Filed 2/26/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LA LIVE PROPERTIES, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

B298278

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC674513)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Elizabeth White, Judge (Ret.). Affirmed.

Ajalat, Polley, Ayoob & Matarese, Richard J. Ayoob, 

Christopher J. Matarese, Gregory R. Broege and Andrew W. 

Bodeau for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lamb and Kawakami LLP, Thomas G. Kelch and Michael 

K. Slattery; Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Peter M. 

Bollinger, Assistant County Counsel, Richard Girgado and Justin 

Y. Kim, Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and Respondent.

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2

This is a tax refund action brought by appellant LA Live 

Properties, LLC (LA Live) against respondent County of 

Los Angeles (County). In 2012, the County levied “escape 

assessments”—that is, “retroactive [tax] assessment[s] for years 

in which property was either not assessed or underassessed” 

(Williams & Fickett v. County of Fresno (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1258, 

1265, fn. 2 (Williams))—on real property owned by LA Live. 

After paying the taxes due under the escape assessments, 

LA Live filed the present action, which seeks a refund of those

taxes. LA Live claimed that when the Los Angeles County 

Assessor (Assessor) reassessed the real property in 2012, he

failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Revenue 

and Taxation Code1 section 531.8, which required that “Notices of 

Proposed Escape Assessment” be issued ten days before the 

escape assessments were enrolled. Instead, the Assessor mailed

the notices just five days before enrolling the escape assessments. 

LA Live contended that because too few days passed between the 

mailing of the notices and the enrollment of the escape 

assessments, the assessments were void and subject to refund.

The matter was tried in the superior court, which denied 

LA Live’s claim for a refund. The court found, among other 

things, that the Assessor’s failure to wait 10 days before enrolling 

the escape assessments did not render them void, and LA Live 

had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before pursuing 

the present action. The court therefore entered judgment for the 

County.

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 

the Revenue and Taxation Code.
3

As we discuss, the trial court correctly concluded that 

LA Live’s claim is not reviewable on the merits because LA Live 

did not exhaust its administrative remedies. By statute, a 

taxpayer is required to file administrative requests for 

reassessment and refund before filing a refund action in court. 

The administrative exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional 

unless the assessment is a “ ‘nullity as a matter of law.’ ” 

(Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1264.) In the present case, the 

assessment was not legally null: Even if the Assessor failed to 

follow the statutory procedure set out in section 531.8, that 

failure did not render the assessment a nullity because the real 

property at issue was not tax exempt, nonexistent, or outside the 

County’s jurisdiction. We therefore will affirm the judgment for 

the County. 

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. Regular and Escape Assessments

“The assessors in each of California’s 58 counties have the 

authority—and duty—to levy taxes on all of the property within 

their boundaries. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a); § 401.) 

The amount of the levy is the property’s assessed value (referred 

to as its ‘full cash value’) multiplied by the applicable, onepercent tax rate.” (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment 

Appeals Board No. 2 (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1, 11–12 (Prang).)2

2 “When Proposition 13 became law in 1978, the assessed 

value of real property was redefined as (1) either (a) the value of 

the property reflected on its ‘1975–[19]76 tax bill’ or, if certain 

events triggering reassessment occur, (b) the ‘appraised value of 

[the] real property’ at the time of the triggering event, plus (2) an 

‘inflationary rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year’

keyed to the ‘consumer price index or comparable data.’ 
4

An assessor may reassess real property “only if one of three 

triggering events has occurred—namely, (1) when the property 

has been ‘purchased,’ (2) when the property is ‘newly 

constructed,’ or (3) when ‘a change in ownership has occurred.’ 

(Cal. Const., art XIII A, § 2, subd. (a); § 110.1; 926 North Ardmore 

Ave. LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2017) 3 Cal.5th 319, 326 . . . ; 

Osco Drug, Inc. v. County of Orange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 189, 

192 . . .).” (Prang, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 12–13.)

Although county assessors in some cases reassess property 

in the same assessment year that a triggering event occurred, in 

other cases there is a delay between the triggering event and 

reassessment. In that circumstance, “the county assessor has the 

authority—and a constitutional duty—to levy retroactive 

assessments to recapture any under-taxation in the prior years 

that would otherwise escape taxation due to the delay between 

the triggering event and the reassessment. (Rev. & Tax. Code, 

§§ 51.5, subd. (d), 531, 531.2; Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of 

Equalization (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 565, 580.)” (Prang, supra, 

54 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) 

“If . . . reassessment is appropriate, then the assessor has 

‘a constitutional [and a statutory] duty to levy retroactive 

assessments’ ‘if [he or she] discovers property has “escaped 

assessment.” ’ [Citations.] The duty to levy escape assessments 

springs from our Constitution’s mandate that ‘[a]ll property . . . 

be taxed in proportion to its full value’ (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 1, 

subd. (b), italics added), and this mandate obligates assessors 

‘(1) to assess all property in [their] jurisdiction and (2) to do so on 

(Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subds. (a) & (b); see §§ 110.1, 110.)” 

(Prang, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)
5

a uniform basis.’ [Citation.] ‘If any property subject to taxation 

should escape assessment in any year,’ . . . ‘the taxation for that 

year would not be equal and uniform, nor would all property in 

this State be taxed in proportion to its value, and the behest of 

the Constitution would not be obeyed.’ [Citation.]” (Prang, 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 14, italics omitted.)

B. Statutory Scheme for Challenging Assessments

The Legislature has established a three-step process by 

which a taxpayer may challenge a regular or escape assessment. 

(Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1307–

1308 (Steinhart).) The first step is the filing of an application for 

assessment reduction (also referred to as an assessment appeal) 

under section 1603, subdivision (a), through a “verified, written 

application showing the facts claimed to require the reduction 

and the applicant’s opinion of the full value of the property.” (See 

Steinhart, at p. 1307; Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1269.) An 

application for assessment reduction is made to the “county 

board” (§ 1603)—i.e., to “a county board of supervisors meeting as 

a county board of equalization or an assessment appeals board.” 

(§ 1601, subd. (a).) Applications for assessment reductions are 

resolved through an administrative appeals process that can 

involve a public hearing (§§ 1605.4, 1605.6), exchanges of 

information (§ 1606), examinations under oath (§ 1607), and the 

collection and introduction of additional evidence in support or 

refutation of an application (§§ 1609, 1609.4, 1609.5, 1610.2). 

(See generally Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1269.) The county 

board “shall make a record of the hearing” and, if requested, shall 

make “[w]ritten findings of fact,” which “shall fairly disclose the 

board’s determination of all material points raised by the party in 

his or her petition and at the hearing, including a statement of 
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the method or methods of valuation used in appraising the 

property.” (§§ 1611, 1611.5.) Ultimately, “ ‘the county board 

shall equalize the assessment of property on the local roll by 

determining the full value of an individual property, by assessing 

any taxable property that has escaped assessment, correcting the 

amount, number, quantity, or description of property on the local 

roll, canceling improper assessments, and by reducing or 

increasing an individual assessment . . . .’ (§ 1610.8.)” (Williams, 

supra, at p. 1269.)

The second step in the process is the filing of an 

administrative refund claim under sections 5096 et seq. (See 

Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1307–1308.) This step may be 

satisfied by application for assessment reduction under 

section 1603 “if the applicant states in the application that the 

application is intended to constitute a claim for refund.” (§ 5097, 

subd. (b).) If the applicant does not so state, “he or she may 

thereafter . . . file a separate claim for refund of taxes.” (Ibid.)

The third and final step for challenging a regular or escape 

assessment is the filing of a refund action in a superior court 

pursuant to sections 5140 et seq. (See Steinhart, supra, 

47 Cal.4th at pp. 1307–1308.) These sections provide that within 

six months of the date the county board makes its final decision, 

a taxpayer may bring an action in superior court “against a 

county or a city to recover a tax which the board of supervisors of 

the county or the city council of the city has refused to refund on 

a claim filed pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 

5096) of this chapter.” (§ 5140; see also § 5141.)
7

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Property

LA Live owns and manages a sports and entertainment 

development in downtown Los Angeles known as L.A. Live (the 

development). The development, which surrounds the Staples 

Center and Nokia Theatre, is made up of several distinct 

buildings and structures that were completed in 2007 and 2008. 

Three are relevant to the present appeal: the Regal Building 

(Assessor’s Parcel Number (APN) 5138-007-094), Building A 

(APN 5138-007-097), and Building B (APN 513-007-098).3

B. The “Escape Assessments”

On June 21, 2012, the Assessor mailed “Notices of Proposed 

Escape Assessment” (notices) to LA Live. The notices stated that 

the Assessor had reassessed the Regal Building, Building A, and 

Building B for the years 2008–2011, and intended to “enroll[]” the 

new assessments 10 days from the date of the notices.

On June 26, 2012, five days after the notices were mailed, 

the Assessor transmitted the escape assessments to the 

Los Angeles County Auditor (Auditor). The Auditor levied 

property taxes on the Regal Building, Building A, and Building B 

3 Building A has a total of 387,722 square feet of interior and 

exterior office and restaurant space. Its key tenants include the 

Grammy Museum, Conga Room, Club Nokia, Trader Vic’s, 

Starbucks Coffee, Yard House, ABC Radio, Lucky Strikes Lanes 

and Lounge, Rosa Mexicano, Herbalife, The Farm of Beverly 

Hills, Rock’n Fish, and Wolfgang Puck Bar & Grill. Building B is 

five stories and has a total of 119,862 square feet of interior and 

exterior office, studio, and restaurant space. Its main tenant is 

ESPN Broadcast; other tenants include Lawry’s Carvery 

Restaurant and ESPN Zone.
8

on August 4, 2012, and mailed adjusted property tax bills to 

LA Live on August 16, 2012.

4 The tax bills were based on the 

following assessments:

Building Tax Year Prior 

Assessed 

Value

New 

Assessed 

Value

Net Tax 

Due

Regal 2008 $1,167,788 $4,767,788 $42,830

2009 $1,191,143 $4,863,143 $44,814

2010 $1,188,319 $4,851,616 $46,519

2011 $1,197,267 $4,888,148 $45,983

Building A 2008 $2,000,628 $41,693,128 $472,237

2009 $2,040,640 $112,074,990 $1,342,904

2010 $2,035,803 $111,809,371 $1,393,969

2011 $2,051,132 $112,651,294 $1,377,911

Building B 2008 $722,772 $23,959,872 $276,461

2009 $737,227 $34,146,069 $407,735

2010 $735,479 $34,065,141 $423,240

2011 $741,017 $34,321,650 $418,364

Collectively, the principal amount of property taxes levied 

as a result of the escape assessments was $6,292,967. On March 

21, 2013, LA Live timely paid the property taxes due under the 

tax bills.

C. LA Live’s Request for Refund 

LA Live did not administratively appeal the escape 

assessments pursuant to section 1603 on the grounds raised in 

4 LA Live contends the escape assessments were “enrolled” 

within the meaning of section 531.8 when they were transmitted 

to the Auditor, and the trial court so found. The County 

disagrees, asserting that enrollment occurred when the Auditor 

processed the information provided by the Assessor—in this case, 

on August 4, 2012. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume 

without deciding that the escape assessments were enrolled when 

they were transmitted to the Auditor on June 26, 2012.
9

the present appeal.

5 Instead, on September 20, 2016, it

submitted a claim for refund pursuant to sections 5096 et seq., 

seeking reimbursement of the entirety of the taxes paid pursuant 

to the escape assessments. LA Live claimed that in issuing the 

escape assessments, the County failed to comply with section 

531.8, which required the Assessor to mail notices of escape 

assessment at least 10 days before enrolling the escape 

assessments.

6 LA Live contended that because the Assessor had

mailed the notices only five days before enrolling the escape 

assessments, rather than 10 days as required by statute, the 

assessments were void and subject to refund.

The County denied LA Live’s claim for refund on March 1, 

2017.

D. The Present Action

On September 1, 2017, LA Live filed the present action for 

refund of property taxes pursuant to section 5140. LA Live’s

5 In 2012 and 2013, LA Live filed administrative appeals 

challenging the assessed values of Building A and Building B, as 

well as of several other structures that comprise the 

development. In those administrative appeals, LA Live asserted

that the County had over-valued the property at issue, but did 

not claim the assessments were void. Although LA Live and the 

County disagree about the proper characterization of these 

administrative appeals, both parties agree that the 

administrative appeals did not exhaust LA Live’s administrative 

remedies for purposes of this action.

6 Section 531.8 provides, in relevant part: “No escape 

assessment shall be enrolled under this article before 10 days 

after the assessor has mailed or otherwise delivered to the 

affected taxpayer a ‘Notice of Proposed Escape Assessment’ with 

respect to one or more specified tax years.” 
10

complaint alleged that section 531.8 required the Assessor to wait 

10 days after issuing a notice of proposed escape assessment 

before enrolling the escape assessment. Because the Assessor did 

not wait the statutory 10-day period before enrolling the escape 

assessments, the escape assessments were “void and thus subject 

to refund.” LA Live sought judgment of $6,292,967, plus interest 

and attorney fees.

The matter was tried to the court in November 2018. In 

lieu of live testimony, the parties submitted stipulated facts and 

exhibits. As relevant here, the parties stipulated that the 

Assessor entered the escape assessment for tax years 2008 

through 2011 into the Property Tax Database on June 17, 2012, 

and mailed “Notices of Proposed Escape Assessment” to LA Live 

on June 21, 2012. The Assessor transmitted the escape 

assessment to the Auditor on June 26, 2012, and the escape 

assessments were placed on the Auditor’s “Secure Tax Roll” the 

same day. The Auditor levied property taxes on the Regal 

Building, Building A, and Building B based on the escape 

assessments on August 4, 2012, and mailed tax bills to LA Live 

on August 16, 2012. LA Live submitted a claim for refund within 

four years of paying those taxes. 

The trial court filed a statement of decision on February 15, 

2019. It concluded that (1) nothing in the plain language of the 

Revenue and Taxation Code suggested that “ministerial 

violations of the 10 day [notice] period [of section 531.8] result in 

voiding an escape assessment,” (2) interpreting the statute as LA 

Live suggested would create an absurd result, (3) the County 

substantially complied with the notice requirement of section 

531.8, and (4) LA Live failed to exhaust its administrative 

remedies. Thus, the court found the assessments at issue were 
11

“valid and should not be voided,” and it awarded judgment in 

favor of the County.

LA Live timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

LA Live contends that compliance with the 10-day notice 

provision of section 531.8 is essential to the County’s taxing 

power, such that a failure to comply with section 531.8 renders 

the resulting assessments “ultra vires [and] void.” LA Live thus 

urges that because the County enrolled the escape assessments 

fewer than 10 days after it mailed notices of such assessments, 

LA Live is entitled to a full refund of the property taxes paid 

pursuant to the assessments.

The County contends that as a predicate to bringing this 

action, LA Live was required to exhaust its administrative 

remedies by administratively challenging the escape assessments 

before the county board. Because LA Live indisputably failed to 

do so, the County urges LA Live’s claims are not reviewable on 

the merits. In the alternative, the County urges that it fully or 

substantially complied with section 531.8.

As we discuss, parties generally must exhaust available 

administrative remedies as a prerequisite to seeking relief in the 

courts. In the property tax context, the exhaustion requirement 

means that a taxpayer ordinarily may not pursue a court action 

for a tax refund without first filing claims for reassessment and 

refund with the county board of equalization or assessment 

appeals board. Although there is a limited exception to this rule 

where a property tax assessment is a “ ‘nullity as a matter of 

law’ ”—i.e., where “ ‘the property is tax exempt, nonexistent or 

outside the jurisdiction [citations], and no factual questions exist 

regarding the valuation of the property’ ” (Williams, supra, 
12

2 Cal.5th at p. 1275)—that exception does not apply in the 

present case. Accordingly, LA Live was required to exhaust 

administrative remedies before initiating this action, and its 

failure to do so rendered its claim nonreviewable.

I.

Necessity of Exhausting

Administrative Remedies

A. Exhaustion Requirement Generally

The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is 

well settled. “ ‘In general, a party must exhaust administrative 

remedies before resorting to the courts. [Citations.] Under this 

rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon 

“termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative 

review procedures.” [Citations.]’ (Coachella Valley Mosquito & 

Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations 

Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080 (Coachella Valley); see also 

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292–

293.)” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1267–1268.)

“[I]n California a requirement that administrative 

remedies be exhausted is jurisdictional.” (California Correctional 

Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 

1133, 1151.) Thus, “[t]he exhaustion rule ‘ “is not a matter of 

judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure . . . 

binding upon all courts.” ’ (Campbell v. Regents of the University 

of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321 (Campbell).) . . . ‘[T]he 

exhaustion doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring 

administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an 

agency determination until the agency has reached a final 

decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should 

decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless 
13

absolutely necessary). [Citations].’ (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 

Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 391; see also Rojo v. Kliger

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 83 [explaining that the exhaustion doctrine 

advances policy interests such as ‘easing the burden on the court 

system, maximizing the use of administrative agency expertise 

and capability to order and monitor corrective measures, and 

providing a more economical and less formal means of resolving 

[a] dispute’]; Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1986) 

185 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240 [observing that the exhaustion 

doctrine ‘ “facilitates the development of a complete record that 

draws on administrative expertise” ’ and affords ‘a preliminary 

administrative sifting process [citation], unearthing the relevant 

evidence and providing a record which the court may review’].)” 

(Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1268.)

In the property tax context, the requirement to exhaust 

administrative remedies is explicit in the governing statutes. 

Section 1603, subdivision (a) provides: “A reduction in an 

assessment on the local roll shall not be made unless the party 

affected or his or her agent makes and files with the county board 

a verified, written application showing the facts claimed to 

require the reduction and the applicant’s opinion of the full value 

of the property.” Section 5097, subdivision (a) provides in 

relevant part that “[a]n order for a refund . . . shall not be made, 

except on” the timely filing of a verified claim for refund. And, 

section 5142, subdivision (a) provides that a court action may not 

“be commenced or maintained . . . unless a claim for refund has 

first been filed pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 

5096),” and “[n]o recovery shall be allowed in any refund action 

upon any ground not specified in the refund claim.” (See 

Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1307.)
14

In light of these statutes, our Supreme Court has explained 

that in the property tax context, “application of the exhaustion 

principle means that a taxpayer ordinarily may not file or pursue 

a court action for a tax refund without first applying to the local 

board of equalization for assessment reduction under section 

1603 and filing an administrative tax refund claim under section 

5097.” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th 1298, 1308, citing Stenocord 

Corp. v. City etc. of San Francisco (1970) 2 Cal.3d 984, 986–990

(Stenocord); see also Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1268.) 

Whether the exhaustion requirement applies in a 

particular case raises legal issues, which we review de novo. 

(Ortega v. Contra Costa Community College Dist. (2007) 

156 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1080; Evans v. City of San Jose (2005) 

128 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1136.)

B. The “Nullity Exception” and the Supreme Court’s 

Decision in Parr-Richmond

Our Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to 

the exhaustion rule in the property tax context where a tax 

assessment “is ‘a nullity as a matter of law.’ ” (Williams, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1264.) The court discussed this exception most 

recently in Williams, in the context of escape assessments 

imposed by the County of Fresno. In that case, the taxpayer took 

no action on the escape assessments for several years, but 

eventually paid the additional taxes and filed a refund action in 

superior court, asserting it had not owned most of the property at 

issue during the relevant years. The superior court sustained the 

county’s demurrer on the ground that the taxpayer had failed to 

exhaust its administrative remedies; the appellate court

reversed, concluding that because the taxpayer claimed it did not 

own the taxed property, it was not required to exhaust 
15

administrative remedies. (Id. at pp. 1265–1267.) The county

sought review.

The Supreme Court explained that as a general rule, a 

party must exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite for 

seeking relief in the courts. Prior cases had recognized 

exceptions to this general rule, however, “ ‘when the 

administrative agency cannot provide an adequate remedy’ and 

‘when the subject of [a] controversy lies outside the agency’s 

jurisdiction.’ ” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1274.) In the 

property tax context, cases had recognized an additional 

exception “ ‘when the assessment “ ‘is a nullity as a matter of law

because, for example, the property is tax exempt, nonexistent, or 

outside the jurisdiction [citations], and no factual questions exist 

regarding the valuation of the property which, upon review by 

the board of equalization, might be resolved in the taxpayer’s 

favor, thereby making further litigation unnecessary [citations].’

(Stenocord, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 987.)” (Williams, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1275, italics added.)

In an earlier decision, Parr-Richmond Industrial Corp. v. 

Boyd (1954) 43 Cal.2d 157 (Parr-Richmond), the court had 

applied the nullity doctrine where, as in Williams, a taxpayer 

“ ‘attack[ed] the assessment as void because he [did] not own the 

property on which the tax demand was made.’ ” (Williams, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1275.) Under those circumstances, the 

Parr-Richmond court had held that exhaustion of administrative 

remedies was unnecessary because the tax had been “levied 

against a greater property interest than [the taxpayer] allegedly 

owned,” and hence was “illegal.” (Parr-Richmond, supra, 

43 Cal.2d at p. 165.) The Parr-Richmond court had explained: 

“ ‘While in one sense it is true that almost any mistake which 
16

results in an excessive assessment amounts to an overvaluation 

of the property of a taxpayer, we think there is a real and distinct 

difference between those cases in which it may properly be said 

that the error is one of overvaluation and those cases in which 

the overvaluation is a mere incidental result of an erroneous 

assessment of property which should not have been assessed.’ ” 

(Parr-Richmond, at p. 165.) Accordingly, “plaintiff’s theory of 

relief—from an illegal tax because it was levied against a greater 

property interest than it allegedly owned . . . did not require its 

prior application to the board of equalization before recourse to 

the court.” (Ibid.)

The Williams court overruled Parr-Richmond, holding that 

a taxpayer is required to exhaust administrative remedies even if 

it claims it does not own the assessed property. (Williams, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1265.) The court noted that current law had 

expanded the role of county boards, expressly giving them

jurisdiction over valuation and nonvaluation issues, and also had 

provided a procedure by which a taxpayer could avoid the 

assessment appeals process if the taxpayer and the assessor 

stipulated that an assessment challenge involved only 

nonvaluation issues, and the board accepted the stipulation.

7 

7 Section 5142, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: 

“When the person affected or his or her agent and the assessor 

stipulate that an application involves only nonvaluation issues, 

they may file a stipulation with the county board of equalization 

stating that issues in dispute do not involve valuation 

questions. . . . The board shall accept or reject the stipulation, 

with or without conducting a hearing on the stipulation. The 

filing of, and the acceptance by the board of, a stipulation shall be 

deemed compliance with the requirement that the person affected 

file and prosecute an application for reduction under Chapter 1 
17

(Id. at pp. 1270–1271.) These statutes, the court said, evidenced 

the Legislature’s intent that claims as to which no stipulation 

had been entered should be submitted to a county board as a 

prerequisite to maintaining a refund action under section 5140. 

The court explained: “[T]he stipulation procedure bespeaks a 

legislative determination that the county board should, in the 

first instance, pass on this question, or decide that it need not do 

so. Indeed, the whole stipulation process—part of a ‘carefully 

crafted statutory scheme the Legislature has, within its 

constitutional authority, put in place’ [citation]—would be

meaningless, and section 5142, subdivision (b) would be 

surplusage, if an exhaustion requirement did not apply to 

nonvaluation issues. If that were true, there would be no need 

for a taxpayer to seek a stipulation in order to obtain judicial 

review of a challenge to an assessment when the dispute did not 

involve a valuation issue.” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

pp. 1271–1272, fn. omitted.) 

The court noted, moreover, that requiring exhaustion of 

administrative remedies in the case before it advanced “the 

purposes served by the exhaustion of administrative remedies in 

general.” (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1272.) It explained

that nonvaluation challenges typically involve questions of fact, 

and thus the assessment appeal process “would facilitate the 

development of a record conducive to judicial review. The parties 

also might resolve their disagreement over ownership through 

the administrative process. Such an outcome could eliminate the 

need to pay the tax under dispute and bring a refund action, and 

(commencing with Section 1601) of Part 3 in order to exhaust 

administrative remedies.”
18

thereby lessen the burden on the courts.” (Ibid.) Further, the 

court said, recognizing an assessment appeal as subsumed within 

the exhaustion requirement “also supplies a timeline for the 

presentation and resolution of disputes such as this one. There is 

a timeframe defined by statute for bringing and resolving an 

assessment appeal through administrative channels. (§§ 1603, 

subds. (b)–(d), 1604, 1605, subds. (b)–(e).) But no comparable 

deadline exists when the nullity exception applies. Where 

exhaustion is excused, therefore, the predictable result is stale 

claims like the one before the court in this case. The passage of 

time can make these claims difficult to adjudicate; it also hinders 

counties’ ability to predict and budget for revenue.” (Id. at 

pp. 1272–1273.)

Finally, the court noted that as a result of legislative 

enactments, the modern assessment appeals process is 

significantly more robust than it was when Parr-Richmond was 

decided. (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1280-1281.) The court 

explained that in the 1950’s, the assessment appeals process “was 

informal and incorporated few features conducive to the 

development of a robust record.” (Id. at p. 1280.) In the 1960’s, 

however, “the Legislature took substantial steps to make the 

assessment appeal process a more effective mechanism for 

challenging an assessment, and to improve the ability of a 

taxpayer to develop an administrative record that could usefully 

inform subsequent judicial proceedings.” (Id. at p. 1281.) Thus, 

although the Parr-Richmond court in 1954 may have regarded 

the assessment appeals process “as having little value in 

advancing the purposes served by the exhaustion rule,” it was 

apparent that such proceedings before a county board “can serve 

useful purposes today.” (Id. at pp. 1281−1282.)
19

For all of these reasons, the court overruled Parr-Richmond

to the extent that it extended the nullity exception to cases where 

the sole basis for invoking the exception was an assertion that a 

taxpayer did not own taxable property. (Williams, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at p. 1282.) Instead, the court said, “a claim of 

nonownership of nonexempt assessed property, by itself, will not 

provide a sufficient basis for invoking the nullity exception and 

thereby avoiding the assessment appeal process when a taxpayer 

seeks a reduction in an assessment on the local roll.” (Id. at 

p. 1283.)8

In so holding, the court did not purport to overrule, and 

therefore implicitly left intact, the much more limited version of 

the nullity exception articulated in its earlier cases, which had 

applied the exception where “it is readily ascertainable that the 

property or interest lies beyond the county’s legal authority to 

tax,” for example because “ ‘the property is tax exempt, 

nonexistent, or outside the jurisdiction.’ ” (Williams, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at pp. 1278, 1275.) In such cases, Williams said, the 

nullity exception may appropriately be invoked because “a 

dispute will not squarely implicate the county board’s valuation 

expertise, and the other public interests advanced by 

exhaustion—including the ability of the government to timely 

anticipate and collect revenue—would not be unduly 

compromised by allowing a refund action to proceed without prior 

8 The court held, however, that because the taxpayer in the 

case before it might reasonably have relied on Parr-Richmond to 

conclude that it was unnecessary to exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing a tax refund action, the court’s holding 

would apply prospectively only. (Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 1282.)
20

exhaustion through an assessment appeal.” (Id. at pp. 1278–

1279.)

II.

LA Live’s Challenge to the Escape Assessments 

Is Not Reviewable Because LA Live Failed to 

Exhaust Its Administrative Remedies

The parties agree that LA Live did not its exhaust its 

administrative remedies by filing an application for assessment 

reduction with the county board pursuant to section 1603. The 

question before us, therefore, is whether LA Live was required to 

do so, as the County contends, or was excused from exhausting 

administrative remedies because the escape assessments were 

null as a matter of law, as LA Live contends.

9 For the reasons 

that follow, we conclude that LA Live was required to pursue its 

administrative remedies before initiating this action, and that its 

failure to do so bars consideration of this case on the merits. 

As we have described, although Williams did not 

completely eliminate the nullity exception in the property tax 

context, it significantly limited its application to cases where “it 

is readily ascertainable that the property or interest lies beyond 

9 Throughout its briefs, LA Live refers to the escape 

assessments as “void,” rather than as “null.” The two words are 

synonymous (see, e.g., Merriam-Webster Dictionary

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/void> [defining 

“void” as “of no legal force or effect: null”] [as of Feb. 26, 2021], 

archived at https://perma.cc/UQ6C-QBGE); Black’s Law 

Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) p. 1411, col. 2 [defining “void” as “[n]ull; 

ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect”]); 

thus, because California case law refers to assessments as to 

which administrative remedies need not be exhausted as “null” 

assessments, we will use that nomenclature in this opinion. 
21

the county’s legal authority to tax,” for example because “the 

property is tax exempt, nonexistent, or outside the jurisdiction.’ ” 

(Williams, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1278, 1275.) Here, it is

undisputed that the parcels at issue are within the County’s 

taxing authority: While LA Live challenges the timeliness of the

notices of proposed escape assessments, it does not contend that 

the parcels are outside the County’s boundaries, are exempt from 

taxation, or do not exist. As such, the present case does not fall 

within the narrow nullity exception left intact by Williams.

Moreover, application of the exhaustion rule to the 

circumstances present here advances the purposes served by the 

exhaustion requirement. The present case turns, in part, on 

questions of fact, including when the escape assessments were 

enrolled, and whether LA Live’s 2012 and 2013 administrative 

appeals addressed any aspect of the escape assessments.

Administrative exhaustion before the county board would have 

resolved these issues, thus “facilitat[ing] the development of a 

record conducive to judicial review. (See Williams, supra, 5 

Cal.5th at p. 1272.) Administrative exhaustion also would have 

ensured that LA Live’s claims were litigated within the statutory 

timeframe, thus avoiding the present circumstance in which 

challenges to a June 2012 assessment were not filed until

September 2016. As Williams noted, “[t]he passage of time can 

make these claims difficult to adjudicate; it also hinders counties’ 

ability to predict and budget for revenue.” (Williams, supra, 5 

Cal.5th at p. 1273.) The latter concern is particularly salient 

here, where the challenged assessment exceeds six million 

dollars.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, LA Live urges that the 

escape assessments were legally null, and thus were not subject 
22

to administrative exhaustion requirements, because the County 

acted in excess of its statutory taxing power when it imposed the 

escape assessments. In LA Live’s view, because the County “ ‘is a 

creature of limited powers,’ ” its actions necessarily are “ultra 

vires [and] void” whenever it fails to strictly comply with 

statutory procedures. But in so urging, LA Live makes no 

attempt to address the Supreme Court’s analysis in Williams, 

where the taxpayer’s claim—that it had been assessed a tax on 

property it did not own—plainly asserted a statutory violation. 

(See § 405, subd. (a) [“the assessor shall assess all the taxable 

property in his county, except state-assessed property, to the 

persons owning, claiming, possessing, or controlling it on the lien 

date,” italics added].) Because this statutory violation was the 

express basis for the taxpayer’s refund claim in Williams, the 

Supreme Court necessarily would have found the escape 

assessment in Williams to have been null were the nullity 

doctrine as broad as LA Live contends. The court’s rejection of 

the nullity exception in Williams, therefore, fatally undermines 

the extremely broad application of the doctrine LA Live espouses.

We note, moreover, that the legal violation urged in 

Williams (assessing a property tax against a nonowner) is more 

fundamentally inconsistent with the County’s taxing powers than

is the violation urged in this case—issuing an escape assessment 

on five days, rather than on 10 days, notice. Because the 

Supreme Court held in Williams that the alleged legal error did 

not nullify the assessment, we have no difficulty reaching the 

same conclusion here.

None of the cases cited by LA Live compels a different

result. Two of the cases, House v. Los Angeles County (1894) 

104 Cal. 73 and Selby v. Oakdale Irr. Dist. (1934) 140 Cal.App. 
23

171 do not concern the validity of tax assessments: House

addressed an alleged breach of contract, and Selby concerned an 

alleged failure to pay amounts due on irrigation bonds. Two 

other cases, Ferguson v. Gardner (1927) 86 Cal.App. 421 and 

Ryan v. Byram (1935) 4 Cal.2d 596 concluded, contrary to claims 

made by the plaintiff taxpayers, that the defendant public 

entities were empowered to collect the taxes at issue. (Ferguson, 

at pp. 424, 429 [rejecting claim that special property tax was 

“null, void, and of no effect”]; Ryan, at p. 610 [“the two levies of 

August 31, 1935, . . . are valid”].) And another case, People v. 

Coghill (1874) 47 Cal. 361, which was decided nearly 150 years 

ago, considered a question entirely different than the one 

presented in this case—namely, the legality of an assessment 

levied on real property “viewed” by two commissioners, rather 

than three.

Just three of the cases cited by LA Live are relevant to the 

issues before us in this appeal, and none assists LA Live. In 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 

42 Cal.App.3d 32, the plaintiffs, like LA Live here, asserted that 

they should be permitted to pursue a court action to recover 

property taxes without first pursuing administrative remedies. 

The plaintiffs “[did] not contend that the property upon which tax 

was assessed [was] tax-exempt, outside the jurisdiction, or 

nonexistent,” but instead urged that the assessments were void

because the County’s assessment practices violated the law in 

various ways, including by applying a discriminatory assessment 

ratio, failing to equalize assessments on business personal 

property, and practicing “ ‘systemic fraud.’ ” (Id. at pp. 37, 39.) 

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention, noting that the 

Supreme Court had previously held that administrative 
24

exhaustion was excused “ ‘only in those cases wherein the 

assessment is totally void as an attempt to tax property not 

subject to taxation, rather than merely an inaccurate assessment 

of the value of taxable property.’ ” (Id. at p. 38, quoting 

Stenocord, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 990.) In the case before the 

court, the plaintiffs’ claims of illegality “[did] not excuse 

appellants from the requirement that they have exhausted their 

remedy before the county board of equalization before filing the 

lawsuit at bench.” (Westinghouse, at pp. 38–39; see also id. at 

pp. 39–43.) 

Finally, in Gaumer v. County of Tehama (1967) 

247 Cal.App.2d 548 (Gaumer) and Tamco Development Co. v. 

County of Del Norte (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 929 (Tamco), the 

courts held taxpayers were excused from exhausting 

administrative remedies because they received no notice of the 

assessments prior to receiving their tax bills, failures that “made 

it impossible for plaintiffs to apply for a hearing or appeal before 

the board at the prescribed times.” (Gaumer, at p. 553.)10 In the 

10 In Gaumer, taxpayers were given no notice of the increased 

assessments before they received their tax bills, a failure that 

“made it impossible for plaintiffs to apply for a hearing or appeal 

before the board at the prescribed times.” (Gaumer, at p. 553.) 

Nonetheless, the taxpayers “did go before the supervisors as soon 

as they could and . . . were there denied relief.” (Ibid.) Under 

those circumstances, the court said, the litigation was proper. 

(Ibid.) Similarly, in Tamco, the county assessor failed to notify 

taxpayers of an increased assessment, and thus the taxpayers did 

not timely administratively challenge the assessment “because 

[they] had no knowledge of the increase from any source.” (Id. at 

p. 930.) They nonetheless applied to the board of supervisors for 

relief “at their earliest opportunity.” (Id. at p. 935.) On this 
25

present case, in contrast, LA Live admittedly received notices of 

the proposed escape assessments—and, although the notices 

were issued five days later than the statute required, LA Live 

received them well within the statutory time to file an application 

for assessment reduction. (See § 1603, subd. (a) [application for 

reduction “shall be filed within the time period from July 2 to 

September 15”].) 

LA Live’s citations to various administrative materials 

issued by the State Board of Equalization also fail to persuade us 

that the County’s assertedly untimely notice of the proposed 

escape assessments excused LA Live from exhausting 

administrative remedies. At most, the administrative materials 

LA Live cites suggest that compliance with section 531.8 is 

“mandatory,” and thus that failure to give proper notice renders 

an escape assessment “invalid.” But as the County notes, even if 

an act required by a public entity is “mandatory” (i.e., 

nondiscretionary), the public entity’s failure to do the act does not 

invariably invalidate the government action to which the act 

relates. Indeed, our Supreme Court has explained in an

analogous context that there are many procedural rules “that are 

not directory[,] but mandatory; these are binding, and parties 

must comply with them to avoid a default or other penalty.” 

(Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 341–

342.) Nonetheless, “ ‘failure to comply does not render the 

proceeding void’ in a fundamental sense. . . .” (Ibid., italics 

added.) Thus, for example, “a statute of limitations may be 

‘mandatory in the sense that the court may not excuse a late 

record, the taxpayers were entitled to pursue their action in 

court. (Id. at p. 932.) 
26

complaint on grounds of mistake, neglect, or the like,’ but ‘it is 

not ‘jurisdictional.” ’ ” [Citation.] A properly raised objection to 

an untimely complaint may require that the court dismiss it, and 

the court’s failure to dismiss is reversible on appeal. But a party 

cannot raise the untimeliness for the first time on appeal or in a 

collateral attack. If an untimely complaint results in a judgment, 

the judgment will not be disturbed on timeliness grounds if the 

defendant did not properly preserve a statute of limitations 

defense.” (Ibid.)

The principles articulated in Kabran and Williams suggest 

that although assessments levied without proper notice may be 

vulnerable to reversal through proper administrative channels, 

they do not entitle a taxpayer to a reversal if it has not made use 

of those channels. LA Live’s failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies, therefore, is fatal to its claim.

CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, the County’s apparent failure to 

timely comply with the notice provision of section 531.8 did not 

excuse LA Live from challenging the failure through prescribed 

administrative channels. The trial court therefore properly 

concluded that LA Live had failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies and, therefore, declined to review its claims on the 

merits.
27

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The County is awarded its 

appellate costs.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

DHANIDINA, J.