PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The PR/USVI High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area1 (PR/USVI HIDTA) continues to 

experience violent crime in its communities associated with Drug Trafficking 

Organizations (DTOs) and their related criminal activities. The National HIDTA program 

philosophy, tailored to each jurisdiction’s needs, is an excellent methodology to develop 

a strategic plan involving federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies guided by 

its Executive Board (EB) using a balanced mix of resources. This strategic plan 

specifically addresses the Threat across both jurisdictional boundaries of Puerto Rico 

(PR and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). To its credit, this approach has worked extremely 

well for both jurisdictions for the last ten years. It has made it easier to eradicate the 

boundaries between two jurisdictions which are separated by 14 miles of water. 

The EB in 2004 strengthened its leadership role through the development of a three 

pronged approach intended as a guide to all Initiatives in their efforts toward the 

disruption/dismantling of DTOs or Money Laundering Organizations (MLOs). In FY2005, 

this clear directive was maintained and enforced and is recognized as part of the 

strategic planning to ensure an increase in effectiveness with all Initiatives operating 

under this approach. This Report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of 

the operations within the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner. 

• Effectiveness in dismantling DTOs and MLOs requires the development of a 

cohesive and seamless approach that spans over two jurisdictions separated by 

water. With this as a goal, there are 26 federal and non-federal collaborating law 

enforcement organizations with 20 agencies conforming the EB. 

• Regional Law Enforcement Initiatives continue to pursue DTOs and MLOs, using 

all the capabilities of the Intelligence Support Center (ISC) to make significant 

progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling or disrupting the most 

complex, threatening, as well as violent, drug traffickers, money launderers, drug 

related weapons traffickers, drug dealers and violent criminals, to include 

fugitives. 

• Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) estimates indicate that approximately 12 metric tons of 

cocaine transship monthly through PR, with 80-90% destined to the United 

States via ports and airportsi. 

• The sale of illicit drugs is widely recognized as highly profitable. It is the goal of

the HIDTA to target those profits. For 2005, the drugs seized were valued at the 

wholesale level at $157.4 million, or a Return on Investment (ROI) of $22 for 

every dollar invested; a cost-effective use of resources. 

• For this reporting year the combined ROI for this HIDTA is $24 versus a law 

enforcement budget of $7.3 million. 

1

 For the purpose of this document, note that the reference to HIDTA should be construed as meaning the PR/USVI 

HIDTA except where otherwise noted. 
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• Eight MLOs were identified and/or targeted during CY 2005. Two were 

dismantled / disrupted for a success rate of 25%. 

• Drug assets seized during CY 2005 were valued at $10.3 million and impacted 

DTOS and MLOs by reducing the availability of resources at their disposal. Not 

only were the assets seized, but was a visible reminder to the general public 

about the hazards to follow a criminal lifestyle. 

• The main goal of every HIDTA is to disrupt and dismantle DTOs and MLOs.

Toward this end, 123 DTOs were identified and, of these, 123 were targeted. By 

the end of the year: 22% were disrupted and 9% dismantled of those that were 

targeted; for a total of 31% combined. Of the 8 identified and targeted MLOs a 

combined 25% were dismantled or disrupted. 

• The HIDTA increasingly addresses large, complex DTOs and MLOs. Its goal is 

to disrupt/dismantle organizations that are known to cause significant damage in 

the region through their illegal activities. It is recognized that results take longer 

when targeting these larger and more sophisticated DTOs; however, the benefits 

are well known. A review of the statistical information provided in this Annual 

Report reveals success in this area: from the 123 DTOs/MLOs investigations, 66 

were carried over from 2004, 57 were newly opened. Of these, 123 DTOs/MLOs, 

65 were international, 14 were multi-state, 44 were local, 42 were OCDETF 

designated cases, and nine were identified in the RPOT list. 

• This HIDTA continues to experience violent crime in its communities believed to 

be associated with DTOs and their related criminal activities. Drug abuse 

remains the primary social problem in those areas, and its demand has 

substantially maintained a high rate of violent crime. During CY2005, the HIDTA 

Region experienced a high crime rate: 807 murders, 247 rapes, 5,832 

aggravated assaults, 19,125 burglaries, 30,076 property thefts, and 9,681 auto 

thefts. Ninety percent of all crime is believed to be drug related. 

• Federal law enforcement investigations reflect that cocaine and crack cocaine 

continues to be abused in PR and the USVI. Both maritime and air methods are 

used to transship large amounts of cocaine through the region to the United 

States. Dominican Republic groups continue to be the most dominant 

transporters of the cocaine. Considerable quantities of cocaine are driven across 

the border in Hispaniola, from Haiti to the Dominican Republic for eventual 

shipment to PR or other destinations. 

• Marijuana availability and abuse in PR and the USVI continues to be high. It is 

perceived however, as a lesser threat than cocaine and heroin, inasmuch as it 

causes less violent crimes, as evidenced by DEA reporting. Most marijuana 

available in PR is produced in Mexico and transported from the southwestern 

United States. In the USVI locally grown marijuana is most common. Marijuana 

is consumed by large sections of the population, including individuals with 

legitimate employment and college students. 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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• The ISC was streamlined to 38 collocated agents and analysts, with only one 

HIDTA funded employee and investigative support staff from all agencies. It 

continues to produce refined intelligence products that guide complex 

investigations for all the investigative task forces. The ISC is a critical and costly 

operation, but has proven its ROI many times over. 

• This highly technical ISC is structured and located in a neutral location, 

interconnected worldwide, to include the Department of Defense’s SIPIRNET, 

and to local, state, federal and international law enforcement organizations that 

enables our law enforcement community to more effectively address the Threat 

within the region. Its law enforcement/analytical personnel are supported to the 

maximum extent possible by full time National Guard in specialized areas. As 

such, they fill a critical intelligence need and provide four to six Intelligence 

Analysts which reduces reliance on HIDTA funding.

This report serves to highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations within 

the HIDTA in a uniform and measurable manner. In 2005, the EB continued centralized 

efforts in addressing the two National goals. The first consists on disrupting the 

market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting DTOs / MLOs. This clear 

directive serves to narrow the focus and unity of purpose used by all HIDTA initiatives in 

maximizing their effectiveness. 

• The first priority of the National HIDTA goals seeks to capitalize on the 

engagement of producers and transit counties or regions like the Caribbean in 

order to address the drug trade as a business-one that faces numerous and often 

overlooked obstacles that may be used as pressure points. The drug trade is not 

an unstoppable force but rather a profit-making enterprise that can be disrupted. 

Coupled with our efforts to reduce the demand, every action that makes the drug 

trade more costly and less profitable works to “break” the market. Following is an 

example: 

• The AMF organization was investigated as of late 2003. This DTO was 

responsible for cocaine, cocaine base (crack), heroin and marijuana distribution 

in multiple public housing communities. The DTO was known to be extremely 

violent and Intelligence indicates that the organization was responsible for over 

45 murders during a 12 month period. Most of these murders are believed to be 

related to a war between rival DTOs. On a monthly basis they were reputed to 

receive shipments of 50 to 100 kilograms of cocaine from Dominican nationals 

with half being kept on-island and the remainder transported to CONUS. 

 Agents successfully identified a painting business, used by the DTO to 

warehouse the drugs and serving as a “front” to launder proceeds of drug sales. 

The subject owned the business by purchasing winning lottery tickets to launder 

drug proceeds as well as properties under other people’s names to hide his drug 

proceed assets. Investigation revealed that two bank accounts, identified through 

FinCEN checks were used to launder their proceeds. Confidential sources 

identified DTO assets and culminated with the arrest of the subject in November 

of 2005 and an indictment against 48 members of his DTO and some of a rival 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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DTO in December 2005. To date, 39 individuals have been taken into custody 

and the crime rate of the area has reduced to less than 20% of previous trend. 

• The second National HIDTA goal is to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of HIDTA Initiatives. In doing so, PR/USVI HIDTA continues to 

be the driving force in the law enforcement area in the region. The focus on 

training, sharing of resources and information/intelligence, particularly the 

support from the ISC allows for greater efficiency and productivity in the law 

enforcement area. The EB, as comprised of an evenly divided twenty federal 

and non-federal law enforcement agency heads, ensures that a unified approach 

is used to achieve the clearly agreed upon goals. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

The PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to present this Annual Report to document its most 

significant activities and achievements that occurred in CY2005. To fully appreciate the 

achievements, it is important to understand how each HIDTA is structured, and why it 

exists. The Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), designates 

regions with critical drug trafficking problems adversely impacting the United States, as 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs). Thus, the national HIDTA is comprised 

of 28 individual HIDTAs spread throughout the country, and uniquely situated to 

counteract this illicit activity. HIDTAs play a significant role in addressing real world 

drug and drug-related problems, and offer real world solutions. The PR/USVI HIDTA is 

similar in this regard and has developed or encouraged the development of working 

relationships with over 26 federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies in joint 

pursuit of disrupting and dismantling DTOs and MLOs. 

Law enforcement initiatives are clear on their prioritization of dismantling and/or 

disrupting DTOs and MLOs. Of particular importance are those that most substantially

endanger the communities of the region by the violent manner in which they conduct 

their illegal activities. 

The PR/USVI HIDTA’s EB’s strong leadership and commitment to success have played 

decisive role in the achieving of performance measures for these reporting periods. The 

EB’s leadership strategy was guided by establishing specific goals and objectives in 

support of the National Drug Control Strategy to focus the investigative efforts of the 

Initiatives and enhance their productivity. The PR/USVI HIDTA’s EB composition 

solidifies the partnership among federal and non-federal agencies by enhancing 

participation and ensuring equality among all participants. The resulting balanced 

Strategy of intelligence, interdiction, investigative/enforcement and support initiatives 

has served as a force multiplier to enable the disrupting and dismantling of drug 

trafficking, money laundering and supporting crime organizations. 
The overall HIDTA mission is embodied by the National Program Mission Statement: 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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National HIDTA 

Program Mission Statement 

The mission of the HIDTA Program is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the 

United States by assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement entities 

participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and disrupt DTOs with particular 

emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the 

United States. 

The PR/USVI HIDTA EB during 2005 focused on the vision, mission, goals and 

objectives that personify the efforts undertaken by the law enforcement entities 

comprising its initiatives. To that end, this information is shared with you. 

PR/USVI HIDTA 

Mission Statement 

The PR/USVI HIDTA participating agencies create intelligence driven task forces 

comprised of federal, state and local law enforcement agents who focus on at 

eliminating or reducing drugs trafficking and its associated criminal consequences 

within the domestic environment.

PR/USVI HIDTA 

Vision Statement 

HIDTA will continue to develop and operate a major intelligence driven joint 

investigation system, using the latest technology and with full participation by 

all local, state and federal agencies. This seamless integration of land, sea 

and air resources will continue to be dedicated to dismantling and disrupting 

major DTOs operating in the Caribbean Basin (i.e., RPOTS/CPOTS) and their 

related criminal activities, with a specific focus in the area of money 

laundering. This system will continue to be manned by a highly trained and 

effective law enforcement work force.

Reporting Period: This Annual Report covers the reporting period January 1, 2005 to 

December 31, 2005. 

Budget Allocation: The HIDTA has a budget of $9,084,494. The HIDTA strives to 

reduce administrative costs to allow maximum budgetary allocations to be used for 
operational activities. Periodic evaluation of service contracts occurs to seek to reduce 

costs even further. Effective property management redirects surplus items into initiatives 

that need them and particular attention is paid in the trade-in of obsolete equipment 

against the cost of the new to further increase our cost effectiveness; a practice that 

obtained commendations from the auditors. Obsolete equipment is auctioned and the 

proceeds are reinvested in the program. 

Geographic Area of Responsibility: The HIDTA covers two separate island jurisdictions: 

PR and the USVI. This area is a primary arrival and transit zone of drugs originating 

from many foreign countries through hundreds of miles of ocean, which further 

complicates interdiction operations. The jurisdictions are separated by 14 miles, or 12 

nautical miles, as measured by their nearest populated islands (St. Thomas and 

Culebra). Each jurisdiction is comprised of larger inhabited islands and smaller islets 

and cays. While the uninhabited islets and cays are frequently used by the general 

population for recreational enjoyment, they are also used by the criminal element as 

drug stashing points. Specifically, the inhabited islands are: 

Puerto Rico: Islands of Puerto Rico, Culebra, Mona and Vieques. 

Virgin Islands: Islands of St. Croix, St. John, St. Thomas and Water Island. 

Within the HIDTA, the areas where drug related criminal activity is most noted in PR are 

the San Juan Metro Area (Bayamon, Carolina, Guaynabo, Caguas, Toa Baja, as well as 

San Juan) and the cities of Fajardo and Ponce. In the USVI, the islands of St. Croix and 

St. Thomas are those with the higher rates of drug related criminal activity, primarily in 

or around the densely populated public housing communities. 

INITIATIVES DISTRIBUTION ALONG THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY CY 2005 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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St Thomas MOI 

St. Croix MOI 

Blue Lightning SF 

Ponce MOI Fajardo MOI 

PONCE AREA 

FAJARDO 

AREA ST THOMAS ST JOHN 

VIEQUES 

PUERTO RICO

SAN JUAN AREA 

San Juan MOI HIDTA Training Fugitives Task Force 

Safe Neighborhoods Investigative SC Mgmt./Coordination Supt. 

High Seas Narcotics TO FURA Money Laundering (HIFCA)

CULEBRA

ST CROIX 

U.S. VIRGIN 

ISLANDS AREA 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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The jurisdictions in the HIDTA are ripe for the transshipment of drugs into the CONUS, 

as well as its related criminal activities, due to substantial coastlines, not just of the 

seven populated islands, but also as previously mentioned the hundreds of small cays 

and islets. This is also contributed to the areas low per capita income. Other impacting 

factors include the high volume of shipping containers, the transient nature of tourism 

based economies, and the significant number of cruise ships that daily traverse the 

ports of PR and the USVI, which all contribute to making it attractive for use as a 

smuggling route. This has to be placed within the backdrop of high part one crime rates 

associated with the drug trade, accountable for over 90% of crime, particularly murder. 

It is critical to note that the PR/USVI HIDTA has been designated a High Intensity 

Financial Crimes Area (HIFCA) due to the areas frequent use as a conduit for money 

laundering. 

III. NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS 

HIDTAs nationally have adopted two specific goals to be achieved in meeting the drug 

challenge. These two national goals guide all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout 

the United States. The PR/USVI HIDTA is proud to present these national HIDTA 

program goals, plus concise summaries of its Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 

and resultant Strategy in the following sections. The PR/USVI HIDTA has fashioned an 

individual strategy to meet local drug threats according to its individual needs, in 

conjunction with the national objectives: 

NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS 

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by 

dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money 

laundering organizations; and

Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 

HIDTA initiatives. 

The EB, in addition to supporting the National HIDTA goals, developed region specific

objectives and subsequently required each Initiative to operate within that framework. 

Initiatives are required to annually appear before the Board and demonstrate their 

progress in achieving the below goals and objectives. Performance Management 

Process (PMP) Core Tables are used as the standard briefing model. 

A) Goal 1: Reduce drug availability by eliminating/disrupting drug trafficking or 

MLOs. 

1) Objectives Intelligence: 

i) Develop and expand on intelligence trends and patterns used by traffickers, 

money launderers, violent gangs and terrorist groups operating within or 

affecting PR/USVI.

ii) Identify weaknesses that are within commercial carrier systems and the U.S. 

Postal System that are used by organizations trafficking weapons and drugs.
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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2) Objectives Interdiction: 

i) Target organizations that smuggle, sell, stash, or distribute illegal drugs and 

firearms engaged in other violent crimes. 

ii) Target trafficking organizations smuggling drugs from South America through 

the Caribbean basin to PR/USVI with a focus on RPOTS and CPOTS. 

3) Objectives Money Laundering:

i) Identify money laundering trends and techniques used to facilitate the 

movement of illegal and illicit proceeds. 

ii) Disrupt and dismantle MLOs or systems by conducting investigations and 

undercover operations. 

iii) Attack and seize illegally obtained proceeds and assets of DTOs (e.g. 

RPOTS/CPOTS). 

B) Goal 2: Improve efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations 

and their efforts within HIDTA. 

1) Objectives Intelligence:

i) Identify smuggling, trafficking and money laundering activities that could 

adversely affect the soundness of public institutions in PR/USVI. 

ii) Improve intelligence sharing among HIDTA initiatives. 

iii) Increase ISC use and effectiveness through participation and sharing of 

information by all HIDTA agencies. 

iv) Explore, identify and acquire new technology and innovative techniques that 

enhance the mission of HIDTA. 

v) Increase information building and sharing with all reliable U.S. intelligence 

sources. 

vi) Ensure that any pertinent databases/information systems be shared with the 

ISC to facilitate the dissemination to all agency representatives assigned to 

the ISC in support to each HIDTA initiative investigations. 

2) Objectives Interdiction:

i) Maintain a robust, professional interagency maritime interdiction force 

around/between PR and the USVI. 

ii) Enhance the maritime air cargo information sharing to increase the 

intelligence collection and analyze responses for successful interdiction. 

3) Objectives Money Laundering:

i) Provide training to state, local and federal and non federal law enforcement 

officers participating in HIDTA 

IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 

The PR/USVI HIDTA prides itself on maximizing and strategically using HIDTA funding 

to achieve results. In 2005, this was assisted by the development of a strong Threat 

Assessment which only occurred after a major and intense collaborative effort by 

multiple federal and non federal law enforcement agencies in the ISC. This Threat 
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Assessment serves as the basis from which the strategic plan evolves. The reader is 

referred to The PR/USVI HIDTA Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 for details on 

the threats identified. The following summary is presented for your easy reference. 

The two jurisdictions of PR and the USVI, mid-point junctures between CONUS and the 

source countries, continues to be attractive as the transport conduit for the transit of 

illicit drug destined to CONUS. The regions attractiveness is derived from: 

A. Substantial coastlines, seven populated islands, plus hundreds of small cays and 

islets that serves as stashing site; 

B. Low per capita incomes of the area; 

C. Influx of illegal aliens mainly from the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti and Canada; 

D. Notably higher transient populations found in tourism based economies. 

Regional Characterizations: According to the DEA, the region is characterized by a 

continuous increase in cocaine and heroin coming from Colombia through the Eastern 

Caribbean corridor and also using the alternate route through Haiti and the Dominican 

Republic. 

• Drug-related violence in the PR/USVI region is rampant. Ninety percent of homicides

in PR, in which a motive could be determined, were drug-related 

• Political and economic disruptions are causing a large increase in the number of 

inhabitants fleeing Haiti and the Dominican Republic. U.S. Coast Guard migrant 

interdictions of marine vessels coming from Hispaniola in CY2005 were anticipated 

to result in more than double that of CY2004. In many cases the vessels used to 

transport illegal aliens, when tested by ION scans, reveal that they apparently have 

also been used to transport drugs. 

• Cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are widely available and abused throughout the 

region. Heroin is more prevalent in Puerto Rico, but is also used within the Hispanic 

community on St. Croix. Designer drugs, diverted pharmaceuticals, and other drugs 

such as hallucinogens are available and abused to a lesser extent. 

Primary Drug Threat: Cocaine is the primary drug threat in PR and the USVI. It is 

readily available throughout the region. Cocaine seizures have been significant. The 

drug is transported primarily in maritime vessels from Colombia, Venezuela, and the 

Dominican Republic. Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican DTOs are the primary 

transporters of cocaine. Dominican and Puerto Rican organizations are the primary 

wholesale and retail distributors of the drug. Cocaine is smuggled first into the USVI 

from the British Virgin Islands, with an origination point of Colombia through St. Maarten 

and stashed for shipment into PR for eventual shipment to CONUS. “Cocaine leaves 

PR via maritime bulk freighters and on commercial airlines either in the possession of 

couriers or concealed in cargo.”2

 

Heroin... A Serious Problem: Heroin is a serious problem in PR. South American 

heroin is widely available and responsible for more substance abuse treatment 

 

2 The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, September 2003, DEA-03014, page 30 
admissions than any other illicit drug. Heroin is transported into the region primarily by 

couriers aboard commercial aircraft and by parcel delivery services from Colombia or 

transit areas such as the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands Antilles, and Venezuela. 

Maritime smuggling is less frequent, although heroin occasionally is seized from 

passengers and crew members on cruise ships. Puerto Rican and Dominican criminal 

groups are the primary distributors of heroin. 

Marijuana Availability:

Marijuana is readily available 

throughout PR and the USVI. It is 

the most widely abused drug in 

the region and its use is

particularly high among 

adolescents and young adults. 

Most marijuana is produced in 

Mexico and transshipped from 

the southwestern United States. 

The drug typically is transported 

via couriers on commercial 

aircraft and via package delivery 

services. Some marijuana is 

produced in the region and law enforcement has noted an increase in indoor, 

hydroponics marijuana production. Puerto Rican criminal groups and independent 

dealers are the primary transporters, and wholesale and retail distributors of marijuana. 

Designer Drugs: Designer drugs, specifically MDMA, do not pose an increasing threat 

in the region. The drug is not the drug of choice among teens and young adults. MDMA 

often is transported from Europe and the Dominican Republic via couriers aboard 

commercial aircraft and via parcel delivery services. Wholesale distribution does not 

occur in the area, retail distribution is conducted primarily by Puerto Rican independent 

dealers. 

Other drugs: Among other drugs, diverted pharmaceuticals also appears to be an 

increasing problem. Law enforcement reporting and limited demand data suggest that 

both availability and abuse of the drugs is increasing. Inhalants are abused primarily by 

youth, while hallucinogens and methamphetamine rarely are abused in the region. 

Money laundering: The laundering of illicit drug proceeds is extensive in PR and the 

USVI. Wire remitters and bulk currency shipments are the primary methods used. This 

has resulted in PR being designated a HIFCA. The region possesses a diverse financial 

sector that allows for many options regarding the laundering or transportation of illicit 

drug proceeds. DTOs primarily rely on bulk currency smuggling and wire remitters. 

Heavy gambling in the form of betting on horse races and cock fights is prevalent 

throughout the USVI. It is believed that drug traffickers use this as one of their means 

of money laundering as gambling is pervasive at these events. 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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V. HIDTA Strategy Summary 

The reader is referred to The PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 Strategy for details on the PR/USVI 

HIDTA initiatives. The following summary is presented for your convenience. 

The Strategy co-locates all law enforcement personnel to foster the sharing of 

intelligence and investigational resources. This is orchestrated through directives from 

the twenty heads of federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies that serve on the 

EB. This collocation also serves to provide a united front in addressing illegal drug 

activities in a seamless marine and land based system encompassing two separate 

jurisdictions. The Strategy has determined the need for an increase in intelligence 

presence in the USVI, and in CY2006 we plan to establish an ISC satellite office at St. 

Thomas. 

The law enforcement initiatives focus on DTO’s, money laundering groups, violent drug 

offenders and firearms trafficking groups, the training of law enforcement personnel 

assigned to HIDTA initiatives to improve their effectiveness. All initiatives provide data 

and receive information from the ISC that develops and expands on trends that promote 

Goal 1’s intent to disrupt and dismantle DTOs / MLOs, as well as event and case 

deconfliction, enhanced officer safety and minimizing duplication in case investigation 

and prosecution. Fifteen Initiatives were manned during CY 2005. The HIDTA Training 

Initiative received no funding and the DEA Forensic Laboratory initiative was closed and 

their funds reprogrammed to other initiatives. The 15 Initiatives comprised were: 

• 8 Investigative • 3 Interdiction 

• 3 Support • 1 Intelligence 

During CY2005, the USVI marine interdiction initiative, the Blue Lightning Strike Force 

funding, was increased to allow the addition of a St. Thomas Marine Unit as an 

extension of the St. Croix unit. 

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures 

PR/USVI HIDTA as part of an effort to measure initiatives achievements working within 

and toward the established goals and objectives commenced using the Performance 

Management Process (PMP) measures which provide a new capability to quantify and 

track HIDTA targets and monitor HIDTA results. The use in this year and subsequent 

years of the PMP will ensure that measurable results can be easily identified in a 

uniform manner at a National level. Furthermore, they will establish a base year against 

which achievements in future years can be placed in context. The PR/USVI HIDTA 

continues to annually achieve ambitious and high performance results. 
A. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 1:

Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drugs 

trafficking and /or MLOs. 

Core Table 1

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 

2005. 

NOTE: Budget includes law enforcement initiatives ONLY. Law enforcement includes

prosecution, intelligence, and law enforcement initiatives, but administration

(Management/Coordination) and training initiatives are NOT included. 

REMARKS: This table presents a total investigation load of 123 cases. PR/USVI HIDTA 

initiatives carried 66 DTOs investigations from 2004. During 2005, the initiatives identified 

and targeted 57 additional DTOs. By the end of calendar year 2005, the PR/USVI HIDTA 

disrupted 27 and dismantled 11 for a total of 38 DTOs disrupted or dismantled. In short, out 

of the 123 DTOs targeted in the reporting period, 31% (38) were disrupted or dismantled, a 

notable achievement. 

Core Table 2

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SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05. 

NOTE: International refers to DTOs activities conducted between individuals trafficking

drugs from different countries. Multi-state organization refers to conspiracy schemes 

using interstate/US territories localities to trafficking illegal drugs. Local refers to

DTOs conspiracies within the same state or US territory. 

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the DTOs disrupted or

dismantled by their operational scope. In 2005, the international arena was substantially 

impacted by disruptions which given the nature of their organizations was of benefit not just 

to the region alone, but for the entire Nation. 

Table 2 explains our success in terms of the operational scope of the DTOs identified and 

targeted in calendar year 2005. Of the 123 DTOs identified, 65 operated internationally. 

Initiatives targeted 65 of these major DTOs organizations, disrupting 16 and dismantling six 

of the larger targeted DTOs. From the 14 targeted Multi-State DTOs, one was dismantled 

and thee were disrupted. Out of the 44 targeted local DTOs, four were dismantled and eight 

were disrupted. These results reflect the commitment of the PR/ USVI HIDTA to identify, 

target and dismantle or disrupt 34% of the large-scale DTOs within the area of operations. 

Core Table 3

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005. 

NOTE: Breaks out a specific type of DTO - MLOs - from Table 2. Money laundering is the 

primary function of these organizations. 

REMARKS: This table represents the complete inventory of the eight MLOs targeted for 

disruption or dismantling in PR/USVI HIDTA as classified by their operational scope. An 

excellent disruption and/or dismantling success rate of 25% are noted. In 2005, the 

international and local categories received the major impact resulting from investigations 

producing two organizations disrupted/dismantled during the year. These organizations will 

no longer constitute part of the underground banking system or be used to launder drug 

trafficking proceeds. 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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Core Table 4

SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05. 

NOTE: DTO refers to drug trafficking and MLOs. 

REMARKS: Table 4 represents the complete inventory of the cases initiated/handled in 

2005 that became very important for law enforcement and prosecution. Thus, it is a 

remarkable achievement that of the 57 newly opened HIDTA investigations the task forces 

converted 15 into OCDETF cases and one into a RPOT due to their magnitude. A total of 

42 HIDTA initiated investigations are currently open as OCDETF and nine as RPOTs in the 

PMP database. 

Tables 1-4 clearly reflect the nature of the PR/USVI HIDTA’s enforcement efforts and 

demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its targeted outcomes. In nearly 

every instance, the PR/USVI HIDTA achieved or exceeded its performance targets. 

Core Table 5

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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SOURCES: PR/USVI HIDTA Performance Management Process (PMP) Database CY 

2005; "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug Prices, February 2006 - National Drug 

Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2006-L0424-005. 

REMARKS: Table 5 lists the drugs seized during this reporting period as presented by 

Task Force Supervisors to the Executive Board and End of the Year Report. Cocaine, 

crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are the main drugs trafficked in the region. There 

have been some seizures of MDMA by HIDTA task forces although PR and USVI area is 

not known as major MDMA transshipment location.”3 The total value of the seized drugs 

exceeded $157 million at wholesaler price. 

 

The seizure of large amounts of drugs, along with its proceeds, serves to substantially 

cripple DTO operations. During CY 2005, the PR/USVI HIDTA through such drug seizures 

had a significant impact on the region’s drug trade. Table 5 lists the wholesale values of the 

respective drugs seized, thus giving an accurate view of the economic impact of removing 

these drugs from the marketplace. The data demonstrates achievement of goals in terms of 

real dollar outcomes. Despite these achievements and the dollars they reflect, the most 

critical success can never be measured, that of reducing the availability of drugs in the 

region’s communities and thereby contributing to a better quality of life. 

Core Table 6

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, PMP Database & Matrix. "Special Issue: National Illicit Drug 

Prices, February 2006 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 2006-

L0424-005. 

REMARKS: The drug wholesale value average for the last three years was $120 million or

a return on the investment (ROI) of $18. For 2005, the drugs seized were valued at the 

wholesale level at $157.4 millions, or a return on the investment of $22 for every dollar 

invested in the investigative and interdiction efforts. This achievement is considered 

notable despite the restrictions imposed by a constrained budget. As to the future of the 

HIDTA Program, the morale was always high, and TFO put forth their best effort to 

accomplish the mission. It should be noted that seizures where significantly less than in 

2004 mainly due to a change in trend and patterns and low marine interdiction resources 

available to cover the requirements in the Threat Assessment. 

 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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3 The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment, September 2003, DEA-03014, page 30 
Core TABLE 7 

SOURCES: PR/USVI HIDTA Performance Management Process (PMP) Database 

Calendar Year 2005. 

REMARKS: The seizure of more than $12.8 million in drug assets during CY2005 

significantly reduced the availability of resources at the disposal of DTOs and MLOs. These 

seized investments in real property, including luxury homes, vehicles and boats, 

businesses, not only served to hurt DTO’s king-pin players, but also is a clear message to 

others on the consequences of criminal lifestyles. This is an ROI of $2 for every $1.00 of 

funding invested. Law enforcement agencies provide additional dollars that cover officers’ 

salaries, administrative overhead and related expenses not included in Table Seven. 

Core Table 8 

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, PMP Database & Matrix. "Special Issue: National Illicit 

Drug Prices, February 2006 - National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Product No. 

2006-L0424-005. Please cite all sources used. 

*NOTE: Law Enforcement includes prosecution, intelligence, and enforcement

initiatives. The budget column should be the same in tables 6-8. 

 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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REMARKS: Major disruptions occur in DTO operations when large amounts of drugs are 

seized by law enforcement. The larger the seizure of drugs, the bigger the impact achieved 

over the potential profits of the DTOs. A review of tables 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate the 

efficiency in the PR/USVI HIDTA in achieving its goal of diminishing illegal drugs, profits 

and assets on DTOs hands. Tables 6 - 7 show the results achieved, through an investment 
of 7.2 million which resulted in the permanently removal of $157 million in illicit drugs and 

$12.8 million in drug profits from the marketplace. This is a remarkable figure and reflects 

very good rate of return on investment (ROI) as evidenced by the $24 derived from each 

HIDTA dollar expended in law enforcement investigative, interdiction and intelligence 

initiatives. This ROI compares favorably to a profitable private sector business. 

Core Table 9 

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 

2005. 

REMARKS: This table was not completed for CY 2004 as there was no such initiative in 

the PR/USVI HIDTA. However, prosecution support of cases should be mentioned. In PR 

and the USVI, the USAO regularly attends the monthly task force commanders meetings 

and provides support and guidance to expedite investigative and interdiction efforts with 

case development, evidence collection and organization, pre-trial preparation, asset 

seizures and case presentation. 

Core Table 10 

SOURCE: HIDTA Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 

2005. 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

Page 18 of 30 
REMARKS: This table was filled with zeros as there are no known cases of amphetamine 

trafficking organizations identified as drug problem in the PR/USVI HIDTA region.

Core TABLE 11 

SOURCE: Budget, Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 05. 

*NOTE: Transactions refers to both identified sellers and purchasers. Calculations 

will be automatically completed as data is entered. 

REMARKS: This table was not completed as clandestine laboratories (CLANLAB) are not 

known to operate in the PR/USVI HIDTA region. 

B. Performance Measures for PMP Goal 2

Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives

Core TABLE 12 

SOURCE: HIDTA On-Line Training Tracking System (HOTT), HIDTA Budget, 

Performance Management Process Database & Matrix CY 2005. 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

Page 20 of 30 

REMARKS: Training is pivotal to improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of law 

enforcement personnel and their operations. In training was provided to 1,665 students for 

a total of 19,925 classrooms hours. This training was provided almost free of charge to 

assigned personnel and participating agency staff. These training courses would not have 

been provided/available without PR/USVI HIDTA support and funding. With a cost of $1.75 

per training hour our training strategy is becoming a success. 

During CY 2005, the Training Initiative was operated by one part-time coordinator. Training 

funds for travel were allocated to the operational task forces at a modest rate. This 

occurred primarily due to the development of a more cost-effective approach to training that 

would focus on securing/coordinating free or reduced costs trainings. The goal was to focus 

training strictly on Task Force Officers (TFOs) assigned to HIDTA Initiatives and thus 

reduce the reliance on the limited HIDTA funds for the trainings and free them for use in 

vital operational areas. 

Core TABLE 13

HIDTA PR/USVI Deconfliction Services, 2005 

Year Total HIDTA 

Initiatives 

# Initiatives 

Targeted to Use 

Services 

# Initiatives 

Using 

% Initiatives 

Using 

2004 15 12 12 100% 

2005 14 12 12 100% 

2006 

2007 

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB 

Core TABLE 14

PR/USVI HIDTA Deconfliction Submissions by Year 

Year 

Baseline # 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

# Deconfliction 

Submissions 

Targeted 

# Event 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

# Case/Subject 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

Total 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

% 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

2004 5,118 4,050 1,007 4,111 5,118 126% 

2005 4,111 4,019 588 3,431 4,019 100% 

2006 0 

2007 0 

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB. 

REMARKS: A major law enforcement concern has been the paramount need to devise 

ways in which officer safety will not be placed in jeopardy. A critical aspect is the need for 

an effective deconfliction center that can ensure that law enforcement agents are not 

simultaneously conducting conflicting operations in the same place and time because of 

lack of communications, this causing injuries or death from “friendly fire.” Therefore, one of 

the core reasons for each HIDTA to have an ISC is to have a site that can serve as a 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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coordinating body to prevent the potential conflicts/encounters that may result in injury or 

death to law enforcement personnel. 

Of the 12 initiatives eligible to use the deconfliction services, 100% took advantage of this 

valuable tool. This service promotes officer safety, helps to coordinate the investigative 

aspect of their work and serves to ensure resources conservation. 

Core TABLE 15 

PR/USVI HIDTA Investigations Supported by Year

Year 

Baseline # 

Investigations 

Receiving Analytical 

Support 

# Investigations 

Targeted for 

Analytical 

Support 

# Investigations 

Provided 

Analytical 

Support 

% Targeted 

Investigations 

Supported 

2004 105 133 92 69% 

2005 105 123 94 76% 

2006 

2007 

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB. 

NOTE: Analytical support refers to toll, title III, document analysis, and/or complete 

analysis including prosecution stage 

REMARKS: Law enforcement initiatives, while aggressively pursuing incarceration of the 

DTO leaders and dismantlement their operations, require support from those trained in 

intelligence analysis. In an environment where every dollar counts, intelligence driven 

investigations is of paramount importance and the desired mode of operation. The goal is 

to have every investigation supported by the ISC with analytical processes to maximize the 

success of each investigation. ISC support is rendered based on initiative requests. Table 

15 depicts that 94 analytical support requests were handled by the ISC in support of 123 

investigations targeted, or 76% of the organizations under investigation. 

Core TABLE 16 

PR/USVI HIDTA Affiliated Cases Referred by Year 

Year 

Total HIDTA 

Initiative 

Cases 

# Initiative 

Cases Targeted 

for Referral 

# HIDTA 

Initiative Cases

Referred to 

Other HIDTAs

# HIDTA Initiative 

Cases Referred to 

Other Agencies 

Total 

Initiative 

Cases 

Referred

% Targeted 

Initiative 

Cases 

Referred 

2004 133 7 4 2 6 86% 

2005 123 6 2 2 4 66% 

2006 0 

2007 0 

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB. 

REMARKS: Table 16 depicts the positive outcomes achieved in the area of Case 

Referrals. These activities are essential to achieve the goals of improving efficiency and 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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effectiveness through information sharing and coordinated intelligence. A review of the data 

will show that performance far exceeded the anticipated number of requests. Additionally, 

the ISC was able to respond positively to all such requests. Finally, the investigators and 

analysts referred four investigations, two to other HIDTAs and two to other agencies for 

further investigations. 

Threat Specific TABLE 17A 

PR/USVI HIDTA Firearms Removed from the Marketplace, 2005 

Firearms Seized (type.) Amount Seized (ea.) Wholesale Value

Rifles 19 $32,000

Shotguns 5 $4,500

Pistols 356 $154,000

Revolvers 7 $2,600

Firearms Traced 

Total Value 387 $203,100

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB 

REMARKS: Table 17A presents specific information on firearms removed from the 

marketplace with a DTO nexus. Reducing the availability of automatic and illegal firearms in 

the drug trafficking groups is crucial, as it contributes to the lowering of violent crime rates, 

particularly that of murder and against the safety of law enforcement officers. 

Threat Specific TABLE 18 

PR/USVI HIDTA Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended by Year 

Year # Identified # Targeted % Targeted 

of Identified # Apprehended Apprehended % of Targeted 

2004 530 370 70% 309 84% 

2005 1,120 1,120 100% 1,099 98% 

2006 

2007 

SOURCE: Budget, Initiative Statistical Reports and Initiatives Performance briefing 

Presentation before the EB 

REMARKS: Table 18 highlights a 98% success rate of the apprehension of fugitives that 

have a drug felony HIDTA nexus. Communities within PR and USVI are made safer by 

their apprehension of targeted fugitives. 

VII. Other Achievements 

In 2005, PR/USVI HIDTA initiated a thorough transformation process to address the latest 

threat challenges, budgetary constraints, and the technology developments, now available 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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to the law enforcement community. This transformation will continue the revamping of the 

HIDTA structure and its way of doing business in this region. This HIDTA is in a unique 

location and situation representing the third frontier of the U.S. main effort against the drug 

trafficking establishment and as such the initiatives have been refocused. Additionally three 

initiatives initiated relocation to improved sites: Money Laundering, Ponce and Fajardo 

Major Organization Investigations initiatives. HIDTA operations greatly contributed to the 

overall regional reduction of 479 crime against people and 5,286 crime against property as 

compared to CY-2004. 

VIII. Conclusions 

 

The two jurisdictions of PR and the USVI, located at a mid-point juncture between the 

CONUS and the source countries can be summarized as follows: 

• Continues to be attractive as a key avenue of approach for illicit drugs in transit to 

the CONUS market; 

• Major drugs trafficked remain cocaine, crack cocaine and heroin, and on a lesser 

scale marijuana; 

• There is a recent trend to include some European MDMA; and 

• Marijuana, mainly from Jamaica, Mexico and Northern California, is the most widely 

abused drug among adolescents and young adults. 

Cocaine traffickers are predominantly Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican. Dominican 

and Puerto Rican organizations are the primary wholesale and retail distributors of the 

drug. The region is heavily used for drug related money laundering, resulting in federal 

designation as a HIFCA. 

The EB’s strong leadership and commitment to success have played a decisive role in 

achieving performance measures during the reporting period. The EB’s leadership strategy 

was to establish specific goals and objectives in support of the National Strategy and that 

guided and focused the investigative efforts of the Initiatives and enhanced their 

productivity. 

The EB has focused on reduction of drug availability by eliminating /disrupting DTOs 

through the use of intelligence driven investigations, reducing the harmful consequences of 

drug trafficking by addressing public corruption and violence in the community and, finally, 

improving efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement organizations and their efforts 

within HIDTA implementing a strong training program and dedicating resources to the 

curtailment of money laundering.

 

This is our second year of an effort to measure initiatives performance working within and 

toward the established goals and objectives, commenced using the PMP measures. The 

PR/USVI HIDTA is pleased to highlight its remarkable achievements in 2005 toward the 

reduction of DTOs and MLOs, particularly those that are international in nature. The 

PR/USVI HIDTA continues to annually achieve remarkable results and such are achieved 

not only in measurable form, but in an efficient and effective manner. 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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The average cost per investigation, including arrests, has been computed at $190.499. An 

insignificant amount expended when measured against the well being of the communities 

served and the lives that were saved because of disrupting or dismantling these DTOs. Of 

particular importance was the total return on the investment noted to be $19 for 2005, while 

the drugs seized were valued at the wholesale level at $127 million, or a ROI of $17 for 

every dollar invested. This high performance occurred despite the restrictions imposed by 

austere budgetary times. 

To close, the successes of the PR/USVI HIDTA are measurable, tangible and exceeded 

expectations. Focus will continue to be in maritime interdiction based on hard intelligence, 

investigations of DTOs/MLOs, money laundering and the use of intelligence driven 

investigations. 

Our motto, “COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE”, is one that guides our efforts. We are proud 

of our achievements and since our inception have won four National ONDCP awards for 

outstanding performance, including the one for “Outstanding HIDTA of the Year”. This has 

occurred solely because of the tremendous successes we have experienced against drug 

traffickers that just would not have occurred if HIDTA did not exist. 
PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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IX. Appendices 

A. Organizational Chart of the HIDTA. 

B. Table listing composition of Executive Board with local, state and federal affiliation. 

C. List of participants by agency 

D. HIDTA PMP Matrix 2005 (Attached Excel File) 

E. HIDTA Initiatives - (Operational listing with brief descriptions) 

X. List of Tables and Charts 

Table 1 Cost per DTO Disrupted or dismantled, 2005 13

Table 2 Percentage of DTOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2005 13

Table 3 Percentage of MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2005 14

Table 4 Operational Scope of All DTO Cases Initiated, 2005 15

Table 5 Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2005 15

Table 6 ROI for Drugs Removed from Marketplace by Law Enforcement 

Initiatives, 2005 

16

Table 7 ROI for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement 

Initiatives, 2005 

17

Table 8 ROI Drugs and Assets Removed from Marketplace by LEA Initiatives, 

2005 

17

Table 9 Prosecution Initiative Cost Per Investigation, 2005 18

Table 10 Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs Dismantled in 2004, by 

Size 

18

Table 11 Clandestine Laboratory Activities, 2005 18

Table 12 PR/USVI HIDTA Training Efficiency by Year and Type of Training 19

Table 13 HIDTA Initiatives Using Event and Case Deconfliction Services, 2005 19

Table 14 Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted, 2005 20

Table 15 Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical Support, 2005 20

Table 16 HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred to Other HIDTAs and Other 

Agencies, 2005 

21

Table17A Firearms Removed from the Marketplace, 2005 21

Table 18 Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended, by Year 22

 
APPENDIX A 

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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COORDINATORS

FAJARDO

MOI

ST CROIX

MOI

ISC

PONCE

MOI

SAN JUAN

MOI

FTF -USMS BLUE

DRMMH -PH -

HSCINE

M & CSI

ONDCP

Coordinators

Executive

Board

Director Deputy Director

Fajardo MOI St Thomas MOI

St. Croix MOI

Investigative 

Support Center

Ponce MOI

Money 

 Laundering 

San Juan MOI

Fugitives Task Force - Blue Lightning 

Strike Force

Safe Neighborhoods -

FURA High Seas Narcotics 

Traff.Organizations

HIDTA Training 

Initiative 

PR/USVI HIDTA ORGANIZATION CY 2005

8 Investigative 

3 Interdiction 

2 Support 

1 Intelligence 

14 Initiatives Total Management &

Coordination Support

LEGEND: 

MOI: Major Organization Investigations 

FURA: Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion (PR Police Department Air and Marine 

Law Enforcement) 

Investigative

Interdiction

Support

Intelligence
APPENDIX B 

EXECUTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chairperson 

ELTON LEWIS 

Commissioner 

U.S. Virgin Islands Police Department 

Vice Chairperson 

LUIS FRATICELLI 

Special Agent in Charge 

Federal Bureau of Investigations 

MEMBERS 

Non-Federal Federal

BG FRANCISCO A. MARQUEZ HUMBERTO GARCIA, ESQ. 

The Adjutant General United States Attorney 

PR National Guard District of PR

ALVA SWAN, ESQ. (Deceased) ANTHONY JENKINS, ESQ. 

Attorney General United States Attorney 

VI Department of Justice District of the Virgin Islands

LYDIA St JOHNS JOSE LOZADA MEDINA 

Special Agent in Charge (Actg.) Director 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Investigations Bureau - PR

JUAN A. FLORES GALARZA, CPA JEROME HARRIS 

Secretary Special Agent in Charge 

PR Department of Treasury (Hacienda) Drug Enforcement Administration Caribbean Division

PEDRO A. TOLEDO DÁVILA BRIAN WIMPLING 

Superintendent Special Agent in Charge 

PR Police Department Internal Revenue Service

MIGUEL PEREIRA, ESQ. MARCIAL O. FELIX 

Secretary Resident Agent in Charge 

PR Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

BG EDDY L. CHARLES CAPTAIN JAMES E. TUNSTALL 

The Adjutant General Commanding Officer 

U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard U.S. Coast Guard 7th District

LT. EDWIN ROSADO ACEVEDO MARCELINO BORGES 

Commissioner Director, Field Operations 

Bayamon Municipal Police Customs & Border Protection

WILLIAM VAZQUEZ, ESQ. 

Secretary of Justice 

PR Department of Justice

HERMAN J. WIRSHING 

United States Marshal 

U.S. Marshal Service

PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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APPENDIX C 

Participating Agencies (Personnel) and Organization CY 2005

Federal Full-time Part-time Total 

• Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 10 10 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation 24 1 25 

• Drug Enforcement Administration 39 5 44 

• Immigration & Customs Enforcement 26 2 28 

• U. S. Postal Inspection Services 1 1 2 

• U.S. Marshal Service 10 10 

• U.S. Coast Guard 24 24 

• U.S. Coast Guard Investigation Services 10 10 

• Bureau of Prisons 1 1 

• Internal Revenue Service/CID 7 7 

Non-Federal Full-time Part-time Total 

• PR Police Department 82 82 

• FURA (Forces United for Rapid Action - PRPD)4

547 547 

• USVI Police Department 14 14 

• PR National Guard 14 14 

• Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation - PR 4 4 

• U.S. Virgin Islands National Guard 4 4 

• Department of Hacienda (IRS-PR) 6 6 

• Special Investigation Bureau (NIE) 25 25 

• Municipal Police & Contractors 25 25 

875 9 884 

 

4

 P.R. Air and Marine Unit 
APPENDIX E 

STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005. EB streamlined the number of Task Forces to synchronize operations 

developed goals and objectives. The HIDTA was reduced to 14 initiatives as indicated below: 

Initiative Type Lead 

Agency 

Mission 

Investigative Support Center 

Intelligence FBI • Investigative and strategic drug intelligence 

• Enables a more effective and efficient utilization of drug investigative resource

• Develops strategic intelligence • Ensures subject and case deconfliction 

Air and Marine Interdiction Program (FURA) 

Interdiction PRPD • Ground, air and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to 12 miles de

PR. 

Blue Lightning Strike Force 

Interdiction VIPD • Ground and marine drug law enforcement interdiction up to three miles dee

USVI. 

High Seas Narcotics  Trafficking Operations 

Interdiction USCG • Targets drug and migrant trafficking organizations through 24 hour interdiction

• Disrupts transit and arrival zones outside territorial waters specifically i

responsibility 

• Assists other agencies in the regional marine intelligence trafficking, interdictin

organizations. 

Fajardo Major Organization Investigations 

Investigative DEA • Conducts long range complex investigations 

• Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the East coast of PR to include 

Vieques and Culebra islands 

Money Laundering Initiative 

Investigative ICE • Conducts regional complex investigations and interdiction of sophisticated dr

exporting of illegally obtained proceeds to international bank accounts 

Ponce Major Organization Investigations 

Investigative DEA • Conducts long range complex investigations 

• Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in the southwest region of PR. 

Safe Neighborhoods Investigative ATF & 

NIE 

• Identifies, targets, investigates and prosecutes DTOs operating in PR and the 

• Targets violent narco-trafficking organizations responsible for drug related vio

USVI. 
STRUCTURE: This structure was implemented during CY 2005. EB streamlined the number of Task Forces to synchronize operations 

developed goals and objectives. The HIDTA was reduced to 14 initiatives as indicated below: 

Initiative Type Lead 

Agency 

Mission 

San Juan Major Organization Investigations 

Investigative DEA • Conducts long range complex investigations 

• Dismantle sophisticated DTOs operating in the northwestern region of PR. 

PR Fugitives Task Force 

Investigative USMS • Disrupts narcotics smuggling, distribution, money laundering and street ga

throughout PR, by identifying, locating and apprehending HIDTA related 

CONUS. 

St. Croix Major Organization Investigation 

Investigative DEA • Conducts long range complex investigations 

• Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Croix, USVI. 

St. Thomas Major Organization Investigations 

Investigative DEA • Conducts long range complex investigations 

• Dismantles sophisticated DTOs operating in St. Thomas, USVI. 

HIDTA Training Initiative 

Support PRPD & 

HIDTA Mgt. 

• Enhances the quality of drug related investigations • Improves the performance and effectiveness of law enforcement agencies 

• Increases the safety of law enforcement officers in PR and USVI. 

Management and Support HIDTA 

Mgt. 

• Management and organizational guidance 

Coordination Support • Finance, logistics, operations and administrative support 

• Coordinating of translation services and training to all initiatives in PR and USV

2. ICE Threat Assessment CY2004 PR/USVI HIDTA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT

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