# Oman - United States Department of State

- Joint Statement on the Second U.S.-Oman Strategic Dialogue Office of the Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Joint Statement on the Second U.S.-Oman Strategic Dialogue				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Joint Statement on the Second U.S.-Oman Strategic Dialogue																																		Media Note																														April 24, 2024																																							The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Sultanate of Oman on the occasion of the Second U.S.-Oman Strategic Dialogue.Begin Text:Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the U.S. Department of State Jose W. Fernandez welcomed His Excellency Sheikh Khalifa bin Ali bin Issa al-Harthy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the Foreign Ministry of Oman, to Washington on April 24, 2024, for the second Strategic Dialogue between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman.&nbsp;The inaugural Strategic Dialogue in February 2023 in Muscat advanced cooperation in three priority areas:&nbsp; trade and investment; clean energy; and education, culture, and science. This year’s dialogue identified new opportunities to strengthen the bilateral partnership in these priority areas.&nbsp;A key trade and investment goal is maximizing bilateral ties under the U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This year, the United States and Oman celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the FTA. During the second Strategic Dialogue, both sides reinforced the importance of taking advantage of the FTA to further strengthening the bilateral economic relationship, which can contribute greatly to Oman’s Vision 2040 goals while also advancing U.S. economic interests.&nbsp; They affirmed the value of private sector engagement to increase market access, promote trade and investment, and address shared challenges.&nbsp; They discussed opportunities for U.S. companies in the Omani market, highlighting information and communication technology services, semiconductors, and clean energy as areas of opportunity.&nbsp;&nbsp;The two sides also discussed ways to promote mutual prosperity, including through the Memorandum of Understanding signed last year between the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Oman Ministry of Finance to facilitate procurement of up to $500 million of U.S. goods and services for projects in Oman and through the newly-established Commercial Attaché’s office at the Embassy of Oman in Washington.The two countries explored opportunities to collaborate on demonstrating and deploying carbon capture, use, and storage, and carbon dioxide removal technologies, including via technical exchanges, investment, and trade missions. U.S.-Oman cooperation on geologic carbon was reinforced by a technical workshop hosted in Muscat in September 2023 by Oman’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Oman’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals and U.S. firm Eden GeoPower to study and demonstrate the potential of stimulated hydrogen production in Oman. The two sides committed to pursue new avenues to strengthen cooperation in developing clean energy solutions, including by leveraging U.S. private sector expertise, as well as opportunities for investment in critical minerals necessary for the clean energy transition.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Both countries followed up on environmental priorities within the framework of the U.S.-Oman Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation. They explored ways to connect researchers from Omani universities with their colleagues in American research centers and universities to enhance scientific research on clean energy.Both sides welcomed continuing cooperation on education, culture, and science, citing the selection of Oman’s first nominees for the Fulbright Visiting Scholars Program in nearly 10 years as a major milestone. The United States and Oman look forward to expanding cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges in priority fields, including artificial intelligence, downstream space applications, higher education, clean energy, inclusive education, and the media and film industries. The two sides also decided to explore new ways to increase the number of Omani students studying in the United States, and U.S. students studying in Oman.&nbsp;&nbsp;The United States and the Sultanate of Oman are committed to maintaining the exchange of high-level bilateral visits, including the goal of scheduling the next round of the Strategic Dialogue in 2025.End Text						Tags																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																																														Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																																					Energy																															Office of the Spokesperson																								Oman																								Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment
- Oman HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Oman				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Oman																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Oman during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including censorship and criminal libel and blasphemy laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; and laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although the government did not actively enforce such laws.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no credible reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices and there were no credible reports that government officials employed them.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						There were no significant reports regarding prison or detention center conditions that raised human rights concerns.Administration: The Oman Human Rights Commission (OHRC), a government-funded entity, conducted prison and detention center site visits and reviewed written complaints in conjunction with prison administrators, but the frequency of such visits was not known. The OHRC reported on human rights conditions to the sultan via the State Council. There was no ombudsperson to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees; this responsibility fell under the jurisdiction of the public prosecution, which maintained an office in Sumail Central Prison.Independent Monitoring: The law permitted monitoring visits by independent nongovernmental observers. There were no reports of independent monitoring.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements; however, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Omani Centre for Human Rights, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights, and MENA Rights Group reported the government arbitrarily arrested peaceful activists whose public criticism of the government violated the law.According to the United Kingdom-based Omani Centre for Human Rights, in December 2022, security authorities abducted lawyer Majid al-Rahili in the Muscat Governorate. Authorities held him for weeks without clarifying his place of detention or allowing him to communicate with his family or legal representation. On January 4, authorities released al-Rahili without bringing any charges against him.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law did not allow police to arrest or detain a person “without an order to this effect from a concerned legal authority” unless caught in the act. The law stipulated that police had to either release the person or refer the matter to the public prosecution within 48 hours. The law required those arrested be informed immediately of the charges against them. There was a functioning bail system. Detainees generally had prompt access to a lawyer of their choice and the state generally provided public attorneys to indigent detainees, as required by law. There were reports the government prevented some activists from promptly accessing legal representatives. Diplomatic missions reported police sometimes failed to notify the local embassy of noncitizen detainees.Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention. The government generally observed these requirements, but NGOs reported the government arbitrarily arrested peaceful activists whose public criticism of the government violated the law.On August 9, authorities detained local businessperson Hani al-Sarhani for his activities on social media platforms and his criticism of the government, including his support for Taleb al-Mamari, whose social media post criticizing the government received significant attention. A court tried al-Sarhani on October 19, sentencing him to two years in prison on charges of inciting public opinion and misuse of information technology. According to the Omani Centre for Human Rights, he was released on bail and at year’s end was waiting for the trial date for his appeal hearing to challenge the two-year sentence.On August 16, authorities detained imam Masoud al-Maqbali for public comments criticizing the government, according to the Omani Centre for Human Rights. On August 24, authorities released al-Maqbali.On September 30, the Omani Centre for Human Rights reported the government summoned and detained Talal Salmani for a video he posted online criticizing the government’s position on electricity subsidies. Social media users used the Arabic hashtag “Freedom for Talal Salmani” to draw attention to his case, but he remained in detention at year’s end.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality. The sultan could act as a court of final appeal and exercise his power of pardon as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the country’s highest legal body, which was empowered to review all judicial decisions. In August, a court sentenced Maryam al-Nuaimi for a variety of related misdemeanors, but in December the charges were dismissed on appeal. Al-Nuaimi was convicted of blasphemy in June 2022, although Sultan Haitham pardoned her in April. Her codefendant in the 2022 blasphemy case, Ali al-Ghafri, remained in prison at year’s end.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right.The judiciary enforced these rights for citizens; however, human rights organizations, including the Lebanon-based Gulf Centre for Human Rights and the Omani Centre for Human Rights, expressed concerns that occasionally activists were denied prompt access to legal representation. Some foreign embassies reported rights were not always uniformly enforced for their citizens, particularly migrant workers.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were credible reports of political prisoners or detainees. No accurate number of total detainees could be obtained due to lack of official publicly available information either from the government or NGOs. The Germany-based Omani Association of Human Rights reported on 14 cases of politically motivated summons, arrests, or other similar actions during the year. Most of the reported cases were related to freedom of expression. The government did not permit access to political prisoners by human rights or humanitarian organizations. Freedom House reported that “ordinary” detainees were generally provided with access to legal representation but that security forces did not always adhere to rules on arrest and pretrial detention, especially in vaguely defined so-called security cases. Several human rights organizations, including the Gulf Centre for Human Rights and the Omani Centre for Human Rights, expressed concerns that some activists may have been denied prompt access to legal representation.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions. There were reports from previous years that the government accessed private communications and personal data including cell phone, email, and social media exchanges, including the information used to prosecute Maryam al-Nuaimi’s 2022 blasphemy case, but no new cases were reported during the year.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for limited freedom of expression for citizens and members of the press and other media, including citizen journalists, but authorities did not always respect even these constrained rights. Journalists, high-profile figures, and writers reportedly exercised self-censorship.Freedom of Expression: The law prohibited criticism of the sultan in any form or medium, as well as any “provocative propaganda to undermine the prestige of the state,” electronic communication that “might prejudice the public order or religious values,” and “defamation of character.” The law prohibited insulting the sultan, his wife, and children. It was illegal to insult a public official or private citizen. Authorities prosecuted individuals for writing about the sultan in a way the government perceived to be negative. The law prohibited statements hostile to Islam or denigrating Islamic values, and authorities prosecuted individuals for comments insulting religion. The government censored publicly shown films, primarily for sexual content and nudity, and placed restrictions on performances in public venues. The law also prohibited dancing in restaurants and entertainment venues without a permit.The Gulf Centre for Human Rights and the Omani Association for Human Rights reported that four internet activists faced a new trial August 23 in the case known as “Ghaith spaces.” The activists (Ali al-Ghafri, Maryam al-Nuaimi, Ghaith al-Shibli, and Abdullah al-Muqbali) were sentenced in 2022 to three years in prison for “using the Internet and information technology means to produce what would prejudice religious values and public order” and “inviting [people] to participate in a meeting for the sake of opposing the Islamic religion and defaming the foundations on which it is based.” The new charges were dismissed in December.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Media did not operate freely. Authorities tolerated very limited criticism in privately owned newspapers and magazines, and editorials generally were consistent with the government’s views. Authorities required journalists to obtain a license to work; freelance journalists and citizen journalists were ineligible for a license and not recognized as journalists under the law.Headlines in both public and private print media outlets were subject to an official review and approval before publication, but specific details regarding the review process were not disclosed. Journalists and writers reported they exercised self-censorship. The law permitted the Ministry of Information to review all media products including books produced within or imported into the country. The ministry occasionally prohibited or censored material from domestic and imported publications viewed as politically, culturally, or sexually offensive.In March, independent news outlet WAF permanently shut down, with widespread speculation that the owner quit because of onerous government limitations on published content.Libel/Slander Laws: Libel and blasphemy were enforced as criminal offenses. Freedom House, for example, noted the penal code’s seven-year maximum prison sentence for slandering the sultan, his wife, or his children.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted access to the internet and censored online content. The government blocked most voice over internet protocol sites, monitored telecommunications service providers, and blocked access to numerous websites considered pornographic, or culturally or politically sensitive.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for limited freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. Gatherings of 10 or more persons in a public place were unlawful if they “endangered the public security or order” or “influenced the function of authorities.” Human rights organizations expressed concern that overly broad provisions in the penal code could further restrict the work of human rights activists and limit freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.In contrast to the government’s general restriction on freedom of assembly, authorities permitted regular protests once or twice a week across the country following the Israeli military operations in response to Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attacks.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for limited freedom of association for undefined “legitimate objectives and in a proper manner.” The government limited freedom of association by prohibiting associations whose activities it deemed “inimical to the social order” or otherwise inappropriate. Citizens joining groups deemed “harmful to national interests” could be subject to revocation of citizenship.The government required registration and approval of all association bylaws to determine whether a group served the interest of the country. The time required to register an association ranged from two months to two years. Approval time varied based on the level of preparedness of the applying organization, the subject matter of the organization, its leadership, and the organization’s mission. The law limited formal registration of nationality-based associations to one association for each nationality and restricted their activities. The government sometimes denied permission for associations to form.The law prohibited associations from fundraising without government approval, including for charitable causes. Foreign diplomatic missions were required to request meetings with nongovernmental associations through the Foreign Ministry by diplomatic note. Associations could not meet with foreign diplomatic missions and foreign organizations without prior approval from the Foreign Ministry. The government enforced this law, and all foreign-funded educational and public diplomacy programs required government review.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. Freedom House reported that some foreign workers could not leave the country without permission from their employer and risked deportation if they changed employers without documentation releasing them from their previous contract, during the time of their initial contract, typically two years.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government generally did not allow asylum seekers to remain in the country. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) personnel occasionally visited the country but did not maintain an office locally. According to UNHCR, the Omani Committee for International Humanitarian Law considered matters of refugees and displaced persons. During the year, UNHCR reported 716 previous refugee and asylum seekers mostly from Iraq but also from Syria, Pakistan, and Sudan remained in Oman.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status and the government had established a system for providing protection to refugees. The Royal Oman Police system for granting asylum and resettlement was not transparent, and the law did not specify a timeframe in which authorities were required to adjudicate an asylum application. It was an official policy not to recognize refugees from conflict zones such as Yemen, although Yemenis traveled to Oman regularly, and the government provided temporary admissions to certain Yemeni citizens seeking medical care.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to an unknown number of individuals who may not qualify as refugees. There were reports that Yemeni citizens who demonstrated they could not receive adequate care in Yemen received emergency medical care. These Yemenis and one accompanying family member per patient were offered temporary resident status in Oman during the treatment period on an ad hoc basis.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness through discrimination against women in nationality laws. Citizenship was passed only through the father. The country’s law permitted mothers to transmit citizenship to their children only if the father was unknown or the father was a former Omani national. The government could grant citizenship to a minor child born from an Omani mother and a foreign father in limited circumstances.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law did not provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage. The sultan retained ultimate authority on all foreign and domestic matters. Except for the military and other security forces, all citizens age 21 or older had the right to vote for candidates for the Majlis al-Shura and municipal councils.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities. In October approximately 500,000 citizens participated in elections for the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), or lower house of parliament. Electoral commissions reviewed potential candidates against a set of objective educational and character criteria (at least a high school education and no criminal history or mental illness) before they allowed candidates’ names on the ballot. The Ministry of Interior administered and closely monitored campaign materials and events. There were no notable or widespread allegations of fraud or improper government interference in the voting process. The government did not allow independent monitoring of the elections, but invited some international journalists to report on election day events. The OHRC stated it was a member of the Main Elections Committee and a key partner in overseeing the electoral process.In June, the Omani Centre for Human Rights reported that the government excluded several candidates from the Shura Council elections for undisclosed reasons, including Majid al-Rahili, Awad al-Suwafi, and former council member Ahmed al-Haddabi.Political Parties and Political Participation: The law prohibited political parties. The law allowed the revocation of citizenship for anyone who joined an organization, including political parties, deemed harmful to national interests, but there were no reports the law was applied.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively.Corruption: Isolated reported allegations of government corruption included government procurement offices and state-owned enterprises. For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						No domestic or international human rights groups operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were often cooperative and responsive to the views of UN representatives and UN-recognized regional organizations, but they were rarely cooperative and responsive to the views of independent NGOs.International NGOs reported the government restricted access and operations in the country, and there was no presence of local, regional, or international human rights organizations. Two of the main Omani human rights organizations, the Omani Centre for Human Rights and the Omani Association for Human Rights, were based in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. They reported they were not allowed to conduct their work within Oman and they had legal disputes with Omani authorities. The Lebanon-based Gulf Centre for Human Rights reported the same regarding their lack of access to the country. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Freedom House, and other international NGOs reportedly relied heavily on the Omani Centre for Human Rights, the Omani Association for Human Rights, and Gulf Centre for Human Rights for information.Government Human Rights Bodies: The OHRC, a government-funded commission made up of members from the public, private, and academic sectors, reported on human rights to the sultan via the State Council. The OHRC also published an annual report summarizing the types of complaints it received and how it handled those complaints.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalized rape with penalties of up to 15 years in prison and the government generally enforced the law effectively. The law did not criminalize spousal rape. The law criminalized assault, battery, and aggravated assault, which carried a maximum sentence of three years in prison; however, the law did not specifically address domestic violence, and judicial protection orders prohibiting domestic violence did not exist. The government operated a hotline for reporting incidents of domestic violence and a shelter for survivors. Reports from the Ministry of Social Development indicated police responded promptly and professionally. Media and the Omani Centre for Human Rights reported that Hayam al-Shukili was killed by her husband, who then burned her body inside their car, on January 1 or 2. Police arrested the husband on January 2, but no other details were available at year’s end.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): Instances of FGM/C were reportedly rare. The law prohibited health practitioners from conducting “traditional practices,” including FGM/C, that were harmful to a child’s health. The 2019 Executive Regulations for the Child Law included “disfiguring female genital organs” as one of these harmful practices and the law was generally enforced.Discrimination: The law prohibited gender-based discrimination against citizens, but the law did not always provide for the same legal status and rights for women as for men. Local interpretations of Islamic law and practice of cultural traditions in social and legal institutions discriminated against women. In some personal-status cases, such as divorce, a woman’s testimony was equal to half that of a man. The law favored male heirs in adjudicating inheritance. Despite legal protections for women from forced marriage, deeply embedded tribal practices often controlled women’s choice of spouse.Until April, the Ministry of Interior required both male and female citizens to obtain permission to marry most foreigners. A royal decree adopted in April allowed citizens to marry foreign nationals without the state’s permission; however, local culture and tradition, particularly the role of male guardian, reportedly made it much more difficult for women to marry foreign nationals than for men.The law provided for transmission of citizenship at birth if the father was a citizen, if the mother was a citizen and the father was unknown, or if a child of unknown parents was found in the country. Women married to noncitizens could not transmit citizenship to their children and could not sponsor their noncitizen husband’s or children’s presence in the country.The law provided that any adult, male or female, could become a citizen by applying for citizenship and subsequently residing legally in the country for 20 years, or for 15 or 10 years for foreign husbands or wives of citizens, respectively, if they had a son.Government policy provided women with equal opportunities for education. According to the Special Categories Bulletin for the year 2022 issued by the National Center for Statistics and Information (the most recent information available), the previous gender gap in higher educational attainment had been inverted as women earn 60 percent of bachelor’s or higher degrees.Although some educated women held positions of authority in government, business, and media, many women faced job discrimination, including in hiring, advancement, and treatment in the workplace. For example, a woman lawyer reported in several instances judges told her to leave the courtroom because she did not wear a hijab, or headscarf. The law entitled women to paid maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The government, the largest employer of women, observed such regulations, as did many private sector employers. Labor laws did not allow women to work in jobs deemed hazardous or arduous, although no specifically named occupations were closed to women.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities. Unmarried women did not always have access to family planning and information. Health clinics disseminated information on family planning under the guidance of the Ministry of Health. Some forms of birth control, including condoms, were available at pharmacies and supermarkets; however, medically prescribed contraceptives were generally not available for unmarried women. Menstrual health care was available for citizens and menstrual care products were readily available in pharmacies and grocery stores. The government provided free childbirth services to citizens within the framework of universal health care. Prenatal and postnatal care was readily available and used. Abortion was illegal unless the mother’s life was in danger. While survivors of sexual violence could seek medical treatment at public health-care facilities, the government did not provide emergency contraception or dedicated sexual and reproductive health services to survivors; postexposure prophylaxis was widely available in the medical system but was not necessarily provided as part of the clinical management of rape.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law stated that all citizens were equal and prohibited discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, language, religion, sect, domicile, or social status. The government generally enforced the law effectively.The country was an ethnically diverse society. There were no reports of racial or ethnic violence.																																				Children										Child Abuse: There were laws against child abuse, and the government enforced the laws effectively. According to the law, any concerned citizen was required to report child abuse, and each governorate had an interagency committee that would meet to discuss the allegations and remove the child from parental custody if appropriate until the allegations were investigated. The government operated a child abuse hotline.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The age of legal marriage was 18 and the government generally enforced the law. The courts permitted a person to marry younger if deemed in their interest. There were reports that child marriage sometimes occurred in rural communities.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. The minimum age of consensual sex was 18. There were no known reports of sexual exploitation of children.																																				Antisemitism										There was no remaining indigenous Jewish population in the country. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents. After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli operation in Gaza, local press carried antisemitic articles and caricatures.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults and cross-dressing. The government did not actively enforce such laws.Neutral laws were not disproportionately applied to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons. There were no credible efforts to rescind discriminatory laws that targeted LGBTQI+ persons.Violence and Harassment: There were no known reports that police or other government agents incited, perpetrated, condoned, or tolerated violence or harassment against LGBTQI+ individuals or those reporting such abuse. There were no known instances of violence or harassment by nonstate actors against LGBTQI+ persons or those reporting such abuse.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics, but due to prevailing religious and culture norms, there was little data on discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons. The law did not explicitly recognize LGBTQI+ couples and their families or grant them rights equal to those of other persons. In January, the Grand Mufti, Ahmed al-Khalili, sent a message to his followers encouraging anti-LGBTQI+ forces to push back against civilizations that spread homosexuality “with all force, including on children.”Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports that forced or involuntary so-called conversion therapy was practiced on adults or children to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. There were no reports that surgeries were performed on nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Public discussion of sexual orientation and gender identity remained a social taboo. There were no known LGBTQI+ organizations active in the country, although regional human rights organizations focused on the human rights of LGBTQI+ citizens. Authorities took steps to block LGBTQI+-related internet content as well as international films that featured LGBTQI+ characters. The Consumer Protection Agency confiscated school supplies and toys with rainbow colors, citing a threat to public morals.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities had access to education, employment, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis. The law required such access, and the government generally enforced the law effectively, although some older buildings, including government buildings and schools, did not fully conform to the law.Children with disabilities attended school through the secondary level. Most attended segregated schools, but some children with disabilities attended school with peers without disabilities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Health-care facilities were required by law to report the results of HIV tests to the government. Citizens with HIV or AIDS were provided with medical care. While they did not face official repercussions, social stigma due to their medical status remained if it became public. Foreigners seeking residency and employment in the country were tested for HIV and AIDS; those who tested positive would be denied residency permission and required to leave the country, but there were no known reports of such the policy being enforced.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for workers to form and join unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes, and prohibited antiunion discrimination, but with restrictions. The law provided for one general federation, the General Federation of Oman Workers, to which all unions were required to affiliate, and which represented unions in regional and international fora. No independent organized labor unions existed. The law required a minimum of 25 workers to form a union, regardless of company size. The law required an absolute majority of an enterprise’s employees to approve a strike with notice to employers three weeks in advance of the intended strike date. Strikes were not permitted in the gas and oil industries. The law prohibited employers from firing or imposing other penalties on employees for union activity; however, employers rarely faced penalties for dismissing workers for organizing efforts. It was difficult to legally prove that the firing was for union organizing, and the law did not require reinstatement for workers fired for union activity. Government-approved unions were open to all legal workers regardless of nationality; however, the law prohibited members of the armed forces, other public security institutions, government employees, domestic workers, as well as individuals convicted of criminal activity or acts against the security of the country or national unity from forming or joining unions.The law prohibited unions from accepting grants or financial assistance from any source without the government’s approval. The government generally enforced applicable laws effectively and respected the rights to collectively bargain. Penalties were commensurate with those for other laws involving civil rights but were rarely enforced.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at:  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for minimum wage for citizens but not for noncitizens. The minimum wage did not apply to small businesses employing fewer than five persons, dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories of manual labor. The minimum wage exceeded the World Bank International Poverty Line. The law provided for a regular workweek of 40 hours reduced from 45 hours by a new labor law issued in July. The law continued to require 125 percent of regular pay for overtime work and 150 percent of regular pay for overtime night work.Occupational Safety and Health: There were occupational safety and health (OSH) standards generally appropriate for the main industries in the country. The government proactively identified unsafe conditions and carried out inspections. Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment. There were reports the government did not always enforce standards for low-wage foreign workers.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government effectively enforced the minimum wage, hour, and OSH laws for citizens, but neither wage and hour nor occupational safety and health regulations applied to domestic workers. Penalties for violations were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud, and were sometimes applied against violators.The Ministry of Labor was the agency that enforced wage, hour, and OSH laws. The number of labor inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance and inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.Foreign workers were vulnerable to poor, dangerous, or exploitative working conditions. There were reports that migrant laborers in some firms and households worked more than 12 hours a day without a day off for below-market wages. Employers often canceled the employment contracts of seriously sick or injured foreign workers, forcing them to return to their countries of origin or remain in the country illegally. Some labor inspections focused on enforcing visa violations and deporting those in an irregular work-visa status rather than verifying safe and adequate work conditions. Employers had a great deal of control over workers in the informal sector, particularly domestic workers who were not covered by existing labor laws. Although expatriates were not legally required to obtain a “no-objection certificate” to secure new work upon completion or termination of their employment contracts, workers who left their jobs without the consent of their employer could be punished with fines, deportation, or re-entry bans.There were no maximum workhour limits for domestic workers nor any mandatory rest periods, although the contract between the employer and worker could specify such requirements. There were some reports that domestic workers were forced to work without adequate rest periods. Separate domestic employment regulations obligated the employer to provide domestic workers with free local medical treatment throughout the contract period. Penalties for noncompliance with health regulations were insufficient to deter violations. Some domestic workers were subjected to abusive conditions.World Economics estimated the size of the country’s informal economy was approximately 20 percent of GDP. The government did not publish statistics on informal employment; however, some workers were employed informally in making handicrafts, small scale retail, and on family farms. The government did not monitor or enforce labor laws for the informal sector.																																				    							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- Digital Press Briefing with Timothy Lenderking, Special Envoy for Yemen Timothy A. Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for YemenDubai HubMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Dubai Regional Media Hub.  I would like to welcome our participants joining us from the Middle East and around the world for this on-the-record briefing with U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking.  During this call, Special Envoy Lenderking will discuss issues related to maritime security and efforts to de-escalate tensions in the Red Sea.   After opening remarks, Special Envoy Lenderking will take questions from participating journalists.  We are pleased to offer simultaneous interpretation for this briefing in Arabic.  We request that everyone keep this in mind and speak slowly. I’ll now turn it over to Special Envoy Lenderking for some opening remarks.  Sir, the floor is yours. MR LENDERKING:  Good afternoon.  Thank you, Hala, and thank you all for joining us today.  Ramadan kareem for those of you celebrating.  I’m pleased to be joining you all from Muscat, where I’ve had excellent meetings today, including with Oman’s foreign minister, His Excellency Sayyid Badr.  During my meetings here, I expressed my appreciation for the important role Oman has played in advancing peace in Yemen and for the importance of this bilateral relationship to the United States. Yesterday I traveled to Saudi Arabia for additional engagements with partners helping lead the effort to promote regional stability.  In all of these discussions, the bottom line is this:  The Houthis must immediately halt their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden because they are undermining progress on the Yemen peace process and complicating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemenis and others in need, including the Palestinian people.  We discussed steps to secure Houthi de-escalation and renew focus on securing a durable peace for the Yemeni people.  I also had a chance to congratulate the new Yemen foreign minister before he traveled to Aden.   Houthi attacks must stop so we can return our focus to the Yemen peace effort and direct our full attention towards supporting the Palestinians and their legitimate aspirations for a two-state solution, which Houthi behavior, frankly, is complicating and undermining.  Houthi actions endanger the lives of civilian seafarers, disrupt the flow of food and other essential commodities to people worldwide, undermine navigational rights and freedoms, and irreparably harm the marine environment and sensitive ecosystems that Yemeni fishermen depend on. The Houthi attacks are raising prices for consumers and jeopardizing the regional development goals of countries in the region that depend on shipping and international trade, including Oman.  These attacks are also not helping Yemen, which remains in dire need of humanitarian and economic support.   The Houthis claim that their actions are a response to the conflict in Gaza, but their attacks only hurt ordinary people in the region.  You can care about and support the Palestinians and still oppose the Houthi attacks.  These negative impacts are due exclusively to Houthi recklessness and Iran’s efforts to sow instability across the region.  These attacks serve nothing more than a narrow Houthi agenda.  Iran continues to enable these attacks through arms funding and intelligence support to the Houthis, reminding the world that they are the leading sponsor of terrorism.   Let’s be clear.  The Houthis’ attacks against civilians and commercial ships are acts of terrorism.  This is further exemplified by their seizure last November and continued unlawful detention of the MV Galaxy Leader and its 25-member crew.  The United States has been very clear that we seek de-escalation in the Red Sea and that the Houthis’ attacks cannot continue.  When their attacks stop, so too will coalition actions in the Red Sea and Yemen. Our commitment to the peace process in Yemen remains unshakable.  The Houthis could have avoided global condemnation, including recently by the UN Security Council, by ceasing their illegal attacks.  They can still de-escalate and return to the path of peace.  But they have left the international community with no choice.  While there remains broad international support for an inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni peace process to find a lasting solution to the country’s conflict, successful negotiations are extremely difficult as long as the Houthis continue their aggressive actions.  Absent a political settlement, we fear Yemen’s humanitarian and economic crises will only get worse.  But we cannot let the Yemeni people continue to suffer.  The United States is the world’s leading donor of humanitarian assistance for Yemen.  The United States has provided almost $6 billion in assistance since the conflict began.   Let me stop there.  I’m happy to take your questions.  Thank you.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Special Envoy.  And we’ll start the Q&amp;A with a pre-submitted question, and we had two Omani journalists that asked similar questions, so I will take questions from both of them.  It was from Mohammad Afar from the Muscat Daily and Shaded Al Musalmy from Oman Observer, and their questions are:  “What are the main challenges that are facing peacemaking and hindering negotiations given all the efforts by Oman and the United States, and considering Oman’s history of negotiating with the Houthis on various issues?”  MR LENDERKING:  Thank you so much, Mohammad and Shaded.  I really appreciate that question.  This is exactly what has brought me to Muscat today and to Saudi Arabia yesterday.  These two countries in particular have such an important role to play.  They both border on Yemen, as you know, and have very, very strong interests in a solution in Yemen.  I couldn’t think of two better partners, quite honestly, to work with, and that’s why I am here so often – more than 50 trips to this region since I was appointed envoy three years ago. And I think what we have to do is seize the moment that was presented to us before October 7th.  There is a roadmap for peace that the parties have agreed to.  It may be imperfect.  It may have challenges.  But the fact that the key conflict parties have agreed to it – it’s been endorsed by the Omanis and by the UN of course – gives us an opportunity to take advantage of these principles to push the peace process forward.  And that’s why I’m so committed to seeing that this happens, that not every crisis in the region is going to be able to be resolved before Yemen’s peace effort can go forward.  And that’s why we need to seize this moment now, building on the progress that has been made, the ongoing truce, the possibility of releasing more prisoners, the possibility of getting Yemen’s economy back on track.  These are such important aspects that I think we need to push toward.  It’s going to be a team effort.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Special Envoy.  Now we will go to the live queue to Elizabeth Hagedorn from Al-Monitor.  Elizabeth, please go ahead and ask your question.  You can unmute yourself.  Go ahead.  QUESTION:  Hi, thanks.  Tim, do you see any evidence that the SDGT designation or the U.S.-led military strikes have deterred the Houthis or changed their behavior?  And then if I could just add, have you – how would you characterize the Saudi-Houthi peace process at this stage?  Are the talks indefinitely postponed?  MR LENDERKING:  Thanks so much, Elizabeth.  I know how closely you have been following these issues and thank you for your interest.  I do think, from our point of view, that the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization in February has put additional pressure on their ability to fundraise, and it is – it was our intent to put this additional pressure on the Houthis as a way of signaling our desire to move their behavior away from the focus on the Red Sea back toward the peace process.  And I do think, from what I’m seeing, that there is this pressure that is being felt.   But my hope as the envoy for Yemen is that we can find diplomatic offramps to find ways to de-escalate and allow us to pull back eventually the designation and of course to end the military strikes on Houthis’ military capability.  We favor a diplomatic solution.  We know that there is no military solution, and in that commitment we are joined by all members of the P5 – Russia, China, France, the UK – united in this goal, and I think that’s very helpful for listeners to know that there’s a strong consensus in the international community and among key players to support the peace effort going forward. MODERATOR:  And back to a pre-submitted question from Saudi’s Almughtarib TV, from Yaser Almuaalemi, and the question is:  “Is your visit to Saudi Arabia intended to signal a de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Yemen?”  MR LENDERKING:  Hello, Yaser.  Thank you very much.  In no way are we de-escalating our involvement.  What we want to see is a de-escalation of the tensions that we’re seeing not only in Yemen and the Red Sea, but throughout the region.  And of course, my focus is particularly on the ways that we could move beyond the current crisis in the Red Sea and get back to the Yemen peace effort.  As I say, there’s a fundamental foundation, a very, very important foundation in the roadmap that was agreed to in December after a year or more of painstaking work.   And I think tying back to Elizabeth’s question earlier, the fact that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have been able to make progress, Saudi Arabia mediating between the Houthis and the Yemen Government, multiple visits to Sana’a and to Riyadh by both sides, building confidence and driving agreement on a roadmap, gives us some hope that we can use this moment to get beyond current tensions and refocus on what the Yemeni people need, which is an end to this nine-year civil war.   MODERATOR:  We’ll go back to the live queue, to Jeff Seldin from Voice of America.  Jeff, feel free to unmute yourself and ask your question.  QUESTION:  Thank you very much for doing this.  I’m wondering, in your talks the last couple of days, how much concern there’s been, how much talk there’s been about the Israeli airstrike on the embassy complex in Damascus, Iran’s embassy complex, and whether – and what that means for the region in terms of perhaps dragging it into a wider or escalated war, and specifically what it might mean for the Houthis given their relationship with Iran and whether they may escalate their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.   MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you for that.  That was a significant development, and of course it has – that issue has come up in my stops on this trip.  This attack took place while I was on the road.  I was not briefed on it.  I believe that the White House has made very clear that the United States was not briefed on it.  This was not our strike.  And I think you can continue to look toward Washington for further commentary on that. What I’ve sought to do is keep the Yemen focus first and foremost – that whatever is happening in the region, we need to keep a laser focus on the needs of the Yemeni people.  They’ve suffered through nine years of war, of deprivation, of destroyed infrastructure, of displacement, and I think harnessing the regional efforts in a positive direction toward peace is exactly where this administration wants to go.  We have to be able – to be able to push efforts on peace in Yemen just as we’re working on multiple other crises in the region.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  Now to Farida Ahmed from the pre-submitted questions, and she is from South24 Center for News in Yemen, and her question is:  “The American response to the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has yet to achieve its objectives.  What are the next steps for the United States in light of the Houthi escalation, and will this escalation affect the expected negotiations process and your efforts as a special envoy to Yemen alongside Hans Grundberg?”  MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you so much again for reaffirming the importance of the peace effort.  I do think that the efforts, the pressure that the United States and a coalition of other countries – Operation Prosperity Guardian, the coalition that is conducting military strikes on Houthi military capability to destroy that capability that the Houthis use to attack ships – it has no broader purpose than that very specific goal – plus the designation of the Houthis does put additional pressure on that – on the Houthis and may help discourage them from continuing down this path. But nevertheless, I do think that ultimately diplomatic solutions will have to be found, and again, that’s why the importance of consulting with regional partners who have such a strong stake in a peaceful outcome to this conflict – Oman, Saudi Arabia, and others.  I will travel elsewhere in the region later this month.  That’s why this is so important, I think, and why I refer to this being a team effort, because I think the other countries in the region have such a strong stake in a peaceful outcome.  We all want Yemen to be a source of stability for the region.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  And we’ll take one more question from the pre-submitted questions, from the Oman News Agency from Khalid Al Busaidi, and the question is:  “Since the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea is linked with the genocide in Gaza, why is the U.S. administration continuing to supply Israel with weapons instead of forcing Israel to end the brutal war on Gaza after the shocking numbers of casualties and famine?” MR LENDERKING:  Khalid, thank you so much for that question.  I know that’s very much on people’s minds, and I would refer you to Secretary Blinken’s long statement on the issue of weapons sales to Israel.  I think it’s quite comprehensive, but one of the points that he makes is that we do have a longstanding commitment to Israel’s security and to helping ensure its ability to defend itself.  That, of course, does not mean rampant attacks on civilians, which the United States has called out and is seeking to end through very, very forceful engagement with the parties in that conflict.   Again, I think let us do our utmost together to ensure that regional conflicts do not impinge, threaten, or undermine the effort that we’re trying to do to build on these foundations that we have laid over the last couple of years in Yemen.  And let me just remind everybody, despite the attacks on the Red Sea, there is a truce in fact being observed in Yemen.  The fighting that we had seen that was so raging up to two years ago ended with the truce, and I think it’s very important for people to appreciate that internally in Yemen, fighting has not returned.  That de-escalation has allowed more humanitarian supplies to reach Yemen, for Yemenis to travel abroad on their own airlines for the first time from Sana’a since 2016, for prisoners to be released, and for some efforts to begin to be made toward rebuilding Yemen’s economy.   We need to pull all of these lines of effort together in a united fashion, joined with efforts from the region, focused and determined, to get us to ending this war in a durable way and promoting Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue which ensures that Yemen’s – that the Yemeni people can take charge of their own future. MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  And now we’re back to the live queue to Tawfiq Ali from Independent Arabia.  Tawfiq, please feel free to unmute yourself and ask your question.  You’re still on mute, Tawfiq.  Go ahead and unmute, and feel free to ask your question.  Okay, I don’t think we’re able to hear Tawfiq.  Tawfiq, feel free to write your question and we’ll try to ask it on your behalf. QUESTION:  Oh, hello.  Hello, hello.  I will speak Arabic, okay?   MODERATOR:  Actually, we can only take questions in English, but feel free to write – (in Arabic).  But the questions will be asked only in English. QUESTION:  (In Arabic.) MODERATOR:  I’m sorry?  Okay, thank you.  All right, I will go back to the pre-submitted questions and ask a question &#8212; QUESTION:  I will be back shortly, okay?   MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you – thank you, Tawfiq. All right, so back to the pre-submitted questions.  Huthaifa Al Amiri from ymn-now.com:  “Is there any breakthrough in the Yemen peace process given that the Houthis continue their terrorist activities in the Red Sea?” MR LENDERKING:  I think most importantly we’re looking for and working toward the durable ceasefire in the Yemeni-Yemeni talks that we so much want to achieve, and I think that the UN Security Council and the countries in the region want to achieve.  It’s very difficult to take advantage of the momentum that we have made in Yemen over the last few years given these attacks on the Red Sea.  Unfortunately, these attacks against international shipping have undermined the credibility of the Houthis as a good-faith actor in Yemen.   Let us see whether they can find a way to release the crew of the Galaxy Leader – 25 sailors who were detained in November of last year who are still being held.  There is no justification for it.  They have no connection to Israel; their ship had no connection to Israel.  This is a step that the Houthis could take to show good faith to the international community that they do have an intent to de-escalate, they do have a commitment to do – to de-escalate.  Steps like these could generate a lot of goodwill, will be noticed and welcomed by the parties, and can be used to contribute to the peace process going forward. MODERATOR:  All right.  And now Monalisa Freiha from Annahar asks:  “Does Washington have an assessment of the impact of the U.S. campaign against Yemen’s Houthis?  Are there any other options on the table to deter attacks by the group?” MR LENDERKING:  So as I’ve said, I think that the pressure campaign is something that is having its intended effect in the sense that those targets that the military is striking, whether they be underground facilities or coastal radars, they are being destroyed.  They are hampering the ability of the Houthis to continue to launch attacks on Red Sea shipping.  And by the way, these attacks are hurting ships of many, many different countries – I think more than 70 attacks over the last several months.  They’ve sunk a ship; they’ve killed three mariners.  I mean, this is not acceptable behavior for any party to exert on international waterways and threatening freedom of navigation.   So I do think that we need to – we collectively need to continue this pressure, but at the same time continue to talk to our allies and partners in the region about ways to de-escalate, and looking to defuse this tense situation as soon as we can. MODERATOR:  Now Abdulhadi Habtor from Asharq Al Awsat newspaper asks:  “How do you respond to the recent Houthi actions regarding the issuance of a new currency denomination of a hundred rials?  And is there any change in the U.S. position regarding the peace process?” which I believe you’ve answered.  Over to you, sir. MR LENDERKING:  Thank you for that question, referring to the introduction of a new coin in some parts of Yemen.  What this shows us is that there is economic pressure that the Houthis are facing.  I’ve talked about the economic pressure that the Houthis are placing on international shipping, which is harming regional economies, but it’s also harming Yemen.  And in that sense I would point to a 15 percent reduction in ships being able to dock at Hudaydah Port, which is a lifeblood for the Yemeni people.  These actions on Red Sea shipping have obstructed humanitarian supplies from reaching the Yemeni people.  And that’s why we say that these attacks are misplaced and why they’re reckless and indiscriminate.   And so I think what this introduction of a new coin shows is economic pressure that is being felt by the Houthis.  There is a liquidity crisis in Yemen.  What this all points to is the importance of returning Yemen to a period of stability where its economic resources can be used to promote stability and benefit for all Yemenis, where salaries can be paid according to the terms of the roadmap, where Yemen’s fisheries are not endangered by attacks on oil tankers and other ships that could threaten these vital ecosystems.  And that’s, again, why we need to make this push toward the Yemen peace effort, which will help the humanitarian situation and also help Yemen – Yemenis rebuild their economy. MODERATOR:  Now Lama Alhamawi from Arab News asks:  “You met with officials in Riyadh this week to discuss the recent Houthi attacks on vessels on the Red Sea.  Who did you meet with, and what were the results of those meetings?” MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you.  I continue to meet with a broad range of officials in Riyadh.  I did meet – I did mention the Yemen foreign minister, who was on his way to Aden, and that was a pleasure to meet him for the first time in this new capacity.  And of course, we welcome the presence of the legitimate Yemeni Government in Yemen, where it can connect with the Yemeni people, I think do projects that are of benefit to the Yemeni people, and demonstrate its accountability to the Yemeni people.  I also do meet with a broad array of Saudi officials and other Yemenis who may be found in Riyadh at the times that I am there.  I think all these consultations are extremely important in narrowing the differences that may exist between the conflict parties and ensuring that the international community is fully behind a genuine and sustained peace effort in Yemen, that these efforts are coordinated and focused and determined. MODERATOR:  Now Amina Zaki from Dostor asks:  “Is there cooperation with Arab countries and Egypt to confront the challenges in the Red Sea?” MR LENDERKING:  Well, thank you so much.  Of course, we talk about Yemen as a regional issue, and indeed it is; while Yemen is connected by border with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and those two countries have a special stake, the Egyptians have had longstanding interest in Yemen.  And we see that Yemen’s stability is a benefit to all countries in the Middle East.  And so that’s why I think the regional effort is so important to what we are doing.  We welcomed Algeria on the Security Council, for example, recently, and we’ve had very productive conversations with all the members of the Security Council about the need to push Yemen peace efforts forward.  The Egyptian economy is taking a terrible hit as a result of attacks on the Red Sea, with revenues from the Suez Canal decreasing by 50 percent.  And this is why we say that the – that the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping have such a negative impact, and why that impact is spread out and being felt by ordinary people, ordinary consumers, and obstructing the movement of fuel, food, medicine to people who need it around this entire region. MODERATOR:  All right, we just have time for just a couple more quick questions, if you have time, sir.  From Jamila Alabri from Atheer in Oman, and she asks:  “If the attacks on ships continue in the future, will America continue its attacks?  And are there clear statistics on the losses resulting from the rerouting of shipping routes and ports?” MR LENDERKING:  There are some terrific websites and a lot of open-source reporting on the impact of the attacks on Red Sea shipping.  We look at those quite extensively ourselves.  Every single country almost in the region is impacted in one way or the other, in a negative way – a loss of revenues, blockage of essential commodities, driving up of insurance costs, of fuel costs.  The diversion of ships from going through the Red Sea and going around Africa instead adds millions of dollars in fees that is going to be passed on to consumers and to ordinary people in each of these countries, and it’s a shame to see this kind of impact continue when it’s not necessary to resolving the conflict in Gaza. So again, I think that’s why we point to the urgency of ending these attacks on Red Sea shipping, returning the focus to the Yemeni peace process. MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ve unfortunately run out of time, so I’m sorry for those who have not been able to get their questions answered.  But we’ll turn the floor back to Special Envoy Lenderking for any closing remarks, sir. MR LENDERKING:  Hala and colleagues, thank you so much for organizing this call today, and thank you to the many callers who called in from periodicals and publications and organizations from around the region.  I value very much this conversation, I look forward to further opportunities, and once again, the United States, very committed to the peace effort in Yemen.  We must stay focused and committed, we must consult our partners, and think of the needs of the Yemeni people first and foremost.  Ramadan kareem to all of you.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  That concludes today’s call.  I would like to thank the special envoy for joining us, and thank all of our colleagues from the media for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, please do contact the Dubai Regional Media Hub at DubaiMediaHub@state.gov.  Thank you for joining us for this important briefing today, and have a lovely rest of your day. 
- U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Lenderking’s Travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman																																		Media Note																														April 1, 2024																																							U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking is traveling to Saudi Arabia and Oman this week to meet with partners to discuss the need for an immediate cessation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which are undermining progress on the Yemen peace process and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen and other countries in need.The United States remains firmly committed to supporting a durable peace in Yemen and alleviating the complex humanitarian and economic crises harming the Yemeni people. The United States supports a return to UN-led peace efforts once the Houthis halt their indiscriminate attacks.Special Envoy Lenderking will meet with regional counterparts to discuss the steps to de-escalate the current situation and renew focus on securing a durable peace for the Yemeni people.						Tags																					Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration																																Humanitarian Aid																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Oman																																Peace																																							Red Sea																																																					Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance																															Saudi Arabia																																Seas																																							United Nations																															Yemen
- Joint Communiqué of the United States-Oman Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs and Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following communiqué was released by the Governments of the United States of America and the Sultanate of Oman on the occasion of the inaugural meeting of the Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs and the fourth meeting of the Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation.Begin text:On February 19, 2024, the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the United States of America (Governments) held the inaugural meeting of the Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs (Subcommittee) established under the United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the fourth meeting of the Joint Forum on Environmental Cooperation established under the United States-Oman Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation (MOU).  The MOU was negotiated in parallel with the FTA and recognizes the importance of strengthening capacity to protect the environment while promoting sustainable economic development, in concert with the expanded bilateral trade relationship as a result of the FTA.The meetings serve as an important opportunity to continue and enhance the longstanding bilateral relationship between the United States and Oman, and to highlight a shared commitment to environmental protection and the sustainable use of natural resources.The Oman delegation included representatives from the Environment Authority; Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Investment; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Water Resources.  The United States delegation included representatives from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Muscat, U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service.The Subcommittee reviewed the Parties’ progress in implementing obligations under the Environment Chapter (Chapter 17) of the FTA by exchanging information regarding recent actions each Party has taken to: (1) establish high levels of environmental protection; (2) effectively enforce environmental laws and regulations; and (3) provide opportunities for public participation with respect to the implementation of the Environment Chapter.In this regard, the Governments exchanged information and views regarding respective and global efforts to: tackle the climate crisis; strengthen marine species conservation, including through combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and implementing the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement; promote circular economy approaches, including with respect to waste management and plastic pollution; and combat wildlife trafficking and support the implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).The Joint Forum reviewed the implementation of the MOU and discussed environmental cooperation projects completed under the 2018-2021 Plan of Action on Environmental Cooperation, including activities on protected area management, sea turtle conservation, implementation of CITES, combating wildlife trafficking, and disaster management and emergency preparedness.The Joint Forum also approved the 2024-2027 Plan of Action, which includes the following priorities for environmental cooperation: protecting wildlife and combating wildlife trafficking; tackling the climate crisis; combating plastic and air pollution; strengthening environmental laws and enforcement; improving disaster management response; and advancing inclusiveness in the development, implementation, and enforcement of the Governments’ respective domestic environmental laws, regulations, and policies.The Subcommittee and Joint Forum held a joint public session on February 20, consistent with relevant requirements in Chapter 17 of the FTA.  The public session included civil society and private sector representatives.  The Governments updated the public about their respective efforts to implement Chapter 17 and to strengthen environmental cooperation under the MOU.  Public participants had the opportunity to engage directly with government officials by offering comments and asking questions about implementation of the FTA Chapter 17 and the MOU.End text.
- Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn’s Travel to Oman, Ghana, and Kenya Office of the SpokespersonActing Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Jennifer R. Littlejohn will travel to Oman, Ghana, and Kenya from February 16 to February 29, 2024.  During her visit, she will discuss nature and marine conservation, plastic pollution, the climate crisis, deforestation, nature crimes, civil and commercial space activities, and the sustainable blue economy.  She will co-represent the United States with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative at meetings in Oman focused on Free Trade Agreement Environment Chapter implementation and on environmental cooperation.  In Ghana, she will meet with partners, visit U.S.-supported projects helping to rebuild and protect Ghana’s coastal fisheries, and engage with university students studying environmental issues.  In Kenya, she will lead the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth UN Environment Assembly to promote global cooperation to address shared environmental challenges, promote gender equality; and address global issues such as the climate, biodiversity, and pollution crises.  She will also discuss opportunities for space cooperation with Kenyan officials.For media inquiries, please contact oes-press@state.gov.
- U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Dyer’s Travel to Oman Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons Cindy Dyer traveled to Muscat, Oman from January 20-23, 2024.In Oman, Ambassador Dyer met with a range of government officials and organizations to learn more about the government’s efforts to combat human trafficking, and promote victim identification and protection efforts, including for domestic servitude.  Ambassador Dyer discussed with her Omani counterparts their endeavors to criminally investigate reports of domestic worker abuse and prosecute and convict labor traffickers, particularly those who exploit migrant workers.Learn more about the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons or follow the office on Twitter,  Facebook,  and Instagram .  Read Understanding Human Trafficking to learn more about trafficking in persons.For additional information, contact the Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at TIPOutreach@state.gov.
- Oman HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Oman				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Oman																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Oman																																												Oman				Overview:  Oman is an important regional counterterrorism (CT) partner.  The nation remained concerned about the conflict in Yemen and the potential for AQAP and ISIS-Yemen to threaten its land and maritime borders.  Omani and U.S. officials regularly engaged on efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism.  Oman sought training and equipment from the U.S. government, other countries, and commercial entities to support its efforts to control its land, air, and maritime borders.  The country welcomed U.S. security assistance to improve its crisis management capacity, as well as its CT tactics and procedures, and it requested training in CT financing and cybersecurity.  Oman issued statements condemning terrorist attacks around the world in 2022.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  On February 3, a third-country national violent extremist followed a U.S. citizen to his apartment building in Muscat and attacked and injured him with a knife.  Omani authorities later captured the violent extremist and deported him to his home country.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  There were no changes to Oman’s counterterrorism legislation in 2022.Local capacity and a challenging operating environment owing to Oman’s extensive coastline and long, remote borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen remain obstacles for counterterrorism investigations, crisis response, and border security capabilities.  Nevertheless, Oman had sufficient communication and coordination among its many CT-related agencies and National Security Council.  The Sultan’s Special Forces and the Royal Oman Police (ROP) Special Task Force are Oman’s primary tactical counterterrorism response forces.  The Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service, the Internal Security Service, and ROP’s Special Branch play key roles in securing Oman from terrorist threats.  Omani authorities have developed specific plans to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against soft targets.Oman recognizes the need to improve its counterterrorism capabilities and the value of U.S. counterterrorism, military, and law enforcement training and assistance.  The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program targeted skills related to crisis management and advanced counterterrorism operations and response.  Omani officials from the ROP and other agencies participated in ATA training.  The Omani military received U.S. training and equipment to help interdict the movement of people, weapons, and illicit materials across the Yemen border and through sea shipping lanes. The Ministry of Defense applied for Section 1226 Border Security Reimbursement for operational expenditures related to border security.The ROP Coast Guard, ROP Customs, the Maritime Security Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Royal Office participated in several training activities through the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program.  EXBS programming supported the government’s efforts to build its capacity to interdict weapons and conduct investigations at airports and seaports.  EXBS programming also increased Omani officials’ understanding of UN sanctions implementation through virtual webinars and tabletop exercises.The major impediments to effective law enforcement and border security in Oman remained limited resources, challenges with Omani interagency coordination, and the need for continued training to develop advanced law enforcement skills.  The rugged mountainous terrain along Oman’s border with Yemen presents an additional challenge.  Oman continued to seek opportunities for additional U.S. border security training.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Oman is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its FIU is the National Center for Financial Information.  The country also is a member of the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC).In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Oman in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram.Countering Violent Extremism:  The full nature and scope of Oman’s CVE initiatives remained opaque in 2022, but engagement with the Omani government suggests that Oman continued to counter terrorist recruitment through unpublicized initiatives.There were no reports of foreign government or foreign non-governmental support for religious schools, mosques, or other organizations that may be conducive to the spread of violent extremism.International and Regional Cooperation:  Oman is a member of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition, and of the TFTC.  Oman regularly votes in favor of counterterrorism measures in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.																												    							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- Oman National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I extend my warmest congratulations to the people of Oman on the occasion of your National Day. Our warm and enduring friendship dates back to the earliest days of our republic. We value our history of cooperation, especially the work we undertake together to promote security, stability, peace, and prosperity in the region. We celebrate the success of the inaugural U.S.-Oman Strategic Dialogue earlier this year in Muscat, a testament to the strength, depth, and growth of our bilateral relationship in areas including clean energy, trade and investment, and educational and cultural ties between our people. As you celebrate your National Day, please accept my best wishes for your continued success.
- Assistant Secretary Leaf’s Travel to the Middle East HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Assistant Secretary Leaf’s Travel to the Middle East				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Assistant Secretary Leaf’s Travel to the Middle East																																		Media Note																														November 14, 2023																																							Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf is traveling to the Middle East from November 14-20. During this trip, she will meet with regional partners to discuss the Israel-Hamas conflict, including efforts to ensure this crisis never happens again, increase the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza, evacuate foreign nationals, and ensure the immediate and safe return of all hostages. She will travel with a senior U.S. delegation to Israel and the Gulf, including to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, where she will attend the Manama Dialogue to discuss regional security issues and share policy responses.						Tags																					Bahrain																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Israel																																Israel-Hamas Conflict																															Kuwait																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Oman																								Palestinian Territories																								Saudi Arabia																								United Arab Emirates