In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-2349 

TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES

INCORPORATED, a Delaware

Corporation, doing business as

Teledyne Electronic Manufacturing

Services,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAJ SHEKAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 1392 — Ronald A. Guzman, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 23, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2016

Before BAUER, POSNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Teledyne Technologies, Inc. (“Teledyne”) obtained a temporary restraining order and, later, a

preliminary injunction against its former employee, Raj Shekar

(“Shekar”). Both required Shekar to return Teledyne’s equipment and electronic information, which he retained following
2 No. 15-2349 

his termination. Since Shekar refused to comply with either

order, Teledyne filed a motion for rule to show cause why

Shekar should not be held in contempt. The district court

granted the motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing.

Prior to the hearing, Shekar filed a motion to vacate the

preliminary injunction. 

Ultimately, the district court issued an order holding

Shekar in contempt and denying his motion to vacate the

preliminary injunction. Shekar appeals both rulings. 

I. BACKGROUND

On February 3, 2015,Teledyne terminatedShekar’s employment. On February 13, 2015, Teledyne filed a verified complaint for injunctive relief against Shekar in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

According to the verified complaint, as a Teledyne employee, Shekar had access to Teledyne’s servers, which

contained the company’s confidential information. After

Teledyne fired Shekar, Shekar “accessed or attempted to

access” Teledyne’s servers. There was also “a large data

transfer between Teledyne EMS’s server 20 and Shekar’s

laptop computer” on the day he was terminated. Further, in

the months prior to his termination, Shekar emailed Teledyne’s

confidential information to his personal email addresses and

saved it on his computer’s hard drive. 

In addition, Teledyne’s verified complaint states that

Shekar had worked from home and used equipment provided

by Teledyne. This included a “laptop computer, a VPN token,
No. 15-2349 3

a projector, and a printer/scanner.” After his termination,

Shekar refused to return any of the equipment.

Teledyne’s verified complaint names several causes of

action against Shekar, such as violations of the Computer

Fraud and Abuse Act, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, and the

Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Teledyne 1

sought injunctive relief that would require Shekar to return all

of Teledyne’s electronic information and equipment, as well as

produce his personal computers and electronic storage devices

to be inspected for Teledyne’s confidential information.

Teledyne also sought damages and other relief.

On February 17, 2015, the district court issued a temporary

restraining order requiring Shekar to return all of Teledyne’s

electronic information and equipment. It also ordered him to

identify in verified interrogatory responses all devices he

owned that were capable of storing electronic information.

Further, Shekar had to submit a declaration certifying that he

had returned all of Teledyne’s property, and that he had

retained all relevant devices and electronic information

without any alterations.

On March 5, 2015, Teledyne filed an amended motion for a

preliminary injunction. On March 10, 2015, the district court

held a hearing on the motion, which Shekar did not attend

(although the district court found that he had notice). The

district court granted Teledyne’s motion for the preliminary

injunction, noting that Shekar had “failed to comply with any

aspect of the [temporary restraining order].” Most of the

 The underlying case is still pending in the district court. 1
4 No. 15-2349 

preliminary injunction’s directives mirrored the earlier

temporary restraining order. But the preliminary injunction

also required Shekar to provide Teledyne with “unrestricted

access” to all of his devices that were capable of storing

electronic information.

On March 17, 2015, Teledyne filed a motion for rule to show

cause why the court should not hold Shekar in contempt for

violating the temporary restraining order and the preliminary

injunction. Teledyne argued that Shekar had refused to comply

with the preliminary injunction’s provisions. The district court

granted the motion and scheduled a hearing for April 30, 2015. 

On April 27, 2015, Shekar filed a motion to vacate the

preliminary injunction. He claimed that he did not receive

notice of either the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction until after the orders were entered. Shekar also

stated that his lawyer had turned over all of Teledyne’s

equipment that was in his possession and that he did not have

any of Teledyne’s electronic information. 

Following two evidentiary hearings, on June 17, 2015, the

district court entered a written order finding Shekar in contempt for violating the temporary restraining order and the

preliminary injunction. The district court found that Shekar

had violated both orders by not producing several of his

devices that were capable of storing electronic information (i.e.

his personal computer, at least three external hard drives, and

his Teledyne iPhone accompanied with the correct password),

by not turning over or accounting for all of Teledyne’s electronic information that he possessed, by not providing complete and truthful answers to Teledyne’s interrogatories, and
No. 15-2349 5

by not submitting a complete and truthful declaration of

compliance. In addition, the district court denied Shekar’s

motion to vacate the preliminary injunction because it found

that Shekar had actual notice of both the temporary restraining

order and the preliminary injunction. On June 24, 2015, Shekar

appealed the district court’s rulings.

II. DISCUSSION

Shekar argues that the district court abused its discretion in

holding him in contempt and erred in denying his motion to

vacate the preliminary injunction. Before we address themerits

of Shekar’s appeal, we must first determine whether we have

jurisdiction. 

In general, an order holding a party in civil contempt is not

appealable while the litigation is pending. E.g., SEC v.

McNamee, 481 F.3d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

There is an exception, however, in which we may have

jurisdiction if the order that the party in contempt violated is

itself appealable. Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Rimsat,

Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Whether a judgment of

civil contempt is appealable at the time entered, rather than

later ... depends on the appealability of the underlying order,

the order that the judgment of civil contempt is intended to

coerce the contemnor to obey.”). In this case, the district court

held Shekar in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. Further, the underlying litigation is still pending. As a

result, Shekar can only appeal the district court’s contempt

order if he can also appeal the preliminary injunction.

Congress granted federal appellate courts jurisdiction over

certain interlocutory appeals, as enumerated in 28 U.S.C.
6 No. 15-2349 

§ 1292(a). The statutory list includes “granting, continuing,

modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to

dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But

interlocutory appeals must still conform with Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4. Erb v. All. Capital Mgmt., L.P., 423 F.3d

647, 650 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d

1159, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). This Rule requires litigants

to file a notice of appeal “within 30 days after entry of the

judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A);

see also People of State of Ill. ex rel. Hartigan v. Peters, 871 F.2d

1336, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989) (“To obtain review of a district

judge’s decision to grant an injunction, the defendant must

seek review through a direct appeal within [30] days of the

district judge’s decision or give extraordinary reasons for not

having done so.”).

Here, the district court issued the preliminary injunction on

March 10, 2015. Shekar filed a notice of appeal of the district

court’s contempt order on June 24, 2015. By that time, more

than 30 days had passed since the preliminary injunction was

entered. As a result, Shekar’s appeal is untimely. 

Although Shekar cannot appeal the underlying preliminary

injunction, he argues that he can still appeal the contempt

order because he is also appealing the district court’s denial of

his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction. But it is well

established that “a party seeking review of an interlocutory

order cannot enlarge the time for noticing an appeal by filing

a successive motion and appealing the denial of the latter

motion.” Erb, 423 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted). 
No. 15-2349 7

Further, although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) grants federal

appellate jurisdiction over orders that refuse to “dissolve” an

injunction, we noted in Securities and Exchange Commission v.

Suter that there are limits to this jurisdiction. 832 F.2d 988 (7th

Cir. 1987). In Suter, the district court entered a permanent

injunction against the appellant on February 6, 1986. Id. at 990.

Rather than timely appeal the injunction, the appellant filed

three motions to vacate the injunction. Id. The last of these

three motions was denied on November 7, 1986, which the

appellant then appealed. Id. We stated:

If ... the only purpose of the motion [to vacate

the injunction] was to take a belated appeal from

the order entering the injunction, we penetrate

through form to substance and treat the appeal

from the denial of the motion to vacate as an

untimely appeal from the injunction, and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Id. (citations omitted). In Suter, we found that it was a belated

appeal because the appellant had not argued that the facts or

law had changed since the injunction was originally entered,

but only that the injunction should not have been issued in the

first place. Id.

In this case, Shekar argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction

because it did not apply the correct “criteria governing

preliminary injunctive relief” and because “there is no basis in

the evidentiary record for finding that preliminary injunctive

relief was appropriate.” Shekar’s claim that the district court

did not apply the correct criteria for issuing a preliminary
8 No. 15-2349 

injunction is wrong; the district court did apply the correct

criteria when it originally issued the preliminary injunction on

March 10, 2015. Furthermore, Shekar’s latter argument is

2

essentially that the preliminary injunction should not have

been entered in the first place; which is analogous to the

appellant’s failed argument in Suter. 

Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction over Shekar’s appeal

of his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction because it is

merely a “belated appeal” of the initial preliminary injunction.

Suter, 832 F.2d at 990; see also Peters, 871 F.2d at 1339 (“[i]n

reviewing a denial of motions to dissolve an injunction ... we

are not called upon to examine the district judge’s original

decision to impose an injunction”). Since Shekar cannot appeal

the preliminary injunction, he also cannot appeal the contempt

order while the underlying litigation remains pending in the

district court.

3

In the June 17, 2015, order, the district court did not revisit the criteria for

2

issuing the preliminary injunction. It insteadfocusedonShekar’sarguments

raised in his motion to vacate the preliminary injunction.

Shekar cites Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare

3

Fund v. Lewis, 745 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 2014), to support his appellate brief’s

jurisdictional statement. Although procedurally similar, the court in Lewis

did not address anyissues involving Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

Therefore, it is not binding in this case. See R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. FTC,

931 F.2d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Issues, even jurisdictional issues, lurking

in the record but not addressed do not bind the court in later cases.”)

(Citations omitted).
No. 15-2349 9

III. CONCLUSION

This appeal is DISMISSED.