# Moldova - United States Department of State

- Joint Statement on U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Moldova.Begin TextThe Governments of the United States of America (United States) and the Republic of Moldova (Moldova) held a meeting of the U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue in Washington, D.C. on April 18, 2024, as well as political consultations between Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, Richard Verma and Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popsoi.For more than 30 years, the United States and Moldova have built a strategic bilateral partnership.  Faced with threats posed by the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, this partnership has only grown stronger.  During the Strategic Dialogue, both sides highlighted the progress made since the last Strategic Dialogue in Chisinau in March 2023, on advancing bilateral priorities including defense and security cooperation; Moldova’s progress toward EU integration and its reform agenda including justice sector reforms and anti-corruption policies; economic and energy security; and strengthened people-to-people ties.  The United States stands with Moldova in supporting its long-term democratic and economic reform efforts, as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.Moldova and the United States also discussed programs that help Moldova develop its national resilience and build capacity to defend its territory, protect its constitutional neutrality, and effectively manage and respond to crisis situations.  Since Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, Moldova has received nearly $75 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to bolster its defense capabilities.  The United States, through U.S. European Command, conducts regular exercises with the Moldovan National Army, building upon the strong partnership between Moldova and the State of North Carolina in the State Partnership Program.  Both countries highlighted the importance of this cooperation between Moldova and the State of North Carolina, extended for another five years on March 19, in Chisinau.  Looking ahead, we are resolute in our commitment to fostering deeper mutual respect and cooperation, as articulated in our joint strategic statement.Through the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS), Moldova’s border enforcement agencies have received tools and enhanced capacity development that have resulted in strengthened border communication and enforcement capabilities.  The United States is assisting Moldovan security forces in increasing their physical security and stockpile management of weapons and ammunition, as well as advising on how to defend against cyber threats.  Strengthened borders, more effective law enforcement, and improved weapons and ammunition management increases Moldovan and regional security.  The United States commended Moldova on the 30-year anniversary of Moldova’s participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program and on the 10-year anniversary of Moldova’s participation in the NATO KFOR Mission in Kosovo.The United States also announced a new initiative to assist Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs to align its law enforcement academy more closely to international standards.  The $2.7 million INL-supported project will update firearm training methodologies, enhance firearms instructors’ knowledge and effectiveness, introduce new learning technology, and fully renovate and modernize the academy’s shooting range.  A stronger academy will promote more self-sufficient law enforcement entities, transformed and further professionalized into a well-equipped and well-trained force capable of better protecting and building trust with Moldovan citizens.Moldova has made significant progress in the justice sector.  With support from the U.S. government, various projects have been implemented to promote justice sector reform and to build the capacity of the justice sector, including activities to boost the efficiency and performance of national courts, streamline judicial procedures, assist courts in developing and implementing quality management standards, and improve the Integrated Case Management system with courts.  Progress has also been made in strengthening the legal and institutional capacities in fighting corruption.  National institutions acknowledged the significant support provided by the U.S. government for the tools needed to investigate corruption cases.The United States welcomed the European Council’s December 2023 decision to open accession negotiations with Moldova and recognition of Moldova’s progress in advancing the necessary reforms on their EU path.  The United States supports Moldova’s integration with the EU and the continued implementation of an ambitious reform agenda essential for the advancement towards this objective and for the benefit of the people of Moldova.The two countries addressed Moldova’s management of the economic, energy, security, defense, and humanitarian impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine.  The United States remains the largest single-country donor to Moldova with more than $774 million of new economic, security, defense, and humanitarian assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to help Moldova manage the impacts from the war while maintaining progress on its democratic and anti-corruption reform agenda, advancing defense and security modernization, and promoting economic growth.  Assistance to help Moldova improve resilience to malign influence is also vital.The United States thanked Moldova for continuing to welcome and protect refugees fleeing Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and for the adoption of temporary protection status allowing refugees access to social programs and legal protections.  Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, over 1 million refugees passed through Moldova and 116,000 remain.  The United States has provided nearly $118 million in humanitarian aid to international partners working in Moldova to support both refugees and their Moldovan host communities.  The United States expressed its appreciation for Moldova’s support of Ukrainian transshipments and commended its leadership in the Danube Quint to facilitate the flow of Ukrainian grain to world markets in the aftermath of the July 2023 Russian withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.  Both sides reconfirmed their unwavering commitment to contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction and discussed further cooperation opportunities.Discussions also addressed Moldova’s upcoming Presidential elections and referendum on European integration later this year, and next year’s Parliamentary elections.  Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring free and fair elections in Moldova and to impeding Russia’s ongoing efforts to interfere in Moldova’s democratic institutions and electoral process.  Moldova expressed its appreciation for the U.S. sanctions announced in June 2023 and February 2024 against eight Russian and Moldovan citizens who attempted to subvert Moldova’s electoral processes through illegal vote buying and other activities.  Both sides expressed their commitment to further cooperation to bolster Moldova’s resilience and ability to effectively counter foreign malign influence.  Additional joint efforts will be undertaken to mitigate the negative impacts of foreign disinformation and propaganda under a Memorandum of Understanding with the State Chancellery of Moldova on signed by U.S. Special Envoy and Coordinator for the Global Engagement Center James Rubin countering foreign information manipulation in September 2023.The United States and Moldova discussed human rights issues, including Moldova’s advancement of labor law reforms, which resulted in an upgraded assessment in the 2023 U.S. Department of Labor Report on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, as well as ongoing cooperation to promote human rights, address hate-based crimes, and protect vulnerable groups around the world.  Participants welcomed the diverse perspectives presented during the second annual U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue Civil Society Platform in Chisinau on April 11, and emphasized the important role of civil society in advancing the bilateral relationship and people-to-people ties.Moldova and the United States discussed energy security and economic development, highlighting the signing of the Open Skies Agreement in May 2023, and significant progress on securing Moldova’s energy security and diversification through the support of USAID.  Both sides committed to dedicate time, expertise, and authorities to quickly and effectively implement the proposed energy assistance projects, which include construction of a high-voltage energy transmission line to increase connectivity between Moldova and Romania and improve electricity grid stabilization and reserves capacity.Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to collaborative efforts on transitioning to renewable sources of energy.  The delegations noted that, in April 2024, and for the first time, Moldova purchased U.S. natural gas and underscored that future U.S. natural gas deliveries will enhance both Moldova’s energy security and U.S.-Moldova bilateral trade relations.  Both sides discussed the “vertical corridor” which will leverage existing gas infrastructure to deliver non-Russian supplies routed from terminals in the Eastern Mediterranean to Ukraine and Moldova, and eventually from Ukraine to Central Europe.Both sides also emphasized the critical importance of continued cybersecurity cooperation and digitalization in a way that protects individual privacy rights.  The United States recognized that the Republic of Moldova has made significant efforts to advance cybersecurity and embrace digitalization.  Acknowledging the evolving nature of cyber threats and the transformative power of digital technologies, the United States and Moldova expressed readiness to deepen collaboration in this area to ensure the security and prosperity of both nations.  Moldova expressed its interest to join the Counter Ransomware Initiative to build our common resilience to ransomware attacks and enhance partnerships among its members.Moldova expressed enthusiasm for the 2023 return of Peace Corps volunteers to the country, noting the positive contributions of the more than 1,500 volunteers over the last 30 years to strengthening people-to-people ties between the two countries.The Strategic Dialogue was hosted by the U.S. Department of State and included interagency and inter-ministerial representatives from both governments.  The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, the Peace Corps, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Trade Representative.The Moldovan delegation included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Economic Development and Digitalization, the Presidential Administration, and the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.The United States and Moldova underscored their shared interest in continuing to build on the discussions during the Dialogue to advance further cooperation, rooted in our shared democratic values and common interests.  Both countries committed to hold the next meeting of the Strategic Dialogue in Chisinau, Moldova in 2025.End text
- Moldova HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Moldova				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Moldova																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in the Republic of Moldova during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by authorities; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence and sexual violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting Roma; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting persons with disabilities.The government took some credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses, but progress was slow.Significant human rights issues in the breakaway region of Transnistria in the country included credible reports of: torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by “authorities;” harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the “judiciary;” political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including censorship and the enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel “laws” to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive “laws” on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their “government” peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious “government” corruption; serious “government” restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; and extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.In the separatist Transnistria region, former political prisoner and political activist Oleg Horjan was found dead in his home after reportedly being stabbed to death on July 17. Transnistrian “law enforcement” claimed Horjan was murdered incident to a burglary, but civil society observers called Horjan’s death “suspicious.” Horjan’s killing occurred less than two weeks following his signing of a joint declaration expressing the need to consolidate the civic initiatives to fight for the social, economic, and human rights of persons in Transnistria and the rest of the country. The Moldovan government called for an independent investigation into the killing, while the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Promo-LEX called for the intervention of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.There were no known reports of disappearances in the Transnistria region.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.The Antitorture Prosecution Office reported allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, mainly in detention facilities. Reports included cases of mistreatment in pretrial detention centers in police stations, particularly in regional police inspectorates. Impunity persisted, but authorities increasingly initiated prosecutions regarding allegations of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment during the year.Many cases classified by authorities as suspected torture occurred in public spaces, through abusive physical or psychological treatment by the police, carabinieri, or border police officers initially encountering individuals, or by emergency law enforcement officers called to a scene.There was an uptick in recent years in the number of torture cases investigated and prosecuted. The Prosecutor General’s Office attributed this increase to better implementation of a Prosecutor General directive mandating that all abuse complaints automatically trigger the opening of a criminal investigation.In Transnistria, there were reports of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in detention facilities, including denial of medical assistance, detention in metal cages during court hearings, and prolonged solitary confinement. There was no known mechanism to investigate alleged acts of torture by Transnistrian “security forces.” Promo-LEX noted that “authorities” perpetrated most inhuman and degrading treatment in the region to obtain self-incriminating confessions. Transnistrian “law enforcement” bodies did not report any investigations or prosecutions for torture or inhuman treatment by Transnistrian “security forces” during the year.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in most prisons and detention centers remained harsh, due to overcrowding, poor sanitation, lack of privacy, insufficient or no access to outdoor exercise, and a lack of facilities for persons with disabilities.Abusive Physical Conditions: Human rights organizations, members of the National Mechanism to Prevent Torture, and the ombudsman reported overcrowding, poor lighting and ventilation, noise, no minimum detention standards, inadequate medical care, and insufficient medical personnel and health care in most detention facilities. The chronic staff shortage in prisons led to a reliance on informal hierarchies to keep control over the inmate population, often through violence.Conditions at Penitentiary No. 13 in Chisinau were reportedly the worst in the country. Prison officials stated they closed basement cells that inmates had previously complained did not meet national or international standards. Allegations of inhuman treatment persisted. Some cells were overcrowded, unhygienic, and lacked ventilation. Authorities called for the closure of the facility and construction of a new penitentiary, but no construction took place during the year.In Transnistria, physical conditions of prisons and detention facilities remained poor, and mistreatment of detainees remained a major problem. Most pretrial detention cells lacked beds and toilet facilities, a condition the Transnistrian “ombudsman” qualified as an “infringement against human dignity.”There were consistent reports that persons detained in Transnistria were often denied access to professional medical assistance. According to Moldovan authorities, Alexandr Dimov, sentenced in March by a Transnistrian “court” to 20 years in prison for alleged terrorist attacks in Transnistria, was denied medical assistance and shared a cell with an inmate who was ill with tuberculosis.Administration: Internal investigation procedures in the penitentiary system slightly improved during the year and detainees had access to complaint mechanisms.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by local and international human rights observers. Prison officials generally allowed observers to interview inmates in private. In Transnistria, “authorities” denied access for independent evaluation of detention center conditions.Improvements: The Ministry of Justice carried out penitentiary staff personnel training on respect for human rights and dignity, zero tolerance to torture, and improved health care for prison inmates.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements. In Transnistria, there were frequent reports that Transnistrian “authorities” engaged with impunity in arbitrary arrest and detention.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Authorities were required to promptly inform detainees of the reasons for their arrest and describe the charges against them. Authorities could detain suspects without charge for 72 hours.Once charged, a detainee could be released pending trial. The law provided for bail, but authorities generally did not use it due to a lack of practical mechanisms for implementation. In lieu of confinement, the courts could also impose house arrest or travel restrictions. The Superior Council of Magistrates reported judges rarely applied alternative arrest measures. The law provided safeguards against arbitrary use of pretrial detention and required noncustodial alternatives wherever possible. Judges disproportionally used noncustodial alternative detention mechanisms in cases with political implications.Detainees had the right to a defense attorney. The government required the local bar association to provide representation to indigent defendants, but frequently delayed reimbursement of legal fees. Indigent defendants often did not have adequate counsel.Arbitrary Arrest: There were no reports of arbitrary arrests during the year.In Transnistria, arbitrary arrests, particularly of those who criticized de facto Transnistrian authorities, remained a significant problem. Adrian Glijin, whose 2020 arrest and charge of espionage was viewed by human rights NGOs as politically motivated, was released on April 7 after three years in a Transnistrian prison. Stanislav Minzarari, who was arrested with Glijin and two others, was the only member of the “Camenca four” remaining detained in Transnistria. Minzarari was sentenced to 16 years in prison.Pretrial Detention: In Transnistria, lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										While the law provided for an independent judiciary, judicial independence remained a problem due to problems stemming from corruption and selective justice, in which the law was not applied equally to all and was often selectively enforced for politically motivated reasons.Selective justice remained a problem and lawyers complained of instances in which their clients’ rights to a fair trial were denied. Several prominent politicians detained during the year alleged selective justice and abuses of their right to a fair trial.Authorities passed several laws authorizing vetting of candidates to judicial and prosecutorial oversight bodies, as well as of judges and prosecutors. These efforts were designed to weed out corruption in the judicial system. In April, the General Assembly of Judges elected a fully vetted Superior Council of Magistrates, which oversaw the appointment, functioning, and discipline of judges.Media and judicial reform activists noted it was common for judges to indefinitely postpone hearings for wealthy or well-connected defendants. This practice was believed to be connected to personal corruption of the judges. The government implemented an electronic case management system to provide transparency in the assignment of judges to cases. All courts in the country used the system, increasing transparency and efficiency in court proceedings.Media representatives and NGOs remained concerned regarding limitations on access to data on the national courts’ information portal developed by the Ministry of Justice’s Agency for Court Administration. Civil society and journalists complained that, because there was no search option, they could not find the names of those involved in court cases, nor could they determine who adjudicated or prosecuted a case.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary enforced this right to some extent. The law presumed the innocence of defendants in criminal cases.Justice NGOs noted that courts repeatedly delayed hearings without justification in high-profile cases. Hearings on a criminal appeal by Ilan Shor, the leader of the Shor Party and member of parliament convicted and sentenced in 2017 to seven-and-one-half years’ imprisonment for his involvement in a billion-dollar bank fraud scandal in 2014, were postponed until April 13 when the Chisinau Appeal Court issued a final sentence of 15 years in prison.In Transnistria, “authorities” disregarded fair trial procedures and denied defendants a fair trial. Attorneys in Transnistria reported “authorities” regularly denied accused individuals the right to an attorney of their choosing and that trials were often held in secret without public announcement of charges. For example, the trial of Adrian Glijin was held in secret and he was denied access to the court decision due to the “secrecy of the case” even after he was released on April 7. Trials for those who were arbitrarily arrested for exercising fundamental freedoms and criticizing the de facto authorities were held behind closed doors.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.In Transnistria, several known political prisoners remained in custody or served sentences. Most political prisoners were arrested for exercising freedoms of expression and assembly under accusation of criticizing the “authorities.” Transnistrian “authorities” used the “2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism” as a pretext to apply additional repressive tools to silence dissent and repress fundamental freedoms. The de facto authorities did not permit access to political prisoners by international organizations with very few exceptions.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Although the law provided for restitution of private property confiscated during the Communist era, the government had no laws or mechanisms in place for restitution of communal property, and NGOs and advocacy groups reported the government did not make progress on resolving Holocaust-era claims concerning communal property, including for foreign citizens.The state did not return any communal or religious property the Jewish community had purchased or was seeking to acquire through litigation. Jewish groups sought a comprehensive restitution solution for communal property instead of the current system of the government returning individual buildings piecemeal.The Department of State’s Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act Report to Congress, released publicly in 2020, can be found on the Department’s website:  https://www.state.gov/reports/just-act-report-to-congress.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution prohibited such actions, and there were no reports that the government in Chisinau failed to respect these prohibitions. However, there was a report that Transnistrian “authorities” forcefully separated a foreign resident in Transnistria from his child, age seven, when they prohibited his re-entry into Transnistria from another region of Moldova.Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, parliament approved a state of emergency that imposed: special entry and exit rules; special rules for the use of airspace; limits on public gatherings; rules for evacuating citizens from life-threatening areas; potential rationing of food and other products; special use of telecommunications; and other necessary measures to ensure state security. Parliament repeatedly extended the state of emergency since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The most recent extension of the state of emergency was on November 24 for 30 days.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the authorities generally respected these rights. The influence by oligarchs and Russia over certain media outlets, a challenging advertising market that limited outlets’ commercial sustainability, and the lack of an independent judiciary created challenges for independent media. Harassment and intimidation against journalists occurred in some instances, but there were no reports of government involvement. Media outlets and NGOs contended that frequent lawsuits, including by public officials, represented threats to press freedom.Freedom of Expression: Hate speech was regulated by the Law on Freedom of Speech and the Audiovisual Code.Several symbols representing Russia’s military operations remained banned, including the “Z” and “V” symbols used by Russia during its invasion of Ukraine. In April, the Constitutional Court reviewed legislation banning the black and orange St. George’s ribbon, which was associated with the Russian military, and determined that it could be worn as long as it did not promote military aggression or crimes against humanity. The General Police Inspectorate reported 180 violations concerning banned symbols (the St. George ribbon) on May 9, including by nine Members of Parliament. The minimum fine for the violation was 4,500 Moldovan lei (MDL) ($245).In Transnistria, de facto authorities used the “2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism” to silence dissent and repress freedom of expression, complementing the existing “anti-extremism law”. Several individuals faced charges pursuant to the “anti-extremism law” for publicly criticizing “authorities” during the year. Public insults of the region’s “leader” could be punished by a fine or up to five years in prison.“Authorities” arrested Mihail Ermurachi in December 2022, based on his July 2021 conviction for “insulting” the de facto leader of Transnistria in a private conversation.In April, the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration requested the Transnistrian “authorities” release Victor Plescanov or at least allow an independent doctor to examine him. Plescanov was serving a three-year sentence for alleged “extremism,” because he said he would fly a Ukrainian flag from his balcony.Violence and Harassment: Some journalists continued to be subjected to harassment, intimidation, and frequent lawsuits.At Chisinau town hall meetings in March, Mayor Ion Ceban initiated what media NGOs referred to as an intimidation campaign to criticize the media, including public broadcaster Teleradio Moldova, and stated he was unhappy with how journalists covered issues in the city. He classified reporting that criticized the city as “lies,” “nonsense,” and “gross manipulation.” He also called on vice-mayors and department directors of the mayoralty to “univocally and urgently” contract services that provide public information monitoring, in addition to legal services. Mayor Ceban also announced a series of lawsuits against media outlets that had run content critical to him. Media NGOs criticized Ceban’s statements as attacks on the media and as actions that undermined press freedom.On September 21, Elena Covalenco, a photo-reporter for IPN news agency, was denied entry to the Transnistria region and informed of an entry ban from August 2 for three years. Moldovan NGO Promo-Lex called this a violation of freedom of movement and freedom of expression.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: In its 2023 Press Freedom Index report, Reporters Without Borders moved the country from #40 to #28 and classified the media situation as “satisfactory.” Nevertheless, the Press Freedom Index pointed to the polarization and political control of the media space as well as the influence of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor on the media landscape as negative influences.On July 31, parliament amended the Audiovisual Code to decrease the maximum share of the media market that any individual or single entity could hold from 35 percent to 25 percent. The change was intended to help the de-oligarchization process in the media field and reduce political influence in the media.On October 25, the Audiovisual Council fined TV stations Prime, Publika TV, Canal 2, Canal 3, Canal 5, and Mega TV MDL 12,000 ($662) each for covering the electoral campaign despite earlier notifying the council that their programs would not include electoral campaign coverage, which was inconsistent with the country’s electoral regulations. The coverage included summaries of campaign events and direct and indirect participation by candidates.On October 27, the Audiovisual Council voted unanimously to fine media distributors in the autonomous region of Gagauzia, Oguzsatlink SRL and Ilk Halk Televizion SRL MDL 130,000 ($7,111) each for “not protecting the national audiovisual space.” In its decision, the council cited 2022 amendments to the Audiovisual Code intended to prohibit rebroadcasts of news, political, and military content from countries other than the member states of the European Union, the United States, Canada, and others which had ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. The council said these actions were in response to the channels’ rebroadcasting programs from Russian and Belarusian television channels, some of which included military content. The council previously fined these channels in July for broadcasting prohibited content.On October 30, the Commission for Emergency Situations (CSE) suspended the licenses of six TV stations – Orizont TV, ITV, Prime, Publika TV, Canal 2, and Canal 3 – at the request of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), which said it had evidence that Russia was using the stations to influence local elections. The Center for Independent Journalism (CJI), the Association of the Electronic Press (APE), and Acces-Info NGOs jointly signed a statement expressing concern about the suspension, asking authorities to present more detailed reasons and evidence underlying the decision.In many cases, journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid conflicts with the sponsors or owners of their media outlets, many of whom were politicians or oligarchs connected to political parties. Obstacles for accessing information persisted. News reporters from the Ialoveni Online local portal tried unsuccessfully to obtain copies of draft decisions that were to be adopted at a June 30 meeting of the Costesti village council. Their requests were denied by local authorities, and Costesti Mayor Vasile Borta later stated he would not give the journalists any documents because he did not know what their purpose was. Several media organizations, including the Independent Journalism Center, issued a joint statement urging local elected officials to follow the law requiring draft decisions to be published in advance.In Transnistria, de facto authorities censored media outlets, including through controlling licensing and accreditation. On February 16, the Joint Control Commission (JCC) press center denied accreditation to Irina Tabaranu, a journalist for the Zona de Securitate news outlet, due to opposition by the Russian and Transnistrian delegations to the JCC. The Moldovan delegation challenged this decision, and Tabaranu was able to obtain accreditation. In Transnistria, journalists regularly practiced self-censorship and avoided criticizing “authorities,” the separatists’ goal of independence and their “foreign policy,” or anything that would be deemed “extremist” under the “2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism.”Libel/Slander Laws: Libel and slander were civil offenses punishable by a fine, community service, being barred from holding certain public offices for a period of months, or a combination of these punishments. Defamation was not a crime, but individuals and organizations could be sued civilly for defamation. Some newspapers practiced self-censorship and avoided controversial topics due to concerns that government officials and other public figures could use slander, libel, or defamation accusations to retaliate against critical news reports.The Transnistrian “Criminal Code” criminalized the “denial of the positive role of the peacekeeping mission of the Russian Federation in Transnistria.” Article 278-3 on denial of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Transnistria provided for a punishment of up to three years in prison or up to seven years in prison if the ‘violation’ was made by a group of individuals or an “official.” Article 316-1 in the Transnistrian “Criminal Code” provided for up to five years in prison for offending the Transnistrian de facto leader.Actions to Expand Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media: On June 9 parliament approved a new law on access to information of public interest aimed at increasing the transparency of public sector activities. The previous law was adopted in 2000 and observers said it contained insufficient safeguards to ensure constitutional right of access to public interest information.																Internet Freedom						Under the instructions of the Commission for Emergency Situations, the intelligence service issued a public warning in 2022 to online media outlets to refrain from publishing or distributing “fake news” and “biased information” that incite hatred, public disorder, war, justify military aggression in Ukraine, provoke conflict, or glorify military aggression.Under the ongoing state of emergency, the government blocked access to online content deemed threatening to state security, including websites that justified Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine or called for civil disobedience. The Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) blocked eight websites in the first half of year, including five Sputnik affiliates, for promoting false narratives affecting national security and for inciting to hatred during the state of emergency.On October 24, the SIS ordered internet service providers to block 22 Russian websites, inclusive of news and media sites, for inclusion of “online content used in the war of information against the Republic of Moldova.” On October 30, the SIS ordered internet service providers to block 31 additional portals, including 21 managed by Russia, for “altering the informational space of the Republic of Moldova.” The sites included major Russian state news agencies like TASS, Lenta, Interfax, and portals of TV stations controlled by fugitive oligarchs Vlad Plahotniuc and Ilan Shor.Internet users and civil society in Transnistria accused the region’s largest internet service provider, Inderdnestrcom, believed to be controlled by the de facto authorities, of eliminating its competitors in Transnistria. Linkservice, one of Inderdnestrcom’s two small competitors, ceased operations after the Transnistrian “authorities” suspended Likservice’s license on July 18. Linkservice’s owners were likewise prohibited by the “authorities” from transferring their equipment to their newly created “Links Plus” company.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The Transnistrian “authorities” did not authorize any protests in the region during the year.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for freedom of association and stated that citizens were free to form parties and other social and political organizations, and the government generally respected this right. The law prohibited organizations “engaged in fighting against political pluralism, the principles of the rule of law, or the sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity” of the country.The Constitutional Court ruled on June 19 that the Russia-backed Shor Party was unconstitutional because it violated the rule of law and carried out activities against the country’s sovereignty. Most prominent human rights NGOs did not publicly comment on the ruling.In Transnistria, “authorities” severely restricted freedom of association, granting it only to persons they recognized as “citizens” of the region. All activities had to be coordinated with local “authorities”; groups that did not comply faced criminal charges and harassment by “security forces.” “Authorities” strictly prohibited organizations favoring reintegration with the rest of the country.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government generally respected these rights, with some exceptions.In-country Movement: In Transnistria, “authorities” restricted travel to and from the region. The Moldovan delegation to the Joint Control Commission demanded Transnistrian “authorities” remove additional illegal checkpoints installed in 2022. Transnistrian “authorities” maintained the restrictions throughout the year.Foreign Travel: The law required individuals to settle all outstanding financial obligations with other persons or legal entities before emigrating. The government did not strictly enforce this requirement. The law also provided that close relatives who were financially dependent on a potential emigrant had to concur before the prospective emigrant could depart the country. In practice, the government did not limit entry or exit of citizens.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. In Transnistria, “authorities” did the same.Access to Asylum: The law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees. The process for obtaining formal refugee status was slow but conducted in line with international and European standards. Authorities issued refugees identity cards valid indefinitely; beneficiaries of humanitarian protection received identification documents valid for three years; and asylum seekers received temporary identification cards. UNHCR provided financial support to refugees in the form of multipurpose cash assistance. A temporary accommodation center administered by the Bureau of Migration and Asylum was available for asylum seekers.Temporary Protection: In March, the government approved Temporary Protection Status for refugees, allowing greater access to employment, education, health care, and other social services for those who registered. Those who exited the country for more than 45 days temporarily lost Temporary Protection Status and were required to pay a small fine to restore the status upon re-entry, which they could pay at border crossing points. The government also allowed for some exceptions to the 45-day rule for exceptional cases at the discretion of the General Inspectorate for Migration. The government provided asylum or humanitarian protection to 145 individuals who might not qualify as refugees.f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)The law did not define the concept of IDPs and authorities did not report any official data on IDPs as such. Nonetheless, NGOs such as Promo-LEX and a 2004 Norwegian Refugee Council report estimated that approximately 130,000 persons were displaced by the 1992 conflict in Transnistria, with approximately 51,000 of them residing in government-controlled territory. IDPs could include victims of forced displacement by Transnistrian “authorities,” former combatants, and persons who left the region for political reasons.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center: https://www.internal-displacement.org.																																				g. Stateless Persons										According to the Public Service Agency (PSA), as of January there were 1,797 persons registered as stateless in the country, 1,249 of whom resided in Transnistria. According to immigration law experts, most stateless persons fell into one of two categories: 1) former citizens of the Soviet Union residing in Moldova who were ineligible for Moldovan citizenship and did not hold another country’s citizenship, and 2) Moldovan citizens who had renounced their citizenship to acquire another citizenship and had not notified Moldovan authorities of any subsequent acquisition of citizenship. Experts assessed that most persons in the second category, especially Transnistria residents, were not actually stateless, and most acquired Russian or Ukrainian citizenship or another nationality. PSA data showed 6,849 citizens of the country did not possess any valid documentation of their citizenship but had Soviet era passports endorsed by the Public Services Agency, which served as a prima facie proof of citizenship. There were an additional 1,400 persons of indeterminate citizenship status.Stateless persons and refugees could gain citizenship through naturalization. The law allowed a refugee or stateless person who had resided legally in the country for eight years to seek citizenship. The family reunion process for naturalized refugees was burdensome.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to be free and fair, with observers noting some irregularities in presidential election in 2020 and parliamentary elections in 2021.ODIHR’s preliminary report following the November local elections concluded that the elections “were peaceful and managed efficiently, but interference from abroad and restrictive measures, imposed due to national security concerns on freedom of speech, association, and the right to compete, had a negative impact on the process.” In particular, the report noted that the de-registration of all candidates from the Sansa Party on the eve of the elections “limited voters’ choice and resulted in uncontested races in some smaller localities.” ODIHR also stated that the suspension of broadcast licenses for certain media outlets appeared “to be a disproportionate restriction of freedom of expression.” The report commented that the Central Electoral Commission worked professionally and in an open manner, and “generally enjoyed the confidence of stakeholders, with the exception of the opposition,” but the fact that a majority of its members were nominated by the ruling party could impact perceptions of its impartiality.Election irregularities were reported during the year in regional elections in Gagauzia, an autonomous region within the country.Residents of Gagauzia elected their Governor (Bashkan) on April 30 and May 14 in the first and second round respectively, and the Comrat Appeal Court validated the results May 22. Shor Party candidate Evghenia Gutul was sworn in as Gagauzia Governor on July 19, one month after the Shor party was declared unconstitutional. Prosecutors and the National Anticorruption Center alleged the Shor Party engaged in widespread fraud, including vote-buying, in order to secure Gutul’s victory. The Civic Coalition for Free and Fair Elections NGO expressed concern regarding “the degradation of the electoral process” and accused local authorities of ignoring the basic legal principles of ensuring free and fair elections.Political Parties and Political Participation: On June 19 the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the government’s November 2022 request to dissolve the Shor Party for crimes including illicit campaign financing and working to support Russia’s malign influence in the country. Pursuant to the ruling, Shor Party members of parliament became independent members without the right to join other parliamentary factions. Parliament approved a law on July 31 to ban executive officers, party members in elective offices, or party members on the list of the alternative candidates during elections from any party declared unconstitutional from running for elective offices for five years. Human rights NGOs and the Venice Commission recommended that the government narrow the legislation to exclude broad categories of party officials who did not play a role in the party’s unconstitutional activities. On September 29, the Constitutional Court suspended the five-year ban prohibiting former members of unconstitutional parties from competing in elections, in effect enabling approximately 600 former Shor Party members to register to run in November’s local elections. On October 4, the Emergency Situations Commission (CSE) adopted a decision to establish a more narrow, individualized criteria for those not permitted to run in the November 5 local elections. Subsequently, on October 5, parliament passed, and President Sandu signed into law, these changes to the electoral code, which prohibited former members of any party deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court from running for office for three years if they had either been removed from previous races, suspected or convicted of crimes that were cited in the Constitutional Court’s decision to ban the party, or subject to international sanctions. Effectively, this decision banned 102 Shor Party leaders from seeking office. Individuals subject to restrictions had the right to challenge the decision in the Chisinau Court of Appeals. Several politicians and experts criticized the measures, noting that parliament adopted them quickly without public consultations.On November 3, two days before the first round of local elections, the CSE determined that candidates of the Sansa Party, which was affiliated with fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, would have their registration cancelled and should be removed from the ballot throughout the country. The CSE stated they acted based upon evidence submitted by the SIS demonstrating that the Sansa Party had taken over the banned Shor Party’s party structures and had engaged in widespread vote buying and illegal campaign spending on a scale unprecedented in the country’s history. The SIS published a detailed report on the evidence they compiled against Sansa, including financing and support from the Russian government.On December 12, the Chisinau Court of Appeal overturned the November 5 CSE decision on the Sansa Party candidates but said its ruling did not affect the election results. The government spokesperson indicated the government would challenge the decision at both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice.Opposition parties claimed that several criminal cases opened by authorities against their members in previous years were politically motivated. Several high-profile politicians were charged or investigated in criminal cases, including former President Igor Dodon, accused of corruption and state treason, and Shor Party member of parliament Marina Tauber, accused of corruption and illicit party financing. Authorities rejected allegations regarding the political nature of the criminal cases, and no prominent legal or human rights experts concluded the investigations were politically motivated. These and several other criminal cases from previous years regarding high-level politicians continued during the year.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively.Corruption: Despite the government taking steps to combat corruption and increase the independence of the judiciary and capacity of anti-corruption agencies, corruption remained endemic. Corruption in the judiciary and other state structures was widespread. The government, including parliament, prioritized judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts, including through pursuing asset recovery, prosecution of corrupt former officials and oligarchs, and implementing vetting of judicial and prosecutorial oversight bodies.The key anti-corruption institutions in the country – the Prosecutor General’s Office and its specialized anti-corruption and anti-organized crime units, the National Integrity Authority, the National Anti-corruption Center, the Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO), and the Criminal Assets Recovery Agency – made some progress on corruption investigations of illicit enrichment and asset seizures. Prosecutors continued several criminal cases throughout the year on illicit enrichment of sitting and former political leaders, including former President Igor Dodon, Socialist Party member of parliament Corneliu Furculita, Socialist member of parliament and former Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii, Shor Party member of parliament Marina Tauber, and others.On March 10, APO prosecutors sent to the court the criminal cases against Vladimir Andronachi, a close ally of fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, on charges of large-scale embezzlement and money laundering in the interest of a criminal organization relating to a $1 billion bank fraud scandal in 2014. On April 13, the Chisinau Court of Appeals sentenced U.S.-sanctioned oligarch Ilan Shor in absentia to 15 years in prison for participating in the 2014 scandal. The court also ordered the confiscation of Șhor’s assets, worth approximately €278 million (more than $293 million), in favor of the National Bank of Moldova. The oligarch fled the country in 2019.On April 19, APO prosecutors sent to the court a case against former deputy governor of the National Bank Emma Tabarta, charging her with fraud, money laundering, and influence peddling in the interest of an organized criminal group that committed the 2014 billion-dollar theft.On July 18, the Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office announced the completion, in absentia, of the criminal investigation against U.S.-sanctioned oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc. In 2020, prosecutors had charged Plahotniuc with creating and leading a criminal organization, fraud, and money laundering in the case of the 2014 plundering of the banking system. Plahotniuc, whose lawyers deny he was involved, fled the country in 2019.On September 21, the National Anti-corruption Center detained two non-affiliated members of parliament, Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, on charges of accepting illicit financing of the political party from a criminal organized group led by oligarch Ilan Shor, and parliament voted on a waiver of their parliamentary immunity on the same day in order to facilitate their arrest at the request of the prosecutor general.Following his 2021 arrest and suspension from office on corruption charges and for improperly handling conflicts of interest involving personal connections to fugitive oligarch Veaceslav Platon, Prosecutor General Alexandru Stoianoglo was dismissed on September 26. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled on October 24 that the automatic nature of Stoianoglo’s suspension from office upon his indictment violated his rights and ordered the government to pay €3,600 ($3,800) in damages. At the time of the ECtHR ruling, the government had already amended the law that had enabled Stoiangolo’s automatic suspension from office, which government officials and legal experts said now complied with the ECtHR’s standards.Former President Igor Dodon was released from judicial control on September 14, while four criminal cases against him were pending. Law enforcement authorities had accused Dodon of corruption, use of forged documents, abuse of office, and state treason. Dodon pled not guilty and said the charges against him were politically motivated – a claim rejected by authorities, local NGOs, and human rights groups.In July, authorities released Marina Tauber, a member of parliament and former deputy chair of the now-outlawed Shor Party awaiting trial on charges of illicit party financing, from house arrest and placed her under judicial control.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were for the most part cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups.Authorities in Chisinau did not have full access to or control over the Transnistria region. According to local and international experts, “authorities” in Transnistria monitored and restricted activities of human rights NGOs. There were credible reports that human rights NGOs in the region limited their investigations of serious human rights abuses due to fear of repression and harassment by Transnistrian “authorities.”The United Nations or Other International Bodies: OSCE observers reported their access to the Transnistria region was severely restricted, such that OSCE personnel had to be escorted by Transnistria “law enforcement” within the region, and that during the year they were not permitted to travel in the Transnistria region beyond the jointly administered security zone between Transnistria and the rest of the country.Government Human Rights Bodies: There were three human rights bodies in the country. The People’s Ombudsman and the Council for the Prevention of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality (Equality Council) were independent institutions that reported to parliament, while the Agency for Interethnic Relations was part of the government.The law provided for the independence of the People’s Ombudsman from political influence and appointment to a seven-year, nonrenewable term. The Office of the People’s Ombudsman could initiate an investigation based on complaints or on its own authority. Although the office lacked the power to enforce decisions, it acted as a monitor of human rights conditions, including in prisons and other places of detention. A separate ombudsperson for children’s rights operated under the same framework within the Office of the People’s Ombudsman.The Equality Council was responsible for reviewing complaints of discrimination and making recommendations. On February 2, legislation was passed to enable the Equality Council to examine and apply fines in cases of discrimination in employment and education sectors, as well as in cases of harassment and to provide for protection of victims. In addition, the council could determine whether an act of discrimination took place, offer advice on a remedy, and request that prosecutors initiate criminal proceedings. The Agency for Interethnic Relations oversaw and implemented state policies regarding interethnic relations and the use of languages in the country, but its status as an agency not directly answerable to a cabinet-level officer limited the efficacy of its mandate.Parliament also had a separate standing committee for human rights and interethnic relations; the committee’s powers and areas of oversight were narrow.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law defined domestic violence as a criminal offense, provided for the punishment of perpetrators, defined mechanisms for obtaining restraining orders against abusive individuals, and extended protection to unmarried individuals and children of unmarried individuals. The law covered five forms of domestic violence: physical, psychological, sexual, economic, and spiritual. The maximum punishment for domestic violence offenses was 15 years’ imprisonment. The law criminalized rape of a person, regardless of gender, including spousal rape and forcible sexual assault, and established penalties for violations ranging from three years to life in prison. Panel participants at the International Conference on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Girls and Domestic Violence held in Chisinau in October mentioned that requirements that survivors prove they were subjected to violence impeded some survivors from seeking legal protection, as did lack of understanding about laws covering domestic violence.Domestic violence resulting in “nonsignificant bodily harm” fell under the civil code, rather than the criminal code, and could be punished by a fine or community service. The law provided for cooperation between government and civil society organizations, established survivor protection as a human rights principle, and allowed third parties to file complaints on behalf of survivors. During the year, 65 percent of requests for restriction orders were filed by the victims themselves and 30 percent were filed by police investigating the incident.Sexual violence, including rape, remained a significant problem. Survivors of violence were often retraumatized by the system and subjected to social stigmas. Legislative gaps, social stigma, and fear of re-traumatization contributed to a culture of impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence. As a result, women’s rights advocates believed few survivors of sexual offenses reported the crimes.Through September 30, police registered 7,643 domestic violence cases, including 17 that resulted in death. The General Police Inspectorate issued 2,721 emergency restraining orders, and courts issued 946 protection orders.The law authorized the Ministry of Justice to use electronic devices for monitoring accused abusers in domestic violence cases.The police were required by law to inform the survivors of domestic violence regarding the release of the aggressor from detention, detention term expiry, or court refusals to extend preventive detention. Prison administrations were also required by law to inform domestic violence survivors concerning the imminent release of their aggressor from the penitentiary institution.During the year police and human rights NGOs reported an increase in domestic violence complaints.Survivors of domestic violence in Transnistria were not protected by the “law,” which lacked a definition of domestic violence and did not allow for domestic violence cases to be distinguished from other crimes, creating an absence of official statistics on domestic violence. Domestic violence without “substantial bodily harm” (such as broken bones or a concussion) remained an administrative, rather than criminal, offense punishable only by a fine. Transnistrian “authorities” often did not take any action when male abusers beat women.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law provided criminal penalties for sexual harassment ranging from a fine to a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment. The law prohibited sexual advances that affected a person’s dignity or created an unpleasant, hostile, degrading, or humiliating environment in a workplace or educational institution. There were no criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment. According to NGOs, law enforcement agencies steadily improved their handling of sexual harassment cases. Civil society groups, however, criticized the judicial system for displaying inadequate concern for the safety of survivors and for not holding perpetrators accountable for their behavior.On July 19, police placed a vlogger from Chisinau in a 20-day pretrial detention for sexually harassing young women, including minors, on the streets for videos, which were uploaded later to a social media platform.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination in respect to employment and occupation based on sex, age, race, color, nationality, religion, political opinion, social origin, residence, disability, HIV-positive status, sexual orientation or gender identity, refugee or stateless status, and membership or activity in trade unions, as well as other criteria. The law required employers to provide for equal opportunity and treatment of employees without discrimination, to apply the same criteria to assess each employee’s work, and to provide equal conditions for men and women relating to work and family obligations. The law defined and prohibited both direct and indirect discrimination. The government sometimes applied penalties against violators. When enforced, penalties for violations were commensurate with those for other crimes related to denial of civil rights.Women and men had the same legal status in family, labor, property, nationality, inheritance law, and in the judicial system. The law required that women fill a minimum of 40 percent of decision-making positions in government and political offices, including a minimum quota of 40 percent of candidates for parliament on the electoral lists of political parties, distributed evenly across the entire electoral list, and sanctions for noncompliance. While the law strictly prohibited discrimination, spelled out employers’ responsibilities in ensuring that workplaces were free of gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment, and prohibited sexist and discriminatory language and images in media and advertising, gender-based discrimination remained a significant problem. The government did not enforce the law effectively and women experienced discrimination in the workplace. The law required equal pay for equal work, but discrimination with respect to employment, pay, and access to pension benefits persisted in the country.The age at which men and women could retire with either full or partial benefits was not equal, nor was the mandatory retirement age for men and women.Discrimination in employment and occupation occurred with respect to gender, disability, minority status, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, sex characteristics, and HIV-positive status. Pregnant women reported being denied employment opportunities since such employment was associated with additional benefits payable after childbirth.The law also stipulated that the Equality Council be responsible for reviewing complaints of discrimination and making recommendations.Women with disabilities, Romani women, and LGBTQI+ women reported discrimination based on some combination of their protected characteristics.In Transnistria, employment segregation “laws” banned women from more than 300 professions. Prohibited occupations included those deemed “too dangerous or demanding” for women, including welding, driving, snow blowing, and gas extraction.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Women and girls from historically marginalized communities, including rural areas and ethnic minorities, faced exclusion, stigmatization, and discrimination, which often kept them in poverty and impeded their access to public services. Teenagers and young women in rural areas had particularly limited access to accurate information on reproductive and sexual health.Survivors of sexual violence had access to sexual and reproductive health services on the same basis as other citizens. Emergency contraception was not universally available to survivors of sexual violence as part of clinical management of rape. Emergency contraception was provided only in pharmacies and by family doctors and was not available in hospital emergency units.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution provided that all citizens were equal before the law and public authorities, regardless of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth, or social origin. The law governed the equality principles; prevented and combatted discrimination; and provided for equality in political, economic, social, cultural life, and other areas regardless of race, color, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion or belief, sex, age, disability status, opinion, political affiliation, or any other similar criteria. Discrimination and hate-based crime were reported throughout the year, particularly against Roma and the Jewish community.Roma were one of the most vulnerable minority groups in the country and faced a higher risk of marginalization, underrepresentation in political decision making, illiteracy, and social prejudice. Roma had lower levels of education, more limited access to health care, and higher rates of unemployment than the general population. Romani women were particularly vulnerable to social exclusion and discrimination. Some Romani communities lacked running water, sanitation facilities, and heating. Other problems facing Roma included lack of emergency health-care services in secluded settlements, unfair or arbitrary treatment by health practitioners, and lower rates of health insurance coverage. Authorities lacked an effective mechanism to address vulnerable families whose children did not attend school.Romani leaders accused law enforcement bodies of failing to investigate hate speech and holding discriminatory attitudes towards Roma. Romani representatives also reported that police failed or refused to investigate cases of discrimination against Roma. According to Romani leaders, the community faced a high rate of emigration, and the state did not provide sufficient financing for Romani community mediators, as prescribed by law.																																				Children										Birth Registration: As in previous years, the birth of Roma and children from very rural areas were not registered, generally due to parents’ preferences or limited access to public services. Failing to obtain birth registration limited the ability to receive public services, including education.Education: Education of Romani children remained a problem; only half of Romani children attended school and one in five attended preschool. According to Romani representatives, absenteeism and school dropout rates in Romani communities stemmed from poverty and fear of discrimination.Child Abuse: Although the law prohibited child neglect and specific forms of abuse, such as forced begging, child abuse remained a problem.In most cases of abuse children were subject to physical violence, neglect, psychological violence, and labor exploitation. Local public authorities failed to monitor all cases of abuse against children, claiming a lack of experts.A special unit for minors in the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Juvenile Justice Unit, was responsible for ensuring that particular attention and expertise were devoted to child abuse survivors and child offenders.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age for marriage was 16 for women and 18 for men. Child marriage was most common in Romani communities, where there were reports of girls between the ages of 12 and 16 being married. This either took the form of a forced marriage, whereby a girl was married off to an adult man against her will, or an arranged marriage, whereby “matchmakers” arranged for two children to be married in the future. In such cases, marriage took place without official documentation or registration. After marriage, girls commonly dropped out of school to take on household duties.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The exploitation of a child in a commercial sex act was punishable by 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment. Authorities punished commercial sex with minors as statutory rape. The law prohibited the production, distribution, broadcasting, import, export, sale, exchange, use, or possession of child pornography, for which the punishment was one to three years’ imprisonment and fines. These laws were generally enforced. The minimum age for consensual sex was 16.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community numbered between 1,600 and 30,000 persons (depending on source and definition), including up to 2,000 living in Transnistria.According to the Jewish community, antisemitic discourse and hate speech online and in media against members of the Jewish community remained a problem. Online publications related to the community’s activities received hateful and insulting comments.The law included administrative and criminal liabilities for Holocaust denial and insulting the memory of the Holocaust, as well as xenophobic, racist, and fascist propaganda. During the year, the government appointed Sergiu Diaconu as Special Envoy for Antisemitism and Holocaust Issues and publicly supported a two-day program commemorating the 120th anniversary of the Kishinev Pogroms. State educators worked with the OSCE to create an optional Holocaust studies curriculum for grades 10-12 and 9,000 students enrolled in this optional course during the year. Holocaust studies were not mandatory in state schools. Civil society experts said the general knowledge concerning Jewish community history in the country and laws governing hate-based crimes remained low. The Jewish Community of Moldova reported that laws were infrequently enforced, as law enforcement was unwilling to prosecute or lacked understanding of what behavior the law prohibited.For further information on incidents of antisemitism in the country, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, cross-dressing, or other sexual or gender characteristic-related behaviors. Seemingly neutral laws, such as laws covering debauchery, immorality, loitering, or other activities were not disproportionally applied to LGBTQI+ persons. The country lacked a legal framework for civil partnerships. In Transnistria, the “law” did not criminalize consensual same-sex sexual activity. However, the “law” did not recognize same-sex unions. There were no antidiscrimination “laws” protecting members of the LGBTQI+ community and there were no efforts to combat discriminatory behavior.Violence and Harassment: While LGBTQI+ persons reported an improvement of respect for their rights during the year, they nonetheless still experienced verbal harassment and discrimination by public officials, particularly local officials and opposition party leaders, and religious leaders. A survey on public attitudes towards the LGBTQI+ community showed that the majority of LGBTQI+ individuals surveyed had heard of assaults against LGBTQI+ individuals and believed that most victims did not go to the police., citing widespread distrust of the police among the LGBTQI+ community.Religious leaders made homophobic statements against LGBTQI+ persons. On January 30, the Moscow-affiliated Metropolitan Orthodox Church website published an article in response to the January 17 European Court of Human Rights decision concerning recognition and protection of LGBTQI+ unions, calling the decision “promotion of sin” and a “heaven-defying decision for our orthodox conscience.” Similarly on April 13, during an interview with Russia-based Sputnik TV, Orthodox priest Vitalie Sincari declared that liberalism as promoted in connection with LGBTQI+ rights was a “desire for satanic sins” and claimed that the LGBTQI+ community’s understanding of human rights promoted sin, vileness, and bestiality.As in previous years, police were reluctant to open investigations against perpetrators of abuse. According to the NGO Genderdoc-M, in most cases law enforcement bodies failed to identity and hold to account persons who perpetrated acts of violence against LGBTQI+ individuals. As of December 15, Genderdoc-M reported 15 cases of abuses of the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals, down from 32 in 2022, including hate speech, discrimination, and hate incidents. The state did not provide specialized provisions for LGBTQI+ victims of domestic abuse. On January 1, however, a new provision equating the penalty for same-sex rape with opposite-sex rape entered into force.Insults against LGBTQI+ representatives on social media by both public officials and private individuals were also frequent. On June 14, pediatrician Igor Pletos posted a video on social media in which he stated that members of the LGBTQI+ community were “mentally ill.” On June 19, Pletos posted a proposal to petition to prohibit public promotion of LGBTQI+ ideas on his Facebook page.Discrimination: The law prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, but societal discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity persisted. As noted by participants in an October “Coming Out” conference organized by NGO Genderdoc-M, hate speech and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity remained a problem especially for adolescents.  Transgender individuals also reported employment discrimination.Same sex couples were not granted the same rights as heterosexual couples. For example, two LGBTQI+ activists filed a lawsuit April 25 demanding that the state recognize them as a couple. The plaintiffs argued the country was not in compliance with a May ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that obligated Council of Europe member states to ensure equal rights for same-sex and heterosexual marriages.The government trained 39 representatives from the Republican Center for Psycho-pedagogical assistance, and the Ombudsman for the Rights of the Child took a strong stance on “prioritizing the interest of the child” and publicly supported the educational campaign “LGBT Children in Your School,” yet bullying of LGBTQI+ students remained pervasive.In Transnistria, there were no antidiscrimination “laws” protecting LGBTQI+ persons from discrimination by either “authorities” or private individuals and members of the LGBTQI+ community report bullying in public spaces.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Civil society organizations reported that, although transgender individuals were technically allowed to change their names on legal identity documents, including passports, the government did not permit them to easily update gender markers to reflect their gender identity. The Public Services Agency refused to change identity documents for transgender individuals, despite court orders. Obtaining those court orders remained time-intensive and requirements were case-by-case, often requiring applicants to obtain a psychiatric diagnosis of “transsexualism” or “gender identity disorder,” or else to prove that a gender-affirming surgery had taken place. Self-determination was not permitted.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports during the year that so-called conversion therapy or similar practices were practiced on non-consenting adults or minors to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: While Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban initially voiced opposition to the Pride Parade in June, the parade occurred with protection from the national police and without incident. Registered NGOs promoting LGBTQI+ rights operated freely and held meetings and public events, though their presence was largely limited to Chisinau.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law stipulated equal access to public facilities, health services, public buildings, and transportation. Authorities rarely enforced the law, and discrimination against persons with disabilities persisted. The government did not regularly provide information and communication on disability concerns in accessible formats.The law required new construction and transportation companies’ vehicles to be accessible to persons with disabilities. Authorities implemented the provisions of the law only to a limited extent. While some newly built or reconstructed buildings were accessible, older buildings largely remained inaccessible. According to the disability rights NGO Motivation, more than 70 percent of public institutions lacked access ramps for persons with disabilities. Persons with mobility disabilities complained regarding the lack of access to public transportation and public institutions, as well as a shortage of designated parking places. Despite some improvements during the year, city authorities and construction companies often disregarded legal requirements on accessibility for persons with mobility impairments.Most schools were poorly equipped to address the needs of children with disabilities. Some children with disabilities attended mainstream schools, while authorities placed others in segregated boarding schools, or they were home schooled.There were reports of violence and abuses against persons with disabilities. In most cases, prosecutors refused to investigate complaints of violence and abuses against persons with disabilities, questioning the accuracy of allegations made by persons with mental disabilities. According to Promo-LEX, most prosecutors and investigators lacked technical skills to investigate acts of violence or torture in psychiatric institutions. Authorities also lacked a regulatory framework for the psychological assessment of victims of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in psychiatric institutions.In previous years, members of the Council for Prevention of Torture, as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture (NMPT), conducted preventive visits to residential institutions for persons with disabilities. The NMPT identified pervasive problems in such institutions, including: a shortage of personnel in most residential institutions and of qualified medical staff in institutions hosting persons with disabilities; neglect of the special needs of persons with mental disabilities; verbal and physical abuse by personnel of persons with disabilities; involuntary confinement of patients; insufficient qualified staff at specialized institutions for children with disabilities; and lack of complaint mechanisms.According to the Moldovan Institute of Human Rights, systemic deficiencies identified in psychiatric hospitals and temporary placement centers for persons with disabilities were not addressed. Experts reported cases of forced medication without a legally mandated court order. Patients isolated in temporary placement centers reported the administration of psychotropic drugs without consent and mistreatment by personnel. The institute also found deficiencies in the documentation, investigation, and management of cases involving persons with mental or psychosocial impairments by police, prosecutors, judges, and health-care providers. The institute stated the Balti Psychiatric Hospital lacked a separate ward for criminally committed patients, resulting in them being held and treated alongside civilly and voluntarily committed patients. Persons with different types of disabilities and of widely different ages sometimes shared the same rooms, and unjustified restrictive measures were sometimes applied. There was no separation of persons presenting a danger to themselves or others from those who voluntarily committed themselves in any of the country’s three psychiatric hospitals.According to Promo-Lex, patients from psychiatric hospitals held under coercive measures were the most vulnerable. Patients with mental disabilities were neglected, wore old clothes, and were held in poor “detention conditions” with no guarantees against their ill-treatment. The general prosecutor’s order on the procedures for identification, registration, and reporting of alleged cases of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment was not functional. One of its provisions, according to which the hospital staff had to inform the prosecutor’s office of any injuries within 24 hours, was not usually enforced.Although the law provided for equal employment opportunities and prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities (except for jobs requiring specific health standards), many employers either failed to provide accommodations or avoided employing persons with disabilities.Not all polling stations in Gagauzia were fully accessible for the elections that took place during the year.The government continued the deinstitutionalization of persons with disabilities and provided alternative community-based services under the National Program of Deinstitutionalization of People with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities from residential institutions for 2018-26.An individual placed under guardianship lost all standing before the law and could not perform social and legal acts, such as marriage, voting, claiming social benefits, and consenting to or refusing medication. Most residential institutions lacked proper accommodation for persons with mobility impairments.In Transnistria, the “law” provided for protection of the rights of persons with disabilities in the areas of education, health care, and employment.Reliable information on the treatment of persons with disabilities in Transnistria was generally unavailable, but there were reports that children with disabilities rarely attended school and lacked access to specialized resources.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Persons living with HIV continued to face societal and official discrimination.The law prohibited hospitals and other health institutions from denying admission or access to health-care services or requesting additional fees from persons with HIV or suspected of being HIV-positive. Prison inmates with HIV or AIDS faced high levels of discrimination by both prison staff and other inmates. Official practice required that positive HIV test results be reported to the public health sector’s infectious disease doctor.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided workers the right to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes. The government generally respected these rights, but with limitations. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination but did not provide for the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law did not allow government workers and workers in essential services, including health-care providers and public utility employees, to strike. The law prohibited strikes when the government declared an emergency, such as during natural disasters, epidemics, and pandemics. Authorities could impose compulsory arbitration at the request of one party to a dispute. There were no groups of workers excluded from or covered differently by relevant legal protections.The State Labor Inspectorate (SLI) and the Prosecutor General’s Office were responsible for overseeing labor laws, but they failed to monitor or enforce effectively the rights to collective bargaining and labor union organization. The law did not provide effective sanctions for abuses of freedom of association nor antiunion discrimination, nor stipulate penalties for violating trade union rights. Penalties for violations were less than those of other laws related to civil rights and penalties were rarely applied against violators.The government and employers generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Worker organizations were generally independent of the government, political parties, employers, and employers’ associations, although the country’s sole national-level trade union confederation remained largely unreformed since independence in 1991.There were no reports that the government, political parties, or employers interfered in the functioning of workers’ organizations. Prosecutors could reject appeals by trade unions alleging antiunion behavior, and authorities did not punish alleged violations of the trade union law.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a national minimum wage that was less than the poverty level. According to the SLI, as of September salary arrears were at 51.44 million lei ($2.8 million).The law set the maximum workweek at 40 hours with overtime compensation, provided for at least one day off per week, and mandated paid annual leave of at least 28 calendar days (government holidays excluded). Different paid leave plans could be used in some sectors, such as education, health care, and public service. The law prohibited excessive compulsory overtime. Foreign, migrant, and domestic workers had the same wage and hour protections as other workers.Occupational Safety and Health: The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, which were appropriate for the main industries. Inspectors proactively identified unsafe conditions during announced and unannounced inspections. According to labor law, workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.In December 2022, parliament approved legislation empowering the SLI to make unannounced labor inspections. The law entered into force in March.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The SLI was responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor relations and OSH laws. Government efforts to enforce occupational health and safety standards were limited. The number of inspectors was insufficient to effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. The law required the government to establish and monitor safety standards in the workplace, but inspections could only occur when a complaint was received and not all complaints met the criteria for a workplace inspection. Penalties for violations were less than those for other similar crimes.A thriving informal economy accounted for a significant portion of the country’s economic activity. The labor code required work contracts for employment, but the government did not have an effective mechanism to monitor compliance. According to data issued by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter of the year, 14.5 percent of employed persons worked in the informal sector. Workers in the informal economy did not have the same legal protections under wage, hour, and occupational safety and health provisions as employees in the formal sector.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Moldova
- Special Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery Pritzker’s Travel to Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania Office of the SpokespersonSpecial Representative for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery Penny Pritzker traveled to Chișinău, Moldova on April 1, Lviv, Ukraine on April 2, and will travel to Bucharest, Romania on April 3.In Chișinău, Special Representative Pritzker met with President Maia Sandu, Prime Minister Dorin Recean, and private sector representatives to discuss U.S.-Moldovan cooperation on Ukraine’s economic recovery, the importance of EU and Western Black Sea regional economic integration, and Moldova’s role as a launching pad for Ukraine’s recovery that could greatly benefit both countries.In Lviv, the Special Representative highlighted Ukraine’s thriving IT sector and ways we can encourage innovation and entrepreneurship in a way that strengthens our economic bonds. She also emphasized the role that community-driven recovery will play across the country. She met with the Mayor of Lviv Andriy Sadovyi, technology entrepreneurs, and business representatives.In Bucharest, Special Representative Pritzker will meet with Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu, government ministers, and private sector leaders to discuss Romania’s important contributions to regional cooperation including emergency energy assistance to Ukraine, as well as the long-term benefits of infrastructure investments for both Romania and Ukraine. She will also tour RomExpo Refugee Center and listen to the experience of Ukrainian refugees and discuss the role they will play in Ukraine’s recovery.
- Joint Statement on the 11th United States-European Union Energy Council HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Joint Statement on the 11th United States-European Union Energy Council				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Joint Statement on the 11th United States-European Union Energy Council																																		Media Note																														March 15, 2024																																							The text of the following statement was released by the Government of the United States and the European Union.Begin text:1. The eleventh United States-European Union (EU) Energy Council (“Council”) met today in Washington, chaired by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy David M. Turk, European Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson, and EEAS Acting Deputy Secretary General Bélen Martinez Carbonell. The Deputy Head of Mission of the Kingdom of Belgium to the United States of America, Sophie Karlshausen, represented the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.2. The U.S.-EU Energy Council serves as the lead transatlantic forum for coordinating strategic energy issues at political and technical levels. Transatlantic energy cooperation is vital to advancing diverse and resilient energy systems, bolstering energy security, promoting stability and transparency in global energy markets, and accelerating just energy transitions consistent with our mutual commitment to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions at home and globally by 2050.3. On this occasion, the Council also recognized the important work of the U.S.-EU Task Force on Energy Security, which helped ensure the EU’s energy security, achieve a 99% EU natural gas storage filling level ahead of the winter 2023-24, and phase out reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Moving forward, the EU and the US will continue working closely together and build on these efforts to ensure energy security in Europe and beyond and contribute to decarbonization globally.4. The Council welcomed the outcome of the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement, including the call on all Paris Agreement Parties to come forward in their next nationally determined contributions with ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Council also emphasized the need for the world to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.5. In this context, the Council reiterated the urgency of phasing out unabated coal in the energy sector globally, in particular ending the continued investment in new coal-fired power plants. The Council underlined its commitment to advance on the COP28 goals of tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, including through action at national, regional, and local levels. Energy systems with diverse and resilient supply chains that do not overly rely on a single supplier for fuels, critical raw materials and minerals, or other inputs are key to reducing dependencies and countering attempts to weaponize energy.Reinforcing Support for Ukraine and Eliminating the Threat of Russia Weaponizing Energy6. The Council reaffirmed its enduring commitment to Ukraine and its people. We strongly condemn Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, including attacks on the nation’s energy and civil infrastructure. We stress the need to continue military support, notably air defense, to protect such infrastructure, and are increasing our efforts to provide humanitarian aid and critical energy sector assistance. We reiterate our demand for Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its military forces and equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The Council stresses the importance of security and stability in the Black Sea.7. The Council acknowledged the important contributions of the United States, the EU, and its Member States, including through the G7+ coordination group, to provide Ukraine with essential material, technical, and financial assistance to rapidly repair, restore, and defend its energy systems and to support Ukraine’s efforts to build a more resilient, sustainable, and decentralized energy system that is more integrated with Europe. The Council highlighted the will of the G7+ group to work with Ukraine on its Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan and to implement the Clean Energy Partnership including further necessary reforms, which are essential to attracting private sector investment for Ukraine’s green recovery and reconstruction.8. The Council welcomed Ukraine’s formal membership in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and commended the completion of required actions to enable its permanent synchronization with the power systems of continental Europe. This milestone enhances regional energy security and helps enable Ukraine and Europe to accelerate the broader energy transition. The United States and the EU also recalled the growing number of cyber and physical threats to energy infrastructure and plan to continue related cooperation to bolster resilient energy systems, including in the context of the ongoing synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with the Continental European Network.9. The Council reiterated its strong condemnation of Russia’s continued control as well as irresponsible and dangerous actions at and around Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) that puts countless people at risk. The Council reaffirmed its support for the five concrete principles presented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General to the UN Security Council and for the Agency’s work to apply safeguards and assist Ukraine in managing the safety and security of its nuclear facilities. The Council welcomed Ukraine joining the IAEA Board of Governors. The United States and the EU strongly call on Russia to heed the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference, to unconditionally withdraw its personnel and military equipment from the ZNPP, to give full and unhindered access to IAEA experts to all areas of the ZNPP, and to return its full control to its rightful owner, Ukraine.10. The Council reiterated its strongest commitment to confront, with adequate measures, Russia’s efforts to destabilize the global energy markets and to circumvent sanctions. In this context, the Council intends to continue intensifying cooperation on the enforcement of the oil price cap, coordinating bilateral and multilateral responses to mitigate excessive market volatility, supporting the energy transition required to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, and continue cooperative measures on energy efficiency, electrification, and other initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels in general, and Russian fossil fuels in particular in order to limit Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine. We reaffirmed our resolve to continue taking steps to limit Russia’s future energy revenue, which directly supports the brutal war against Ukraine.11. To promote energy diversification, security, resilience and sustainability, the Council recalled the strategic importance of energy relations with partner countries in regions such as the Caspian Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa. The pivotal role of reliable energy partners in these regions calls for mutually beneficial cooperation on security of energy supplies as well as enhanced cooperation on critical infrastructure.Energy Security, Transition, and Reforms in Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and the Western Balkans12. The Council reaffirmed that the future of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, the Western Balkans, as well as Georgia, and their citizens, lies with the EU and would continue supporting their integration with the EU, including through the enlargement process as a matter of priority for the years to come.13. The Council welcomed the European Council’s 14 December 2023 decision to also open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova and reaffirmed continued support for their citizens. The Council intends to continue assisting the countries’ long-term economic and energy transition towards climate neutrality and integration with the EU’s energy system, including by accelerating the development of energy infrastructure and interconnections. The Council welcomed Ukraine’s and the Republic of Moldova’s reform efforts towards meeting the objectives underpinning their candidacy for EU membership and encouraged the countries to continue to make progress on these reforms.14. The Council reaffirmed that both sides intend to deepen cooperation to support regional integration and energy sector investments to achieve climate neutrality in the Western Balkans, including by supporting decarbonization efforts and phasing out their dependency on coal and Russian natural gas and oil imports as soon as possible. The United States and the EU continue to promote transparent, integrated, and competitive energy markets in the Western Balkans, in line with EU enlargement policy, as well as with the climate and energy objectives and obligations under the Energy Community Treaty.Energy Policy, Technology, and Innovation15. The United States and the EU pledged to continue to cooperate closely, at multilateral and bilateral levels, to encourage investments and complementary policies, standards, and regulations in the transition towards climate neutrality. Including through our Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue, we intend to work in a transparent and mutually reinforcing manner, to avoid zero-sum competition and distortions in transatlantic trade and investment flows that could arise from our respective policies and incentives.16. The Council welcomed the 2023 announcement of an international working group to establish an internationally aligned approach, which builds on existing frameworks on greenhouse gas supply chain emissions measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MMRV) framework for providing transparent, comparable, and reliable information to natural gas market participants.17. The Council intends to continue advancing the implementation of the Global Methane Pledge, including through promoting effective global schemes to limit leakage, venting, and flaring in the natural gas, oil, and coal sector, with particular attention to reducing methane emissions from internationally-traded fossil fuels. The Council recognized the UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory as a key independent methane emissions data collector and verifier, and intends to continue to support its initiatives, including the Oil and Gas Methane Partnership 2.0 and the Methane Alert and Response System with strong industry engagement.18. Further, the Council noted the role that nuclear power can play in decarbonizing energy systems in countries that have decided or will decide to rely on nuclear energy. The United States and the EU intend to intensify cooperation to reduce dependency on Russia for nuclear materials and fuel cycle services, and support ongoing efforts by affected EU Member States to diversify nuclear supplies, as appropriate. The Council expressed support for multilateral efforts to identify alternative nuclear energy-related suppliers across the global nuclear supply chain for relevant countries.19. The Council noted interest in enhancing cooperation to promote the development of rules-based and transparent global hydrogen markets based on reliable international standards and certification schemes primarily through mutually agreed-upon international platforms.20. The Council noted the vital importance of diversifying and securing supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials as well as voluntary stockpiling necessary for the energy transition to climate-neutrality and reinforced the value of U.S.-EU collaboration in fora such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and its newly established MSP Forum, the Conference on Critical Materials and Minerals, and the International Energy Agency Critical Minerals Working Party, as well as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. The Council welcomed a jointly drafted discussion paper on lithium supply for the energy transition and signaled support for a set of U.S.-EU focused stakeholder roundtables over the coming year and an accompanying recommendations document to map pathways to foster supply chain linkages between the United States and the EU.21. Furthering last year’s Council endorsement to build on existing dialogues and frameworks, the Council noted research and innovation cooperation advancements in the fields of i) fusion research, development, and commercialization, in particular based on the new Model Project Agreement, and through the ITER Project, and ii) mutual modelling capabilities for transition pathways to climate-neutrality. In particular, the Council welcomed joint work on scenario development of transition pathways with applications of machine learning.22. As the United States and the EU scale up policies and technologies that intend to drive decarbonization particularly in hard to abate sectors, carbon capture and storage has emerged as an area for joint cooperation. Following a series of policy exchanges, the Council identified two technology and innovation collaboration areas: CO2 transport and carbon capture demonstrations for emerging applications.23. The Council noted the U.S.-EU co-convened workshop in 2023 on just transition, energy poverty, and economic and workforce development assistance for communities in transition, disadvantaged communities, and communities experiencing environmental hazard exposure. Further, the Council supported the intent to hold a second workshop, focused on multi-level governance in energy poverty policies, to take place in 2024, followed by the publication of a joint summary document.Strengthen Cooperation to Advance the Global Energy Transition24. Looking ahead and building on the aforementioned joint activities, the United States and the EU intend to continue to ambitiously and resolutely strengthen their strategic relationship to ensure energy security, align policies, and deepen cooperation on technologies and innovation, all with the aim of accelerating the global transition to climate neutrality. The United States and the EU intend to also continue working closely together to this end in international fora.End text.						Tags																					Bureau of Energy Resources																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																																Climate Change																																																					Energy																																							European Union																															Moldova																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Russia																								Ukraine
- Department Press Briefing – March 4, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; March 4, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; March 4, 2024																																																					March 4, 2024																																																								1:26 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon. Monday. Start with some opening comments. We remain extremely concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. As last week’s incident in northern Gaza made painfully clear, people are desperate for food, for water, for medicine. Parents are facing impossible choices about how to feed their children. Many don’t know where the next meal will come from, or if it will come at all.The situation is simply intolerable. And that’s why the United States is focused on increasing and sustaining aid in Gaza through as many channels as possible.Over the weekend, the Department of Defense and the Jordanian Royal Air Force worked together to air drop 38,000 ready-to-eat meals into Gaza. Operating out of Jordan, this operation saw a United States contribution of 66 bundles of aid, packed across three C-130 aircraft, delivered to those in dire need.This air drop was the first in a series the Department of Defense will be conducting, but I want to be clear about one thing: these air drops are intended to supplement, not replace, aid through other mechanisms.We are also actively pursuing options to establish a maritime assistance corridor. We are in discussion with a number of partners about this initiative, and while it is still in the development phase, we are optimistic about its potential to supplement our air and land efforts.We continue to work to increase the amount of aid flowing through existing border crossings at Rafah and Kerem Shalom and to press the Government of Israel to open additional crossings and routes into Gaza. Even as we explore other means of delivery, it is critical that we maximize the aid flowing into Gaza over land.When it comes to distribution inside Gaza, over the past week, the ability of the UN and other humanitarian implementers to distribute assistance within central and south Gaza has improved. While over 100 trucks a day of humanitarian assistance are now being distributed to those in need, this level is still significantly below the levels needed to meet minimum requirements to avert famine.In northern Gaza, we remain concerned at the increasing severity of the humanitarian situation. While private sector convoys have attempted to deliver assistance and some have been successful, these efforts are not and cannot be a replacement for large-scale assistance to the north distributed by the UN. We will continue to press the Government of Israel to facilitate increased deliveries to the north.Our goal is clear: to establish a comprehensive aid strategy that includes air, land, and sea routes to maximize the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and ensure that aid is distributed to everyone in Gaza who needs it.Finally, we continue to push for a temporary ceasefire through a hostage agreement that would allow a massive surge of aid into Gaza and ease the distribution problems that are currently hindering humanitarian efforts. A deal is on the table – a deal that would bring the hostages home and that would alleviate the terrible suffering of the Palestinian people. Hamas should accept it immediately.With that, Matt.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Before getting back to the – before getting into the aid, I just want to ask you what you know about this U.S. Embassy employee who was found dead in Jerusalem.MR MILLER: I can confirm the death of a direct-hire employee of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. There’s not much more I can say at this point due to privacy considerations; as you know, there are steps we need to undertake, including next-of-kin notification, whenever such a terrible tragedy occurs. But it’s an incident that is under investigation, and I do just want to be clear that’s a step that always happens when someone dies, and there are no indications of foul play.QUESTION: Okay. But when you say a direct hire, what does that mean? Does it mean an American citizen?MR MILLER: American citizen. And I can’t say much more. I’m sure when we’ve finished next-of-kin notifications I’ll be able to say more, but that’s not where we are today.QUESTION: Okay. Well, do you know what this person did?MR MILLER: Again, due to the privacy and respect for the family, it’s not something I can say today. Be happy to get into it once we’ve completed that process.QUESTION: All right. And then back to the – unless someone else wants to go on that, just back on the aid situation. So you know that Bennie Gantz is in town and meeting with the Vice President and people at the White House today and with Secretary Blinken tomorrow. How focused are those – are these discussions going to be on the aid situation, which you just said was intolerable?MR MILLER: So it will be at the top of the agenda. I won’t speak in detail as to what the Vice President and the National Security Advisor will discuss with the minister. I’m sure that they will provide readouts and speak to those meetings at some point. But I can tell you it is at the top of the agenda. It will be at the top of the agenda when Secretary Blinken meets with Minister Gantz tomorrow. It’s something that the Secretary raised in a phone call with Ron Dermer, the Israeli minister for strategic affairs, earlier today to press that more must be done to get aid into Gaza, to ensure that the delivery of aid is sustained into Gaza, and to ensure that once aid gets into Gaza it can be disturbed to those who need it.QUESTION: Okay. And based on the conversation the Secretary had with former Ambassador Dermer this morning, do you have any indication that the Israelis are willing to allow more aid in, especially since you’ve been pushing for several weeks now on opening Erez crossing in the north into Gaza, and that has not yet happened?MR MILLER: So I will let the Israeli Government speak for themselves about decisions that they take, but we will continue to press them to allow more aid in through Rafah, through Kerem Shalom, and to open additional crossings to the north. As we’ve spoken about before, it’s extremely difficult to get aid from southern Gaza and central Gaza into the north right now. We all saw the horrific video last week of commercial deliveries in the north to people who are incredibly desperate for food and the way they – when they see any hope of a chance of getting food, the way they rush to get it. It’s a clear sign that more needs to be done, and so that’s what we’re pressing the Government of Israel to do.QUESTION: Do you have any indication that they get it and that they’re accepting your – your appeals?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to speak for them, but it’s something we’re continuing to press with &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I’m not asking you to speak for them. I’m asking you to tell me whether or – or to tell everyone here what – whether or not you think that your arguments are having an impact.MR MILLER: It is an issue that we remain incredibly focused on. The Government of Israel tells us, as they say publicly, that they want to ensure that aid gets to those who need it. But ultimately, as you’ve heard us say when it comes to other matters, it’s the results that matter, not the intent. And right now not enough aid is getting in and not enough aid is getting distributed, and that needs to change.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Humeyra.QUESTION: Hi, Matt. I just want to go back a little bit to the air drops because they have raised a lot of questions and some criticism as well. A lot of people made the point that why does Washington need to resort to a practice that it would use in battlefields or areas that are controlled by hostile forces? Given that this area is controlled by Israel, why is the United States forced to use this practice to get aid into an area that its closest ally controls?MR MILLER: So a few things. Number one, we are using air drops because not enough aid is getting in right now. That’s the fundamental reason, and we want to do everything we can to get aid in through any mechanism possible.Number two, even as we air drop food and assistance into Gaza, as I said in my opening comments, we are continuing to push for the expansion of alternative mechanisms.But then the third thing I would say is I’ve seen people expressing their opposition to these air drops, and it’s something I frankly don’t understand. If you want to say that air drops are not enough, fine. We would agree with that proposition. As I said, we want to see aid come in through a maritime delivery route, and we’re exploring one. We want to see aid come in through the crossing that are already open but need to be increased. And we want to see aid come in through additional crossings that are open.But it’s a good thing, not a bad thing, to see thousands of meals distributed by air. And so we will continue to deliver aid through that mechanism, but it is very much not a replacement for every other mechanism to get aid into Gaza.QUESTION: I mean, I think a lot of people were pointing out to the fact that it’s a very expensive workaround. So I want to repeat a question that me and my colleagues have repeatedly asked you here over the last four months. The United States does have a very important and big leverage over Israel, like it does over other countries, and that is the military aid. And you have repeatedly said that Washington has so far – did not feel the need to or does not think it’s the best option to use that leverage.So after the events of last week and as the situation on the ground gets even more dire, and there seems to be an obvious inability on the part of U.S. Government to influence Israel in a meaningful way on this particular issue, does the United States – is the United States reconsidering its decision to not use military aid as its leverage over Israel?MR MILLER: So again, we continue to support Israel’s campaign to ensure that the attacks of October 7th cannot be repeated. We have provided military assistance to Israel because it is consistent with that goal. Hamas continues – the leadership of Hamas, that planned and plotted October 7th, continue to be at large inside Gaza. They continue to pose a threat to innocent civilians inside Israel. They would relaunch the attacks of October 7th today, tomorrow, if they had the capability to do so. So we support Israel’s legitimate military campaign consistent with international humanitarian law, and that’s why we continue to support them militarily.At the same time, we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation, and that’s why you’ve seen engagement at the highest levels of this government. And you all have heard this from me before, but it is the engagement by the President, the engagement by the Secretary, that ensured that Rafah was open in the first place, that ensured that Kerem Shalom was open in the first place, that hopefully is going to ensure another crossing opens in the north.And so it is through that engagement that we have gotten humanitarian assistance in. That is in no way to say that we are satisfied. We are very much not satisfied. And so we are going to build on the record that has proven somewhat successful but very much needs to be expanded in getting more humanitarian assistance in, and we will engage directly with the Israeli Government on that question.QUESTION: So that’s a no?MR MILLER: It’s my – the answer I just provided.QUESTION: Okay, a couple of other little things &#8212;MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: &#8212; on maritime. You said this is in developmental – development phase. But – so I mean, as much as you can say, there is no port in Gaza. Where is this going to be offloaded?MR MILLER: So I can’t say very much about it. It’s a matter that we are exploring with commercial partners as well as other partners in the region. There are a number of different ways to do it. We’re trying to find the most efficient way to get as much aid in as possible. But while we’re reviewing that privately, I don’t think I should talk to it in detail from here.QUESTION: Is there any consideration that the U.S. military would be involved?MR MILLER: We have – as you’ve heard the President make clear, we do – he is not sending U.S. military to Gaza.QUESTION: Could I just basically follow up on Humeyra’s question, but maybe ask it in a slightly different way? Israel, of course, is a friendly country to the United States, is a very good relationship, but there are actually warnings of famine, perhaps, coming soon in Gaza. I mean, do you believe that Israel could do more to actually avert this?MR MILLER: We do think there is more that they could do. There is more that they could do practically. There are decisions that they could make that would have an impact. Opening an increased crossing would be one. There are practical decisions that they could make with respect to security around the distribution of aid inside Gaza that we have been pressing them to make. So yes, we very much agree that there is more that they can do and more that they should do.QUESTION: And why do you think they haven’t done it? Is there any influence that the U.S. could –MR MILLER: I will – I will let them speak to their own decision making. The point that we make to them is that the situation as it stands now is unacceptable and everyone involved needs to do more.QUESTION: And just one more on that. The situation in northern Gaza in particular, there’s been a security deterioration. I mean, do you think that everything has been done that could be possible to actually improve the security there, or do you think there are things the Israelis could do to improve the stability there?MR MILLER: I do think there’s more. I think the – one of the most important things that they could do to improve the security situation in northern Gaza would be to open a crossing to allow humanitarian aid to get in. There – Israel faces a – there are a number of security issues right now with respect to northern Gaza. One is that there are Hamas fighters that continue to operate there and continue to pop up from time to time and try to re-engage with IDF forces. But there is also a security situation with respect to the number of people who are there – who are desperate for aid. And that’s a security situation that you saw play out last week when you see hundreds if not thousands of people running to trucks just because they’re desperate for food for their families.So we think getting more aid in would both alleviate the underlying humanitarian situation but would alleviate the desperation, and that if people knew – it gets to this point. The reason we are trying to get aid in through as many channels as possible is it is our assessment that if people know that this truck they see today is not the last truck that’s going to be in their neighborhood delivering food in the next week or month, they’re less likely to rush out there and put themselves in danger, put their neighbors in danger, and create a chaotic situation.So we just need to get more aid in so people have confidence that there will be a next meal for themselves, for their family members. And that’s what we’re trying to do.QUESTION: Can I just follow up?MR MILLER: Jen, go ahead.QUESTION: Oh, do you want to &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: It was just a follow-up on the security point.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, how much of a factor is the bombing of police forces that were securing these convoys by the Israelis in what has happened since? Because we know what a problem that has caused. These police, as far as I understand it, are sometimes unarmed, they contain remnants that are still called Fatah, not all Hamas, and they have been hit. And that seems to have been a huge factor in them no longer be willing to secure the convoys, which has led to this complete drying up of aid, particularly being able to get to the north, and therefore part of the problem with the terrible event we saw on Thursday. So how much of a factor was Israel doing that in what’s now happening?MR MILLER: It is a significant factor. And the point that we have made to the Government of Israel is what’s important is that aid be distributed from the warehouses at Rafah, the warehouses in – at Kerem Shalom or just inside the Gaza border, out to neighborhoods so people can get it. There are a number of ways in which that could occur. Police escorts could be one. As I mentioned a moment ago, there are increased deliveries that have been going on the last week in which the UN has been able to provide – to find security that is not provided by on-duty police. There may be other alternative mechanisms as well. Ultimately, that’s a question for the Government of Israel and the United Nations to determine.But what we have made clear is what’s not an acceptable alternative is for people to starve. And so whatever the security situation is that’s – that needs to be established to ensure that those trucks can deliver needs to be done. And Israel can – we will be happy to work with Israel and with the United Nations to find the best alternative to ensure that those trucks can safely deliver their food, their water, their medicine. But an unacceptable answer is allowing those – is leaving those trucks just sitting in warehouses and not getting the aid distributed to the people who desperately, desperately need it.QUESTION: But doesn’t it go – it goes to the fundamental issue, though, that there is no security in Gaza. So this is not a day-after problem, some sort of hypothetical in the future; it’s happening now. And it’s happening now because there was no plan.MR MILLER: I would not disagree with the assessment that it is not a day-after issue, it is an issue now, and it’s one that the Government of Israel needs to work with the United Nations to determine an answer to now, because there is a very urgent need on the ground.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, go ahead. Sorry, I was supposed to come to you &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple things. In your response to Humeyra and to Shaun, on the – what happened last Thursday, you’re saying that we’ve seen what desperate people needing food and so on, what could – are you saying that the tragedy was a result of the stampede of people?MR MILLER: There is an investigation ongoing by the Government of Israel. I know they’ve released preliminary – a preliminary assessment. But there’s a further investigation going on. But clearly, the reason all those people were out there in the first place at 4:30 in the morning – I think it’s easy to lose sight of that. This was not in the middle of the day; it’s 4:30 in the morning. And the reason that many people were out there was because they’re so desperate for food and assistance. When aid trucks roll in, especially in the middle of the night, you shouldn’t have to see people swarming them for aid. They should have confidence that that aid will be distributed, but they don’t right now and for good reason, because aid hasn’t been getting there, and they’re desperate to feed their families.QUESTION: Okay. But you don’t doubt that the Israeli military fired on those people?MR MILLER: They have &#8212;QUESTION: That there were gunshots?MR MILLER: They have offered a public assessment of what’s happened, and they said that they did fire in one context. We do not have any independent confirmation of how the actual events rolled out. I know that there are differing assessments and conflicting evidence about what happened, which is why we’re going to await the outcome of the investigation.QUESTION: Yeah, but I mean, as wonderful as it is to send them aid by airplanes, I mean, it’s 38,000 meals. That’s, like, 0.07 – one-seventh each one person. I mean, that’s a very small amount. The best way obviously is via ground, and the U.S. can send in trucks. I don’t think that the Israelis would shoot or would fire on American-controlled trailer trucks and so on.MR MILLER: Said, I think you’re – you, number one, are missing everything I just said, both in my opening comments and &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Just – I – please don’t interrupt, because I didn’t interrupt you – about the fact that these air drops are intended to supplement, not replace. And while they are insufficient by themselves, they are still important and will provide meals to people who otherwise did not have them, so we do feel they meet a critical need and we will continue them. But that does not change the fundamental underlying issue, which is we do need to get more aid in through land delivery and potentially through sea delivery, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Yeah. First of all, I’m not dismissing the value of that. In fact, I asked the question last week if the U.S. would do something like this – nor was I interrupting you. I’m just saying I realized that it’s an effort, but it’s a very small effort. There are other ways. And even by sea, I mean, I understand the U.S. military has these wonderful causeways they can roll things in. Doesn’t – you don’t even have to have a harbor and so on. But that is still inefficient. I mean, it’s – the United States and Egypt and so on, there is a political decision to ensure – I mean, to basically force Israel to allow trucks in. I’d believe that they will prevail. You don’t think that the U.S. can prevail if it pressures Israel to allow these trucks in?MR MILLER: We are making clear that more trucks need to come in from the seniormost levels of this government.QUESTION: Okay, a couple more questions. Of course I think it was raised that there is something like 15 children that have already died of starvation in Gaza, and there seems to be maybe hundreds more in the coming days and so on. So the situation is very, very desperate. Let me ask you about UNRWA. Have you arrived a decision on continuing aid or resuming aid to UNRWA?MR MILLER: We have made clear that we are going to make that determination at the conclusion of the two investigations the UN is conducting with respect to UNRWA. Neither of those investigations has concluded at this point.QUESTION: Do you have any, like, calendar or timetable on this, because &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s – it’s &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; the people in UNRWA are saying that we are – the situation is pretty horrible.MR MILLER: So it’s a question you should direct to the UN about how long that – those two investigations will take.QUESTION: But you are not demanding that the UN sort of speed up the process?MR MILLER: I think it’s in the UN’s interest that the investigations be completed as soon as possible. I’m sure that they are well aware of that.QUESTION: And finally, I have one – can you share with us any update on the talks?MR MILLER: On the hostage talks? No, I’m not going to read those out in detail other than to say, as I said in my opening comments, that there is a deal on the table. And that deal would get hostages out, it would deliver a temporary ceasefire of six weeks, and it would allow more aid to come in, so we hope Hamas will accept the deal.Jen.QUESTION: On the hostage talks, Matt, what do you make of the fact that Israel did not send a delegation to Cairo for these continued working-level talks?MR MILLER: I will let Israel speak for itself. We want – we are engaged in the ongoing talks and want them to conclude successfully.QUESTION: Are you concerned that this indicates that they would not accept any Hamas counterproposals or discuss them at all?MR MILLER: Israel has made clear that they want a deal to secure the release of hostages. They have been engaged to try to secure a deal to release hostages and achieve a temporary ceasefire. And we’ll continue to engage with them in that regard.QUESTION: And you spoke of the Israeli investigation into what happened last Thursday. Would the U.S. support an independent investigation?MR MILLER: So I’ve heard those calls for an independent investigation. I have – as yet have not seen who people have in mind or what body they have in mind to conduct the – such an independent investigation. I did note that the UN says that it is sending UN staff into hospitals to look at the nature of the wounds to see if it was a small number of people who were killed by gunshot or whether it was a larger number, or whether the deaths have – came as a result of being run over by trucks or crushed in the horrific events that occurred. So it does appear the UN is conducting at least its own kind of assessment of what happened, and we support them doing that.QUESTION: And then on the Gantz visit, there’s been a lot of political furor in Israel from Netanyahu and members of his coalition there. Does the U.S. – I guess can you talk us through why you thought it was still appropriate to meet with Gantz despite &#8212;MR MILLER: So Benny Gantz is a member of the war cabinet, someone with whom the Secretary has engaged in his visits to Israel, someone with whom the Secretary has had one-on-one phone calls on repeated occasions when we’re back here in the United States. So what ministers travel to the United States is – and how they make those decisions and how they coordinate is ultimately an internal matter for the Government of Israel to determine on their own. For our part, we find him an important figure inside the Israeli Government to engage with and – given the number of issues that we have currently that we are in discussion with the Government of Israel about, including the need to surge humanitarian assistance in – for our purposes, it’s an important meeting to have.QUESTION: And I have a couple on Haiti when (inaudible) &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Let’s go ahead. Go ahead and go to Haiti, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: I was going to follow up. Is that all right?MR MILLER: Oh, go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Sorry. I don&#8217;t want to step on anybody, but just directly to follow &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; on Jenny’s question, I mean does the fact that senior U.S. officials – including the Secretary, the Vice President, National Security Advisor – the fact that they’re taking these meetings with Benny Gantz signal that they see in him more of a willing diplomatic partner than Prime Minister Netanyahu?MR MILLER: I would not make that assessment. We’re meeting with Benny Gantz because he’s one of three members of the war cabinet thought to – one of five, if you count the two advisor members – but one of three members of the war cabinet who has a critical vote and a critical stake in how this war is conducted. He has a critical voice in the delivery of humanitarian assistance; he’s an important figure in the sitting government of Israel, and so that’s why we engage with him.QUESTION: I mean, he’s also a political rival of the sitting prime minister and Prime Minister Netanyahu made clear that he disapproves of these meetings going forward. So in taking these meetings, did the U.S. consider that they might fuel political instability within the existing Israeli Government.MR MILLER: We – that is – the various political intrigue inside Israel is ultimately a matter for the Government of Israel and the political class in Israel that we take no position on. The Secretary has met with Benny Gantz a number of times – met with him in the presence of the prime minister; he’s met with him separately, just as he’s met with members of the opposition and members of the – and other members of the government, and we’ll continue to do that, because we think it’s important to do so and advances the interests of the United States.QUESTION: Two quick follows on the region?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: One is, what can you say about Israel’s willingness to make good on the requirements set forth in the National Security Memorandum set forth last month, about providing written confirmation that they’ll use American military aid in accordance with humanitarian law? Absent having already supplied that response, have they indicated that they will be able to meet that deadline and provide you a written &#8212;MR MILLER: So it’s a matter we are in conversation with the Government of Israel about, as we are in conversation with other countries that receive security assistance from the United States. I don&#8217;t want to get into those underlying discussions, but there is a deadline that the executive order sets out. I think it’s 45 days from early February, when it was established. And we will engage with every country that we provide military assistance to about the requirements set out on the executive order and how they can fulfill them.QUESTION: Is Israel on track to meet that deadline?MR MILLER: Again, the deadline is clearly imposed. I don&#8217;t want to speak to it before we get there. It’s a matter, right now, we’re in discussion with Israel. And I should note, I know all the questions always come with respect to Israel, but this is a matter that’s not unique to Israel. It applies to every country that receives security assistance from the U.S.QUESTION: Last quick one on Rafah.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Was – has the U.S. been advised as to whether there is a likely or an imminent ground operation likely to be launched into Rafah?MR MILLER: No, we have not. And we have still not been briefed on any plan either for a military operation or a humanitarian assistance plan that we have said is critical before a military operation takes place.QUESTION: And you would still expect that to happen before anything happens on the ground?MR MILLER: It is what we have said is critical.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: The situation on the ground in Haiti &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; has deteriorated even further. What’s the U.S. assessment of where things go from here? Our understanding is the prime minister is not in the country. Is the U.S. trying to facilitate his return there? And then are there any plans to evacuate the embassy at this point?MR MILLER: So first of all, we are closely monitoring the situation and condemn efforts by gangs to further destabilize and take control of Haiti. It’s our understanding that the prime minister is returning to the country. We think it’s important that he do so and that he be allowed to do so.Many of those responsible for the uptick in violence have been designated by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act and illicit drugs sanctions programs and by other members of the international community under their authorities. And I think the actions you’ve seen these gang members take over the last few days shows exactly why they have been so designated. And it also underscores the urgency of finalizing the Multinational Security Support Mission to assist the Haiti National Police in dealing with the dire security situation on the ground.With respect to the embassy, the embassy remains open. The – we announced yesterday that the embassy has moved to limited operations with no public services available the first three days of this week due to the ongoing violence in Port-au-Prince.QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that?MR MILLER: Yeah. Janne, I swear I’ll come to you. We’ll do this first and then &#8212;QUESTION: So just the tense – the prime minister is returning to the country. Like is he in the process of it? Is he &#8212;MR MILLER: I will let the Haitian Government speak to that.QUESTION: Does the U.S. have any role in &#8212;MR MILLER: Again, I’ll let the Haitian Government speak to the prime minister’s travel. Go ahead, Janne.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions on Russia and North Korea. The Russian President Putin warned that if the Western countries sent troops to Ukraine nuclear war would break out. How do you think about the Russia as a nuclear threat?MR MILLER: So first of all, the – that rhetoric, as we’ve seen before, is irresponsible and inappropriate for a nuclear power and is inconsistent with the way that any nuclear power should talk about the use of such weapons in public. But we have seen no reason to change our nuclear posture. And I would just note, as I always note, as the President has made clear, we are not sending boots on the ground to Ukraine.QUESTION: Secondly, on North Korea, there are signs that North Korea will soon launch another reconnaissance satellite. Do you think Russia is providing satellite technology to North Korea as part of its weapons support?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to comment on that detail.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. A couple of separate topics. Staying on Russia rhetoric.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Russia ramped its rhetoric against Moldova, saying that West is trying to take over the leadership of Moldova. Do you have any response to Lavrov?MR MILLER: That’s obviously not true.QUESTION: He also accused Armenia of going towards the West, and then he promised that they will respond to Armenia. Any reaction?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to respond directly to that question, although it’s the kind of – it’s the kind of rhetoric that we have seen the Russian Government make that is destabilizing to the region, and it’s why you’ve seen so many of Russia’s neighbors be concerned about threatening rhetoric and threatening actions that the Russian Government has shown over and over it is willing to take against its neighbors. And I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Thank you. Do you want to weigh into a German leaked story in two contexts actually? One is Germany says that it – Russia has ramped up its information war against it since last night; secondly, whether do you see this might mean that Germany will be frozen out of intel sharing?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on intelligence matters at all.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: A couple of – a few questions, Matt, on Iran. Today, the director general of the IAEA delivered his report – officially delivered his report to the Board of Governors and made statements about the different subjects, including Iran. He didn’t have anything positive to say about what Iran’s been doing in the past few months.MR MILLER: Nor will I, much to your surprise.QUESTION: (Laughter.) He also expressed concern about some comments that Iranian officials have been making that – about their capabilities to build a bomb. This was the first time that Grossi made reference to that. Does the U.S. think that it’s time to censor Iran or at least report it directly to the UN Security Council? Because I think Reuters has reported and quoted Western officials that the E3 do have a draft for a censure, but the U.S. may not be very willing to go along with it.MR MILLER: So we are closely coordinating with our E3 allies on our approach to Iran’s nuclear program, including with respect to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. I don’t have any actions to preview at this time, but we fully support the IAEA and Director General Grossi and believe that Iran must fully uphold its safeguard obligations without further delay.QUESTION: Your Iranian counterpart today was asked about the 2015 nuclear agreement. He said that the &#8212;MR MILLER: I didn’t know I had an Iranian counterpart. Does he hold press briefings?QUESTION: Yes, they do – once a week. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Yeah. Yeah. Once a week.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: With a thriving free press inside Iran.QUESTION: Perfect. He was asked about the JCPOA, and he said that the diplomatic channels was – were still open. Have any communication been exchanged in this regard regarding their nuclear program?MR MILLER: So we have the ability to communicate to Iran when it is in the U.S. interest to do so, but I’m not going to characterize those communications further.QUESTION: Okay. One last one. Shervin Hajipour, one of – who composed a song last year &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; about – yeah – the protests, and he was given an almost four-year sentence, plus that he has to read books on women’s rights in Islam and to compose an anti-U.S. song and publish it on social media. Do you have any comments?MR MILLER: So we condemn the years-long prison sentence for Shervin Hajipour, who many around the world know for his song Baraye which became a global anthem for the Iranian peoples’ protests. You may remember that Secretary Blinken had the – that song on his 2022 Spotify playlist and Dr. Jill Biden presented him with the first ever Grammy for best song for social change. And I think the Iranian Government’s actions are just another signal of their intent to crack down on freedom of expression and repress voices inside their own society whenever possible.QUESTION: Can I ask one more on Iran?MR MILLER: To – yeah.QUESTION: The – I know you commented on this before the election, but the election, particularly the turnout. Authorities are reporting its 41 percent, which would be the lowest since the Islamic Revolution. Do you have any comment either on the turnout – whether you think that turnout is accurate, but what the overall historically low turnout, what it means?MR MILLER: I don’t have our own assessment to offer about turnout, other than to say that the Iranian authorities’ claims about turnout have generally been unreliable. But as you heard me say last week, we did not assess that these elections would be free and fair and believe that many Iranian voters would assess that the elections would not be free and fair. And so it wouldn’t be surprise me if in that regards they chose not to participate.QUESTION: Can I just take it one step further? I mean, do you think this is a show of discontent or whatever the low &#8212;MR MILLER: We know that the Iranian people are discontented. We see them – we’ve seen them come out and protest on a number of occasions, and we’ve seen the Iranian authorities brutally crack down on those protests. So I don’t think there’s any doubt that there’s discontent about the regime’s rule and the regime’s willingness to crack down and try and keep that discontent from bubbling up.Go ahead. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: The 30 days notification by the U.S. State Department to the U.S. Congress on sale of drones to India has passed yesterday. What the next steps in that? Do you know?MR MILLER: I will have to take that and get back to you. I wasn’t aware that, that date had passed.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I have two questions on Gaza. First, on Israeli investigations – at recent briefings, you have urged a lot of investigations into a lot of issues. I wanted to follow up on two of these. You have urged for investigation into the sexual violence allegations, sexual assault allegations against Palestinian women, and the killing of Hind Rajab. Do you have any updates on those, any &#8212;MR MILLER: I – oh, sorry.QUESTION: Have you heard back from any of these?MR MILLER: I don’t have an update. I don’t know if we have. I’m happy to check, I’m just personally not aware with respect to that one.QUESTION: And the second question, on have you seen the reports of Israeli war planes bombing a makeshift cemetery in Sunday built near the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza? Have you seen those reports? Do you &#8212;MR MILLER: I have seen the reports. I haven’t been able to – we have not been able to verify them, but as we have said a number of times, it is important that Israel conduct this campaign in full compliance with international humanitarian law.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Shehbaz Sharif has been elected as the new prime minister of Pakistan. Would you like to comment on your expectations for bilateral relations with Pakistan under the leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak with respect to the new prime minister, but as we’ve said before, we value our longstanding partnership with Pakistan and have always viewed a strong, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan as critical to United States-Pakistan interests, and our engagement with new Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his government will continue to focus on advancing these shared interests.QUESTION: Sir, Maryam Nawaz, the daughter of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has been elected as the chief minister of the key province of Punjab in Pakistan, the country’s first woman to hold the post. Despite facing fabricated cases and spending time behind bars, she emerged as the winner and the first woman chief minister of Punjab. In your opinion, how does her historic election signify progress for women’s representation in Pakistani politics?MR MILLER: So her selection as chief minister is a milestone in Pakistani politics. We look forward to cooperating with Pakistan more broadly on integrating women more fully into the country’s political life, in the economy, including through the U.S.-Pakistan Women’s Council, civil society, and other decision making spaces. An inclusive Pakistan makes for a strong, prosperous country which all Pakistanis benefit from, and so we are always pleased when we see cracks in the glass ceiling anywhere in the world.QUESTION: Follow-up.MR MILLER: Go ahead – no, go ahead. Go ahead first. Yeah. I’ll come to you &#8212;QUESTION: Yes. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein is in Beirut today.MR MILLER: I – he does not work for the State Department. He works for the White House, so I will defer to them for comment on Amos’s travel.QUESTION: But the ambassador with him in his meeting with officials.MR MILLER: Again – again, I’m going to defer to the White House for comment on a – the travel of a White House official, but Amos Hochstein has been engaged, as have people at the State Department, on trying to achieve a diplomatic resolution to the situation in the north of Israel.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Yes. You just called my colleague that Maryam Nawaz Sharif was a milestone, becoming the first female chief minister of Pakistan. Has &#8212;MR MILLER: Of Punjab. Of Punjab.QUESTION: Of Punjab, yeah.MR MILLER: Of Punjab.QUESTION: Prime – we have had a prime minister, female, Benazir Bhutto, if you remember.MR MILLER: I do. That does not &#8212;QUESTION: She was a milestone too.MR MILLER: I do. She absolutely was. It in no way changes this accomplishment.QUESTION: But you know Maryam Nawaz Sharif was caught in the supreme court of Pakistan &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have a question?QUESTION: No, but are you aware that Maryam Nawaz was caught in the supreme court by presenting a fake Calibri font as well?MR MILLER: I am not going to get into those underlying details. It’s a matter for Pakistan, but we do believe her selection as chief minister is a milestone for Pakistan (inaudible).QUESTION: Just one more question. One more question. Human rights – United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Mr. Richard Bennett urged countries to initiate a case against Taliban over women rights. Last week, Karine and you spoke about having a inclusive government, but the women rights are totally forgotten. Can the U.S. at least urge – like, be a part of this case? Because this is a very general case. Millions of girls just across the border from Pakistan are – have been without education for two years now.MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to the specific case that you’re referring to because I’m not aware of it, but of course we have said it many times that the treatment of women and girls inside Afghanistan is deplorable.Humeyra, you had something.QUESTION: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just to go back to a couple of Israel-Gaza related stuff, so about Erez or the third border crossing opening, given your comments at the top about the urgency and how severe the situation is, what is the sticking point with the Israeli Government?MR MILLER: I’m not going to get into our private conversations, but it’s a matter that we are engaged with them on. I will let them speak for themselves. We think it needs to open urgently.QUESTION: Okay. And just to push you a little bit more on that, given you think it needs to open urgently, can you give a timeline on like days, weeks?MR MILLER: I can’t because it’s not a decision that needs to be made by the United States Government; it’s one that needs to be – that can – has to be made by the Government of Israel. I can’t speak for them, but we continue to urge them to open it as soon as possible.QUESTION: Okay. And on Benny Gantz, following up from colleagues, do you think, like, given that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not happy with this particular trip – and I know the Secretary has seen Benny Gantz on several occasions in our trips – do you think that dispute with Netanyahu actually reduces his effectiveness in – for U.S. to push, like, on aid situation and – does that under – does that trip undercut his impact, his effectiveness?MR MILLER: I am not going to make assessments about the varying levels effectiveness – of effectiveness of any member of the &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you guys are meeting with him.MR MILLER: &#8212; of any member of the Government of Israel. But, that said, he is one of three members of the war cabinet, plays an important role inside the government. That’s why we’re meeting with him. It’s the same reason why the Secretary talked to Ron Dermer, minister for strategic affairs and an advisory member of the war cabinet, today because there are a number of issues that we need to urgently engage with them on. And so that’s what we’re doing.QUESTION: Okay. A couple of little things on CHIRG. You – you have said a few weeks ago that U.S. has begun reviewing reports that Israel may have harmed civilians in its war in Gaza under the CHIRG process specifically, and I know that you did say that this is not a process that is going to yield results right away, but I still would like to check back in and ask. We know that there are dozens, if not more, a number of – dozens of incidents that are being reviewed. Have any of them moved to stage two? Has – have the – has this building made any determination that yes, U.S. weapons were used in incident XYZ and that caused civilian harm, and Israeli military was at fault in this particular incidence?MR MILLER: Those reviews are ongoing. None of them have been concluded, and I’m not going to offer kind of preliminary assessments as they move through the process.QUESTION: Right. And final one. Do you have a better understanding – does this building have a better understanding on what it would do when it reaches – when and if it reaches that assessment? What is the next step of that review?MR MILLER: It &#8212;QUESTION: You should know that because, I mean, that’s the whole point of conducting that review, right?MR MILLER: It totally depends on the circumstances. And given that’s a variety of different cases with different circumstances, I wouldn’t want to speculate.Go ahead in the back, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: At least some recent report by United Nation there was a significant funding gap for humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, more than $2 billion. Can you elaborate how does the United States plan to contribute to alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan?MR MILLER: So the United States remains committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. One way we continue to do that is to address underlying macroeconomic issues, which will provide necessary stability for the current humanitarian response to be more effective and will help alleviate many of the issues that fuel the humanitarian crisis we see in Afghanistan today. And we also remain the single largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, includes providing over $2 billion in lifesaving and sustaining assistance to the Afghan people since August of 2021.With that, we’ll wrap for – yeah, go ahead. Shaun, and then we’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Just one on Zimbabwe.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The announcement this morning. I was wondering if you could expand a little bit about the thinking about doing this, about having the targeted – I mean, I realize the Secretary has a statement, but having targeted sanctions against the president and others. Some, including the Zimbabwean Government, are actually saying this is a victory, saying that the sanctions regime has been – in 2003 is over. Is this half full? Half empty? How are you &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s rare that you see a government say that sanctions on the sitting president is a victory for the government. So I won’t – I don’t think – I’ll let that one slide.With the transition, we are focusing our sanctions policy on Zimbabwe now to actively target those who are currently engaged in human rights abuses and corruption. So there were a number – under the old sanctions regime, which had been in place for 20 years, actually over 20 years at this point, there were a number of sanctions in place on people who were no longer in government, some of whom were deceased. So we thought it important to update our policy and focus on those who are currently engaged in human rights abuses and corruption, including the sitting president.QUESTION: Do you have a rough number how many were – will be taken off as a result?MR MILLER: I don’t know, sorry. All right, with that I’ll &#8212;QUESTION: On (inaudible) Pope Francis?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, appreciate it. Good afternoon, by the way.MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: So on Sunday, yesterday, Pope Francis, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza so the hostages can be freed and civilians can get aid. He said, quote, “Enough, please! Stop!” Does the State Department believe that the pope’s urgent plea can help secure a ceasefire in Gaza?MR MILLER: So we believe there ought to be an immediate ceasefire in Gaza that brings the hostages out, that alleviates the suffering of the Palestinian people, and that’s what we are advocating for. There is a deal on the table that would deliver all of those things; Hamas just needs to accept it.With that, we’ll wrap for the day.(The briefing was concluded at 2:12 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Haiti																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Lebanon																								Moldova																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Ukraine																								Zimbabwe
- Department Press Briefing – February 28, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; February 28, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; February 28, 2024																																																					February 28, 2024																																																								1:04 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon. I don’t have anything, but I’ll say apologies from the top. The President has a speech scheduled at 1:30, so if I have to wrap a bit early today, that’s why. So let’s get to it.Leon.QUESTION: Sure. Yeah, I’d like to ask you about Transnistria.MR MILLER: Here comes Matt complaining I’m on time again. (Laughter.)QUESTION: That was not two minutes. That was like 45 seconds.MR MILLER: Go – go ahead. You’re good.QUESTION: Yeah, no, no. So the separatist authorities there are asking for – Russia for protection, extra protection. What is your take on what’s happening there in that region?MR MILLER: So given Russia’s increasingly aggressive and destabilizing role in Europe, we are watching Russia’s actions in Transnistria and the broader situation there very closely. The United States firmly supports Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and we continue to encourage Chisinau and Tiraspol to work together and identify solutions to pressing concerns of communities on both sides of the Dniester.Matt, do you want me to come to you now?QUESTION: No, continue. I’m still trying to digest the text of &#8212;MR MILLER: Okay. I think it was two minutes. I think it was two minutes. It was supposed to be two minutes.QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, whatever.MR MILLER: Humeyra, go ahead.QUESTION: Time is relative.MR MILLER: Time is a flat circle.QUESTION: I just want to ask a little bit about the settlements, Matt. So after Secretary’s announcement last week, Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich doubled down on those plans, and he said Israel will continue expanding the settlements in the occupied West Bank. I mean, first of all, do you have a response to that most recent announcement?MR MILLER: So my only response is that we are going to continue to be very direct with the Government of Israel, both privately and publicly, that we think that their settlement program is both a – an obstacle to peace and inconsistent with international law.QUESTION: Right. This seems to be another topic between Israel and U.S. that you guys are increasingly at odds. And diplomacy, whatever you are saying to your Israeli counterparts, does not seem to be working. You’re unable to convince them, and you’re also pushing for a two-state solution. And so how are you – what are you going to do differently to get Israeli counterparts on board? How are you going to reconcile the expansion of the settlements with the two-state solution that you’re pushing for?MR MILLER: So first of all, I’d say that disagreements between the United States and Israel over settlements in the West Bank are something that date back far beyond the outset of this administration. These disagreements go back decades, in fact, over multiple administrations of both parties in the United States and multiple governments of Israel. So that’s not a thing that is new in terms of a disagreement between the United States and Israel.QUESTION: Yes, but wouldn’t you &#8212;MR MILLER: With – but with – no, no &#8212;QUESTION: Wouldn’t you really like to be the administration who solved that?MR MILLER: Of course, and with respect to the broader question, we are going to continue to make clear to them, as I said, that we think settlements are an obstacle to peace, inconsistent with international law. And we’re going to have this conversation with them in the context of the larger challenges that Israel faces and the larger opportunity that we are ready to present to them with Arab partners in the region. So we’ve talked a lot about the work that the Secretary has done with countries in the region who want to further integrate with Israel, want to provide security assurances to Israel, want to move past the disputes that have existed between Israel and those countries for decades, but they’re going to need Israel to make some hard choices.So we’re going to continue to do that work and have those conversations with Israel. But, as I’ve said a number of times and as you’ve heard the Secretary say, ultimately it’s Israel that has to make those decisions and nobody else can do it for them – not the United States, not anybody.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Hamas is calling on Palestinians to march on al-Aqsa Mosque on the first day of Ramadan. I was wondering if the State Department has any comment on these – this call for &#8212;MR MILLER: So I don’t have any comment on the call for marches. I would just say, as it pertains to al-Aqsa, we continue to urge Israel to facilitate access to the Temple Mount for peaceful worshipers during Ramadan consistent with past practice, and that’ll continue to be our position.QUESTION: Have you received any commitments from the Israeli Government that they will allow access to the mosque?MR MILLER: We have seen reports about – what’s the right word – plans that are under consideration. I don’t know if they’ve made a final decision over that matter. We have urged them that worshipers should have access to al-Aqsa during Ramadan, and the thing – the point that we have made clear to them is, as is true for a number of areas that we discuss with them, that’s not just the right thing to do. It’s not just a matter of granting people religious freedom that they deserve and that – to which they have a right. But it’s also a matter that directly is important to Israel’s security. It is not in Israel’s security interest to inflame tensions in the West Bank or in the broader region, and so we’ll continue to make that clear.QUESTION: Would there be any repercussions if any of these foreign ministers who have threatened to go actually worship at al-Aqsa actually go through with this?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to deal with a hypothetical.QUESTION: And could I follow up? My colleagues just completed an investigation that found that indiscriminate Israeli fire killed scores of members of a family that was sheltering in what they were told was a safe area of Gaza. Has the State Department – like, can you update us at all on the investigations into civilian harm?MR MILLER: So I don’t – I have not seen this particular report that CNN has done, so I’ll need to look into that for – to be able to respond to the specifics. But broadly, we have engaged with the Government of Israel over a host of civilian deaths and called for investigations, asked for more information. At times they have been able to give us information about things that happened, either mistakes that the IDF made in its targeting. At times they’ve been – told us that matters are under investigation. That’s the general way that we approach this. But I don’t – I can’t comment specifically on this report, which I haven’t seen.QUESTION: And you won’t to speak to specific incidents, but can you give us an understanding of the universe of how many of these incidents you’re looking into?MR MILLER: No. There are a number of incidents that we’ve looked into, as I’ve said. We are always collecting information and gathering information, but I can’t speak to &#8212;QUESTION: What about – what about the investigations into the destruction of civilian infrastructure or apparently civilian infrastructure in Gaza?MR MILLER: So the – sure.QUESTION: So – but specifically, did you ever get an answer to them about the university?MR MILLER: So the most recent update I have, we pressed the Government of Israel for information about that. We – they came back to us and said that that particular facility was one that was used by Hamas to launch terrorist attacks. We asked for more information, said that we wanted to know more information about their decision-making on that process, and do not yet have a further answer.QUESTION: So you have not &#8212;MR MILLER: They gave us an initial answer. We wanted to know more and have not gotten to – as far – as far as I know, have not yet gotten a further answer.QUESTION: So in other words, from the administration’s perspective, you’re – this is still like a kind of – I don’t want to say open case, but it’s &#8212;MR MILLER: Open question where we are waiting for more information, correct.QUESTION: Matt, can I follow up on &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Although at that university, they had been there for a couple of months, so the university, even if it was used, it was neutral for at least two months, under Israeli control and occupation when they blew it up.Let me just ask you on – follow up on Humeyra, on the settlements. Now, there’s going to be some staggering number, like 13,600 housing units east of Bethlehem, creeping into my village, more than likely. So – and you say we will continue to express our views and so on. But the Israelis are not listening. So what are you willing – what leverage are you willing to use to say, look – we asked this a number of times in this room, this issue. Will there ever be a – will there ever – will we ever reach a point where you say, okay, you continue to do this, we’re going to do this in return?MR MILLER: So, Said, I think again sometimes – and we’ve discussed this before &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; there is a mistaken belief that the United States is able to dictate to other countries sovereign decisions. Israel makes its sovereign decisions; we make clear where we disagree with them. And there have been times when we express our disagreements privately; there are times we express them publicly. And of course you have seen individuals in Israel take actions that – where we have felt the need to hold them accountable.So with respect to extremist violence in the West Bank, we have made very clear that when we didn’t see the Government of Israel taking action that we thought was sufficient, we were ready to hold people accountable. And we are ready to hold further individuals accountable, if appropriate. And that’ll continue to be the case.QUESTION: We – yeah. I mean, other countries, they’re all sovereign, of course. But not – we don’t give every country $4 billion a year, at least, in aid and so on. So we should have some leverage, and especially when it comes to settlements that you are committing, at least verbally, to have a Palestinian state on, on that land. I mean, once that land is made into settlements, there will be no land to erect a Palestinian state.MR MILLER: So again, we provide security assistance to Israel because we support Israel’s legitimate right to ensure that the attacks of October 7th never happen again; to ensure Israel’s legitimate right to protect itself from a terrorist organization, Hizballah, that exists to the north of Israel and continues to attack Israel and has said that it wants – that it is committed to the destruction of Israel. So that is true. It is also true that there are things that the Government of Israel does with which we disagree and we express our disagreements.But that doesn’t change our fundamental commitment to Israel’s security. And so I know that’s sometimes hard for people to understand, but we are committed to Israel’s security, and that’s why we take the actions to support their right to defend themself consistent with humanitarian law. But that does not mean that we agree with everything that they do.QUESTION: My last one, although we must admit that American aid to Israel predates October 7 by decades. So let me ask you about also the issue that Humeyra raised on the – you’re not seeing eye to eye or the administration is not seeing eye to eye with Mr. Netanyahu. I mean, we see it in the – on timetables, on many other issues, and so on. Now, the President has not retracted what he said last Monday about we are looking hopefully at a ceasefire possibly next Monday and so on. So – but Mr. Netanyahu seems to be in total disagreement with you guys.MR MILLER: So I will not speak to the comments by the prime minister. But on the behalf of the United States, we continue to believe that an agreement is possible. We have made significant progress towards one, as you heard the President say, as you’ve heard me say, and we’re going to continue to work towards it.QUESTION: Sorry, just on the sovereignty issue.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know we had a tiny exchange about this yesterday. But when you say that, the idea of your respect, or U.S. respect, for sovereignty does not extend to the Palestinians. Right?MR MILLER: We are committed to the establishment &#8212;QUESTION: They are not a &#8212;MR MILLER: We are committed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.QUESTION: They do not &#8212;MR MILLER: They are not currently a state.QUESTION: So they have – they have no sovereignty.MR MILLER: We are trying to establish sovereignty for the Palestinians.QUESTION: No, I know. But currently, they don’t. Right?MR MILLER: We are trying to establish it for them.QUESTION: Okay. So can you think of any other – like how does this compare to Taiwan, for example?MR MILLER: I think this is the – you’d need to &#8212;QUESTION: No. In terms of your – your belief in sovereignty.MR MILLER: It is &#8212;QUESTION: So you have a “one China” policy as it relates to China and Taiwan which indicates that Taiwan is not sovereign, and yet you treat them as a sovereign entity – maybe not a state, but a sovereign entity. With the Palestinians, do you treat them with the same kind of regard, that maybe they’re not a sovereign state or you do not recognize them as a sovereign state, but at least they have a right of self-determination?MR MILLER: So we do not treat them as a sovereign state, but we are trying to establish an independent Palestinian state &#8212;QUESTION: Because – okay, all right.MR MILLER: No, I don’t – just let me &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. So on this &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me get to the answer. And we do support self-determination for the Palestinian people.QUESTION: Okay. But they do not currently enjoy your – the administration’s – thinking and previous administrations’ thinking as well. They do not enjoy the rights of sovereignty that, say, Israel or Jordan or Australia or Madagascar have.MR MILLER: So I don’t know what you mean by the question, but we do not recognize them as an independent state. That’s a factual matter.QUESTION: And so &#8212;MR MILLER: But we are trying to establish &#8212;QUESTION: And thus they have no right or claim to sovereignty?MR MILLER: They are not a sovereign state at this point, but we are trying to – we are trying to establish them as one.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: Okay.QUESTION: Very quickly to Matt’s point, is the Biden administration ever going to reopen the consulate for Palestinians in Jerusalem? And if not, why not?MR MILLER: I don’t have any update on that matter. It’s something that we continue to look at.Go ahead.QUESTION: The Secretary raised the point though that &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m sorry, sorry.QUESTION: &#8212; that the Secretary said back in 2021 that this would be done. It’s three years later. What’s the holdup?MR MILLER: And it’s something that we continue to review, but I just don’t have an update.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. A couple questions going back to Moldova. Can you please expand on what you just said to my colleague? Obviously, there are a lot of pieces moving there, but what kind of reaction will that yield back from the U.S.? And do you view this as an isolated event or part of a broader strategy that Russia is feeling emboldened given the investment delay in Ukraine?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to speak to what we might do. As I said, we’re watching the matter very carefully. I don’t want to speak to a hypothetical what may happen down the road, but obviously we have seen Russia take a number of incredibly reckless and destabilizing acts in the region. That’s not – nothing new, so that is the very reason, as I said, why we are watching this matter so closely.QUESTION: In Georgia, Russian occupiers – they kidnapped another Georgian citizen in Kareli, and the Georgian Government said that they have informed international allies including Geneva process co-chairs, which is the U.S. Do you have any reaction to it?MR MILLER: Let me take that back and get you a comment.QUESTION: And – thank so much. On Berlin talks, do you have anything for me? I know the U.S. is not in the room as the German ministers &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have a readout from those talks, so no.QUESTION: And I have two more on Russia, if I may.MR MILLER: One. One more.QUESTION: Okay, I’ll try to put them together. About hostages, I know that there were some meetings today in Moscow, the consular visit to Paul – Paul Whelan. Any update on his situation and also the situation about – involving other Americans hostages?MR MILLER: We did have a consular visit with Paul Whelan today – I believe you saw that the embassy made a statement about that – part of our ongoing, longstanding process to provide consular assistance to American citizens who are detained overseas. We continue to work to try to secure the release of Paul Whelan and Evan Gershkovich, but I don’t have any update on it.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions very quick. Secretary Blinken meets with the South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul today. What is the purpose of the meeting and what will be discussed at the meeting?MR MILLER: So I will not preview what will be discussed before he has a chance to have that meeting and – as is my longstanding practice – but they will certainly discuss cooperation on a number of issues in the region, destabilizing acts by North Korea, and of course the trilateral partnership between the United States, Korea, and Japan. And you can look, of course, for a full readout after the meeting.QUESTION: Secondly, do United States want South Korea to provide more weapons including the artillery shells to Ukraine? What items do you specifically want?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak with respect to specific conversations with South Korea, but I will – or specific military items – but we, of course, encouraged a number of allies and partners around the world to step up and provide security assistance to Ukraine, and in fact we’ve assembled a coalition of more than 50 countries who have provided assistance to Ukraine.And the way we see it is that every country has different capabilities, different ways that they can step up and help, and so we have engaged in a process to try to match up the needs that Ukrainian – that Ukraine has with different capabilities that other countries can meet.QUESTION: This issue will be raised at the foreign minister meeting today?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to preview a meeting before it happens.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Two questions, two questions on Pakistan, thank you. Four foreign nationals were charged last week in the U.S. for transporting suspected Iranian-made weapons on a vessel intercepted by U.S. Naval forces in Arabian Sea. Now Pakistani authorities have told us that they have approached the U.S. for consular access to four of them. Do you have any update on that?MR MILLER: I would defer that question to the Department of Justice. When people are taken into federal custody, they are held by the Department of Justice, and it is that department that decides matters of consular access.QUESTION: So second question. So Imran Khan, former prime minister, he has asked IMF to factor in countries’ political stability in any further bailout talks. And as U.S. knows, Pakistan needs 2 billion alone in March to be able to avoid economic breakdown. How do you see this effort on PTI’s part to be contacting IMF and also talking about election rigging?MR MILLER: So I’ll just say with respect to the IMF that we support Pakistan’s efforts to break free from the vicious cycle of debt and international financing. The long-term health of Pakistan’s government – or economy is crucial to its stability. Pakistan’s new government must immediately prioritize the economic situation because the policies over the next several months will be crucial to maintaining economic stability for Pakistanis. And we urge Pakistan to continue working with the IMF and other international financial institutions towards macroeconomic reforms.Nick, go ahead.QUESTION: There’s some reporting today about a CODEL from last week to Cuba, about ten Democratic members of the House. Did State facilitate any of that or do you have any visibility on that CODEL?MR MILLER: We did not facilitate any meetings that they held. This is what I think you call a NODEL – the technical term.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much.QUESTION: Really? So they had – they had absolutely no contact with the embassy?MR MILLER: That’s not what I said. They may have had contact. That I’m not aware of. We did not facilitate any meetings they had with the Cuban Government.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. AFP reported yesterday that the United States supports the idea of European allies sending troops to Ukraine. Can you confirm that? Does Washington support it or not?MR MILLER: I think I spoke to this yesterday from this podium, where I made clear that other countries will decide what they want to do. But on behalf of the United States, the President has been very clear that he is not going to put U.S. boots on the ground. And if you heard me yesterday, I referred to the comments by the NATO secretary general that he has made very clear – been very clear that there will be NATO – no NATO troops in Ukraine.QUESTION: Okay, and one more question.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: According to IMF data, the Russian economy grew faster than any of the G7 economies in 2023. And in &#8212;MR MILLER: Sir, I just misheard. Can you just &#8212;QUESTION: According to IMF &#8212;MR MILLER: According to IMF. Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; IMF data, the Russian economy grew faster than any of the G7 economies in 2023 and is expected to do so in 2024. Can you explain this phenomenon? Thus, does it mean that sanctions doesn’t work?MR MILLER: So I didn’t see that specific report, but we have seen the Russian GDP decline dramatically since its invasion due to the sanctions and export controls that the United States and other countries imposed on Russia, and due in part to, in our belief, the hundreds of thousands of Russians – some of the best and brightest – who fled Russia after the outbreak of that conflict.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. The United States is helping Pakistan in the energy sector and recent projects help Pakistan – additional 4,000 megawatt of energy capacity in Pakistan. Would you like to share some details about that?MR MILLER: Share what?QUESTION: Some details about that. Do you have any details about the energy &#8212;MR MILLER: I will have to take that back and get you an answer.QUESTION: The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom disclosed that Indian embassy in Washington, D.C., is not giving them visa for the last three years to monitor the ground situation in India about the religious freedom. And they also asked Biden administration to include India in the CPC countries. Do you have any comments on that?MR MILLER: What was the second part of the question?QUESTION: Is there &#8212;MR MILLER: I heard the part about visas.QUESTION: So they are asking Biden administration to include India in the CPC countries. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.MR MILLER: Oh, so yeah. So USCIRF is an independent commission established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 to provide recommendations to the President, so I would refer you to them for any further comment.Humeyra, go ahead. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Yeah, just to go back to your answer on settlements, Matt – and this is not something that I’ve heard for the first time, but I just want to put it on record. So you’ve talked about wider integration of Israel into the region, and you’ve talked about the Secretary’s efforts, which I’ve seen firsthand traveling with him. But so the – what U.S. is hoping is that you would have a broader normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia and perhaps like other Arab countries; and in return, Netanyahu would agree to a two-state solution or some form of it that would effectively put a halt to the settlements? What’s the settlement sort of element of that?MR MILLER: So the settlement element of that is that if, at the end of this, you would have the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: And if you have an establishment of an independent Palestinian state, that would necessarily include the inability for Israel to build settlements in what is another country at that point. Now, the issue of existing settlements, as we have always been clear, is something that would have to be discussed in negotiations between all the parties.QUESTION: Right. And when you have been holding talks with the Israeli Government, with Netanyahu and your counterparts there, have they actually privately told you anything that would make you think that they’re open to any of these ideas, especially like putting – putting a lid on the settlement expansion?MR MILLER: I am not going to &#8212;QUESTION: Independent of this.MR MILLER: Yeah, I’m not going to – I’m not going to speak to – I’m not going to speak on behalf of the Israeli Government. I will say what we have made clear, and you’ve seen the Secretary speak to this when he’s in the region about the case that he has made to them and why we think it’s important that there be a coherent plan for the day after this conflict in Gaza that includes reconstruction, that includes governance. And in our view, you have to have the participation of other countries in the region to achieve such a coherent plan, and you also have to have the participation of other countries in the region to achieve real and lasting security for Israel. And so that’s why we’re going to continue to make that case.QUESTION: Yeah, one last thing on aid, and I’ve asked you this earlier this week since the situation is even more and more dire. We’re seeing a lot of reports of now like children, sort of starvation, malnutrition. So there seems to be like almost a complete collapse in the distribution of aid inside Gaza. We’ve seen Israel blame UN. I mean, does the United States share that view? Is it up to UN and is it their inability to provide this? And what are you guys doing to address this urgently?MR MILLER: So I think with respect to the distribution issue, the UN is unable to distribute food and other assistance inside Gaza the way that they would like to due to the security situation. So it is a matter that needs to be addressed by all of the concerned parties, and that’s what we’re trying to do.I will say we are also working on opening additional crossings to get humanitarian assistance in, in addition to Rafah and Kerem Shalom, and hopefully in a way that would alleviate some of the distribution issues that we have faced. There are other ways that we are exploring to get humanitarian assistance in, but we are also – and it’s why you hear us talk about this so much and why we’re devoting so much effort – trying to secure a hostage deal that would lead to a temporary ceasefire because, ultimately, that would resolve a lot of the issues regarding the distribution of humanitarian assistance.And if there aren’t active – there isn’t active conflict going on, it’s easy – it’s much safer for people to move around; it’s much safer for aid to be delivered. And then because there’s more aid coming in and more aid being delivered, the people on the ground aren’t in such a desperate situation that you see looting of convoys and that sort of a security problem, as we’ve seen in the last few weeks.QUESTION: Yeah. I understand the hostage – the emphasis on the hostage talks, but we’re talking about dates like March the 4th, and some people even call that, like, optimistic. We’re talking about March the 10th, the start of Ramadan. But what we’re seeing inside Gaza right now is, like, much more urgent than that.MR MILLER: Yeah. No, that’s – that was what I was speaking to with the first part of my answer, is why we’re trying to resolve the security situation that has led to trucks being unable to move freely. We’re trying to get an additional crossing open. This is &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: This is independent of a potential hostage deal. And we’re exploring other ways to get humanitarian assistance in. To – like, we’re not just waiting for a hostage deal. We are trying to address that issue now while also recognizing that the best solution to the problem would be a temporary ceasefire.QUESTION: Right. By the way, how is the third opening of the crossing will help the distribution problem inside?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to that now. It’s something that we’re pressing on, and if and when I have more details, I’ll speak to them from here.QUESTION: Okay, thanks.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. I told her I’d come to her next.QUESTION: Sure.MR MILLER: I’ll come to you after.Go ahead.QUESTION: Recently an Austrian hostages was released by Taliban regime with Qatar mediation. As we know, there are some American hostages in the Taliban prison, including the Ryan Corbett. Is there any negotiation between United States and Taliban for releasing American hostages from the Taliban prison?MR MILLER: U.S. officials have continuously, consistently pressed – including in meetings with Taliban representatives – for the immediate and unconditional release of Americans detained in Afghanistan, noting that these tensions are a significant obstacle to positive engagement.QUESTION: Can we stay on Afghanistan for one second?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Yesterday, I think it was Nick asked you about Representative McCaul’s &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; quote/unquote threat to subpoena the Secretary over these AAR notes. Well, HFAC majority staff is none too happy with your response yesterday. They say it was disingenuous and untrue, basically. Did you – and I don’t have a position on this because I don’t really know. I don’t think anyone other than you – but did the State Department tell HFAC majority staff on this call on January 12th that you no longer had custody of the after-action review interview notes and couldn’t and wouldn’t release them unless the White House and the NSC signed off?MR MILLER: So I wasn’t on that call, and I saw that they had put out a statement right before I walked out to the podium. I didn’t get a chance to &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, that was what I was reading.MR MILLER: I didn’t get a chance to read it or look into it, so I’ll have to get back to you on that. But &#8212;QUESTION: Well, there are several specific questions in – that they have about your response yesterday, and so I just &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m happy to review the statement and either get back to you &#8212;QUESTION: Can &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; afterwards or speak to it from the podium tomorrow. Either way.QUESTION: Okay. Well, can you address them? But is it your understanding right now, the current situation is that the State Department no longer has custody or the ability under the Presidential Records Act or whatever – executive privilege – to provide those notes to the committee without either the White House or the NSC &#8212;MR MILLER: I’m just &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; signing off on it?MR MILLER: I’m just going to have to look into it and get back – get back to you. I’m just not aware of the underlying details of the situation.QUESTION: Okay. Well, is there – are you &#8212;MR MILLER: I can say the offer that we have made to them, which is to have the deputy secretary come and discuss this with them, still stands, obviously, to try to work through these issues.QUESTION: This is the deputy – Rich?MR MILLER: Rich Verma, yeah, yeah.QUESTION: Okay. But – and they say, though, that he said on this call that you guys wouldn’t turn them over, and then when they said – this is what they say.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: And they say, well, then Chairman McCaul might have to elevate this to the Secretary’s level, and the response was, well, that’s his prerogative – go ahead. Basically, go ahead.MR MILLER: (Laughter.) Again &#8212;QUESTION: And – and if that’s correct – I don’t know if that characterization is correct or not &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but if it is, it just seems – I don’t know, it just doesn’t seem to be, like, saying – it doesn’t seem to be indicative of an agency that wants to or thinks that it’s important &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; to cooperate on this.MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: And I understand this has gone on for a long time.MR MILLER: So I was about to say, like &#8212;QUESTION: And I get all that. But they have a legitimate interest.MR MILLER: They – so again, I can’t speak to those specific details because I wasn’t on the call, as I said, and I have not been able to &#8212;QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: &#8212; look into the matters. But as I think you anticipated I was going to say, we have turned over in this inquiry thousands of pages of documents. We’ve made available witnesses for transcribed interviews; we have cooperated in a good-faith fashion. But as is always true, the Executive Branch has legitimate confidentiality rights and legitimate privileges that we also expect Congress to respect, and we try to reach an accommodation. And that’s what our offer to have &#8212;QUESTION: Right.MR MILLER: &#8212; the deputy secretary come discuss with the committee was ultimately trying to pursue.QUESTION: Fair enough, but – but these – the notes that they want to see are – were not among the documents that were turned over, that you that you turned over.MR MILLER: Well, again, in general we do have legitimate confidentiality interests and legitimate privileges that we &#8212;QUESTION: Not suggesting that you don’t.MR MILLER: Yeah, I know, that’s always the nature of this dispute.QUESTION: But anyway, all right, so could you take a – could you take a look at this?MR MILLER: I will take – I will – yeah, I will.QUESTION: And then try to get an answer to the best of your ability to the questions that they raised?MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thank you. Two – two quick questions. There were some reports yesterday claiming that U.S. demands Israeli Government to submit a written letter on using U.S. weapons in Gaza – I mean, giving some assurances it will abide by international law. Can you have anything on that?MR MILLER: So I did see that report, and I think it is just describing the National Security Memorandum that the President issued in early February that outlines a procedure that is not specific to the State of Israel but is specific to all countries that receive military assistance from the United States, that those countries provide us written assurances that recipients, number one, will use the weapons in accordance with the use – with the law of war; and number two, will facilitate and not arbitrarily deny or restrict humanitarian assistance.So there is a process that we are engaged in with every country that receives military assistance from the United States to make sure they are aware of the requirements of the National Security Memorandum, make sure that they are aware of the timeline that is outlined in the National Security Memorandum. Again, this is all public; it requires a 45-day timeline for these countries to provide written assurances. So we’re going about that process now.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: And Alex, and then we’ll have to end because I think it’s time for the President.QUESTION: Just very quick on Sandvine. The U.S. blacklisted Sandvine today. Give us – fill us in on what are the main practices in terms of holding repressive regimes accountable. According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan, Russia, the UAE – they have used that company to go after human rights defenders. To hold them accountable, will you take a further step rather than just denouncing them unwanted?MR MILLER: I do not have any further actions to preview from here.With that, thanks, everyone. Sorry for the short briefing.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 1:37 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Israel																								Moldova																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								South Korea																								Ukraine
- Welcoming the European Council Decisions on EU Enlargement Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States welcomes the European Council’s December 14 decisions on EU enlargement as a powerful affirmation of the EU candidates’ and prospective candidates’ European future. Today’s decisions to open EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, grant EU candidate status to Georgia, and open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, once it has met the necessary criteria, offer hope and incentive to these countries and their people to continue reforms needed to advance their EU ambitions. This is a historic moment for Europe and for the transatlantic partnership.The United States continues to strongly support the EU’s enlargement process, and we look forward to supporting EU candidate and prospective candidate countries as they continue critical reforms on the path to EU membership. At this pivotal moment for the transatlantic community, we encourage them to seize the momentum to realize their full democratic and economic potential and secure their future in Europe.
- Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Anti-Corruption Champions Award Ceremony Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWashington, D.C.Burns AuditoriumASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Good morning, everybody.  Before we get started this morning, I’d like to acknowledge the tragedy in the Seychelles.  Commissioner De Silva, our thoughts are with you and your country, your people, at this time.It’s an honor to welcome this year’s Anti-Corruption Champions Award honorees.  Thank you for joining us here today and from across the globe.  My name is Todd Robinson, the assistant secretary of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL as it’s better known.  And let me give you just a little bit of an overview of what we’re going to do this morning.We have, as you see, a high-powered lineup for you today – (laughter) – starting with Secretary Antony Blinken, who has made it his business since day one to place the fight against corruption at the center of our foreign policy.  We also have here from – we will also hear from Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya, a diplomat with three decades of experience around the world, and my boss.  (Laughter.)  And Richard Nephew, our global anti-corruption coordinator, is going to introduce our honorees today.  We will also have an opportunity to hear from one of our inspiring award recipients.As I mentioned, the fight against corruption is front and center in our U.S. foreign policy.  As I’m sure our honorees can attest, this fight is a difficult one, but from Europe to Africa to Central America, we have seen remarkable wins in 2023.In Guatemala, there was an election victory by a presidential candidate, Bernardo Arévalo from the Semilla party, who ran on a platform of weeding out corruption.In Ukraine, INL works closely with anti-corruption investigators and prosecutors, who this year alone have opened cases against over 20 high-level government officials, including the former chief justice of the supreme court.  Since the summer, Ukraine has advanced significant reform measures, including requiring government officials to declare their assets and adding judges to the High Anti-Corruption Court.In Liberia, our embassy’s stalwart support for action against corruption has put compromised officials on the defensive and is fueling the Liberian public’s desire for increased accountability and sanctions.As you’ll see shortly, the tenacious men and women with us here today are responsible for successes like these.  Tenacious, but also – let’s not forget – fearless.  Corruption is silent, secret, and corrosive.  People know it’s out there but it’s difficult to root out.  That has not deterred our honorees, who have joined this fight at great personal and professional risk, but not without recognition.  To today’s honorees, we see what you are doing and we applaud it.With that, I would like to invite Under Secretary Zeya.  (Applause.)UNDER SECRETARY ZEYA:  Thank you to my dear friend, Assistant Secretary Robinson.  Your leadership on this issue set has been indispensable.  Secretary Blinken, Coordinator Nephew, colleagues and friends, I am delighted to be here today to celebrate these courageous honorees.This weekend, we will commemorate the 20-year anniversary of the first and only global anti-corruption instrument, the UN Convention Against Corruption, or UNCAC.  This distinguished group, through their advocacy and actions, embodies the central message of that consequential document:  The betrayal of the public trust will no longer be tolerated.The drafters of UNCAC, which included the United States, understood the corrosive impact of corruption and recognized it as a transnational challenge.  It affects all countries, regardless of the level of development, political system, or history.  Thus, preventing and countering corruption is a shared responsibility among all countries.UNCAC responded to these threats by providing governments with the tools to counter this scourge at the global level.  The convention endures.  Its comprehensive set of standards, measures, and rules are even more relevant today than they were 20 years ago.  What we’ve learned since the UNCAC’s adoption is that while corruption is a cross-cutting global challenge, every country experiences it in different ways, which requires tailored solutions.For example, in Moldova, through the courageous work of President Sandu’s administration, the country is countering Russia’s interference and the actions of other corrupt actors by fortifying its democracy, modernizing its economy, and aligning its institutions with its European neighbors.  I myself had the privilege of visiting Moldova last week, and I was honored to meet with Minister of Justice Veronica Mihailov-Moraru, who is on the front lines of these efforts and is one of the champions that we are celebrating here today.For our part, President Biden has elevated anti-corruption as a core national security interest.  We’re actively implementing the first-ever U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption that the President issued two years ago.  Now, this strategy has domestic and international components, acknowledging that we must combat corruption here at home as well as prioritize it in our foreign policy.  We’re also committed to working with all of you, the honorees here today and all of those who stand with us across the globe, dedicated to shining a light on corrupt behavior.When Secretary Blinken launched the Anti-Corruption Champions Award in 2021, we not only wanted to celebrate you, but we also want to learn from your invaluable expertise and experience.  The fight against corruption is a collective effort, and thus we must foster critical engagement across public and private institutions and across borders.  This will bolster our policies and advance the unshakable principles of accountability and integrity ingrained in the UNCAC.So thank you all for joining us here today, and congratulations again to our honorees.I now have the immense honor of introducing an admired friend and a phenomenal boss, Secretary of State Antony Blinken.  (Applause.)SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you.  Good morning, everyone.AUDIENCE:  Good morning.SECRETARY BLINKEN:  So this is a day, a moment I’ve been looking forward to.  And we’ll share the reasons why in just a minute.  But first, let me say to Under Secretary Zeya, to Assistant Secretary Robinson, to our Coordinator Nephew:  Thank you not just for today, but for the extraordinary work you’re doing every day, including and notably on taking the fight to corruption.In public service – whether in government or in civil society – I know it can feel at times like the challenges are just too big; the forces arrayed against change too strong, too entrenched to make meaningful progress.One of the things that I love most about this ceremony each year is that every one of our awardees has proved that idea wrong.  There is no force against progress that is actually immovable.  You’ve demonstrated with your work, with your courage, with your commitment that it can be done.  Even in places where impunity is the rule, you’ve shown how determined individuals can tip the balance, make the difference toward justice.Today, we gather not only to honor these extraordinary champions, but to learn from them.  Corrupt officials and their partners are constantly borrowing from each other’s playbooks.  Well, governments, organizations, citizens committed to fighting corruption need to do the same thing, because in so many different ways, in so many different places, each of you has found a particular angle, a particular way of being effective in combatting corruption.  And so the more we’re talking to each other, the more we’re listening and learning from you, the more effective we are going to be.Now, before speaking to the accomplishments of the awardees, let me underscore that no matter who they are or where they work, none of them does this alone – and I know you would be the first to say that.Indeed, one of the reasons that these leaders are so effective is because they inspire others to join them.  So today, we’re honoring not only these 11 champions, but all of their partners.Including their teammates here at the State Department.  Every awardee was nominated by American diplomats around the world, most of whom work side-by-side with all of our champions to advance our shared priorities.Take any goal of our foreign policy, anything that we really care about – expanding economic opportunity, empowering underserved communities, enhancing security, defending human rights – all of them are served by building more accountable institutions, more accountable societies, more transparency.So we have an abiding interest in rooting out corruption – both to improve lives in local communities and to build more prosperous, more secure, more rights-respecting partners for the American people.As we were looking at the awardees and learning from their stories, I think what’s powerful is you can really draw lessons from each of their work.  And I’ve seen, as we’ve been talking about this together, maybe five things that really jump out.  So let me share those with you in talking about the awardees.First, a key part of combatting corruption is working to reform corrupt institutions from within wherever possible.  That’s a very powerful thing.You heard reference to Veronica Mihailov-Moraru and what she’s done in the Republic of Moldova.  Having worked as a public defender, she knew firsthand how broken her country’s justice system was, but that didn’t stop her from working to overhaul the justice ministry when offered the chance to lead it.  That’s change from within.  Veronica designed and implemented a rigorous vetting process to root out corrupt judges, corrupt prosecutors; she helped reform the country’s anticorruption agencies.  She’s made a point of pursuing these reforms out in the open, not a secret, modeling the transparency she’s trying to foster, and that in turn has allowed her to build broad public support for this work.Vladimir Novovic made a similar leap when he left his post as a judge to become Montenegro’s chief prosecutor for organized crime, corruption, war crimes, terrorism, and money laundering.  That’s a portfolio.  He inherited an ineffective and an infiltrated institution, in a country where citizens were disillusioned by graft that they were experiencing every single day in their institutions.  By pursuing investigations of corrupt judges, of national security officials, senior police, Vladimir showed citizens that even the most powerful people are not above the law.  Since he took office, public trust in the corruption prosecutor’s office has doubled.As Liberia’s anti-corruption commissioner, Marc Kollie led a series of investigations that uncovered bribery of powerful politicians in exchange for favors.  Despite being threatened, Marc pursued his work.  He testified in the case, and then went on to lead other groundbreaking investigations, including one in which he froze bank accounts being used by organized crime to launder money.  His efforts demonstrated how a few committed individuals can turn government institutions from sources of corruption into sources of accountability.Second broad lesson that I’m drawing from our awardees:  When they’re informed, when they’re empowered, citizens – citizens – are our most effective anti-corruption allies.So Nikhil Dey has spent more than four decades in India working with and for those harmed by corruption, and those particularly who are harmed most by it: underserved, marginalized populations.  Nikhil has helped communities in Rajasthan demand access to essential services and rights – education, health care, fair wages, better working conditions.  His organization pioneered the practice of public audits, in which local officials have to report to communities how and where they spend the resources, and citizens have a chance themselves to ask probing questions of these officials.  As these public audits spread across India, more citizens started taking the lead in holding officials to account.  And that, at its heart, is how democracy needs to work.After decades of writing about corruption and organized crime for Ecuador’s newspapers, Arturo Torres founded an independent media site to report on these issues.  In a series of articles, Arturo and his team combined rigorous analysis of publicly available information with deep investigations to uncover the corrupt ties of candidates for judges, for mayors, and other important public offices.  In a country of 16 million people, the website’s reporting garnered 18 million views in just a couple of months – 16 million people in the country, 18 million views in a couple of months.  That showed the public hunger for this information and for the incredibly powerful role it can play in informing voters.Third, more than ever, if we’re going to address corruption effectively, we also have to address forces outside our countries that are looking to weaponize corruption for their gain.In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jean-Claude Mputu has helped lead “Congo is Not for Sale.”  That’s a civil society coalition that uncovers the way mining deals have benefitted foreign companies, governments, and corrupt officials at the expense of the people.  By exposing the bribes that were used to win these contracts and the billions in lost revenue to the state, the investigations led the DRC Government to try to recover funds for the Congolese people, and has resulted in international sanctions against corrupt businesses and corrupt investors.In Timor-Leste, reporting by Francisco Belo Simoes da Costa showed the way a Beijing-based company used bribes to win a contract to digitize the country’s national television broadcast corporation.  Francisco uncovered the way a corrupt official profited by awarding the contract with no competition.  His reporting also showed the way the agreement would have allowed the Chinese Government to disseminate propaganda throughout the Timorese nation.  Francisco’s reporting prevented the tainted deal from going forward, it sparked an investigation by Timor-Leste’s anti-corruption commission, which is ongoing.For advocate Stanislau Ivashekvich, fighting for accountability, for transparency, for space for civil society in Belarus has long meant taking on the country – excuse me, he’s taking on the country working with Belarus’s dictator to try to quash it, and that is Russia.  Stanislau’s organization, the Belarus Investigative Center, has shone a spotlight on the ways that Russia and Belarus collaborate to try to evade sanctions, to enrich oligarchs, to fuel Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine.  His organization’s reporting has been critical to closing sanctions loopholes, seizing the illicit assets of Russian officials and oligarchs.Fourth broad lesson:  Every individual that we’re honoring today has made educating, inspiring, and mentoring young people a key part of their work.With Anette Plannells leading civil society campaigns resulting in the first-ever prosecution of high-ranking officials in Panama – even as she was doing that, she also helped build a youth wing of the nation’s anti-corruption movement.  Thanks to her trainings, thanks to her workshops, not only are countless Panamanians more engaged citizens, but scores of young people have now been inspired to pursue careers in advocacy and in elective office.  And so a whole new generation is coming up at the same time thanks to her work that she was engaged in, the work of the of the moment.As the Seychelles anti-corruption commissioner, May De Silva – you already heard reference to her before – has built an unprecedented case against businesses and former officials for international tax evasion.  At the same time, she’s designed and implemented seminars, conferences, workshops, an anti-corruption curriculum – all of this for students in schools and for colleges across the country.  She says her goal is to show how corruption eats away at societies, but also what every citizen can do to fight it.In Kyrgyzstan, Ali Toktakunov leads MediaHub.  This is an independent news outlet that exposes corruption and shows corrupt actors and how they’re using social media to try to hide, to obfuscate their crimes.  A key part of MediaHub’s efforts is building greater digital literacy among young people, something that they’re doing by holding workshops across the country’s universities, so that individuals are better prepared, better equipped to detect and call out online disinformation.Fifth and finally, every one of these champions – every one – has in some fashion been subject to repression, to threats, to persecution for their work.  Several had been forced into exile.  Many are subject to ongoing legal proceedings.  Some had been locked up.  Their families have also been threatened.  One of our awardees said that his small children can no longer play in public playgrounds and parks because of targeted threats.And yet, each and every one of them persists.  They continue to do the work.  As awardee Arturo Torres said, “It’s part of the job.”To all of today’s awardees, your bravery, your commitment to truth, to justice – it humbles us, it inspires us to do more, and it adds even greater urgency to the enduring effort to strengthen protections for advocates, for human rights defenders, for journalists, for educators around the world who are threatened and attacked for the work they’re doing to fight corruption and to better their societies.As you’ve heard from Under Secretary Zeya, Assistant Secretary Robinson, this has been a top priority for President Biden, for this administration, for this department from day one.  We’ll keep working to build effective ways to have the backs of those who are at risk and to hold perpetrators to account.I know that there are folks watching today who are leading hard fights for transparency and good governance in hard places.  And I know there have to be days when you feel disillusioned, when you feel isolated, when you feel fearful.So I hope, if nothing else, you’ll take heart from today, you’ll take heart from the stories of your colleagues around the world who are doing such remarkable work in the ways that you are – doing it a great cost, at great risk, but doing it.And I hope that today’s ceremony reminds us that, again, the actions of determined individuals can make a difference, are making a difference.  They can puncture the seemingly impenetrable walls of impunity.  They can rekindle citizens’ faith in their own capacity to make governments and institutions work for them.Indeed, they and you are often the only way that change effectively happens.To all the anti-corruption champions far beyond this room, please know you have a partner in the United States.With that, it is my honor to give the floor to one of our awardees so deserving who can speak most effectively for all of our awardees, Minister Mihailov-Moraru.Minister, congratulations.  The floor is yours.  (Applause.)JUSTICE MINISTER MIHAILOV-MORARU:  Good morning.  Honorable Secretary Blinken, colleagues and new friends, ladies and gentlemen, I am very honored to be with you here and be among of this group of all about – with all remarkable activists, journalists, and public officials you have brought together from all around the world.  Thank you very much for all the appreciation.  I am not sure I actually deserve this recognition or to be in the company of this inspiring group of people, but I am very grateful for the honor and I will use it as a reminder and motivation when I need it to persist and to press forward against the resistance we encounter every day in fighting corruption in Moldova and around all the world.The Republic of Moldova is currently undergoing broad reform in its justice sector, addressing challenges relating to integrity, accessibility, efficiency, and widespread lack of trust.  Corruption remains, unfortunately, a central obstacle to the formation of trust in government in Moldova.  But one of our main goals in my country is to improve living standards, to change society’s perception of the independence of the judicial system in order to ensure transparency, but also their responsibility, and ultimately to increase trust in the acts of justice.  And this can only be happen by fighting everywhere and with increasing success against corruption.Corruption, of course, is not unique to Moldova.  It is a global problem that affects us all.  Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gains, and it undermines the rule of law, the legitimacy of government, and the trust of citizens.  Corruption is a threat to the realization of the United Nation Sustainable Development Goals, which aim to create a better and more sustainable future for all.But I am sure that corruption is not inevitable.  It can be prevented and combated through effective anti-corruption policies, practices, and a lot of courage.  Anti-corruption efforts vary in scope and strategy and include both preventive and reactive measures – preventive measures to reduce the opportunities for – of corruption actions, but reactive measures – detect, investigate, prosecute, and sanction corruption and return stolen assets.In Moldova, we have committed to implement de-oligarchization measures to eliminate excessive influence of powerful and at times dangerous vested interest in economic, political, and public life.  We have taken action to fortify our agencies charged with responsibility for investigation and prosecution of high corruption act cases.  We have modernized our legislation for combating money laundering and terrorism financing, and also we are in the process to improve our asset recovery mechanism.But this is only the beginning, and we in Moldova cannot do this alone, of course.  None of us can.  So we are committed to increasing our mutual legal cooperation, including on financial investigations, international and organized crime cases, to identify and to recover criminal assets.  But we also need, as do anti-corruption fighters in every country, the commitment and collaboration of all stakeholders, including the international community, the private sector, civil society, journalists, and academia.So I really believe that every effort counts.  Only together we can make a difference and create a more transparent, accountable, and inclusive society for ourselves and for future generations.During IVLP meetings throughout this week, I was inspired by some quotes.  Finding and fighting corruption – your anti-corruption fight is our fight.  And I want to thank to the American people for the inspiration and all the support toward rule of law.Let me please on behalf of all the IVLP group to receive our gratitude to all of you for your attention, and for the honor you bestow, and the kindness, and the continuing support you have shown to all of us.  Thank you very much.  (Applause.)
- Recognizing the 2023 Anti-Corruption Champions   Todd D.  Robinson, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsIn a world faced with myriad challenges, including terrorism, health epidemics, and strategic competition to shape the future of the international order, corruption may not always seem to be at the top of the list of threats.   But that is changing, for the U.S. government and partners around the world.  Left unchecked, corruption steals from a country’s citizens and can sell out a country’s future &#8212; giving a foothold to hostile, criminal actors in the process. Corruption keeps unaccountable officials in power, slows the pace of development, facilitates crime, and ensures unequal distribution of resources – which can affect underrepresented and underserved populations disproportionally.  For all these reasons, the Biden-Harris Administration released and is now implementing the first-ever U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption.   Our strategy recognizes that preventing, uncovering, and combatting corruption takes a mix of courage, intelligence, and doggedness by many stakeholders, and each year the Department seeks out examples to highlight.  And each year, we find many examples of individuals who are committed to pushing back on corruption.  Recently, Department leadership, including Secretary Blinken, gathered to recognize 11 exemplary corruption fighters. They include reporters, government practitioners, and civil society activists.   We hope you will join us in celebrating our 11 State Department International Anti-Corruption Champions for 2023, and in recognizing all those who fight for accountability, the rule of law, and press freedom.   More information on each of our 2023 honorees can be found below. Moldovan Justice Minister Veronica Mihailov-Moraru advanced countless transparency initiatives as part of a broader effort to cleanse Moldova’s judiciary and prosecution services of corrupt actors.  She now leads the ministry she helped reform. For the past 35 years, activist Nikhil Dey has championed policy reforms to empower workers in India.  He and his counterparts have brought to light official corruption, such as the underpayment of workers on official projects, and built peasant and worker empowerment campaigns targeting corruption in the delivery of government services.    Stanislau Ivaskhevich not only took huge personal risks by engaging in independent media reporting in Belarus, but he and his team also tackled government and business corruption despite intense government pressure – all while building a 50-person organization that serves as a resource to civil society and journalists alike.   Marc N. Kollie fearlessly took on high-level bribery and corruption among Liberia’s powerful political elites as part of his tireless work at the Liberian Financial Intelligence Agency.  His commitment to uncovering corruption cost him his job, exposed him and his family to harassment and threats, and forced him to relocate his family for safety.   In Timor-Leste, Francisco Belo Simoes da Costa exposed a corrupt deal for a Beijing-funded project to digitalize the country’s largest broadcaster.  The deal, involving a company majority-owned by a PRC-based businessperson, ultimately led to charges being filed against a sitting minister.  Jean-Claude Mputu is a leading anti-corruption activist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and spokesperson for the NGO “The Congo is Not for Sale,” which focuses on extractive industries, and has called attention to billion-dollar losses due to mining sector corruption.    Montenegro has long struggled to stem transnational organized crime.  In an effort to turn the tide and root out corruption within the government, Chief Special Prosecutor Vladimir Novovic has aggressively targeted high-profile individuals, indicting the former president of the Supreme Court, among others. Panamanian civil society leader Annette Planells is a tireless advocate of transparency in government and a leading figure of anti-corruption efforts in her country.  She has experienced retaliatory lawsuits and government intimidation, but wins more than she loses, including joining a successful suit against the former Chief Justice of Panama’s Supreme Court, who was sentenced to five years in prison.    Seychelles anti-corruption commissioner May De Silva has 35 staff but – like many successful public servants – is extending her reach by leveraging external allies, to include FBI agents and investigators from the United Kingdom.  She also shaped the outlook of young people around her country and their civic engagement.  Ecuadoran investigative journalist Arturo Torres published research into drug trafficking, corruption, and exploitation of his country’s natural resources.  A judge sued him for $15M for defamation, a case that Mr. Torres ultimately won.    Journalist “Ali” Totakunov is known as one of the most effective and visible anti-corruption advocates in his native Kyrgyz Republic.  Ali’s reporting initially as a correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – and his MediaHub team’s independent journalism &#8212; have resulted in legal victories, but they have come at a price including lawsuits, cyber attacks, harassment, and even credible death threats.  This award demonstrates our support for anticorruption leaders who put their lives on the line to spur lasting change.  Secretary of State Antony Blinken was pleased to honor these 11 honorees, who inspire us all to stand up firmly to champion more equitable societies, in a December 7 event at the Department of State. For more from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, you can follow us on Twitter @StateINL, Facebook @StateINL, and Instagram @StateINL.   
- Under Secretary Zeya’s Opening Remarks at the TETRA Launch  HomeUnder Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;Under Secretary Zeya’s Opening Remarks at the TETRA Launch 				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Under Secretary Zeya’s Opening Remarks at the TETRA Launch 																																		Remarks																														December 1, 2023																																							Good afternoon, we just had an excellent discussion with the Prime Minister Recean and thank you to our Moldovan government hosts.&nbsp; Minister Efros, your principled leadership and dedication to reforming and strengthening the capacity of Moldova’s law enforcement institutions plays an essential role in building a secure future for the Moldovan people.&nbsp; I am proud to join you today to recognize your efforts and formally launch a historic new U.S. investment to expand the ministry’s secure communications system.&nbsp;&nbsp;Moldova sits at an important political and geographic crossroad.&nbsp; The people of Moldova have demanded reform, democratic governance free from corruption, and a future in the European Union.&nbsp; Your government is making remarkable progress to deliver those objectives to the people of Moldova.&nbsp; The EU commission’s recommendation to open accession negotiations is a testament to the hard work and progress you have made. &nbsp; At the same time, your government has been capably managing the effects of Russia&#8217;s brutal war of aggression next door in Ukraine.&nbsp; Moldova has demonstrated unwavering support for its neighbor, Ukraine.&nbsp; The Moldovan people and government have welcomed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees to safety, facilitated by the highly professional, round-the-clock response by Moldova’s border police, police officers, and other emergency services.&nbsp; Moldova is truly an example of how a country can center respect for human rights while also upholding security for its people.Like Moldova’s dedication to its neighbors, the United States’ dedication to Moldova is steadfast.&nbsp; As Secretary Blinken said earlier this year when he met with President Sandu, “We stand strongly with Moldova in support of its security, its independence, its territorial integrity, and the very important reform efforts that the president and the government are making.”&nbsp; Over the last year and a half, the U.S. government has provided $774 million in new development, humanitarian, and security assistance to Moldova.&nbsp; Under the umbrella of our strong partnership, we’re working closely together to address shared priorities including corruption, border security, gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, and cybercrime.&nbsp; We look forward to continuing this partnership and strongly support Moldova’s advancement on its path to EU integration.&nbsp;&nbsp;We are clear-eyed that malign actors are working hard to prevent Moldova from assuming its rightful place within the community of Europe.&nbsp; We know that Russia’s attempts at election interference and disinformation follow its familiar playbook to try to weaken the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries whose people have determined their future lies with Europe. &nbsp; Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine has also created new opportunities for corrupt actors, traffickers, and transnational criminal organizations trying to exploit border vulnerabilities.&nbsp; We must work together to combat these risks.&nbsp; Strengthening border security is important to thwart criminal networks and counter transborder threats across the region.&nbsp; The United States is committed to strengthening border security and law enforcement capabilities across Moldova, including along the administrative line with Transnistria.&nbsp; We also recognize Moldova’s national security is integral to European and regional security.The secure communications assistance we’re announcing today is a big step in delivering on that commitment.&nbsp; At $22.3 million, the TETRA project is the United States’ largest single security sector investment in Moldova.&nbsp; This project will expand Moldova’s existing law enforcement communication network across the country to ensure that Moldovan authorities have the most effective, reliable, and secure communications capabilities.&nbsp; When complete, this network will support all units within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.&nbsp; This includes the Border Police, law enforcement, and emergency services, as they work to protect and secure families, communities, and businesses across Moldova.&nbsp; The TETRA project complements U.S. efforts to provide specialized equipment, technical assistance, and training.&nbsp; This is to help Moldova manage migrant flows, prevent and respond to border incidents, improve contingency preparedness, and implement accelerated and human rights-based border management in crisis situations.&nbsp; The United States will also continue to support the mobile and special intervention units of both the Border Police and the Customs Service with protective equipment, first aid kits, vehicles, and training.&nbsp;&nbsp;To close, I want to underscore the enduring commitment of the United States to supporting the full spectrum of Moldova’s democracy – your sovereignty, your democratic institutions, a vibrant civil society, and the rule of law.&nbsp; I look forward to closely following the TETRA project’s progress as a symbol of our joint commitment to strengthening Moldova’s sovereignty and security, and we are eager to continue our partnership to build law enforcement capacity.&nbsp; Moldova’s commitment to implementing these important democratic reforms has been exceptional, and we will stand with you in solidarity as you cultivate Moldova’s democratic institutions.&nbsp;Thank you.						Tags																																											Combating Drugs and Crime																																							Cyber Security																																							European Union																																							Gender-based Violence																																																					Human Rights and Democracy																																							Human Trafficking																															Moldova																																Sovereignty																															Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights