.g., on statutory rape, immorality, or loitering) were not disproportionately applied to LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment: Transgender individuals were particularly vulnerable to abuse and violence from nonstate actors. Activists reported transgender individuals working in commercial sex faced violence and threats, which was common in the commercial sex industry.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The government did not enforce the law effectively. LGBTQI+ persons faced overt discrimination in employment and the workplace, at school, and in access to government services, especially in health care. Older LGBTQI+ persons experienced high rates of discrimination when attempting to access health-care services. There were no legal mechanisms in place to specifically transfer power of attorney to a same-sex partner; however, the law granted some protections to same-sex partners.Transgender activists said most of the transgender community turned to commercial sex to earn a living due to discrimination in the job market and unwillingness on the part of employers to accept their identity documents and professional licenses.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The law allowed transgender individuals to update their name, gender marker, and photograph to reflect their gender identity on all legal identification cards and birth certificates after undergoing a psychological evaluation and appearing before the Civil Registry Service.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of the practice of so-called conversion therapy and the practice of performing surgeries on intersex persons. There were no reports that medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries were performed on children or on nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no restrictions on freedom of expression, association, or peaceful assembly regarding LGBTQI+ matters or convening related events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities encountered difficulties accessing education, employment, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law required access for wheelchair users to all public and private buildings, duty-free import of orthopedic devices, and a 50 percent reduction in public transportation fares for persons with disabilities. The law also required communication outlets and government agencies to offer services and publications in sign language and braille. The law stipulated that persons with “serious and severe” disabilities were entitled to monthly government payments stipends. The law required both public and private institutions to employ a certain percentage of workers with disabilities.The government did not effectively enforce these provisions. Architectural and infrastructure barriers prohibited access in most urban areas for individuals with physical disabilities. Official action was rarely taken to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for violence against persons with disabilities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Although the law prohibited discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS, pervasive discrimination persisted. Ministry of Health authorities reported discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS was most severe in Indigenous communities, where the government was less able to diagnose cases either because persons were less willing to be tested or the government lacked the resources to reach individuals in remote areas. Activists reported discrimination forced persons with HIV to seek medical attention outside the country.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to strike for certain workers. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and required reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law did not provide these rights for agricultural workers or workers in enterprises with fewer than 20 employees, estimated to be 70 percent of all enterprises. The constitution provided for protection of general strikes and solidarity strikes and for the right of any working individual to join a union. The law protected the right to strike but stipulated that a strike could not be indefinite, a reaction according to legal experts to health-care workers threatening to strike for an indefinite amount of time.Workers could form a union in any private company of 20 or more employees. The law required at least 50 percent of the workforce be in favor, an excessive requirement by international standards. The law required that trade unions obtain prior government authorization to establish a union, and the government confirmed their elected leadership with the right to force new leadership. The law permitted only one union per enterprise and allowed the government to dissolve unions by administrative fiat. The law also required that members of union executive boards be citizens. The law prohibited most public employees from forming unions, including the military, police, and other public security forces. Some public-sector workers, including teachers, transportation workers, and health-care workers, were legally unionized and actively participated without penalty as members of the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation, the country’s chief trade union federation.Collective bargaining and voluntary direct negotiations between employers and workers without government participation were common. Most collective bargaining agreements were restricted to addressing wages.The law limited the right to strike by requiring three-quarters of workers to call for a strike, by prohibiting strikes in the banking sector, and by imposing compulsory arbitration to end a strike in nonessential sectors.The government did not effectively enforce applicable laws, and penalties were less than those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The National Labor Court handled complaints of antiunion discrimination but took one year or longer to issue rulings. Freedom of association was limited by the ineffectiveness of labor courts and the lengthy time to resolve cases and complaints. The court ruled in favor of discharged workers in most cases and required their reinstatement; however, union leaders said problems often were resolved or no longer relevant by the time the court ruled.The government took criminal actions against union leaders who spoke out against government policies. In September 2022 the government arrested César Apaza, a coca union leader from the Yungas region of La Paz, for his role in organizing protests against a MAS-aligned, unauthorized coca market in Villa El Carmen. In February, Apaza suffered a stroke and was transferred to a hospital. One month later, the government returned him to prison despite his partial paralysis. At his hearing, Apaza blamed his poor health and stroke on “beatings [he] had suffered.” Observers reported Apaza’s health was only monitored by nurses, he did not receive physical therapy, and a cell mate was helping him with basic needs. Although a judge originally turned down the prosecutor’s request for four months of preventive detention, a different judge intervened on August 3 and granted the original request for Apaza to be hospitalized, where he awaited formal charges and a trial. On August 31, Apaza began a hunger strike to protest these actions and what he described as “judicial torture.” He stopped his hunger strike on September 6 but remained in prison with deteriorating health.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a minimum wage for most sectors; it was not provided for agricultural workers. The monthly minimum wage was greater than the government’s official poverty income.The law mandated rest periods and required premium pay for work beyond a standard workweek. For men the official workweek was 48 hours, and the workday was eight hours. For women the law set a 40-hour workweek and prohibited women from working at night. The law stipulated a minimum of 15 days of annual leave. The law mandated that the standards apply uniformly to all industries and sectors. Minimum wage violations were common for domestic workers, with up to 40 percent receiving minimum wage.Occupational Safety and Health: The law mandated that occupational safety and health (OSH) standards apply uniformly to all industries and sectors. OSH standards were appropriate for the main industries in the country. OSH experts did not actively identify unsafe conditions, including responding to workers’ OSH complaints. A national tripartite committee of business, labor, and government representatives was responsible for monitoring and improving OSH standards and enforcement. The Ministry of Labor maintained offices for worker inquiries, complaints, and reports of unfair labor practices and unsafe working conditions, but it was unclear if the offices were effective in regulating working conditions.The law prohibited dismissing employees for removing themselves from work conditions they deemed hazardous and provided for the Ministry of Labor to mandate the employees be rehired following an inspection.Extensive use and illegal trade of mercury in gold mining operations led to mercury poisoning in workers in the departments of Beni and La Paz. As a result, worker safety conditions in the artisanal and industrial gold mining sectors were a concern.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Labor was responsible for enforcement of minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. The government did not effectively enforce the law. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and could initiate sanctions; however, the number of inspectors was insufficient to provide effective workplace inspection. Penalties for wage and hour violations were commensurate with fraud, and sanctions were regularly applied against violators.The Ministry of Labor’s Bureau of Occupational Safety had responsibility for the protection of workers’ health and safety, but penalties for OSH violations were not commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as negligence. Penalties were regularly applied against violators. Part-time workers were not covered by wage, hour, and OSH laws.According to labor law experts, the informal sector constituted 80-90 percent of the economy as of August 2022. Labor laws did not cover informal sector workers, and the government did not inspect the informal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bolivia																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
- Bolivia National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the 198th anniversary of its independence on August 6.On this date, we celebrate the dedication of Bolivians to building a more democratic, just, and inclusive society.  The United States and Bolivia enjoy strong ties—ties that are rooted in friendship and a deep admiration for each other&#8217;s cultures.  We remain committed to strengthening those bonds in partnership with the Bolivian people.I wish all Bolivians a happy Independence Day.
- Department Press Briefing – July 27, 2023 Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy Spokesperson													HomeDepartment Press Briefing – July 27, 2023				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – July 27, 2023																																																					July 27, 2023																																																																																																				Article Index																									NIGERDEPARTMENTNORTH KOREA / CHINA / RUSSIAISRAEL / PALESTINIAN ISSUESRUSSIA / UKRAINEBOLIVIA / IRANBANGLADESHIRAQRUSSIA / SYRIACHINA / REGIONCHINA / RUSSIARUSSIALEBANONRUSSIA / UKRAINE																													1:22 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: I do not have anything off the top today. So, Simon, care to kick us off?QUESTION: I thought you might want to make a correction about &#8212;MR PATEL: This is why I don’t make predictions on – (laughter) – this is why I was hesitant to make one in the first place, but overall still a phenomenal game – match.QUESTION: Yeah. So I guess we should talk about Niger first. I wanted – the Secretary spoke about it a few – well, quite a few hours ago now, so could you give us an update on your understanding of the situation there?MR PATEL: Sure. So again, as the Secretary reiterated yesterday, we are gravely concerned about the developments in Niger. The situation remains fluid. We are monitoring the situation closely and continue to be in close touch with the embassy in Niamey. As you all know, Secretary Blinken spoke to President Bazoum yesterday. He conveyed the unwavering support of the United States for President Bazoum and Niger’s democracy. He emphasized that the U.S. stands with the Nigerien people and regional and international partners in condemning this effort to seize power by force. He also underscored that the strong U.S. economic and security partnership with Niger depends on the continuation of democratic governance and respect of the rule of law and human rights.I will also note that Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee had the opportunity yesterday to speak with Foreign Minister Hassoumi and former Nigerien President Issoufou to condemn the efforts to seize power, as well as encourage their roles in facilitating negotiations between President Bazoum and the instigators of this takeover. Our CDA, Susan N’Garnim, also spoke with the foreign minister by phone yesterday as well.So all to say the U.S. continues to remain deeply engaged on this. We’re monitoring and paying attention, very closely in touch with officials from the constitutionally elected government of Niger as well as our colleagues at the embassy.QUESTION: And any contacts you can report with the people who have attempted this takeover?MR PATEL: I have nothing additional to readout in terms of engagements.QUESTION: What about contacts with the former President Mahamadou Issoufou?MR PATEL: I just mentioned him as one of the people that Assistant Secretary Phee &#8212;QUESTION: Oh, okay.MR PATEL: &#8212; had the opportunity to engage with yesterday.QUESTION: And is he – do you have a sense that he is somebody who is liaising with the people who’ve attempted the takeover?MR PATEL: I’m not going to just get into the specifics or characterize others’ engagements in this beyond the United States, and so would just reiterate what I said about our efforts here.QUESTION: Follow up on that?QUESTION: Thanks.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Do you have any information as to the whereabouts of President Bazoum, as it stands now? And secondly, are you in a position to suspend aid, since obviously it’s a coup d’état.MR PATEL: So at this time, we understand that President Bazoum is detained in his residence. We call for the immediate release of President Bazoum and for the respect of the rule of law and public safety. Again, Leon, as I said yesterday, this continues to be an evolving situation and it is quite too soon to characterize the nature of these ongoing developments. But as I said, we continue to monitor the situation quite closely and are in touch with not just officials but as well as our own embassy personnel as well.QUESTION: But you say it’s too soon to characterize, but at the same time, the coup is there. It’s happened. So I don’t quite understand what you’re waiting for more to know.MR PATEL: Well, there are some important pieces in here. First, President Bazoum is still president. He has not resigned. It’s also our understanding that the foreign minister – we have reports of the foreign minister indicating that he is the head of the government. Again, this is a fluid situation, and it is too soon to characterize any of these kinds of developments, Leon. We, of course, will continue to pay close attention and remain in touch with appropriate officials, as well as other regional partners as well.Go ahead, Jenny.QUESTION: Can you just confirm there is still full accountability for the U.S. embassy? Are there any plans for an authorized or ordered departure there? And have you seen any signs that Wagner is at all involved in this coup?MR PATEL: So we continue to have full accountability of all official personnel and family members. This obviously is still a developing situation. We’ve also publicly advised U.S. citizens to limit unnecessary movements, avoid affected areas until further notice as this situation develops. I will also note that at this time Niamey remains calm, and we’re continuing to monitor the situation, and we’ll provide appropriate information to American citizens as the situation continues to progress. Of course, all of this relevant information is also available through our Travel Advisories, through alerts, and of course on travel.state.gov.As it relates to your second question, I’m not aware of any indication that the Wagner Group could be involved, but I also am not going to speculate or hypothesize from here as the situation continues to be quite fluid.Anything else on this, before we shift topics? Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: I wanted to ask about the status of the administration’s nominee for ambassadorship to Niger, if that is being impacted by Senator Rand Paul’s hold on nominations, and how that is affecting on-the-ground efforts from the embassy.MR PATEL: So what I will say though – what I will say firstly is that our CDA in Niamey continues to remain deeply engaged on this and, as I just said, had the opportunity to speak with the foreign minister yesterday. That being said, you saw the Secretary be quite clear about this – and others – that it is our hope and desire to have confirmed ambassadors in as many places and in as many capitals as possible. And of course, this also includes Niger. We have cooperated extensively with Senator Paul by providing him documents and other information, but he continues to block all State Department nominees, the vast majority of whom are career Foreign Service officers, from filling critical national security posts, including, as you so noted, our nominee to serve to as ambassador in Niger.We currently have 65 nominees outstanding with the Senate, including 38 ambassadorial nominees on the Senate floor awaiting confirmation for posts in Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, where U.S. leadership continues to be desperately needed. Holds on State Department nominee are leaving critical posts unfulfilled. When we don’t have ambassadors confirmed in place, our ability to provide leadership – and, in too many places of the world, it’s impacted.I will also just note on a – from a human element, we are making a big push to get some of these nominees confirmed and out by the end of this week. If the Senate doesn’t confirm them this week, then the senators who continually hold their nominations aren’t just depriving our country of having critical diplomatic positions filled and members of its diplomatic team on the field, but they are separating families who already give so much service to this country. For those families whose – have nominees that are not able to be confirmed by the end of this week, that leaves serious potential for those that have children, for them to not be able to enroll in appropriate schools starting in September for the upcoming school year at these relevant posts, embassies, and consulates.So it’s our strong desire to have confirmed ambassadors in as many places as possible, and we continue to be ready to work with the Senate to do so.Anything else on Niger before we move away?QUESTION: Niger.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Is Wagner Group playing any role in the events there, and how will these events affect the U.S. military presence in Niger?MR PATEL: So on the role of the Wagner Group, I – Jenny just asked that question right before you, and I would reiterate that I, again, am not going to speculate on this situation. At this point, we’ve not seen any indication. And as it relates to any force posture or military personnel on the ground, I would just refer to our colleagues at the Pentagon. I will just, of course, note that Niger has been an incredible security partner on the continent, and so we’ll continue to pay close attention to this (inaudible).QUESTION: Thanks.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah – no, no, behind you. Sorry. Yes, go ahead.QUESTION: Me? Unless you’re asking about Niger.QUESTION: I was. I – just a follow-up.MR PATEL: Oh, okay.QUESTION: Go ahead.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah. Yeah.QUESTION: Just if you can confirm that no embassy personnel, non-essential personnel, have been moved out of the country at this point?MR PATEL: There has been no change in posture at this time, and we continue to have full accountability.QUESTION: And is the State Department doing any contingency planning or talking to DOD about options in case the situation becomes more volatile?MR PATEL: So in any situation we continuously adjust our posture at embassies and consulates throughout the world, in line with, of course, the local security environment and other factors. I’m certainly not going to get into the deliberative and ongoing processes around this, but we’ll continue to monitor the situation and make appropriate adjustments as necessary.For now, I would reiterate again that we continue to have full accountability.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah. Go ahead, Christina.QUESTION: Thanks. Christina Ruffini with CBS. I’ve crossed your predecessors, but don’t think I’ve had the pleasure yet.MR PATEL: Welcome.QUESTION: Thanks. I want to ask you about passports.MR PATEL: Okay.QUESTION: And I just want to start off by saying – I mean, do you think it’s acceptable that it’s taking Americans at least 12 weeks, and often in cases longer to get a critical U.S. Government document?MR PATEL: So what I would just say, first from a broad point of view, is that the demand for passports has been greater than it’s ever been. Earlier in calendar year 2023, we were receiving up to 560,000 applications a week. Volumes have certainly tapered but remain above levels at the same point pre-pandemic, which began in Fiscal Year 2019. Our processing times are an accurate reflection of the current demand.But what I will also note is that the State Department is taking appropriate steps, any steps that we can, to try and not only expedite processing but also of course enhance our capacity to do so. I’ve seen some, I would say, misreporting and misinformation out there that department passport adjudicators have been teleworking or things to that effect. That is simply not the case. Passport adjudicators have been back in the office since June of 2020, and we have increased staffing levels, and have hundreds of additional staff in the hiring pipeline. We’ve also had staff work tens of thousands of hours of overtime a month. In fact, from January through August, we have authorized approximately 30,000 to 40,000 overtime hours each month, and we have volunteers across the department working on surge things.The post-pandemic spike in passport demand from Americans truly is unprecedented, and we will be on track to issue more passports this year than in any previous year, but we’re also taking steps to ensure that we can meet this demand as well.QUESTION: But if you could go ahead and answer the question: Do you think that 12 weeks is an acceptable turnaround time? Are you saying that the system is working well enough at capacity?MR PATEL: It is a reflection of the demand, and our current processing times are about 10 to 13 weeks for routine processing and 7-9 weeks for expedited processing.QUESTION: Right, but you said you guys have taken steps to try to mitigate this. But in the last couple months, the timeline has gotten longer, right? It was six to nine weeks; now it’s up to 13 weeks. So that seems to be going the wrong direction. So what do you need to fix this? How do you get it to a more acceptable turnaround time? Because we’re talking to people who say, like, it’s really hard to plan your life out 12 weeks in advance. People don’t always know they’re going to need this.MR PATEL: Certainly understand the importance that passports play, especially as individuals plan out their travel, whether it be for personal purposes, whether it be for emergency situations, and so have you. I think an important thing to note is that this is a line of effort that we have continuously taken steps to turn back on. During the pandemic, this is something that had fallen completely to zero, just given the state of the world and the state of affairs. I would also remind this room that passport operations are one of the few aspects of the federal government that are self-funding. And so this is going to be a turning of a dial a little bit, not exactly flipping a switch. But the State Department certainly understands the seriousness of this, and that’s why we are not just surging staff, surging overtime hours, but we’re also thinking through ways in which we can make this process easier and more accessible for Americans.As you probably know, Christina, we ran a limited online passport renewal process as a pilot in the early parts of 2022, from early parts of 2022 through the early parts of ’23. In that time we processed and issued more than five hundred and sixty thousand – sixty-five thousand passports through an online system. We’ve surveyed customers who were part of that, and we look forward to making improvements based on that feedback, and formally launching this portal at the tail end of 2023.So this is certainly – we understand the demand signal that we’re getting from the American people, and we stand ready to not just continue to make adjustments, but also make improvements in this process.QUESTION: And just really quickly, I don’t want to eat too much of my colleagues’ time &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but there’s legislation on the Hill being put forward by Senator Lankford that he says would address some of the issues, including staffing and turnaround time. Do you – are you aware of that legislation, and do you have a response?MR PATEL: So lots of great, important ideas coming from Congress. We tend to avoid commenting on active legislation, but of course on the issues of passports we know that our partners in Congress are an important piece of that equation, and we look forward to engaging with them as we continue to work on this very important issue.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: All right. Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. I have two questions on North Korea.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: On – today’s the 70 anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Day. But the Russian defense minister and Chinese delegations visited North Korea (inaudible) and delivered personal letters from Putin and Xi Jinping to Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang. They strongly committed to military cooperation. This happened. Do you think North Korea denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be difficult?MR PATEL: What I can say, Janne, is that, one, that our commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula continues to be unwavering, as well as our willingness to engage with Pyongyang without preconditions. But Pyongyang has continuously not been interested in diplomatic engagements back.The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, they pose a grave threat to international peace and security and stand in blatant violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. You just spoke of two countries, Russia and China. Russia’s support for these unlawful weapons programs by blocking additional action at the UN Security Council, by participating in events in Pyongyang celebrating these weapons, by failing to crack down on DPRK sanction evasion activities – all of this just highlights how detrimental it has become to preserving international peace and security.I will also note is that we’ve previously said we believe that Beijing has influence over Pyongyang, and we hope that it will use that influence to encourage Pyongyang to return to dialogue and refrain from destabilizing activities.QUESTION: Yeah. Kim Jong-un and the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu pledged military cooperation between the two countries, and they discussed the purchase of weapons from North Korea while accompanying them to the ICBM and the new weapons shown in Pyongyang. How concerned are you about this, firstly?MR PATEL: We continue to be incredibly concerned. Look, the DPRK’s support for Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, whether through public statements, whether through arms transfers we’ve previously discussed, all of this clearly illustrates its destabilizing and irresponsible role in international affairs.QUESTION: King, Private King – last question.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Excuse me. Are limited dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea expected, or what &#8212;MR PATEL: I just don’t have any updates for you on that at this time. Private King’s well-being continues to be an extremely high priority for the State Department and we’re continuing to coordinate with the interagency on this.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Switching topics?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: To the Palestinian – I have a couple of questions on the Palestinian issue and on the visa waiver. Israeli far-right minister Ben-Gvir today stormed al-Aqsa, causing your allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Türkiye to condemn the action, and I wonder if you would do the same. Would the United States condemn such an action?MR PATEL: Said, we absolutely are concerned by today’s visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. We reaffirm our longstanding U.S. position that – in support of the historic status quo at Jerusalem’s holy sites, and we underline Jordan’s special role in Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. You’ve heard me say this before, that any unilateral action or rhetoric that deviates or jeopardizes the status quo is completely unacceptable.QUESTION: On the visa waiver &#8212;MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: &#8212; switching gears here. There are widely circulating copies of the U.S.-Israeli MOU that was signed a week ago or so, and reports citing it. Do you intend to make it public? Are you going to publish the MOU so people know what the United States Government and Israel have agreed to, Americans would know?MR PATEL: Said, we’ve talked about the Visa Waiver Program pretty regularly for the past couple of weeks.QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: I think an important perspective and thing to remember here is that this is an ongoing process and that we’re looking forward to continuing to work with our Israeli partners on ensuring that any requirements and prerequisites are met prior to any potential entry into the program. We also fully expect that the Israeli Government will further modify its regulations and public-facing guidance in the coming days and weeks to fully reflect adherence to any prerequisites, but also adherence to the program.QUESTION: So – but there are no plans to publish it in the near future &#8212;MR PATEL: Correct.QUESTION: &#8212; as far as you know?MR PATEL: Correct.QUESTION: Okay. My other question is that the Israeli Government’s public-facing guidance directs some U.S. citizens to use a smart application, which was developed by the Israeli military, and its terms of service include permissions for accessing locations, phone files, and so on. Has the State Department or any U.S. Government agency conducted a cyber security review of this application? Have you done that to see what U.S. citizens are subjecting themselves &#8212;MR PATEL: Said, I &#8212;QUESTION: You may have to take this question, but I understand &#8212;MR PATEL: Said, within – I certainly wouldn’t speak – be able to speak to any – the specificity of any review from up here, but what I will just note is that for American citizens traveling not just in Israel and the proximate regions, but also anywhere in the world &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR PATEL: &#8212; on travel.state.gov we have very clear recommendations on what our official State Department policies are as it relates to interfacing with the appropriate visa or adjudicating mechanism in any country that grants access.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: So I would refer you to that, but I’m not aware of nor would I speak to any specific review of this app.QUESTION: Could you look into it, see maybe what is your position on this?MR PATEL: I’m happy to.QUESTION: Because they are prying into the security of American citizens.MR PATEL: I’m happy to. Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Vedant. A couple questions. The President’s decision about the ICC and cooperation with ICC, can you just let us know what is going on on your end? What does the traffic look like? Have you guys already started transferring data to ICC? And where is Ambassador Von Schaack these days?MR PATEL: So, Alex, it’s certainly – and you saw the Secretary speak a little bit to this yesterday in Wellington – would not get into the specifics of this just given the legal, prosecutorial, and investigatory implications. So – but to let me take a step back – since the beginning of Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the President has been clear that there needs to be accountability for the perpetrators and enablers of the war crimes and atrocities in Ukraine. And Secretary Blinken reiterated this yesterday that we have made clear that there needs to be accountability and we support the ICC’s investigation. We support a range of international efforts to identify and hold to account those responsible, including through the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, the Joint Investigative Team, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, and others. We have deployed teams of international investigators and prosecutors to assist Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General in documenting, preserving, and preparing war crime cases for prosecution, and the Department of Justice has also entered an MOU to cooperate with Ukraine on investigations and prosecutions of war crimes committed during Russia’s invasion.Ambassador Van Schaack of course is deeply engaged and deeply part of this process and will continue to be working closely not just with the Secretary but across the interagency on these efforts.QUESTION: And are you also intending to (inaudible) about Wagner Group being &#8212;MR PATEL: Alex, I’m just not going to get into the specifics of kinds of flow of information and the specificity of the cooperation.QUESTION: Thank you. Related to that, any reaction to Prigozhin being spotted at St. Petersburg today at the Russia-African Union summit?MR PATEL: I don’t really have a comment on that specifically, Alex. The whole situation continues to be somewhat puzzling to all of us. But what I will just, if you’ll allow me, speak to the broader Russia-Africa summit, if I’ll just note that the U.S.’s Africa policy is about Africa, and I will remind you all that earlier this year – or late last year, sorry – we hosted 46 leaders from across North and Sub-Saharan Africa at the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, which highlighted our commitment to expanding and deepening our partnership with African countries, institutions, and people.We also condemn Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. We join the secretary-general in expressing our disappointment that Russia refused the UN’s proposals to keep the initiative alive.And while we’re on the topic of food security, which I know is something that is so critically important to many of these countries attending this summit and the African continent writ large, as the Secretary said yesterday, the United States supports approximately half of the budget of the World Food Program whereas Russia is only .02 percent. And so it’s pretty clear to us who is actively committed to addressing the dire concerns of food security.And lastly, if you’ll just allow me, Alex, it surely does not take a mathematician to see that compared to 2022 the number of countries attending this Russian Africa summit is far less than it was the year before. And this is just a further testament to the egregious global implications of Russia’s unjust assault on Ukraine and how from everything like food security to global trade prices and things like that have impacted countries around the world, not just in the immediate vicinity of Eastern Europe.QUESTION: Thank you. My last question, if you don’t mind &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: It’s about &#8212;QUESTION: Can I have a follow-up just on the grain?QUESTION: Sure, yeah, please. Yeah, of course.MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah, go ahead, Leon.QUESTION: Do you have any – the Russian president offered to – at the summit several countries – offered to several African countries to give grain free, for free, bypassing the grain – so do you have any reaction to that?MR PATEL: Actions certainly should speak louder than words in any situation, including addressing the global threat of food security. What I will just note and reiterate, as I said, is that currently Russia provides .02 percent of the World Food Program’s budget and the United States provides about half. So the numbers clearly don’t lie when it come to who in here is actually committed to addressing the crisis of food security. But broadly on President Putin’s comments, actions speak louder than words.QUESTION: My last question &#8212;MR PATEL: I’m going to work the room, Alex. You’ve got like four questions in already.QUESTION: Please come back to me later.MR PATEL: I’ll think about it. Go ahead, Guita.QUESTION: Thanks, Vedant. We’ve talked a lot about Russia using Iranian UAVs, but it seems like Bolivia is now – is interested in Iran’s UAVs. The president of Bolivia has reportedly said that he wants it for border security protection, but given the U.S. sanctions against many different organizations and companies working in Iran’s UAV production sector, would the reason that Bolivia is stating that it needs, it wants the UAVs exempted from those sanctions – and is it advisable?MR PATEL: So Guita, obviously this is something that is concerning, and we are closely monitoring any efforts by Iran to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere. And we take seriously any efforts by other countries who are interested in deepening military partnerships with Iran or procure Iranian UAVs. We strongly urge all nations to avoid engaging in transactions with Iran for military equipment or related items which could subject entities and individuals to multiple U.S. sanctions authorities. We of course remain open to forging stronger bilateral relationships with the Bolivian Government in areas of mutual interest, potentially even border security, migration, things of that space. But on this specific topic, we of course would take quite seriously any effort by any country to deepen military partnerships with Iran or procure Iranian UAVs.QUESTION: Does the administration have the kind of relationship with Bolivia to dissuade it?MR PATEL: I’m just not going to get into the specifics of the kind of diplomatic engagements that we can and may have as it relates to this beyond just reiterating that this of course would be of increasingly concern to us.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Bangladesh situation is turning into confrontational. The opposition, BNP, shifted their ground rally from July 27 to next day, Friday. The Sheikh Hasina-led ruling party, Bangladesh Awami League, is hosting counter political meetings considering – coinciding the opposition meeting as an apparent incite of violence on the state. The state apparatus work overtime to obstruct the opposition rally while facilitating the counter-program by ruling party. The police alone have arrested thousands opposition activist, as the opposition party claim. So how you are evaluating this confrontational situation in Bangladesh as regime is inciting violence in the street?MR PATEL: So I spoke a little bit about this yesterday, and you’ve been very clear – I’ve been very clear about this. I will reiterate that political violence has no place in a democracy, and the United States, we favor no political party. We support Bangladesh’s goal of holding free, fair, and peaceful elections. We’ve also emphasized the importance of the United States and Bangladesh working together to achieve this goal, and certainly continue to believe that this endeavor has no space or room for political violence.Diyar, go ahead.QUESTION: A couple questions on Iraq and the region.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: The first one: Your sanctions on Iraqi banks, as this has triggered protests in Iraq and Iraqi dinar devaluation. Why you sanctioned those Iraqi banks, and have you issued any warning to Iraq on the dollar cash flow to the (inaudible) countries in Iraq?MR PATEL: So to take a step back and to be quite clear, we did not sanction these 14 banks. Earlier in July the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York removed 14 banks from access to the Central Bank of Iraq’s foreign currency sale window, known as the dollar and wire auctions. These actions help limit the ability of bad actors seeking to launder U.S. dollars, profit from the exploitation of money owned by the Iraqi people, and evade U.S. sanctions.I will also note that corruption poses a challenge for Iraq’s banking sector. Our government and the Government of Iraq are working together to tackle this challenge head on. Prime Minister Sudani is taking the integrity of the Iraqi financial system quite seriously, and all of these actions are happening in close coordination and harmony with the prime minister’s vision and his identification – and his identifying of fighting corruption and modernizing Iraq’s financial sector.QUESTION: And yesterday I asked this question – I’ll ask again – about the reforms in the Ministry of Peshmerga of Iraqi Kurdistan. Have you told the Kurdish leaders to appoint an interim Peshmerga minister before September? And what’s your view on the reforms process in the Peshmerga?MR PATEL: So our colleagues at the Department of Defense can certainly speak more about the memorandum of understanding that was signed, but we continue to have concerns of the impact of internal Kurdish divisions on the pace of Peshmerga reform and readiness, and we have communicated these concerns to senior KRG leaders as well.QUESTION: And last question.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: On the Russian provocation in Syria, are you going to push back against this Russian provocation against your drones in northwest Syria?MR PATEL: So I spoke a little bit about this earlier in the week, and I would just reiterate again what the Pentagon and the White House said, that these actions by Russia, they violated established protocols and international norms, and that we strongly urge Russian forces in Syria to immediately stop reckless and threatening behavior. And we will, of course, take any appropriate action to keep our service members or to keep civilians in the region safe.Go ahead.QUESTION: So touching briefly on the China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, recently we’ve been seeing a disparate amount of erosion of democracy within Solomon Islands, one being that the, the governor, the former governor of the Malaita Province – the biggest province within the Solomon Islands, Daniel Suidani – being sacked by the government for essentially going against the “one China” policy. And in fact, the – there’s a delay in the election elections of where the Pacific Games are taking place when the election should be going on. There’s also a security pact between Solomon Islands and China. And there’s reports of policing stations being – operating in the island itself.So with the continual growth of the Chinese Communist Party’s presence in the Solomon Islands, and overall it becoming a – it seems like it’s becoming a concern, especially for our allies around the region, particularly, it seems like. for Australia, among many others, I was just wondering if you can comment on that as well.MR PATEL: What I will just say is that we – as it relates to our relationship with the Solomon Islands or any country, we do not ask countries to choose between the United States and the PRC. We offer them a choice and offer to them what a partnership with the United States could look like and what that could mean for the people of both of our countries. And that continues to be the case in the Solomon Islands and the Indo-Pacific region broadly. There are a number of issues, core issues, that are at the nexus of our relationship with many, all of these Pacific Island countries. The Secretary in the past three months has been to the region quite consistently, raising, discussing some of these issues, deepening our cooperation in a number of areas, whether it be security, climate change, energy cooperation, things of that nature.And so that is the foot that the United States is going to continue to put forward and deepening our bilateral ties and relations on a number of these issues.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. A couple of questions. One is just follow-up to Diyar’s question. There will be any additional sanctions on Iraqi banks? This has created instability in the Iraqi market and devalued &#8212;MR PATEL: Certainly am not going to preview any actions that the U.S. Government might potentially take.QUESTION: Okay, the second question is about Iraqi Kurdistan parliamentary elections. The Kurdistan Region Presidency has proposed February 25th as the day for parliamentary elections in the region, after they have been delayed for a year – for over a year. What’s your view on this?MR PATEL: I’m going to have to check in on that and we’ll make sure to follow up with you and get back to you on that.Julia, you’ve had your hand up patiently.QUESTION: Thank you. The House Intelligence Committee just released the unclassified ODNI assessment showing that China’s helping Russia evade and circumvent Western sanctions and is probably supplying Russia with key technology and equipment in the war in Ukraine. What possible recourse options are available? What does the State Department have to say about China assisting Russia in evading these sanctions?MR PATEL: Well, so first, on this specific report, I’ve not seen it so I’m not going to comment on that. But in every engagement that the Secretary and others have had with PRC officials, we have made quite clear our concern should the provision of lethal aid, should steps be taken to allow Russia to further its aggression into Ukraine. And we have continued to make that very clear through all appropriate channels.Now, and any potential actions, I’m certainly not going to preview from here, as we don’t preview U.S. actions. But this is something that, of course, we’re going to continue to monitor closely and pay close attention to.Jenny, you had your hand up.QUESTION: Two on Russia. Have there been any efforts to get consular access to Evan Gershkovich in recent weeks, and have those requests been granted by Moscow? And then Putin signed a law earlier this week banning gender-affirming care. I was wondering if State has a comment or if there’s anything you can do for these marginalized communities.MR PATEL: Sure. So first, we continue to call for the release of wrongful detainee Evan Gershkovich, as well as wrongful detainee Paul Whelan. We obviously fairly consistently ask for appropriate consular access that is consistent with our consular convention with the Russian Federation. I’m not aware of a specific date or the last point of contact, but I’m happy to check with the team and get back to you on that.Specifically, on the second law, this – your second question on this law about Russia banning gender-affirming care, quite directly I believe this law is repressive. It increases the risk of violence against these marginalized communities. Targeting members of vulnerable communities for repression, such as the LGBTQI+ community is a favored tool of the Kremlin’s handbook. It is a tactic, I believe, being used to distract from the Russian Government’s economic and policy failures. And we quite clearly condemn this law as well as other laws in Russia, around the world, that attempt to demonize LGBTQI+ people. We firmly oppose any discrimination or abuses against these marginalized communities.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that really quickly?MR PATEL: Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Given that many U.S. states are passing their own laws to restrict and ban gender-affirming care, how does that affect the State Department’s ability to characterize Russia’s law as repressive, given it’s happening in the United States?MR PATEL: Well, I certainly appreciate your question. I think your question is more better suited for a domestic-facing agency. I think we have been incredibly clear about the values of this department, the values that we try to live and – live by and conduct our bilateral relationships through. As Secretary Blinken has been pretty clear, for the United States human rights are always on the table, and these are some things that when we see impacted or marginalized or targeted, we’re going to raise those directly with foreign governments, with foreign officials, in countries around the world.QUESTION: Can I ask a Russia question?MR PATEL: I’m going to go to Michel.QUESTION: Okay. Whenever you &#8212;MR PATEL: Go ahead, Michel.QUESTION: Thank you. I have two questions on Lebanon.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: France’s special envoy for Lebanon Jean-Yves Le Drian was in Lebanon to press the parties to elect a new president. Are you in full coordination with France on this issue, and do you support France’s approach to the Lebanese matter?MR PATEL: So our joint statement earlier in July from Doha underscored that we continue to work closely with our partners, including France, to urge Lebanese officials to elect a president, form a government, and implement appropriate critical reforms as well.QUESTION: And did you get any update to &#8212;MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates on that.QUESTION: Second, Lebanese Central Bank governor will retire this week, with no replacement in the horizon. Are you concerned about the vacuum that this retirement will create?MR PATEL: The – on the Central Bank, the current governor has announced that he’s not going to extend his position after the end of the month, and ultimately it’s up for the Lebanese Government to determine who is in that position. We will work with the appropriate designated governor in their official capacity.Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thanks.QUESTION: Thank you. I have a couple of questions on Ukraine. On Saturday, one of my colleagues from Russian news agency Rostislav Zhuravlev was killed in a Ukrainian strike and four more journalists were injured. Preliminary reports show that that strike was conducted with cluster munitions. In your view, does this use of cluster munitions constitute an appropriate use as promised by Kyiv last week?MR PATEL: So I’m not aware of those specific reports. Obviously, the safety of journalists and those in the media reporting in conflict zones should certainly be respected. But I would also note and remind you that we continue to be in this situation and have this conversation because of Russia’s unjust, illegal war into Ukraine and its efforts to erase Ukrainian borders, its efforts to completely violate and ignore the rules that are very clearly laid out in the UN Charter.QUESTION: And I have one more on the Black Sea Grain Initiatives.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: According to the UN data, only 10 percent of grain was actually sent to African countries, while the lion’s share was sent to China, Spain, Türkiye, Italy, and the Netherlands. In light of this data, do you still believe that the grain initiative benefitted the poorest countries?MR PATEL: The Black Sea Grain Initiative benefitted the world. It had a direct impact on global food prices. In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s withdrawal, we already saw and are continuing to see global food prices rise. Of course we want to ensure that grain is going to all the countries possible that are needed, but this is not just a regional issue to Eastern Europe, to Africa; it is a global issue. Ukrainian food and grain products are incredibly important to not just global demands but global supply chains, and the Black Sea Grain Initiative was an important boon in that aspect, and we continue to call on Russia to rejoin it.All right. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 2:07 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Bangladesh																								Bolivia																								China																								Iran																								Israel																								Lebanon																								Niger																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Syria																								Ukraine
- Bolivia HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Bolivia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Bolivia																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																																																									Additional Resources																																																																											Climate Issues																																																																																	9. Corruption																																																									Resources to Report Corruption																																																																																	10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information:																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Bolivia’s 2009 constitution nationalized companies in “strategic” sectors, including extractive industries like fossil fuels and mining, telecommunications, and electricity.  The Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) government of President Luis Arce favors nationalization and an “import substitution model” for its statist economic model.   There is no significant foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no specific incentives to encourage U.S. investment.  Bolivia abrogated its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States in 2012 and has not sought a positive bilateral economic and commercial relationship.Enforcement of laws regarding dispute settlements, intellectual property, and real property are lacking, creating legal discrepancies and inconsistent enforcement, and therefore, an uncertain investment climate. Furthermore, Bolivia’s judicial system is increasingly compromised, making judicial recourse for investment disputes challenging. Bolivia’s weak judicial security, complicated regulatory systems, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and corruption adversely affect the private sector and impede investment in Bolivia.Bolivia is a state-run economy focused on public spending. Many state-owned enterprises are inefficiently managed, and the economy is fragile and vulnerable to external shocks. Central bank reserves are low, and the public debt is high. Bolivia’s inflation rate is the lowest in the region at around 3 percent, but the economy is cushioned by a fixed exchange rate, government subsidies, and rampant contraband from Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Multiple rating agencies downgraded Bolivia in March 2023 due to its low reserves and the government’s poor fiscal policies. As a result, speculation has led to dollar scarcity in the formal financial system, placing pressure on the foreign exchange rate. A black market has emerged for dollars at an exchange rate surpassing the legal peg. Banks are facing liquidity issues and have limited cash withdrawals.Among the leading sectors in Bolivia are energy (mainly fossil fuels), which is Bolivia’s historical main revenue source. However, for the first time in 20 years, Bolivia has become a net importer of fuel and has struggled to meet its commitments for natural gas exports. Gas price increases, partly due to Russia’s war against Ukraine, and a decrease in Bolivia’s production and investment in exploration, are factors. Bolivia also maintains extremely high fuel subsidies which, along with certain food subsidies, help keep consumer prices low, but at a significant fiscal cost. In 2022, more than half of Bolivia’s fiscal deficit stemmed from fuel subsidies alone.Other key sectors for investment include environmental technologies, automotive, healthcare technologies, and the food and agriculture value chain. Agriculture is a growing sector in Bolivia, with 2022 exports increasing by 27 percent from 2021 and more than doubling since 2020. Nonetheless, droughts, floods, and other climate phenomena in recent years have been devastating in Bolivia and advanced equipment and technology is limited. Manufacturing is also experiencing growth, particularly with foods, oilseeds, chemicals related to urea and lithium derivatives, and basic metals for tin production.Children in Bolivia are subjected to the worst forms of child labor particularly in mining and agricultural industries.  In 2021, Bolivia made minimal advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, according to the U.S. Department of Labor.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index2022126 of 180 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview Global Innovation Index2022N/A https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator U.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2020$300 Mhttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ World Bank GNI per capita20213,290 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD 																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										The 2014 Investment Law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms, however public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign). The Bolivian government determines which sectors require private investment. Public policies promote internal consumption of products made in Bolivia. Foreign investment is not allowed in matters relating directly to national security.  There is no significant FDI from the United States in Bolivia, and there are no initiatives designed to specifically encourage U.S. investment.  Bolivia does not have an investment promotion agency to facilitate foreign investment. The government has not held a significant dialogue with the private sector since it came to power in 2020.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										Foreign and domestic private entities have a right to establish and own business enterprises and engage in remunerative activity. Any investment will be monitored by the relevant ministry for a specific sector. What may limit private companies from investing, both foreign and national, are the government’s investment decisions, control, and prioritization of key strategic sectors including natural resources and broadcast licenses.The constitution sets a “border security zone” of fifty kilometers into Bolivian territory from the border. No foreign entity may acquire property in this territory, except in the case of state necessity and approved by supermajority of the legislative assembly.  Non-compliance results in the property or possession being passed to the state, without any indemnity.The state has complete control of Bolivia’s natural resources, including fossil energy and mining. Temporary authorizations to exploit natural resources may be granted, but no concessions or contracts may transfer its ownership to private interests.  Foreign individuals or companies may enter joint venture contracts on a service-contract basis with the state. However, foreign enterprises must submit to the sovereignty and laws of the state. No foreign court case or jurisdiction will be recognized, and foreign investors may not invoke any exceptional situation for international arbitration, nor appeal to diplomatic claims.Foreign persons or entities cannot obtain licenses for radio broadcasts.  The share of total foreign investment in broadcasting associations cannot exceed 25 percent, unless approved by the state or by international treaties. Bolivia does not maintain an investment screening or approval mechanism.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										Bolivia underwent a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade policy review in 2017.  In his concluding remarks, the WTO Chair noted several WTO members raised challenges impacting investor confidence in Bolivia, due primarily to Bolivia’s abrogation of 22 BITs following the passage of its 2009 constitution.  However, some WTO members also commended Bolivia for enacting a new investment promotion law in 2014 and a law on conciliation and arbitration, both of which increased legal certainty for investors, according to those members.																																				Business Facilitation										Any new businesses must be registered and certified by the public entity Servicio Plurinacional de Registro de Comercio (SEPREC) at  https://www.seprec.gob.bo . Foreign businesses report they are able to use the SEPREC website fto complete their online business registration needs. The process to register a new business takes about 30 days from start to finish.  The government has not made any specific efforts to facilitate business.Companies must also register with the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales) and with the respective company’s municipality. If the company has employees, it must additionally register with the national health insurance service, the national retirement pension agency, and the Ministry of Labor.																																				Outward Investment										The Bolivian government does not promote or incentivize outward investment, but they also do not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						In 2012, Bolivia abrogated its BITs with the United States and 21 other countries. The BIT with Bolivia was the first to be terminated by a U.S. treaty partner.  In October 2007, Bolivia became the first country to withdraw from the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Bolivia does not have a bilateral taxation treaty with the United States.  Bolivia has various agreements with other countries aimed at avoiding double taxation, including Argentina, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Andean Community countries.Bolivia is not a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										Bolivia has no laws or policies that directly foster competition on a non-discriminatory basis.  The Commercial Code does state that unfair competition, such as maintaining an import, production, or distribution monopoly, should be penalized according to criminal law.  There are no informal regulatory processes managed by nongovernmental organizations or private sector associations. Regulatory authority regarding investment lies solely at the national level in Bolivia.The Commercial Code requires that all companies keep adequate accounting records and legal records for transparency.  However, there is a large informal sector, comprising over 60% of the economy, that does not follow these practices.  Most accounting regulations follow international principles, but the regulations do not always conform to international standards. Large private companies and some government institutions, such as the Central Bank and the Banking Supervision Authority, have transparent and consistent accounting systems.There is no established public comment process allowing social, political, and economic interests to provide advice and comment on new laws and decrees.  However, the government generally, but not always, discusses proposed laws with the relevant sector.  Online regulatory disclosures by the government can be found in the Official Gazette at  http://www.gacetaoficialdebolivia.gob.bo/ .The Business Auditing Authority (AEMP) is tasked with regulating the business activities of public, private, mixed, or cooperative entities across all business sectors.  AEMP’s decisions are legally reviewable through appeal.  However, should an entity wish to file a second appeal, the ultimate decision-making responsibility rests with the Bolivian government ministry with jurisdiction over that specific sector.  This has led to a perception that enforcement mechanisms are neither transparent nor independent. In addition, the laws to implement Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution are lacking. The legal discrepancies between constitutional guarantees and the dated policies currently enforced help foster an uncertain investment climate.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										Bolivia is a full member of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), which includes Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.  The CAN’s norms are considered supranational in character and have automatic application in the regional economic block.  Bolivia is in the process of joining the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) as a full (rather than associate) member.  The government does notify the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade regarding draft technical regulations.																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										Property and contractual rights are enforced in Bolivian courts under a civil law system; however, the legal process is time consuming and has been subject to political influence and corruption.  Bolivia’s Commercial Code provides general guidance for commercial activities. The constitution has precedence over international law and treaties and stipulates that the state will be directly involved in resolving conflicts between employers and employees. Regulatory and enforcement actions are appealable.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										The 2014 Investment Law guarantees equal treatment for national and foreign firms, however public investment has priority over private investment (both national and foreign). The Bolivian government determines which sectors require private investment. There is no primary, central point-of-contact for investment that provides all the relevant information to investors.																																				Competition and Anti-Trust Laws										Bolivia does not have a competition law, but the Constitution prohibits private monopolies. The AEMP oversees business activities, including the protection of free competition and antitrust. Cases related to unfair competition can be presented to AEMP. These cases are appealable.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										The Bolivian Constitution allows the central government or local governments to expropriate property for the public good or when the property does not fulfill a “social purpose”, as defined under Article 57 of the Constitution.  In the case of land, the Constitution defines “Economic Social Purpose” as “sustainable land use to develop productive activities, according to its best use capacity, for the benefit of society, the collective interest and its owner.”  In cases where there is non-compliance in fulfilling this “economic social purpose,” the Bolivian government is not required to pay for the land and the land title reverts to the state. The Bolivian government has no official definition of “collective interest” and makes decisions on a case-by-case basis. In cases where the expropriation of land is deemed a necessity of the state or for the public good, just indemnification is required by law.The Bolivian government has nationalized entities related to hydrocarbons, electricity, mining, telecommunications, the pension fund, and others. To do so, the government forced private entities to sell shares to the government, often at below market prices.  All outsourcing and private contracts were canceled and assigned to public companies. Some companies affected by the nationalization efforts (including from the United States and several European countries) have cases pending with international arbitration bodies.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						In November 2007, Bolivia became the first country to withdraw from the ICSID.						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						Conflicting Bolivian law has made international arbitration in some cases effectively impossible. The 2009 Constitution states international arbitration is not recognized in any case and cannot proceed under any diplomatic claim, and specifically limits foreign companies’ access to international arbitration in the case of conflicts with the government.  All bilateral investment treaties must be renegotiated to incorporate relevant provisions of the 2009 constitution. amended under Evo Morales. Under the 2015 Arbitration Law, international arbitration is not permitted when the dispute is against the government or a state-owned enterprise (SOE).In the past 10 years, there have been foreign investor disputes with the government of Bolivia, including claims arising from mining concessions and the nationalization of the pension fund and electricity companies. Some disputes are pending, including a claim the business community considers would have the effect of expropriating mining concessions. Other investment disputes have been settled, or decided in favor of the investor.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						Two Bolivian institutions have arbitration bodies: the National Chamber of Commerce (CNC) and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Santa Cruz (CAINCO).  To use these domestic arbitration bodies, private parties must include arbitration within their contracts.  Depending on the contract between the parties, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or Bolivia’s Arbitration Law may be used.  Local courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and judgments.  There are no statistics available regarding SOE involvement in investment disputes.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										The Bolivian Commercial Code includes bankruptcy regulations. In general, the application of laws related to commercial disputes and bankruptcy has been perceived as inconsistent, and businesses have frequently complained of corruption.  Foreign creditors often have little redress beyond Bolivian courts, and judgments are generally more favorable to local claimants than international ones.  If a company declares bankruptcy, the company must pay employee benefits before other obligations.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										To attract more investment, each Ministry may provide sector-specific investment incentives of any type. In practice, however, implementation of the mechanisms to offer such incentives has not been established. The government can and does incentivize investment in certain sectors that contribute to the economic and social development of the country. The government does not offer business incentives for direct foreign investment, nor do they offer any direct green investment or clean energy incentives. The government has promoted investments in the exploration and exploitation of fossil fuels.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										Free industrial zones exist in the cities of El Alto, Patacamaya, Oruro, Puerto Suarez, Cobija, and Warnes.  Concessions within free industrial zones last 15 years and are renewable.  There are eased customs procedures for goods entering the zones and stronger government support for the promotion of productive investments within the zones.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Bolivian labor law requires businesses to limit foreign employees to 15 percent of their total work force and requires foreign hires be technical staff. The 2014 investment law requires technology transfer from foreign companies operating in Bolivia to Bolivian workers and institutions.  The law also specifies that Bolivians should work in operational, administrative, and executive offices of foreign companies.  Companies investing in Bolivia should donate equipment and machinery to universities and technical schools in the same area as the investment and conduct research activities that will find solutions that contribute to public welfare.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										Property rights are legally protected and registered in the corresponding jurisdiction’s Real Estate Office, where titles or deeds are recorded, and mortgages/liens are registered.  These Real Estate Offices are administered by the Council of the Magistracy of the Judicial Branch. . Bureaucratic delays, especially in rural areas, and an absence of a reliable dispute resolution process does create risk and uncertainty in real property acquisition.The Bolivian Constitution grants citizens and foreigners the right to private property but stipulates that the property must serve a social or economic function.  If the government determines that a given property is not sufficiently useful (according to its own criteria), the constitution allows the government to expropriate. The government will not grant public lands to foreigners, non-indigenous people, or agriculture companies.According to Bolivia’s Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), 12 percent of all land in Bolivia lacks a clear title. As a result, squatting and land grabbing is a problem.  In some cases, squatters can make a legal claim to the land.  While the Criminal Code criminalizes illegal occupation, the judicial system is slow and ineffective in its enforcement of the law.  The INRA plans to complete the process of clearing titles for all lands in 2024.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										Bolivia is not named in the 2021 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy. However, Bolivia is on the Watch List of the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2022 Special 301 Report. According to the 301 Report, Bolivia has not acceded to the WIPO Internet Treaties, relies on antiquated laws, and lacks the resources to protect and enforce IP adequately or effectively. The report states that “Video, music, literature, and software piracy rates are among the highest in Latin America, and rampant counterfeiting persists.” In addition, although Bolivian Customs has the authority to pursue criminal prosecutions of visual works, the necessary regulations are not implemented, and overall communications between Bolivian Customs and SENAPI is lacking.Bolivia is a signatory of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and of the Andean Community (CAN) Decision 486.  The Bolivian Intellectual Property Service (SENAPI) protects and enforces IPR. Although copyright laws recognize copyright infringement as a public offense, criminal charges and prosecutions are rare. Civil suits, if pursued, face long delays.  SENAPI does offer a conciliation process to resolve IPR controversies without trial, which is the preferred procedure to settle disputes.The issue with counterfeit goods is exacerbated by Bolivia’s predominantly informal economy. According to the International Labor Organization, about 90 percent of Bolivians have informal jobs. Unregulated sales of counterfeit goods are common and many importers believe the payment of customs fees will “legalize” the sale of these products. Large quantities of counterfeit electrical appliances from China are available in local markets. There is also a flourishing market of Bolivian textile products marketed with counterfeit labels of major U.S. brands.For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/. 																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										The government’s general attitude toward foreign portfolio investment is neutral.  The government and central bank respect their obligations under IMF Article VIII, as the exchange system is free of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions. The stock exchange is small and is highly concentrated in bonds and debt instruments. Established Bolivian firms may issue short or medium-term debt in local capital markets, which act primarily as secondary markets for fixed-return securities. Foreign investors legally established in Bolivia can get credits on the local market.  However, due to the size of the market, large credits are rare and may require operations involving several banks. Credit access through other financial instruments is limited to bond issuances in the capital market.Liquidity issues starting in February 2023 have disrupted Bolivia’s stock market. According to Bolivia’s stock exchange data, Bolivia’s stock market transactions were valued at $14.7 billion in 2022 (an estimated 33% of the GDP), of which $9.8 billion were in the market for repurchasing agreements (REPOS), which account for 22% of GDP. This year, Bolivia saw defaults for the first time in 35 years, which sharply increased interest rates in this market.																																				Money and Banking System										The Bolivian banking system is small, including a dozen major banks (one state-run), and 30 savings and credit cooperatives. In 2022, the banking sector accounted for 80 percent of all personal deposits ($32 billion) and 80 percent of total loans and credits to private individuals ($31 billion). Foreigners can establish bank accounts in Bolivia, but only with residency status.Bolivian banks have the capacity to adjudicate credit risk and evaluate expected rates of return in line with international norms.  The financial sector is regulated by the Supervising Authority of Financial Institutions (ASFI).  The Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB) oversees all financial institutions, provides liquidity when necessary, and acts as lender of last resort.  The BCB also manages the payment system, international reserves, and the exchange rate.State-owned Banco Union is the largest bank in Bolivia, with over $6.6 billion in total assets, followed by Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz. Banco Union’s principal activities include managing public sector accounts. The only commercial foreign bank present in Bolivia is the Banco de Credito del Perú.On February 8, 2023, the Central Bank reported its foreign reserves totaled $3.5 billion, with $376 million in cash, $2.6 billion in gold, and $573 million in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). On February 27, the Central Bank reduced the reserve requirement for foreign currency to meet the growing demand for dollars, while increasing the reserve requirement for Bolivianos, resulting in further liquidity issues.On March 15, Standard and Poor’s maintained Bolivia’s B rating, while placing Bolivia “under surveillance” due to concerns over Bolivia’s falling foreign reserves.  On March 16, Fitch Ratings downgraded Bolivia’s sovereign debt risk to B minus with a “negative outlook.” The report also publicized that the Bolivian government used its IMF SDRs, which the Economic Minister confirmed. On March 24, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded Bolivia’s foreign currency credit rating to “Caa1.” On March 15, JP Morgan increased Bolivia’s country risk in the Emerging Markets Bond Index, and Bolivia’s sovereign bonds have dropped in value by 42 percent since their issuance in 2021 (a 19 percent drop in 2023). Most of Bolivia’s sovereign bonds are held by Bolivian companies, banks, and by Bolivia’s pension funds (AFPs), which are transitioning from private ownership to the Bolivian government. In March, private bank Banco Fassil suffered a bank run and temporarily halted electronic transactions.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						Bolivian law allows repatriation of profits, with a 12.5 percent withholding tax.  All bank transfers in U.S. dollars within the financial system and leaving the country must pay a Financial Transaction Tax (ITF) of 0.3 percent.  This tax applies to foreign transactions for U.S. dollars leaving Bolivia, not to money transferred internally. The BCB also charges fees for various international transactions related to banking and trade.Currency is freely convertible at Bolivian banks and exchange houses.  The Bolivian government describes its official exchange system as an “incomplete crawling peg.” The Boliviano (BOB) has remained fixed at BOB 6.96 /$1 for selling and BOB 6.86 /$1 for buying since 2011 but undergoes micro-readjustments not pre-announced to the public.  To avoid distortions in the exchange rate market, the BCB es at the official rate ±1 basis point. Nevertheless, dollar scarcity in Bolivia’s financial system that began in early 2023 has resulted in a black market for dollars, with an exchange rate that surpasses the official peg.						Remittance Policies						Each remittance transaction from Bolivia to other countries has a $2,500 limit per transaction, but there is no limit to the number of transactions that an individual can remit. Business travelers may bring up to $10,000 in cash into the country and any amount higher must be declared.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										Neither the Bolivian government nor any government-affiliated entity maintains a sovereign wealth fund.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						The Bolivian government focuses and spends heavily on SOE’s, owning and operating more than 60 businesses, including energy and mining companies, a telecommunications company, a satellite company, the nation’s second largest bank, and Bolivia’s main airline. Total profits from Bolivia’s state-owned enterprises have declined by 94% from 2014 to 2021 (from $7.1 billion to $413 million).  Many of these companies have been operating at a loss, constituting a burden on government’s finances.  In 2022 Bolivia created a coca leaf derivatives manufacturing company and an ecological oils industrial company to promote domestic biodiesel and pharmaceutical production. This is in line with Bolivia’s push to become less reliant on other nations by shifting towards an import-substitution model. The resources and infrastructure are not yet in place, however, to make this a feasible short-term goal.The largest SOEs can acquire credit from the Central Bank at very low interest rates and convenient terms.  Some private companies complain that it is impossible for them to compete with this financial subsidy.  Moreover, SOEs appear to benefit from easier access to licenses, supplies, materials, and land; however, there is no law specifically providing SOEs with preferential treatment in this regard.  In many cases, government entities are directed to do business with SOEs, placing other private companies and investors at a competitive disadvantage.																										Privatization Program										There are currently no privatization programs in Bolivia.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						Per the Constitution, economic activity cannot damage the collective good. The Mother Earth Law, rooted in indigenous principles, also promotes elements of responsible business conduct (RBC), such as collective good, harmony, respect, and defense of rights.  However, the government gives no advantage to businesses that implement RBC practices. Both producers and consumers in Bolivia are generally aware of RBC, but consumer decisions are ultimately based on price and quality. The Bolivian government does require financial entities to allocate six percent of profits to RBC-related projects.Bolivia is not part of the OECD and does not use the OECD Guidelines for RBC.  Bolivian companies and organizations focus on the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and they use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) methodology to show economic, social, and environmental results.  However, only a few private companies and NGOs follow the UN standard ISO 26000 guidelines and methodologies.  A widely accepted methodology in Bolivia, developed by the ETHOS Institute, provides measurable indicators accepted by PLARSE (Programa Latinoamericano de Responsabilidad Social Corporativa), the Latin American Program for RBC.The government created the Authorities of Supervision and Social Control to oversee and audit telecommunications and transportation, water and sanitation, forests and land, pensions, electricity, and enterprises.  These authorities can request public disclosure of information, ranging from financial disclosures to investigation of management decisions. In support of consumer protection rights, the government also established the Ministry of Justice and Transparency, and the Consumer Protection Law to manage customer complaints.																										Additional Resources										Department of StateCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices ( https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/)Trafficking in Persons Report ( https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/)Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ( https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/due-diligence-guidance/)U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ( https://www.state.gov/u-s-national-contact-point-for-the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises/)Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory ( https://www.state.gov/xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory/)Department of the TreasuryOFAC Recent Actions ( https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions )Department of LaborFindings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings  )List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ( https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods )Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World ( https://www.dol.gov/general/apps/ilab )Comply Chain ( https://www.dol.gov/ilab/complychain/ )																																				Climate Issues										Under the Mother Earth Law, the Ministry of Environment and Water oversees climate change mitigation. Bolivia’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) include increasing water, energy, forest, and agriculture capacities. Bolivian land laws, however, indirectly promote deforestation since all unproductive lands must be reverted to the government, and forests are deemed unproductive. Property owners either convert these lands to a more productive use, such as for agriculture, or risk having the government take that property away.In its NDCs, Bolivia commits to increase renewable energy use to 81 percent by 2030. However, Bolivia does not have a fossil-fuel phase out policy nor does it offer regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve biodiversity or other ecological benefits. Public procurement policies do not include environmental and green growth considerations. Although too early to determine, the current administration’s push for import-substitution, with increased local biofuel production, could result in more environmentally friendly methods of consumption in the future.																																												9. Corruption						    																						Bolivian law stipulates criminal penalties for corruption by officials. Bribery of public officials is a criminal offense. Laws also exist that provide protection for citizens filing complaints against corruption. In 2022, the UN special rep for judicial affairs issued a report on Bolivia stating corruption was identified as “a serious problem” and a “national challenge.”  Corruption cases against pro-government public officials are rarely allowed to proceed.In August 2021, the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI) stated the Bolivian government needs to implement profound reforms in its justice system to: guarantee that the judiciary and attorney general’s office are not used for political purposes by the government in power; guarantee due process; and ensure preventive detention is only used as a last resort in criminal proceedings. In 2023, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS) will observe Bolivia’s compliance with GIEI recommendations.Bolivia ratified the UN Anticorruption Convention in 2005.  Bolivia is also party to the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption.  Bolivia is not a signatory of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.																										Resources to Report Corruption										Contact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption:Susana RiosVice Minister of Transparency and the Fight Against CorruptionMinistry of Justice and Institutional TransparencyCalle Capitan Ravelo Esq. Montevideo N. 2101 Piso 8, La Paz+591-2-2158900ministeriodetransparencia@gmail.com There are no international, regional, local, or nongovernmental organizations operating in the country that monitor corruption. Transparency International, a leading global indicator of public sector corruption, ranked Bolivia 126 out of 180 countries in its 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index.																																												10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Bolivia is prone to social unrest and protests, which can include violence.  Given the country’s reliance on a few key thoroughfares, conflict often disrupts transportation and distribution networks. Political tensions in Bolivia are high, with opposition to the ruling MAS party protesting political persecution, police regression, and judicial bias. Civil disturbances related to domestic issues are common: usually workers pressuring the government for concessions by marching or closing major transportation arteries.While Bolivia has low levels of personal crime, with a homicide rate well below the regional average, there is a growing concern about increased criminality, especially a recent increase in femicides. Production of coca leaf is legal in Bolivia for traditional consumption, but the country is a known source and transit country for cocaine and other illicit drugs mostly destined for Brazil and Europe, but that may also find their way to the United States.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						Approximately two-thirds of Bolivia’s population is considered “economically active.”  Between 60 and 80 percent of workers participate in the informal economy, where no contractual employer-employee relationship exists.  Relatively low education and literacy levels limit labor productivity, a fact reflected in wage rates.  Unskilled labor is readily available, but skilled workers are often harder to find. The government encourages hiring of nationals by limiting the number of foreign nationals employed by any business to 15 percent.Bolivia has no unemployment insurance or employment-related social, safety net programs.  However, if an employee is laid off due to economic or technical reasons, employers are required to pay three months of salary as compensation.  Employees generally have more negotiating leverage in Bolivia than employers, and many employers choose to pay additional compensation to avoid retaliation.Labor laws provide for the freedom of association, the right to strike, and the right to organize and bargain collectively. The Ministry of Labor has labor-related conflict resolution mechanisms, but these processes are skewed towards employees.  If parties cannot reach an agreement, employees are able to initiate legal proceedings. The National Labor Court handles complaints of antiunion discrimination, but rulings generally take a year or more.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs						    																						The DFC is not currently active in Bolivia.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmountHost Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2021$40,7002021$40,400www.worldbank.org/en/country Foreign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2021N/A2020$300 MBEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)2021N/A2020$21MBEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/ Total inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP2021$59420211.5%UNCTAD data available at https://unctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report   * Source for Host Country Data:Table 3: Sources and Destination of FDIDirect Investment from/in Counterpart Economy DataFrom Top Five Sources/To Top Five Destinations (US Dollars, Millions)Inward Direct InvestmentOutward Direct InvestmentTotal InwardAmount100%Total OutwardAmount100%Spain246724.9%The Netherlands41946.7%Peru141513.3%Peru748.2%Sweden138613.0%Brazil717.9%The Netherlands8838.3%Panama677.5%France5214.9%Canada383.1%&#8220;0&#8221; reflects amounts rounded to +/- USD 500,000.																																		14. Contact for More Information:						    																						CommerceLapaz@state.gov																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											The Bahamas											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nepal											Netherlands											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Philippines											Peru											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Anti-Trust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																																							Additional Resources																																																						Climate Issues																																																			9. Corruption																																							Resources to Report Corruption																																																			10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information:																						Tags																					Bolivia																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
- Press briefing with Todd D. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D.  Robinson, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D. Robinson. Assistant Secretary Robinson will discuss outcomes from Friday’s virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats as well as next steps for the global coalition.  This coalition seeks to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs, identify emerging drug trends, and respond effectively to their public health impacts. As a reminder, today’s briefing is on the record.  And with that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Robinson. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you for joining this call today and for the opportunity to discuss the collective efforts we have undertaken to confront the important issue of synthetic drugs. Last Friday, as you know, Secretary Blinken hosted a virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.  Nearly 100 countries and international organizations participated in the launch, underscoring the shared concern about this public health and national security threat.  The coalition aims to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to combat the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  Together, we hope to strengthen efforts to prevent the production and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, identify emerging synthetic drug trends and use patterns, and promote efforts to respond effectively to the public health impacts they impose. Participants at the ministerial underscored the importance of sharing data and increasing efforts to mitigate the health impact of synthetic drug use.  As you all already know, synthetic drugs such as fentanyl and methamphetamine pose a grave risk to the health and security of our citizens here in the United States.  The consequences of these drugs are devastating as evidenced by the alarming statistics. In 2022, the CDC estimated that nearly 110,000 Americans lost their lives to drug overdoses.  Recognizing the gravity of this situation, the Biden administration is fully committed to preventing drug use and minimizing its negative impact.  We understand the importance of connecting individuals to treatment and supporting the more than 20 million Americans in recovery.  President Biden’s National Drug Control Strategy has allocated a substantial $24 billion dollars in this fiscal year to strengthen drug-related public health interventions.  These measures not only safeguard the health of our citizens, but also exemplify our dedication at home as we look to other nations to also take action. It is vital to note that these dangers are not limited to the United States.  More countries than ever are facing an increasing threat from synthetic drugs like tramadol, Captagon, MDMA, and Ketamine.  Criminals are constantly innovating to create new synthetic drugs, adjusting formulas to avoid international controls and domestic regulations, and creating new demand.   One staggering number to note:  Over the past decade, more than 1,100 new synthetic drugs were detected and reported by the United Nations.  Through the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, we are harnessing international cooperation and shared knowledge to tackle this crisis head on.  By working together, we can more effectively disrupt the illicit synthetic drug supply chains, enhance our ability to identify and respond to emerging threats, and protect the lives and well-being of our own citizens and of people around the world. The United States has already been working with partners like Mexico, Canada, and other countries to drive urgent global action to disrupt the synthetic drug trade from beginning to end.  We are engaging with countries such as India to strengthen our partnerships on securing pharmaceutical and chemical supply chains to prevent criminal diversion of dual-use precursor chemicals, and we remain committed to engaging with the PRC to address the threat illicit synthetic drugs pose to our countries.  The Department of State also works within the UN, the Organization of American States, the G7, G20, and other organizations to improve the abilities of our countries to detect and disrupt the illicit manufacturing, diversion, and trafficking of precursor chemicals and finished drugs.   We have more important work to do, so in closing, let me express my gratitude to our international partners who have already joined us in this crucial endeavor.  The fight against synthetic drugs requires a global response, and we are confident that our collective efforts will yield significant results.  Together, we can create a safer and healthier future for our citizens and generations to come.   Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.   MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  For those on the English line asking questions, please limit yourself to one question related to the topic of today’s briefing.  If you submitted your question in advance, I have incorporated the question into the queue.  Our first question today we received from Daniel – from Jim Carson of La Jornada in Mexico:  “What specific will be new out of this declaration?  Are you setting up a FinCEN-type structure to share information, do evaluations, and a secretariat, or is it simply a reiteration of past commitments without any specific additional actions?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  The first thing I would say is we are – we are building on what we have done in the past and what has been done by other countries in the past.  The coalition is intended to be an inclusive forum for sharing best practices and identifying areas for collaboration to improve the global response to public health and security threats posed by synthetic drugs.  We ask that countries commit to working collaboratively with other coalition member countries at both political and technical levels to develop a joint framework for addressing synthetic drugs and develop actions in line with that framework.  Thanks.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We received a question from journalist Fernando Morales from Red Salvadoreña de Medios in El Salvador: “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry.  Could you say that again?  MODERATOR:  Absolutely, Assistant Secretary.  “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?&#8221; ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  As our correspondent will note, the United States Government on several different levels is working with members of the civilian security forces in El Salvador and throughout the region – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – on things like investigations, going after the trafficking networks.  We have experts on the ground from DEA and the Department of Justice.   We also work on training.  As the correspondent will note, there is an International Law Enforcement Academy hosted by the Government of El Salvador where we can do training for police and prosecutors in the region on different techniques and modernized techniques for going after these networks.  So those are ways that we are – those are ways that we are trying to get after these – shut down these corridors.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question will go to Jesús Esquivel from Proceso Magazine in Mexico.  Jesús, please unmute yourself.   QUESTION:  Hello.  Can you hear me?   MODERATOR:  Yes.  Please ask your question.  &#8212;    QUESTION:  Okay.  Yes.  Under Secretary, there has always been the accusations that the Mexican cartels are responsible for all the synthetic drugs in the United States, but as you probably know, the domestic cartels in the U.S. are also responsible for the distributions and sale of these drugs.   My question to you is:  What exactly or when exactly the U.S. Government for the first time is going to be exposing the domestic cartels in this problem and in the United States?  And also, if you think the accusations as – members of the U.S. Congress made to Mexico and threats that they probably going to invade Mexico to stop the drug trafficking, it will help in this global coalition in the case of – specifically of Mexico to cooperate with the U.S. Government?   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, Jesús.  Both good questions.  Look, first of all, I would – I would not exactly support the premise of your question.  We have never said that all of the fentanyl or synthetic opioids that are coming to the United States are coming from Mexico.  We know that this is a global – a global effort by cartels from different regions around the world, including criminals in the United States.  I don’t think the FBI or the Department of Justice or our local law enforcement authorities have been shy about exposing the criminal networks in the United States that are trafficking in these drugs.  I think they will continue to publicly expose them when available.  So that’s thing number one. Thing number two, we have – the United States has an excellent relationship with our counterparts in Mexico.  We are both working very close to go after the networks in Mexico, to increase our cooperation on both sides of our southwest border, your northern border.  And we are working together internationally to share our experiences with working together with other countries around the world.  I’m very proud of our relationship with our Mexican counterparts, and we’re going to continue to call on them as they call on us to work together to do more to stop – to stop this global trafficking of synthetic drugs. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Robison.  The next question will go to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Adyr, please unmute yourself.  Go ahead.  Adyr, can you hear us?   Okay, unfortunately we’re going to have to move on.  I see we have a submitted question in our Q&amp;A from Brendan O’Boyle from Reuters in Mexico City: “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded alarm about fentanyl spreading in drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry, can you repeat that question again? MODERATOR:  Sure, sir.  “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded the alarm about fentanyl spreading in the drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  The short answer is I believe the Government of Mexico has recognized the short-term spread of synthetic opioids.  We are – and – but there’s a very good relationship between our Office of National Drug Control Policy and the secretary for Health in Mexico.  They are working very closely together on campaigns to raise awareness about synthetic opioids and what can be done to avoid falling into – into that addiction.  So we feel like we have a burgeoning story to tell, a better story to tell as we go forward on our cooperation on the messaging against the domestic – in Mexico, the domestic spread of the – and growth of the use of synthetic opioids. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I’m told we’ve resolved the microphone issues with Adyr Corral, so we’ll go back to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Please unmute yourself. QUESTION:  Hi.  You can hear me? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Yes. MODERATOR:  We can hear you. QUESTION:  Ah, thank you very much.  Sorry for the problems.  I would like to ask the assistant secretary for a comment on the initiative to designate the fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction in Congress.  How about that, Assistant Secretary? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, great question.  We have currently – the Department of Justice, DEA, FBI, Department of State – we feel like we have the authorities necessary to go after the networks that are trafficking in these drugs.  At the moment, we don’t see that classifying fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction will give us any more authority than we already have to try to stop its trafficking.  So we feel pretty comfortable that we’re in a good place in terms of having the tools necessary to go after the drug and to go after the networks that are trafficking the drugs.  QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question was submitted in advance from Juan Silva from W Radio in Colombia:  “How do you assess the current situation in Colombia in terms of the fight against drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, as the correspondent, as Juan will know, we have a very long, very strong, very deep relationship with Colombia and Colombia’s security forces that has developed over a number of years.  We feel like we are – we have developed into great partners.  Colombia has become a net exporter of security globally, and that is in large part due to the very strong relationship that has developed with the United States.   Today we continue in that effort.  There are areas where we are hoping to start working – new areas where we are starting to – we want to begin working with the Petro government, and we are in constant conversation with Petro and his team to figure out how we can best help them bring greater security and safety to communities in Colombia, and by doing so, help shut down the networks that are trafficking drugs north to the United States.  Thanks.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.   Our next question we received from Eduard Ribas from EFE:  “What responsibility does China have on the trafficking of fentanyl precursors?  How can this coalition be successful without Chinese participation?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say the – we know good things happen when China is involved in conversations like this.  You will recall in 2019 the Chinese Government scheduled fentanyl and made it much harder to get out of the country directly and be shipped directly to other countries.  And when they did that, the trafficking of fentanyl itself in the United States from China went to almost zero.  So we think that there’s a lot more that can be done by the PRC in terms of greater monitoring and labeling and information-sharing on the precursor chemicals that are leaving the PRC, and they – we invited them to join the coalition.  We expect at some point that they will take us up on our invitation because they want to be responsible, a responsible country in this effort.  And we all know that they play – that there are companies in China that play an important role in the distribution of the precursor chemicals that go into making these drugs.  Over.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We have time for about two more questions.  One was submitted in advance from a journalist in Guyana regarding CARICOM, Denis Chabrol from Demarara Waves Online News:  “How badly are Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations affected by synthetic drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you.  Again, this is a – that’s a great question.  I would say although we haven’t seen significant production in the Caribbean, it’s important to note that criminal chemists can easily synthesize fentanyl almost anywhere.  The Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats will provide a foundation for developing and implementing effective, practical solutions to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  It will help detect emerging drug threats, and we hope it will help respond to the – to their public health impacts.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you.  I see in the chat the journalist had added:  “What do we expect from CARICOM and what assistance the U.S. can provide?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, actually, I would turn it around.  The question should be:  What more can CARICOM countries do?  And I think, again, when we talk about things like exchanging information, when we talk about things like making sure that they are getting access, making sure their communities are getting access to the antidotes for overdoses, making sure that they are reporting to the international organizations that are collecting information that everybody else can use – those are the things that that we would hope we could get from countries that are involved in the global coalition.  And the United States and the international community will continue to help with training and equipping those police forces and prosecutors that are working on this issue.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We had a question from Martin Villena from Andina News Agency in Peru:  “Concerning the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, does its launch also mean strengthening even more relations with countries such as Peru and Colombia, which face the issue and the related problems concerning cocaine productions in their territories?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, we’re always working to strengthening – strengthening the relationship with our good friends in Peru and Colombia.  But in fact, again, we will – what the establishment of this coalition is looking to do is to have our friends from Peru and Colombia share their experiences with other countries around the world and help other countries who don’t have the expertise that our countries do, help them address the issues in their countries.  We have great relationships with our partners in Peru and Colombia; I don’t expect that will change.  But we will – in the establishment of this coalition, we will be asking them to do more to help on a global level.  Over.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We received a question from Carrie Kahn with NPR:  “How do proposals from some Republicans in the United States urging military intervention to stop fentanyl trafficking in Mexico affect your plans to enlist global partners?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say we’re going to let Congress – the Senate and the House – develop and debate their own ideas.  We are going to – I am focused on working with our civilian security partners globally, making sure that they have the training, the equipment, the strategies; making sure they have access to the expertise necessary to focus on what is our responsibility, which is providing civilian security to our communities, both in the United States and around and world. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I believe we’ve gone through all the questions that we had today, so that will conclude today’s briefing.  I wanted to thank you for joining us today, as well as all of the journalists on the line for their questions.  If you have any follow-up questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  An English recording and transcript will be available for this briefing, as well as transcripts in Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese.  Thank you so much and have a good day. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thanks.  Thanks, everybody. 
- Bolivia HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Bolivia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Bolivia																																					Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons																																																																																																				 In this section										/																							BOLIVIA (Tier 2 Watch List)																																													BOLIVIA (Tier 2 Watch List)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								BOLIVIA (Tier 2 Watch List)				The Government of Bolivia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.  These efforts included adopting a new NAP for the elimination of trafficking and reportedly sentencing three traffickers who had been in pretrial detention since 2016.  However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period.  Officials did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting traffickers and did not report identifying or referring victims to care.  Therefore Bolivia was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison time.Provide victim protection services for all trafficking victims nationwide, including men and boys, and reopen the shelter for child victims of trafficking in La Paz.Fund and implement the 2021-2025 NAP.Appoint specialized labor inspectors and train all labor inspectors on victim identification and criminal referral of forced labor cases.Expand training of officials on the use of established protocols for the proactive identification of trafficking victims among vulnerable populations and for the referral of victims to care services.Amend the anti-trafficking law to ensure that a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion is not required to constitute a child sex trafficking offense.Screen displaced Venezuelan migrants for trafficking indicators, including individuals in commercial sex and those working in high-risk sectors.Develop and implement a centralized data collection system on trafficking to reconcile duplicative data stored across different systems.Direct Ministry of Health staff to screen vulnerable populations for trafficking indicators when conducting medical screenings.Provide interpreters to assist law enforcement officials investigating child sex tourism cases in popular tourist locations.Increase the time law enforcement officials serve in anti-trafficking units to preserve institutional knowledge.Expedite the issuance of humanitarian visas for victims of trafficking.Train officials on the difference between migrant smuggling and human trafficking.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government decreased prosecution efforts.  Authorities did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting cases of trafficking, making it difficult to assess progress.  Law 263 of 2012 – the Comprehensive Law against Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons – criminalized labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking through amendments to Bolivia’s Criminal Code and prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for adult trafficking and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for child trafficking.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties for other serious crimes, such as rape.  Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, the definition of trafficking under Article 281-bis required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking.  Article 281-bis defined trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation, the sale of organs, and unlawful biomedical research.  Article 321 of the Criminal Code criminalized pimping using force, fraud, or coercion and was used to prosecute sex trafficking crimes.  The law prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving adults, 12 to 18 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving children ages 14 to 18, and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving children younger than 14, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.  Article 321 did not require a showing of force, fraud, or coercion for victims younger than 14 years of age but did require a demonstration of such means for offenses involving children ages 14 to 17.  Additionally, Article 322 criminalized the purchase of sex with a minor and prescribed penalties of eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for crimes involving victims 14 to 17 years of age.  Penalties increased by one-third for crimes involving children younger than 14.  While the Criminal Code included separate criminal offenses for trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, one government agency was responsible for both crimes, and that agency often conflated the two crimes in its collection of data and response to perpetrators and potential trafficking victims.Authorities did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any traffickers, compared with the previous reporting period when officials reported 419 open complaints filed with the national police, 62 trafficking investigations, 22 trafficking prosecutions (12 for sex trafficking, five for labor trafficking, and five for other forms of servitude), and 12 trafficking convictions (five for sex trafficking and seven for labor trafficking).  The media indicated authorities had received 420 trafficking-related complaints in the first seven months of 2022.The government had specialized prosecutors in all nine departments focused on human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases; however, according to civil society organizations these prosecutors also prosecuted other crimes.  Officials did not provide information on the activities of the specialized prosecutors in 2022.  Authorities did not have dedicated funding to combat trafficking crimes, and only 0.5 percent of the federal budget was devoted for the entire judicial system, which left entities combating trafficking crimes depleted and heavily under resourced.  In previous years, the majority of arrested suspects, including traffickers, served time in pre-trial detention without ever receiving a final sentence and often avoided justice by paying bribes to corrupt officials to avoid prosecution.  In 2022, the media reported authorities convicted three traffickers prescribing 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment – after serving six years in pre-trial detention – for their role in a trafficking ring based out of two popular nightclubs located in La Paz and Santa Cruz.  General backlogs in the judiciary, insufficient resources and personnel, and inadequate training of law enforcement officials hindered effective law enforcement efforts.  In addition, police officials rotated into new positions every three months to one year, resulting in a cyclical loss of institutional knowledge and impeding specialization in the investigation of trafficking crimes.Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action.  The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes.  Civil society organizations reported low-level official complicity in trafficking crimes persisted.  According to stakeholders, the government, with the support of international organizations, trained law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on human trafficking investigations and prosecutions.  Authorities did not report coordinating with foreign governments to investigate trafficking cases, assist victims, or when appropriate, repatriate them.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government decreased protection efforts.  Officials did not report identifying, protecting, or referring trafficking victims to care, compared with identifying 594 trafficking victims in 2021.  An NGO reported authorities referred an unknown number of victims to care in 2022.  NGOs noted a significant increase in Venezuelan trafficking victims and cases of trafficking facilitated by a Venezuelan transnational criminal gang.  The government had a victim identification protocol and NRM; however, authorities did not report using the protocol to identify or refer victims.  The government’s overlapping legal framework and understanding of human trafficking and related crimes limited victim identification efforts.  Authorities confused human trafficking with other crimes, such as general labor exploitation, sexual abuse, and migrant smuggling, hindering their ability to identify trafficking victims.  Authorities from the Ministry of Health did not receive training on victim identification and did not screen for trafficking indicators despite periodically administering medical tests to individuals in commercial sex, a population vulnerable to sex trafficking.There were five specialized shelters that could assist female trafficking victims, including three located and funded by department-level authorities in Cochabamba, Potosi, and Santa Cruz, and two NGO-operated shelters in La Paz.  A sixth shelter in La Paz for underage female trafficking victims was not operational.  Law enforcement officials were often unable to secure safe accommodations for trafficking victims, particularly in departments without multi-use facilities.  Law enforcement officers could provide support for temporary stays in hotels.  The government did not report providing specialized services to adult male victims but could provide basic assistance for them at migrant shelters.  Authorities could refer underage male trafficking victims to NGOs, private shelters, and religious and faith-based organizations for assistance, but it did not report doing so during the reporting period.The government had several mechanisms to encourage victims to cooperate in cases against traffickers, but officials did not report using these during the reporting period.  Foreign victims who assisted in the case against traffickers could receive a humanitarian visa, but the process often took years, and victims could not work during that time.  While authorities did not report how many trafficking victims received humanitarian visas, if any, NGOs reported authorities treated foreign trafficking victims fairly and according to legal standards; foreign victims had access to the same services as Bolivian victims.  According to civil society organizations, government officials worked with their foreign counterparts to facilitate repatriation in a timely fashion when victims sought that remedy.  The government had a protocol for the repatriation of victims identified abroad but did not report repatriating any victims, compared with repatriating 20 Bolivian victims in 2021.  The government had Gesell chambers in every department, and in lieu of testifying in person, victims could provide recorded testimony or submit a written statement to the court.  Under Bolivian law, victims and prosecutors could request restitution for damages from the sentencing judge.  When victims did not participate in the case against the traffickers, they or prosecutors could still file restitution claims within three months of sentencing.  The government did not report whether any victim or prosecutor sought restitution in trafficking cases.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained prevention efforts.  The Plurinational Council against Human Trafficking and Smuggling, chaired by the Ministry of Justice, was responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts at the national level and met 17 times.  Two sub-ministerial units were responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts at the technical level.  In 2022, the government – with the support of international organizations and civil society actors – approved the 2021-2025 NAP, which focused on prevention of the crime, victim protection and care, prosecution of traffickers, and the improvement of international and national coordination.  According to observers, officials shared the plan with all nine departments but did not report dedicating funding for its implementation.  An international organization and civil society contacts reported authorities were working on updating the anti-trafficking law.  According to stakeholders, some of the changes would establish a funding mechanism for victim protection services, expropriation of assets of convicted traffickers, improve efforts to distinguish between trafficking and smuggling crimes, and include the Ministries of Defense and Public Works into the interinstitutional committee for the fight against trafficking.  In the past, observers noted a lack of interagency coordination, in part due to overlapping mandates.  The government had a federal registry of employment agencies; authorities required all agencies to be registered and provide the Ministry of Labor (MOL) with all recruitment and job placement records.  However, authorities did not report reviewing or investigating any applications that raised trafficking concerns.  The MOL conducted inspections in 2022, but officials did not report identifying any victims of forced labor.  Labor authorities reported conducting awareness campaigns to educate the public on the worst forms of child labor, which likely included trafficking crimes against children.  Authorities did not report training officials on the identification of victims of forced labor.  Authorities in the La Paz metropolitan area maintained a hotline for citizens and victims to report trafficking crimes.  However, observers noted concern over the functionality of the hotline, as no one answered when they called.  The autonomous department of Cochabamba launched a new hotline to report trafficking crimes.  Authorities did not report identifying any victims or starting any investigations as a result of calls to the hotlines.  The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.  The Institute for Normalization of Quality, a semi-autonomous government agency, operated a “triple seal” certification program for sugar producers whose final products were certified to be free of child labor, discrimination, and forced labor.  In January 2022, authorities issued the triple seal to the largest sugar producer in the country, responsible for 40 percent of the market.  This was the second sugar producer to receive the triple seal since the creation of the certification.  The media reported 80 percent of the exported and 60 percent of the internal sugar market were free from child labor, discrimination, and forced labor.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Bolivia, and traffickers exploit victims from Bolivia abroad.  Traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and children in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country and abroad.  To a more limited extent, traffickers exploited women from neighboring countries, including Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay, in sex trafficking in Bolivia.  Traffickers exploit an increasing number of Venezuelan victims in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country.  According to a 2022 report from the Ombudsman’s Office, 63 percent of victims identified were female, and 28 percent were male.  In 2021, authorities reported a notable surge in the number of Venezuelan and Haitian victims of sex trafficking and forced labor in the country.  Traffickers subject some migrants from The Gambia, Venezuela, Chile, and the Caribbean traveling to or through Bolivia to sex trafficking and forced labor.  Child sex tourists exploited children in sex trafficking in rural Indigenous communities in the north of the La Paz department, in and around the city of Rurrenabaque, and in tourist areas in the departments of La Paz and Beni, openly advertising to tourists speaking Hebrew and Arabic.  Rural and poor Bolivians, most of whom are Indigenous, and LGBTQI+ youth are particularly at risk for sex and labor trafficking.  Bolivian women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking within Bolivia and neighboring countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and Peru.  Rural to urban trafficking, including within departments, remains the most common form of domestic trafficking.  Within the country, traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and children in forced labor in domestic work, mining, ranching, and agriculture.  Forced criminality continues to be a problem; the media reported cases of children forced to commit crimes, such as robbery and drug production, and others exploited in forced begging.  In 2019, traffickers forced a Bolivian victim into criminality by compelling her to smuggle drugs into Malaysia.  Traffickers exploit Bolivians in forced labor in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in sweatshops, agriculture, brickmaking, domestic work, textile factories, and the informal sector.  Traffickers continue to use social media as the primary recruitment tool, luring vulnerable individuals with fraudulent employment opportunities and then exploiting them in forced labor or sex trafficking.  Civil society organizations noted a pattern of exploitation in which older trafficking victims became recruiters of younger victims.																																				    							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- La Paz, Bolivia: American Cooperative School: 2024 Special Needs Profile Office of Overseas SchoolsDownload the Special Needs Profile (La Paz- 2024 Special Needs- Bolivia) for this school to learn more about their capability to support students with exceptionalities.&nbsp;Founded in 1955, The American Cooperative School (ACS) of La Paz, Bolivia, is a private, nonprofit, non-denominational, coeducational international school offering an exceptional educational program for learners in preschool to grade 12. The school year is divided into two semesters extending from August to December and from January to June.This is intended to provide general information. Prospective users of the schools may wish to inquire further of A/OPR/OS or contact the school directly for more specific and up-to-the-minute information. Information and statistics are current as of December 2023 and provided by the school.NOTE: School situations can change quickly, particularly as schools face cutbacks to learning support programs due to the pandemic, unrest, and economic uncertainty. For the most current information, work with the REO and school. Information in this document was collected by the Department of State’s Office of Overseas Schools directly from the school in December 2023 and shows the availability of services rather than an assessment of the quality of the services. The profile is intended as a jumping off point for a conversation with the REO and school to understand the best fit for your child. Definitions may vary school to school.
- Bolivia HomeReportsOffice of International Religious Freedom2022 Report on International Religious Freedom&#8230;Bolivia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bolivia																																					Office of International Religious Freedom																																																																																							Download Report																																																																																	 In this section										/																							Executive Summary																																													Executive Summary																															Section I. Religious Demography																																																																																		Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																																									Legal Framework																																																																											Government Practices																																																																																	Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																																																		Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																																																																								Executive Summary				The constitution stipulates the state is independent of religion and provides for “freedom of thought, spirituality, religion, and worship, expressed individually or collectively, in public and in private.” The constitution and other laws accord educational institutions the right to teach religion, including Indigenous spiritual belief classes.Reportedly, administrative and COVID-19 delays slowed the implementation and enforcement of a 2019 religious freedom law that created a clear distinction between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious organizations. According to media outlets, Roman Catholic bishops advocated for including the question of religious identity in the national census, which the government opposed. On December 2, the government instituted a census law and announced the census would be held in March 2024. The law did not address whether religious identity would be included in the census.In November, during the Bolivian Episcopal Conference (BEC) of Catholic Bishops’ annual assembly in Cochabamba, the bishops called for the cessation of societal tensions surrounding debates on the planned national census and for a national project that represents all sectors of society.During the year, U.S. embassy officials were unable to meet with government officials to discuss religious freedom issues because the government said it considered the issue part of its “internal affairs.” Embassy representatives regularly engaged religious leaders to underscore the importance of religious tolerance and freedom. In September, the Chargé d’Affaires met with religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Sikh, Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish communities to discuss religious freedom issues and encourage religious leaders to engage in interfaith dialogue. Throughout the year, embassy officials, including the Chargé, met individually with leaders of the Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and Mennonite communities to discuss the state of religious freedom.																														Section I.													 Religious Demography												    																																															The U.S. government estimates the total population at 12 million (midyear 2022).  According to U.S. government figures, 70 percent of the population identifies as Catholic; 14.5 percent as evangelical Protestant; 6.6 percent as none; 3.5 percent as other; 2.5 percent as Seventh-day Adventist; 1.2 percent as members of The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (Church of Jesus Christ); and the remainder as unspecified, agnostic, or atheist.  According to the local leader of the Church of Jesus Christ, approximately 300,000 followers reside in the country; the Church of Jesus Christ’s central website estimates more than 200,000 followers.  Approximately 5 percent of the population identifies with smaller religious groups, and 5 percent self-identify as nonbelievers.  Approximately 70,000 Mennonites live in the lowland province of Santa Cruz, according to community leaders.  There are approximately 1,500 Muslims and 450 Jews, according to leaders of the respective faiths and news reports.  Many Indigenous communities, concentrated in rural areas, practice a mix of Catholic and Indigenous spiritual traditions.																																					Section II.													 Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																																Legal Framework										According to the constitution, as amended in 2009, the state respects and provides for “freedom of thought, spirituality, religion and worship,” expressed individually or collectively, in public and in private. The constitution stipulates the state is independent of all religion. The 2009 constitution removed the Roman Catholic Church’s previous status as the country’s official religion.The constitution prohibits religious discrimination, including access to educational institutions, health services, and employment, and protects the right of access to public sport and recreational activities without regard to religion.The law governing religious freedom and religious and spiritual organizations creates a clear distinction between NGOs and religious organizations. Under the law, religious organizations are constituted to practice, profess, and teach their specific faith or religion, while NGOs have no such faith-based ties. The religious freedom law requires all religious or spiritual organizations to inform the government of all financial, legal, social, and religious activities. The law regulates religious or spiritual organizations’ finances and labor practices by requiring their use of funds exclusively to achieve the organization’s objectives, banning the distribution of money among members, subjecting all employees to national labor laws, requiring the organizations to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and compelling them to pay taxes. Pursuant to a concordat with the Holy See, the Catholic Church is exempt from registration.Religious organizations must submit 14 documentary requirements to register with the government. These include notarized legal documents, including statutes, internal regulations and procedures; rental agreement documents, utility invoices for the place(s) of worship, and a site map; detailed information on board members and legal representatives, including criminal background checks; an INTERPOL certificate for foreigners; proof of fiscal solvency; organization chart, with names, addresses, identification card numbers, and photographs; a full list of members and identifying information; details on activities and services provided by the organization, including the location of the services; and information on their financing source(s), domestic and foreign.The requirements for classification as a spiritual organization or religious organization vary slightly, but the government requires essentially the same type of information from both spiritual and religious entities. The constitution defines a spiritual organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves to carry out practices that develop their spirituality according to their ancestral worldview. Most spiritual organizations are Indigenous in their origins. The constitution defines a religious organization as a group of natural, national, and/or foreign persons who organize themselves with the purpose of carrying out practices of worship and/or belief around a Supreme Being to develop their spirituality and religiosity, and whose purpose does not pursue profit.The government may revoke a spiritual or religious organization’s operating license for noncompliance with the registration requirements if the organization does not produce an annual report of activities for more than two consecutive years; does not comply with its stated objectives; carries out activities different from those established in its statutes; or carries out activities contrary to the country’s constitution, laws, morality, or “good customs.” A religious or spiritual organization may also lose its operating license if it does not comply with the deadline for renewing the license. The government may not deny legal recognition to any organization based on its articles of faith.The fees to obtain an operating license differ between “religious organizations” and “spiritual organizations” at costs of 6,780 bolivianos ($990) and 4,068 bolivianos ($590), respectively.The constitution and other laws provide educational institutions the option to teach religion classes, including Indigenous spiritual belief classes, with the stated aim of encouraging mutual respect among religious communities. While religion classes are optional, schools must teach ethics with curriculum materials that promote religious tolerance. The government does not restrict religious teaching in public or private schools, and it does not restrict a student from attending private, religiously affiliated schools. The law also requires all schools to accept students regardless of their religious affiliation.The country is a party to the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.																																				Government Practices										Religious leaders and other sources said the government had not completely implemented or enforced the religious freedom law that was passed in 2019, particularly aspects pertaining to the registration requirement, due to the political fluidity in the country and prolonged restrictions related to administrative delays and COVID-19.Members of the evangelical Protestant community continued to say several smaller religious communities formed congregations that held services at unofficial worship locations and conducted other activities without registering. These smaller communities continued to refuse to register their organizations because, according to sources, they preferred not to provide the government with access to internal information. Sources stated these unregistered groups still could neither own property nor hold bank accounts in their organization’s name; instead, money for a group was generally held in a bank account controlled by the leader’s family.According to the MFA’s Office of Religion and Nongovernmental Organizations, there were approximately 680 registered groups listed under the requirements of the religious freedom law, compared with 648 groups in 2021, and an additional 40 groups with a registration request in process with the MFA.Religious groups said the registration process generally took four to six months to complete, and most organizations complied with the registration requirement. In November 2021, MFA officials stated they were working on a system to digitize the registration process to reduce the timeline to one to two months; however, the government had not completed the process by year’s end.During the year, Catholic leaders reported that despite political differences between the government and the church, the government refrained from issuing harsh statements against the church, which it had done in 2020 and 2021.According to media reports, Catholic bishops advocated for including the question of religious identity in the national census, which the government opposed. BEC leadership said that excluding information on religious affiliation in the census violated the constitution because individuals had the right to be educated in accordance with their faith. A June BEC statement said, “As [the] Catholic Church, we once again ask that the question about the religion that each person professes be included.” The BEC called for “a transparent and inclusive census.” During Mass in late October, the Archbishop of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Rene Leigue Cesari, urged both the government and the political opposition to resolve their differences regarding the scheduled date of the national census. Following Mass, the Archbishop and other clergy led a procession through the streets of Santa Cruz calling for peace. On December 2, the government instituted a census law and announced the census would be held in March 2024. The law did not address whether religious identity would be included in the census.In February, the BEC called for the government to provide medical care and a fair trial to former Interim President Añez, then in pretrial detention, and, in October, commented on the “poor state” of the justice system and democratic backsliding. The government did not respond to the BEC’s statements.According to one evangelical Protestant leader, his group prioritized engaging the government not to force doctors to perform abortions if doing so violated their religious beliefs.																																					Section III.													 Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom												    																																															In November, during the BEC’s annual assembly in Cochabamba, the Catholic bishops called for the cessation of societal tensions surrounding debates on the planned national census and for a national project that represents all sectors of society.  BEC President Pesoa, also the Apostolic Vicar of El Beni, stated, “The bishops of Bolivia call on all the Bolivian people, in the face of everything we are experiencing, in the face of the conflict that threatens us all, in the face of hatred, resentment, or intolerance that grows and that takes over our streets ... We call for sanity and for a sincere and fraternal dialogue in which we put aside hidden and irrational interests and sit down with a true and sincere desire to solve problems in a spirit of peace, understanding, and serene fraternity.”The Catholic Church remained involved in projects to help the poor, especially operating temporary shelters, including the shelter Casa de Acogida Julio Terrazas for migrants and victims of trafficking, as well as providing educational services.  The church provided the assistance regardless of the religion of the individuals it served.																																					Section IV.													 U.S. Government Policy and Engagement												    																																															During the year, embassy officials were unable to meet with government officials to discuss religious freedom issues because the government said it considered the issue part of its “internal affairs.”Embassy representatives regularly engaged religious leaders to underscore the importance of religious tolerance and freedom.  In September, the Chargé met with religious leaders from the evangelical Protestant, Sikh, Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish communities to discuss religious freedom issues and encourage religious leaders to engage in interfaith dialogue.  Throughout the year, embassy officials, including the Chargé, met individually with leaders of the Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and Mennonite communities to discuss the state of religious freedom.The embassy posted traditional greetings for Hannukah and Christmas on its Facebook page.																																				    							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Religious Demography																																																	Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom																																							Legal Framework																																																						Government Practices																																																			Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom																																																	Section IV. U.S. Government Policy and Engagement																																																							Tags																					Bolivia																								Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																								Office of International Religious Freedom																																Religious Freedom
- Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Santa Cruz Cooperative School: 2024 Special Needs Profile Office of Overseas SchoolsDownload Special Needs Profiles (Santa Cruz 2024 Special Needs- Bolivia,) for this school to learn more about their capability to support students with exceptionalities.The Santa Cruz Cooperative School is a private, coeducational day school, which offers an educational program from pre-kindergarten through grade 12 for students of all nationalities. The school was founded in 1959 and officially formed into a cooperative of parents in 1971. The school year comprises two semesters extending from the beginning of August to mid-December and from mid-January to the beginning of June. The school has maintained accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools since 1987, the Bolivian Ministry of Education since 1960, is a member of the American International Schools in the Americas (AMISA) and has been re-accredited by COGNIA in April 2019.This profile is intended to provide general information. Prospective users of the schools may wish to inquire further of A/OPR/OS or contact the school directly for more specific and up-to-the-minute information. Information and statistics are current as of December 2023 and provided by the school.NOTE: School situations can change quickly, particularly as schools face cutbacks to learning support programs due to the pandemic, unrest, and economic uncertainty. For the most current information, work with the REO and school. Information in this document was collected by the Department of State’s Office of Overseas Schools directly from the school in December 2023 and shows the availability of services rather than an assessment of the quality of the services. The profile is intended as a jumping off point for a conversation with the REO and school to understand the best fit for your child. Definitions may vary school to school.&nbsp;