# Burma - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 11, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024																																																					April 11, 2024																																																								2:16 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. We have a couple of guests today. Run of show: Our Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield is here along with our Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is going to kick it off with some open remarks. They’ll take a few questions about the conflict in Sudan, and then I will return for the remainder of the briefing.So, Ambassador.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you very much and good afternoon everyone. Let me just start by welcoming Special Envoy Tom Perriello back from Chad just last week but also welcome him back to the State Department. Last week, Tom traveled to Adré Refugee Camp right along the border of Sudan. It’s a trip that I know quite well. I was at that same refugee camp just a few months ago in September. I also visited the camp 20 years ago.Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees had fled for this camp in the months prior – 90 percent of them women and children. And among those refugees was a six-month-old baby, born only days before the fighting broke out in Sudan. When I saw her, she was suffering from acute malnutrition – so small, so fragile, I thought she was a newborn. There is so much about her story that I don’t know: how she arrived at the MSF hospital, whether she ever left the hospital. But I think about her today as the world nears a grim milestone: one year of horrific civil war in Sudan; how she was born as her country spiraled into conflict; how she was carried into Chad, her protectors walking miles and miles to reach a semblance of safety; how she spent those formative few months in a hospital too small and weak to even cry as doctors tried desperately to nurse her back to health; and how now she reaches her first birthday having only known violence, hunger, and displacement.April 11th should be a historic occasion as we mark the five-year anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Omar al-Bashir’s regime, 30 – his 30-year reign. Five years ago, you could practically taste the spirit of freedom, peace, and democracy in the air as women and young people took to the streets demanding change. And yet that baby I met in September is not growing up in a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan. Instead, she’s one of millions whose lives have been upended and forever altered by this war.Today, nearly 25 million Sudanese people live in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection; three-quarters of them face acute food insecurity. Nearly 8 million have had to flee their homes in what has become the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. We’ve seen reports of gang rape, mass murder at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces militia, of girls sold into sexual slavery, boys being made into child soldiers, of urban areas destroyed by arial weapons, and entire villages burned to the ground. And yet, as communities barrel toward famine, as cholera and measles spread, as violence continues to claim countless lives, the world has largely remained silent. And that must change and it has to change now. The international community must give more, it must do more, and it has to care more.And let’s start with the funding piece because that’s critical. To date, just 5 percent – 5 percent – of the UN’s humanitarian appeal for Sudan has been met. Already, the World Food Program has had to cut assistance to over 7 million people in Chad and South Sudan, and that includes 1.2 million refugees like the ones I met in Adré, people who were already struggling to feed themselves and their families.This is a matter of life and death. Experts warn that the coming weeks and months, over 200,000 more children could die of starvation. The United States, for our part, plans on significantly increasing our funding in the days to come.More than just lacking aid, however, humanitarian workers have been systematically obstructed from delivering aid to those in need. From the beginning, brave people have been on the ground, often putting their lives at risk, to save people in Sudan. But at every turn, combatants on both sides of the war have undermined their work. That includes the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has impeded the major humanitarian aid crossings from Chad into Darfur.And that’s where doing more comes in. Should the SAF not reverse course immediately, the Security Council must intervene to ensure lifesaving aid is delivered and distributed, including, if necessary, through a cross-border mechanism. What’s more, we must continue urging the warring parties to stop the fighting and get back to the negotiating table, as well as urge those outside supporters prolonging this conflict and enabling these atrocities to stop sending weapons to Sudan.Finally, I want to talk about the lack of care, the lack of attention, the world has paid to Sudan. Just five years after a revolution that offered a glimpse at a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan, people are losing hope. Aid workers have begun calling this conflict the forgotten war. Sudanese children are asking why the world has forgotten them. And let’s be clear: I don’t believe the dearth of attention is because people are ignorant or unfeeling. In fact, I believe it’s the opposite. I believe it’s because there are so many terrible crises, so much violence and pain, that people don’t quite know which way to turn.And this is where I need the help of all of you – the members of the press who join me in this briefing. As we mark one year of this conflict, please don’t let it go uncovered. Don’t let stories like the ones I heard in Chad go unheard. Don’t let perpetrators of this horrific violence go unexposed, from the generals who started the war to the backers who continue to fuel it. Don’t let the feeling that we have forgotten Sudan become a reality, because we need – we need to reignite that spirit of revolution, the hope and promise that characterized this day five years ago. I’m counting on you, and the people of Sudan are counting on you as well.So thank you, and Special Envoy Perriello and I will now take a few questions.MR MILLER: Matt, do you want to – do you have anything?QUESTION: I don’t really have anything.MR MILLER: Shaun.QUESTION: Sure, thanks. Thanks, Ambassador and Special Envoy. Could I ask you two things?Tom, you’ve said before that you’re hopeful with the end of Ramadan that the talks could resume. Do you think that that’s on the cards now? Do you see an interest – a strategic decision by both sides – to resume talks?And Ambassador, you mentioned a cross-border mechanism. I know you’ve spoken about that before. How close do you think we are to that becoming reality? Do you see that as realistically something that the Security Council with the vetoes there can push through?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: You want to come first?MR PERRIELLO: First. We do sense a great deal of urgency to resume talks. And in fact, talks are already ongoing in the sense that we are negotiating every day and trying to align key actors inside and outside with a plan that would end this war. We appreciate that Saudi Arabia has committed to hosting a new round of talks and that those will be inclusive talks. We hope that that will be a date that we can be able to announce soon and build momentum coming out of the gatherings in Paris and start to have a sense of when that date will be. But in the meantime, we are not waiting to continue to try to put pressure on the parties to come to the table, and we do think that there are some signs – while many, many signs point to the war getting even worse, in some ways it’s gotten so bad and it’s starting to have such regional implications that it’s also increased, I think, some of the diplomatic appetite to try to find an end to this war. And we’re going to try to use every lever we have to build that into enough political momentum and political will to end this war.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Look, on the cross-border concept, we know that it is a concept that can work. It worked in Syria. We hope we don’t have to go there. We hope we don’t have to push for a resolution to go there. And for that reason, we’re engaging very actively with the SAF as well as the RSF and other parties on the ground to see how we can work with all of them to facilitate getting needed humanitarian assistance into these areas that is so desperately needed.But if we’re not able to work with them, if we’re not able to get their cooperation, then we have to find another way. We can’t sit back and not look for other opportunities to see – to get humanitarian assistance to people who are in desperate need.MR MILLER: Michele Kelemen in the back.QUESTION: Hi, thanks for taking my question. You talked about other countries fueling the conflict. I wonder if you can name them. What are you telling them? Because I think some of them are U.S. partners.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Yeah, we &#8212;QUESTION: And what more can the U.S. do to put pressure on the political players in terms of sanctions?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: With all of the countries who have been identified as possibly fueling this conflict, we have had direct conversations with every single one of them to press them to cease their support and fueling of this war. They’ve been named in the press. We’ve seen the Emiratis be named in the press. We’ve seen Egypt be named in the press. There are others who have been identified in the press as well. And with all of them we have constant engagements, and I know that Tom has had those engagements as well.MR MILLER: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Thank you. Just to elaborate a little bit more on that, to what extent is the UAE – can you talk about them helping the RSF and refusing to listen to U.S. messages to stop its weapons shipments? Can you speak about that at all?MR PERRIELLO: I think we’ve been making very clear to all partners across the region that escalating the war at this time is something that is going to not only have increasing humanitarian costs but actually risks destabilization of the entire region. We see a conflict that in some ways has been between two sides that shows signs of being increasingly factionalized in ways that brings in some of the tribal militias that have stayed neutral and affects the ability of some of the neighboring countries to – that have tried to stay – be constructive and not get more involved to get pulled in. And right now is a time that every arms shipment, every bit fueling this conflict, is something that pushes us closer to not only famine, but to a failed state. And the flip side is this is a situation in which everyone in the region can benefit from a peaceful and stable Sudan. The Sudanese people are extremely clear about what they want. They want a return to the constitutional transition begun with great courage just a few years ago. They want to see a unified professional military that is accountable to the people. They want to see not a return of extremists and former corrupt officials. And they want that full humanitarian access.And I think they’re going to be looking across the region at who stood with the Sudanese people at this time of great crisis, and who was pouring fuel on the fire. And those consequences for those that are making the situation worse need to increase, and I think we are seeing particularly around this anniversary on the 15th that finally some attention is being paid to this issue, and we need those actors to know that the world is watching. And we need that not to just be one day, but that people continue to cover the sheer scale of this – this tragedy, but also cover the inspiring stories. If you look at the emergency response rooms, you see young Sudanese who’ve created cash apps in local kitchens to completely disrupt the kind of barriers being set up by the belligerent actors to get food into some of the hardest-hit areas. These are stories of courage and of innovation, and ones that are literally a lifeline for many of the Sudanese left behind.MR MILLER: We have time for one more. Simon.QUESTION: Just to follow up on this point about the direct conversations with countries fueling the conflict, does that include Iran? And we’ve reported that Iranian-made armed drones have had a big impact on the course of the war. Is – so is that something that you’re – you’ve communicated directly with Iran on? Are they included in those countries? And what would be the message &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: We’ve had numerous discussions with countries in the region. And in those discussions with countries in the region, we’ve encouraged them to encourage other countries like Iran not to engage. I won’t get into what discussions we may or may not have had with Iran, but in our discussions with other countries in the region we’ve also asked for their assistance in pressing each other as well as others to stop fueling this war.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PERRIELLO: And the one thing I would just – sorry – add on that is I think this speaks to the idea that for people in the region, there are many, many reasons to become pro-peace right now. The continuation of this conflict and the introduction of additional actors and additional negative elements only takes the situation into a more destabilizing direction in addition to the human costs of this. And we think it’s very important for people to notice those trend lines and see that this is an opportunity and a moment to switch from either not paying attention, or playing a not-constructive role, to realizing we all benefit, everyone in the region will benefit from finding a path to peace.MR MILLER: Thank you &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; to you both.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Okay, thank you.MR MILLER: Ambassador.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. So before we get to questions, I have just a couple opening comments about the situation in the Middle East.We continue to be concerned about the risk of escalation in the Middle East – it’s something we have been working to mitigate and contain since the attacks of October 7th – and specifically about the threats made in recent days by Iran against the State of Israel and the Israeli people. You saw the President make clear yesterday that we stand in strong support of Israel’s security against these threats. Secretary Blinken has been engaged in diplomacy over the past 24 hours through a series of calls to foreign counterparts, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to make clear that escalation is not in anyone’s interest, and that countries should urge Iran not to escalate. We have also engaged with European allies and partners over the past few days and urged them as well to send a clear message to Iran that escalation is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in the region’s interest, and it’s not in the world’s interest.Separately, the Secretary spoke yesterday to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to reiterate our strong support for Israel against these threats. On that call, the Secretary also emphasized the importance of Israel meeting the commitments that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to President Biden last week to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to put in place enhanced deconfliction and coordination measures. Our teams, including our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues David Satterfield, have been meeting with Israeli, UN, and private relief organizations this week to push forward on all of those fronts. And while we have seen progress, it is critical that that initial progress continue and that it be sustained. And that is the message we have been delivering consistently to the Government of Israel.And with that, Matt.QUESTION: Right. Thanks, Matt. Just to – logistically, the calls that you just mentioned with the Turk, the Chinese, and the Saudi foreign ministers were all today?MR MILLER: He talked to the Turkish foreign minister last night, he talked to Wang Yi this morning, and then – early this morning, and then talked to the Saudi foreign minister later this morning.QUESTION: Okay. Are there others planned as well?MR MILLER: I don’t have any calls to announce, but we have been engaged in a series of contacts – not just at his level, but at other levels too – to talk to foreign counterparts to send this very clear message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict.QUESTION: All right. I didn’t want to raise this with the previous two speakers, because obviously the Sudan situation is a situation in and of itself. But so much of what they said very powerfully about the conflict in Sudan could also – or does also apply to what’s happening in Gaza. And when they say – when the ambassador and special envoy talk about how every arms shipment leads us closer to famine and a failed state, do you not think that that same logic applies in Gaza?MR MILLER: I would &#8212;QUESTION: Just because it’s you who are supplying the weapons as opposed to whoever it is – the Iranians, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, whoever it is that’s supplying the weapons in Sudan – doesn’t the same thing apply?MR MILLER: I would say that we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and that’s why you’ve seen the United States Government working to get more humanitarian assistance in and it’s why we’ve been pushing the Israeli Government so hard to let more humanitarian assistance in and to improve their deconfliction and coordination measures so there isn’t such a loss of political life.And then on the political front, it’s why we have been pushing with partners in the region to develop a plan for post-conflict governance in Gaza so we don’t see a failed state, so we don’t see anarchy in Gaza, so we see a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. That is very much the policy that we are trying to pursue and that we have been engaged in in this administration from the President on down.QUESTION: But is it correct then, though, that the administration believes that every arms shipment to Sudan leads us closer to famine and a failed state – that that does not apply &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in Gaza?MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: I get that, but &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very – it is – they’re – it is a very different situation in Sudan, where you have a brutal civil war, two warring parties trying to seize control of the government; and in Israel, where you have Israel responding to a terrorist attack against its people and trying to achieve a legitimate counterterrorism and military purpose. That does not change at all the severity of the humanitarian situation, which is why we have been working so hard to improve that humanitarian situation for the people in Gaza.QUESTION: So you don’t think that arms shipment to Israel leads us closer to famine and &#8212;MR MILLER: We have continued to support Israel’s right to &#8212;QUESTION: Is that correct?MR MILLER: We have &#8212;QUESTION: I just – I don’t know.MR MILLER: Let me say &#8212;QUESTION: It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other what you say, but &#8212;MR MILLER: They are different conflicts, but the – I’d say &#8212;QUESTION: I know they are, but I’m just asking you &#8212;MR MILLER: I would say &#8212;QUESTION: They made the point in Sudan &#8212;MR MILLER: And I’m answering the &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I just want to know if you have – if you feel the same way about Gaza.MR MILLER: They are very different conflicts, but the humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire, and that is why we are working so hard from the President on down to get more humanitarian assistance in, and it’s why we are working to improve deconfliction and coordination so we don’t see such a high number of civilian casualties as we have seen over the past six months.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just press you briefly on the – what – on the opening comments on calling Wang Yi and others? I realize you’re probably not going to give a full readout, but how successful was that? I mean, do you think there’s an interest from these other countries as well to see Iran not escalate?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak for any of those other countries. I will let them speak for themselves. But the point that the Secretary has been making to each of these counterparts – foreign counterparts, both those in the region and foreign counterparts outside of the region – is that further escalation of this conflict doesn’t just hurt Israel, doesn’t just hurt Iran, doesn’t just hurt the countries in the region, but that it harms every country in the world. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional conflict. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional war, both economically, diplomatically. And so the Secretary has been making clear to every country that has any semblance of a relationship with Iran that it is in their interest to use that relationship to send a message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict. But I will let those countries speak for themselves about what action they may or may not take.QUESTION: And I have to ask – I know this has been asked before – but Iran, of course, argues that a diplomatic facility was struck in Damascus. Has there been an assessment at this point from the United States whether this was indeed a strike on a diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: We do not have a final determination. It’s something we’re still assessing.QUESTION: Is it – do you think there will be an assessment at some point from the U.S. on that?MR MILLER: I do, but it’s something we’re continuing to work through.QUESTION: Matt, on this.MR MILLER: Yeah, Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Reports say today that Iran delayed or changed plans to attack Israel at the last moment due to U.S. warnings. Can you confirm that? And do you still expect an Iranian reaction to the attack on Damascus?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to what Iran may or may not do, or what our assessments are. You don’t need an Intelligence Community assessment to see the threats that Iran has been making. They’ve been making those threats quite publicly and quite loudly over the past few days. So we will continue to send the message to them that it is not in their interest to escalate this conflict and it’s not in the region’s broader interest, and we hope other partners will send that same message.QUESTION: Can I follow on Iran?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: Sure. I wanted to ask this question actually to the ambassador, but the Iranian mission at the UN said that basically if the U.S. – or the Security Council, rather, condemn the attack on the consulate in Damascus, this could – any retaliation could’ve been avoided. So is this your understanding, that actually you don’t condemn it because you cannot verify whether it is a diplomatic mission or not? And also, do you think that Israel can go and attack any other diplomatic mission if this is proved to be actually a diplomatic mission, and you don’t expect any country to retaliate? Just explain those points.MR MILLER: So a few – a few things in order. First of all, I think that’s a pretty flimsy excuse from the Iranian Government. If they don’t want to widen this conflict and they don’t want to attack Israel, they don’t need permission from anyone else either at the United Nations or – they just have to make the decision not to do that, and that’s the decision that they should make.Now, with respect to your second question, no, we do not want to see attacks on diplomatic facilities. We oppose attacks on diplomatic facilities. We continue to assess the exact status of that facility in Damascus, and don’t have a final determination on that question.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I do a follow-up on Iran?MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I – yeah. I – not Iran, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Like Matt, I was struck with what the ambassador said, the similarity. You could change the word “Sudan” for “the Palestinians” or “Gaza” and it’d be exactly the same, with one difference. I mean, you don’t have any control over the conflict in Sudan, but you certainly have control &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, that’s – let me just say &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just finish my question? I have not asked my question.MR MILLER: Fine, fair enough. Go ahead.QUESTION: So my question to you is: Why has the United States not taken its – the moral high ground and its ability and its leverage to end this conflict, as it can? We have seen this happen in the past. We’ve seen it happen in 1982. We’ve seen it happen with this administration in May – in 2021. So my question to you: Why has not this administration taken that step to end this conflict now?MR MILLER: So first of all, Said, they are very different conflicts and very different situations, and that’s incredibly important. The conflict in Sudan is two warring military factions, following a coup that overthrew a democratic government, who are fighting for control of Sudan. That is a different question than the conflict in Gaza that was started not by Israel, but by Hamas – Hamas launching a brutal terrorist attack that killed over 1,200 Israelis and citizens of other foreign countries. And Israel has the right to hold Hamas accountable for those attacks, as the United States would, as other countries in the region would, as any country in the world if it were the victim of such a brutal terrorist attack.That said, we are trying to bring this conflict to an end. You have seen us work to try to achieve a ceasefire, an immediate ceasefire of at least six weeks that would bring the hostages home and that we have said consistently we would like to see widen into a broader end to the conflict. You have seen us work on post-conflict governance to try to find a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. And you have seen us work to address the very, very severe needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza. So we are working to try and do exactly that.QUESTION: Okay, let let me just follow up.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Please don’t interrupt.QUESTION: Let me just follow up.MR MILLER: Just let me go – I’ll go through the questions and get to who I get to.QUESTION: If I may, I just want to follow up. I mean, you talked about Palestinian legitimate aspirations and so on, but insisting that this conflict began on October 7th does not recognize that, does it? Does it recognize that this – that the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that go back 75 years, not just to October 7th?MR MILLER: So they do have legitimate political aspirations that go back decades. It has been the policy of the United States for decades to try to achieve two states. But, Said, I don’t want to – not only I don’t want to, I fundamentally degree – or disagree that October 7th had anything to do with trying to answer the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. It was a terrorist attack targeting civilians, that killed civilians, by a terrorist group that does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. So when you look at trying to achieve a peaceful resolution to the decades of violence and the decades of political conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, it is Hamas that has firmly rejected a political solution to that decades-long dispute.QUESTION: Yeah, but do you – do you acknowledge that Gaza was under siege for basically 17 years and &#8212;MR MILLER: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; every other year there would be an attack and a war by Israel, time after time after time, killing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians?MR MILLER: Said, there – there have been incidents going back in this dispute, in this conflict for decades. Nothing that happened in – on either side justifies the attacks of October 7th.QUESTION: Can I just have a quick question on Iran before we &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just one, there are reports of the Iranian foreign minister coming to New York City next week to visit the UN. I’m wondering how the U.S. assesses the likelihood of an Iranian attack happening during that period of time, if it would have any attack – any impact at all?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to a timeframe. We’re obviously very concerned about the threat of an Iranian attack. We’ve made that clear from the President on down, but I don’t want to put any kind of timeframe on it. We were hoping, of course, to avoid such an attack in the first place.QUESTION: Do you think it’s moving in the direction of avoiding one?MR MILLER: I don’t want to give any type of assessment. As I said, it is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in anyone’s in the region – anyone the region’s interest for Iran to escalate this conflict. And that’s the message we are sending to them.QUESTION: Wait, you were hoping to avoid an attack in the first place? Has one happened?MR MILLER: An attack by Iran. Yeah, we’re – no, one has not happened. We are &#8212;QUESTION: Well, weren’t you hoping to avoid the Israelis attacking an Iranian diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: I – her question – her question was – her – hold on.QUESTION: I know, but you – but you made it &#8212;MR MILLER: No, hold on, let me just answer the question.QUESTION: Your answer to her seemed to suggest &#8212;MR MILLER: My &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that you thought the Iranians had already retaliated.MR MILLER: No, my – well, that’s not what I was suggesting.QUESTION: Okay. All right.MR MILLER: My answer was in the context of the question she asked me, which was about an attack coming next week.QUESTION: Fair enough.MR MILLER: So let’s go – let me – just in – yeah.QUESTION: On that call, just – the call with the Turkish foreign minister, was it purely Iran call or did they have a chance to discuss Ukraine, the Caucasus, President Erdogan’s upcoming trip? And why Türkiye? Do you guys believe that Türkiye has enough leverage to move the needle on Iran – they have Iran’s ear?MR MILLER: It’s not just Türkiye; it’s a number of countries. It’s other countries as well that have relationships with Iran – Saudi Arabia, China. And we have made other – have had other diplomatic engagements with countries in Europe and other countries in the world because we want to send a very unified message. With respect to the call itself, the primary purpose of the call was to discuss Iran’s threats against Israel. There were other issues discussed, but I don’t want to get into those any further.QUESTION: Last thing, because we have a statement from Khamenei last night saying that any Islamic countries supporting Israel or not supporting their narratives, they’re engaged in treason.MR MILLER: Any countries that what?QUESTION: Any Islamic countries that do not fall in line with their narratives, they are engaged – they’re engaged with treason. I’m just wondering how much this – your calculation of calling Türkiye in this case is part of &#8212;MR MILLER: So it doesn’t &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; fits into this &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; have anything to do with the with those comments. Obviously, his comments are not – are ones that wouldn’t be – just be rejected by the United States but would be rejected by other countries in the region.QUESTION: I have different coverage of questions. Please come back to me.MR MILLER: Let me stay in the region and then we’ll – yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. On the hostage talks, can you give any update on whether there’s been a response from Hamas? And also, is there a level of concern in the U.S. Government about the Israeli strike that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh’s family members and how that might affect the talks?MR MILLER: I’m not going to give any update on the talk – excuse me – the talks themselves, other than that we continue to engage in them and try to pursue a successful resolution.With respect to those strikes, I certainly hope that it will not, but I wouldn’t want to make any kind of assessments.Stay – want to stay in the region? Nadia, go ahead. And then we’ll come back.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: There is a record number of land that has been confiscated in the West Bank that came out today. It’s like between 2018 and 2023 is 5,900 acres have been confiscated. The administration has always talked about this two-state solution, and the major – one of the major obstacles is settlements. So if this land has been taken and there’s – just like condemnation from the administration but actually there is nothing practical that we see that will stop this land from being taken, that will undermine the President’s vision. So what – or how can you go forward when actually there’s not even base for to have a state in the future?MR MILLER: So two things. First, we have made consistently clear that we oppose further settlement activity in the West Bank. We think they are a barrier to peace; we think they are inconsistent with international humanitarian law.And I will just say, to put those actions in the larger context, there have been a number of things that the Government of Israel has done over time that we have said are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security. Obviously, settlements in the West Bank are one of them. There are other actions that it has taken in Gaza that we think are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security.So what fundamentally it comes down to is we are working, as you know, with partners in the region to develop a path forward for Israel and the Palestinian people that we would present to them, that would provide for post-conflict governance in Gaza, that would have a component to reconstruct Gaza, that would provide further assurances for Israel’s security by its partners in the region, and there are other countries ready to step up.And so I’m making this a broader answer, because all of this relates to that very question. It’s not just about settlements; it’s about what kind of future the Israeli people see for them in the region. And ultimately – and we’re not there yet, because we’ve not finished this plan and we’ve not presented it to the people of Israel and the Government of Israel – but ultimately, this is a choice that Israel’s going to have to make.QUESTION: Okay, just very quickly, the ambassador made a passionate appeal to us, the press corps, to cover Sudan, not to forget civilians, rightly so. But we haven’t hear from any senior officials the same appeal about Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Number one, we have many journalists who’ve been killed, including our colleagues. We don’t hear any – apart from condemnation, nothing is being done to protect them. And second, why can’t the United States allow independent journalists to go to Gaza, since you don’t have anybody on the ground, so they will have access and tell us what’s happening there?MR MILLER: So a few things. First of all, the reason you heard the ambassador make that appeal with respect to Sudan – and this is not for me to play editor or segment producer – but it is that we don’t see as much coverage about atrocities in Sudan. We don’t see as much coverage about the plight of the Sudanese people. We do see a lot of coverage of the Palestinians in Gaza, appropriately so, but I think her point was that we would welcome seeing coverage of this very difficult conflict that we are trying to resolve in Sudan.When it comes to journalists in Gaza, we have made clear on a number of occasions that we want to see journalists protected. And the coordination and deconfliction measures that we have been pushing the Government of Israel on so hard, that the President pushed the Government of Israel on in his call on Friday, would ultimately help with journalism and make it safer for journalists to operate inside Gaza.And I’ll just make it very clear that we have pressed the Government of Israel directly to allow journalists to go into Gaza. It’s not something that we control, but we have made clear that we all benefit from seeing what’s happening on the ground, that we know what’s happening there – not because we have U.S. officials there, many other countries don’t have officials there, but because of journalists who are putting their lives on the line to bring us those stories. And we’ve made clear to the Government of Israel that we think they ought to let more journalists in.QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. And then I’ll come to you, and then we’ll start taking other ones. I’m going to come to you, Janne, but I know – I doubt it’s an Israel question, so that’s why I’m moving around the room first.QUESTION: There’s some &#8212;MR MILLER: You may surprise me, so I’ll just &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, yes. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. America has a number of allies. What message do they receive when America harangues one its closest allies, Israel, and their democratically elected leader Benjamin Netanyahu? And a follow-up.MR MILLER: I think the message they should see is that we want Israel to live up to its values, that we want to see Israel live up to the same standards that we expect every country in the world, including ourselves, to live up to.QUESTION: Thank you. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Clearly a majority of Israelis agree with his policies, since the majority of voters keep re-electing him. How does this mesh with what President Biden seems to be calling for, which is essentially a rejection of Israeli democracy?MR MILLER: So first, I think that is a vast conflation of two very different things. So it is up to the Israeli people to choose their leaders. We strongly support their right to choose their leaders, as we do for the people of every country in the world. But we are going to engage with the governments that they choose to talk with them about what we think are the policies that are in our interest, what are the policies that are in their interest.And you have heard – the President himself spoke to this in the week right after October 7th, when he made the point – these aren’t the exact words, but it’s the general gist – that sometimes in the aftermath of a horrific event your vision can be clouded, and you can make mistakes. And we are there to offer them our very best advice as a country that’s made mistakes in the aftermath of horrific events and try to keep them from making some of those same mistakes.QUESTION: Well, it seems like there is an attempt to demonize the current Israeli Government, there are efforts to support the overthrow of the Israeli Government with a lot of protests and so forth.MR MILLER: So that is not – and that is not what you’ve seen from this administration. We’ve traveled to Israel – the Secretary has been there – eight times I believe since October 7th meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. The President has been there and talks to Prime Minister Netanyahu all the time. The Secretary just talked to the defense minister yesterday. We fully support the right of the Israeli people to decide who their leaders are.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. As Secretary Blinken spoke with the regional leaders about sending a message to Iran, were there any connections with Iraqi leaders to send any message to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any – I don’t have any engagements to read out today.QUESTION: Okay. And have you received any signals from the Iranian Government that they taking these messages into their consideration?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak for the Iranian Government at all.QUESTION: And in the past few times the Iranian use it to – use its baseless accusation to attack the Erbil and also Kurdistan region in their response to the threats from Israel. Is there something that you’re concerned maybe Iran this time use the same justification and to attack the U.S. allies and U.S. friends in the region in their retaliation for that attack?MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear to them that they shouldn’t escalate this conflict in any way – with respect to Israel, with respect to others in the region, with respect to U.S. forces. One of the first messages we sent to them when the Iranians were making these baseless claims that the U.S. was involved in the strike in Damascus is that that is not true, we weren’t involved, we didn’t know about it, and you should not use this as a pretext to strike U.S. forces in the region, including in Iraq, as we have seen their proxy groups do over the past few months and the past few years.QUESTION: And last thing. Have you granted visa for the Iranian foreign minister to attend the Security Council?MR MILLER: We never speak to visa records. They’re confidential by law, and so I can’t speak to visa records from here. But as has long been the case, we take our obligations as the host of the United Nations very seriously.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Janne.QUESTION: So when he shows up in New York, we can just assume that that’s confirmation that he got a visa?MR MILLER: Well, you can’t travel here without one. So I can’t speak to it, but you can’t travel here without one. But I would note that Iranian foreign ministers have traveled to New York &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, they have.MR MILLER: &#8212; under administrations of both parties, including the last one.QUESTION: Yes. No, I’m not suggesting that there’s anything inappropriate or untoward about it. It’s just that I just – I mean, it’s ridiculous. The guy shows up in New York, if he shows up in New York, it’s pretty damn clear that he got a visa.MR MILLER: I would welcome your advocacy to the United States Congress to change the law and allow me to speak more about any number of things from here, not just visa records.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I didn’t surprise you today that I had to ask this. (Laughter.) Yeah, I had to ask Ambassador Greenfield and I hope you can answer this, all right?MR MILLER: I’ll do my best.QUESTION: Okay, are you ready? Ambassador Greenfield will be visit South Korea this weekend. What agenda will she discuss with the South Korea? Also she will visit to Panmunjom this time?MR MILLER: So I said I’d do my best. I’m afraid I’m going to disappoint you. I am not in a position to preview her trip. She does have a press office in New York, and I would urge you to send the inquiry there. Go ahead.QUESTION: That’s why you didn’t give me any chance to ask it?MR MILLER: She had a limited time. Sorry.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I would have loved her to stay longer. The more questions she takes, the fewer I have to – not that I don’t enjoy our lengthy engagements.QUESTION: She can take – all right, second question quick. The United Nations Security Council’s expert panel on sanctions against North Korea was disconnected. Will the U.S. submit a report together with the other countries, and do you expect to discuss with the South Korea or Japan about the continuation of this report?MR MILLER: So as I’ve said in the past from this podium, we are incredibly disappointed that Russia chose to block that panel from going forward. And I don’t have any specific actions to preview today, but we are engaged with our allies and partners in other ways to continue to monitor North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.QUESTION: Have you any discussion when the – I mean, Prime Minister Kishida was here? Do you have any chance to discuss it?MR MILLER: I would defer to the White House to speak to those engagements.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Hey, Matt. I’m going to ask you about your new Diversity and Inclusion Chief Zakiya Carr Johnson. She’s drawing new criticism for past comments. In a 2019 piece she claimed America’s organizations and institutions were, quote, “riddled with racism, patriarchy, and exclusion,” that they refused to reconcile with the colonizing past, and called them a, quote, “failed historic model.” Do you find those comments problematic?MR MILLER: So I would say that, first of all, our new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer Zakiya Carr Johnson is one of the most qualified experts in this field. She has 20 years of experience working to expand diversity, and it’s something that we see as important here at the State Department that the Secretary has put a premium on because he believes that when our workforce looks like America and reflects the full diversity of America, our workforce is stronger and our ability to protect America’s national security is improved and enhanced. And that’s why he selected her to do this incredibly important job.Second of all, with respect to her quote, I have seen that people have used excerpts, have not used the full context of it. But I would say a lot of this criticism seems to be from individuals. I saw former officials tweeting about this.QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo took the hardest &#8212;MR MILLER: Certain former officials who don’t seem – for whatever reason – to support our work to expand diversity inside the State Department. And that’s just where we have an honest agreement – disagreement where we think that’s work that we ought to do and we ought to hire experts who have experience in doing that. And that’s what we’re going to continue to do, and I think we’re just going to have to disagree with some of those critics.QUESTION: Can I just lastly read you – Secretary Pompeo obviously worked here in the building. He said, quote, “The State Department should be staffed by individuals who love America and believe in our core principles, not ideologues who think that America represents a ‘failed historic model.’” Do you want to respond to that?MR MILLER: Well, apparently, he believes there are different ways to love America, because one of the ways we believe you can best love America is to love its full diversity and build a workforce that reflects that full diversity.Alex. I’ll come to you next. Alex, sorry.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you so much. Turning to Ukraine &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, I should not mumble my &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Thank so much. Let’s turn to Ukraine if I may. Going back to last night’s strikes, which Ukraine believes that was designed to maximize attacks on infrastructure, what is your reaction and what is your take of the state of play on the battlefield? And do you still believe that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to retaliate?MR MILLER: So we have seen Russia, unfortunately, continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. That’s something they’ve done not just overnight but over the past couple of years. And I would say for us it comes back to the need for Congress to fully fund, fully pass the President’s supplemental request. And it goes directly to this question you asked me about the situation on the battlefield where we have seen Ukrainian armed forces having to ration artillery shells, having to ration ammunition. And of course that has an effect on their ability to fight the war and an effect on their ability to repel Russian troops, and it’s why it is so urgent for Congress to act.QUESTION: Is any active restrictions on Ukraine imposed from the U.S., by the U.S., to prevent them from retaliating &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; this obvious steps will take it back to Russia.MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear that we do not encourage strikes outside of Ukraine, and we do not enable those strikes with U.S.-provided weapons and that we don’t want to see U.S.-provided weapons used for strikes outside Ukraine. Ultimately, when it comes to deciding how to prosecute this war, those are Ukrainian decisions, but we do not encourage or enable such strikes.QUESTION: Can I have one more if may on Georgia? So what – as you have learned during the past couple of days since Georgia – Georgia Government – moved forward and submitted the Russian law, I’m just curious, like, what – you made it clear this is taking Georgia away from European path. Do you witness democratic backsliding in Georgia? Is that your analysis?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make any broader assessment than the assessment I made the other day that pertains to this specific law that we believe would harm civil society organizations working to improve the lives of Georgian citizens and would derail Georgia from its European path. It’s still draft legislation, and I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Has anyone from this building reached out to Georgia or &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me move on just because we’re running short of time.Michel.QUESTION: On Bahrain, Matt, do you have any comments on the release of more than 1,500 prisoners?MR MILLER: We did see that step by the Government of Bahrain. We welcome very much the decision by the king to pardon over 1,500 prisoners along with the government’s announcement April 9th that they will work to help the recently released find employment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.Shaun, I’m sorry – well, go ahead, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: That’s all right.MR MILLER: This time I promise I’ll come back to you.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. In meeting alongside President Biden with President Kishida, did the pending deal between U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel come up?MR MILLER: I will let the White House speak to those comments. In fact, I believe the President addressed them yesterday. Or speak to that question, I should say.QUESTION: And on Wednesday, President Xi held a meeting with former president of Taiwan Ma, who supports closer ties with China. Does the department have any reaction to this meeting?MR MILLER: No, I do not.Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Two things, one going back to Ukraine. The Swiss have announced a conference on Ukraine. This is in light of Zelenskyy’s visit in Davos and the peace formula he has. Russia has had some strong words about it, saying that it was part of – it’s part of the Biden re-election campaign, I think; that the U.S. is behind it. Does the U.S have any comment on this – on whether the U.S. will participate or whether it sees utility in the conference?MR MILLER: So I don’t speak to campaign matters &#8212;QUESTION: I realize &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; but that doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the Swiss Government’s ability to conduct their own foreign policy matters. I would say obviously that is an absurd allegation by the Russian Government. I can’t preview – I believe that conference is still several weeks away. I can’t preview what the U.S. participation would be, but we have supported Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts. We have supported Ukraine’s peace formula. We have support President Zelenskyy making his case to other countries in the world, and we will – that will continue to be our policy. But we have seen consistently that Russia has not been willing to engage in real diplomacy about a path forward for Ukraine. Ukraine has made clear that at the right time they would welcome that, and they have not had a willing partner in Russia.QUESTION: And just briefly – I mean, do you generally speaking think it’s useful for the Swiss to hold this – your support of – regardless of the participation of &#8212;MR MILLER: Look, so our policy on this has always been nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. If this is a diplomatic meeting that the Ukrainian Government supports and wants to engage in, we certainly support their right to do so. I don’t have any further comment on the conference itself as it – or how it’s going to shape up.QUESTION: Sure. Just one completely separate issue briefly, Mali. I don’t know if you’ve followed the latest developments there – a ban on activities of political parties and then the ban on media coverage of political parties.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Anything to say about that?MR MILLER: We are deeply concerned about the Malian transition government’s decree suspending all political activities until further notice. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are critical to an open society. The transition government has already made a decision not to hold an election in February 2024 to return to a civilian-led, democratic government despite the commitment that it made publicly in 2022 to do so. We call on Mali’s transition government to honor its commitments to its citizens and hold free and fair elections. In Mali and elsewhere, democracy remains the best foundation for stability and prosperity.Simon.QUESTION: I want to ask about another conflict which is often getting forgotten, which is in Myanmar – Myanmar or Burma. The rebel – alliance of rebel forces have taken one of the – well, the main border crossing with Thailand recently. The situation is very fluid in this conflict. Wondering – this is right up against, obviously, a U.S. ally. Are you having any – is there any diplomacy going on from the U.S. with Thailand about how they should be dealing with this? They’ve got refugees coming across the border, the junta forces reportedly trying to sort of use Thailand as a – taking flights into Thailand to try to sort of push back the rebels in this case. So I’m wondering if – if the U.S. has any new sort of actions that you’ve been taking as this has been developing.MR MILLER: So we have been incredibly concerned about potential spillover this – of this conflict. It’s something that we have been focused on. With respect to any engagements with Thailand, let me take that back and get you an answer. I don’t have anything to read out.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Due to situation in Gaza, there is too much hate spreading all around the world, even here in U.S. as well. Is it a concern?MR MILLER: It’s absolutely a concern. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this on a number of occasions, including in Israel, when he said that we – the worst thing that can happen is people dehumanizing each other, and that once you see people on either side of this conflict dehumanizing each other, it gives license – not actual license, but gives them – they give themselves license to do any sorts of things that we would oppose and that are not in anyone’s interests. So it’s absolutely one of our concerns.We have unfortunately seen a rise in antisemitism. We have seen a rise in anti-Muslim summit, and the President has spoken to this. It’s something we’ve been incredibly concerned about both here at home and around the world.QUESTION: Sir, many religious scholars and others trying to portray this situation as a war between Muslims and Jews, while many others believe it is just a territorial conflict. What is your position on this? And what are we going to say to those spreading hate in our communities?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – we would – obviously don’t want to see anyone spreading hate in any form, and I would just say that we are trying to bring an end to this conflict as soon as possible and find a durable solution to this conflict, because it is in the interests of Muslims and Jews and Christians, Israelis, other countries in the region alike. It is in the interest of all parties to see this conflict end, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Sir, one last question, if I may. Sir, you always talk about two-state solution, but whatever is happening right now, it seems impossible. So is United States, partners, and mediators trying to explore other options to bring peace in the region?MR MILLER: So I spoke to this a little bit in response to an earlier question. We think ultimately that is the path forward, and I know it’s incredibly difficult and it looks incredibly bleak, but it is our assessment that at the end of this conflict – it is going to end – that if there is not a path forward, Israel is going to be back with the same security risks it has had since before October 7th. It is going to be in the same position with respect to a lack of relationships with all of its neighbors. And it is in Israel’s broader security interests to find a path forward for reconciliation with the Palestinian people, as difficult as that seems, and so that’s why we’re going to continue to pursue it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just three questions. One is – come on, it’s my sixth briefing. Three questions is not too bad.MR MILLER: Oh, just go ahead.QUESTION: So with regard to Iran, please correct me if I am wrong that this administration has basically made Iran more stronger in these past few years till now, this threatening that has started. But can you confirm whether Pakistan and Iran – you have information that Iran is supporting the ISIS in Pakistan right now, these recent terrorist activities? Do you have any information that it’s the Iranian regime that is doing this or no?MR MILLER: So I would obviously disagree with your characterization. I’m not going to get into a long rebuttal about something we’ve spoken to a number of times, but no, I do not have information to suggest that.QUESTION: Okay, sir. My second question is about ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who is – was prime minister from this ruling family where Shehbaz Sharif is prime minister. He said himself just last week that this current regime has stolen the mandate. Basically, Shehbaz Sharif should not be a prime minister of Pakistan. Do you agree with him on that or no?MR MILLER: Ultimately, as you’ve heard me say once or twice from this podium, decisions about the Pakistani Government are for the Pakistani people to make.QUESTION: Just last one: A few days ago, U.S. officials from Islamabad embassy went to meet this gentleman named Zahir Jaffer, who was convicted on a – murdering his wife. He’s a U.S. citizen. He’s on death row now. The U.S. official went to Adiala Jail to meet him. Just a few blocks down there was Imran Khan in jail as well. Thousands of American – Pakistani Americans have asked to go and meet him as well. Why is the U.S. not going to meet the guy in jail?MR MILLER: I would defer to the – our embassy in Pakistan for – answer that question.Go ahead, Shannon. I’ll come to you next, Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. On the State Department’s latest Travel Alert for the U.S. embassy in Israel, it details how American personnel have now been limited from traveling within the country. It says it’s been done out of a, quote, “abundance of caution.” Just wondering if you can say definitively whether this is linked to the threat to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: So obviously, there – we have seen Iran making public threats against Israel in the past few days. Israel’s in a very tough neighborhood, and we have been monitoring the security situation. You saw us slightly adjust our travel warnings at the beginning of this conflict, and we conduct ongoing assessments all the time about the situation on the ground.So I’m not going to speak to the specific assessments that led to us to restrict our families – employees and family members’ personal travel, but clearly we are monitoring the threat environment in the Middle East, and specifically in Israel, and we – that’s what led us to make – give that warning to our employees and their family members, and to make it public so all U.S. citizens who either live in Israel or are traveling there are aware of it.Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. President Biden said this week that the U.S. is considering Australia’s request that it drop its extradition attempt against Julian Assange and instead allow him to go back to Australia. Normally when we ask about Assange you say “refer you to the Department of Justice,” but now that the President has said that there’s a – there are diplomatic talks going on, that seems like it would be squarely in the State Department. So are – is the State Department involved in these conversations with Australia, and what can you tell us about these talks?MR MILLER: That is a good way to try to get me to violate that rule about not commenting on extradition matters, but I am going to refrain from doing so. I don’t have any comment. I would refer to the Justice Department for comment on this.QUESTION: Does it broadly raise concerns for you about free speech and free press? Because you often will see dictators say, why is the U.S. lecturing us about press freedoms when they are trying to extradite a foreign citizen to their own maximum security prison?MR MILLER: So I will let the Justice Department largely speak to this issue. But as you’ve heard me say here before, one of the crimes that Julian Assange is charged with is helping Chelsea Manning hack into government systems – not receiving classified information, but helping her actually break into government systems to retrieve classified information, which as far as I’m aware has never been considered a legitimate journalistic practice, and is not the kind of practice that journalistic organizations typically engage in.QUESTION: Well, technically he offered to help her cloak her identity so that she wouldn’t be discovered. We as journalists do that all the time with sources –MR MILLER: I – you – so &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; talk with them on Signal and other devices to try to make sure that sources are protected. Is that considered helping steal information?MR MILLER: So I am now a little bit probably further than I ought to go about facts that still are contained, or alleged facts that are contained in a pending indictment.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Two questions. Saudi Arabia joined Pakistan in addressing Jammu and Kashmir dispute while engaging with India to dialogue. Will United States encourage any mediation from Saudi Arabia between Pakistan and India? Because from very recent past, we see – we observed that United States encouraged all those engagements that goes according to the regional interest of U.S., including the Houthis and Saudis talks. After October 7th, U.S. stressed Saudi Arabia to halt their talks; before October 7th, U.S. was encouraging that. At first &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me take you that – that one back and get a complete answer.QUESTION: And number second &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: National Security Advisor had scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia for talks on Israel normalization. Is it rescheduled, or with the ongoing circumstances in Middle East, there is some policy change expected from United States?MR MILLER: So I will let the White House speak to the National Security Advisor’s travel, but I did see him at the White House podium two days ago saying that he does intend to reschedule that trip.Go ahead, and then we’ll go here, and then wrap up for the day.QUESTION: Thank you. What is the State Department’s position regarding Israel possibly conducting an offensive attack on Iran or Iranian interests, as Netanyahu today – he said they’re ready for a defensive or offensive attacks. Wouldn’t an offensive attack be part of that escalation that you say that we’re trying to prevent?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to hypotheticals, other than to say we don’t want to see this conflict escalated in any way.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, said that he will recognize the state of Palestine before this summer, and that he wants other European countries to join him. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: Every country has to make its own decision with respect to when and where it recognizes entities in this regard. I will say on behalf of the United States, we have always believed – we have always strongly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but we believe that that’s something that is best achieved through dialogue and negotiation between the two parties, as well as other countries in the region, and that’s something we’re actively pursuing.And with that, wrap for &#8212;QUESTION: And on &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have one more? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, also Mexico asked today to suspend Ecuador’s membership of the United State after their raid on the Mexican embassy. Do you have any answer?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything, other than what we’ve said previously, which is we have asked Ecuador to work with Mexico to find a resolution to this dispute.And with that, wrap for today.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Bahrain																								Burma																								Ecuador																								Iran																								Israel																								Mali																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Sudan																								Ukraine
- Counselor Chollet’s Meeting with NUG Representatives Office of the SpokespersonCounselor Derek Chollet and USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Schiffer met today with the leadership team of the Burma “National Unity Government” (NUG), including NUG-designated Acting President Duwa Lashi La NUG-designated Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung, and other leaders.Counselor Chollet welcomed the NUG’s efforts toward inclusive and representative democratic governance in Burma. The Counselor underscored U.S. support for the pro-democracy movement, including efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to millions in need and build local administrative capacity to provide vital public services. The Counselor commended the NUG on efforts to build inclusive coalitions with those striving for a democratic future in Burma, including key ethnic and religious groups, particularly Rohingya. The Counselor and the NUG leaders reiterated the urgency of pressing the military regime to end violence, release those unjustly detained, and engage in dialogue with all stakeholders to promote an end to the conflict and a path toward democracy in the interests of the people of Burma.
- On Thingyan Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States, I extend best wishes and solidarity to the people of Burma as you mark Thingyan, Burma’s New Year.Thingyan is a time for reflection, as well as an opportunity to look ahead toward a new year. Unfortunately, this past year Burma continued to witness violence committed against civilians and the repression of human rights. The military regime’s decision to implement conscription only adds to the significant anxiety and hardship faced by the people of Burma.We will continue to support all those seeking an end to the crisis and striving for an inclusive, democratic future for Burma. We remain committed to international efforts to promote accountability for the regime’s coup and its abuses against civilians. The people of Burma have repeatedly demonstrated tremendous courage and resilience in the face of unimaginable suffering.Despite the current conflict, may Thingyan’s spirit of renewal bring new hope to the people of Burma.
- Burma HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Burma				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				The human rights situation in Burma deteriorated during the year as the conflict between the military regime and opposition forces escalated. Deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other leading members of the deposed civilian government and the National League for Democracy party remained in detention.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the regime; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, torture, and physical abuses or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in an armed conflict by the regime as well as some ethnic armed organizations; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on religious freedom; restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national and ethnic minority groups; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults (although those laws were rarely enforced); prohibiting independent trade unions and significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association, including violence and threats against labor activists; and some of the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Some ethnic armed organizations and Peoples Defense Force groups or members committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, and physical abuse and degrading treatment. This included a number of abuses of civilians in connection with the armed conflict.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that regime security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings of civilians, prisoners, and other persons in their power. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which noted that the actual number was likely to be much higher, there were 4,162 verified reports of persons killed by the regime as of October 31. According to the National League for Democracy’s (NLD’s) Human Rights Documentation Team, as of August 22, regime security forces killed at least 100 NLD members, including 11 women and three elected parliament members during arrest or interrogation or while in detention.On January 4-5, the website Irrawaddy reported that regime soldiers arrested nine NLD party members from three villages in Myittha Township of Mandalay Region. Myo Lin, an NLD member from Htein Kan village, was allegedly killed during interrogation, and his body was not returned to his family.On July 10, Burma Human Rights Network reported that at least eight students detained in Bago prisons had died from the regime’s abuses during interrogation. The regime claimed the deaths occurred during attempted escapes while the eight were being transported to Insein Prison in Rangoon.The regime encouraged the development of proxy vigilantes to target prodemocracy groups and their families. The groups – many operating under the name of Thway Thauk, or “Blood Comrades” – operated primarily in urban areas such as Mandalay, Rangoon, and in the Tanintharyi Region. Similarly, the military-trained Pyu Saw Htee group operated in other regional areas and reportedly killed multiple NLD supporters. As of August 22, according to the NLD’s Human Rights Documentation Team, these groups killed 269 persons, 233 civilians and 36 NLD members during its “Red Operation,” an assassination campaign directed at NLD and People’s Defense Force (PDF) members and their families.																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of disappearances allegedly committed by the regime.On March 12, the Karenni Human Rights Group reported that the regime Light Infantry Division No. 66 entered the Khong Tar internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Loikaw, Kayah State, and detained several residents, allegedly to use them as human shields. At year’s end, requests for information regarding their whereabouts by the families and local media outlets remained unanswered by regime authorities.On August 30, Karen Human Rights Group stated that since the 2021 coup more than 72 civilians were reported as victims of enforced disappearance in the country’s southeast. Regime forces allegedly arrested the disappeared villagers without warning and due process and neither acknowledged any arrests nor informed families of the whereabouts of those disappeared.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited torture; however, the emergency order establishing the regime authorized it to disregard any law, and members of regime security forces reportedly tortured and otherwise abused suspects, prisoners, detainees, and others. Such incidents occurred, for example, during interrogations and were widely reported across the country. Harsh interrogation techniques were allegedly designed to intimidate and disorient and included severe beatings and deprivation of food, water, and sleep.On August 7, the news service Myanmar Now reported details of physical abuses in Thayarwaddy Prison, including forced 24-hour work shifts particularly targeting prodemocracy political prisoners.According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women in custody were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence and verbal abuse. Women who reported sexual violence faced further abuse by police and the possibility of being sued for impugning the dignity of the perpetrator.Impunity for rights abuses was pervasive for regime officials and security force leaders and members. The regime routinely denied responsibility for atrocities and abuses. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar established by the UN Human Rights Council stated in its 2023 annual report that regime armed forces’ failure to investigate or to otherwise curtail the pattern of combat-related war crimes was significant.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in prisons, labor camps, and military detention facilities were reportedly harsh and frequently life threatening due to overcrowding; degrading and abusive treatment; and inadequate access to medical care (including COVID-19 treatment) and basic needs, including food, shelter, and hygiene.Abusive Physical Conditions: There were 50 known prisons and 50 known labor camps, including two new prisons still under construction, according to the AAPP. Labor camps, which predated the coup, existed across the country; the regime provided no information on conditions in the camps or the number of inmates. The military’s practice of using public facilities (e.g., community halls) as interrogation centers continued, according to the AAPP.Several reports documented poor conditions within prison facilities, including inadequate sewage systems, insufficient – and often inedible – rations, and a lack of basic necessities. Overcrowding was reportedly a serious problem in many prisons and labor camps. Insein Prison reportedly held 220 inmates in a 1,200-square-foot room.Medical care was inadequate, and this reportedly contributed to deaths in custody. Reports indicated prisoners suffered from many health problems, including COVID-19, malaria, heart disease, high blood pressure, tuberculosis, skin diseases, and intestinal illnesses caused or exacerbated by unhygienic conditions and spoiled food.Conditions for women were deplorable, with a lack of access to sufficient toilets and no privacy. Prison guards denied requests for sanitary products for menstruation and other basic hygiene products.Administration: The Department of Corrections in the Ministry of Home Affairs operated the prisons and labor camp system.Prisoners and detainees could sometimes submit complaints to judicial authorities prior to the coup, but there was no clear legal or administrative protection for this right. As of October, there was no credible evidence of prisoners and detainees submitting complaints.Independent Monitoring: The regime denied access to prisons and detention sites by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and other independent nongovernmental observers. According to regime-controlled media, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission visited the Maubin Prison in Ayeyawady Region on October 10.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law did not prohibit arbitrary arrest. Persons held generally were unable to exercise their legal right to appeal the legality of their arrest or detention either administratively or before a court.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law allowed authorities to order the detention without charge or trial of anyone they believed was performing or might perform any act that endangered the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility. Aspects of the privacy protection law remained suspended by the regime to legalize arrests and private property searches without a warrant.For crimes carrying potential sentences of less than seven years’ imprisonment, the law allowed authorities to hold suspects in pretrial detention for two weeks (with a possible two-week extension) before bringing them before a judge or informing them of the charges. For crimes carrying longer potential sentences, detention could last up to 30 days. There was a functioning bail system, although the courts regularly denied bail to prodemocracy supporters. Authorities reportedly did not inform family members or attorneys of arrests in a timely manner.Incommunicado detention was common. The regime detained politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, and Civil Disobedience Movement members, refusing to confirm their locations, according to media reports, eyewitness accounts, and social media posts. In September, the AAPP reported that an estimated 19,246 individuals listed by the regime as “under detention” were in unknown locations. Even when the whereabouts of prisoners were known, prisoners were regularly denied access to lawyers and family members.Arbitrary Arrest: There were numerous reports of arbitrary arrest, including detention by the regime in unknown locations. Since the coup, the AAPP calculated that regime security forces made nearly 25,000 arrests as of September 21. According to the NLD Human Rights Documentation Team, 1,172 NLD members were under arrest as of August 22, of whom 73 were members of parliament and the rest members of the NLD, including 189 women, who served at different levels in various township committees.On January 17, the regime reportedly arrested a member of the Mandalay regional parliament, Win Myint Khine, along with his son and two others, in his home. A regime-associated Telegram post stated that Win Myint Khine supported the PDF and was in hiding before his arrest.Pretrial Detention: Arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detention resulted from lengthy, complicated legal procedures, widespread corruption, and the regime’s ability to detain persons indefinitely without trial. The regime removed the right to legal aid services during pretrial detention. Additional changes limited legal aid for stateless persons, asylum seekers, foreigners, and migrant workers.Although habeas corpus existed in national law, regime security forces ignored this right, arresting and detaining individuals without following proper procedures. Arbitrary arrest or detention remained common to suppress political dissent, according to the AAPP, and detainees had limited ability to meaningfully challenge the lawfulness of detention due to the lack of judicial independence from the regime.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										Constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary were effectively suspended. In August, the regime appointed a new chief justice and a new associate justice of the Supreme Court. Regime appointees occupied nine of the 10 seats on the Supreme Court.Judicial corruption was a significant problem. According to NGOs, eyewitness accounts, and media reports, judicial officials at all levels received illegal payments at all stages of the legal process for purposes ranging from influencing routine matters to substantive decisions, such as fixing the outcome of a case.																Trial Procedures						Regime-declared martial law continued in 50 townships across the country; in those areas military commanders held all judicial (and executive) power. In martial law courts, defendants had few or no rights, including to legal counsel and appeal (except in cases involving the death penalty, which could be appealed to armed forces Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing). Hearings were abbreviated, verdicts were reached within one or two sessions, and sentences were typically the maximum allowed. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported defendants tried before military tribunals faced almost certain conviction regardless of the evidence against them. Neither the public, human rights monitors, nor foreign diplomats had access to the trials. According to data collected by the AAPP, there were 103 post-coup death row prisoners. At least 119 individuals were sentenced in absentia, of whom 43 were sentenced to death.Although no formal changes to trial procedures in civilian courts were made following the coup, the lack of judicial independence left much to the interpretation of the regime. The law, which the emergency decree enabled the regime to ignore, granted broad exceptions to the right to a fair and public trial, effectively allowing the regime to violate these rights at will. Trial rights not allowed included: a presumption of innocence; to be informed promptly of the charges; a fair, timely, and public trial; to communicate with an attorney of one’s choice (or have one provided at public expense if unable to pay); adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; free assistance of an interpreter; the ability to confront prosecution or plaintiff witnesses and present witnesses and evidence; to not be compelled to testify or confess guilt; and to appeal.While the right to counsel remained in the law, many defense lawyers were unwilling to handle prodemocracy cases due to fear for their personal safety. In June, HRW found an emerging pattern of intimidation and harassment against defense lawyers representing political detainees, reporting many cases of arrests and mistreatment and torture in detention. According to the AAPP, the regime arrested more than 53 lawyers associated with prodemocracy cases and 29 lawyers remained in detention as of August.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						The regime detained and arrested politicians, election officials, journalists, activists, protesters, religious activists, and Civil Disobedience Movement members. The AAPP estimated the regime arrested 1,591 persons on political grounds as of mid-August; in addition, 22,710 persons arrested on political grounds in previous years (since the coup) remained in detention. Political prisoners were not always held separately from the prison’s general population. Many political prisoners were held incommunicado, and there were numerous reports of political prisoners being denied medical services. According to local media reports, all political prisoners were vulnerable to sexual violence and hard labor.The regime continued to deny political prisoners the right to receive visitors by holding them in institutions far from their homes or by otherwise imposing extensive restrictions on visits.Many former political prisoners reportedly remained subject to surveillance and restrictions, including the inability to secure identity or travel documents, following their release.In August, deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint received partial pardons. A regime court dismissed five of the 19 cases against Aung San Suu Kyi, reducing her prison sentence from 33 to 27 years. The court voided two of eight convictions against President Win Myint and reduced his sentence to eight years.On September 4, Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly experienced gum swelling and vomiting due to prescribed antibiotics while in prison. The prison administration rejected the suggestion of an outside dental consultation, despite the prison’s chief medical officer recommending it.Aung San Suu Kyi’s trials were closed to the public, and the regime placed a gag order on her attorneys barring them from communicating with the public. As of November, Aung San Suu Kyi remained in solitary confinement at Nay Pyi Taw prison; her legal team applied five times for permission to meet with her but received no response as of October. The team submitted appeals in all her cases.Amnesty: The country traditionally marked Buddhist holidays by granting amnesties to prisoners. According to the AAPP, the regime released an estimated 2,455 prisoners in four separate amnesties. Among those released were the former union minister of religious affairs and culture, nine foreign prisoners including five Sri Lankan nationals, and 2,153 political prisoners sentenced for terrorism. Corruption, rampant in the criminal justice system, applied to amnesties as well. Families often bribed prison authorities to secure a higher position on the “Pardon/Amnesty” list.Although thousands of prisoners were released in the four amnesties, there was no reliable data on the number of those amnestied who were detained on political grounds.																										f. Transnational Repression										Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence: The regime was alleged to have kidnapped persons in other countries for politically motivated reprisal. According to an HRW report, on July 4, Burmese Muslim activist Thuzar Maung and her family were abducted from their home in Malaysia; their whereabouts remained unknown as of November. HRW stated persons linked to the Malaysian government could have been involved.Efforts to Control Mobility: There were credible reports that the regime attempted to control mobility in reprisal against citizens abroad by revoking their passports, jeopardizing their legal status. According to an October 30 report by Radio Free Asia, the regime canceled the passports of three Burmese nationals living in Singapore without prior notice or explanation.Bilateral Pressure: There were credible reports the regime attempted to pressure the Thai government to impose stricter control on movement across the border with Burma to undermine the ability of prodemocracy supporters, including members of the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, to depart the country. On April 1, Thai authorities arrested three members of the Lion Battalion Commando Column in Mae Sot and handed them over on April 4 to a regime- aligned Border Guard Force in Myawaddy, according to HRW, which alleged Thai officials colluded with the regime by unlawfully returning opposition activists, disregarding the dangers they faced in Burma.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The 2008 constitution stipulated that the state owned all land, although there was a limited amount of freehold land. Most land was held in long-term leases, meaning that while the government owned the land, private parties could lease it on a long-term basis with a general expectation that the lease would automatically roll over upon its expiration. The law allowed for registration and sale of private land ownership rights and provided for compensation when the government acquired privately held land for a public purpose; postcoup, however, the situation was unclear. According to the 2008 constitution, the government could declare land unused or “vacant” and assign it to foreign investors or designate it for other uses. There was no judicial review of land ownership or confiscation decisions; administrative bodies subject to regime control made final decisions on land use and registration. The law did not favor recognition of traditional land tenure systems (customary tenure).As of August 16, media reports indicated the regime seized approximately 1,100 properties owned by 892 individuals with ties to the prodemocracy movement or who provided donations to the prodemocracy movement via mobile phones. The regime also seized properties belonging to members of the Committee Representing the Union Parliament, the NUG, or their families. The regime amended laws to permit extrajudicial seizure of property owned by defendants, even before charges were filed. According to the AAPP, the regime used its authority to seize property as a weapon to intimidate the public.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										Although precoup law protected privacy and the security of the home, in 2021 the regime legalized entering properties without a warrant. Unannounced nighttime household checks were common. The law did not protect the privacy of correspondence or other communications. The regime regularly monitored private electronic communications through online surveillance; there were numerous reports the regime monitored prodemocracy supporters.According to the July 9 Burma Affairs &amp; Conflict Study, in June and July the regime conducted biometric data collection training and implemented a data collection project in towns and cities nationwide. The data collected included fingerprints, iris patterns, and facial biometrics from registrants plus personal information such as names, addresses, blood types, and telephone numbers of citizens ages 10 and older, as well as of foreign nationals living in the country. Regime news outlets stated the collection was part of a plan for issuing 10-digit national identification cards. Activists expressed concern the regime intended to use the biometric data to increase surveillance.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Fighting between the regime and opposition forces reportedly intensified in Kachin, Chin, Karen, Shan, and Kayah States and in Sagaing and Magway Regions. Reports of killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual and gender-based violence, and other abuses committed by regime security forces were common; some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and PDF groups were accused of similar abuses.Killings: Deliberate killings and deaths due to excessive or unjustified use of force by the regime and some opposition forces were reported. The military routinely conducted airstrikes that killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure.Regime forces engaged in armed conflict with opposition forces failed to protect noncombatants, resulting in death, injury, and other harm. The military also routinely conducted airstrikes that killed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure. In June, the UN secretary-general’s 2023 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict recorded 149 child killings (and numerous other injuries to children) by regime forces in 2022. On April 11, regime forces reportedly launched aerial attacks that killed more than 160 civilians at Pazigyi village, Kantbalu Township in Sagaing Region, as the regime’s forces dropped bombs on a gathering; media reported two attacks by fixed-wing aircraft followed by indiscriminate shooting from helicopters.On August 3, an abbot in Magwe’s Gangaw District, Tilin Township, was reportedly shot and killed at his monastery by a resistance member from Gangaw Battalion 15.On August 28, the regime reportedly detonated a mine near Shwe Pyi village in Mandalay’s Singu Township, killing one child and injuring another. Singu locals said the regime conducted attacks on civilians to put the blame on the PDF.Abductions: There were reports of such abuses including on July 16, when drunken regime troops from Infantry Battalion 274 based in Mindat reportedly abducted a pastor and three church elders from a church in a residential ward of Mindat town. According to Irrawaddy, all four detainees were believed to have been killed by regime troops during interrogation. In November, there were reports of regime forces detaining youths in Rangoon for conscription or ransom. EAOs in Shan State were also accused of forcible conscription.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: There were reports of such abuses both by regime and some opposition forces. Local media reported Lia Do Deih Huai Kum, a woman, age 31, died on September 5 due to severe head injuries after regime security forces allegedly beat her and a male friend in Kale Town, Sagaing Region, on August 27. The victim remained unconscious for 10 days before succumbing to her injuries at a hospital in Mandalay city.There were reports of both regime security and opposition forces raping and sexually assaulting women and girls during security operations.A June 17 report from the Burmese Women’s Union stated resistance forces committed four of the 59 rape cases reported to it since the coup; regime forces were responsible for the majority. Between June 28 and July 31, Magwe Region’s Saw Township authority reportedly arrested eight members of the NUG’s People’s Security Force jail guards for repeatedly raping a woman arrested in April for theft.Child Soldiers: The military and some EAOs, including the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independence Army, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Chin National Front, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and People’s Defense Forces, were listed in the UN secretary-general’s 2023 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict as having recruited and used children. The report found that 235 children (215 boys and 20 girls) as young as age 12 were recruited and used as soldiers. There was no evidence the regime or NUG prosecuted those responsible.The Secretary of State determined that the regime’s military recruited or used child soldiers during the reporting period of April 2022 to March 2023. See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at    https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.Other Conflict&#8211;related Abuse: According to numerous local media reports, UN officials, and NGOs, the regime restricted the passage of relief supplies, including medical supplies, and access by international humanitarian organizations to conflict-affected areas, primarily in Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magway Regions and Rakhine, Chin, Karenni, and Karen States. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported humanitarian access to 82 percent of those displaced by the conflict was considered “difficult” or “very difficult.”Most access constraints were initiated by de facto authorities and regime security forces. Local reports indicated military checkpoints often confiscated aid (e.g., food and medicine) and the delivery of motorbikes intended for IDPs. According to the UN special rapporteur on human rights, the regime arrested medical workers and patients, attacked and occupied hospitals, and blocked the delivery of medicines and medical supplies to displaced populations.The military reportedly forced civilians to act as human shields, carry supplies, or serve in other support roles; human rights organizations documented the use of villagers as human shields in Karen, Kachin, and Shan States. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, more than 70,000 homes were deliberately burned by the regime since the coup, most in the northwest. The military reportedly increased airstrikes on civilians by 141 percent in the second year following the coup, while artillery shelling of communities, including hospitals, schools, and places of worship, increased by more than 100 percent.With the escalation of violence and conflict, an estimated 12 of 14 states and regions were contaminated by mines.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The regime, by the terms of its emergency decree exempt from respecting the law, continued its full-scale crackdown on freedom of expression throughout the year.Freedom of Expression: Freedom of speech was severely limited. Those who spoke openly against the regime or in favor of the NLD, NUG, or democracy more broadly risked abuse and punishment by regime authorities. The regime used the revised privacy law to allow authorities to review content on individuals’ cell phones at checkpoints and during neighborhood raids.The law stipulated any attempt to “hinder, disturb, damage the motivation, discipline, health and conduct” of military personnel and government employees and cause their hatred, disobedience or disloyalty toward the military and the government was punishable by up to three years in prison. Under this law, hip-hop singer Byuhar was arrested in May after posting a video criticizing the regime for prolonged electricity shortages in Rangoon. Tik Tok celebrity Zaw Win Maung was arrested on the same charges in July after he posted a short comedy video in which he mocked Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing.The regime restricted academic speech and freedoms. In October 2022, regime amendments to education law notably excluded representatives from student unions and teacher unions from participation in the formation of the National Education Commission. In May, the regime banned political lectures in conflict with regime policy. The law empowered the Ministry of Education’s supervisory board to set standards for private schools, issue teaching licenses, and approve curricula.On August 31, a military tribunal in Sagaing’s Ye-U Township handed down a life imprisonment sentence for terrorism to a student named Aye Mya Sandar. The verdict was based solely on her association with and attendance at an NUG-affiliated school.Violence and Harassment: The regime harassed and detained reporters and subjected them to violent and at times lethal abuse for covering antiregime protests. According to a November 12 Radio Free Asia report, the regime revoked at least 14 media outlet licenses and arrested 156 journalists, of whom approximately 50 remained in detention as of October. Very few journalists were among amnestied prisoners as of October.Regime harassment of journalists took many forms, including property seizure and sexual assaults.The regime used various laws to harass, imprison, and try journalists, including those on sedition, which carried a possible 20-year prison term; laws on unlawful association, which could result in a three-year sentence; and counterterrorism, which could carry the death penalty.In March, Narinjara News and the Border News Agency, two Rakhine-based media outlets, were accused of “deliberately reporting to disturb the peace” after reporting regime soldiers demanded money at checkpoints in Rakhine. Narinjara chief editor Khine Myat Kyaw was charged under the Telecommunications Act for use of coercive speech.On September 6, a regime military tribunal sentenced photojournalist Sai Zaw Thaike of Myanmar Now to 20 years in prison with hard labor for covering the aftermath of May’s Cyclone Mocha.Doxing was another form of harassment. Promilitary social media activist Han Nyein Oo was the most prominent channel on Telegram for doxing prodemocracy activists. There were reports that regime security forces often appeared at homes within hours of their targets being doxed on Han’s channel. Telegram banned the channel several times for violating its community standards, yet the same doxing cases would reappear a few days later under a modified username and Han continued to operate in concert with like-minded channels that often cross-posted content.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: After the coup, the regime banned independent media outlets that did not self-censor reporting on the prodemocracy movement. The regime also banned the use of certain terminology in reporting, such as “junta,” “coup d’état,” and “military council.” Media registered with the regime had to follow these censorship rules.Ministry of Information instructions required broadcasters and content providers to Myanmar Radio and Television to self-censor before broadcasting foreign movies and drama series. In July, the censorship requirement was extended to locally produced films and television series. Effective August 1, television broadcasters and producers were required to submit a brief synopsis of planned movies to the censor board to obtain permission for production.In March, the regime announced revisions to the Printing and Publishing Law that allowed police or a designated Ministry of Information official to confiscate published material without a court warrant after the published material was administratively declared unlawful.Libel/Slander Laws: Even before the coup, the military could and did use various legal provisions, such as a criminal defamation clause in the telecommunications law, to restrict freedom of expression.According to local media, the regime arrested Daw Nyo Aye, a Rakhine activist and chair of the Rakhine Women’s Network, on August 15 after she participated in the commemoration of “Rakhine Rice Killing Day.” She was reportedly indicted under laws against defamation of the state.Swiss citizen Didier Nusbaumer and 13 Burmese nationals, including a girl, age 12, were arrested on August 8 for their roles in the film Don’t Expect Anything! released online July 24. Proregime social media channels accused the film of using language that “insults the morals of the monks and harms the cultural traditions of Buddhists.”National Security: Although the regime prosecuted some media critics using laws specifically related to national security, in general the regime used other methods to pursue its critics, especially by doxing them through proxies. The regime maintained its designation of the NUG and other prodemocracy groups as terrorist organizations. According to the AAPP, 6,700 civilians criticized in state-run newspapers were subsequently arrested, although some were eventually released without charge.																Internet Freedom						The regime continued to practice zero tolerance of online dissent. The regime surveilled and censored online content, restricted access to the internet, and prosecuted its online critics. Precoup law included broad provisions giving the government the power to block and filter content “temporarily” for the “benefit of the people.” It did not explicitly allow forced removal of content or provide for intermediary liability.According to Freedom House, the regime, the military, and promilitary groups pressured users to remove antiregime and prodemocracy content. Regime authorities used, or threatened to use, other provisions of criminal law to pressure internet users to remove content or face lengthy prison sentences.Mobile device users were required to provide their names, national registration documents, birthdays, addresses, citizenship, occupations, and gender to register a SIM card; noncitizens were required to provide their passports. Telecommunications companies reportedly required some subscribers to include information beyond the bounds of the regulations, including their ethnicity. Telecommunications and internet surveillance allegedly contributed to violent crackdowns on citizens, including physical assaults and enforced disappearances in retaliation for online activities. Throughout the year, proregime social media users conducted “doxing campaigns” by publishing the legal names and physical addresses of persons tied to the prodemocracy movement, including children attending online school. In the year through August, the regime restricted mobile data network access in 51 townships across the country. Moreover, blocking of social media websites used by prodemocracy groups, such as Facebook and Twitter, continued. Authorities allegedly arrested Facebook users found to have posted content interpreted to be antiregime or used antiregime profile photographs.In regions perceived as supportive of the opposition or governed by martial law, the regime forced telecommunications service providers to restrict mobile data network speeds, effectively shutting down the internet and voice communications in some areas. Access Now verified at least seven shutdowns in 2022, affecting all regions at least once, and no internet access in more than 50 townships for more than a year. Freedom House reported in its 2023 report on internet freedom in the country that, following the forced sale of the last two independent internet service providers in 2022, all service providers were under the direct or indirect control of the military. The regime maintained a “whitelist” of at least 1,200 approved websites with local internet service providers and telecommunications companies. The approved “whitelist” included more than 100 companies in the financial, delivery service, and entertainment sectors, including Instagram, YouTube, Netflix, and Tinder. The “whitelist” further specified that some social media sites were permitted if “used by many customers for business purposes.”																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The regime curtailed the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The regime maintained a blanket ban on protests and demonstration across the country that severely impeded activists’ ability to organize and protest. According to numerous reports in local media, small-scale prodemocracy protests continued across the country despite violent intimidation and suppression by regime security forces. Military violence in response to protests continued throughout the year. On August 8, seven regime soldiers in civilian clothes reportedly opened fire on six young activists staging a flash protest to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the 1988 prodemocracy uprising. Three of the activists were arrested; their whereabouts remained unknown as of December.						Freedom of Association						The regime restricted the right to freedom of association, including by using arbitrary detentions to prevent the formation of new associations or destroy old ones perceived to be antiregime. As amended by the regime, the law on registering organizations stipulated mandatory registration and required a declaration of funding sources and locations of operation for both local and international non-profit organizations. Notably, religious, economic, or political NGOs were subject to separate laws and provisions. Failure to meet all conditions could result in high fines or up to five years in prison. As of September, registration procedures were vague, lacked many of the prescribed mechanisms to facilitate the process, and were interpreted variously by local officials. Many NGOs argued the law primarily functioned as a tool for the regime to gather information about non-profit organizations, including their staff, operations, and activities.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law did not protect freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation. Local regulations limited the rights of citizens to settle and reside anywhere in the country. Authorized officials could require the registration of foreigners’ movements and require foreigners to register every change of address exceeding 24 hours.In-country Movement: Regional and local orders, directives, and instructions restricted freedom of movement. Numerous local media reports described regime security force roadblocks and random searches of private cars and taxis. Nightly curfews in Rangoon and several other cities also restricted movement, as did a requirement that all visitors register with the local ward administrator. Local media reported the regime harassed health-care workers and sometime seized ambulances when medical emergencies occurred after curfew. Due to escalating fighting with the military, the NUG and EAOs warned civilians to travel only in case of an emergency in areas affected by violence. COVID-19 mitigation regulations, at times abused for political or security reasons, also restricted movement.Limitations on freedom of movement for Rohingya in Rakhine State were unchanged. Rohingya could not move freely; they were required to obtain travel authorization to leave their township. The regime’s General Administration Department made it illegal for Rohingya to travel without permission in Sittwe and Kyauktaw Townships, Rakhine State.According to Border News Agency, in August the regime restricted the right of locals to travel in Maungdaw Township in northern Rakhine State. Locals reported that automobiles and motorcycles were prohibited on the Angu Maw to Maungdaw highway after 6 p.m.Foreign Travel: The regime restricted foreign travel by prodemocracy supporters and expanded measures to increase oversight. All bookings for departures had to be made at least 10 days in advance and be shared with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The regime also reportedly canceled, or refused to issue, passports to prodemocracy supporters and required key business leaders to request advance approval for travel. Numerous prodemocracy supporters expressed concern for their security and safety if they tried to leave the country by air. There were confirmed reports of questioning and limited detention at airports.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The regime did not always cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, or other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for granting asylum or refugee status, and there was no system for providing protection to refugees. UNHCR did not register any refugees or asylum seekers during the year.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										UNHCR estimated that as of November 20, more than two million persons were internally displaced in the country, either in camps or informally. More than one million fled their homes since the coup, most notably in areas such as Sagaing and Magway Regions. Conflicts during the year in northern Shan State significantly increased the number of IDPs from 6,700 to 71,800 in less than a month. Decades of conflict between the central government and ethnic communities also contributed to the large number of IDPs.On July 12, regime aircraft bombed an IDP camp during airstrikes in Shadaw and Mese Townships in the resistance stronghold of Kayah State, killing at least two civilians and sending thousands of refugees across the border into Thailand’s Mae Hong Son Province. The military’s deliberate destruction of homes contributed significantly to an increase in the number of IDPs. In June, local media reported more than 12 instances of displacement across at least seven townships in Sagaing Region.UNHCR estimated that nearly all IDPs were living in their own state and region, principally in Kachin State, Shan State, Northwest Burma (Sagaing Region, Chin State), Rakhine State, Central Burma (Magway Region, Bago Region), and Southern Burma (Kayah State, Mon State, Kayin, and Tanintharyi Region). IDPs in Sagaing Region alone numbered 820,880 as of October, the highest concentration in the country.The regime systematically obstructed humanitarian relief for IDPs and denied access to conflict-affected persons affected by natural disasters.In early January, media reported regime officials forcefully closed 25 temporary IDP settlements near Sittwe in Rakhine State. In early March, the regime ordered 140 ethnic Rakhine households (532 individuals) to return from an IDP camp in Ponnakyun Township but offered limited assistance.On June 8, three weeks after Tropical Cyclone Mocha made landfall in Rakhine State, the regime revoked approvals to provide assistance to cyclone-affected populations, to the detriment of approximately 3.4 million persons in need of humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations. The ban followed a letter requiring the United Nations and international NGOs to hand over all domestic distribution of relief supplies to regime authorities.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness, including through discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and religion, in nationality laws and in their practical administration, and in the birth registration process.The law defined a “national ethnic group” as a racial and ethnic group that could prove origins in the country dating back to 1823, a year prior to British colonization, and the regime officially recognized 135 “national ethnic groups” whose members were automatically granted full citizenship. The law also established two forms of citizenship short of full citizenship: associate and naturalized. Citizens in these two categories were unable to run for political office; form a political party; serve in the military, police, or public administration; inherit land or money; or pursue certain professional degrees, such as medicine and law. Only members of the third generation of associate or naturalized citizens were able to acquire full citizenship.Rohingya, most of whom were Muslim, were not recognized as a “national ethnic group,” and the vast majority were stateless as a result. As of September, up to 630,000 Rohingya were estimated to remain in Rakhine State. Some Rohingya could have been technically eligible for full citizenship. The process involved additional official scrutiny and was complicated by logistical difficulties, including travel restrictions and significant gaps in understanding the Burmese language. The process also required substantial bribes to regime officials and, even then, did not result in equality with other full citizens. In particular, only Rohingya were required to go through an additional step of applying for the National Verification Card, through which they received identity documents that described them as “Bengali.” Regime officials treated Rohingya with the presumption of noncitizenship, undermining access to public services and contributing to a wide range of societal discrimination.There were also significant numbers of stateless persons and persons with undetermined nationality, including persons of Chinese, Indian, and Nepali descent. Although these latter groups did not face the same level of official and social discrimination as Rohingya, the regime granted members of these groups only the lesser rights, and imposed the greater restrictions, of associate and naturalized citizenship. The regime did not single these groups out the same way as Rohingya when obtaining citizenship, and the National Verification Card requirement did not apply to these groups.The law did not provide any form of citizenship (or associated rights) for children born in the country whose parents were stateless. The regime issued birth certificates to Rohingya children born in Rakhine State but did not grant citizenship.Media reported that in January and February the regime arrested 2,000 Rohingya from refugee camps in Rakhine and Bangladesh on their way to Malaysia, with nearly 500 sentenced to two to five years in prison under the immigration law. In an aid worker’s description, “They left risking their lives, as they know (sic) they would be free in a new land, if they escape, or they will just go back to their original lives of failure if they get caught. They have already anticipated that they could end up like this.”																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The 2008 constitution provided citizens a limited ability to choose their government through elections held by secret ballot. The military replaced the members of the Union Election Commission, which administered national elections, with regime loyalists and appointed a former military major general to chair the commission.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses and Irregularities in Recent Elections: Observers considered the 2020 national elections to be generally reflective of the will of the population, notwithstanding some structural shortcomings. The NLD won more than 80 percent of the 1,150 contested seats at the state, regional, and union levels, including 396 of 476 races for national assembly seats. The regime delayed an election it promised to hold during the year, citing violence across the country. Media reported that the regime procured electronic voting machines modified with Russian assistance; civil society groups expressed concern that electronic voting machines would make it easier for the regime to alter election results.Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties continued to face narrowing political space amid regime investigations and threats to ban them from competing in elections. Political parties not aligned with the military were denied the rights to assemble and protest peacefully. The regime, moreover, conducted politically motivated investigations into prodemocracy political parties and their leaders, particularly the NLD.On January 26, the regime enacted a political party registration law requiring parties to apply for reregistration with the Union Election Commission within 60 days or face automatic dissolution. Once the regime accepted a party’s application for registration or reregistration as a national party, that party had to amass a minimum of 100,000 members within 90 days of the acceptance, a 100-fold increase from the previous minimum threshold. Additionally, national-level parties were required to establish offices in at least half of the country’s 330 townships within six months, contest at least half of all constituencies, and deposit 100 million kyats ($476,000) with a state-owned bank as registration fees. To register a party at the state or regional level, the law required 1,000 party members, a one million kyat ($4,760) deposit in a state-owned bank, and the establishment of five party offices. State or local parties only had to run a single candidate. The registration law also forbade anyone convicted of a crime or affiliated with regime-designated “unlawful associations” from serving as a political party member, a provision that alone made registration impossible for many prodemocracy parties.On March 28, the Union Election Commission used the new law to disband the NLD and 39 other political parties, including the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Kayah State Democratic Party, Arakan League for Democracy, Chin National League for Democracy, and Ta’ang National Party. Eight of these 40 dissolved parties collectively won 987 of the 1,161 parliamentary seats contested in the 2020 general election.On March 31, regime security forces removed signs and flags from the NLD office in Rangoon’s Kamayut Township. In April, the regime Ministry of Home Affairs pressured the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy to remove flags from their offices. On the night of May 8, following vandalism at the NLD Mandalay regional office, the residence of NLD vice-chairman Zaw Myint Maung was bombed, with security forces intimidating the local community with threats and gunfire. In November, the regime removed NLD signs and flags from Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Laws limiting the citizenship status of many ethnic minority groups limited their rights to participate in political life. Women and members of historically marginalized and minority groups continued to be underrepresented in government.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The regime-controlled Anti-Corruption Commission continued to target deposed NLD politicians and other former civilian government leaders for prosecution under anti-corruption law. As of August, according to the AAPP, 46 former NLD and civilian government officials, Aung San Suu Kyi, and former President Win Myint faced charges under the Anti-Corruption Law. Most observers considered these charges baseless.Corruption was widespread in all dimensions of political life, including especially the judicial system. Petty extortion by police was paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.Corruption: The regime used corruption laws almost exclusively against opponents, as noted. Such cases, which often relied on coerced testimony, did not provide an accurate picture of actual corruption. On October 7, the regime’s Supreme Court rejected the appeals on six corruption convictions, including four related to the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation, a charity. The remaining two cases involved accusations of receiving cash from a crony.For additional information about corruption, please see the Department of State&#8217;s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						The regime did not allow domestic human rights organizations to function independently or openly and regularly disrupted the routine activities of numerous NGOs across various sectors. Human rights NGOs continued to operate but reported harassment, monitoring by authorities, and arbitrary detention. The regime, for example, sometimes pressured hotels and other venues not to host meetings organized by activists or civil society groups. Regime security forces also raided and damaged NGO offices. On July 30, regime forces raided an All Burma Federation of Student Unions office in Nyaung Kan village, Budalin Township, Sagaing Region, and killed three members, including Ko Kyaw Win Thant (chairman), Ko Than Sin Thing (vice chairman), and Ko Thu Ta Nay (news and information secretary).The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The regime systematically denied attempts by the United Nations, other international organizations, and NGOs to investigate human rights abuses or to access the locations of alleged abuses. Foreign human rights activists and advocates, including representatives from international NGOs, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), continued to face visa restrictions. Several international NGOs’ local partners were repeatedly asked to show financial statements and other documents that revealed their relationship with foreign funders and some reported unprecedented levels of scrutiny when withdrawing funds, being asked by their bank for copies of grant agreements and lists of local partners.The regime refused to cooperate with or grant access to the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar created by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate alleged atrocities in the country.The regime continued to refuse entry to the UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in the country.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission did not, in the view of many organizations and independent observers, operate as a credible, independent mechanism, despite its mandate to conduct independent inquiries on alleged human rights abuses. According to the Asian NGO Network on National Human Rights Institutions’ 2023 report, the commission was complicit “in the junta’s grave human rights violations and atrocit[ies]” and “aligned ... with the military junta.”																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women and men was illegal but remained a significant problem, as the regime did not enforce the law effectively and reports emerged of sexual abuse of women in prisons by security guards. Rape of a woman outside of marriage carried a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Spousal rape was not a crime unless the wife was younger than the legal age of marriage (which could vary according to ethnicity or religion), the penalty for which was a maximum of two years in prison. The law prohibited committing bodily harm against another person, but there were no laws specifically against domestic violence or spousal abuse unless the wife was younger than the legal age of marriage. Overlapping and at times contradictory legal provisions complicated implementation of these limited protections.Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, remained a serious problem. Abuse within families was prevalent and considered socially acceptable. Spousal abuse or domestic violence was difficult to measure because the regime did not maintain comprehensive statistics and survivors typically did not report it. According to the Global Protection Cluster, a coalition of NGOs and UN agencies, gender-based violence increased since the coup as economic opportunities shrank, and tensions rose in households over hunger and poverty. Forty percent of persons in IDP households reported fear of sexual violence or harassment.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibited sexual harassment and prescribed a maximum penalty of two years in prison if the harassment involved physical contact. Harassment was punishable by a fine or up to one year in prison. The regime did not report information on the prevalence of the problem, and many of these crimes were unreported. NGOs reported regime police investigators were not sensitive to survivors and rarely followed through with investigations or prosecutions.Discrimination: By law women enjoyed the same legal status and rights as men, including property and inheritance rights and religious and personal status, but regime officials did not enforce the law. Communities around the country implemented customary law to address matters of marriage, property, and inheritance that differed from the provisions of statutory law and was often discriminatory against women.The law required equal pay for equal work, but the formal sector did not respect this requirement, and the regime did not actively enforce it. Women remained underrepresented in most traditionally male-dominated occupations (forestry, carpentry, masonry, and fishing) and were effectively barred from them by hiring practices and cultural barriers rooted in male dominance. The law governing hiring of civil service personnel stated that nothing should prevent the appointment of men to “positions that are suitable for men only,” with no further definition of what constituted positions “suitable for men only.” The law restricted the ability of Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhist men by requiring public notice prior to any such marriage and allowing objections to the marriage to be raised in court. The law was generally ignored and rarely enforced.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of regime authorities. The law permitted the government to impose coercive birth-spacing requirements – 36 months between children – if the president or national government designated “special regions” for health care based on factors such as population, migration rate, natural resources, birth rates, and food availability. In such special regions, the government could create special health-care organizations to establish family planning regulations. The regime did not designate any such special region. In Rakhine State, however, local authorities imposed regulations that prohibited Rohingya families from having more than two children, although the regulations were not enforced.The law otherwise limited the right of individuals to manage their reproductive health. Access to sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception for sexual violence survivors through public and private facilities, was very limited and further exacerbated by the collapse of the public health system after the coup.The World Bank estimated in 2020 that the maternal mortality rate nationwide was 179 deaths per 100,000 live births. NGOs regularly reported throughout the year that humanitarian access and movement restrictions among Rohingya limited access to health-care services and contributed to maternal mortality rates in Rakhine State higher than the national average. Complications resulting from unsafe abortions were also a leading cause of maternal deaths.Other major factors influencing maternal mortality included poverty; the high rate of home births; limited availability of and access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and maternal and newborn health services; low coverage of antenatal care visits; and the lack of access to services from appropriately trained and skilled birth attendants and other trained community health workers. Delivery of these services was likely affected by significant staffing gaps in the public-sector health workforce.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Wide-ranging institutional and societal discrimination against members of minority groups persisted, including in areas such as education, housing, employment, and access to health services. Members of ethnic minority groups constituted 30 to 40 percent of the population. The seven ethnic minority states comprised approximately 60 percent of the national territory, and a significant number of minority members also resided in majority ethnic Burmese regions. Rohingya continued to face severe discrimination based on their ethnicity and religion. The regime and private actors reportedly practiced discrimination that impeded Muslim-owned businesses’ operations and undercut their ability to hire and retain labor, maintain proper working standards, and secure public and private contracts.																																				Children										Birth Registration: There were significant rural-urban disparities in birth registration, with an informal or almost nonexistent process in small, rural villages. Birth registration was required to obtain a national identification card, and it could provide important protections for children, particularly against child labor, early marriage, and underage recruitment into the armed forces and ethnic armed groups.Education: By law education was compulsory, free, and universal through the fourth grade (up to age 10). This left children ages 10 through 13 vulnerable to child labor, since they were not required to attend school and were not legally permitted to work (the minimum age for work was 14). Burmese was the mandatory language of instruction in public schools. The national education plan did not allow for other languages of instruction, although some public schools taught ethnic languages as extra subjects. Schools were often unavailable in remote communities and conflict areas, and access to them for internally displaced and stateless children was also limited.Child Abuse: The laws were neither adequate to deter child abuse nor enforced. There were no reliable data on child abuse.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law stipulated different minimum ages for marriage based on religion and gender. The minimum age for Buddhists was 18, while the minimum age for non-Buddhists was 16 for boys and 15 for girls. Child marriage occurred, especially in rural areas. There were no reliable statistics on forced marriage.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The 2022 Anti Trafficking in Persons Law criminalized all forms of labor and sex trafficking. It stated that when trafficking involved the sexual exploitation of a child, it was not necessary to demonstrate the use of force, fraud, or coercion to prove guilt. The law also barred adoption by deception, included measures consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and defined a child as a person younger than 18. Other law criminalized physical or sexual violence against children, but there were no reports on its implementation as of October.Prohibitions on the commercial sexual exploitation of children included pimping; separate legal provisions prohibited sex with a child younger than 14. The penalty for the purchase of commercial sex acts from a child younger than 18 was 10 years in prison. The law prohibited child pornography and specified a minimum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and a modest fine. The law on child rights prescribed a penalty of one to seven years in prison, a substantial fine, or both, for sex trafficking and forced marriage. If a survivor was younger than 14, the law considered any sexual act to constitute statutory rape. The maximum sentence for statutory rape was two years in prison when the survivor was between ages 12 and 14, and 10 years to life in prison when the survivor was younger than 12. The Bangkok-based NGO End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism cited a lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as well as of publicly available data sufficient to ascertain the effectiveness of implementation.																																				Antisemitism										There was one synagogue in Rangoon serving a very small and primarily expatriate Jewish population. There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at    https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: Consensual sexual activity “against the order of nature” was a criminal offense, punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a fine. In addition, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons were sometimes subjected to detention or threatened with arrest under section 35 of the Police Act, which punished persons found between sunset and sunrise with their “face covered or otherwise disguised.”Violence and Harassment: Reports of violence against LGBTQI+ persons persisted. According to media reports, eyewitness accounts, and social media posts, regime officials deliberately humiliated LGBTQI+ prodemocracy supporters after their arrest, employing tactics such as sexual insults, taunts, mocking of clothing, and physical abuse at rates greater than those endured by other prisoners. According to Amnesty International, the regime often subjected members of the LGBTQI+ community to thorough body checks to, as one detainee said, “ensure whether they are males or females.”Several media reported the June 29 conviction of Justin Min Hein, president of the LGBTQI+ Union Mandalay, for violating the Counter-Terrorism Act. The LGBTQI+ Union Mandalay had documented and publicized the sexual assault against a transgender prisoner in Monywa Prison. Justin Min Hein was reportedly beaten and denied food and water while awaiting trial in the Yay Kyi Ai Interrogation Center after his 2022 arrest. Sue Sha Shinn Thant, another LGBTQI+ activist from Mandalay Region, was sentenced to more than 20 years in prison in 2022 for incitement, murder, and terrorist acts and was reportedly sexually assaulted during interrogation.Discrimination: The 2008 constitution did not recognize sexual orientation as a ground for nondiscrimination. The law did not recognize same-sex marriage or grant LGBTQI+ couples and their families rights equal to the rights of other persons. Stigma and a lack of acceptance among the general population of LGBTQI+ persons persisted. There were reports of discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in employment. Many LGBTQI+ individuals reportedly faced barriers to education and employment if they were vocal or visible about their status. LGBTQI+ persons reported facing discrimination from health-care providers, including public shaming. The local diplomatic community observed that some members of the LGBTQI+ community were denied access to HIV treatment while in prison.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: There was no mechanism for legal gender recognition or to change the gender assigned at birth on civil or identification documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no confirmed cases of so-called conversion therapy practices or medically unnecessary and irreversible “normalization” surgeries on children or nonconsenting intersex persons, nor were these practices banned.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: The regime did not permit LGBTQI+ persons or groups to participate in LGBTQI+ related public events, although members of the community continued to support the prodemocracy movement, including participation in flash protests.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities. While the law required job protection, equal access to education, and access to public transportation, there was no meaningful enforcement.According to the Eden Center for Disabled Children, in the school year the majority of children with disabilities, particularly of those in rural and border areas, did not attend school; very few special education schools were available in urban areas.Numerous individuals suffered disability due to conflict and landmines, especially in remote border areas. According to monitors of landmine and other unexploded weaponry incidents, as of July 556 casualties were reported nationwide. Rehabilitation and other support services for these persons were in short supply.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Official and societal violence and discrimination, including employment discrimination, against persons with HIV continued. Reports of abuse included verbal insults, harassment, threats, and physical assault. Significant legal, social, and financial barriers impeded access to services for persons with HIV. These barriers included stigma, unhelpful gender norms, poor infrastructure, and political instability. Laws criminalizing behaviors that increased the risk of acquiring HIV fueled stigma and discrimination against persons engaged in these behaviors and impeded their access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care services.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The regime committed extensive abuses against organized labor, including extrajudicial killings of union leaders and members and unlawful detention for exercising their fundamental freedoms and human rights. Labor laws often went unenforced or were enforced primarily against organized labor and labor activists and in the interests of business owners and the regime.The military maintained its designation of at least 16 labor unions as illegal and continued to issue arrest warrants for union leaders. There were numerous reported raids of trade union offices and union leaders’ homes.The law promised the right of workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct strikes; however, the regime, by the terms of the emergency decree, de facto abolished these rights, declaring all major independent labor organizations illegal. The law permitted labor organizations recognized by the regime to demand the reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity, but it did not explicitly prohibit antiunion discrimination in the form of demotions or mandatory transfers. The law did not provide adequate protection for workers from dismissal before a union was officially registered. The law prohibited civil servants and personnel of the security services and police from forming unions. The law permitted workers to join unions only within their category of trade or activity, and the definition of trade or activity lacked clarity. Basic labor organizations were required to have a minimum of 30 workers and register through township registrars via the Chief Registrar’s Office of the regime Ministry of Labor. The law provided unions recognized by the regime the right to represent workers, to negotiate and bargain collectively with employers, and to send representatives to a conciliation body or tribunal. There were no labor unions recognized by the regime apart from seafarers, who worked abroad, and regime-sponsored “yellow” unions.The law provided the right to strike in most sectors with significant restrictions. The law prohibited strikes addressing problems not directly relevant to labor matters. The law did not permit strikes or lockouts in essential services such as water, electricity, or health. The military continued to threaten criminal charges against public-sector workers who, during strikes, did not return to work.Penalties for violations of related labor laws were commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights. Penalties were never applied against violators.Worker organizations reported that formal dispute settlement and court procedures were not effective at enforcing labor laws.There were reports that employers dismissed union leaders with impunity and military support. In June, the military threatened and arrested seven garment factory workers for demanding a pay raise in Shwe Pyi Thar Industrial Zone in Rangoon Region. While by law labor disputes should be heard in civilian courts, a military court tried those arrested on the grounds that the factory was in a township under martial law.The military regime maintained martial law over two major industrial zones located in Hlain Thar Yar and Shwe Pyi Thar Townships, Rangoon Region, and other townships with a high concentration of industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Labor representatives alleged that some employers hired military-affiliated security guards to harass and intimidate workers, sometimes leading to fatal violence when disputes arose.The Confederation of Trade Unions in Myanmar reported the arrest and harassment of trade unionists by regime security forces. On June 26, Thet Hnin Aung, general secretary of Myanmar Industry Crafts &amp; Services Trade Unions Federation, was released after two years’ detention by military authorities. The ILO reported on July 12 that he was rearrested for unknown reasons and his whereabouts were unknown.Military authorities continued to interfere in the operations of the ILO country office through the imposition of banking restrictions, denial of visa extensions for ILO officials, and refusal to conclude a memorandum of understanding on tax exemptions and other privileges and immunities for the ILO office and staff. A senior-level ILO Commission of Inquiry report on October 4 called upon the regime to cease violence, torture, and other inhumane treatment against trade unionists and to end forced or compulsory labor.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at    https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at    https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The official minimum daily wage was above the poverty line, although the official poverty line had not been adjusted since 2019. The minimum wage covered all sectors and industries in the formal sector for businesses with more than 15 employees. The law required the minimum wage to be revised every two years, although it was last revised in 2018.The workweek was 44 hours per week for factories. For shops and other establishments, it was 48 hours per week. Although the law in general stated that overtime should not exceed 12 hours per work week for shops, the law allowed up to 16 hours of overtime when special matters required additional overtime. Overtime for factory workers was limited to 20 hours per week. The law also stipulated an employee’s total working hours could not exceed 11 hours per day (including overtime and a one-hour break). Wage and overtime laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.The Business and Human Rights Resource Center noted in April that workers at various garment factories were not receiving minimum wages or were being forced to work excess hours.Occupational Safety and Health: The law set standards for occupational safety and health (OSH) that were appropriate for the main industries. The regime Ministry of Labor had the authority to suspend businesses operating at risk to worker health and safety until these risks were remediated.The regime often ignored workers’ OSH complaints. Labor unions reported instances in which workers could not remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment. Such violations were commonly seen in the construction sector.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The regime Ministry of Labor’s Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Department oversaw labor conditions in the private sector. Inspectors were authorized to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.Although penalties for wage and hour violations were commensurate with those for similar violations such as fraud, the regime did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties for similar violations, such as employer negligence, were rarely applied. The number of labor law inspectors and factory inspectors was insufficient to address wage, salary, overtime, OSH standards, and other matters adequately. In some sectors, other regime ministries regulated OSH laws (e.g., the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation).Informal-sector jobs usually lacked basic benefits such as social and legal protections. In at-risk industries – defined as having occupational hazards, volatile pay structures, and ease in exploiting labor rights – 20 percent of workers on average had an informal work arrangement, although the proportion was even higher in manufacturing, construction, recreation, and personal services.Although no recent data were available, experts believed a large majority of workers were in the informal sector. Wage, hour, and OSH laws did not apply to those in the informal sector or self-employed.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Burma
- Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) HomeBureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Condition (10)(C) Annual Report on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)																																		Report																														April 4, 2024																																							IntroductionThis Report is submitted consistent with Condition (10)(C) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).  The Convention was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29, 1997.  This report covers the period January 1 through December 31, 2023.Condition (10)(C) provides that the President shall submit on January 1 annually to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth—a certification of those countries included in the Intelligence Community’s (IC) Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the Director of Central Intelligence’s Arms Control Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)) that are determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to adherence of the country to its obligations under the Convention;the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party:to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of non-compliance;to call attention publicly to the activity in question; andto seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); anda detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the United States described in clause (iii).It is the view of the United States that, in most cases, efforts to resolve compliance concerns discovered through review of declarations or inspection results should first be attempted through diplomatic means.  This does not preclude or prevent the escalatory step of requesting challenge inspections, but diplomatic outreach is an initial mechanism to attempt to resolve compliance concerns before the need to resort to challenge inspection requests.For its part, both as a matter of national policy and as a guide to national policy, the United States undertakes its own independent review – based upon the best available information, including intelligence information – of the compliance of CWC States Parties with their obligations under the Convention.  The United States believes that CWC States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance with specific declaration and implementation provisions (e.g. Articles III, IV, V, VI, and VII) and the “general obligations” provision under Article I. Information and assessments in this report are current as of December 31, 2023.  This report highlights developments since the conclusion of the reporting period included in the Condition (10)(C) Report published in 2023, and, to the extent possible, refrains from repeating older information found in previously submitted reports. The United States continues to take extraordinary steps, bilaterally and in close coordination with Close Allies and like-minded states, to address CWC non-compliance and restore deterrence of chemical weapons (CW) development and use.The United States continues to be a member of the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons (“the Partnership”), a French-led initiative created in 2018 in which participating states made a political commitment to increase pressure on those responsible for the use of CW.  As of December 2023, the Partnership had 40 members, plus the European Union.Further, the United States engaged in bilateral efforts throughout 2023 to encourage Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member States to pay their arrears, so that their voting rights could be reinstated.  The United States, along with allies, lobbied countries that usually do not attend the annual Conference of the States Parties (CSP) meeting and encouraged them to do so.The United States also works diligently with partners and the OPCW to support and encourage effective national implementation by other States Parties of their obligations under the Convention.The OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) reported, as of July 31, 2023, the following regarding Article VII implementation:Somalia, which became a State Party in 2013, does not have a designated National Authority.Sixty eight1 States Parties had not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures (scheduled chemical transfers, prohibitions, penalties, extraterritorial obligations, legal basis of regulations, establishment of national authority, and other initial measures).  They were:  Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cabo Verde, Chad, Congo, Cook Islands, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.One State Party, Tonga, has not yet submitted its required initial declaration (due July 28, 2003) pursuant to the Convention.  The TS is unable to fulfill its verification tasks with regard to this State Party.  The United States made efforts in 2023 to encourage Tonga to prepare and submit its initial declaration.As of December 31, 2023, there were 192 CWC States Parties.2  Four States have neither ratified nor acceded to the CWC and, therefore, are not States Parties to the Convention (one signatory State, Israel, and three non-signatory States, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan).During the reporting period, South Sudan, working with the OPCW TS has undertaken efforts to prepare to accede to the CWC.  The Department of State met with South Sudanese representatives on the margins of the CWC Fifth Review Conference and the 28th session of the CSP to acknowledge progress made and to urge South Sudan to complete its process to accede to the CWC.  The Director-General (DG) of the OPCW met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of South Sudan, on the margins of CHEMEX held in Algeria between September 28 and October 4, 2023.  They discussed the importance of upholding the global norm against the use of chemical weapons and signed a joint communiqué on their work together to complete the accession process.Four States Parties – Burma, Iran, Russia, and Syria – are certified in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia and Syria were first certified in non-compliance in April 2018.  Iran was first certified in non-compliance in November 2018.  Burma was first certified in non-compliance in 2019.  Additional information is available in the 2024 classified Condition (10)(C) Reports.  The United States also cannot certify the People’s Republic of China’s compliance, which was first reported in 2021.COUNTRY ASSESSMENTSBURMAFINDINGThe United States certifies that Burma is in non-compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare its past CW program and destroy its historical CW production facility (CWPF) near Tonbo.  The United States has concerns that a CW stockpile may remain at Burma’s historical CWPF.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSFor the reasons described in previous reports, the United States continues to assess that Burma is in violation of its obligations under CWC Article I, paragraph 4, and Article III, paragraph 1 of the CWC; and continues to have concerns about Burma’s compliance with Article I, paragraphs 1(a) and 2. BACKGROUNDThere is no additional information to report in 2023.  See previous years reports for additional details.  Most of the original buildings associated with Burma’s legacy research, production, weaponization, and storage of sulfur mustard munitions during the 1980s remain at the historical CWPF. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSBurma did not attend the annual CSP sessions in 2021, 2022, and 2023.  The United States has not engaged with Burma bilaterally on these issues following the February 2021 military coup, but continues to monitor the situation in Burma closely.PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)FINDINGBased on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(a), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.”  The United States is concerned about the PRC’s interest in PBAs and toxins because these agents have utility for CW applications.BACKGROUNDThe PRC signed the CWC on January 13, 1993, ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997, and submitted its initial declarations in 1998.  Since then, scientists at a PRC military research institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, such as fentanyl.3  Other PRC research organizations have been conducting and directing military research, discovery, testing and characterization of animal venoms and marine toxins  – which raises further questions about the intended purposes of the work conducted by the military researchers.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSDuring the November 2023 CSP, in bilateral discussions with the PRC, the United States reiterated its concerns about the PRC’s potential development of aerosolized fentanyl.  In response to U.S. concerns, the PRC reiterated that it does not use fentanyl for law enforcement purposes.  The PRC objected to the 2021 CSP decision on the aerosolized use of central nervous system (CNS)-acting chemicals and issued a joint statement with Iran, Russia, and Syria that, “Article II, paragraphs 1(a) and 9(d) of the Convention permits the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes’ as long as types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.  Therefore, the Convention allows States Parties to choose their own method of law enforcement in full conformity with the provisions of the Convention including the General Purpose Criterion (GPC).”In November 2023, the United States and the PRC met in Washington for bilateral discussions on arms control, during which meeting the U.S. side raised concerns about PRC CWC compliance and emphasized the importance of preserving the international prohibition on chemical weapons.  The United States continues to engage the PRC about the implementation of its CWC obligations.  The United States will continue to monitor and report, as well as pursue substantive bilateral engagement with the PRC.  The United States will also continue to engage our partners on this issue, both to raise awareness of the threat and build diplomatic pressure on the PRC to address these concerns.ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRAN)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Iran is in non-compliance with the CWC due to (1) its failure to declare its transfer of CW to Libya during the 1978-1987 Libya-Chad war, (2) its failure to declare its complete holdings of Riot Control Agents (RCAs), (3) its failure to submit a complete CWPF declaration, and (4) its pursuit of PBAs for offensive purposes. ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone” or to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party.”  Iran maintains a chemical weapons program that includes pursuit of certain PBAs as part of a broader category of “incapacitating agents” for offensive purposes.  The development and proliferation of such agents is in violation of Iran’s obligations under Article I.See previous reports for analysis of Iran’s violation of its obligations under Article III, paragraph 1(a) (iv); Article III, paragraph 1(c)(i) and (ii); and Article III, paragraph 1(e).BACKGROUNDDevelopment of PBA WeaponsSince 2005, some of Iran’s military-controlled facilities, Imam Hossein University (IHU) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), have researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic incapacitating effects.  Most recently on September 23, 2023, an X (formerly Twitter) account representing Lab Dookhtegan – whose members claim to be hacker organization in opposition to Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors &#8212; posted confidential documents detailing an Iranian military university’s development of grenades meant to disseminate medetomidine, an anesthetic that is a central nervous system-acting chemical.  According to the documents, this development included information on the production and testing of prototype weapons.For further background on Iran’s history of non-compliance and background on Iranian PBA and toxin development, including undeclared chemical weapons transfers, incomplete RCA declarations, and incomplete declaration of chemical weapons production facilities, see the 2023 10(C) Report.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS and Next StepsOn November 22, 2018, the United States addressed Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC in its national statement to the CWC’s Fourth Review Conference.  In 2019, the G7 also issued a statement of concern about Iranian CWC compliance further reinforcing the U.S. non-compliance finding.  In 2020, the United States designated Iranian defense entity Shahid Meisami Group (SMG) and its director, Mehran Babri, for sanctions under Executive Order 13382 because of its responsibility for projects involving the testing and production of chemical agents for use as so-called incapacitation agents. In part to address concerns about Iran’s work on PBAs, the United States led an effort in 2021 at the OPCW CSP that concluded with the adoption of a decision affirming that “the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals is understood to be inconsistent with law enforcement purposes as a ‘purpose not prohibited’ under the Convention.”  Iran—along with Russia, the PRC, and Syria—was a principal opponent of the decision.No bilateral discussions with Iran occurred during the 2023 reporting year regarding the CWC.  The last CWC compliance-related bilateral exchanges occurred in 2001 and 2004, on the margins of OPCW EC meetings, but discussions did not resolve any of the issues raised by the United States.Additionally, in November 2023 at the twenty-eighth session of the OPCW’s CSP, the OPCW adopted a U.S. co-sponsored decision on “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use”.  This decision creates a mandate for the OPCW Director-General to report to States Parties annually on information available on transfers of scheduled chemicals.  This reporting could help facilitate transparency on any declared transfers of scheduled chemicals from Iran to Syria.The United States will continue to monitor and report on Iran’s non-compliance with the CWC and continue to raise awareness of the issue with partners.  Additional U.S. action at the OPCW to put additional pressure on Iran will focus on addressing potential threats posed by central nervous system-acting chemicals and toxins.RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RUSSIA)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Russia is in non-compliance with the CWC.  Russia has used chemical weapons at least twice in recent years in assassination attempts using Novichok nerve agents – also known as fourth generation agents (FGAs)—in 2018 and 2020.  Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons program.  During the reporting period, Russia also used RCAs as a method of warfare in Ukraine, in violation of its CWC obligations.  Russia is also in non-compliance for the lack of its complete declarations of its: (1) CWPFs; (2) CW development facilities; and (3) CW stockpiles.  Russian scientific institutes have researched and developed chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies to deliver CW agents.  Russia has conducted chemical weapons-related testing at the Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground.  The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding Russia’s assistance to Syria regarding the regime’s use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Douma in April 2018.  Furthermore, the United States has concerns that Russia’s PBA program is for offensive purposes.  In addition to its use of RCAs, the United States also has concerns about reports that Russia has used other chemical agents against Ukrainian armed forces.ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons” or “to use chemical weapons.”  On August 20, 2020, the Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) officers used a Novichok nerve agent to poison a Russian opposition leader, Aleksey Navalny, while he was traveling back to Moscow after campaigning in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia, against pro-Kremlin candidates in regional elections.  On March 4, 2018, Russia attempted to assassinate two individuals in the UK using a Novichok nerve agent.  These acts are clear violations of the CWC Article I, paragraph 1 prohibition on the use of CW. In accordance with Article 1, paragraph 5, each State Party “undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”  The United States assesses that Russian forces have used RCAs against Ukrainian armed forces in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine.  Although not all uses of riot control agents by armed forces amount to use “as a method of warfare,” use by military forces against combatants on the battlefield in an armed conflict violates Article I, paragraph 5 of the CWC.   In accordance with Article I, paragraph 2, each State Party “undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses.” Each State Party is also required to declare its chemical weapons program in accordance with Article III.  Russia completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile on September 27, 2017.  Based on existing information, however, the United States does not believe Russia has declared all of its CW stockpile, CWPFs, and all CW development facilities.  Rather, the United States assesses that Russia maintains an undeclared CW program. In addition to these violations, the United States is concerned about reports of use of other chemical agents by Russia in Ukraine.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative asserted that Russian troops had begun adding the CWC Schedule 3 chemical Chloropicrin to grenades already containing RCAs.The United States is also concerned that Russia has a PBA program intended for purposes inconsistent with the CWC.  Russian Health Minister Shevchenko acknowledged to the press that Russian special operations forces employed “derivatives of fentanyl” to resolve the October 2002 Dubrovka theater hostage crisis.  The United States is concerned that Russia is pursuing these types of agents for offensive purposes, which would be a violation of Article I.  Russia long opposed the efforts to adopt a decision on the aerosolized use of CNS-acting chemicals, which was adopted at the OPCW in 2021.  According to a non-paper Russia published at the OPCW in November 2018 entitled, Aerosolisation of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes, Russia believes use of these agents “is not regulated under the  Convention.” In accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(d), each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.  In January 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) reported Russia’s military presence and cooperation with Syrian forces in Douma at the time of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons attack on Douma on April 7, 2018, including exclusive control of the airspace over Douma by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Areospace Defence Forces.  Russia’s joint air operations and negotiations to retake eastern Ghouta from opposition forces, and its activities assisting the Syrian regime to cover up the use of CW after the attack, raise serious questions about Russia’s possible role assisting the Syrian regime’s use of CW on April 7, 2018.  Further, Russia maintained a joint operations room with Syria and Iran in charge of war strategy and coordination in Syria at a time when the Syrian forces repeatedly used chemical weapons.  Russia continues to conduct a global disinformation campaign in defense of the Syrian regime.BACKGROUNDThe Convention entered into force for Russia on December 5, 1997, and Russia made its initial declaration in March 1998.  Russia’s declaration included CWPFs, CW storage facilities (CWSFs), a CW development facility, and a stockpile of almost 40,000 MT of CW agent, in both bulk and weaponized form.  As of September 27, 2017, Russia had completed destruction of its declared Category 1 CW stockpile.  Its Article VI declaration included Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and other chemical production facility plant sites. Use of CWRussia has denied any responsibility for the use of a Novichok chemical agent in an assassination attempt against UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal, despite the evidence that Russia is responsible, including UK identification and video of officers from Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate.  The Soviet Union developed these toxic Novichok agents in the 1970s and 1980s as part of its development of a new class of “fourth-generation” nerve agents.  It is highly likely these agents were developed to prevent detection by the West and circumvent international CW controls.  The OPCW TS confirmed, as part of two separate Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) to the UK in 2018, that the chemical agent used to poison the Skripals matched the UK’s analysis and was, at that time, unscheduled.   With respect to the poisoning of Aleksey Navalny in August 2020, analysis from several national laboratories, including laboratories in Germany, France, Sweden, and other OPCW-designated laboratories, concluded that Navalny was poisoned with a nerve agent from a group of chemical agents, Novichoks.  In addition, the FSB was tracking and surveilling Navalny during his stay in Tomsk, Russia.  Navalny has for many years been the target of FSB surveillance, including wiretapping and covert video surveillance.  Russia continues to deny any responsibility for the attack.  On February 16, 2024, Aleksey Navalny died while imprisoned in Russia. The OPCW TS also confirmed, as part of a TAV to Germany in September 2020, the analytical findings of German, French, and Swedish laboratories that determined Navalny was exposed to an unscheduled nerve agent from the Novichok group.  Specifically, the unclassified TAV summary stated that the unscheduled nerve agent had “structural characteristics similar to the toxic chemicals belonging to Schedules 1.A.14 and 1.A.15, which were added to the Annex on Chemicals at the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties in November 2019.”Use of RCAs as a Method of WarfareThe United States assesses that Russia has repeatedly used RCAs as a method of warfare across the frontlines in Ukraine. In May 2023, Russia’s state-controlled Channel 1 broadcasted an interview with a Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.  In the video, drone footage shows a grenade being dropped into a trench, smoke billowing from the trench, and then soldiers fleeing from the trench.  On the broadcast, the soldier states, “We are trying to force them out with smoke.”  The broadcast then goes on to state, “Soldiers from the 88th Brigade are using the so-called ‘Bird-Cherry’ tear grenades.”  In December 2023, Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade stated on its Telegram channel that the brigade is using a “radical change in tactics” by dropping K-514 grenades on Ukrainian forces.In addition to these Russian reports, there have been several Ukrainian reports on use of RCAs by Russia’s forces.  On September 23, 2022, Ukraine’s Operational Command South alleged a Russian drone strike dropping grenade devices that released a noxious smoke in a Facebook post.  Operation Command South identified a Soviet-era K-51 tear gas grenade designed to disseminate the powdered, highly irritating riot control agent CS (2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile).  Ukraine’s General Staff of the Armed Forces (AFU) posted photos of a spent K-51 tear gas grenade and a downed quadcopter on Facebook on October 12, 2023.  The AFU Facebook allegation stated that Russian forces had dropped K-51 grenades from drones on Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhzhia region.  At the 28th session of the OPCW CSP, the Ukrainian representative expressed serious concerns about “the Russian Federation uses  riot control agents as a method of warfare in Ukraine”.  On December 4, 2022, the Naval Forces of AFU charged on their Facebook page that Russia dropped K-51 grenades on Ukrainian “defenders in the East” who were able to hold their positions through their chemical defenses.Incomplete DeclarationsThe United States believes the Russian CW declaration is not complete, in particular with respect to its chemical agent and weapons stockpile, as demonstrated by the 2018 and 2020 Novichok poisonings.  The United States also notes that Russia may have additional facilities that require declaration as CWPFs.  Lastly, the United States does not share Russia’s narrow interpretation of the CWC that Article III only requires declaration of facilities that are used “primarily for” the development of CW.  Instead, the United States believes that all CW development facilities, including CW testing facilities, need to be declared.CW Development FacilitiesIn violation of Article I, the 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute, 27th Scientific Center, and the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GosNIIOKhT) have engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities, including technologies for delivering such weapons.  GosNIIOKhT is a Russian institute with a longstanding role in researching and developing chemical weapons, and GosNIIOKhT developed Russia’s Novichok chemical weapons.  Since 2016, GosNIIOKhT has expanded its research, development, testing, and evaluation capabilities.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute and the 27th Scientific Center are organizations subordinate to the Russian Federation Armed Forces Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense troops.  The 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute stewards Russia’s Shikhany Chemical Proving Ground, where Russia conducts chemical weapons-related testing.  The 27th Scientific Center has been involved with Russian chemical weapons research and testing activities.Assistance to the Syrian RegimeRussia’s assistance to the Syrian regime may have facilitated and enabled the regime’s use of chemical weapons.  Beginning in September 2015 until present, the Russian Government has been directly involved in the Syrian civil war, assisting the Syrian regime to execute its military offensive by providing Russia’s airpower and other material support to the regime. For example, in its report dated January 27, 2023, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe that around 7:30 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.  The report also points out that the IIT received credible information corroborated through multiple sources that Russian forces were co-located at Dumayr airbase alongside the Tiger Forces.  It also concludes that, based on the extensive review of military analysis and of Russia’s and Syria’s public statements and open sources that, prior to the eastern Ghouta offensive – and since the early stages of the intervention of the Russian Federation in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic – the relationship between the Tiger Forces and the Russian Forces was one of special proximity and close coordination at the operational and tactical level.  The IIT also obtained information that, at the time of the attack, the airspace over Douma was exclusively controlled by the Syrian Arab Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces.  For additional details, see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.Moreover, Russia has continued supporting Syria by seeking to obstruct discussion of Syrian CW use in international fora in 2023, including at the UN and at the OPCW.EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSThe United States has had longstanding concerns about Russian compliance with the CWC, and has engaged in numerous exchanges with Russia regarding a number of compliance issues.  The United States has also taken significant action to address its concerns with Russian non-compliance.  For historical details see the 2023 Condition (10)(C) Report.The United States has imposed a range of sanctions on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) and other authorities in response to Moscow’s chemical and biological weapons activities.  The sanctions imposed under the CBW Act will remain in place until Russia (1) is no longer using chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in violation of international law, (2) has provided reliable assurances it will not engage in any such activities in the future, and (3) is willing to allow on-site inspection to ensure it is not using CBW in violation of international law.  To date, Russia has not met those conditions.    Furthermore, in August 2023 the United States designated four FSB operatives pursuant to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 for their involvement in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksey Navalny in August 2020.  The United States also imposed visa restrictions on these operatives for their involvement in a gross violation of human rights pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023.The United States has played a leading role in countering Russian disinformation at the OPCW and highlighting that Russia has a history of chemical weapons use.  For additional details see previous reports.On October 10, 2023, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States submitted questions to Russia in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article IX of the CWC to ask Russia if its armed forces used RCAs in combat operations in the conflict in Ukraine, and to ask it to explain the above-described Channel 1 broadcast showing an interview with a Russian soldier describing use of tear gas against Ukrainian forces.  To date, Russia has claimed that its forces’ statements were a “misunderstanding.”In November 2023 – during the 28th session of the OPCW CSP – the United States and thirty-one other countries made statements condemning Russia for its use of chemicals weapons and its brutal war in Ukraine.On November 27, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, the United States co-hosted a side event with a panel of experts to discuss the prohibition on use of RCAs as a method of warfare under Article I of the CWC.  During the event, the United States showed the Channel 1 broadcast of the Russian soldier describing the Russian Army’s use of tear gas to “smoke out” Ukrainian forces.On November 29, 2023, during the 28th session of the CSP, States Parties voted by secret ballot to fill the three available Executive Council seats of the Eastern European Group.  The Conference elected Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine with the Russian Federation losing a vote for a seat on the Executive Council for the first time since it became a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.  This rejection demonstrated States Parties’ resolve to hold Russia to account for its actions – including its war of aggression and continued violations of the Convention.SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (SYRIA)FINDINGThe United States certifies that Syria is in non-compliance with the CWC.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime used CW more than fifty times against the Syrian people since acceding to the Convention in 2013, in violation of its obligations under Article I of the CWC.  In addition, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime did not declare all elements of its CW program, as required by Article III of the CWC, and in fact retains CW as defined by the CWC.  Further, Syria has failed to cooperate with the OPCW’s work to verify the accuracy and completeness of the Syrian declaration.  Rather, Syria’s actions continue to impede resolution of these matters. ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNSIn accordance with CWC Article I, paragraph 1(b), each State Party is obligated never under any circumstances to use CW.  The United States assesses that the Syrian regime repeatedly used chlorine and sarin as chemical weapons after its accession to the CWC, from 2014 through 2019, in violation of Article I of the CWC.  In spite of compelling evidence, which included findings of attribution by two independent international mechanisms, Syria continues to deny it used CW.In accordance with CWC Article III, paragraph 1, each State Party is obligated to declare its CW program.  The Syrian declaration contains obvious gaps, discrepancies, and omissions, in violation of Article III of the CWC and the additional declaration requirements outlined in operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 2118.  In light of the persistent and significant gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in the declaration, and Syria’s repeated use of CW, as independently confirmed by both the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW IIT, and the additional instances that the United States assesses can be attributed to the Syrian regime, the United States assesses that Syria retains a CW capability and has not disclosed the full history and scope of its CW-related activities.BACKGROUNDDetailed background information on Syria’s CW use and OPCW and U.S. responses to the Syria’s noncompliance in previous years may be found in the 2014 – 2023 reports.  Following the threat of military force in response to the use of sarin in multiple, small-scale attacks in opposition areas, and in a large-scale attack using surface-to-surface rockets in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in August 2013, Syria deposited its instruments of accession to the CWC on September 14, 2013.  The United States and Russia then negotiated the Framework for Elimination of the Syrian CW Program.  This Framework led to the September 27, 2013, OPCW EC decision and to UNSCR 2118, which, taken together, established milestones for the full disclosure and elimination of Syria’s CW program and stringent verification, including unfettered access for the OPCW to Syrian sites and individuals. After a preliminary disclosure of its CW program, Syria submitted to the OPCW its treaty-mandated initial declaration in October 2013, followed by numerous subsequent amendments.  The sum of Syria’s disclosures, declarations, and amendments provided an incomplete declaration of Syria’s CW program.  In April 2014, the OPCW Director-General established the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to attempt to clarify these concerns.  To date Syria has not provided adequate information to resolve all declaration issues, with most of the issues raised by the DAT still outstanding.During 2023, Syria continued to fail to fully cooperate with the DAT and instead obstructed its work, including by preventing the deployment of the entire team in country for most of the year by denying visas to its lead technical expert.  During the period in which the full DAT team was unable to visit Syria in 2023, the DAT completed two deployments of a reduced team to Damascus, in January (17-22) and April (12-19), for limited in-country activities.  A separate meeting between the OPCW TS and Syria was held at a higher level in Beirut, on 22-23 June 2023. On October 10, 2023, the OPCW Director General (DG) announced to the 104th session of the Executive Council that Syria agreed to hold the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus, after two and a half years’ delay.  Syria announced, via Note Verbale dated 9 October 2023, that it would allow the entire DAT team back into the country to meet with the Syrian National authority, during dates suggested by the Secretariat (30 October – 5 November 2023).  The December 2023 inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) did not result in new information that resolved any outstanding issues.  The DAT will continue its work in 2024.    In an unclassified report dated November 24, 2023, the Director-General noted that analysis of samples collected by the DAT in April 2023 revealed the presence of indicators of several chemical warfare agents that were not declared.  The Secretariat requested Syria to provide plausible and verifiable explanations.During this reporting period, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which investigates whether toxic chemicals have been used as a weapon in Syria, had no deployments to Syria.  The FFM continues to look into several incidents from 2016-2019.  The FFM is currently extracting data from interviews and analyzing all information obtained. On January 27, 2023, the OPCW IIT, which is responsible for identifying the perpetrators of specific instances of chemical weapons use in Syria, released its third report. The IIT found reasonable grounds to believe that between 7:10 and 7:40 p.m. local time on April 7, 2018, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Sryian special forces known as the Tiger Forces, dropped two chlorine cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more. This is the ninth case of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime independently attributed by the IIT and OPCW-UN JIM.Ahead of the 104th session of the EC, on 27 September 2023, the TS issued a report marking ten years since Syria joined the CWC.  The report, titled “Accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Ten Years On,” recounts developments since Syria joined the CWC, including uses of chemical weapons and efforts related to Syria’s initial declaration.  Among other things, the report identifies three areas of unresolved outstanding issues of concern with respect to Syria’s initial declaration, namely: unverified quantities of chemical weapons, undeclared production of chemical weapons, and undeclared chemical weapons and facilities.  According to the report, these “issues give rise to concerns regarding the potential existence of undeclared stockpiles of chemical weapons, activities, and/or facilities.”EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSThe United States continues to seize every available opportunity to bring attention to Syria’s non-compliance with the CWC and continues to take action to deter the regime from continuing to maintain its chemical weapons capability.  For past efforts, see the previous reports. At the OPCW, the United States uses its statements before the EC and the CSP to underscore that Syria:  1) admit its past use of CW; 2) cooperate with the FFM, DAT, and IIT; 3) adopt a proactive and fully transparent approach, as recommended by the DG; and (4) resolve the gaps, discrepancies, and omissions in its declaration.  During 2023, the United States denounced Russia’s actions to hinder efforts to address Syria’s violations at the OPCW EC and CSP, issued replies to Syria at the OPCW EC; issued a statement at the CWC Review Conference; and continued to express its support for the IIT and the DAT and their mission.  The National Security Council and Secretary of State also issued statements marking the 10th anniversary of the chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta that killed over 1,400 individuals. In 2023, the United States led an effort with other States Parties to further accountability and deter Syria from maintaining its chemical weapons by co-sponsoring a decision adopted at the 28th CSP titled: “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use.”  The decision calls for, among other things, 1) capacity-building for States Parties to address the threat from non-state actors; 2) greater transparency of the transfer of scheduled chemicals to Syria to deter states from providing scheduled chemicals to Syria; and 3) implementation of collective measures by States Parties under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, including to take steps to prohibit and prevent the transfer of certain high risk chemicals and dual use equipment to Syria.  This is the first decision taken in the history of the OPCW to recommend States Parties take collective measures under Article XII, paragraph 3 of the CWC, demonstrating the resolve of the CSP to take incremental steps to further address the Syrian CW threat.  The decision not only addresses the continued Syrian non-compliance, but also the threat of non-state actors.  It highlights the risk of chemical weapons proliferation to all actors in Syria as well as the possibility that other states may be identified as using chemical weapons in the future.  The decision importantly requests the Technical Secretariat to report on transfers of scheduled chemicals to Syria, which will enable discussion of risks associated with such transfers at meetings of the policy-making organs of the Organization.  The decision also calls on the OPCW Director-General to bring to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council the continuing threat related to Syria’s possession and use of CW, and urges the General Assembly and Security Council to take appropriate actions to address the situation and advance accountability. Supplementing and reinforcing this work in the OPCW, the United States and our allies also implemented a highly effective diplomatic engagement strategy to maintain international focus on the Syrian CW issue and project the vital importance of preserving the prohibition on chemical weapons.  U.S. diplomats led this strategic outreach with countries across the globe, including through bilateral engagement with regional groups. The 2024-2025 OPCW budget, adopted at the 28th session of the CSP, includes funding for investigative efforts into the use of CW in Syria and was approved overwhelmingly, signaling continued broad support for the OPCW’s mandate.  The adoption of the OPCW CSP budget decisions also further highlights the isolation of Russia and others who levy attacks on the OPCW to shield the Syrian regime from accountability for CW use. The United States previously imposed sanctions on numerous Syrian individuals and entities for their involvement in Syria’s production and use of CW in contravention of its CWC obligations.  Where feasible, the United States will continue to explore new sanctions in coordination with allies and partners.The United States will continue to seek accountability for the regime’s chemical weapons use and take action to urge the regime to return to compliance with the CWC in 2024. The Report by the Director-General Status of Implementation of Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention as of 31 July 2023 also includes the “State of Palestine” in its list of States Parties that have not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures.  On May 18, 2018, the Palestinians deposited a purported instrument of accession to the CWC. On June 18, 2018, the United States submitted to the UN Secretary General, the Depositary for the CWC, a letter detailing U.S. objections to the purported accession of the “State of Palestine” to the CWC. This letter was circulated to all States Parties by the Depositary.  Fentanyl has been referred to by some as an “incapacitating agent,” but during the 2002 Moscow Dubrovka theatre hostage crisis, over 100 people were killed by aerosolized fentanyl analogs (including both civilians and hostage takers), demonstrating the potential toxicity of fentanyl and its derivatives/analogs.  Grenades produced in the 1970s by the Soviet Union to disperse the riot control agents CS. 						Tags																																											Arms Control and Nonproliferation																															Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability																								Burma																																Chemical Weapons																																							Chemical Weapons Convention																															China																								Iran																								Russia																								Syria
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will provide an overview of his visit to Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei.  He will also discuss the historic progress the United States has made with Southeast Asian allies and partners over the past two years in advancing an Indo-Pacific that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And with that, let’s get started.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.  Thanks for joining us.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Katie, and thank you as always for hosting me, and I’m really excited to have this opportunity to engage with journalist friends in Southeast Asia and here in the United States as well, and really grateful to all of our colleagues at the Bangkok Media Hub for setting this up.  I really am excited to have the opportunity to chat with colleagues tonight.  I’m just back from an incredibly productive five-country trip to Southeast Asia last week.  I had the pleasure of visiting Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei, and I’m eager to share how these engagements, I think, further strengthened our commitment to the region and demonstrated that commitment – again, particularly to our friends and partners in Southeast Asia.Before I dive into the specifics of each stop, let me just make a couple general framing comments about just how critical these relationships are to advancing our overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And I think you know that our Indo-Pacific Strategy is designed to advance a region that’s free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.And one key point that I made this past week in Southeast Asia to each and every one of my counterparts was this:  Despite the many global challenges that we collectively face, the United States remains squarely focused on the Indo-Pacific region.  I think you all know that we recently marked the second anniversary of our Indo-Pacific Strategy, and I emphasized to all of my counterparts that in accordance with that strategy, our top priority remains investing in the collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends.  And I think we’ve made tremendous progress in advancing that strategy, especially in Southeast Asia.Just a couple of highlights.  I’ll remind friends that we held the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in D.C. in 2022, and we of course continue to strongly support ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and really honored to have upgraded our partnership with ASEAN to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.I think friends are aware as well we’ve strengthened our ties with traditional allies and partners, including elevating our relationships with both Vietnam and India to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, and we’ve also increased engagement with other key partners in the region, including the Philippines.We signed the IPEF Supply Chain Agreement and we substantially concluded negotiations of the Clean Economy Agreement and Fair Economy Agreement under IPEF, and we look forward to continuing discussions around IPEF, including with our IPEF Southeast Asian partners Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.And of course, we continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup d’etat, we have provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance and dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice for the people of Myanmar.Now, I could continue listing our accomplishments in the region over the last couple of years, but why don’t I spend the remainder of my time focusing more specifically on my activities in the last week across the region.In Singapore, I was absolutely delighted to join my counterpart Permanent Secretary Albert Chua to co-host the sixth U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue.  And during our very productive conversations, we reaffirmed our nations’ wide-ranging partnership on defense and security, economic cooperation, critical and emerging technology, and climate and energy.  I was also honored to meet with Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, and I took the opportunity to thank Singapore for its continued leadership in the region, including in ASEAN and in IPEF, and Singapore’s incredibly strong support for tackling today’s greatest challenges.In Phnom Penh, I had a range of productive conversations with counterparts on how the United States and Cambodia can deepen our relationship and address issues of concern.  I met with new Prime Minister Hun Manet as well as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Seiha for what were really wide-ranging discussions on the whole range of issues before the United States and Cambodia.  Now, on the positive side that includes our cooperation on DPRK UN sanctions enforcement, condemning Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, and other cooperative areas, including related to law enforcement.  We also addressed candidly other areas, including areas of difference related to issues such as human rights, trafficking in persons, and creating space for free and independent media.I also reiterated to Prime Minister Hun Manet that the United States remains committed to the Cambodian people and their aspirations for a more prosperous, democratic, and independent country where all voices are heard and respected, and where Cambodia’s sovereignty is protected.In Bangkok, my Thai counterpart Permanent Secretary Eksiri Pintaruchi and I co-chaired a very productive ninth U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue.  I was also honored the next day to co-host the second U.S.-Thailand Strategic and Defense Dialogue, or 2+2, alongside Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Sanitchanog and my DOD colleague Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jed Royal.  And during those two dialogues, I was really gratified that we were able to reaffirm with our Thai allies our commitment to advancing our bilateral cooperation across a whole range of areas, including economic growth, climate change, global health, security cooperation, and people-to-people ties.  We also had an opportunity to discuss with our Thai allies shared concerns, including regarding the situation in Burma.In Hanoi, I participated in the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, which was our first iteration of this dialogue since we upgraded our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  During the dialogue with my counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Minh Vu, we further deepened our relationship and found new ways to facilitate our shared vision for, again, a prosperous, open, resilient, and peaceful region.  We also discussed the need to maintain peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in the face of rising challenges there.  I was also delighted to meet with Vice Foreign Minister Ha Kim Ngoc as well as Chairman of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Commission for External Relations Le Hoai Trung, in which we were able to discuss a broad range of other issues important to our partnership with Vietnam.And last but not least, I was absolutely delighted to travel to Brunei, which was my first trip there ever.  Of course, this year marks our 40th anniversary of formal bilateral relations, and I was proud to mark the milestone with my friend Foreign Minister Dato Erywan, Minister of Finance Dato Amin, and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Dato Alirupendi.  I also had the opportunity to reaffirm our enduring bilateral ties and commitment to our strong partnership with Brunei.So let me just sum up this rundown of my trip with, again, a reaffirmation of how proud I am of our efforts to strengthen our partnerships across all of Southeast Asia as well as our strong relationship with ASEAN.  These relationships continue to be critical to American national security and prosperity, and as the United States we are always looking for ways to boost our cooperation and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Indo-Pacific.  Again, we believe the Indo-Pacific is the region where much of the history of the 21st century will be written.  And perhaps more than anything, I was incredibly gratified by the close strategic alignment between the United States and our partners in the region in tackling our shared priorities together.So, Katie, why don’t I stop there.  Sorry my opening was a little bit longer than usual, but after a five-country trip, I hope people will understand.  But now let’s get on to the main event and I’m delighted to take your questions.  Over.MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  So now we’ll turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  Our first question came in in advance from Bui Mai of Nguoi Lao Dong newspaper in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, who asks:  “What will the U.S. do to demonstrate its security commitment in the Pacific region to its Southeast Asian allies, including Vietnam?  And in the context of China increasing its military presence in the area, recently a ship collision with the Philippines, will the U.S. take any specific actions such as deploying military force to this area or not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Katie, thank you, and thanks to our friends in Vietnam for leading us off with an excellent question.  Let me say just a couple of things in response.  First thing I’ll do is reiterate what I said in my opening remarks:  The focus of the United States in the Indo-Pacific – and including in Southeast Asia – is investing in the collective capacity of our partners so as to support the rules-based regional order and to advance our shared challenges.  And we do that across a whole range of domains, from working to combat pandemic disease and climate change to investing in the economic prosperity of our partners.  But also – related to your question – in the security domain, we also invest in the capacity of our partners.And I would say in particular for many of our friends in Southeast Asia, especially the five claimant states, they are especially concerned about the situation in the South China Sea.  And our focus in our response to meeting those concerns is threefold.  First, we continue to focus on our diplomacy, including with partners in ASEAN, to make sure that all countries – including all claimants – base their claims in international law, that all claimants commit to recognizing and respecting freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.We also – secondly, we spend a great deal of time, effort, and money investing in building the maritime capacity of our partners, especially building an increasing maritime domain awareness.  So the United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in partners’ maritime domain awareness capabilities because we believe that the more countries are able to understand what is happening in their maritime domains and defend their own interests in the maritime domains, we further promote stability across the region.And then thirdly and finally, the United States continues through our own operations to be physically present in the region on a daily basis, and we continue to fly, sail, and operate everywhere that international law allows, demonstrating thereby that all countries share those same rights.So our goal, again, is to promote peace and stability, security and prosperity, promote respect for international law, peaceful resolution of disputes, but also ensure that countries have their own ability to protect their sovereignty and their own interests.  And we think if we do that, we maximize our chances of preventing miscalculation and conflict and, again, promoting peace and stability.And I should be candid too:  I think we’ve seen in a number of instances where the People’s Republic of China has taken a number of steps in the South China Sea that both run counter to international law, but that also utilize coercion to intimidate partners in ways that we find deeply unacceptable and destabilizing.Hope that answers your question.MODERATOR:  Great, thank you.  I see we have a question from Kea Puy of Kyodo News based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.  “During your recent meeting with PM Hun Manet, did you raise any concern about Ream Naval Base?  If so, what was the response?  Also, did you raise the South China Sea issue?  If so, what were your concerns and reply from PM Hun Manet?  Thank you.”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, thanks to our Japanese friends for asking another good question.  Look, as I hope I made clear in my opening remarks, I did have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Hun Manet and we had a very productive, very positive, and very candid meeting.  And we discussed a number of ways in which we would like to both deepen and expand the existing cooperation between the United States and Cambodia, but also address certain areas of concern.Now, I will state just very clearly and transparently that we did discuss issues related to Ream Naval Base, and I think that as the United States has stated very clearly and transparently before, that the United States and a number of countries in the region have expressed serious concerns about the intent, the nature, and the scope of construction at Ream Naval Base as well as the role that the PRC military is playing in this process and in the future use of the facility.But I do want to underscore while we had a very productive and candid exchange, it was a broad-ranging conversation.  Ream was one of many topics that we discussed, but again, I underscored – whether it was related to Ream or a range of other issues – again, America’s approach to the region is to ensure that our partners continue to have choice and that partners continue to be able to preserve their own sovereignty.  And that helped form the basis of my very productive conversation with Prime Minister Hun Manet.I think you also asked about the South China Sea.  Obviously, I discussed the South China Sea really in all of my stops in the region, but we did not discuss it in detail with the prime minister.  We focused a bit more squarely on the bilateral relationship and some of the issues that I’ve outlined here this evening.  Thanks very much.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Sangho Song of Yonhap based in Washington, D.C.  You should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we can.QUESTION:  Okay.  Thank you very much for doing this, Assistant Secretary.  I have a question about North Korea.  Recently, U.S. senior official for DPRK Jung Pak and NSC official Mira Rapp-Hooper talked about the need for interim steps on a path towards North Korea denuclearization.  Can you comment on why officials have started to mention that expression “interim steps”?  We understand it is only natural to think that there should be interim steps towards the time-consuming denuclearization process, but interim steps are usually involving a nuclear freeze in return for sanctions relief and other incentives.  Can you elaborate on the reason why the officials started to use that expression “interim steps”?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I very much appreciate your question.  Here’s what I would say.  The United States continues to be deeply concerned, along with our close allies and partners in the region, particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan – continue to be concerned with the range of destabilizing North Korean activities, including now a large number of ballistic missile tests and other provocative behavior that we find unacceptable.  We’ve continued to demonstrate, as the U.S. Government, that we will remain absolutely committed to the security of our partners and to the security of the United States, that we will carry out a number of steps to deter North Korea.  We will also continue to strictly enforce a range of sanction measures both in the UN context and also bilaterally and trilaterally.At the same time, we have continued to indicate that the door remains open to North Korea to engage and to proceed down a better path that leads to denuclearization and stability in the region.  But I don’t have any new developments to share with you this evening, but I do appreciate your comment and I will say this too: that North Korea did feature in many of my conversations in the region, including in Southeast Asia, where I think it’s fair to say that countries across the entire Indo-Pacific remain deeply concerned about the range of actions that North Korea continues to take.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question comes to us from the Q&amp;A tab, from Huong Doan of SOHA News in Vietnam, who asks:  “Would you mind telling more detail about the trip to Vietnam?  Was there any developments in IPEF negotiation and semiconductor cooperation?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, to my friend from Vietnam, I’m always delighted to talk about Vietnam, and it was a privilege to return to the country where I had the – again, the privilege of serving as America’s ambassador for three and a half years.  I would say that the conversations I had in Hanoi were – they were detailed, they were rich, they were incredibly broad-ranging and extremely candid.  We did talk about the economic and trade relationship, of course, which remains vitally important to our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, but we also exchanged views on a whole range of security and strategic issues from the South China Sea to the situation in Myanmar to the Korean Peninsula.  We talked about our cooperation in a broad range of other areas, including on a range of transnational and global issues, including climate change and health.Now, I would say that our economic engagement in IPEF and our cooperation in the high-tech sector also remains a really important element of the relationship.  We’ve certainly – again, in accordance with our strategy, we’ve demonstrated that we are invested in Vietnam’s success, literally and figuratively, including in Vietnam’s high-tech sector.  So we’re very grateful, actually, for the leadership role that Vietnam has played in IPEF thus far.  I think you saw from the announcements at the time we upgraded our partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year during President Biden’s visit that our cooperation in the tech sector is really a critical, new, and exciting element of the relationship.  That will continue going forward.  Certainly it was a key element of my conversations, but I didn’t go to Hanoi to make any new announcements in that area, but I’m confident it will remain one of the most important and exciting elements of our relationship for decades to come.MODERATOR:  Okay, next we’ll go to the live queue.  We have Giff Johnson from the Marshall Islands Journal.  Giff, you should be able to unmute yourself now.QUESTION:  Thank you.  I know you’re focused on Asia because of the visit, and I’m just wondering, however, if you could comment briefly on where the Compacts of Free Association for the three North Pacific countries are headed given the holdup in congressional approval, but some developments over the last few days.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, Giff, thanks so much for your question, and I’m really delighted to be speaking with you.  Because even though my trip last week and the primary focus for this evening has been on my five-country trip in Southeast Asia, I think you know very well that the United States is committed to the entire Indo-Pacific, and in particular to the Pacific Islands.  I know President Biden was absolutely honored to host two U.S.-Pacific Island Forum summits in Washington, D.C.  He really benefitted from developing close personal relationships with leaders across the entire Pacific.And I think as you know, our approach to the Pacific is – the way we’ve termed it – meeting our partners where they live.  In other words, in accordance with the 2050 Pacific Island Forum Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, we have worked with Pacific partners to identify their key priorities, whether it’s related to combatting climate change or illegal fishing or focusing on economic development and people-to-people ties.  And then we’ve crafted a strategy to meet each of those needs and demands.Now, in the North Pacific, I think particularly for out partners in the three Freely Associated States, obviously the newly renegotiated Compacts of Free Association have been the key focus for the last couple of years.  We were really delighted to substantially complete the negotiations for the new compacts, and of course we’ve been working with our friends on Capitol Hill to make sure that the implementing legislation for the compacts is in fact passed so that the newly negotiated agreements can come into effect and, of course, the United States can continue to provide the assistance that I think has played such a key role in our partnerships.Look, we’ve engaged with our – with congressional leaders very intensively over the past several weeks and months to demonstrate the importance of the Pacific, the importance in particular of the Freely Associated States and the Compacts of Free Association.  Have been very pleased and excited to see the positive developments on Capitol Hill that you mentioned just a little while ago.  We’ll continue to watch closely work by leaders in Congress, but certainly the developments of the last week that we’ve seen are very promising and we very much look forward to early passage by the Congress of the compacts and then their full implementation.  And most importantly, once we do so, we can get back to the daily business of continuing to grow our partnerships in every possible way.I hope that’s helpful and responsive to your question.  Really delighted to have you on the call tonight.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question goes to Pimuk, who comes to us from Radio Free Asia:  “What is the U.S. role in Thai Government efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people in Myanmar?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, this is a great question.  And look, I’ll say a couple of things.  First of all, I was really delighted to be in Thailand and to engage in the two dialogues that I did with our Thai allies – just refreshingly candid and cooperative and productive.  Those discussions were really focused on how the United States and Thailand can work together to make the region more prosperous and more secure.  I praised in great detail and repeatedly the Thai Government’s ongoing and longstanding efforts to support refugees who have fled from the violence in Myanmar, and also Thailand’s both historic strong support for providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar but also the more recent efforts by the Prime Minister Srettha government in the ASEAN context to, again, increase humanitarian assistance across the board.Now, the United States also provides a great deal of assistance – humanitarian assistance – both to people in Myanmar and to refugees in the region.  And again, as I said in my opening, we’ve provided nearly $317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance.  We’ve also dedicated, I think as you know, hundreds of millions of dollars to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  And I will say that much of that humanitarian assistance is implemented and delivered with the Royal Thai Government’s cooperation and support.  And so we remain, again, very grateful to the leadership role that Thailand has played in the region, including on Myanmar, and in particular most helping – helping those, rather, most in need from Myanmar.So thanks for the opportunity to be able to highlight both Thailand’s role and America’s role in close cooperation with our Thai allies.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Well, we have so many great questions we could probably go another half hour, but I think we have to let the Assistant Secretary go soon.  So I’ll turn it back over to him for closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I’m happy – if you want, Katie, let’s do one more.MODERATOR:  Okay, maybe we’ll mix it up and go to the live queue.  Christopher Woody, independent journalist based in Bangkok.  Christopher, you should be able to unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for your time this morning.  Thailand is among the U.S.’s five treaty allies in the region, but it seems like over the past three years of the administration most of the major progress on defense and security was with the other four.  I wanted to ask if after your most recent engagements in Bangkok, do you feel like the U.S.-Thai relationship is in a position to kind of pursue those – pursue that progress on defense and security that wasn’t possible previously?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, look, I’ll state very candidly and very enthusiastically that I came away from our two days of dialogues in Thailand as optimistic as I’ve ever been about the U.S.-Thai alliance, and particularly after the 2+2 dialogue I was really struck and impressed by the depth of our security relationship and our military-to-military ties.  And look, that’s been the case for more than six decades now.  But I really do think that our two militaries are closer than ever.  I think our security cooperation is probably more robust than ever.  And look, I think you could argue across the board that the U.S.-Thai alliance is as strong as it’s ever been.But really, I was impressed by first our strategic alignment on the major issues in the region – the decades-long cooperation between our militaries; the deep and rich interpersonal relations that have developed, mainly by our operating and training together, studying in one another’s academies, and the like.  So I came away very bullish on the U.S.-Thai alliance, and again, I think you’ll see our security cooperation probably more robust than it’s ever been in the coming years.MODERATOR:  All right.  And now, Assistant Secretary, if you have any last words you’d like to sum up, please go ahead.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Well, I’ll just – I’ll thank you again, Katie, and most importantly I’ll thank our friends from the media in the region.  It’s always a pleasure to spend time together with you.  I really appreciate your questions.  I wish we had more time because I think you are right, we could probably go on for another few hours.  But I hope you’ve taken away my primary message that the United States of America remains strongly committed to the Indo-Pacific region.  It’s where we think, again, much of the history of the 21st century will be written, and where America’s future security and prosperity will largely be determined.  And in particular, I was delighted to spend so much time last week in Southeast Asia, where together with our – with the 10 countries of ASEAN we intend to ensure the most secure and prosperous future possible for our 1 billion people.So thank you very much for spending time with me, and I’ll look forward to the next opportunity.  And thank you again, Katie.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions, and big thanks to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it’s available, and we’d also love to hear your feedback.  You can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- DRL Burma Human Rights Documentation Project Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborUnited States Department of StateBureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO):  DRL Burma Human Rights Documentation ProjectThis is the announcement of funding opportunity number SFOP0010286Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number:  19.345Type of Solicitation:  Open CompetitionApplication Deadline:  11:59 PM EST on 6, May, 2024Total Funding Floor:  $750,000Total Funding Ceiling:  $1,500,000Anticipated Number of Awards:  3-4Type of Award: Grant or Cooperative AgreementPeriod of Performance:  12-24 monthsAnticipated Time to Award, Pending Availability of Funds:  5-7 monthsA. Project DescriptionThe U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) announces an open competition for organizations interested in submitting applications for projects that: (1) strengthen civil society efforts to investigate and document human rights violations and abuses committed against ethnic and religious minority communities from Burma, including Rohingya communities; (2) support pro-democracy activists pursuing justice for victims and accountability for those responsible for abuses; and (3) promote non-recurrence of atrocities.Competitive projects will build on existing locally led documentation initiatives and networks to credibly and professionally investigate and document gross violations of human rights in accordance with international human rights.  Projects should expand space for diverse actors inside and outside of Burma to work together to participate meaningfully in transitional justice processes at the international and regional levels. Competitive proposals should also demonstrate a clear understanding of the operating environment(s) where activities may be implemented, especially in Burma, Bangladesh, and Thailand, and coordinate with existing U.S. Government or other donor-funded programs working on similar efforts.DRL seeks programs that incorporate integrated, locally owned, and victim and survivor-centered approaches to accomplish at least two of the following objectives:Local civil society members and individual documenters are able to conduct credible, professional, and trauma-informed investigation and documentation of human rights violations and abuses to promote justice for victims, hold perpetrators accountable, and serve as the basis for advocacy to prevent future atrocities;Civil society collaboration and engagement in support of the mandate of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) and international and/or domestic accountability processes, including universal jurisdiction cases, is enhanced, such as by developing a common civil society platform and/or by enabling the efficient and effective collection, management, and analysis of documentation through innovative, sustainable tools, and cross-sectoral collaboration;Key stakeholders engaged in Burma&#8217;s transitional justice process, including civil society, youth, victim and survivor groups, strengthen their understanding of and coordination on concepts related to international justice and accountability processes and mechanisms like the IIMM and effectively develop and deliver a domestically-led justice agenda;Civil society preserves, catalogues, and analyzes different types of documentation of past and ongoing human rights violations and abuses in a systematic and secure manner while ensuring that it is useful to current and future transitional justice processes;Civil society, human rights defenders, and survivors and their families&#8217; resilience is strengthened while seeking to further truth, justice and accountability for past and present human rights violations and abuses, including CRSV, through access to self-sustaining networks of survivors, community-based mental health and psychosocial services, digital and physical safety, and other protective services and assistance;Local civil society and key stakeholders investigate, search for, and identify the missing and disappeared using multidisciplinary forensic approaches to document and identify victims inclusive of relatives and survivors.Competitive proposals will prioritize partnerships with a variety of Burmese actors in program activities, including ethnic and religious communities, and fostering linkages amongst civil society, advocates, and survivor-centered groups across and outside of Burma.  DRL seeks a project approach that prioritizes opportunities for sub-grants and other methods of support to address needs identified by local civil society stakeholders and ensure local buy-in and ownership.  Accordingly, the project must take an inclusive, victim and survivor-centered approach when designing documentation efforts aimed at encouraging broad community ownership and sustainability.DRL is committed to advancing equity and support for underserved and underrepresented communities.  In accordance with the Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Underserved Communities, programs should implement strategies for integration and inclusion of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries that can bring perspectives based on their religion, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, national origin, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, pregnancy, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  Programs should be demand-driven and locally led to the extent possible.DRL requires all programs to be non-discriminatory and expects implementers to include strategies for nondiscrimination of individuals/organizations/beneficiaries based on race, color, religion, sex, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, pregnancy, national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.Competitive proposals may also include a summary budget and budget narrative for 12 additional months following the proposed period of performance, indicated above.  This information should indicate what objective(s) and/or activities could be accomplished with additional time and/or funds beyond the proposed period of performance.Where appropriate, competitive proposals may include:Opportunities for beneficiaries to apply their new knowledge and skills in practical efforts;Solicitation of feedback and suggestions from beneficiaries when developing activities in order to strengthen the sustainability of programs and participant ownership of project outcomes;Input from participants on sustainability plans and systematic review of the plans throughout the life of the project, with adjustments made as necessary;Joint identification and definition of key concepts with relevant stakeholders and stakeholder input into project activities;Systematic follow-up with beneficiaries at specific intervals after the completion of activities to track how beneficiaries are retaining new knowledge as well as applying their new skills.Activities that are not typically allowed include, but are not limited to:The provision of humanitarian assistance;English language instruction;Development of high-tech computer or communications software and/or hardware;Purely academic exchanges or fellowships;External exchanges or fellowships lasting longer than six months;Off-shore activities that are not clearly linked to in-country initiatives and impact or are not necessary per security concerns;Theoretical explorations of human rights or democracy issues, including projects aimed primarily at research and evaluation that do not incorporate training or capacity-building for local civil society;Micro-loans or similar small business development initiatives;Initiatives directed towards a diaspora community rather than current residents of targeted countries.This notice is subject to availability of funding.B. Federal Award InformationPrimary organizations can submit 1 application in response to the NOFO.The U.S. government may:  (a) reject any or all applications, (b) accept other than the lowest cost application, (c) accept more than one application, and (d) waive irregularities in applications received.The U.S. government may make award(s) on the basis of initial applications received, without discussions or negotiations.  Therefore, each initial application should contain the applicant&#8217;s best terms from a cost and technical standpoint.  The U.S. government reserves the right (though it is under no obligation to do so), however, to enter into discussions with one or more applicants in order to obtain clarifications, additional detail, or to suggest refinements in the project description, budget, or other aspects of an application.DRL anticipates awarding either a grant or cooperative agreement depending on the needs and risk factors of the program.  The final determination on award mechanism will be made by the Grants Officer.  The distinction between grants and cooperative agreements revolves around the existence of “substantial involvement.”  Cooperative agreements require greater Federal government participation in the project.  If a cooperative agreement is awarded, DRL will undertake reasonable and programmatically necessary substantial involvement.  Examples of substantial involvement can include, but are not limited to:Active participation or collaboration with the recipient in the implementation of the award;Review and approval of one stage of work before another can begin;Review and approval of substantive provisions of proposed sub-awards or contracts beyond existing Federal policy;Approval of the recipient’s plan of work prior to the award.The authority for this funding opportunity is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).To maximize the impact and sustainability of the award(s) that result from this NOFO, DRL retains the right to execute non-competitive continuation amendment(s).  The total duration of any award, including potential non-competitive continuation amendments, shall not exceed 54 months, or four and a half years.  Any non-competitive continuation is contingent on performance and pending availability of funds.  A non-competitive continuation is not guaranteed, and the Department of State reserves the right to exercise or not to exercise this option.C. Eligibility InformationFor application information, please see the proposal submission instructions (PSI), updated December 2023 on our website.C.1 Eligible ApplicantsDRL welcomes applications from U.S.-based and foreign-based non-profit organizations/nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and public international organizations; private, public, or state institutions of higher education; and for-profit organizations or businesses.  DRL’s preference is to work with non-profit entities; however, there may be some occasions when a for-profit entity is best suited.Applications submitted by for-profit entities may be subject to additional review following the panel selection process.  Additionally, the Department of State prohibits profit to for-profit or commercial organizations under its assistance awards.  Profit is defined as any amount in excess of allowable direct and indirect costs.  The allowability of costs incurred by commercial organizations is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at 48 CFR 30, Cost Accounting Standards Administration, and 48 CFR 31 Contract Cost Principles and Procedures.Please see 2 CFR 200.307 for regulations regarding program income.C.2 Cost Sharing or MatchingProviding cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not an eligibility factor or requirement for this NOFO and providing cost share will not result in a more favorable competitive ranking.  Per 2 CFR 200.306, budget line items that are proposed for cost share must be allowable per 2 CFR 200, Subpart E—Cost Principles.C.3 OtherApplicants should have existing, or the capacity to develop, active partnerships with thematic or in-country partners, entities, and relevant stakeholders, including private sector partners and NGOs, and have demonstrable experience in administering successful and preferably similar projects.  DRL encourages applications from foreign-based NGOs headquartered in the geographic regions/countries relevant to this NOFO.  Applicants may form consortia in order to bring together organizations with varied expertise to propose a comprehensive program in one proposal.  However, one organization should be designated in the proposal as the lead applicant, with the other members designated as sub-award partners.  DRL reserves the right to request additional background information on applicants that do not have previous experience administering federal grant awards, and these applicants may be subject to limited funding on a pilot basis.DRL is committed to an anti-discrimination policy in all of its programs and activities.  DRL welcomes applications irrespective of race, ethnicity, color, creed, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, or other status.  DRL seeks applications that demonstrate that the recipient does not discriminate against any beneficiaries in implementation of a potential award, such as, but not limited to, by withholding, adversely impacting, or denying equitable access to the benefits provided through this award on the basis of any factor not expressly stated in the award.  This includes, for example, race, color, religion, sex (including gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics, sexual orientation, and pregnancy), national origin, disability, age, genetic information, marital status, parental status, political affiliation, or veteran’s status.  The recipient should insert this provision, including this paragraph, in all sub-grants and contracts under a potential award.Any applicant listed on the Excluded Parties List System in the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) (www.sam.gov) and/or has a current debt to the U.S. government is not eligible to apply for an assistance award in accordance with the OMB guidelines at 2 CFR 180 that implement Executive Orders 12549 (3 CFR,1986 Comp., p. 189) and 12689 (3 CFR,1989 Comp., p. 235), “Debarment and Suspension.”  Additionally, no entity or person listed on the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov can participate in any activities under an award.  All applicants are strongly encouraged to review the Excluded Parties List System in SAM.gov to ensure that no ineligible entity or person is included in their application.D. Application and Submission InformationD.1 Address to Request Application PackageApplicants can find application forms, kits, or other materials needed to apply on www.grants.gov and SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com) under the announcement title “DRL Burma Human Rights Documentation Project,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010286.”  Please contact the DRL point of contact listed in Section G if requesting reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities or for security reasons.  Please note that reasonable accommodations do not include deadline extensions.D.2 Content and Form of Application SubmissionFor all application documents, please ensure:All documents are in English and all costs are in U.S. Dollars.  If an original document within the application is in another language, an English translation must be provided (please note the Department of State, as indicated in 2 CFR 200.111, requires that English is the official language of all award documents).  If any document is provided in both English and a foreign language, the English language version is the controlling version;All pages are numbered, including budgets and attachments;All documents are formatted to 8 1⁄2 x 11 paper; and,All documents are single-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, with 1-inch margins.  Captions and footnotes may be 10-point Times New Roman font.  Font sizes in charts and tables, including the budget, can be reformatted to fit within one page width.D.2.1 Application RequirementsComplete applications must include the following:Completed and signed SF-424, SF-424A, and SF-424B forms.  Please see SF-424 instructions in Section 2B of the PSI.Organizations that engage in lobbying the U.S. government, including Congress, or pay for another entity to lobby on their behalf, are also required to complete the SF-LLL “Disclosure of Lobbying Activities” form (only if applicable).  Please see SF-LLL guidance in Section 2B of the PSI.Cover Page (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that includes a table with the organization name, project title, target country/countries, project synopsis, and name and contact information for the application’s main point of contact.  Please see Cover Page Section 2C of the PSI for a template and more details.Executive Summary (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) that outlines project goals, objectives, activities, etc.The Executive Summary should include a brief section that explicitly states:  (1) the problem statement addressed by the project, (2) research-based evidence justifying the unique project approach, and (3) quantifiable project outcomes and impacts.Table of Contents (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) listing all documents and attachments with page numbers.Proposal Narrative (not to exceed ten (10) pages, preferably as a Word Document).  Please note the ten-page limit does not include the Cover Page, Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Attachments, Detailed Budget, Budget Narrative, Audit, or NICRA.  Applicants are encouraged to combine multiple documents into a single Word Document or PDF (i.e., Cover Page, Table of Contents, Executive Summary, and Proposal Narrative in one file).  Please see Proposal Narrative Guidelines in Section 2F of the PSI for more details.The Proposal Narrative should demonstrate the applicant’s commitment to ensuring the participation of all people as a strategy for implementation.  Please integrate inclusion strategies in all sections of the Proposal Narrative to enhance programmatic impact.Budget (preferably as an Excel workbook) that includes three (3) columns containing the request to DRL, any cost sharing contribution, and the total budget.  A summary budget should also be included using the OMB-approved budget categories (see SF-424A as a sample) in a separate tab.  Costs must be in U.S. Dollars.  Detailed line-item budgets for sub-grantees should be included as additional tabs within the Excel workbook (if available at the time of submission).Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.The programming approach should be dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Please include costs associated with this commitment in the Budget and Budget Narrative.Competitive proposals may include a summary budget for 12 additional months following the proposed period of performance.Budget Narrative (preferably as a Word Document) that includes substantive explanations and justifications for each line item in the detailed budget spreadsheet, as well as the source and a description of all cost-share offered.  Please see Budget Guidelines Section 2G of the PSI for more information.Competitive proposals may include a summary budget narrative for 12 additional months following the proposed period of performance.The organization’s most recent audit, if applicable.  This should be a single audit, program-specific audit, or other audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS).  Please see Audit Section 2H of the PSI for more information.Logic Model (preferably as a Word Document).  Please see Logic Model Section 2I of the PSI for more information.Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative (not to exceed four (4) pages, preferably as a Word Document).  Please see Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative Section 2J of the PSI for more information.As stated within the DRL Guide to Program Monitoring and Evaluation (p. 6): DRL strongly encourages applicants to consider whether their monitoring and evaluation systems are utilizing human rights-based approaches, applying a gender and equity lens, and/or include the participation of sub-grantees and project participants.  Within the Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative, applicants should demonstrate their commitment to inclusive strategies and consider whether evaluation design, data collection, analysis, reporting and learning are conducted in an ethical and responsible way with all project participants (e.g. direct beneficiaries, sub-grantees).  Applicants should still make adequate provisions to protect the privacy of human subjects when collecting data from individuals.  For instance, when collecting data from project participants, consider whether your organization will have the necessary informed consent forms, confidentiality agreements, and data security protocols.  Applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.Risk Analysis (preferably as a Word Document).  Please see Risk Analysis Section 2K of the PSI for more information on this requirement, including Do No Harm principles and Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) policies/plans.Key Personnel (not to exceed two (2) pages, preferably as a Word Document).  Please include short bios that highlight relevant professional experience.  Given the limited space, CVs are not recommended for submission.Timeline (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document or Excel Sheet).  The timeline of the overall proposal should include activities, evaluation efforts, and program closeout.Gender and Inclusion Analysis (not to exceed three (3) pages, preferably as a Word Document) that provides a concise analysis of relevant gender norms, equity and equality for underserved communities and marginalized populations, power relations, and conflict dynamics in target countries.  Potential domains of analysis include institutional practices and barriers, cultural norms, gender roles, access to and control over assets and resources, and patterns of power and decision-making.  Applicants should briefly explain how they have integrated findings from their analysis into project design and/or other proposal documents, including a plan for regularly reviewing and updating the gender and inclusion analysis with local partners/beneficiaries, and making any necessary adjustments to project implementation.  A set of guiding questions can be found in Section 2L of the PSI.Security Plan addressing any issues involving in-person events and recruitment for said events, and safety for any online programs or communications, including independent IT security audits (to include a vulnerability assessment) of any proposed web application or platform.  Organization’s Security Plan should demonstrate consideration of the risks identified in the submitted risk assessment.  Costs may also be identified within the budget and budget narrative.  Applicants are also encouraged to include contingency plans for in-person or online activities.Contingency Plan for proposed activities should the originally planned activities not be able to be implemented.  The Contingency Plan should be submitted as an additional annex.  Applicants should demonstrate consideration of the risks identified in the submitted risk assessment and include specific alternative activities or locations as part of the Contingency Plan.  Any proposed “plan” must comply with 2CFR200.433 – Contingency provisions.  Plans must not include unallocable or unallowable expenses and must not result in a larger Total Award Value than the identified as the “competition ceiling.”  DRL requires prior approval by the Grants Officer of the “plan” before any activities can take place, or costs can be incurred against the “plan.”Lessons Learned (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably as a Word Document) from past programs (insert country or theme) that demonstrate how the implementer has safely operated and responded to programmatic challenges, learning from both successes and failures, in the operating environment.  To be incorporated into the ten (10) pages allowed for “Proposal Narrative.”Psychosocial Assistance (to be incorporated into the ten (10) pages allowed for “Proposal Narrative,” and into “Budget” and “Budget Narrative”).  A section in the proposal, budget, and budget narrative to reflect appropriate resources and support for the psychosocial health of staff (i.e., activities can range from access to educational materials and training opportunities to counseling services to other contextually relevant support).References:  For reference to international guidance, please see the following: Core Humanitarian Standard Commitment 8.9 (https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/CHS-Guidance-Notes-and-Indicators.pdf ); and IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings Action Sheet 4.4 (http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/guidelines_iasc_mental_health_psychosocial_june_2007.pdf).Burma Due Diligence Assessment (not to exceed one (1) page, preferably in Microsoft Word) that outlines existing organizational practices for vetting program beneficiaries and capacity to conduct due diligence vetting as outlined in the solicitation.Applications that do not include the elements listed above will be deemed technically ineligible.    D.2.2 Additional Application DocumentsStrong applications will also contain the following:Individual Letters of Support and/or Memorandum of Understanding.  Letters of support and MOUs must be specific to the project implementation (e.g., from proposed partners or sub-award recipients) and will not count towards the page limit.Please refer to the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI), updated December 2023, on DRL’s website for detailed guidance on the documents above:  https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.  For an application checklist and sample templates please see the Resources page on DRL’s website:  https://www.state.gov/resources-for-programs-and-grants/.  The sample templates provided on the DRL website are suggested, but not mandatory.DRL reserves the right to request additional documents not included in this NOFO.  Additionally, to ensure that all applications receive a balanced evaluation, the DRL review panel will review from the first page of each section up to the page limit and no further.Note:  If ultimately provided with a notification of non-binding intent to make a federal award, applicants typically have two to three weeks to provide additional information and documents requested in the notification of intent.  The deadlines may vary in each notification of intent and applicants must adhere to the stated deadline in the notification of intent.D.2.3 Additional Information Requested For Those Receiving Notification of IntentSuccessful applicants must submit, after notification of intent to make a federal award, but prior to issuance of a federal award:Written responses and revised application documents addressing conditions and recommendations from the DRL review panel;A copy of the applicant’s latest NICRA as a PDF file, if the applicant has a NICRA and includes NICRA charges in the budget;A completed copy of the Department’s Financial Management Survey, if receiving DRL funding for the first time;Submission of required documents to register in the Payment Management System managed by the Department of Health and Human Services, if receiving DRL funding for the first time (unless an exemption is provided);Other requested information or documents included in the notification of intent to make a federal award or subsequent communications prior to issuance of a federal award;Applicants who submit their applications through Grants.gov will be required to create a SAMS Domestic account in order to accept the final award.  Accounts must be logged into to every 60 days in order to maintain an active account.D.3 Unique Entity Identifier and System for Award Management (SAM)All prime organizations, whether based in the United States or in another country, must have a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and an active registration with the SAM.gov before submitting an application.  DRL may not review applications from or make awards to applicants that have not completed all applicable UEI and SAM.gov requirements.  A UEI is one of the data elements mandated by Public Law 109-282, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA), for all Federal awards.Note:  As of April 2022, a DUNS number is no longer required for federal assistance applications.The 2 CFR 200 requires that sub-grantees obtain a UEI number.  Please note the UEI for sub-grantees is not required at the time of application but will be required before the award is processed and/or directed to a sub-grantee. Note:  The process of obtaining or renewing a SAM.gov registration may take anywhere from 4-8 weeks.  Please begin your registration as early as possible. Organizations based in the United States or that pay employees within the United States will need an Employer Identification Number (EIN) from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov.  Please note that as of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.  If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language:  “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense.  I do not wish to obtain a CAGE code.  I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that do not pay employees within the United States do not need an EIN from the IRS, but do need a UEI number prior to registering in SAM.gov.  Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.  If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their SAM.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online at www.fsd.gov using the following language:  “I do not intend to seek financial assistance from the Department of Defense.  I do not wish to obtain an NCAGE code.  I understand that I will need to submit my registration after this incident is resolved in order to have my registration activated.”Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO NOT plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions: Step 1:  Proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process.  SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.Organizations based outside of the United States and that DO plan to do business with the DoD should follow the below instructions:Step 1:  Apply for an NCAGE code by following the instructions on the NSPA NATO website linked below:NCAGE Homepage:https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/AC135Public/sc/CageList.aspxNCAGE Code Request Tool (NCRT):https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/Codification/CageTool/homeFor NCAGE help from within the United States, call +1 (888) 227-2423.For NCAGE help from outside the United States, call +1 (269) 961-7766.Or, email NCAGE@dlis.dla.mil for any problems in applying for an NCAGE code.Step 2:  After receiving an NCAGE code, proceed to SAM.gov to obtain a UEI and complete the SAM.gov registration process.  SAM.gov registration must be renewed annually.All prime organizations must also continue to maintain active SAM.gov registration with current information at all times during which they have an active Federal award or application under consideration by a federal award agency.  SAM.gov requires all entities to renew their registration once a year in order to maintain an active registration status in SAM.gov.  It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure it has an active registration in SAM.gov and to maintain that active registration.  If an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements at the time of application, the applicant may be deemed technically ineligible to receive an award and use that determination as a basis for making an award to another applicant.Please refer to 2 CFR 25.200 for additional information.Note:  SAM.gov is not the same as SAMS Domestic.  It is free of charge to register in both systems, but the registration processes are different.Information is included on the SAM.gov website to help international registrations, including “Quick Start Guide for International Registrations” and “Helpful Hints.”  Navigate to www.SAM.gov, click “HELP” in the top navigation bar, then click “Explore” and “New to SAM.gov?” for general information.  Please note, guidance on SAM.gov and the guidance on GSA’s website about requirement for registering in SAM.gov is subject to change and is currently being updated.  Applicants should review the website for the most up-to-date guidance.The attached “AQM Guidance for NCAGE-SAM.gov for Foreign Applicants Feb. 2023” is a compilation of resources gathered by the Department’s Office of Acquisitions Management (AQM).  Any content shown from SAM.gov is not owned by the Department of State.  This guidance and instruction are to the best of our knowledge based at the time of posting this solicitation.  Where guidance in these attachments differs from the SAM.gov website, SAM.gov prevails and the applicant is encouraged to seek and document responses provided by the SAM.gov help desk.D.3.1 ExemptionsAn exemption from these requirements may be permitted on a case-by-case basis if:An applicant’s identity must be protected due to potential endangerment of their mission, their organization’s status, their employees, or individuals being served by the applicant. For an applicant, if the federal awarding agency makes a determination that there are exigent circumstances that prohibit the applicant from receiving a UEI and completing SAM.gov registration prior to receiving a federal award.  In these instances, federal awarding agencies must require the recipient to obtain a UEI and complete SAM.gov registration within 30 days of the federal award date.Organizations requesting exemption from UEI or SAM.gov requirements must email the point of contact listed in the NOFO at least two weeks prior to the deadline in the NOFO providing a justification of their request.  Approval for a SAM.gov exemption must come from the warranted Grants Officer before the application can be deemed eligible for review.Note:  As of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.  As of February 2023, organizations based in the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. DoD awards are no longer required to have a Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities.D.4 Submission Dates and Times  Applications are due no later than 11:59 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST), on 6, May, 2024 on https://www.grants.gov/ or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com) under the announcement title “DRL Burma Human Rights Documentation Project,” funding opportunity number “SFOP0010286.” Grants.gov and SAMS Domestic automatically log the date and time an application submission is made, and the Department of State will use this information to determine whether an application has been submitted on time.  Late applications are neither reviewed nor considered.  Known system errors caused by Grants.gov or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.service-now.com) that are outside of the applicant’s control will be reviewed on a case by case basis.  Applicants should not expect a notification upon DRL receiving their application.D.5 Funding RestrictionsPrior to issuing a federal award with a total amount of federal share greater than $250,000, the Department of State is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is found in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (41 USC §2313).  An applicant, at its option, may review information in the designated integrity and performance systems accessible through SAM.gov and comment on any information about itself that a federal awarding agency previously entered and is currently in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov.  The Department of State will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in 2 CFR 200.206.DRL will not consider applications that reflect any type of support for any member, affiliate, or representative of a designated terrorist organization.  Please refer the link for Foreign Terrorist Organizations:  https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/Project activities whose direct beneficiaries are foreign militaries or paramilitary groups or individuals will not be considered for DRL funding given purpose limitations on funding.In accordance with Department of State policy for terrorism, applicants are advised that successful passing of vetting to evaluate the risk that funds may benefit terrorists or their supporters is a condition of award.  If chosen for an award, applicants will be asked to submit information required by DS Form 4184, Risk Analysis Information (attached to this solicitation) about their company and its principal personnel.  Vetting information is also required for all sub-award performance on assistance awards identified by the Department of State as presenting a risk of terrorist financing.  Vetting information may also be requested for project beneficiaries and participants.  Failure to submit information when requested, or failure to pass vetting, may be grounds for rejecting your proposal prior to award.The Leahy Law prohibits Department foreign assistance funds from supporting foreign security force units if the Secretary of State has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.  Per 22 USC §2378d(a) (2017), “No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter  or the Arms Export Control Act  to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”  Restrictions may apply to any proposed assistance to police or other law enforcement.  Among these, pursuant to section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), no assistance provided through this funding opportunity may be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country when there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.  In accordance with the requirements of section 620M of the FAA, also known as the Leahy law, project beneficiaries or participants from a foreign government’s security forces may need to be vetted by the Department before the provision of any assistance.  If a proposed grant or cooperative agreement will provide assistance to foreign security forces or personnel, compliance with the Leahy Law is required.U.S. foreign assistance for Burma or Burmese beneficiaries is subject to restrictions.  This includes restrictions, pursuant to section 7043(a)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. K, P.L. 117-328)(SFOAA), on funds appropriated under title III of the act for assistance for Burma.  Section 7043(a)(3) provides that “none of the funds appropriated by this Act that are made available for assistance for Burma may be made available to the State Administration Council or any organization or entity controlled by, or an affiliate of, the armed forces of Burma, or to any individual or organization that has committed a gross violation of human rights or advocates violence against ethnic or religious groups or individuals in Burma, as determined by the Secretary of State.”  In addition, funds cannot be made available to any individual or organization that has committed serious human rights abuse.Organizations should be cognizant of these restrictions when developing project proposals as these restrictions will require appropriate due diligence of program beneficiaries and collaboration with DRL to ensure compliance with these restrictions.  Program beneficiaries subject to due diligence vetting will include any individuals or entities that are beneficiaries of foreign assistance funding or support.  Due diligence vetting will include a review of open-source materials.Federal awards generally will not allow reimbursement of pre-award costs; however, the Grants Officer may approve pre-award costs on a case-by-case basis.  Generally, construction costs are not allowed under DRL awards.  For additional information, please see the DRL Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for Applications:  https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.D.6 Application SubmissionAll application submissions must be made electronically via www.grants.gov  or SAMS Domestic (https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com).  Both systems require registration by the applying organization.  Please note that the Grants.gov registration process can take ten (10) business days or longer, even if all registration steps are completed in a timely manner.It is the responsibility of the applicant to ensure that it has an active registration in SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov.  Applicants are required to document that the application has been received by SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov in its entirety.  DRL bears no responsibility for disqualification that result from applicants not being registered before the due date, for system errors in either SAMS Domestic or Grants.gov, or other errors in the application process.  Additionally, applicants must save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Faxed, couriered, or emailed documents will not be accepted.  Reasonable accommodations may, in appropriate circumstances, be provided to applicants with disabilities or for security reasons.  Applicants must follow all formatting instructions in the applicable NOFO and these instructions.DRL encourages organizations to submit applications during normal business hours (Monday – Friday, 9:00 AM-5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time (EST)).  If an applicant experiences technical difficulties and has contacted the appropriate help desk but is not receiving timely assistance (e.g., if you have not received a response within 48 hours of contacting the help desk), you may contact the DRL point of contact listed in the NOFO in Section G.  The point of contact may assist in contacting the appropriate help desk.The Grants Officer will determine technical eligibility of all applications.SAMS Domestic Applications:Applicants using SAMS Domestic for the first time should complete their “New Organization Registration.”  To register with SAMS Domestic, click “Login to https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com” and follow the “create an account” link.Please note that establishing an account in SAMS Domestic may require the use of smartphone for multi-factor authentication (MFA).  If an applicant does not have accessibility to a smartphone during the time of creating an account, please contact the ILMS help desk and request instructions on MFA for Windows PC.Organizations must remember to save a screen shot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.SAMS Domestic Help Desk:  For assistance with SAMS Domestic accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://mygrants.servicenowservices.com .  Customer support is available 24/7.Grants.gov Applications:Applicants who do not submit applications via SAMS Domestic may submit via www.grants.gov .Please be advised that completing all the necessary registration steps for obtaining a username and password from Grants.gov can take ten (10) business days or longer.Please refer to the Grants.gov website for definitions of various &#8220;application statuses&#8221; and the difference between a submission receipt and a submission validation.  Applicants will receive a validation e-mail from Grants.gov upon the successful submission of an application.  Validation of an electronic submission via Grants.gov can take up to two business days.  Additionally, organizations must remember to save a screenshot of the checklist showing all documents submitted in case any document fails to upload successfully.Grants.gov Helpdesk: For assistance with Grants.gov, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov.  The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays.See https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/ for a list of federal holidays.E. Application Review InformationE.1 Proposal Review CriteriaThe DRL review panel will evaluate each application individually against the following criteria, listed below in order of importance, and not against competing applications.  Please use the below criteria as a reference, but do not structure your application according to the sub-sections.Quality of Project IdeaApplications should be responsive to the program framework and policy objectives identified in the NOFO, appropriate in the country/regional context, and should exhibit originality, substance, precision, and relevance to DRL’s mission of promoting human rights and democracy.  Projects should have the potential to have an immediate impact leading to long-term, sustainable reforms. DRL prefers new approaches that do not duplicate efforts by other entities.  This does not exclude from consideration projects that improve upon or expand existing successful projects in a new and complementary way.  In countries where similar activities are already taking place, an explanation should be provided as to how new activities will not duplicate or merely add to existing activities and how these efforts will be coordinated.  Proposals that promote creative approaches to recognized ongoing challenges are highly encouraged.  DRL prioritizes project proposals with inclusive approaches for advancing these rights.Project Planning/Ability to Achieve ObjectivesA strong application will include a clear articulation of how the proposed project activities contribute to the overall project objectives, and each activity will be clearly developed and detailed.  A comprehensive monthly work plan should demonstrate substantive undertakings and the logistical capacity of the organization.  Objectives should be ambitious yet measurable, results-focused and achievable in a reasonable timeframe.  A complete application must include a Logic Model to demonstrate how the project activities will have an impact on its proposed objectives.  The Logic Model should match the objectives, outcomes, key activities, and outputs described in the narrative.  Applications should address how the project will engage relevant stakeholders and should identify local partners as appropriate.If local partners have been identified, DRL strongly encourages applicants to submit letters of support from proposed in-country partners.  Additionally, applicants should describe the division of labor among the direct applicant and any local partners.  If applicable, applications should identify target geographic areas for activities, target participant groups or selection criteria for participants, and the specific roles of sub-awardees, among other pertinent details.DRL recognizes that all programs have some level of risk due to internal/external variables that have the potential to adversely affect a program.  Risk management should address how the project design incorporates the identification, assessment, and management of key risk factors.  DRL will review the Risk Analysis based on the organization’s ability to identify risks that could have an impact on the overall program as well as how the organization will manage these risks.Institution’s Record and CapacityDRL will consider the past performance of prior recipients and the demonstrated potential of new applicants.  Applications should demonstrate an institutional record of successful democracy and human rights programs, including responsible fiscal management and full compliance with all reporting requirements for past grants.  Proposed personnel and institutional resources should be adequate and appropriate to achieve the project&#8217;s objectives.  Projects should have potential for continued funding beyond DRL resources.Addressing Barriers to Equal ParticipationDRL strives to ensure its projects advance the rights and uphold the dignity of all persons.  As the U.S. government’s lead bureau dedicated to promoting democratic governance, DRL requests a programming approach dedicated to strengthening inclusive societies as a necessary pillar of strong democracies.  Discrimination, violence, inequity, and inequality targeting any members of society undermines collective security and threatens democracy.  DRL prioritizes inclusive and integrated program models that assess and address the barriers to access for individuals and groups based on their race, ethnicity, religion, income, geography, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability.  The proposal should also demonstrate how the project will further engagement in underserved communities and with individuals from underserved communities.  Applicants should describe how programming will impact all of its beneficiaries, including support for underserved and underrepresented communities.  This approach should be an integral part of both the concept and explicit design, and implementation of all proposed project activities, objectives, and monitoring.  Strong proposals will provide specific analysis, measures, and corresponding targets as appropriate.  Stakeholders shall identify the difference between opportunities and barriers to access, and design projects accordingly to not perpetuate these inequalities, but rather enhance programmatic impact by including all people in society.  The goal of this approach is to bring communities and those in power together in support of more stable and secure societies.Cost EffectivenessDRL strongly encourages applicants to clearly demonstrate project cost-effectiveness in their application, including examples of leveraging institutional and other resources.  However, cost-sharing or other examples of leveraging other resources are not required.  Inclusion of cost-sharing in the budget does not result in additional points awarded during the review process.  Budgets should have low and/or reasonable overhead and administration costs, and applicants should provide clear explanations and justifications for these costs in relation to the work involved.  All budget items should be clearly explained and justified to demonstrate necessity, appropriateness, and connection to the project objectives.Please note:  If cost share is included in the budget, the recipient must maintain written records to support all allowable costs that are claimed as its contribution to cost share, as well as costs to be paid by the Federal government.  Such records are subject to audit.  In the event the recipient does not meet the minimum amount of cost-sharing as stipulated in the recipient’s budget, DRL’s contribution may be reduced in proportion to the recipient’s contribution.Multiplier Effect/Sustainability Applications should clearly delineate how elements of the project will have a multiplier effect and be sustainable beyond the life of the grant.  A good multiplier effect will have an impact beyond the direct beneficiaries of the grant (e.g. participants trained under a grant go on to train other people; workshop participants use skills from a workshop to enhance a national level election that affects the entire populace).  A strong sustainability plan may include demonstrating continuing impact beyond the life of a project or garnering other donor support after DRL funding ceases.Project Monitoring and EvaluationComplete applications will include a detailed M&amp;E Narrative, which detail how the project’s progress will be monitored and evaluated.  Incorporating well-designed monitoring and evaluation processes into a project is an efficient method for documenting the change (intended and unintended) that a project seeks.  Applications should demonstrate the capacity to provide objectives with measurable outputs and outcomes.The quality of the M&amp;E sections will be judged on the narrative explaining how both monitoring and evaluation will be carried out and who will be responsible for those related activities.  The M&amp;E Narrative should explain how evaluation(s), internal or external, will be incorporated into the project implementation plan or how the project will be systematically assessed in the absence of one.  Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Narrative in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the narrative.Note: Applicants are no longer required to submit a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in their proposals.  However, applicants should be aware that, should an application move forward for funding consideration, DRL will request a detailed Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for further review and approval.The output and outcome-based performance indicators should not only be separated by project objectives but also should match the objectives, outcomes, and outputs detailed in the Logic Model and Proposal Narrative.  Performance indicators should be clearly defined (i.e., explained how the indicators will be measured and reported) either within the table or with a separate Performance Indicator Reference Sheet (PIRS).  For each performance indicator, the table should also include baselines and quarterly and cumulative targets, data collection tools, data sources, types of data disaggregation, and frequency of monitoring and evaluation.  There should also be metrics to capture how project activities target those who face discrimination due to their religion, gender, disabilities, ethnicity or sexual orientation and gender identity, where applicable.  Please see the section on Monitoring and Evaluation Plan in the Proposal Submission Instructions (PSI) for more information on what is required in the plan.E.2 Review and Selection ProcessDRL strives to ensure that each application receives a balanced evaluation by a DRL review panel.  AQM will determine technical eligibility for all applications.  All technically eligible applications for a given NOFO are reviewed against the same seven criteria, which include quality of project idea, project planning/ability to achieve objectives, institutional record and capacity, inclusive programming, cost effectiveness, multiplier effect/sustainability, and project monitoring and evaluation.Additionally, the DRL review panel will evaluate how the application addresses the NOFO request, U.S. foreign policy goals, and the priority needs of DRL overall.  DRL may also take into consideration the balance of the current portfolio of active projects, including geographic or thematic diversity, if needed.In most cases, the DRL review panel includes representatives from DRL, the appropriate Department of State regional bureau (to include feedback from U.S. embassies), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) (to include feedback from USAID missions).  In some cases, additional panelists may participate, including from other Department of State bureaus or offices; U.S. government departments, agencies, or boards; representatives from partner governments; or representatives from entities that are in a public-private partnership with DRL.  At the end of the panel’s discussion about an application, the review panel votes on whether to recommend the application for approval by the DRL Assistant Secretary.  If more applications are recommended for approval than DRL can ultimately fund, the review panel will rank the recommended applications in priority order for consideration by the DRL Assistant Secretary.  The Grants Officer Representative (GOR) for the eventual award does not vote on the panel.  All panelists must sign non-disclosure agreements and conflicts of interest agreements.DRL review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed project, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award.  To ensure effective use of DRL funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and project activities.F. Federal Award Administration InformationF.1 Federal Award NoticesDRL will provide a separate notification to applicants on the result of their applications.  Successful applicants will receive a letter electronically via email requesting that the applicant respond to review panel conditions and recommendations.  This notification is not an authorization to begin activities and does not constitute formal approval or a funding commitment.Final approval is contingent on the applicant successfully responding to the review panel’s conditions and recommendations; being registered in required systems, including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Payment Management System (PMS), unless an exemption is provided; and completing and providing any additional documentation requested by DRL or AQM.  Final approval is also contingent on Congressional Notification requirements being met and final review and approval by the Department’s warranted Grants Officer.If awarded, payments under this award will be made through PMS or by completing form SF-270, Request for Advance or Reimbursement.  Final determination will be made in conjunction with the Grants Officer.  Unless otherwise stipulated, the recipient may request payments on a reimbursement or advance basis.Instructions for requesting payments via PMS are available at:  https://pms.psc.gov/.Instructions for requesting payments via SF-270 are available at: https://apply07.grants.gov/apply/forms/sample/SF270-V1.0.pdf.Advance payments must be limited to the minimum amounts needed and be timed to be in accordance with the actual, immediate cash requirements of the recipient in carrying out the purpose of this award.  The timing and amount of advance payments must be as close as is administratively feasible to the actual disbursements by the recipient for direct program or project costs and the proportionate share of any allowable indirect costs.The notice of Federal award signed by the Department’s warranted Grants Officers is the sole authorizing document.  If awarded, the notice of Federal award will be provided to the applicant’s designated Authorizing Official via SAMS Domestic to be electronically counter-signed in the system.F.2 Administrative and National Policy and Legal RequirementsDRL requires all recipients of foreign assistance funding to comply with all applicable Department and Federal laws and regulations, including but not limited to the following:The Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards set forth in 2 CFR Chapter 200 (Sub-Chapters A through F) shall apply to all non-Federal entities, except for assistance awards to Individuals and Foreign Public Entities.  Sub-Chapters A through E shall apply to all foreign organizations, and Sub-Chapters A through D shall apply to all U.S. and foreign for-profit entities. The applicant/recipient of the award and any sub-recipient under the award must comply with all applicable terms and conditions, in addition to the assurance and certifications made part of the Notice of Award.  The Department’s Standard Terms and Conditions can be viewed at https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-the-procurement-executive/.Additionally, DRL supports implementation of the National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality; the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Act of 2017, which highlights the U.S. commitment to the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and the Department of State WPS Implementation Plan.  For additional information, please refer to the following link: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1141.Due to the determination made under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) for funds obligated during FY 2024, assistance that benefits the governments of the following countries may be subject to a restriction under the TVPA.  The Department of State determines on a case-by-case basis what constitutes assistance to a government; the general principles listed below apply.Assistance to the government includes:All branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial) at all levels (national, regional, local);Public schools, universities, hospitals, and state-owned enterprises, as well as government employees;Cash, training, equipment, services, or other assistance provided directly to the government, assistance provided to an NGO or other implementer for the benefit of the government, and assistance to government employees.Subject to TVPA for funds obligated during FY 2024:AF:  Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, South SudanEAP:  Burma, China (PRC), Macau, North KoreaEUR:  Belarus, RussiaNEA:  Iran, SyriaSCA:  AfghanistanWHA:  Cuba, Curacao, Nicaragua, Sint MaartenAdditional requirements may be included depending on the content of the program.F.3 ReportingApplicants should be aware of the post-award reporting requirements for federal assistance awards as reflected in 2 CFR 200 Appendix XII &#8211; Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters.  DRL awards require that all reports (financial and progress) are uploaded to the federal award file in SAMS Domestic on a quarterly basis.  The Federal Financial Report (FFR or SF-425) is the required form for financial reports and must be submitted in PMS, and a copy of the report submitted in PMS then uploaded to the award file in SAMS Domestic.  Progress reports uploaded to the award file in SAMS Domestic must include a narrative as described below as well as Program Indicators (or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer), including standard (F) framework indicators and DRL framework indicators.  F and DRL framework indicators will be reviewed and negotiated during the final stages of issuing an award on a project-by-project basis.Narrative progress reports should reflect the focus on measuring the project’s progress on the overarching objectives and should be compiled according to the objectives, outcomes, and outputs as outlined in the award’s Scope of Work (SOW) and in the Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Narrative.  An assessment of the overall project’s achievements should be included in each progress report.  Where relevant, progress reports should include the following sections:Relevant contextual information (limited);Explanation and evaluation of significant activities of the reporting period and how the activities reflect progress toward achieving objectives, including meeting benchmarks/targets as set in the approved M&amp;E Plan.  In addition, attach the M&amp;E Plan, comparing the target and actual numbers for the indicators;Any qualitative impact or success stories from the project, when possible;Copy of baseline, mid-term, and/or final evaluation report(s) conducted by an external evaluator; if applicable;Relevant supporting documentation or products related to the project activities (such as articles, meeting lists and agendas, participant surveys, photos, manuals, etc.) as separate attachments;Description of how the recipient is pursuing sustainability, including looking for sources of follow-on funding;Any problems/challenges in implementing the project and a corrective action plan with an updated timeline of activities;Reasons why established goals were not met;Data for the required F and/or DRL framework indicator(s) for the quarter as well as aggregate data by fiscal year;Program Indicators or other mutually agreed upon format approved by the Grants Officer;Proposed activities for the next quarter; and,Additional pertinent information, including analysis and explanation of cost overruns or high unit costs, if applicable.Foreign Assistance Data Review:  As required by Congress, the Department of State must make progress in its efforts to improve tracking and reporting of foreign assistance data through the Foreign Assistance Data Review (FADR).  The FADR requires tracking of foreign assistance activity data from budgeting, planning, and allocation through obligation and disbursement.  Successful applicants will be required to report and draw down federal funding based on the appropriate FADR Data Elements, indicated within their award documentation.  In cases of more than one FADR Data Element, typically program or sector and/or regions or country, the successful applicant will be required to maintain separate accounting records.A final narrative and financial report must also be submitted within 120 days after the expiration of the award.Please note:  Delays in reporting may result in delays of payment approvals and failure to provide required reports may jeopardize the recipient&#8217;s’ ability to receive future U.S. government funds.  DRL reserves the right to request any additional programmatic and/or financial project information during the award period.G. Contact InformationFor technical submission questions related to this NOFO, please contact DRL-TJ@state.gov.For assistance with SAMS Domestic accounts and technical issues related to the system, please contact the ILMS help desk by phone at +1 (888) 313-4567 (toll charges apply for international callers) or through the Self Service online portal that can be accessed from https://afsitsm.service-now.com/ilms/home.  Customer support is available 24/7.Please note that establishing an account in SAMS Domestic may require the use of smartphone for multi-factor authentication (MFA).  If an applicant does not have accessibility to a smartphone during the time of creating an account, please contact the helpdesk and request instructions on MFA for Windows PC.For assistance with Grants.gov accounts and technical issues related to using the system, please call the Contact Center at +1 (800) 518-4726 or email support@grants.gov.  The Contact Center is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, except federal holidays.For a list of federal holidays visit:https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/federal-holidays/Except for technical submission questions, during the NOFO period U.S. Department of State staff in Washington and overseas shall not discuss this competition with applicants until the entire proposal review process has been completed and rejection and approval letters have been transmitted.H. Other InformationApplicants should be aware that DRL understands that some information contained in applications may be considered sensitive or proprietary and will make appropriate efforts to protect such information.  However, applicants are advised that DRL cannot guarantee that such information will not be disclosed, including pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or other similar statutes.The information in this NOFO and “Proposal Submission Instructions for Applications” is binding and may not be modified by any DRL representative.  Explanatory information provided by DRL that contradicts this language will not be binding.  Issuance of the NOFO and negotiation of applications does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the U.S. government.  DRL reserves the right to reduce, revise, or increase proposal budgets.This NOFO will appear on www.grants.gov , SAMS Domestic, and DRL’s website https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/programs-and-grants/.Background Information on DRL and General DRL FundingDRL has the mission of promoting democracy and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms globally.  DRL supports projects designed through an evidence-based framework that empower local civil society partners to promote and defend democracy globally, including efforts to counter authoritarianism, promote human rights, and meaningfully address diversity, equity, and inclusion as a core element of good governance.  DRL typically focuses its work in countries facing human rights violations and abuses, where democracy and human rights defenders are under pressure, and where governance infrastructure is undemocratic, in transition, or at risk of backsliding.Additional background information on DRL and its efforts can be found on https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/.
- Joint Statement Marking Three Years Since the Military Coup in Myanmar Office of the SpokespersonThe following is the text of a joint statement by the&nbsp;High Representative on behalf of the European Union, and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, marking three years since the military coup in Myanmar.&nbsp;Begin text:Three years ago, on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government, undoing a decade of progress.&nbsp;&nbsp;Under the military regime, violence against civilians has escalated, with thousands jailed, tortured and killed. Airstrikes, shelling and arson have been used to destroy civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, healthcare facilities and places of worship. Systematic discrimination against members of religious and ethnic groups, including Rohingya, is rife. Many are displaced and continue to face horrific conditions, and others have been forced to flee across Myanmar’s borders.&nbsp;The military’s actions have fuelled a growing humanitarian crisis with 2.6 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 18 million people in need.  &nbsp;&nbsp;We condemn in the strongest possible terms the military regime’s ongoing atrocities and human rights violations, such as sexual and gender-based violence, and the restriction of fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, through peaceful protests and the media. We reiterate our call for the Commander-in-Chief and the military to change course, immediately ceasing violence against civilians, releasing all unjustly detained political prisoners, allowing full humanitarian access and creating space for inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders.&nbsp;&nbsp;We strongly encourage unified efforts by ASEAN to resolve the crisis. We commend the constructive efforts of the ASEAN Chairs and Special Envoys. We call on the military regime to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and engage meaningfully and positively with ASEAN representatives, in order for Myanmar to transition towards an inclusive democracy.&nbsp;We&nbsp;continue to support the full implementation of&nbsp;United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and underline our support for UN Security Council activities to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. We call on the UN to strengthen its efforts on Myanmar including via the timely appointment of a Special Envoy and a Resident Coordinator and urge UN Member states to maintain their support to address urgent humanitarian needs in Myanmar.&nbsp;We call on all members of the international community to support efforts to push the Myanmar military to cease violence, to bring about genuinely inclusive dialogue, in order to establish a credible, peaceful democratic future for Myanmar;&nbsp;&nbsp;to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar and refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries, including its most vulnerable communities, and to cease providing the Myanmar military with the arms and equipment that are necessary for them to commit atrocities.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Three years on from the military coup, we continue to stand in solidarity with the Myanmar people and their desire for an inclusive and genuine democracy in Myanmar.&nbsp;End Text						Tags																													Association of Southeast Asian Nations																															Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Burma																																Human Rights																															Office of the Spokesperson
- Department Press Briefing – January 31, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; January 31, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; January 31, 2024																																																					January 31, 2024																																																								12:39 p.m. EST MR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. Let me start with some opening comments.As you all have repeatedly heard Secretary Blinken say, it has been one of his top priorities to disrupt the global flow of synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals, which fuel a fentanyl crisis, into the United States. For years, bilateral cooperation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China on counternarcotics had been suspended, which hindered our ability to make progress on addressing this crisis that touches the lives of so many Americans.That began to change when the Secretary traveled to Beijing last June and raised the importance of cooperation to address the fentanyl crisis. Those discussions laid the groundwork for the meeting between President Biden and President Xi Jinping at Woodside, California in November where the leaders announced the resumption of bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics.This week, the United States Government began to put that agreement into practice. Over the past two days, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd Robinson joined an interagency delegation to Beijing marking the initiation of a bilateral Counternarcotics Working Group with the PRC. The launch of this working group marks an important step to advance concrete law enforcement action, and to coordinate targeted measures to stop the illicit flow of precursor chemicals that are fueling the fentanyl crisis. At this working group, the United States emphasized the importance of multilateral and international cooperation on chemical precursor scheduling, information sharing, and other measures.The PRC has already started to take steps to dramatically curtail the supply of fentanyl precursors, including taking regulatory and law enforcement action against dozens of PRC‐based synthetic drug and chemical precursor suppliers, issuing a notice to industry, and resuming the submission of chemical incidents to the International Narcotics Control Board’s global information-sharing database.Those were important initial steps, and through this working group, we will continue to press for concrete action.Addressing the fentanyl crisis in the United States and the surge of synthetic drugs globally is a transnational challenge that demands a strong and coordinated global response. We will continue to engage in the robust diplomacy required to make that happen.With that, Mr. Lee.QUESTION: Thank you. What can you tell us about the Secretary’s imminent travel plans?MR MILLER: I don’t have any announcements to make about upcoming travel. Obviously, he has made four trips to the Middle East since October 7th, and you can certainly expect him to make future visits, but I don’t have any announcements to make today.QUESTION: Okay. And then just secondly but related to the Middle East, have you gotten any clarity from your people about this hospital raid in Jenin yesterday or on – or from the Israelis about the destruction of the university in Gaza?MR MILLER: On the first, we have not. It’s – obviously, we’ve raised these issues regularly with our Israeli counterparts and seek information. I don’t have a report back on the incident in the West Bank. With respect to – with respect to the university, I think you’re referring to the university in Gaza that we talked about a couple weeks ago. So we have raised that &#8212;QUESTION: No, it was last week.MR MILLER: I wasn’t here last week, so it couldn’t have been with me last week.QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: I think it was two – I think it was &#8212;QUESTION: Maybe it was ten days ago. Whatever. Whenever &#8212;MR MILLER: I think it was two – yeah, ten days, two weeks, whatever it was. So &#8212;QUESTION: But – yeah, but it’s been – it’s been a while.MR MILLER: Yeah. So &#8212;QUESTION: And you’ve got nothing back?MR MILLER: So I didn’t say that. I will say &#8212;QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I will say that (laughter) &#8212;QUESTION: All right.MR MILLER: I appreciate it. It is an issue that we raised with the Israeli Government. We’ve raised with them the issue of both the demolition of sites, which they have reported to us they have conducted – they have undertaken only when they were sites from which terrorist activities were launched or plotted or being planned; and we have raised with them the issue of the establishment of a buffer zone, because you’ve seen the reports that these demolitions might have been to advance a buffer zone. They have – I will say we have made clear to them the same thing that we have said publicly, which is we are opposed to any reduction in the size of the territory of Gaza. And what they have said to us is that they do not intend to occupy Gaza; they do not intend to leave forces there. And we’re going to continue to engage with them on this question.QUESTION: Well, yeah, but that doesn’t answer my question, which is specifically about the demolition of the university. I mean, you say that they’re only going to – they only target facilities or whatever when they are &#8212;MR MILLER: That is what – that is what they &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; terrorist – terrorist &#8212;MR MILLER: That is what they have reported back to us, correct.QUESTION: Does that mean that 75 percent of Gaza was &#8212;MR MILLER: So I don’t want to mix &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; of buildings in Gaza were, like, being used to plan or – was that your understanding?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – I was speaking specifically with respect to this demolition. There are obviously other buildings that have been hit in air strikes, and some of those have been &#8212;QUESTION: Well, they’re not just in air strikes, but in &#8212;MR MILLER: No, I know, but let me just finish.QUESTION: &#8212; but in controlled demolitions.MR MILLER: Some of them have been instances where they are going after legitimate military targets. Some of them are instances where they make mistakes, right, where there is targeting that either they have bad information or where the – you referred to &#8212;QUESTION: I’m sorry, a &#8212;MR MILLER: You referred to seven &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; a controlled demolition is not a mistake.MR MILLER: Matt, you referred to &#8212;QUESTION: It’s an intentional act.MR MILLER: You referred to 75 percent of buildings.QUESTION: Well, I don’t know how much &#8212;MR MILLER: So that’s why I’m – that’s why – that &#8212;QUESTION: Okay. Because &#8212;MR MILLER: You only – first of all that &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; understandable that there’s going to be damage &#8212;MR MILLER: Matt &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in any kind of an operation like this. But these are – these – this – the university and others that the IDF has put video out of &#8212;MR MILLER: Can I just &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; are not – they are intentional &#8212;MR MILLER: Right.QUESTION: Sorry. So &#8212;MR MILLER: And my – and let me &#8212;QUESTION: And all of those so far &#8212;MR MILLER: Just give me – give me &#8212;QUESTION: Hold on.MR MILLER: Well, but &#8212;QUESTION: Just let me finish the question.MR MILLER: Well, but – all right. You let &#8212;QUESTION: Is it all of those that they have told &#8212;MR MILLER: We’ll have a deal to let each other finish.QUESTION: They have told you that all of those that you’ve asked questions about, all of those buildings, those facilities, were being used or had been used to either plot or conduct terrorist operations?MR MILLER: Yes. That is what I have said.QUESTION: Yes. And you accept that? You – which is fine if you do, but &#8212;MR MILLER: That is what they – that is what they have told us. We don’t have the ability to independently verify all of these issues. But let me just – let me just – I want to follow up on what I was saying a minute ago. The reason I started to talk about air strikes is you referred to 75 percent of buildings in Gaza being destroyed, which &#8212;QUESTION: I don’t know if it’s 75 percent.MR MILLER: &#8212; which – let me – I – no, no, no &#8212;QUESTION: I’m sorry. I shouldn’t have used that word because (inaudible).MR MILLER: Let me finish. I know it’s not – it’s not 75 percent; whatever the number is. But the great majority of them would not have been included in this controlled demolition activity; they would have been hit through air strikes.QUESTION: Fair enough.MR MILLER: Which is why I started to explain a different universe of possibilities. So.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead.QUESTION: A new report out a moment ago from Axios that Secretary Blinken has ordered staff to prepare policy plans for a Palestinian state after the war in Gaza, and that this signals a policy shift in the administration – do you have a comment on that?MR MILLER: So there has been no policy shift in the administration. We have made quite clear publicly that we support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. That has been the policy of the United States for some time. It has been the policy of this administration. You’ve seen the Secretary speak about it publicly. I’m not going to comment on the internal work that we do to advance that objective, but I will say that there are any number of ways that you could go about accomplishing that. There are any number of sequencing of events that you could carry out to accomplish that objective. And we look at a wide range of options, and we discuss those with partners in the region, as well as other partners inside the United States Government, but there has been no policy change.QUESTION: But presumably I guess policy planning would have contingency plans in the works that would include a Palestinian state. I mean, is there something new? Was there a new – can you tell us if the Secretary issued, like, a new directive?MR MILLER: So what I will say is yes, we support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and we do a lot of work inside the government to think about how to bring that about. And you see us talk about that work publicly when we’re in the region, talk about it sometimes here. And as part of that work, obviously we look at any number of options. That’s part of the normal planning process. The vast majority of options never usually get implemented, because we take things – we put things on the drawing board and figure out what will work, what will be effective, and how best to sequence it. So I won’t get into that underlying policy planning process that we go about.But yes, we are actively pursuing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state – with real security guarantees for Israel, because we do believe that is the best way to bring about lasting peace and security for Israel, for Palestinians, and for the region.QUESTION: Sorry, can I – can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Just to put a little context on that – on this, hasn’t the State Department been looking at what it would take to create a Palestinian state since the Clinton administration?MR MILLER: At &#8212;QUESTION: Maybe with the exception of the four years of the Trump administration?MR MILLER: I would say at least that long, yes. Correct. (Laughter.)QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: My own – my history only goes back nine months, but yes, it has been the longstanding position of the United States.QUESTION: Well, let’s go back – let’s go back 20 &#8212;MR MILLER: Right.QUESTION: &#8212; 20 or so years. Hasn’t this always been &#8212;MR MILLER: I feel like you’re asking me leading questions, Matt, but yes, the answer – the answer is yes. I will – the witness will be appropriately led.QUESTION: Okay. So if this report were to be true, it is – it’s basically just a continuation of what has been going on, with the exception of maybe the four years when Trump was president?MR MILLER: So without confirming a specific report, I will say that yes, we do have ongoing policy planning processes about how best to advance the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.QUESTION: And is it not correct that all of the diplomatic efforts that are going into, including a potential Secretary return to the Middle East, are heavily focused on day-after and long-term stability and security for the region, which you believe would include a Palestinian state?MR MILLER: Among other things &#8212;QUESTION: I’m just not sure &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; very much so.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, very much so.QUESTION: Question about the UN. So UNRWA and the UN have kind of been giving conflicting guidance as to when they are going to quote/unquote “run out of funding” for Palestinians in Gaza. You got into this issue a little bit yesterday when you talked about the U.S. funding. Does State have any clarity on how long it might be until UNRWA does actually run out of funding?MR MILLER: So we’ve seen what they have said publicly, and obviously we engaged with them privately as well. I will let them speak to questions of both – of their funding and when it will expire, because it’s not just obviously a U.S. Government issue. We are not the only funder of UNRWA; there are other countries that do as well. So I will let them speak to that. We don’t have any independent information on that question.QUESTION: But as the top donor, don’t you have a sense of when they’re using the funds from the U.S. and how and the timeline?MR MILLER: We – of course we do, but as we are not – because we are not the only donor, we don’t know necessarily when other countries are making their contributions, whether there are others that are pending. In the same way I talked about yesterday how we had upcoming payments that were pending, that will be true for other countries as well. We don’t have – it’s not an internal budget schedule for UNRWA that we keep at the United States. It’s a question that they keep at UNRWA and the United Nations, so they’re best to speak to that question.QUESTION: Do you have any sense that as the secretary has now said, the secretary-general has now said that this could be – the U.S.’s pause on funding could be catastrophic for Gazans?MR MILLER: So what I would say to that is, first of all, to reiterate – as you’ve heard me say, as you’ve heard the Secretary say, and others inside the administration say – the work that UNRWA does is critical. It is critical that – it is critical work to deliver food, and water, and medicine, and other humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. That said, the responses were – or, I’m sorry, the allegations last week were incredibly troubling, and so it is exactly because the work is so important and the work should not be jeopardized that UNRWA needs to conduct – the United Nations needs to conduct a full investigation, respond as appropriate, and put into place measures to prevent such incidents from ever occurring again.The two – I don’t actually – we get this question – I don’t find the two in tension with each other. It is because the work is so important that we cannot allow it to be threatened, right, that UNRWA has to take this seriously. There has to be a real investigation. There has to be full accountability. And there have to be appropriate measures put in place to happen again. I think the two go hand in hand.QUESTION: Thanks.QUESTION: But just to follow up on that, Israel is saying that UNRWA is fundamentally compromised. So you still stand by UNRWA in that – in that context?MR MILLER: So we believe it’s important that there be a full investigation and there be accountability and there be measures put in place, as I said, to prevent this from happening again. But at the same time, we think UNRWA’s work is critical, and we believe that there is no other partner on the ground right now who can replace UNRWA and can deliver the humanitarian assistance. And I will say that in our conversations with the Israeli Government, they have acknowledged to us at very senior levels that the work that UNRWA plays is important.Now look, they have a longstanding dispute with UNRWA that goes back to well before October 7th, as I know you’re aware of, Leon. And I’m sure that they will continue to have disputes with UNRWA that extend far beyond the end of this conflict. But I can tell you that in our conversations, they recognize the critical role that UNRWA plays and that, importantly, there is no other humanitarian relief organization that can play that role in the short term.QUESTION: You said that – sorry – the Secretary’s going to meet with the UN’s Sigrid Kaag today. And you mentioned yesterday that there would hopefully be some work to lay the ground for this UN assessment mission in northern Gaza. Is there any update you can give on what’s happened?MR MILLER: I don’t have an update of what happened today. I know that it’s been planned for – the initial assessment has been planned for the next couple days. I actually just don’t – I don’t know what happened on the ground today. There’s always kind of questions about people being able to move about as they want to in Gaza given ongoing fighting.With respect to the Secretary’s meeting today, what he’ll be emphasizing is that she is an individual who he has worked with in the past, who he has great confidence in; that he welcomes her appointment to this role – as you may know, he talked with her a couple weeks ago. Last time she was here in D.C., he was unfortunately travelling in the region and so couldn’t meet with her, so looks forward to doing it today to discuss how we can continue to coordinate the humanitarian efforts that are so vital on the ground.QUESTION: And in terms of the – the sort of assessment mission was something that the Secretary came back with several weeks ago from the Middle East now. Is it – what is it that’s been holding up getting that assessment mission in there?MR MILLER: It’s quite clear it was ready to go and there was a resurgence of fighting in the north. After Israel pulled a number of units out, there were Hamas fighters that regrouped and started launching rockets and started launching attacks against Israeli forces. So when that fighting – with that resurgence of fighting, it just made it too difficult and too – well, too dangerous for a UN mission to actually be carried out. So what we have been trying to do is find a way for them to safely conduct this mission. We’ve been in contact or in conversation with the United Nations and with the Government of Israel with – about how they can best do that. And I should add we want to see it launched as soon as possible, and I think it would have been launched in the last few weeks if not for this resurgence of fighting.Shannon.QUESTION: Thank you. The Iranian-linked militia that the Pentagon says is likely responsible for the attack on Tower 22 over the weekend has announced that it’s going to temporarily suspend attacks on U.S. forces, really implying that Iran has pressured the group to do so. The Pentagon basically responded that it’s too little too late. But from the State Department’s perspective, is this a positive sign that Iran might be listening?MR MILLER: So I will echo something I heard my colleagues at the Pentagon also say with respect to KH, which is that we will judge this group as we do all of these Iranian proxy groups, not by what they say but by what they do. And this is a group that we have seen launch attacks on U.S. forces in the region, U.S. interests in the region. We have made clear for some time that those attacks need to stop. They did not stop and so, as you heard the President say, we will be holding organizations accountable. This is not to preview any specific actions that we will take but that we will be taking steps to hold accountable those who are responsible for the deaths of U.S. soldiers.QUESTION: But on that pending response, the President said he’s already decided how to respond. Is there any fear from an escalatory standpoint in this building that something that’s sustained, multifaceted, hitting multiple targets, could just contribute to the tit for tat we’ve seen?MR MILLER: So I will say that the United States response will not be escalatory. Our actions to date to defend U.S. troops have not been escalatory. We have made clear from the outset of this conflict that we don’t believe it’s in anyone’s interest to see the conflict escalate. It’s not in the United States’ interest. We don’t believe it’s in the interests of any country in the region, and that includes Iran.At the same time, we will defend our personnel and we will defend our interests. And we made that clear for the last – for a number of months, and you’ve seen us respond and take action, take military action at times, to respond to attacks on U.S. troops and to respond to attacks on commercial shipping, and we will continue to hold accountable those who attack our forces. But we will do so in a way that is appropriate while at the same time making clear we do not want to see this conflict escalate in any way, shape, or form.Janne.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions and North Korea and China and Russia. Last week as North Korea launched cruise missiles, Chinese foreign ministry officers and North Koreans’ foreign ministry officers met in Pyongyang. China and North Korea pledged to strengthen strategic dialogue, all levels. As you know, China continues to protect North Korea in the UN Security Council resolution with its veto power. Do you think China is using North Korea strategically in competition with the United States?MR MILLER: So I will just say, in answer to that, that obviously we have had great concern about the DPRK’s provocative, destabilizing actions, and one of the things that we have pressed China to do in our conversations with them is to use their relationship with DPRK to engage in diplomacy and try to bring an end to those actions.QUESTION: Do – also, regarding money laundering in North Korea, what measures is being taken by United States against Russia and China to block funding for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development?MR MILLER: So we have imposed a number of sanctions with respect to North Korea’s nuclear program, but I don’t have anything to preview today – anything further to preview. I know with respect to financing of that program I don’t have anything further to preview today.QUESTION: But the U.S. and China, they talking about cyber hacking agreement.MR MILLER: I just don’t have anything further to offer on it.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, thank you.Alex.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. A couple of separate topics. Let me start with Ukraine. Can you tell us anything about Toria Nuland’s trip to Ukraine beyond the readout you just put out – about the timing of it and any particular message she wants to convey?MR MILLER: So with respect to the timing of it, I would say only that she has traveled to Ukraine previously. Obviously, the Secretary traveled to Ukraine last fall and she traveled with him at that time, but has conducted her own travel, her own visits to Ukraine as part of a regular tempo of engagement you have seen between the United States and Ukraine. She was there today to meet with senior Ukrainian officials regarding recent battlefield developments and the importance of continued global assistance to support Ukraine. She was also there to highlight ongoing anti-corruption reform efforts to bolster Ukraine’s economic recovery and continue its trajectory towards Euro-Atlantic integration. And I will say that she, while she was there, once again strongly reiterated the United States’ ongoing support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression.QUESTION: Thank you. While in Ankara early this week, she was quoted as saying Türkiye will be welcomed back into F-35 program if the “S-400 issue,” quote/unquote, is resolved. How do you guys see that resolution? Türkiye already has purchased that and got punished for that. Do you expect them to return it back to Russia, perhaps send it to Ukraine, or what is the resolution that you guys are looking for?MR MILLER: So I don’t think I – there’s anything I want to add to that other than to say that we just got finished with a long, drawn-out process over the F-16s that we are providing to Türkiye. I don’t think I’m ready to jump into the next iteration of warplanes at this time when we’ve just notified and not yet even delivered the F-16s.QUESTION: Thank you. One more inquiry, if I may. There are reports that the administration opposes Ukraine’s membership prospects in NATO despite the fact that most of the members are in favor. Why?MR MILLER: I – those reports are incorrect. You’ve heard the President himself as well as the Secretary say it a number of times, that Ukraine will be a member of NATO.QUESTION: Can I move to South Caucasus, please? I have two more.QUESTION: One more on Ukraine?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Since it’s just (inaudible).QUESTION: Talk to you later, yes.MR MILLER: I cannot promise I’ll come back to you later, Alex. We have a full room and no one gets seven questions. But go ahead.QUESTION: Just wondering on Ukraine if you have any reaction to the UN’s top court today basically throwing out the case Ukraine brought against Russia. Of course, this was before the invasion, but still, throwing out just about the whole case.MR MILLER: Yeah, I only will say that we’ve seen the ruling. It’s apparently 117 pages long and quite complex, so we’re reviewing it but don’t have a reaction yet.QUESTION: A very quick question, if I may.MR MILLER: Quick, yeah.QUESTION: On Azerbaijan, does the administration have any policy, any approach, any view on the next week’s snap elections?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything to offer on it. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks for the question. And on Georgia, if I may, on policy on &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me – let me &#8212;QUESTION: Just back on Ukraine.MR MILLER: Yeah, yeah.QUESTION: If it had gone the other way around, I’m assuming you would have a reaction &#8212;MR MILLER: My only understanding is that it is a, like I said, 117-page ruling that covers a number of different issues.QUESTION: There is a summary.MR MILLER: And I know our team is reviewing it now.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: And we will obviously have a response to it. It’s just that we didn’t have it ready by the – we hadn’t fully digested it and had anything by the time I came out here half an hour ago.So let me go &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. After the Iranian-backed groups’ attacks on your forces in Jordan, new sanctions on Iraqi bank, and today you sanctioned three entities in Türkiye and Lebanon. Is that related to – is that a part of the response to the Iranian IRGC groups for what they did that – helping these groups and also providing the weapons for these groups attacking you? Or is this a separate &#8212;MR MILLER: These were part of our ongoing efforts to hold accountable entities and individuals who generate funds for the IRGC and Hizballah to finance their destabilizing activities.QUESTION: And today the Iranian IRGC commander said that we are heard from Americans that they are threatening us to attacking us, but we leave no response – we leave no attacks unresponsed. Do you think that this will affect the calculation of your administration when you’re thinking to responding the attacks that happened in Jordan?MR MILLER: I just don’t think I can get into that without talking about what our response will be. I will say we are obviously quite aware of the position of every entity in every country in the region, and what the President, what the national security team do is look at all these factors in coming up with our response. But we have made quite clear that we will hold accountable those who are responsible for the attacks on U.S. personnel.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Matt, I want to follow up with Shannon’s questions about the retaliation that the U.S. says it’s going to take against – you quoted your Pentagon counterpart yesterday. That was when the KH in Iraq had announced that it was going to suspend their military activities. Now today, Syrian Observatory says that the IRGC has ordered its proxies in Syria to also stop attacking U.S. interests. Could this in any way impact at least the scale and scope of the U.S. response to these groups?MR MILLER: So again, I don’t want to comment on what that response will look like, and it’s hard to answer the question without commenting on that. But I will say that with respect to all of these groups, we will judge them by their actions, not by what they say. And what we have seen a number of these proxy groups is take actions against United States personnel, against United States interests, and as we have made clear, we will hold them accountable for those actions.QUESTION: Have there been any communication with Iran, whether directly or indirectly, since the attack on Tower 22?MR MILLER: I don’t have any communications, either direct or indirect, to read out. As we’ve said in the past, we have ways to make our interests known to Iran when it’s in our interest to do so. But I don’t think our position is lost on Iran. I think they know quite clearly that we, number one, don’t want escalation in the region. We, number two, want the attacks on our personnel to stop and our interests to stop. And, number three, we’ll hold accountable those groups that launched the attacks, those responsible for the attacks at a time and place of our choosing.QUESTION: In an answer to Shannon, you also said that the U.S. response is – will not be escalatory. How is that?MR MILLER: Because the U.S. response will be to hold accountable those who launched attacks on our troops. It is a – the response will be a justified response to attacks on our troops that caused the death of three American soldiers and the injury of dozens more. It is – and we will do so in a way – I would also say we will also make clear to everyone in the region that we don’t seek conflict with Iran, we don’t want conflict with Iran, we don’t seek conflict with any party in the region and we don’t think conflict is in anyone’s interest. But it is incumbent upon the United States to protect our military, and we will do that.QUESTION: One more question. All right, these groups have said they’re going to stop their actions. But on the other side, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthis, have said that they’re going to continue standing – or facing the U.S. and the UK. They’re going to continue with their actions and everything. Seems like this is their – what the U.S. is doing is trying to stop them is not really making a difference or &#8212;MR MILLER: We have always – I will say with respect to the Houthis, we have always made clear that this would be a process that would take place over time. You are not going to eliminate someone’s military capabilities overnight, but if they continued these attacks, we would take the appropriate actions to degrade their ability to do so.QUESTION: All right, thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. So I’ve been told by a reliable source that the IDF is looking into Red Cross personnel participating in the October 7th attack. Is the State Department aware of such an investigation?MR MILLER: I am not.QUESTION: Okay. And given the Axios report about State Department plans to possibly recognize an independent Palestine, what do you say to critics who would say that this is rewarding terrorism?MR MILLER: So I, first of all – sometimes I struggle to even know how to answer those types of questions. Not all – first of all, let me just say what I was about to say, which is I spoke to this at length earlier, but the idea that all Palestinians are terrorists is obviously just flat wrong.QUESTION: Not what I said.MR MILLER: Well, you critics say – whatever. It’s obviously flat wrong. And I would say those that – I’m not going to go there. Look, we believe that the – (laughter) &#8212;QUESTION: How can you be so sure?MR MILLER: Yeah &#8212;QUESTION: Have you polled 12,000 (inaudible) for terrorism?MR MILLER: So it’s – it is – I will say it’s – it is a ridiculous argument. It has been the longstanding policy of the United States to advance the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It continues to be our policy, and it is our policy because we believe not only is that the right answer to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, but also because it is the answer to provide lasting security to the Israeli people. And the – never mind.QUESTION: And finally &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, sorry, I keep almost doing it and then – no, go ahead.QUESTION: And then finally, given the attacks in Jordan and elsewhere in the Middle East, have State Department personnel been evacuated? Has there been increased security at embassies and consulates in the region?MR MILLER: So we always take appropriate measures to protect our embassies, but we don’t – also don’t talk about those measures publicly.Said.QUESTION: Thank you. First of all &#8212;MR MILLER: Did you not get the notice the briefing had moved up?QUESTION: Yeah, first of all, I apologize for being late.MR MILLER: It’s fine.QUESTION: It’s Murphy’s law, and I don’t want to go into explaining.MR MILLER: I’m aware of Murphy’s law.QUESTION: You may have talked about this. I just want to follow up on the UNRWA thing. Has there been any development in terms of evidence or the validity of evidence and all these things about people who participated?MR MILLER: So there is evidence that the Israeli Government developed that they presented to us and that they presented to UNRWA. We found that evidence to be credible. But you don’t just have to take the United States Government’s &#8212;QUESTION: No, that &#8212;MR MILLER: Hold – let me – you don’t have just to take our opinion that the evidence was credible. UNRWA found the evidence credible as well.QUESTION: Okay. So let me ask you this then. I mean, look, Israel stands accused of committing genocide. Right, it’s an allegation &#8212;MR MILLER: That we reject &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; whatever it was &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; and we believe is unfounded.QUESTION: &#8212; the ICJ and so on. But they continue to receive a lot of money. I mean, they get $3.8 billion a year. There is talk about pumping maybe $14 billion and so on. So how do you juxtapose these things all against one another?MR MILLER: So first of all, I’m – that’s kind of a loose question.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: But I’ll say with respect to the charges of genocide, we believe that they’re unfounded, and we have said that we believe that they’re unfounded. We continue to support Israel’s right to take action to ensure that the terrorist attacks of October 7th cannot be repeated, but we want them to do so in a way that complies with – fully with international humanitarian law.QUESTION: Yeah, there are certainly settlers who serve in the Israeli army that you probably designate as either extremist or things of that nature. I mean, we can also look at the Israeli Government that has maybe 12 members who basically have called for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, but they continue to be members of that government in good standing, receiving a great deal of aid. Correct?MR MILLER: And we made clear our disagreements with the calls by members of the government to force Palestinians from their homes in Gaza. Not only did we say that publicly – you may recall us doing this a few weeks ago – but when the Secretary traveled to Israel on his most recent visit, he made clear that he thought it was important that the Israeli Government speak out against those matters and those comments publicly and reiterate that it is not the policy of the Israeli Government to force Palestinians from Gaza. And in the days after the Secretary left, that’s exactly what the Israeli Government did.QUESTION: And finally, it seems that members of Congress yesterday met with an Israeli official, and they discussed with him alternatives to UNRWA. Is the Government of the United States looking at alternatives to UNRWA?MR MILLER: So first of all, let me say that I obviously can’t speak for members of Congress and members of &#8212;QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: I know, I know. Just – and members of – let me just get it out, Said – and members of Congress don’t speak for the United States Government. We believe that UNRWA plays a critical role that cannot be replaced. There is no other humanitarian partner in the – in Gaza right now that could play the role that UNRWA does.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Go ahead. I’ll come to you next, Willy.QUESTION: In two days, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is holding a hearing on the systematic torture and killing of former U.S. allies in Afghanistan by Taliban, who left behind by the Biden administration in Afghanistan. And UN also has documented hundred of similar cases. What the U.S. Government is doing to protect its allies in Afghanistan?MR MILLER: So I am not familiar with the testimony that was given today, and I want to make sure that I give a complete and accurate response. Let me take that question back. I want to see what the testimony actually was and give – and get you a response to it.Willy, go ahead.QUESTION: What about Afghan Adjustment Act?MR MILLER: I’m sorry?QUESTION: What about Afghan Adjustment Act? Don’t you think it’s the time to Biden administration to push the Congress for passing Afghan Adjustment Act?MR MILLER: Let me take – let me just take that one back.Willy, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Appreciate it. I wanted to just go back to the Jenin hospital raid, just quickly. I have a colleague who spoke to – who went to the hospital, spoke to people there. So I know you’re still waiting for an assessment, but he said that there are reports, or that he had eyewitness accounts that the receptionist was knocked out cold with the butt of a gun. Is an action like that – is something that you would condone in the context of a, I guess, targeted assassination?MR MILLER: Again, it’s – I don’t – it’s always difficult when I get these types of questions, because you have allegations that are unverified, and I’m essentially asked to speak about something that’s not yet verified, and it’s very difficult to do so. I can only reiterate what I said yesterday, which is we do – we want to see hospitals protected; we want to see civilians protected. At the same time, Israel does have a right to carry out legitimate antiterrorism operations in Gaza and in the West Bank, but we want to see them do so in a way that respects international humanitarian law and also doesn’t increase instability in the West Bank.QUESTION: I have two questions, one on Venezuela and one on Mexico. The first one: Do you have any response to – that the Government of Venezuela’s threat to stop migration cooperation and not taking deportation flights? Yeah.And the second, on Mexico. Today, in the morning the Mexican president blamed the State Department directly for being behind the story published in ProPublica about his first presidential campaign being linked to drug money. What do you have to say about these reports?MR MILLER: So I don’t have an response to the first one. And with response to the second one, I haven’t even read the story. I have no idea – it’s hard to comment when I haven’t even &#8212;QUESTION: You have no response (inaudible).MR MILLER: It’s – I – it’s hard to comment on a story I haven’t even read. So I don’t have any comment, no.QUESTION: No story to both?MR MILLER: No, I – on that – no, I don’t have a specific response. I’m happy to take the first one and follow up on it. With respect to the second one, it’s just not something I’m going to comment on.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, sir. Sir, there was a bomb blast in Pakistan at Imran Khan’s party – PTI – election rally. Do you have any comments on that?MR MILLER: So I will say you saw the department comment on this earlier today when the assistant secretary issued a tweet on it. We, as we did in that comment earlier today, extend our deepest sympathies to those affected by the attack on the PTI party rally in Pakistan. We believe in the resilience of the Pakistani people and their ability to recover. This attack is one of many we have seen in the last month against multiple parties across Pakistan. The election commission itself has come under attack in several places.We strongly condemn any violence which undermines the electoral process. The Pakistani people have the right to choose their leader without fear or – of reprisal or violence, and we remain committed to working with Pakistan to address the shared threat posed by terrorist groups throughout the region. And we support the Pakistani Government’s efforts to combat terrorism.QUESTION: Sir, Pakistani police arrested a number of PTI – Imran Khan’s party – workers for just – for a peaceful election rally. I mean, it looks like Pakistani Government is not going to allow PTI supporters, Imran Khan supporters, to just peacefully gather somewhere for the election. Really it looks like no more freedom of speech just for one party. No further &#8212;MR MILLER: So I can’t comment on that specific – on that specific report. I – because I haven’t seen it. But I will say, as we have long said, we want to see free and fair elections take place in Pakistan.QUESTION: I have one last question.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: According to a media report, United States lost $3 billion drone sale to India until meaningful investigation of Sikh leader Mr. Pannun assassination conspiracy. Is it true or just a fake news?MR MILLER: So – (laughter) – I love – nice try. The – so I will say that generally the U.S.-Indian Defense Partnership has seen significant growth over the past decade. This is a proposed sale that was announced during Prime Minister Modi’s visit last year. We believe it offers significant potential to further advance strategic technology cooperation with India and military cooperation in the region. Of course, Congress plays – as you know – an important role in the U.S. arms transfer process. We routinely consult with members of Congress with the foreign – on the foreign affairs committees before our formal notification to – so we can address questions that they might have, but I don’t have any comment on when that formal notification might take place.And I said I’d come to you next, and then I’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. How accurate are the reports that the United States will hold the peace conference this fall between the Palestinian and the Israeli to establish or to discuss establishing the Palestinian state?MR MILLER: I have not seen those reports, but I don’t have any announcements of any such conferences to make today.QUESTION: Internationally, many consider that United States is not qualified and unsuitable to mediate this war between Palestinians and Israeli, especially the role of United States in Gaza war, and the strong relation ties between the United States and Israel.MR MILLER: So I will say that when we have traveled in the region, one of the things the Secretary has heard from countries in the region is that they welcome the United States’ role in both trying to resolve this crisis and in ultimately reaching a broader regional agreement to establish peace and security for both Israel and Palestinians alike, and of course for the broader region. What we have heard over and over again is it is a role that only the United States can play. It’s, of course, a very difficult one – these aren’t easy issues – but it is a role that we will continue to play because of how important the issues are.QUESTION: Okay, thank you.MR MILLER: And Simon, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: I wanted to ask a couple of things on Myanmar because you had some sanctions today and the anniversary of the coup is tomorrow – third anniversary of the coup that happened there. So obviously these sanctions are targeting fuel imports and imports to – for domestic arms production for the military. This is a military that’s engaged in a civil war. So I’m interested from the U.S. perspective, are you trying to – do you have a side that you’re supporting in the conflict between the Burmese military and groups that oppose the coup that they conducted?MR MILLER: So what we have done, and what I’ll reiterate today, is to call on the military regime to end its violence against the people of Burma, to release those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, to allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the will of the people for return to the path towards representative democracy. We have always supported the people of Burma and their ability to chart their own path, and – including through the actions that you saw us take today.We have ramped up our economic and political pressure on the military regime, including by restricting U.S. dollar transactions with state-owned enterprises that provide revenue enabling the military to harm and kill its own civilians. So we are going to continue to support efforts by the opposition to the regime and to seek a resolution to the conflict that provides for genuine and inclusive multi-party democracy.QUESTION: And in terms of those efforts to support opponents to the regime, the – last year’s NDAA included language that gives you the opportunity to provide nonlethal aid to People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed groups in Burma. I wonder, are you providing any nonlethal aid to those groups?MR MILLER: Let me take that one back and get an answer.QUESTION: Sure. And just finally, the National Security Advisor met with Wang Yi in Bangkok on the weekend. Out of that came from the White House some discussion that the Burma/Myanmar was discussed in that meeting and talk about lower-level talks potentially between U.S. officials and Chinese officials on trying to resolve the conflict in Myanmar. Is there anything you can tell us on that? Are there a working-group-level meetings that are planned to try to discuss this with the Chinese? And what would you want the Chinese to do on that?MR MILLER: So there’s nothing that I can speak to today other than to say that we have – believe that Chinese engagement in this – on this issue could be constructive, and it’s something we’ll be following up on in the coming days and weeks. And we’ll have more to say at that time, but I don’t have anything to announce today.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: With that, we’ll wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 1:22 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Burma																								China																								India																								Iran																								Iraq																								Israel																								Jordan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- Imposing Sanctions on Burma’s Military Regime Three Years After the Military Coup HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Imposing Sanctions on Burma’s Military Regime Three Years After the Military Coup				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Imposing Sanctions on Burma’s Military Regime Three Years After the Military Coup																																		Press Statement																														January 31, 2024																																							The United States is today designating four individuals and two entities linked to Burma’s military regime. &nbsp;We are taking this action to target the regime’s sources of revenue which support military activities against civilians. &nbsp;The action also targets those who provide material and support for the production of arms in Burma.Since the military coup d’etat on February 1, 2021, the military regime has continued to carry out a campaign of violence and repression against the people of Burma.&nbsp; The military has conducted airstrikes that have killed hundreds of civilians.&nbsp; Regime forces have burned tens of thousands of homes across the country and displaced almost 2.6 million people. &nbsp;There is pervasive discrimination against members of religious and ethnic groups, leaving vulnerable groups, including Rohingya, facing horrific conditions. &nbsp;Many political figures remain unjustly imprisoned by the regime, with some facing life in jail or execution.&nbsp; As a result of the regime’s actions,&nbsp;people across the country lack access to physical security, medical care, and education.We reiterate our call for the military to change course and create space for meaningful and inclusive dialogue toward a future democratic Burma.&nbsp; We also&nbsp;call on the international community to increase support for the broad range of political, ethnic, and religious stakeholders seeking a credible and inclusive democratic process to elect a representative government in Burma&nbsp;The actions mentioned above by the U.S. Department of the Treasury were taken pursuant to Executive Order 14014 “Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma”.  For more information on today’s action, see the Department of Treasury’s press release.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Burma																																														Human Rights and Democracy																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Sanctions