# Ethiopia - United States Department of State

- Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer Travels to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti May 8-19 Office of the SpokespersonSpecial Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer will travel to Nairobi to meet with Kenyan officials to discuss shared regional challenges.  In Addis Ababa, Special Envoy Hammer will meet with the African Union, Ethiopian officials, and the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray regarding implementation of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the urgency of resolving outstanding issues through political dialogue and avoiding a return to conflict.  Special Envoy Hammer will also discuss dialogue to end violence in the Amhara and Oromia regions and the need to investigate reports of human rights violations.  In Djibouti, Special Envoy Hammer will consult on regional and security issues with Djiboutian government officials.
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Deputy Secretary Verma’s Visit to Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Angola Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma will travel to Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Angola April 21-25.In Cameroon, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet with senior Cameroonian government officials, public health partners, and civil society leaders to discuss U.S.-Cameroon cooperation in the areas of health, peace and regional security, and sustainable economic growth.  In Ethiopia, he will meet with African Union Commission officials.  In Angola, Deputy Secretary Verma will travel with Administrator Samantha Power of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to meet with senior Angolan government officials, business and community leaders, farmers, and public health partners.
- Securing the Red Sea: A Global Response Timothy A. Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for YemenThe Houthis’ reckless and indiscriminate attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are creating even worse food shortages in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Sudan, affecting the most vulnerable people.  This is because the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are a high-traffic global shipping route used to deliver food, fuel, humanitarian assistance, and other essential commodities to destinations all over the world, including Yemen. You may not realize that Houthi attacks against commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea are directly impacting people’s lives. Ships taking longer journeys increase the cost of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as life-saving aid to people who need it most. ⤵️ pic.twitter.com/YIkX1numQa&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) February 2, 2024The Red Sea&#8217;s Strategic Significance The Red Sea holds immense strategic importance, serving as a vital maritime route for global trade. Fifteen percent of international commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic flows through the Red Sea.  Locator map for Yemen. Impacts on Yemen and Beyond The Houthis’ attacks, enabled by Iran, are not limited to U.S. or Israeli ships. Houthi rebels have struck ships and crews with ties to more than 50 different countries, resulting in enormous impacts on international shipping. The situation not only affects Yemen but also reverberates across the globe, affecting food, medicine, and fuel supplies for millions, including those in the Middle East, East Africa, and even the United States.  Shipping companies are changing routes to avoid the Red Sea, requiring boats to travel around the Cape of Good Hope. This often adds about 10 days to journey times and requires more fuel and crew-time, significantly raising shipping costs, which are then passed on to the customers and aid-providing organizations. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea are doubling shipping costs to the United States and having real human impacts—increasing the costs of food, medicine, and fuel. pic.twitter.com/8D7nyEI0cE&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) March 2, 2024Response from the International Community The Houthis’ reckless assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are clear violations of international law. In response, the United States and the international community have taken action to counter these attacks and protect the lives of innocent mariners. In December, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 nations committed to defending international shipping and deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.  Sailors stand ready in the Red Sea! 🚢 Dedicated maintenance and drills ensure peak operational capabilities for Operation Prosperity Guardian. Led by Combined Task Force 153, this international effort promotes maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. pic.twitter.com/Enm8XGN6SZ&mdash; Department of Defense 🇺🇸 (@DeptofDefense) December 28, 2023In January, together with 13 allies and partners, the U.S. issued an unequivocal warning that Houthi rebels would face consequences if their attacks did not cease. Additionally, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the Houthis end attacks on merchant and commercial vessels. Yemen: “The resolution unequivocally demands that the Houthis cease their brazen attacks which violates international law&quot; &#8211; Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UNRead the story➡️:https://t.co/JVIdieimAN pic.twitter.com/6vk99ku0cX&mdash; UN News (@UN_News_Centre) January 11, 2024Disrupting Houthi Activities To disrupt the flow of funds to the Houthis for their terrorist activities and to limit their access to financial networks, the United States has designated them as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.  This is a significant step to prevent financial support from reaching the Houthis and to ensure they are held accountable for their actions. If the Houthis stop their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will review this designation. The United States has also sanctioned entities that are enabling Iran’s financial assistance to the Houthis’ destabilizing activities. Today, we announced the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. pic.twitter.com/NFYOaUrm8G&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) January 17, 2024&nbsp;Condemning Houthi Actions These aggressive actions not only endanger innocent lives but also disrupt the free flow of global commerce — including in nations that are already experiencing challenges — exacerbating already dire humanitarian crises across the region.  The United States remains committed to combating Iranian support to the Houthis and calls for international unity against their destabilizing activities. 
- Ethiopia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Ethiopia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				In November 2022, the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, ending active hostilities between them, which held throughout the year, although reports of abuses by Eritrean troops along the border and by militia groups persisted.  In March the U.S. Secretary of State “determined that members of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces, and Amhara forces committed war crimes – during the conflict in northern Ethiopia.  Members of the ENDF, EDF, and Amhara forces also committed crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and persecution.  Members of the Amhara forces also committed the crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer and committed ethnic cleansing in western Tigray.”  In April the government disbanded regional special forces nationwide.  The Amhara and Oromia regions experienced conflict between government forces and Fano militia and the Oromo Liberation Army, respectively.  In August the government declared a state of emergency, under which there were widespread reports of violations by the government, including extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, forcible transfers of civilian populations, torture, physical abuses, conflict-related sexual violence or punishment; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests of journalists, censorship, and the existence of criminal libel and slander laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including rape and sexual violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of racial or ethnic minority groups; and laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced.The government took limited steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.  The government prosecuted some lower-level officers for abuses.There were reports of widespread killings of civilians, mass forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, rape, and other forms of gender-based violence, looting, and destruction of property by Amhara militias and affiliated groups in western Tigray.  There were also reports of widespread unlawful killings of civilians and government officials in Amhara and Oromia regions and elsewhere, including by the Oromo Liberation Army.  Local militia groups in Afar, Oromia, and Somali regions reportedly carried out attacks and killings of civilians, displacing thousands.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.  Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE), the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) reported numerous cases of unlawful or extrajudicial killings within the context of conflicts in Amhara and Oromia regions and other parts of the country, including Tigray.There were numerous instances when regional police forces reportedly used excessive lethal force on civil demonstrators.  According to the EHRC, on February 17, security forces killed at least three and injured 30 others following the demonstrators’ demands to restore water services to the town of Welkite in Central Ethiopia Region after more than a month of water disruption.  On June 2, the government’s Security and Intelligence Task Force acknowledged security forces killed at least three civilians in Addis Ababa during a protest on the demolition of mosques by the Oromia regional government.  On July 20, media reported government security forces killed one and injured 16 protesters in Somali Region’s Birqod district following a disagreement with the local government on the use of a water borehole.The Federal Police Internal Investigative Bureau conducted limited investigation of criminal acts perpetrated by police.  The internal unit’s decisions regarding penalties against police were confidential.The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) had a military investigative unit that reported to the military attorney general’s office.  Military police passed evidence from their investigations to prosecutors and defense counsels.  The ENDF attorney general directed the investigations and heard the cases in military court.  On April 25, the House of People’s Representative amended the defense proclamation, giving the military court jurisdiction to hear cases including crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.There were numerous reports of killings by militia groups in the context of conflict-related abuse.																																				b. Disappearance										There were reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.During the year, local media reports alleged an increase in enforced disappearances of prominent figures critical of the government, including political commentators, former military officers, investigative journalists, and social media activists.  On June 5, the EHRC called on the government to disclose the whereabouts of arrested individuals and to bring their cases to court with credible evidence after the government increased arrests of journalists and activists.On July 12, the EHRC released the Ethiopia Annual Human Rights Situation Report (June 2022 – June 2023) highlighting cases of enforced disappearances where members of the Federal Police, regional security forces, and the ENDF detained individuals from the streets, work, and home and kept them in incommunicado detention at unidentified locations.  The EHRC stated the now-defunct Somali Special Force called one of its former members to report to his office in December 2022, and the person was reportedly missing since.There were also numerous reports of enforced disappearance by both security forces and armed militia groups in relation to conflicts in Amhara and Oromia regions and elsewhere.  Truck drivers working on the Addis-Djibouti highway, A1 Road, connecting Ethiopia to Djibouti port, complained the government was not addressing their security concerns, and armed men continued to kidnap and kill drivers.  According to several reports, thousands of ethnic Tigrayans remained detained throughout the year in unknown locations in western Tigray and elsewhere.  On August 23, local human rights group Human Rights First alleged to news network VOA Amharic at least 3,000 Tigrayan members of the ENDF were in detention in unknown places despite hope for their release as stipulated by the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).  The VOA spoke with family members of former military officers who said they still did not know the whereabouts of their relatives, although they had received information regarding their detention from those recently released from the same prisons.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										Although the constitution prohibited such practices, there were reports security officials tortured and otherwise abused detainees.According to the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), HRW, Amnesty International, and numerous media reports, the government engaged in torture in its security operations and failed to hold soldiers accused of torture accountable.In a March report to the UN Committee against Torture, OMCT, EHRCO, and Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia reported the government had used torture, excessive force, and other forms of inhuman treatment in conflict regions despite democratic reforms enacted in 2018.  During the year, EHRC investigations into prison and detention centers in Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Somali regions revealed detainees reported police beat them during arrests and in detention.  The EHRC’s monitoring teams found evidence of injuries on some detainees who reported police beatings.  In addition, the EHRC stated Oromia police tortured suspects held in unofficial detention centers, including in Oromia police training camps and government offices.  Individuals were allegedly beaten and tortured as punishment for supporting armed groups and to extract information.  The EHRC’s annual report stated regional police officers across various districts of Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somali regions beat prisoners and detainees for various reasons, including to extract confessions.On June 5, the EHRC reported it was investigating an allegation government security forces tortured individuals in a police training center in Gelan town of Oromia.  According to the EHRC, security forces took the victims from their homes in Addis Ababa to the police training camp starting May 2, after unrest broke out in Amhara Region following the federal government’s initiative to dissolve regional Special Forces.On June 1, HRW alleged Amhara security forces, militias, and officials in western Tigray tortured, mistreated, and subjected Tigrayan detainees to inhuman treatment, including beatings with iron pipes, electric wires, and sticks.  HRW reported detainees described being tied in stress positions for long periods, either at night or in the hot sun in Badu Sidiste, a prison that also served as a camp for Amhara Special Forces.On May 12, the UN Committee against Torture expressed grave concern regarding complaints of torture and mistreatment by police officers, prison guards, and other military and security force members in police stations, detention centers, federal prisons, military bases, and unofficial or secret detention places.  The committee urged the government to allow an independent body to investigate all human right violations, including allegations of torture.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life-threatening due to gross overcrowding, food shortages, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Gross overcrowding was common, and prisoners often lacked access to quality food, potable water, sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, or medical care.  Authorities sometimes kept prisoners confined in cells for long periods without an opportunity for movement, exercise, or use of showers or sanitary facilities.  Conditions in detention camps were reportedly life threatening.There were multiple media reports security forces, including members of the ENDF, took prisoners out of detention centers and committed extrajudicial killings.The law prohibited detention in any facility other than an official detention center; however, the ENDF, regional police, police, local militias, and other formal and informal law enforcement entities reportedly operated an unknown number of unofficial detention centers.  During the year, several reports implicated the government in increased use of informal detention centers to keep detainees.Administration:  Authorities failed to conduct investigations of credible reports of mistreatment.Independent Monitoring:  The government permitted monitoring of prisons and detention centers by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and, on some occasions, the EHRC.  Following the imposition of a state of emergency on August 4, such access was largely curtailed and granted only on a case-by-case basis.  The ICRC and international human rights monitors were reportedly denied access to alleged detention facilities in western Tigray, where many thousands of ethnic Tigrayans reportedly were detained in life-threatening conditions.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and federal law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government generally did not observe these requirements, especially regarding the mass detentions made under the state of emergency declared on August 4.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The constitution and law required judicial authorization for an arrest and required detainees to appear in court and face charges within 48 hours of arrest or as soon thereafter as local circumstances and communications permit.  Travel time to the court was not included in this 48-hour period.  With a warrant, authorities could detain persons suspected of serious offenses for 14 days without charge.  The courts increasingly pushed authorities to present evidence or provide clear justifications within 14 days or release the detainee.  Courts also demanded to see police investigative files to assess police requests for additional time.A functioning bail system was in place.  Bail was not available, however, for persons charged with murder, treason, or corruption.  In other cases, the courts set bail at amounts few citizens could afford.  Police reportedly failed to release detainees after a court decided to release them on bail; sometimes, police filed another charge immediately after the court’s decision, filed repeated bail appeals, or transferred detainees to regional jurisdictions to face another charge.  The government provided public defenders for detainees unable to afford private legal counsel, but defendants received these services only when their cases went to trial and not during the pretrial phases.  In some cases, a single defense counsel represented multiple defendants in a single case.  Some suspects were held incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest:  There were reports of widespread arbitrary or unlawful detention.  The government reportedly detained thousands of ethnic Amhara and Oromo after the August 4 State of Emergency, converting warehouses, schools, youth centers, private residences, and other makeshift facilities to house the growing detainee population, according to media reports.On February 15, the EHRC reported police in Addis Ababa and Oromia arbitrarily detained journalists and numerous members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) after authorities canceled a protest called by two opposing groups within the EOTC.  News network BBC reported government security forces on February 4 used excessive force against followers of the main church, resulting in extrajudicial killings, beatings, harassment, and arbitrary arrests.  In investigations in Oromia, Amhara, and Addis Ababa, the EHRC found many detainees had been arrested without court orders or formal investigations, and many had not been brought before court within the time the law prescribed.  In addition, the EHRC reported many police stations held suspects whose charges were dropped or who should have been released in accordance with court orders.  In some cases, children reportedly were held in detention on suspicion of involvement in criminal activity, contrary to the law requiring their release on unconditional bail.On June 1, the EHRC reported security forces in Addis Ababa arrested several Islamic community members around Anwar Mosque for peacefully demonstrating against the demolition of at least 19 mosques deemed “illegal” by the Oromia regional government in Sheger City.  Media reported Addis Ababa police cracked down on a May 27 protest within the premises and the surrounding area of the mosque, resulting in two killed and more than 40 injured, and many more arbitrarily detained.There were reports Amharan militia arbitrarily detained thousands of Tigrayans in western Tigray.Pretrial Detention:  The proportion of the inmate population in pretrial detention and average length of time held were not available.  Lengthy legal procedures, large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, and staffing shortages contributed to frequent trial delays, in some cases lasting years.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary, but the government did not always respect judicial independence and impartiality.  Although civil courts largely operated with independence, criminal courts were weak and overburdened.  Media and human right groups reported police repeatedly denied fair public trial, including through harassment and detention of defense lawyers.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, and the judiciary generally did not enforce this right.The federal Public Defender’s Office provided legal counsel to indigent defendants, but the scope and quality of service reportedly were inadequate due to attorney shortages.  A public defender often handled more than 100 cases and might represent multiple defendants in the same criminal case.  Numerous free legal-aid clinics, primarily based at universities, also provided legal services.  In certain areas of the country, the law allowed volunteers such as law students and professors to represent clients in court on a pro bono basis.  There reportedly was a lack of a strong and inclusive local bar association or other standardized criminal defense representation.The constitution recognized both religious and traditional courts.  Many rural citizens had little access to formal judicial systems and relied on traditional mechanisms for resolving conflict.  By law, all parties to a dispute had to agree to use a traditional or religious court before such a court could hear a case, and either party could appeal to a regular court at any time.  Sharia (Islamic law) courts could hear religious and family cases involving Muslims if both parties agreed before the start of the formal legal process to use the sharia court.  Sharia courts received some funding from the government.  Sharia courts adjudicated most cases in Somali and Afar regions, which were predominantly Muslim.  Other traditional systems of justice, such as councils of elders, functioned predominantly in rural areas.  Women often believed they lacked access to fair hearings in the traditional court system because local custom excluded them from participation in councils of elders and there was persistent gender discrimination.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						On July 24, HRW called for immediate release of seven Oromo opposition figures arbitrarily detained for three years due to the government’s repeated violation of due process and court orders.  HRW stated the government kept Abdi Regassa, Dawit Abdeta, Lammi Begna, Michael Boran, Kenessa Ayana, Gaada Oljira, and Gaada Gebissa in a prolonged and unlawful detention despite several judicial orders directing their release.  HRW stated authorities of the Oromia police repeatedly violated the detainees’ due process rights, forcibly disappearing them or holding them incommunicado, denying them access to their lawyers and family members for weeks or months – at times up to eight months – and frequently moving them between makeshift and official detention sites, further hampering their families’ and lawyers’ access.In August media reported the arrest of political figures and elected officials including Christian Tadele, a prominent lawmaker from the National Movement of Amhara opposition party and an outspoken government critic in connection with the conflict in Amhara.  The EHRC on September 1 stated it had visited 53 detainees kept in a military camp in Awash Arba, Afar Region, including Tadele, and lawmakers Yohannes Buayalew (a member of Amhara Regional Council) and Kassa Teshager (a member of the Addis Ababa City Council) who were both arrested in their constituencies and transferred to Afar Region.  During the visit, detainees told the EHRC they experienced ethnic slurs and harassment during their transfer to Awash Arba.  The Federal Police justified transferring detainees to the military camp due to overcrowding in the Federal Police detention center in Addis Ababa.  Detainees said their families did not know their whereabouts, and the detention center was built in an extremely hot area and lacked basic services.																										f. Transnational Repression										There were some reports the government sought to intimidate critics outside its borders.  In one instance, a journalist faced potential forcible repatriation from Saudi Arabia.  In some cases, diaspora journalists reported their families remaining in Ethiopia had received threats.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										On May 31, the EHRCO released the findings of its investigation into a government-sponsored house demolition and forced eviction mainly in Oromia Region, in areas surrounding the capital Addis Ababa, to make way for a newly established Sheger City administration.  The local independent human rights group stated actions of the Oromia regional government violated economic, social, and cultural rights of citizens and domestic legislation protecting human rights and property rights.  The EHRCO stated the government’s demolition and forced eviction campaign in parts of Addis Ababa, Sheger City, and Adama town administrations in Oromia left 111,811 households disposed of their homes since October 2022.  On July 27, the Ethiopian Institute of the Ombudsman stated it had received more than 100,000 complaints from persons whose homes were demolished.  On March 31, the EHRC stated despite the government’s claim of targeting only “illegal houses,” the demolition included those with proper title deeds and with appropriate legal backing.  The EHRC further asserted the demolition lacked warning, consultation with communities, and compensation.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law generally required authorities to obtain court-issued search warrants prior to searching private property, although the government did not always enforce this.  The law also recognized exceptions for “hot pursuit” cases in which a suspect entered premises or disposed of items that were the subject of an offense committed on the premises.  This legal exception also applied when police had reasonable suspicion that evidence of a crime punishable if convicted by more than three years’ imprisonment was concealed on or in the property and a delay in obtaining a search warrant could allow for the evidence to be removed.  Freedom House reported the government used location tracking and other technical means to surveil online and telephone communications of individuals, including politicians.  Digital surveillance and the use of individual informants to spy on citizens was reportedly widespread.  Authorities purchased an Israeli surveillance system from the company Cellebrite, which they had reportedly used to hack into the mobile phones of detainees since 2021.  In addition, the government had partially or fully blocked internet services, blocked or filtered websites for political reasons, and there was reportedly no mechanism to appeal website blocking.There were reported break-ins into offices of local human rights groups and private media that appeared critical of the government, including the February 13 burglary of the EHRCO office.  That incident targeted a single laptop where documents for a human rights investigation were reported to have been stored.  On July 17, another local group, the Center for Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), called on responsible authorities to protect civic society and media offices after unidentified robbers broke into the office of the Ethiopia Insider, a private online media platform.  CARD recounted similar targeted robberies during the year on civil society organizations and media and stated it had become a major threat to the civic and media space.  In a July 17 statement, Ethiopian Insider reported the robbers broke into its office and stole valuable newsroom equipment critical for its operation.  The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) on July 18 expressed concern regarding the robbery and urged authorities to investigate the incident credibly and ensure accountability.  By the end of the year, the government had yet to announce what kind of actions it was taking to protect media and civil society organizations.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The November 2022 COHA brought an end to active hostilities between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the ENDF in the northern part of the country, although violence in Amhara, Oromia, and elsewhere threatened a fragile peace, and there were some reports of violence in Tigray.  On August 4, the government imposed a state of emergency, under which numerous violations were reported.The September 18 report by ICHREE identified grave and systematic violations of international law and crimes committed in Tigray, as well as in Amhara, Afar, and Oromia regions.  Violations included mass killings, rape, starvation, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention.  According to ICHREE, the conflict in Tigray had not ended, with Eritrean troops and Amhara militias engaging in violations.Killings:  During the year, government counterinsurgency campaigns against the Fano militia in Amhara Region, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia, and militias in the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions continued, with numerous reports of unlawful killings, including killings of civilians.  In addition, there were reports of extrajudicial killings by the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF) and regional militia in Tigray, as well as reports of killings of civilians by other militia groups.On August 18, Amnesty International stated it had received allegations ENDF airstrikes had resulted in mass killings in Finote Selam, Bahir Dar, and Shewa Robit.  Independent media called on the government to grant access to the Amhara Region for independent investigators.  Reuters reported members of the ENDF, who entered the town of Majete in Amhara Region after two weeks of fighting with Fano militia in the area, went on a house-to-house search on September 3 and killed approximately two dozen civilians including children and the elderly.  On September 15, the EHRC reported what it called “seriously concerning” and “widespread” extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions in the Amhara Region.  According to the EHRC, from July 31 to September 9, the ENDF committed extrajudicial killings of civilians and allegedly captured members of Fano militia in nine towns (Adet, Debre Markos, Debre Tabor, Jiga, Lemi, Majete, Merawi, Mertolemariam, and Shewa Robit) of the Amhara Region.  On September 11, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said more than 200 individuals were reportedly killed after the declaration of State of Emergency in Amhara.In June media reported government security forces extrajudicially killed two civilians in Benishangul-Gumuz Region.  After a video of the execution created public outcry, the EHRC described it as an “extrajudicial execution” and promised to investigate.On February 15, the Oromo Legacy Leadership and Advocacy Association (OLLAA) alleged government security forces killed 23 individuals in January.In August media and the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) – an opposition political party – reported government security forces had committed extrajudicial killings in the Oromia Region.  On August 14, the OFC told VOA Amharic security forces had killed at least 12 civilians during operations the prior week in Chobe district of the West Shewa zone in Oromia.  Access to western Oromia was extremely restricted, imposing constraints on access to information.  On November 2, BBC Amharic reported extrajudicial killings of three civilians in East Shewa zone of Oromia by security forces.On February 28, the Washington Post reported Eritrean soldiers killed more than 300 civilians days before the COHA to end the northern conflict.  On September 4, Amnesty International reported Eritrea extrajudicially executed 24 civilians in Kokob Tsibah district following the COHA.  Unidentified groups of militants reportedly carried out attacks and killings of civilians in various parts of Oromia, Gambella, and Benishangul-Gumuz throughout the year.  Local militia groups in Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Sidama, and Central Ethiopia regions reportedly carried out attacks and killings of civilians as part of long-running regional boundary disputes and intercommunal conflicts.  The OLA and Fano militia reportedly killed civilians and government officials in many parts of Amhara and Oromia, especially in western Oromia.In a June 1 HRW report entitled Ethiopia:  Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce, HRW alleged the extrajudicial killings of Tigrayan detainees by Amharan forces in western Tigray, among other abuses.Abductions:  Government actors reportedly abducted journalists, activists, artists, and others who criticized its security operations and the humanitarian situation resulting from conflict.  Eritrean forces reportedly abducted Tigrayans in northern Ethiopia where the two countries shared borders and the EDF maintained its forces.  Thousands of Tigrayans reportedly were arbitrarily detained in western Tigray at unknown locations.On June 1, HRW reported that since the outbreak of the armed conflict in northern Ethiopia in 2020, a mix of security forces, in particular the irregular Fano militia and Amhara forces, had systematically rounded up thousands of ethnic Tigrayans.  They reportedly detained ethnic Tigrayan citizens for prolonged periods without charge in police stations, prisons, military camps, and other unofficial sites including warehouses and schools throughout the western Tigray zone.  Security forces and interim authorities also reportedly expelled hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans toward central Tigray.  Additionally, the EHRC in July stated it was investigating at least seven cases of enforced disappearance in the Oromia Region, including a resident of Gobu Seyo district in West Wollega Zone, whose whereabouts was unknown after police claimed to have transferred him to a detention center in the town of Nekemte on June 16.Throughout the year media reported increased incidents of kidnapping of civilians by armed groups including by the OLA for ransom and other reasons.  On May 29, VOA Amharic spoke with truck drivers who said between mid-April and the end of May, unidentified gunmen killed five drivers and their assistants after they were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen, even though family members paid the demanded ransom.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture:  According to HRW, OLLAA, and media reports, both the government and militias in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray engaged in torture and ill-treatment of civilians and captured combatants.  Victims were reportedly beaten with electric cables and metal pipes, detained incommunicado, threatened with guns to their heads, and deprived of food and water.  Civilians in western Tigray were reportedly tortured and ill-treated mainly because of their ethnic identities.  Elsewhere, captured soldiers and fighters, as well as civilians suspected of providing support to them, were reportedly tortured.In its September 18 report, ICHREE documented rape and sexual violence by both EDF and Amhara forces since the COHA and found reasonable grounds to believe EDF members bore primary responsibility for continuing crimes of rape and sexual violence against women and girls in Tigray.  ICHREE reported EDF-perpetrated sexual and gender-based violence had been abetted or tolerated by the federal government, which had failed in its legal duty to protect its population from violations by a foreign army, or by Amhara militia present in the areas of western and southern Tigray.In July 2022, the EHRC reported gender-based violence including sexual violence occurred in all conflict-affected areas of the country.  Some organizations reported conflict-induced displacement led to increased reports of rape and sexual violence including sexual slavery and sexual exploitation and abuse.  The government reportedly detained thousands of ethnic Amhara and Oromo after the August 4 state of emergency, and there were reports many detainees were held in inhuman and at times life-threatening conditions and subjected to torture.On September 18, ICHREE stated it had uncovered widespread arrests and detentions of Oromo civilians accused of having links with the OLA.  The detentions documented between 2020 and February 2023 were perpetrated primarily by the federal or regional police, Oromia Special Forces, and at times the ENDF, and were accompanied by torture and mistreatment.  Family members of suspected OLA fighters were also targeted for arrest and detention – including women who experienced sexual violence while in custody.  Arrests, detentions, and killings often took place against a backdrop of curfews and restrictions on movement, contributing to an overarching climate of fear.  Large areas of Oromia appeared to have been administered through the mandate of militarized Command Posts, whether or not State of Emergency legislation was in force.According to the Conduct in UN Field Missions online portal, there were two open allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by the country’s peacekeepers deployed to a UN peacekeeping mission:  one submitted in 2018 allegedly involving an exploitative relationship with an adult in the UN Mission in Liberia, and one submitted in late 2020 allegedly involving transactional sex in the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei.  By 2021, the United Nations had substantiated the 2018 allegation and repatriated the perpetrator, but the government had not yet reported accountability measures taken.  Concerning the 2020 allegation, the United Nations had taken an interim action (suspension of payments), but results of the investigation remained pending, as was any final action.Other Conflict-related Abuse:  In April it was discovered food aid intended for the inhabitants of Tigray suffering under famine-like conditions was being diverted and sold on the local market.  In June international actors including the United Nations suspended food aid to Ethiopia following a determination that a widespread and coordinated campaign was diverting food assistance from the persons who needed it to be sold in the market.  In its September 2022 report, ICHREE found grounds to believe the federal government and regional state governments had implemented a range of measures designed to systematically deprive the population of Tigray and other populations of political opponents of material and services indispensable for their survival, including health care, shelter, water, sanitation, education, and food.  International actors announced the resumption of food aid in November.In June HRW reported that interim authorities in control of western Tigray, as well as Amhara authorities and forces, intended to push Tigrayans out of “this land” and east across the Tekeze river (a natural boundary with the Northwestern Zone of Tigray).  According to HRW, these forces, engaged in the forcible transfer of hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans from the territory.  On August 29, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated it received allegations Amhara police supported by local militia and the Wolkait youth detained at least 250 Tigrayans in the disputed area of western Tigray and forced them into areas controlled by the Tigray interim administration, until the ENDF intercepted the individuals and gave them a choice to return to western Tigray or remain where they were.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution and law provided for freedom of speech, including for members of the press and other media.  The government’s respect for this right deteriorated, especially in response to the conflict in the northern part of the country and with the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia regions.  International organizations including the International Federation of Journalists, the CPJ, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), and Freedom House reported a decline in press freedom.RSF reported recent press freedom gains had been lost since the country became embroiled in ethnic conflicts and a civil war, despite the COHA.  Journalists reportedly feared reprisals, as many journalists had been killed under unclear circumstances.  Many reporters whose coverage did not support the government narrative were detained on serious charges such as “promoting terrorism and extremism.”In July CARD commissioned a study entitled Media Space and the State of Media Associations, which found an increasingly narrowing media space in the country.  The study stated, “Owing to the environment of conflict, access to information has increasingly become challenging; harassment and arbitrary detention of journalists has become a common practice; and mobility of journalists has been curtailed.”Freedom of Expression:  During the year, the government restricted criticism, especially regarding internal conflicts.  The government sometimes did not allow journalists access to Tigray and restricted their access to other conflict zones.  According to media reports, federal government officials warned members of the press against reporting misinformation or “promoting the terrorist and extremist group’s agenda.”In September the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center stated that beginning in January there were 30 incidents of arrest that involved journalists and human rights activists.  The center reported that during the year dozens of journalists were subjected to detentions and serious criminal charges, including terrorism charges, for exercising freedom of expression and performing their journalistic duties.  Nevertheless, authorities often subsequently dropped charges, including terrorism charges, demonstrating the charges were only used to silence and create fear among human right defenders, the EHRC asserted.The law prohibited dissemination of hate speech or disinformation through broadcasting, print, or social media using text, image, audio, or video.  Conviction of a crime described under the law was punishable with imprisonment for no more than two years or a substantial monetary fine.  A person convicted of violating the misinformation law could face no more than one year in prison or a substantial monetary fine.  If their action resulted in a person or group being attacked due to hate speech, the punishment for conviction could be between one year and five years of incarceration.  If a person was convicted of hate speech or disinformation via broadcasting services, print media, or a social media account of more than 5,000 followers, the violator faced one to three years in prison or a substantial monetary fine.On June 9, security forces detained filmmaker Yonas Berhane Mewa after an actress displayed an artwork showing a bullet wound on her head and barbed wire on her mouth in an award ceremony.Violence and Harassment:  On May 3, the EHRC commissioner reported an increasing trend of harassment of journalists and restriction of media freedom, including the recent arrest of eight journalists.  On May 8, the EHRC commissioner expressed concern for the growing trend of detentions and harassment of opposition voices in the country, including journalists and opposition political leaders.On April 14, the CPJ reported at least eight journalists were detained, including Meskerem Abera, Genet Asmamaw, Abay Zewdu, Tewodros Asfaw, Dawit Begashaw, and Assefa Adane, amid renewed unrest in the country.  According to the CPJ, Abay, Genet, Assefa, and Meskerem mainly reported on political and social issues affecting the Amhara ethnic group.  The CPJ reported five Federal Police officers arrested Genet on April 6.  Her lawyer, Henok Aklilu, said the police officers harassed and beat her during the arrest.  In an audio clip published by several media outlets and authenticated by Henok, an officer said, “Beat her; kick her,” and Genet said, “Do not beat me.  Why are you hitting me?  Why are you kidnapping me without a court order?”  On April 7, Genet appeared at the Federal First Instance Court and was accused of inciting violence on social media and other platforms and mobilizing young persons to overthrow the government, according to her lawyer.  Throughout the year, there were multiple reports of arrests and rearrests of journalists, denial of release by police after a court decision to release them on bail, and reversal of lower court decisions by higher courts because of pressure from the executive or the army.On March 8, a Federal High Court acquitted journalist Temesgen Dessalegn, editor of the privately owned magazine Feteh, on all three charges the attorney’s office brought against him.  Ethiopia Insider reported the court decided Temesgen was innocent of the charge related to “disseminating disinformation,” as he was cleared from two earlier accusations, including disclosing military secrets to the public.  Police arrested Temesgen in May 2022 and denied multiple court orders to release him on bail.  In November 2022, the Federal Prison Administration followed court orders and released Temesgen.  In September the Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center reported Temesegen was detained twice during the year in relation to the charges he was acquitted for and released after hours of questioning and harassment by police.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  While independent media were active, reports of harassment, intimidation, and other restrictions of journalists critical of the government – especially its response to internal conflicts – were widespread.  The Ethiopian Media Authority restricted some freedom of expression for members of the press.Ethnic, regional, and political considerations were reportedly a major concern at many media outlets to the detriment of independent, pluralistic, and balanced journalism.  Regional news agencies and social media influencers amplified messages that led to “echo chambers,” which often were biased towards ethnic interests.  News agencies reportedly withheld, underreported, downplayed, or discredited reports of abuses against rival ethnic groups.Libel/Slander Laws:  According to the NGO End Blasphemy Laws, the law provided criminal sanctions for blasphemy or scoffing at religious places or ceremonies.National Security:  The government charged some journalists on national security grounds.On May 6, the Ethiopian Security and Intelligence taskforce stated it had detained activist and journalist Gobeze Sisay from Djibouti, who was listed among a dozen “wanted” individuals whom the government suspected of committing “terrorism” related offenses.  The government claimed Gobeze was collaborating with “extremist forces to dismantle the constitutional order in the Amhara Region.”  According to the CPJ, Gobeze appeared before the Lideta branch of the Federal High Court in Addis Ababa on May 9 and 10 where police accused him of terrorism and leading the media propaganda wing of an unnamed extremist group.																Internet Freedom						The government periodically restricted and disrupted access to the internet and blocked social media sites, especially in areas affected by conflict.  In February the government blocked selected social media sites throughout the country for approximately five months, degrading citizens’ rights to expression and access to information.  The government’s outsized influence on the telecommunications sector – through state-owned EthioTelecom – enabled it to control the online media space by leveraging nationwide and regional shutdowns.  The opening of telecom service to foreign companies did not immediately affect internet freedom; Safaricom Ethiopia started service in August.In August the government blocked internet services in much of the Amhara Region.  In September the government started to suspend telecom services in parts of the Amhara regions where fighting between the ENDF and Fano militia was reported.In response to recurrent killings of civilians in western Oromia and other areas of the country, the government reportedly blocked communications, making it difficult for media to report and verify information for human rights organizations.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.  Permission to hold peaceful rallies was required.  Holding unrecognized rallies could result in legal liability.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						Demonstrations were infrequent.  When sustained demonstrations did occur, they often reflected an important shift in the political environment.  The Addis Standard on March 3 reported Oromia police killed at least three persons in Guji Zone during a protest against a new subregional administration structure.  Residents of Guji told media they were protesting the incorporation of Negele Town and three other districts from Guji Zone into the newly formed East Borena Zone following the February 27 decision of the Oromia Regional Council before police responded with force to disperse the crowd.On June 1, the EHRC reported security forces’ excessive use of force on civilians led to numerous deaths.  The EHRC stated on May 26 police had arrested more than 140 individuals alleging participation in “violent demonstrations” against the demolition of mosques in Sheger City of Oromia at the Grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa.  Similarly, on June 2, security forces killed three members of the Islamic community in Addis Ababa following a disagreement as police had encircled the Grand Anwar Mosque during a Friday prayer to prevent potential protest.  In a follow-up statement the Security and Intelligence Joint Task Force confirmed the death of three civilians and alleged injury to 63 security officers.  On June 3, thousands of Muslims attended the funeral ceremony of four Islamic community members killed by security forces in Addis Ababa.On June 17, media reported Addis Ababa police dispersed a meeting of trade associations for persons with disabilities.  Journalists from The Reporter on June 21 talked to members of the Addis Ababa disability associations who said six trade associations of persons with disabilities were gathered in a hotel meeting hall to discuss methods to protest the demolition of their businesses by the Addis Ababa City administration.  The owner of the hotel told media that police requested the hotel management stop the meeting, claiming the associations did not have a proper permit for the meeting.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, migration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.In-country Movement:  The government restricted movement in some areas, especially into and out of regions experiencing violence, including parts of Tigray, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and western Oromia.  Federal and regional authorities erected an extensive system of checkpoints on the road connecting regions to the center, which at times impeded travel for those seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance.Throughout the year, the Oromia Region and Federal Police frequently restricted movement into the capital Addis Ababa during public holidays and similar events, citing security concerns.  On January 7, media reported members of the Federal Police stationed at Alula Aba Nega Airport restricted residents of Tigray ages 16 to 70 from traveling to Addis Ababa.On January 25, media reported Oromia police had restricted movement of youth from the Amhara Region through Oromia.  According to the report, members of the regional police erected checkpoints and were turning away youth passengers traveling to Addis Ababa from Gojjam and Gondar areas of the Amhara Region.  On February 13, news network DW Amharic talked to passengers who said they were forced to return to Dejen town of the Amhara Region as Oromia police at Goha Tsion checkpoint told them to return to their point of origin.  Passengers told DW Amharic the ban included all types of passengers, including those traveling to Addis Ababa for medical treatment and permanent residents of Addis Ababa who had traveled to the Amhara Region for business.Foreign Travel:  There were reports government security officials without a court order occasionally banned individuals from leaving the country.  In November 2022, BBC Amharic reported the government security forces at Bole International Airport denied exit to the former head of the Amhara Special Forces, Brigadier General Tefera Mamo, to seek medical treatment in Israel.  On March 23, his wife told the BBC the government gave no reason for the ban, and it was not clear who sanctioned the order despite a persistent response from immigration officers at Bole International Airport that General Tefera was not permitted to leave the country.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in expanding protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern in most regions of the country.  Shortages of fuel, cash, and humanitarian aid supplies due to bureaucratic impediments created additional challenges in delivering humanitarian aid.  New regulations requiring humanitarian NGOs to pay expensive import duties on vehicles further impeded the ability of humanitarian organizations to assist vulnerable populations in remote parts of the country.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government used a refugee status determination system for providing services and protection to refugees.  UNHCR reported the government did not register Eritrean arrivals because it ceased granting prima facie recognition for Eritrean asylum seekers in 2020.  This led to an increase in unregistered Eritrean asylum seekers with no access to basic services and at heightened risk of protection violations due to lack of a refugee status determination and attendant documentation.  The government, however, provided asylum to approximately 40,000 Sudanese and nearly 100,000 Somaliland asylum seekers during the year.Freedom of Movement:  The government provided refugees with limited freedom of movement, even if properly registered.  Refugees benefitting from this out-of-camp policy faced limitations due to delays in the registration process.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										As of September, the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix estimated there were 44 million IDPs in the country spread across 33,393 assessed and accessible sites, an increase from 2022 due to conflict and drought.The IOM found IDPs had limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, and faced significant protection risks, including exposure to violence, lack of educational opportunities, and lack of health care.  Months of high inflation combined with disruption of farming activities due to conflict and below-normal harvests resulted in rising commodity prices and spiraling levels of food insecurity, hunger, and malnutrition.In March media reported a severe shortage of humanitarian support in the town of Debre Berhan town, Amhara Region, among 30,000 IDPs who were displaced from their neighborhoods in West Shewa, East, and West Wollega zones of Oromia Region.  On September 20, the EHRC reported a “concerning shortage” of food provisions in the refugee and IDP camps and urged the government to work towards swift resumption of food aid, which was suspended due to a widespread and coordinated food diversion scheme.  The resumption of international food assistance for refugees, IDPs, and other vulnerable populations was announced in November.  In September media reported a resurgence of an ethnic conflict in the borders of the Somali and Oromia regions.  The conflict, which affected Koloji IDP camp in Babile district, resulted in the killing of several persons, including women, children, and the elderly.  Media reported the conflict continued for three days after government militia from the Oromia Region on September 18 launched an attack on the IDP camp within the Somali Region, which hosted 20,000 Somalis displaced from Oromia during a 2017 similar conflict.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  Domestic and international nonpartisan observers generally agreed the 2021 elections were peaceful but cited irregularities, including security problems and large turnouts that overwhelmed polling stations across the country.  Observers also noted the elections took place against a backdrop of grave instability, including interethnic and intercommunal violence, and an electoral process that was not free or fair for all citizens.  While some major opposition parties boycotted the elections, observers assessed the result generally reflected the will of most citizens.  In 2021, the National Election Board of Ethiopia held a second round of elections in Somali, Harari, and the now defunct Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Registered political parties were required to receive permission from regional governments to open and occupy local offices.  The law required parties to report “public meetings” and obtain permission for public rallies.The government allowed opposition parties to participate in debates, hold rallies, and campaign actively, although there were reports of government abuses.  In 2021, prior to the election, several political parties alleged government abuses against their candidates, including killings, attempted killings, beatings, arbitrary detention, and harassment.  Some government organizations reportedly forced candidates to accept leave without pay on a mandatory basis.  Opposition parties complained measures the government took against their candidates negatively affected their preparations for the election.In 2021 two major political parties in Oromia boycotted the election.  The Oromo Liberation Front pulled out, citing the jailing of some of its leaders and alleged closure of its offices by the government, including its headquarters in the capital.  The Oromo Federalist Congress withdrew from the election on similar grounds.More opposition parties withdrew from the second round of the elections in 2021, citing unfair conditions, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front, the Freedom and Equality Party, and the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice party.  Although some reports characterized the election process as not conducive for opposition parties, opposition parties won 12 seats in the House of People’s Representative.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  No laws prevented women or members of minority groups from voting or participating in political life, although patriarchal customs, religious factors, and family commitments limited women’s participation in political life in some cases.  Since same-sex activity was illegal, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons did not identify themselves in political activity and did not openly participate.  During election periods, women experienced more psychological abuse and physical violence in comparison to men.  Women were also more likely to experience sexual harassment within political party structures or when running for office.Although many women went to the polls in the 2021 election, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) reported the environment at polling stations put women at risk of harassment and violence.  The association stated the extension of voting time until 9 p.m. had a disproportionately negative impact on women voters, observers, and officials because women faced a higher risk of sexual harassment and gender-based violence at night.  The association also explained that the long lines left women voters at higher risk of experiencing sexual harassment.The Federation of Ethiopia Associations of Persons with Disabilities noted accessibility for persons with disabilities was hindered.  Local human rights organizations also reported millions of IDPs could not participate in the election because the election board did not establish polling places in displacement camps.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for conviction of corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively or comprehensively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption, especially in relation to international humanitarian food assistance.In November 2022, the government categorized corruption as a threat to the country’s national security and formed a National Anti-Corruption Committee led by the country’s intelligence chief, Temesgen Tiruneh.Corruption:  In March a massive food aid corruption scheme was uncovered showing officials at all levels of government were diverting UN and other international food assistance intended for humanitarian purposes and instead using the food to support security forces and selling it on the open market.In December 2022, the Ministry of Justice announced it had filed grand corruption charges against four employees of the National Intelligence and Security Service for procuring cement from factories at a low price on the basis of national security and selling it at higher price in the local market.  During the year, the individuals were charged with serious corruption and abuse of power.  In November a federal court ruled the four individuals guilty and sentenced them from one to two and half years of imprisonment.  On October 18, the government arrested 41 employees working in its Immigration Nationality and Vital Events Agency, including the agency’s Deputy Director Tamiru Gembeta, alleging corruption in passport issuance services.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						While a variety of domestic and a few international human rights groups operated in the country, persistent insecurity and government-imposed access restrictions limited the groups’ ability to conduct investigations and publish their findings on human rights cases, and some international human rights investigators faced threats and intimidation from security forces.  Domestic human rights investigators faced regular intimidation from security forces.  Authorities limited the access of domestic and international human rights organizations, media, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic missions in certain geographic areas.  Government officials were particularly sensitive to any investigation or reporting connected to areas of internal conflict.  Civil society organizations operated in a narrowing civic space with expanding conflicts and repeated state of emergency declarations since 2020.  Domestic human rights organizations operated with limited capacity and practiced self-censorship due to fear of government retaliation.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  During the year, human rights defenders received threats and violence for reporting, especially on issues related to internal conflict and freedom of expression.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  Throughout the year, the government refused to cooperate with the ICHREE, impeding its ability to carry out its UN mandate.Despite the COHA, the government prevented the ICHREE from conducting onsite investigations on conflict-related violations across the country, including Tigray.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The Office of the Ombudsman had the authority to investigate complaints regarding administrative mismanagement by executive branch offices and officials and to investigate prison conditions.  A 2019 proclamation gave foreign nationals the right to present administrative complaints or rights abuse cases to the office.The EHRC was an independent federal state body accountable to parliament and responsible for investigating and reporting on the country’s human rights.  The EHRC had the jurisdiction to observe elections.  The law required EHRC senior staff to be funded as full-time employees.  The EHRC investigated human rights abuses across the country.  The EHRC faced restrictions regarding access to conflict-affected areas and visiting detention centers during a state of emergency, but it was able to criticize the government for disregarding the rule of law and abusing human rights, including through ethnic profiling, arbitrary arrests of journalists, and ethnically and politically motivated killings.  International human rights experts, however, accused the EHRC of systematic bias against Tigrayans when reporting on the conflict and of deliberately censoring information regarding alleged atrocities attributed to the government and its allies.  In some instances, federal and regional government bodies appeared to follow EHRC reports and recommendations in taking corrective measures in response to human rights violations and abuses.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized rape and provided for a penalty of five to 20 years’ imprisonment if convicted, depending on the severity of the case.  The law did not expressly address spousal rape.  The government did not fully enforce the law.  The law generally covered violence against a marriage partner or a person cohabiting in an irregular union without specifically mentioning spousal rape.  Some judges interpreted this article to cover spousal rape cases, but others overlooked such cases.International and local human rights organizations reported alarming levels of rape and sexual violence by all parties in the context of the conflict in the northern part of the country and the continued armed conflicts across different parts of the country.In its July 2022 annual report, the EHRC indicated pervasive incidents of gender-based violence across the country and stated impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence was a problem.  According to the EHRC’s report, women and children were targeted and exposed to a wide range of human rights violations and abuses in Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Oromia.  In its second annual report in July, the EHRC reported on the increased abduction and sexual violence in the Sidama Region, including of children.In October 2022, the United Nations Population Fund reported close to six million individuals needed services for gender-based violence, an increase from 3.5 million in 2021.  The need was greatest in regions affected by conflict, drought, and floods.  The report indicated women and girls accounted for most survivors seeking services, with gender-based violence against men and boys also recorded although highly underreported.  According to the report, access to multisectoral services for women and girls was low due to fear of stigma, access to services, and lower service availability.  In October 2022, the Dr. Denis Mukwege Foundation at Washington University reported survivors of conflict-related sexual violence lacked access to critical support services such as sexual and reproductive health care, psychosocial support, and safe shelter due to limited access to conflict-affected areas.In June the EHRCO called for accountability for sexual and gender-based violence cases.  The EHRCO’s statement followed the reported release of a young accountant who was abducted for nine days by the personal bodyguard of the Hawassa city mayor.  The EHRCO stated such cases were increasing due to impunity and called on the Sidama regional police to apprehend the suspect and for stakeholders working on women’s rights to oppose abduction and forced marriages.  At year’s end, the perpetrator was arrested and was awaiting trial.On January 8, seven local civil society organizations working on human rights reported increased gender-based violence throughout 2022, including physical assault, murder, and other forms of sexual violence against women.  The organizations cited research commissioned by the EWLA that counted approximately 47 cases of murder and attempted murder, 32 cases of rape, and 158 physical assault crimes against women across different regions in 2022.  The EWLA stated it had provided free legal support services to more than 13,000 women including victims of domestic violence within a year.Domestic violence was illegal, but government enforcement of the law was inconsistent.  Depending on the severity of injuries inflicted, penalties for conviction ranged from small monetary fines to 15 years’ imprisonment.  Domestic violence, including spousal abuse, was a pervasive social problem.  According to the 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, 34 percent of married women and girls between ages 15 and 49 had experienced physical, sexual, or emotional violence from spouses.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):  The law criminalized the practice of clitoridectomy and provided for three months’ imprisonment or a monetary fine if convicted.  Conviction of infibulation of the genitals (the most extreme and dangerous form of FGM/C) was punishable by five to 10 years’ imprisonment.According to research by authors from the Amhara Public Health Institute and Bahir Dar University, published in 2021, the prevalence of FGM/C among girls from birth to age 14 was 18.6 percent, representing a decline compared with 24 percent reported in the Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2005.  The research also indicated FGM/C was still widely practiced across communities (16 percent among girls younger than age 14, and 65 percent among girls and women ages 15 to 49).  The country was home to 25 million circumcised women and girls.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  Marriage by abduction was illegal, although it reportedly continued in some regions despite the government’s attempts to combat the practice.  Abductions reportedly led to fighting among families, communities, and ethnic groups.  In cases of abduction, the perpetrator did not face punishment if the survivor agreed to marry the perpetrator.  The practice of forced marriage as a remedy for rape continued, although rape and forced marriage were illegal.  These crimes were difficult to prosecute since they were usually settled outside courts of law.  Some communities reportedly forced rapists to marry the survivor to protect her family’s reputation.  Rapists who married survivors escaped punishment and could also benefit from a lowered bride price demanded by the survivor’s family.  During the year, rights groups reported abductions were most common in Sidama Region.Reports of sexual harassment were widespread.  The law prescribed penalties of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment, but authorities generally did not enforce the law.  The EHRC reported a wide range of factors that exacerbated sexual harassment, including conflict, drought, increased IDP populations, and inadequate working conditions for women in industrial parks.Discrimination:  The law provided for equal rights for women and men, both of whom had the same rights entering marriage, during marriage, and at the time of divorce.  Discrimination against women was widespread.  It was most acute in rural areas, where an estimated 80 percent of the population lived.  Traditional courts applied customary patriarchal law in economic and social relationships.All federal and regional land laws empowered women to access government land.  Inheritance laws enabled widows to inherit joint property acquired during marriage; however, enforcement of both legal provisions was uneven.Women’s access to gainful employment, credit, and the opportunity to own or manage a business was limited by fewer educational opportunities and by legal restrictions on women’s employment.  These restrictions included limitations on working in occupations deemed dangerous and in specific industries such as mining and agriculture.  There were several initiatives aimed at increasing women’s access to these critical economic empowerment tools.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The constitution protected the rights of women to access family planning resources and safeguard their health during pregnancy and childbirth.  Social and cultural barriers limited women’s access to reproductive health services.  According to the 2016 Demographic and Health Survey, 85 percent of married or in-union women in the country made decisions on their health care; 94 percent had autonomy in deciding to use contraception; but only 53 percent could refuse to have sex with their partners, and the law did not protect this right.  Overall, only 45 percent of married or in-union women ages 15 to 49 made their own decisions in all three key areas of sexual and reproductive health and rights:  deciding on their own health care, deciding on the use of contraception, and saying no to sex, according to the report.According to the 2019 Ethiopia Mini Demographic and Health Survey (EMDHS), 95 percent of women of reproductive age had access to family planning with modern methods.  According to 2018 World Health Organization data, the country had an adolescent birth rate (per 1,000 girls ages 15 to 19) of 79.5.  The 2019 EMDHS showed on average, women ages 45 to 49 had given birth to 6.7 children.  Despite nationwide access to contraception, negative cultural stigma around premarital sex reduced utilization of contraception.  Transportation problems in remote areas of the country also reduced utilization of contraception.  According to a small-scale survey in 2019, the modern contraception prevalence rate was 41 percent, up from 35 percent in 2016.  Prevalence and utilization of contraception varied widely among regions.Skilled health personnel attended 48 percent of births, according to 2019 EMDHS data.  Although the government provided free maternal and child health services, problems related to resource constraints and poor transportation in remote areas persisted for women in accessing skilled health attendance during pregnancy and childbirth.  Lack of skilled health attendance during pregnancy correlated with the country’s high maternal mortality rate – 401 deaths per 100,000 live births according to 2017 World Health Organization data.  Major causes of maternal mortality included hemorrhage, obstructed labor/ruptured uterus, pregnancy-induced hypertension, sepsis, and unsafe abortion.Girls and women who had FGM/C were significantly more likely to have adverse obstetric outcomes, including maternal death.  While access to some sexual and reproductive health services was available for survivors of gender-based violence at public-sector facilities, more comprehensive services for survivors – including legal and judicial support – were limited.  Survivors of gender-based violence in areas impacted by the conflict in the northern part of the country faced lasting medical and mental health complications due to a lack of sexual and reproductive health services associated with the destruction of medical facilities and limitations on humanitarian access.Social and cultural barriers related to menstruation and access to menstruation hygiene, as well as pregnancy and motherhood, limited girls’ access to education.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution and law provided for equal protection to all persons without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, or other social origin.  While the government generally enforced the law effectively, there were widespread allegations of government security forces targeting individuals for arrest and detention based on ethnicity in response to the conflict in the north of the country.According to the most recent census, conducted in 2007, the country had more than 80 ethnic groups, of which the Oromo, at approximately 34 percent of the population, was the largest.  An updated census was controversial; one was slated for 2019 but was postponed indefinitely.  The federal system and constitution defined political boundaries based on ethnic considerations, but the documents themselves were not drawn along such boundaries.  Many political parties were primarily ethnic based, although the ruling party and one of the largest opposition parties were not organized along ethnic lines.There were several reported cases of societal violence affecting members of national, racial, or ethnic minorities or groups.  Ethnic-based violence reportedly intensified during the year in the Wollega zones of Oromia Region.  The government blamed the attacks on the OLA, but the OLA rejected the accusation and demanded an independent investigation.  In its September report to the Human Rights Council, the ICHREE noted allegations of ethnically based killings of hundreds of civilians in Oromia.Ethnic conflict in Gambella Region between the Anuak and Nuer ethnic groups led to numerous deaths during the year.  On July 18, an ethnic clash reportedly left at least 24 persons dead and dozens injured, while properties were destroyed and thousands were forced to flee their homes.In August the government imposed a state of emergency, under which thousands of individuals were arbitrarily detained, many allegedly targeted on the basis of their Amhara ethnicity.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  A child’s citizenship derived from the child’s parents.  The law required registration for children at birth.  Children born in hospitals were registered; most of those born outside of hospitals were not.  The overwhelming majority of children, particularly in rural areas, were born at home.  The government continued a campaign initiated in 2017 to increase birth registrations by advising that failure to register would result in denial of public services.  The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2020, published by the African Child Policy Forum, found birth registration was only 3 percent, making it difficult to determine girls’ ages, and therefore to initiate legal action against perpetrators of sexual abuse and child marriage.Education:  The law did not make education compulsory.  Primary education was universal and tuition free; however, there were not enough schools to accommodate the country’s youth, particularly in rural areas and areas affected by conflict and drought.  The cost of school supplies was prohibitive for many families.  During the year, the city government of Addis Ababa provided school uniforms and supplies to students in all government schools.  According to the most recent government data, more than 19 million children were enrolled at the primary level with a gross enrollment rate of approximately 100 percent.  The high enrollment overburdened the education system, and student learning suffered.  There were no significant differences in enrollment rates between boys and girls in primary schools according to the government data, but girls’ enrollment and completion declined in the upper grades.Child Abuse:  Reports of child abuse were widespread.  Uvula cutting, tonsil scraping, and milk-tooth extraction were among the most prevalent harmful traditional practices.  The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2020 found approximately 40 percent of girls were engaged in hazardous labor.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The law set the legal minimum age for marriage for girls and boys at 18.  Authorities, however, did not enforce this law uniformly, and rural families sometimes were unaware of or disregarded this provision.  Some regions worked on banning early marriages.  Based on 2016 UNICEF data, 40 percent of women between ages 20 and 24 were married before age 18, and 14 percent were married before age 15.  The government strategy to address underage marriage focused on education and mediation rather than punishment of offenders.  In April 2022, UNICEF reported many girls in the country were forced to marry at a young age because of the worst drought the Horn of Africa had faced in 40 years.  UNICEF recorded 2,282 cases of child marriage from September 2021 to March 2022, compared with 672 instances in the first half of 2021, showing a dramatic increase.  In September the Amhara Region’s women and children’s affairs bureau stated there were more than 4,000 reported cases of child marriage in one year.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The minimum legal age for consensual sex was 18, but authorities did not enforce this law.  The antitrafficking law criminalized child sex trafficking.  Some families and brothel owners reportedly exploited girls from the country’s impoverished rural areas for domestic servitude and commercial sex.  There were reports brothel owners exploited girls for commercial sex in Addis Ababa’s central market.Infanticide, Including Infanticide of Children with Disabilities:  Ritual and superstition-based infanticide, including of infants with disabilities, continued in remote tribal areas, particularly in South Omo.  Local governments worked to educate communities against the practice.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community numbered approximately 10,000 persons.  The Addis Ababa Jewish community reported it believed it was protected by the government to practice its faith; however, the community at large faced societal discrimination.  Multiple rural Jewish communities reported stigma against them, citing a belief Jews were possessed by demons, and difficulties in participating in daily life while publicly practicing Judaism.For further information on incidents in the country of antisemitism, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, please see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  The law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct, and conviction was punishable by three to 15 years’ imprisonment.  In August there were several reports of arrests due to perceived same-sex sexual conduct, including of foreign citizens, and forced closure of businesses perceived to be LGBTQI+ friendly.Violence and Harassment:  There were reports of state and nonstate violence and harassment of LGBTQI+ persons.  In August the Addis Ababa police department launched a hotline for citizens to report “illegal activities that deviate from the law and social values,” while the city’s tourism bureau warned hotels not to permit “homosexual activities” to take place on their premises.  In May, after he was outed twice on a social media platform, an LGBTQI+ man in Addis Ababa was beaten by classmates and severely injured.  There were no hate-crime laws or other criminal justice mechanisms to aid in the investigation of abuses against LGBTQI+ persons.  Individuals generally did not publicly identify themselves as LGBTQI+ due to severe societal stigma and the criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct.  Activists in the LGBTQI+ community reported surveillance, entrapment, and fear for their safety.  Instances of harassment or violence against LGBTQI+ persons increased in frequency toward the end of the year.Discrimination:  There were high levels of societal discrimination nationwide against LGBTQI+ individuals, including in education, employment, and access to health care.  LGBTQI+ individuals risked physical violence and ostracism if their sexual orientation was revealed.  The social stigma and criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct made it difficult for LGBTQI+ persons to be open regarding their sexual orientation or gender identity.On August 10, the Addis Ababa Security Bureau announced a crackdown on businesses identified as “hotspots for gay practices.”  The bureau stated the measure followed information provided by the public through an anonymous hotline.  The bureau vowed to continue to take measures on those committing “despicable acts that are hated by both man and God.”  Foreign citizens reported harassment and threats to their personal and business livelihoods.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  There were reports of efforts to change the sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of LGBTQI+ persons through coerced participation in religious rituals or fasting.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  State actors sought to prevent LGBTQI+ persons from assembling in public or private.  The LGBTQI+ community was almost entirely underground due to risks of harassment and physical violence, although persons perceived to be LGBTQI+ were exposed via social media and threatened with violence, compelling them to limit their freedom of expression.  Given local attitudes, human rights NGOs did not publicly advocate for the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Many persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others.  The constitution did not mandate equal rights for persons with disabilities.  Employment law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical and mental disabilities but did not explicitly mention intellectual or sensory disabilities.  It was illegal for deaf persons to drive; despite the law, in April the government launched a program for the training and issuance of driver’s licenses for deaf persons.  There were reports the government denied antenatal and postnatal care services, as well as vaccination, for children with disabilities.Property owners were required to give persons with disabilities preference for ground-floor apartments, and they generally did so.Nationally there were several schools for persons with hearing and vision disabilities and several training centers for children and young persons with intellectual disabilities.  There was a network of prosthetic and orthopedic centers in five of the 10 regions.The law did not restrict the right of persons with disabilities to vote and otherwise participate in civic affairs, although accessibility problems made participation difficult for some persons with more significant disabilities.  Older persons, pregnant women, and nursing mothers received priority when voting.  The Federation of Ethiopia Associations of Persons with Disabilities preliminary report on its observation of the 2021 elections noted accessibility for persons with disabilities was hindered and persons with disabilities required additional assistance to access 22 percent of the polling stations visited by observers.On August 8, the Ethiopian Lawyers with Disabilities Association reported an increase in violations of rights of persons with disabilities and blamed the government for failing to hold officials accountable for the breach of the rights.  The association demanded the government allocate a separate budget to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Sporadic but deadly clashes occurred in the border area between Afar and Somali regions, between Oromia and Somali regions, and interethnic conflicts within the Gambella Region between Nuer and Anywa groups.On July 23, the EHRC called for “urgent attention and concerted action of authorities to prevent further deterioration” in Gambella following an escalated interethnic conflict.  The EHRC stated armed conflict between ethnic militias from Nuer and Anywa, and Murle ethnic militia from South Sudan resulted in civilian death and property destruction.  In July journalists from The Reporter talked to residents in the area who said at least 60 civilians and eight police officers had died due to the conflict.  Similarly, on February 7, Gambella regional officials reported ethnic Murle militiamen from South Sudan killed two and injured one.  VOA Amharic talked to the head of the regional security office, Utow Ukot, who said militiamen crossed from South Sudan into the Gog district of Gambella and raided a farm and killed civilians.  Security forces were reportedly deployed to the border to prevent repeated cross-border attacks.Societal stigma and discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS continued in education, employment, and community integration.  Persons with HIV or AIDS reported difficulty accessing various services.  There were no statistics on the scale of the problem.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution and law provided workers, except for civil servants and certain categories of workers primarily in the public sector, with the right to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively.  Other provisions and laws, however, severely restricted these rights.  The law specifically prohibited managerial employees, teachers, health-care workers, judges, prosecutors, security-service workers, domestic workers, and seasonal agricultural workers from organizing unions.  The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and required employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate workers dismissed for union activities.A minimum of 10 workers was required to form a union.  While the law provided all unions with the right to register, the government could refuse to register trade unions that did not meet its registration requirements.  The law allowed for refusing registration for a union when union leaders were restricted from certain civil rights by court and when the union was not willing to replace them.  There were no reports of a registration refused on this basis.  The government could unilaterally cancel the registration of a union.  Workers could not join more than one trade union per employment.  The law stipulated a trade union organization could not act in an overtly political manner.The law allowed administrative authorities to seek recourse via court actions to cancel union registration for engaging in prohibited activities, such as political action.While the law recognized the right to collective bargaining, this right was severely restricted under the law.  Negotiations aimed at amending or replacing a collectively bargained agreement had to take place within three months of its expiration; otherwise, the prior provisions on wages and other benefits ceased to apply.  The law restricted enterprise unions to negotiating wages only at the plant level.  Civil servants, including public-school teachers, had the right to establish and join professional associations created by the employees but could not bargain collectively.  Arbitration procedures in the public sector were more restrictive than in the private sector.  Penalties for violations were not commensurate with those for comparable crimes.There were reports of protests by civil servants demanding three months’ unpaid salary, which resulted in the detentions of hundreds of civil servants in the former Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region.Although the constitution and law provided workers with the right to strike to protect their interests, the law contained detailed provisions prescribing extremely complex and time-consuming formalities that mad legal strike actions prohibitively difficult.  The law required aggrieved workers to attempt to reconcile with employers before striking; it also included a lengthy dispute settlement process.  These provisions applied equally to an employer’s right to lock workers out.  For a strike to be authorized, two-thirds of the workers were required to support such action.  If not referred to a court or labor relations board, the union retained the right to strike without resorting to either of these options, provided they gave at least 10 days’ notice to the other party and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and made efforts at reconciliation.The law also prohibited strikes by workers who provided essential services, including air transport and urban bus services, electric-power suppliers, gasoline station personnel, hospital and pharmacy personnel, firefighters, telecommunications personnel, and urban sanitary workers.  The list of essential services went beyond the International Labor Organization definition of essential services.  The law prohibited retribution against strikers, but it also provided for civil or criminal penalties against unions and workers convicted of committing unauthorized strike actions.  If the provisions of the penal code prescribed more severe penalties, the punishment for conviction codified in the penal code became applicable.  Public servants who went on strike, urged others to go on strike, or failed to carry out their duties in a proper manner, to the prejudice of state, public, or private interest, were subject to imprisonment that involved forced labor.Trade unions expanded their membership in special economic-zone industrial parks and successfully advocated for enforcement against antiunion discrimination and retaliation against workers attempting to organize and assert labor rights.  Union-busting practices were widespread among employers.  The informal labor sector, including domestic workers and seasonal agricultural workers, was not unionized or protected by labor law.  Lack of adequate staffing prevented the government from effectively enforcing applicable laws for those sectors protected by law.  Court procedures were often subject to lengthy delays and appeals.Lawsuits alleging unlawful dismissal often took years to resolve because of case backlogs in the courts.  Labor officials reported high unemployment, fear of retribution, and long delays in hearing labor cases deterred workers from participating in strikes and other labor actions.  Two-thirds of union members belonged to the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions.  Labor-sector stakeholders reported the confederation demonstrated increasing independence from the government.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  There was no national minimum wage, but the Ministry of Labor and Skills made progress toward establishing a national minimum wage with the support of the International Labor Organization by forming a minimum wage board.  The minimum wage board included representatives from the government, employees, trade unions, and other stakeholders.  Some government institutions and public enterprises set their own minimum wages.  Public-sector employees, the largest group of wage earners, earned a monthly minimum wage that was above the poverty line.  Workers in the country’s industrial parks earned wages below the poverty line and reported working longer hours than the legal maximum.  In 2022 the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions urged the government to establish a national minimum wage through different means, including through the media and an official letter to the prime minister.The law provided for a 48-hour maximum legal workweek with a 24-hour rest period, premium pay for overtime, and prohibition of excessive compulsory overtime.  Four conditions allowed employers to make use of overtime work:  urgency of the task, danger, absence of an employee, and lack of alternatives.  Additionally, employers could not engage their employees in overtime work exceeding two hours per day, 20 hours per month, and 100 hours per year.  The law entitled employees in public enterprises and government financial institutions to overtime pay; civil servants received compensatory time off for overtime work.  Most employees in the formal sector worked a 39-hour workweek, but only a small percentage of the population, concentrated in urban areas, was involved in wage-labor employment.Occupational Safety and Health:  The government, industries, and unions negotiated occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, which did not fully address worker safety in many industries.  Many workers specifically excluded by law from unionizing, including domestic workers and seasonal agricultural workers, reportedly did not benefit from health and safety regulations in the workplace.  The Labor Ministry lacked detailed, sector-specific health and safety guidelines.Hazardous working conditions existed in the agricultural sector, which was the primary base of the country’s economy.  There were also reports of hazardous and exploitative working conditions in the construction and industrial sectors, although data on deaths and injuries were not available.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  Overall, the government did not effectively enforce wage laws.  Penalties were not commensurate with those for comparable violations of similar laws.  The Labor Ministry’s inspection department was responsible for enforcement of workplace standards.  OSH measures were not effectively enforced.  The ministry carried out some regular labor inspections to monitor compliance, but the government had an insufficient number of labor inspectors to enforce the law and did not effectively record or track violations.The World Bank and the National Employment Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia reported the informal sector included more than 70 percent of urban workers.  Although labor laws covered informal sector workers, the government did little to enforce the law in this sector.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											Tonga											The Bahamas											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Ethiopia
- Kazakhstan HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Kazakhstan				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Kazakhstan during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners and detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence; crimes involving threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.The government took some credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.In 2022, the government stated 238 persons had been killed in connection with nationwide unrest in January, including at least six deaths due to torture in detention.  Human rights organizations estimated the number of civilian deaths to be higher, possibly up to 260.  Investigations and trials related to these reported human rights violations continued during the year.  On June 7, seven law enforcement officials in Almaty city received prison sentences in connection with the reported death by torture of Zhasulan Anafiyaev, and two police officers in Taldykorgan received prison sentences on July 20 in connection with the reported death by torture of Almas Mukashev.  A Semey city court on August 23 convicted but did not require prison time to be served by two officers accused in the reported death by torture of Zhandos Zhotabayev.  Media reported at least three additional security service officers received prison sentences for “abuse of power” under charges of shooting and killing civilians.In December 2021, Nurbolat Zhumabayev died in police custody in Shymkent after police arrested him for suspected carjacking.  On June 30, the Shymkent city court announced sentences between two and seven and a half years’ for four police officers charged with abuse of power and use of torture that resulted in the death of the victim.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them.  Cases of prison officers being brought to justice for abuse were rare, and officers often received light punishment.  Human rights observers commented that only in rare incidents, such as when information regarding the abuse was publicized and caused a strong public reaction, were perpetrators held accountable.  Abuse occurred in police cells, pretrial detention facilities, and prisons.  Human rights observers reported torture was particularly prominent in pretrial facilities, including interrogation rooms, where security personnel sometimes beat and otherwise abused detainees to extract confessions.  Torture cases were most commonly connected with representatives of law enforcement and national security services, according to human rights observers.In 2022, the domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO) Coalition Against Torture reported it received 188 complaints of torture during the January 2022 unrest, when amid an apparent internal elite conflict, criminal elements incited initially peaceful protests into violent attacks against government sites and personnel, resulting in over 200 deaths.  There were reports of torture and mistreatment of children, while the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman reported it received 110 complaints of torture and inhuman treatment.  Human rights defenders stated the true number of torture cases was much higher, as most cases probably went unreported.  According to information submitted by the government to the UN Committee Against Torture, the government opened 329 criminal cases of torture related to January events, of which 236 were closed.  According to media and official data, at least nine security service officers received prison sentences in connection with torture and abuse not leading to the death of civilians.  This included five former officers accused of torturing 23 victims with a hot clothing iron in Taldykorgan, and three officers accused of torturing Almaty resident Timur Radchenko.  Human rights activists and media articles stated that many victims of torture and abuse connected with the January 2022 events did not report their cases due to fear of persecution by the government.Investigations of torture cases were not transparent and did not involve international bodies, despite repeated calls for transparency from NGOs and the international community.  Human rights defenders reported identifiable suspects in some torture cases were not charged, despite availability of witnesses and evidence.  Human rights defenders further reported that prison sentences for security service officials were disproportionately light in comparison with those of civilians convicted of organizing riots and other crimes connected with January 2022 events.In August, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman announced it received 138 torture complaints and 221 inhuman treatment complaints in the first half of the year.  The announcement did not include information on the number of investigations opened.  In November, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced it had opened criminal cases against 40 law enforcement officers who committed torture against 107 citizens, including 12 convictions at the time of the announcement.  In December, an Almaty court sentenced 11 officers in a January 2022 torture case; seven of the former officers were sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment on charges of torturing more than 40 people.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Observers reported that prison conditions generally remained harsh and that facilities did not meet international health standards.  Health problems among prisoners went untreated in many cases, or prison conditions exacerbated them.Abusive Physical Conditions:  The Public Monitoring Commissions (quasi-independent bodies that carried out monitoring of prison conditions) and the National Preventive Mechanism against Torture (NPM) reported overcrowding, outdated facilities in need of demolition or major repair, lack of appropriate heating or cooling, lack of funding for appropriate nutrition, poor health and sanitary conditions and poor medical services, including for prisoners suffering from HIV, AIDS, and diabetes.  Some facilities were not accessible for persons with disabilities.  The NPM also reported discrimination against prisoners in vulnerable groups, including prisoners with disabilities and prisoners with HIV or AIDS, and some instances in which prison officials targeted members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) community for harassment.On September 4, local media widely published video footage of a group of prison guards in an Akmola Region penal colony restraining and beating Timur Danebayev, an activist included in the civil society expert-vetted Tirek list of political prisoners, after a disagreement over bathroom cleaning.  Danebayev was transferred out of the facility and was in a pretrial detention facility in Astana as of October 13.  Media reported 11 staff members from the penal colony were fired.Administration:  Human rights observers reported authorities sometimes conducted proper investigations into allegations of mistreatment, but in many cases did not respond to or hold prison staff accountable for complaints of abuse or torture.  NPM members reported many prisoners did not have access to a secure channel for submission of complaints.  In addition, human rights experts reported local prosecutor general’s offices responsible for investigating abuse and torture complaints sometimes exploited bureaucratic loopholes to avoid investigating them.  Public Monitoring Commission members reported administrators sometimes followed up on recommendations to improve physical conditions but were limited by budgetary considerations.Independent Monitoring:  There were no independent international monitors of prisons.  The Public Monitoring Commissions and NPM, which were staffed on a volunteer basis and included members of civil society, conducted scheduled monitoring visits to prisons and places of detention.  Human rights advocates, however, stated that funding and administrative limitations prevented these bodies from acting as an effective deterrent to torture.  Specific issues included mandatory prenotification of visits, which gave prison administrators opportunity to hide evidence of abuses; requirements to obtain permission from the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office to conduct extraordinary visits when NPMs received specific torture complaints, which limited the NPM’s ability to conduct independent monitoring; low staffing, which made it impossible for NPMs to provide the majority of prisoners and detainees with opportunities for confidential conversations; lack of training for NPM members, including on how to monitor for signs of torture and abuse; and low funding levels.  Human rights defenders noted the Ombudsman’s Office introduced new confidentiality requirements for NPM members, thereby reducing the utility of the NPM in calling public attention to abuses.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court.  The government generally did not observe these requirements.Human rights observers reported arbitrary arrests of political opponents and activists continued throughout the year.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The duration of preliminary detention could be extended to 72 hours in a variety of cases, including grave or terrorist crimes, crimes committed by criminal groups, drug trafficking, sexual crimes against a child, and others.  The court could choose other forms of restraint, including house arrest or restricted movement.  According to human rights activists, these procedures were frequently ignored.Although the judiciary had authority to deny or grant arrest warrants, judges authorized arrest warrant requests in most cases.The law allowed conditional release on bail, although use of bail procedures was limited.  Prolonged pretrial detention remained commonplace.  Bail was not available to suspects of grave crimes, crimes that led to death, organized crime, terrorist or extremist crimes, or in situations where there was reason to believe the suspect, if released, would hinder the investigation of the case or would escape.Persons detained, arrested, or accused of committing a crime had the right to the assistance of a defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation.  The law obliged police to inform detainees of their rights, including the right to an attorney.  Human rights observers stated that prisoners were constrained in their ability to communicate with their attorneys, that penitentiary staff secretly recorded conversations, and that staff often remained present during the meetings between defendants and attorneys.Human rights defenders reported that authorities dissuaded detainees from seeing an attorney, gathered evidence through preliminary questioning before a detainee’s attorney arrived, and in some cases used defense attorneys to gather evidence.The law required a government-provided attorney when the suspect was indigent, was a child, had physical or mental disabilities, or faced serious criminal charges.  Public defenders often lacked the necessary experience and training to assist defendants.  Defendants were barred from freely choosing their defense counsel if the case against them involved state secrets.Arbitrary Arrest:  The government frequently arrested and detained political opponents and critics, sometimes for minor infractions such as unsanctioned assembly that led to fines or up to 15 days’ administrative arrest.  During the year, authorities detained many persons who participated in unsanctioned protests and some pedestrians walking near protest sites.The law granted prisoners prompt access to family members, although authorities occasionally sent prisoners to facilities located far from their homes and relatives, thus preventing access for relatives unable to travel.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law did not provide for an independent judiciary, and both the executive and judicial branches limited judicial independence in practice.  Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2023 report stated that the judiciary was effectively subservient to the executive branch, with the president nominating or directly appointing judges based on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, which was itself appointed by the president.  Attorneys were required to become members of a state chamber and to register with a government-controlled digital information system, a law criticized by local and international lawyers’ associations as imposing undue state control over legal professionals and threatening their independence.  In 2022, evaluators from the Group of European States Against Corruption noted the president heavily influenced key appointments in the judiciary, prosecution, specialized anti-corruption bodies, and law enforcement.  Although judges were among the most highly paid government employees, lawyers and human rights monitors stated that judges, prosecutors, and other officials solicited bribes in exchange for favorable rulings in many criminal and civil cases.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair trial.  Trials were generally public except in instances that could compromise state secrets or when necessary to protect the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen.  In some cases, human rights experts stated trails were closed to prevent demonstrations of support for political prisoners or detainees.Observers noted the juror selection process was inconsistent.  Judges exerted pressure on jurors and could easily dissolve a panel of jurors for perceived disobedience.  The law had no mechanism for holding judges liable for such actions.  Activists criticized juries for a bias towards the prosecution because of the pressure that judges applied on jurors, experts, and witnesses.According to observers, prosecutors dominated trials, and defense attorneys played a minor role.  Defense attorneys in human rights cases stated they experienced harassment from authorities.  Attorneys also sometimes complained they and the defendants did not always have adequate time or facilities to prepare.Domestic and international human rights organizations reported numerous problems in the judicial system, including lack of access to court proceedings, lack of access to government-held evidence, frequent procedural violations, unfair denial of defense counsel motions, and failure of judges to investigate allegations that authorities extracted confessions through torture or duress.Lack of due process remained a problem, particularly for cases arising from civil protests.Human rights activists and international observers noted investigative and prosecutorial practices that made a confession of guilt more important than evidence when building a criminal case against defendants.  Courts generally ignored defendants’ allegations that officials obtained confessions through torture or duress.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were several reports of political prisoners and detainees.  The government denied the existence of political prisoners.  The civil society alliance Tirek maintained a list of more than 20 individuals it considered detained or imprisoned based on politically motivated charges for most of the year.  As of early December, the list included 23 individuals.  All were reported to be peaceful activists, journalists, protesters, or political figures.  Individuals on the Tirek list during the year included, among others, members of the “group of seven” activists accused of organizing “mass riots” related to November 2022 presidential elections; activists accused of association with the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan or Koshe party; anti-corruption and human rights activists, journalists, and one individual convicted of “inciting hatred” after he filed a police complaint accusing President Tokayev of spreading false information with claims that 20,000 terrorists were involved in January 2022 nationwide unrest.  On November 21, a court sentenced Nurzhan Altayev, leader of the unregistered El Tiregi political party, to 10 years’ imprisonment on charges of receiving bribes.  On November 29, a court sentenced Marat Zhylanbayev, leader of the unregistered Alga, Kazakhstan political party to seven years’ imprisonment on charges of “financing an extremism” organization and participating in a “banned organization” based on alleged ties to Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan.  Human rights defenders considered both unregistered party leaders to be political prisoners.On April 10, leader of the unregistered Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Zhanbolat Mamai, previously under house arrest, was sentenced to six years’ probation on accusation of “organizing mass riots” during the January events of 2022.  He was banned from engaging in social and political activities, journalism, publicism, and participating in the work of public associations for six years.Human rights organizations had access to prisoners through the NPM framework.																										f. Transnational Repression										The government engaged in acts of transnational repression to intimidate or exact reprisal against individuals outside the country.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion:  On February 7, the Atyrau Regional Court upheld a five-year imprisonment sentence on charges of nonpayment of taxes, money laundering, and participation in an organized criminal group against Bekizhan Mendygaziyev.  Human rights defenders alleged that authorities selectively prosecuted Bekizhan and other family members and former colleagues of outspoken opposition supporter and activist Barlyk Mendygaziyev, a brother of Bekizhan, who lived in the United States, to force Barlyk Mendygaziyev to stop his political activities.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, but there were reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.There were reports that government authorities arbitrarily, unlawfully, or without appropriate legal authority entered homes; accessed, collected, or used private communications or personal data; used technologies and practices including facial recognition; employed informer systems; and punished family members for offenses allegedly committed by relatives.  Human rights defenders, activists, and their family members continued to report the government sometimes monitored their movements contrary to international norms, including in the case of persons associated with advocacy, free speech, or association related to LGBTQI+ rights.Courts heard appeals of prosecutors’ decisions for a wiretap or surveillance but could not issue an immediate injunction to cease an infringement.On September 20, the State Revenue Committee published a list of 240 entities and individuals receiving foreign funding.  Civil rights experts noted the registry included many nongovernment employees’ names and individual identification numbers, unique identifiers used to open bank accounts, pay taxes, purchase property, and other activities.  Nongovernment experts stated this was a violation of privacy regulations.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										While the constitution provided for freedom of speech and of the press, the government limited freedom of expression and exerted influence on media through detention, imprisonment, criminal and administrative charges, restrictive laws, harassment, licensing regulations, and internet restrictions, among other means.  Human rights monitors and independent media outlets reported less harassment by government actors than in some years but an increased amount of harassment and intimidation by unidentified nonstate actors.Freedom of Expression:  The government limited individuals’ ability to criticize the country’s leadership, and regional leaders attempted to limit criticism of their own actions.  The law expressly prohibited insulting the sitting president or his family and imposed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment for conviction.Independent media were limited.  Many privately owned newspapers and television stations received government subsidies.  The lack of transparency in media ownership and the dependence of many outlets on government contracts for paid media coverage and advertising were significant problems.According to media observers, the government wholly or partly owned most of the nationwide television broadcasters.  Regional governments owned several television frequencies, and the Ministry of Information and Social Development distributed those frequencies to independent broadcasters via a tender system.  Government-owned media outlets reported significant restrictions on topics they were able to cover, including on criticism of the government, relations with the Russia and China, religion, and human rights.  Symbolic expression including Ukrainian flags, Pride flags, and political slogans, signs or buttons were legally allowed but restricted in practice.Violence and Harassment:  Civil society experts reported several harassment cases against independent journalists by unknown perpetrators in January.  On January 10, media reported unknown attackers vandalized the offices of publication Elmedia.kz.  On January 14, journalist Dina Yegeubaeva reported unknown attackers set fire to her car.  On January 18, representatives of independent media website UlysMedia reported unknown hackers deleted content from their website and distributed copies of editor in chief Samal Ibraeva’s passport, family photographs, and information regarding her minor-age children online.  On January 19, media reported unknown actors applied polyurethane foam and left graffiti on the door of journalist Vadim Boreiko.The government opened a case against businessman Arkady Manevich-Klebanov for organizing the incidents and for his alleged role in organizing harassment incidents in 2022, including additional cases of Elmedia office vandalism and a case in which unknown individuals mailed a pig’s head to Orda.kz editor in chief Gulnara Bazhkenova.  On November 1, a court ordered mandatory treatment for chronic mental illness, deeming Manevich-Klebanov to have been in a state of insanity when the incidents occurred.  In late November, a court ordered a 4.5-year suspended sentence for Oleksiy Tokarev, a Ukrainian hacker, and 1.5-year suspended sentences for four minors on charges related to the incidents.  Several human rights and media figures reported they believed the convicted individuals were not responsible for the attacks and were used as cover for the actual instigators.Media reported unidentified men forcibly removed journalist Diana Saparkyzy from a mine in Karaganda on August 17, while she was attempting to report on the deaths of miners during a fire.  Saparkyzy reported the men took her cell phone when she filmed them and attempted to delete her video footage, which she was subsequently able to restore.  Police did not open a criminal investigation into the incident.On March 27, media reported the Almaty military garrison court gave anti-corruption journalist Mikhail Kazachkov a suspended sentence of 3.5 years’ imprisonment following charges of releasing state secrets and helping a criminal group carry out illegal hostile business takeovers.  According to public reports, Kazachkov’s lawyer described his offense as “a professional mistake in preparing investigative journalism” and noted charges of aiding and abetting raiding were dropped.  Experts on local media condemned Kazachkov’s 2022 arrest as politically motivated.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  Journalists and media outlets exercised self-censorship to avoid pressure by the government.The law prohibited undermining state security or advocating class, social, racial/ethnic, national, or religious discord, enabling the government to restrict media content.  Owners, editors, distributors, and journalists could be held civilly and criminally responsible for content unless it came from an official source.The law provided for additional measures and restrictions during “social emergencies,” defined as “an emergency on a certain territory caused by contradictions and conflicts in social relations that may cause or have caused loss of life, personal injury, significant property damage, or violation of conditions of the population.”  In these situations, the government could censor media sources by requiring media to provide, for government approval, print, audio, and video information 24 hours before publication or broadcast.Political parties and public associations could be suspended or closed if they obstructed the efforts of security forces.  Regulations also allowed the government to restrict or ban copying equipment, broadcasting equipment, and audio and video recording devices, and to seize loudspeakers.By law internet resources, including social media, were classified as forms of mass media and were governed by the same rules and regulations as mass media.  Authorities sometimes charged bloggers and social media users with criminal law violations based on their online posts.On July 10, President Tokayev signed a new law “On Online Platforms and Online Advertising” regarding rights and obligations of owners of online platforms and users, as well as requirements for online advertising.  According to the law, online platforms included social networks, instant messengers, blogs, video hosting and other platforms receiving an average daily user population of at least 100,000 within one month.  The law required owners of online platforms to act to counter the spread of illegal content in the country, post publicly available information on the average monthly number of users in the country over the last six months of operation of the online platform and suspend the activities of accounts in the country that posted and distributed illegal content, or information recognized as cyberbullying in relation to a child, based on an order from the authorized body.In May, media reported journalist Duman Mukhametkarim was placed under a 25-day administrative arrest on charges of participation in unsanctioned public gatherings.  In June, Mukhametkarim was charged with “financing extremism” and “participation in an extremist organization banned by the court.”  Human rights defenders asserted this charge was politically motivated in connection with the journalist’s outspoken criticism of the government, as well as his choice to run as an independent candidate in March parliamentary elections.  His case was pending as of October.Radio Azattyq, a local affiliate of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, reported the government approved only six of more than 30 journalist accreditation applications filed since October 2022, and reduced the period of accreditation to one year from its previous two-year standard.  Journalists believed this reduction in registrations was politically motivated, based on Radio Azattyq’s critical reporting on the government.In September, organizers of the Zhana Shekara film festival dedicated to the culture, history, and human rights violations in East Turkestan (known in Chinese as Xinjiang) reported they were forced to hold their event in online format after government security services pressured their venue into refusing to hold the event.Multiple independent journalists and bloggers alleged the government employed bot farms to file false complaints with social media companies against their pages due to their criticism of the government, leading to temporary and in some cases permanent shutdowns of their public platforms.Libel/Slander Laws:  There was no criminal liability for libel and slander, but the law imposed serious punishment for conviction of libel under the administrative code.  Several articles in the law could also be applied against individuals insulting government officials, particularly the sitting president.  Media activists raised concerns regarding the wide use of the legal provision imposing liability for dissemination of false information.  The activists highlighted its use to pressure or silence journalists and civil society activists, including on investigation of corruption cases.The law included penalties for conviction of defamatory remarks made in mass media or “information-communication networks,” including heavy fines and prison terms.  Journalists and human rights activists reported government officials used these provisions to restrict investigative journalism.Media reported Shymkent-based anti-corruption journalist Amangeldy Batyrbekov, editor of the Saryagash-inform newspaper, was placed under 20-day administrative arrest in July and again in October based on charges of libel from local government officials whom Batyrbekov accused of involvement in corruption schemes.  Batyrbekov stated the charges were politically motivated.  Media freedom organization Adil Soz accused local authorities of arresting Batyrbekov illegally.National Security:  The law criminalized the release of information regarding the health, finances, or private life of the first president, as well as specific economic information such as data on mineral reserves or government debts to foreign creditors.  To avoid possible legal problems, media outlets often practiced self-censorship regarding the president and his family.The law prohibited “influencing public and individual consciousness to the detriment of national security through deliberate distortion and spreading of unreliable information.”  The law also prohibited publication of any statement that promoted or glorified “extremism” or “incited discord.”  Legal and human rights experts noted the terms “unreliable information” and “extremism” were overly broad, and used in practice to persecute political opponents, activists and journalists, and peaceful religious believers.On August 21, media reported the Supreme Court had rejected the complaint of activist Yerulan Amirov, sentenced in 2022 to seven years in prison under articles on “propaganda of terrorism” and “participation in the activities of a banned organization.”  Human rights activists reported Amirov had been subject to government harassment since 2020 based on his participation in peaceful protests, including advocating financial and debt relief support to citizens.																Internet Freedom						The government exercised comprehensive control over online content.  Observers reported the government blocked or slowed access to opposition websites, as well as some news sites from neighboring countries and Change.org.  Freedom House reported that the government throttled access to the internet during local protests.  Many observers believed the government added progovernment postings and opinions in internet chat rooms.  The government regulated the country’s internet providers, including Kazakh Telecom, in which the state owned a majority interest.  Websites carried a wide variety of views, including viewpoints critical of the government.Media law prohibited citizens from leaving anonymous comments on media outlet websites.  Websites had to register all online commenters and make the registration information available to law enforcement agencies on request.  As a result, most online media outlets did not host public comment platforms.The Ministry of Digital Development, Innovations, and Aerospace Industry controlled the registration of the country’s (.kz) internet domains.  Authorities could suspend or revoke registration as punishment for placing computer databases or servers outside the country.  Observers criticized the registration process as unduly restrictive and vulnerable to abuse.The government implemented regulations on internet access that mandated surveillance cameras in all internet cafes, required visitors to present identification to use the internet, demanded internet cafes keep a log of visited websites, and authorized law enforcement officials to access the names and internet histories of users.In several cases, the government denied it was behind the blocking of websites.  Some bloggers reported anecdotally that their sites were periodically inaccessible, as did the publishers of some independent news sites.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for some freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government did not respect it.  Organizers had to submit advance notification to the local government.  In practice the government used bureaucratic technicalities to deny many applications related to political or socially controversial topics.  The law stated all gatherings except single-person pickets could only be held in areas designated by authorities, and persons holding single-person pickets were sometimes fined or harassed.  Spontaneous gatherings were banned, and foreigners and stateless persons were denied the right to peaceful assembly.						Freedom of Association						The law provided for limited freedom of association, but there were significant restrictions on this right.  Any public organization set up by citizens, including religious groups, had to be registered with the Ministry of Justice as well as with the local departments of justice in every region in which the organization conducted activities.  The law required public or religious associations to define their specific activities, and any association that acted outside the scope of its charter could be warned, fined, suspended, or banned.  Participation in unregistered public organizations could result in administrative or criminal penalties, such as fines, imprisonment, the closure of an organization, or suspension of its activities.  Activists and civil society members reported the government or persons loyal to the government sent individuals to join independent organizations and report on or undermine projects.NGOs reported some difficulty in registering public associations working on politically or socially sensitive topics, for example LGBTQI+ rights.  According to government information, these difficulties were due to discrepancies in the submitted documents (see section 5).Membership organizations other than religious groups, which were covered under separate legislation, had to have at least 10 members to register at the local level and had to have branches in more than one-half the country’s regions for national registration (see sections 3 and 7.a.).By law all “nongovernment organizations, subsidiaries, and representative offices of foreign and international noncommercial organizations” were required to provide information on “their activities, including information regarding the founders, assets, sources of their funds and what they are spent on....”  An “authorized body” could initiate a “verification” of the submitted information based on information received in mass media reports, complaints from individuals and entities, or other subjective sources.  Untimely or inaccurate information contained in the report, discovered during verification, was an administrative offense and could carry moderate fines or suspension for three months if the infraction was not rectified or was repeated within one year.  In extreme cases criminal penalties were possible, which could lead to a large fine and suspension or closure of the organization.The law prohibited illegal interference by members of public associations in the activities of the government, with a moderate fine or imprisonment for up to 40 days if convicted.  If the leader of the organization committed the interference, the fine could be slightly increased, or the imprisonment could be for up to 50 days.  The law did not clearly define “illegal interference.”The law established broad reporting requirements concerning the receipt and expenditure of foreign funds or assets.  It required labeling all publications produced with support from foreign funds.  The law set out administrative and criminal penalties for noncompliance with these requirements, including potential restrictions on the conduct of meetings, protests, and similar activities organized with foreign funds.On September 20, the State Revenue Committee published a registry of 240 entities that received foreign funding or support and engaged in collection of sociological data, provision of legal assistance, or production and distribution of information.  Experts on freedom of association stated the list was discriminatory and designed to highlight organizations that criticized the government, noting the registry did not include government-affiliated entities or individuals that received foreign grants or China- and Russia-affiliated news outlets.  Some nongovernment organizations included in the list reported increased scrutiny of their activities from local authorities following its publication.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.  Some citizens were prohibited from leaving the country in connection with refusal to pay fines connected to their religious activities.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees.  UNHCR’s contracted local partners could, if needed, appeal to the government and intervene on behalf of individuals facing deportation.According to UNHCR, the refugee system fell short of the international standard regarding access to asylum procedures and access to the country’s territory.  Experts noted refugees were granted the status of “temporarily residing aliens” and had to renew this status on an annual basis.  Human rights observers reported authorities were reluctant to approve asylum applications for citizens of countries including Russia, China, and Uzbekistan.  Contrary to commitments under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a person who crossed the border illegally to escape persecution could be prosecuted for this in criminal court, and subsequently could be viewed as a person with criminal potential, a negative factor in the asylum decision.According to UNHCR data, as of June, there were 979 refugees and asylum seekers in the country.The law did not provide for differentiated procedures for persons with specific needs, such as separated children and persons with disabilities.  There were no guidelines for handling sensitive cases, including LGBTQI+ cases.The government had an agreement with China not to tolerate the presence of ethnic separatists from one country on the territory of the other.Refoulement:  In December 2022, the government deported to Russia former Russian presidential guard officer Mikhail Zhilin, who according to public reports, applied for and was denied asylum in Kazakhstan.  Human rights experts assessed this to be a case of refoulement, insofar as Zhilin was a conscientious objector to military service following Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine.Employment:  Refugees faced difficulties in gaining employment and social assistance from the government.  By law refugees had the right to work but could not engage in individual entrepreneurship.  Refugees faced difficulties in accessing the labor market due to their annual reapplication requirement for status as “temporarily residing aliens,” as well as local employers’ lack of awareness of refugee rights, with the result that most refugees worked in the informal economy.Access to Basic Services:  Status as “temporarily residing aliens” hindered refugees’ access to the full range of rights stipulated in the law.  The law lacked provisions on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees with specific needs.  Refugees had access to education and health care on the same basis as citizens, but they had no access to social benefits or allowances.  The government did not provide accommodation, allowances, or any social benefits to asylum seekers.  Refugees and asylum seekers were ineligible for public allowances, such as disability and survivors’ benefits, childbirth benefits, care allowances, and benefits for raising a child with disabilities; could not contribute to pension funds; and received minimal access to medical care.Stateless persons, asylum seekers, and foreigners temporarily staying as labor migrants or for other purposes had to sign contracts for voluntary health insurance and register with a local clinic to be eligible for primary health services.Despite a legislative change making refugee travel documents available to refugees and asylees beginning in 2022, these documents did not become available during the year because of pending regulatory and procedural changes needed to produce and issue the documents.  Government officials stated that, when the refugee travel document became available, it would be valid for 12 months and resemble a passport.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The constitution and law provided procedures to deal with stateless persons, and the government generally made serious attempts to ease the burden of statelessness within the country.  The law did not provide for a simplified naturalization procedure for stateless persons.The country contributed to statelessness because its application for citizenship required renunciation of citizenship of the country of origin, with no stipulation that citizenship would be granted.  As of June, a total of 7,379 persons were officially registered by the government as stateless, according to UNHCR, with 869 registered by UNHCR partners as having unknown nationality.  Most individuals residing in the country with undetermined nationality, with de facto statelessness, or at heightened risk of statelessness, were those who had no identity documents, had invalid identity documents from a neighboring Commonwealth of Independent States country, or were holders of Soviet-era passports.  These individuals typically resided in remote areas without obtaining official documentation.  UNHCR reported the government granted citizenship to nearly 13,000 stateless persons since 2014.The law allowed the government to deprive individuals of citizenship if convicted of a range of grave terrorism and extremism-related crimes, including for “harming the interest of the state.”  According to UNHCR and the government, no one had been deprived of citizenship under this law.  According to UNHCR, the law provided a range of rights to persons recognized by the government as stateless.  The legal status of officially registered stateless persons was documented, and they were considered as having permanent residency, which was granted for 10 years in the form of a stateless person certificate.  According to the law, after five years of residence in the country, stateless persons were eligible to apply for citizenship.  Children born in the country to officially recognized stateless persons who had a permanent place of residence were recognized as nationals.A separate legal procedure for citizenship existed for ethnic Kazakhs; those with immediate relatives in the country; and citizens of Belarus, Russia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, with which the country had agreements.  The law gave the government six months to consider an application for citizenship.  Some applicants complained that, due to the lengthy bureaucratic process, obtaining citizenship often took years.In 2019, the government established procedures to allow children of parents without identity documents to receive birth certificates.  Since that time, more than 1,500 children were registered under these provisions.  Experts reported undocumented mothers who gave birth outside of medical institutions could legally request a birth certificate from a court, but expected many would not do so due to low awareness of this legal process and fear of deportation if justice sector institutions became aware of their presence in the country.Persons whose citizenship applications were rejected or whose status as stateless persons had been revoked could appeal the decision, but such appeals involved a lengthy process.Officially recognized stateless persons had access to free medical assistance on the level provided to other foreigners, but it was limited to emergency medical care and to treatment of 21 contagious diseases on a list approved by the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development.  Officially recognized stateless persons had a right to employment, although not with the government.  They could face problems when negotiating labor contracts, since potential employers might not understand or be aware of this legal right.UNHCR reported that stateless persons without identity documents could not legally work, which led to the growth of illegal labor, corruption, and abuse of authority among employers.  Children accompanying stateless parents were also considered stateless.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage, but the government severely limited exercise of this right.The constitution concentrated power in the presidency.  The president appointed and dismissed most high-level government officials, including the prime minister, cabinet, prosecutor general, National Security Committee chief, Supreme Court and lower-level judges, and regional governors.  The law required most of these appointments to be made in consultation with the chairman of the Security Council.  The president also served as chairman of the Security Council.The Mazhilis (the lower house of parliament) confirmed the president’s choice of prime minister, and the senate confirmed the president’s choices of prosecutor general, National Security Committee chief, Supreme Court judges, and National Bank head.  The Mazhilis and the senate always confirmed presidential nominations.  Modifying or amending the constitution effectively required the president’s consent.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were widely reported to not be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.  Independent observers reported restrictions on some candidates’ ability to be listed on ballots, unequal access to media for independent and opposition candidates, and ballot stuffing.On March 19, the country held early elections for the lower house of parliament, with 69 of its 98 seats designated for party list candidates and 29 designated as single mandate seats.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observer mission noted candidates campaigned actively and freely and that 2022 electoral reforms provided more choice for voters in the March polls, but with superficial campaign coverage due to self-censorship and a lack of critical reporting.  The OSCE further noted that some political groups continued to be prevented from participating as political parties in elections, while the practice of deregistration created uncertainty for candidates over their continued participation in the contest.  In addition, the OSCE noted significant procedural irregularities and disregard for important safeguards during counting and tabulation.  Many single-mandate candidates stated government officials undermined their campaigns through various administrative means.  Independent election observers reported attempts to impede monitoring of election conduct and vote counts.Political Parties and Political Participation:  The government did not approve registration of several aspiring political parties, including Alga, Kazakhstan, and El Tiregi.  At least three leaders of unregistered political parties remained on the Tirek political prisoners list or subject to significant restrictions of freedom and political participation.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  No law limited participation of women or members of minority groups, and they did participate.  Social attitudes sometimes hindered women from holding high office or playing active roles in political life.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.  Nongovernment observers reported several cases in which mid-level government officials were effectively and appropriately prosecuted for corruption.  Nevertheless, impunity existed, especially where corruption was involved or there were personal relationships with government officials.  Investigative journalists reported that political persecution and government officials’ ability to exploit legal provisions related to “false information” impeded their ability to conduct and publish reports on government corruption.Corruption:  Corruption was widespread in the executive branch, law enforcement agencies, local government administrations, the education system, and the judiciary, according to human rights NGOs.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups operated with some freedom to investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases.  International and local human rights groups reported the government monitored NGO activities on sensitive topics and practiced harassment, including police visits to and surveillance of NGO offices, personnel, and family members.  Government officials often were uncooperative or nonresponsive to questions from NGOs.  In September, the government published a list of nonprofit organizations receiving foreign financing.  Human rights organizations reported many human rights defenders believed this was intended to intimidate organizations that were critical of the government.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  Human rights defenders reported some cases of retribution against nongovernment and media representatives working to investigate and call attention to human rights abuses.On July 11, the Almaty City Court sentenced five individuals including journalist Aigerim Tleuzhanova to between four- and eight-years’ imprisonment on charges of organizing and participating in mass riots at the Almaty airport during the January 2022 events.  Human rights defenders broadly dismissed the charges as politically motivated.  Human rights defenders reported officials of the Almaty City Court issued a private ruling demanding revocation of the lawyers’ licenses of five defense lawyers working on the case, an action broadly protested within the human rights community.On August 11, media reported human rights and anti-corruption journalist Sandugash Dyusenova was detained on charges of violating privacy and divulging personal information regarding a suspect in a criminal case.  Dyusenova reported she was tortured, forced to strip, filmed naked, and received threats against her family during interrogation before being released on bail.  The Prosecutor General’s Office of Zhetisu Region announced August 15 it had dismissed the charges for lack of evidence.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The Presidential Commission on Human Rights was a consultative and advisory body that included top officials and members of the public appointed by the president.  The commission reviewed and investigated complaints, issued recommendations, and monitored implementation of international human rights conventions.  The commission did not have legal authority to remedy human rights abuses or implement its recommendations.The commissioner on human rights (ombudsperson) was recommended by the president and elected by the senate for a five-year term.  The Ombudsperson’s Office had a representative in each region of the country in addition to its headquarters staff.  The ombudsperson reviewed and investigated complaints concerning abuses of human rights by officials and organizations.  The ombudsperson issued recommendations, published reports on human rights, and served as the chair of the Coordinating Council of the NPM.  The ombudsperson cooperated with international human rights organizations and NGOs; met with government officials concerning human rights abuses; visited certain facilities, such as military units and prisons; and publicized the results of investigations.  Domestic human rights observers reported that the Ombudsperson’s Office played a role in aiding citizens with less controversial social problems and matters involving lower-level elements of the bureaucracy, but that its actions and public statements were heavily influenced by the government and fell short of holding government accountable for serious human rights abuses.Civil society representatives reported reduced cooperation from the Ombudsperson’s Office in comparison with previous years.The national ombudsperson for children’s rights was appointed by the president and worked on a pro bono basis.  Experts noted the ombudsperson’s activities were limited, as the position did not have a budget or staff.  Experts noted that positions labeled as children’s rights ombudspersons for specific regions and cities were an integrated part of local government, had no formal relationship with the national human rights ombudsperson, and did not provide an independent oversight function.  In March, President Tokayev signed a degree establishing a new position of ombudsperson for the rights of socially vulnerable categories of the population, which included persons with disabilities.  Activists noted the position was unfilled for most of the year.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized sexual abuse and rape, and imposed penalties of up to eight years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment if the crime was committed against a child.  There were reports of police and judicial reluctance to act on reports of rape, particularly in spousal rape cases.  According to human rights defenders, fewer than 1 percent of rape complaints made it to court.On June 30, President Tokayev stated publicly that more than 300 murders were committed in two and a half years because of domestic violence.  Media cited government sources and statistics in reporting that domestic violence led to the deaths of 93 women identified in the first nine months of 2022, and 18 deaths in the first six months of the year.  Media further cited government sources in reporting that 70 to 90 percent of domestic violence cases were not reported to authorities.The law specified various types of domestic violence, such as physical, psychological, sexual, and economic violence.  It outlined the responsibilities of local and national governments and NGOs in supporting victims of domestic violence.  The law had mechanisms for issuing restraining orders and provided for administrative detention of alleged abusers for 24 hours.  The law set the maximum sentence for conviction of spousal assault and battery at 10 years in prison, the same as for assault.  The law permitted prohibiting offenders from living with the victim if the offender had alternatives.  It allowed victims of domestic violence to receive appropriate care regardless of the place of residence.  The law replaced financial penalties with administrative arrest if having the perpetrator pay fines damaged the victim’s interests.In April, the government adopted amendments to the law on domestic violence.  Key changes included the possibility for police to initiate administrative cases without testimony from the victim and excluding the possibility of reconciliation of the parties.  Experts reported both measures could help address some cases in which victims were pressured by an aggressor, family members, or others not to pursue justice in domestic violence cases.  The punishment for beatings was increased from 15 to 20 days’ arrest, and for minor bodily harm from 15 to 20 days’ arrest, or 25 days in case of repeated offenses.Research conducted by the Ministry of National Economy indicated most victims of partner abuse never told anyone of their abuse, due in part to social stigma.  Police intervened in family disputes only when they believed the abuse was life threatening.  NGOs also noted the lenient penalties for conviction of domestic violence did not deter even previously convicted offenders.The government maintained domestic violence shelters in each region.  According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were 49 crisis centers, 39 of which had shelters.  The ministry instituted special inspectors for gender-based violence and reported it had 250 women sex-crime inspectors on staff.  In November, media reported the government opened a family assistance center staffed by women police officers in Karaganda to support domestic violence victims and received more than 500 applications in less than a month of operation.Activists and experts reported laws and support structures related to domestic violence were insufficient, advocating among other measures for criminalization of additional forms of domestic violence, additional resources for victim support, and more comprehensive training for law enforcement, judicial and social service professionals with duties related to domestic violence.  Activists reported that even in cases where victims reported violence, police were sometimes reluctant to act.  Police sometimes did not issue restraining orders to assailants and tried to dissuade the victim from filing a complaint, creating an environment of impunity for aggressors.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  Although prohibited by law, the practice of kidnapping women and girls for forced marriage continued in some remote areas.  In October, the prosecutors’ office in the city of Shymkent reported it had received no reports of bride kidnapping during the year, but 25 reports in 2021-2022.  Prosecutors reported no criminal cases were opened primarily because the women refused to accuse their kidnappers, possibly due to social pressure associated with the failure of a potential marriage.  The law prescribed a prison sentence of seven to 12 years for kidnapping.  A person who voluntarily released an abductee was absolved of criminal responsibility; consequently, a typical bride-kidnapper was not necessarily held criminally responsible.Sexual harassment remained a problem.  No law protected women from sexual harassment, and only the use of force or taking advantage of a victim’s physical helplessness during sexual assault carried criminal liability.  There were no reports of any prosecutions.  Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace were hesitant to file complaints due to shame or fear of job loss.Discrimination:  The constitution and law provided for equal rights and freedoms for men and women.  The law prohibited discrimination based on gender, but discrimination remained a problem.  Significant salary gaps between men and women remained.  According to observers, women in rural areas faced greater discrimination than women in urban areas and suffered from a greater incidence of domestic violence, limited opportunities for education and employment, limited access to information, and discrimination in land rights and property rights.  In some communities, cultural and religious norms dictated the social roles of women and girls and the types of interactions permissible between males and females, thereby limiting women’s employment opportunities.The law did not require equal pay for equal work for women and men.  According to the national statistics bureau, the wage gap between men and women was 22 percent in 2022.  Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace were hesitant to file complaints due to shame or fear of job loss.  Laws preventing termination of contracts based on pregnancy were reportedly enforced but did not prevent hiring discrimination because of pregnancy.Girls who wore headscarves based on their own or their families’ religious beliefs were sometimes barred from receiving education in public schools and were not allowed to engage in homeschooling as an alternative.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Women were able to access emergency contraception as part of clinical rape management, but most women privately procured such treatment at their own expense to avoid state-run clinics’ bureaucratic examination requirements.  While a postexposure prophylaxis protocol existed, AIDS centers’ limited working hours, drug procurement challenges, stigma from medical workers, and restricting access to citizens and resident permit holders only undermined rape victims’ access to postexposure prophylaxis, especially for vulnerable groups like migrants.  Significant barriers remained in ensuring comprehensive, stigma-free postexposure prophylaxis for all victims of rape.  Access to government-provided sexual and reproductive health services was available for sexual violence survivors, but many victims were reportedly reluctant to use them, possibly also to avoid bureaucratic examination requirements at state-run clinics.Practitioners noted women in rural areas or women whose communities adhered to traditional ways of life were likely to be less informed regarding or exercise personal choice in selection and use of contraception methods.  Practitioners also reported many types of contraceptives were prohibitively expensive for some segments of the population.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution and law prohibited discrimination based on race or ethnic origin and media content that promoted interethnic discord.  The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan was an advisory body to the president tasked to ensure the strict observance of the rights and freedoms of citizens irrespective of their ethnic affiliation.  Five of the senate’s 50 seats were reserved for members of the Assembly.  Ethnic minorities, however, were underrepresented in government.  Only one of the 26 cabinet members was not an ethnic Kazakh.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Since 2019, most children born to undocumented mothers without legal status or identification received birth certificates.  Experts reported undocumented mothers who gave birth outside of medical institutions could legally request a birth certificate from a court, but expected many would not do so due to low awareness of the legal process and fear of deportation if justice sector institutions became aware of their presence in the country.Education:  Some children from migrant families, particularly undocumented migrants and stateless persons, could not enroll in school due to their lack of legal status.Child Abuse:  Laws prohibited child abuse, but such incidents were reported.  According to experts, corporal punishment was permitted and practiced in residential care institutions and preschools and continued to be practiced in schools despite being prohibited.  Children sometimes faced abusive, cruel, and disparaging treatment in families, schools (particularly special schools for delinquent children), and boarding schools.  Experts noted children were not specifically referenced in legal articles related to domestic violence, and that the government lacked a dedicated structure for child protective social services including specialized case workers and emergency foster families to support children in cases of abuse and neglect, leading to ineffective support for some children in abusive situations.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage was 18, but could be reduced to 16 in the case of pregnancy or mutual agreement, including by parents or legal guardians.  According to the UN Population Fund, approximately 3,000 early and forced marriages occurred annually.  Many couples first married in mosques and then registered officially when the bride reached the legal age.  The government did not take action to address the problem.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  The law did not specify a minimum age for consensual sex.  The law criminalized the production and distribution of child pornography and provided administrative penalties to cover the sale of pornographic materials to minors.  The country also retained administrative penalties for child pornography in addition to the criminal penalties.  Perpetrators convicted of sexual offenses against minors received a lifetime ban on working with children.  In general, these laws were enforced.																																				Antisemitism										Leaders of the Jewish community estimated that the country’s Jewish population was 20,000 persons.  There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  There were no laws criminalizing same-sex activity or conduct.Violence and Harassment:  Human rights defenders reported cases of extortion and blackmail, including cases in which law enforcement and prison officials actively engaged in harassment and blackmail of LGBTQI+ individuals.  They also reported numerous cases of discriminatory treatment and derogatory remarks from government officials, including potential denial of services in medical facilities.  Human rights specialists reported members of the LGBTQI+ community were unlikely to file official reports on cases of harassment and discrimination, because they had not seen precedents in which government representatives responded with appropriate actions and feared further discrimination from law enforcement and government representatives if they disclosed their identities.Human rights defenders reported threats of violence and significant online and in-person verbal abuse towards LGBTQI+ individuals.Human rights defenders noted information on violence, harassment, discrimination and other treatment of LGBTQI+ individuals in some areas of the country was extremely difficult to monitor, as social norms prevented activists and organizations from conducting open outreach or support activists in some regions.Discrimination:  The law did not specifically prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics and did not recognize LGBTQI+ individuals, couples, and their families.  Individuals reported discrimination against persons who were known or suspected of being LGTBQI+ persons, including medical establishments refusing to provide treatment, refusal to provide service in private business establishments, and some cases of loss of employment.  Human rights defenders reported transgender persons were particularly vulnerable to discrimination in employment, housing, law enforcement and other areas, as the requirement to show identification that did not match their outward gender expression exposed them to discrimination on a more regular basis.  Transgender individuals were effectively barred from working in law enforcement or serving in the military.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Although a process for legal gender recognition existed, the law required a transgender person to fulfill psychiatric and physical requirements (including undergoing gender-affirming surgery, not allowed before age 21) before being able to receive updated identity documents.  Many individuals lived with nonconforming documents for years and reported problems with securing employment, housing, and health care as a result.  The law included behavioral disorders as reasons for denial of gender reassignment, which expanded the categories of persons who could be denied such treatments.  Transgender individuals reported medical professionals sometimes used derogatory language towards transgender patients and did not demonstrate clear understanding of issues related to these medical procedures.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  Human rights defenders reported that some families and private religious practitioners engaged in prayers and religious ceremonies intended to alter the sexual orientation or gender identities of LGBTQI+ individuals, who could come under social or family pressure to participate.  Human rights defenders noted children and other persons financially dependent on their families were particularly likely to come under pressure to change their identities or be subject to harassment and abuse.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  Human rights defenders reported individuals could speak publicly on LGBTQI+ issues and could freely associate with other LGBTQI+ individuals or support groups.  Nevertheless, they reported public speech or regular association with groups related to LGBTQI+ issues could lead to government surveillance, verbal harassment, and employment and educational discrimination.  Activists reported that obtaining permission to hold public assemblies related to LGBTQI+ rights was difficult but sometimes possible in Almaty, and not possible in other locations.  NGOs engaged in LGBTQI+ activism were unable to register as such and had to register as specializing in other areas.  Organizations in some cities were able to hold events for the LGBTQI+ community in private venues, but reported they needed to advertise and screen participants carefully to avoid harassment.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, and in the provision of other government services, and required public buildings and transportation to be accessible.  Human rights experts reported these laws were not consistently implemented in practice.  Activists reported public buildings were frequently not built to appropriate accessibility standards, for example lacking wheelchair ramps or accessible bathrooms, and that employees and managers in many companies were not familiar with and did not comply with their obligations regarding accessibility.  Prison and detention monitors reported detention facilities were not appropriately equipped to accommodate prisoners with disabilities.  The government took steps to remedy some barriers to persons with disabilities, for example responding to complaints that specific buildings had not been made accessible but did not have an effective mechanism for proactively identifying and remedying violations.The law required companies to set aside 3 percent of their jobs for persons with disabilities; nevertheless, civil society reported that many persons with disabilities faced difficulty finding employment, in part because some employers were reluctant to undertake building renovations to create accessible facilities.  Civil society representatives reported fraud and public corruption undermined the government’s efforts to provide funding in support of persons with disabilities.Activists reported that political parties improved implementation of quota requirements for 30 percent of party list candidates to be women, youth or persons with disabilities, leading to the election of several persons with disabilities during March parliamentary elections.  Independent election monitors reported the government responded actively to reports of inaccessible polling places during 2022 presidential elections, leading to more accessible voting procedures.There were no regulations regarding the rights of patients in mental health hospitals.  Human rights observers stated this situation led to widespread abuse of patients’ rights.  NGOs reported that patients often experienced poor conditions and a complete lack of privacy.  Citizens with mental disabilities could be committed to state-run institutions without their consent or judicial review, and the government committed persons younger than age 18 with the permission of their families.Members of the NPM could visit mental hospitals to monitor conditions.  According to an NPM report, most mental hospitals required repairs as well as renovations to make them accessible to persons with disabilities.  Other observed problems included a shortage of personnel, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions, poor food supply, overcrowding, and lack of light and fresh air.Education authorities reported that 82 percent of schools were officially listed as equipped and staffed for inclusive education of children with specific needs, but acknowledged many of these schools needed additional equipment, personnel, and methodology to become fully inclusive.  Specific measures undertaken to address these included trainings for teachers on how to work with children with disabilities and expanding the number of educational psychologists in schools.  Of children with specific needs between ages seven and 18, 20 percent attended mainstream schools.  The majority attended classes for children with disabilities or were homeschooled.  According to UNICEF, 10,000 school-aged children with disabilities were educated at home.  Some parents refused to send children with disabilities to school and viewed their education as unnecessary.  Some children with Down syndrome were able to attend privately funded specialized education centers, but the centers had limited capacity, which resulted in waiting periods of up to a year and a half.  Of registered children with disabilities, 71 percent were not covered by social security.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS, but stigma remained and resulted in societal discrimination that continued to affect access to information, services, treatment, and care.  The National Center for AIDS provided free diagnosis and treatment to all citizens, but specialists noted many individuals were reluctant to seek treatment at these centers due to lack of confidentiality.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for workers’ rights to form and join unions, but imposed restrictions such as a requirement that a registered sectoral or national union be represented in at least half of the country’s regions.  With three new regions, in addition to the existing 14 regions and three cities at the national level, this raised the number of regions in which representative branches were required for registration of a labor union.The government exercised considerable influence on organized labor and favored state-affiliated unions over independent ones.  The Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan (FTUK) was the largest national trade union association, with approximately 90 percent of union members on its rolls.  In November 2022, the International Trade Union Confederation restored the membership of the FTUK, suspended since October 2018 due to a lack of independence, according to FTUK Chair Satybaldy Dauletallin.The geographical representation requirement often prevented the registration and operation of independent sectoral unions, especially in geographically concentrated sectors.  For example, the Specialized Interdistrict Economic Court in Shymkent suspended the independent Fuel and Energy Workers Union for six months after finding the union’s original registration was “improper,” as it did not have representation in at least half of the country’s regions.  According to the International Trade Union Confederation, the union remained unregistered as of April 17.The law provided for the right of workers to bargain collectively.  The law prohibited antiunion discrimination, and a court could order reinstatement of a worker fired for union activity.  Penalties for breaking these provisions included fines and imprisonment of up to 75 days, commensurate with penalties of other laws involving denials of civil rights.  Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The government passed new amendments in February which eased some limitations to workers’ ability to strike.  Workers could hold a one-time hour-long strike during arbitration procedures; however, the number of participating workers was limited to 50, and workers were required to notify the employer at least three days prior to the strike.  The decision to strike had to be made in a meeting attended by at least half of an enterprise’s workers, with at least half of them supporting the strike (previously at least two thirds was required), or by a trade union or elected representatives who represented the workers.  A written notice announcing a strike had to be submitted to the employer at least five days in advance.  It took 15 days to initiate a strike in accordance with the law, and although the law prohibited disciplinary actions against striking workers, employers could pressure or even fire activists during this time.A blanket legal restriction barred certain occupations from conducting a strike.  Military and other security service members, emergency, ambulance, fire, and rescue crews, as well as those who operated “dangerous” production facilities were forbidden to strike.  Workers employed in railways, transport, communications, civil aviation, health care, and public utilities could strike if they maintained minimum services to the public.  Employers could take disciplinary actions against striking workers after a court declared a strike illegal.  The government could file criminal charges against labor organizers for calls to participate in strikes declared illegal by the court.  The representatives of independent trade unions called these amendments “cosmetic” because arbitration procedures remained difficult, and, therefore, workers, would continue to hold spontaneous strikes to address workplace grievances.Disagreements between unions and their employers had to be presented to a tripartite commission for arbitration if the disagreement could not be settled between the employer and the union.  The commission was composed of representatives of the government, labor unions, and employer associations.  State-affiliated and independent labor unions participated in tripartite commissions.  The tripartite commission was responsible for developing and signing annual collective agreements governing most aspects of labor relations.In May 2022, the International Labor Organization (ILO), based on the visit of a Direct Contact Mission (DCM), reported that the country failed in legislation and in practice to meet ILO standards for the registration of trade unions.  The DCM further reported that laws allowing the government to restrict the right of those convicted to hold trade union offices or participate in trade union activities represented a restriction on freedom of association.  The DCM also found that requirements for sectoral trade unions to have affiliated organizations or structures in more than 50 percent of the regions, cities of regional importance, and the capital was too high, especially for industries such as the oil sector that were present only in a few regions.  The DCM noted that all trade union representatives it had met with indicated the organization of legal strikes was close to impossible.In May 2021, the tripartite commission signed the general agreement for labor relations for 2021-23.  In July 2021, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection established a working group to ratify the ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, as recommended in the agreement; however, the convention had not yet been ratified.  In May 2022, the government ratified the ILO’s Part-Time Work Convention.  Foreign workers had the right to join unions, but the law prohibited the operation of foreign unions and the financing of unions by foreign entities such as foreign citizens, governments, and international organizations.  Irregular migrants and self-employed individuals residing in the country were covered by the laws regulating union participation.During the year, labor strikes spilled beyond the usual oil-services sector in Mangystau, Atyrau, and Aktobe Regions to coal and metal facilities in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Akmola Regions, as well as utility companies throughout the country.  Employees called for better employment with contracting companies, higher wages, more social benefits, and improved labor and safety conditions.  The strikes continued throughout the year.  Most strikes ended with courts ruling them illegal and employers agreeing to a partial increase in wages and benefits, with one exception.  Approximately 150 Mangystau Region oil workers staged an overnight protest near the Ministry of Energy from April 10-11, which ended with riot police detaining all protesters and holding them overnight.  Shortly after, the KazMunayGas subsidiary and the contractor that operated the Mangystau oil field were investigated and subsequently charged with embezzlement and corruption.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at   https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The national monthly minimum wage was above the poverty line.  Every region estimated its own poverty line, but the national monthly minimum wage remained the same for all regions.  The law stipulated the normal workweek should not exceed 40 hours.  It limited heavy manual labor or hazardous work to 36 hours per week.  The law limited overtime to two hours per day, or one hour per day for heavy manual labor, and required overtime to be paid at least at a 50 percent premium.  The law prohibited compulsory overtime and any overtime for work in hazardous conditions.  The law provided that labor agreements could stipulate the length of working time, holidays, and paid annual leave for each worker.  By law employees were entitled to 24 days of paid annual leave per year.  In general, the government enforced these laws, and violations could be brought to court.  According to labor inspectors, most violations centered on wage arrears and delays incurred by individual entrepreneurs and small and medium businesses.Occupational Safety and Health:  The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate to the main industries.  The law required employers to suspend work that could endanger the life or health of workers and to warn workers of any harmful or dangerous work conditions or the possibility of any occupational disease.  Government experts inspected OSH conditions.  The law specifically granted workers the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without suffering adverse employment action.The Prosecutor General’s Office reported on the results of inspections in 2022, stating that violations centered on wage discrepancies between local and expatriate workers, wage arrears, nonpayment of allowances for work in hazardous environments, lack of protective gear and employer-provided meals, and use of outdated, unsafe equipment.An October 28 explosion at Kostenko mine led to the death of 46 persons, making it the largest industrial accident in the country’s independent history.  Some observers attributed the accident to negligence stemming from lack of appropriate investment in safety measures on the part of ArcelorMittal, the investment company managing the mine, in addition to lack of appropriate inspections on the part of the government over a period of several years.  President Tokayev announced the cessation of government cooperation with ArcelorMittal, and the government expressed its intent to seek a new investor for the mine.In 2022, the national statistics bureau identified 1.6 million workers who labored in hazardous conditions.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection enforced standards for minimum wages, work hour restrictions, overtime, and OSH.  By law labor inspectors had the right to conduct routine and spontaneous inspections of workplaces to detect violations.  Both types of inspections took place only after written notification, except in cases where the inspection was conducted based on a request from law enforcement authorities or a complaint related to certain extreme health and safety hazards.In September, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported that more than 750 safety inspections were conducted during the year.  The law provided for so-called employer’s declarations.  Under this system, labor inspectors could extend a certificate of trust to enterprises that complied with labor legislation requirements.  Certified enterprises were exempt from labor inspections for three years.By law any enterprise or company could form a production council to address labor safety problems between representatives of an employer and employees.  These councils were eligible to assign technical labor inspectors to conduct their own inspections of the employees’ work conditions, and their resolutions were mandatory for both employers and employees.  In January 2022, there were more than 18,000 production councils and 17,595 volunteer labor inspectors, according to the government.The government did not consistently enforce the law.  Violations of law were considered administrative offenses, and penalties for violations of minimum wage and overtime law were not commensurate with crimes such as fraud.  For example, a minimal punishment for conviction of fraud was a substantial fine or imprisonment for up to two years, while violations of wage or overtime payment provisions resulted in fines.  Penalties for violations of OSH law were also not commensurate with crimes such as negligence.  There were reports some employers ignored OSH regulations.The government reported in 2022 that 1.15 million citizens of the country’s workforce of 8.97 million persons worked in the informal economy.  Informal sector workers were not covered by wage, hour, OSH, and other labor laws and inspections.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											Tonga											The Bahamas											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs																								Ethiopia
- United States Provides Nearly $154 Million for Humanitarian Assistance in Ethiopia Office of the SpokespersonThe United States, through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and USAID, is providing nearly $154 million in additional assistance for the humanitarian response in Ethiopia to address urgent needs resulting from conflict, insecurity, and climate shocks. This includes more than $19 million from PRM for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian partners to support refugees and other displaced and vulnerable populations throughout Ethiopia. The additional funding brings the United States’ total humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia to nearly $243 million since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2024.PRM contributions to UNHCR and other partners will support the provision of essential services such as protection; shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene; and mental health support for refugees living in Ethiopia as well as internally displaced Ethiopians. Ethiopia now hosts nearly 1 million refugees, the third-largest refugee population in Africa. Since 2023, Ethiopia has welcomed more than 130,000 new refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in Ethiopia and will continue to support refugees sheltering in the country. We urge other donors to join us in supporting UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations working to assist the most vulnerable people affected by conflict and other crises throughout the region.
- Digital Press Briefing with Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Assistant Secretary of State, Julieta Valls Noyes Julieta Valls Noyes, Assistant SecretaryBureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationMODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic: U.S. Official Travel to Ethiopia and Chad/The Growing Humanitarian and Migration Challenges in Central and Eastern Africa.Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the U.S. Department of State’s Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Julieta Valls Noyes.  Assistant Secretary Noyes will discuss her meetings with senior government officials, humanitarian leaders, and refugees in Ethiopia and Chad on the growing humanitarian and migration challenges in both Central and Eastern Africa.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from Assistant Secretary Noyes and then we will turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of them as we can during the briefing.With that, I would like to turn it over to Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Julieta Valls Noyes, for her opening remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thank you, Johann, and thanks to all the journalists joining us today.  I’m pleased to be with you to speak about my visit last week to Ethiopia and Chad.  As Johann mentioned, during my trip, I met with senior government officials, humanitarian leaders and partners, and refugees in both countries.  I focused on the growing humanitarian and migration challenges in both Central and Eastern Africa.So to that end, I was proud to announce in my meeting with Chad’s Prime Minister Masra more than 47 million in humanitarian assistance for the emergency response in Sudan and neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan.  That amount of money brings the total U.S. humanitarian assistance for people in Sudan and neighboring countries to more than $968 million since last fiscal year.  The United States is the leading humanitarian donor to the Sudan emergency response.  Now, we are committed to working with other members of the international community to help alleviate the suffering of over 1 million refugees forced to flee their homes due to violence, with more arriving daily, as I saw during my visit.Both Ethiopia and Chad are regional leaders, playing essential roles in the Sudan response and broader humanitarian efforts.  Since early 2023, Ethiopia has welcomed nearly 50,000 refugees from Sudan.  At a time of great instability in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s support for displaced populations remains absolutely critical.While I was in Ethiopia, I met with senior government officials to discuss the humanitarian response to the crisis in Sudan.  The Government of Ethiopia has worked closely with humanitarian actors to establish new refugee sites and provide essential, life-saving aid to the tens of thousands of new refugee arrivals.  Their support for the Sudanese people escaping violence in their country is invaluable.During my visit, I also visited an urban refugee center in Addis Ababa, operated by PRM partner Jesuit Refugee Services, where I spoke with refugees in the center’s classrooms and recreational facilities.  Sites like that one provide opportunities, particularly for young refugees, to learn English, gain vocational skills, and express themselves through art and music.  This support, made possible through U.S. and other international donor contributions, advances refugee resilience and helps new arrivals integrate into their new communities.From there I went to Chad.  Now, I want to stress the U.S. – the United States’ deep appreciation for the generosity of the people and the Government of Chad throughout their long history as a refugee host country.  Most recently, Chad has embraced the immense challenge of welcoming over half a million refugees – and over 100,000 returnees – in less than a year.We remain steadfastly committed to supporting vulnerable people in Chad, in particular the over 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers.  U.S.-supported programs, made possible by the more than $47 million that I announced – $18 million of which will go to programs in Chad – those programs will support – those funds will support protection, shelter, water and sanitation, education, and more, for refugees, host communities, and others affected by the crisis in Sudan.Now, one unique feature of the Sudan emergency is that women and children represent some 90 percent of the more than 550,000 refugees who have arrived in Chad since the beginning of the Sudan conflict in April of last year.  To address the long-lasting impact of mental health distress experienced by gender-based violence survivors, our partners in Chad are working to integrate mental health support throughout their programs, but resources are very limited, and the needs are overwhelming.  I was personally devastated to hear from so many survivors of gender-based violence who remain profoundly traumatized by their experiences.As the conflict in Sudan shows little sign of abating, the United States will continue to prioritize the needs of Sudanese refugees across the region, particularly in Chad, where the burden is especially acute and the host government is struggling to meet the basic needs of its own citizens.  Now, no one country or organization can meet these historic needs alone.  In Chad, I called on other donors to help alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people and over 1 million refugees forced to leave their homes due to violence and the communities that host them.The United States also calls on all parties to the Sudan conflict to end hostilities immediately.  We urge all parties to find a peaceful resolution that promotes the safety and resilience of impacted communities and allows for the return of forcibly displaced individuals and families.  Meanwhile, we also call for unhindered humanitarian access, including both cross-line and cross-border access from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas in Sudan.So just in closing before we get to your questions, I want to reiterate our gratitude to the governments and people of Chad and Ethiopia for their leadership as they continue to welcome refugees fleeing violence in Sudan and beyond.  Specific to the Sudan emergency, preventing famine and long-term catastrophe will require both a ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access.  We in the United States are committed to work with the governments of Ethiopia and Chad, and with international and local partners, to provide life-saving support to the millions of people affected by the devastating conflict in Sudan.And with that, Johann, thank you very much.  That concludes my opening statement, and I’m happy to turn to questions.MODERATOR:  Well, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  We do ask that you limit yourself to one question only and that it be related to the topic of today’s briefing, which is:  The Growing Humanitarian and Migration Challenges in Central and Eastern Africa.So we do have a first question today submitted by a freelance journalist in South Sudan named Mr. Richard Sultan, and Mr. Sultan asks:  “What is the difference in the immediate needs of the refugees in Chad to those in Ethiopia?”  Interesting question.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thanks.  Thank you, Mr. Sultan, for that question.  Well, both countries have been enormously generous and the people of both countries have been enormously generous for a long time in receiving and supporting refugees.  But the responses are different and the situation in both countries are different.Ethiopia has hosted for years refugees from a broad range of countries – Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria.  I met refugees from all of those countries while I was in Ethiopia.  Ethiopia currently hosts about 1 million refugees and 4 million internally displaced persons.  The Government of Ethiopia has received – or Ethiopia has received about 50,000 Sudanese refugees over the past year who have been added to those who are already in the country.  Ethiopia is a country with greater resources of its own that it can devote to these efforts.Meanwhile, Chad is a country that – where one in three people require support for their own survival, and that’s Chadian nationals.  And they have received, as I mentioned earlier, about 560,000 refugees over the past year, plus over 100,000 returnees, and that’s to a country that is dealing with a great deal of internal poverty.  In fact, in my meeting with the prime minister, Prime Minister Masra, he told me something that I’m going to carry with me a long time.  He said that in the country of Chad they are dealing with shared poverty and shared – let me – I wrote it down, and now I’m blanking out as I’m speaking to you.  But it was shared poverty – let me come back to that, because I’m blanking out on the phrase now, even though I mentioned that I will – that it is staying with me.Anyway, sorry.  Chad is incredibly generous and is – but a country of great poverty and great needs, and there the response is primarily focused on what’s been happening in Sudan over the past year.  And the issue with the Sudan situation is that as the crisis and the conflict continue, everyone expects more refugees to arrive in Chad.  So the needs – there are real needs in both countries.  There are welcoming governments and peoples in both countries.  But the populations of refugees in both countries are different, and the ways that they are responding are different.So I’m going to check my notes here to go back to what the prime minister said.  Oh, I’ve got it.  It was shared poverty and shared humanity.  And I thought that that was an excellent way of describing how both Chad and, for that matter, Ethiopia are responding to their respective refugee situations.  So thanks, Mr. Sultan.  And sorry for that mental lapse as I was trying to recall the prime minister’s statement.  I’m still a little jet lagged.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary.  So I see that we do have a hand up from Pearl Matibe of Premium Times in Nigeria.  Pearl, would you like to – you’ve put your question into the Q&amp;A box, and I appreciate that, but would you like to ask your question live if we open your mic?QUESTION:  Thank you so much.  I really do appreciate the opportunity and, Assistant Secretary Noyes, your availability.  It’s really concerning what’s happening in Chad.  In fact, I met the prime minister when he was here in Washington just recently.So my question to you is this:  Considering Chad&#8217;s recent efforts to enhance its development and stability, including prime minister&#8217;s recent visit to the U.S.A., how do you see Chad&#8217;s potential for leapfrogging in terms of – I know he was concerned.  He wants economic growth, regional security, as well as this humanitarian response, so doing these things in parallel to the refugee crisis in Sudan.  Given the interplay between migration flows from Sudan and the security challenges posed by terrorism in Chad – because how do we know how the people have been filtered with – so to avoid any terrorism flows into Chad?  What role can the international community play in supporting Chad’s aspirations for progress and stability?  I know those were key concerns of the prime minister, Dr. Succès.  If you could address that, I’d really appreciate it.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thanks, Ms. Matibe.  That’s a really interesting question and one that I can respond to in part.  In terms of the specific issues related to Chad’s development and stability, I would defer to my colleagues in the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as the Department of Commerce and Treasury and the DFC.  However, it is also clear that as Chad works to meet the needs – and works with partners to meet the needs – of refugees and its own people in this terrible conflict and at this very, very difficult moment, it is clear that international sources of humanitarian assistance are not sufficient to meet all of the needs.  We’re seeing this situation all over the world, where humanitarian resources are simply not keeping pace with humanitarian needs.And so we are taking a long, hard look at the international infrastructure for dealing with humanitarian needs and coming up with innovative new solutions that involve bringing together humanitarian assistance funding and development funding, working with partners like the World Bank – indeed, I met with the World Bank director in Chad when I was there – and looking for more work in the space of the peace-development nexus and in the space of sort of relief and development coherence.  We’re putting together the humanitarian dollars, but planning for what is likely to be not a quick emergency response but a prolonged response, where many of those people are likely to be in Chad for years.  Indeed, I met when I was there with some refugees who had arrived from Darfur in 2004 and who are still there.So it’s clear that the international community and the international humanitarian infrastructure need to pivot and find new ways of working and finding ways to combine humanitarian and development initiatives and funding in ways that can deal with issues, to meet the emergency needs, but also to provide prolonged support for communities that are likely to be there for a long time, as well as for the host communities where they are living.And so this is a space where we see a lot of potential.  It is an area of growing focus for the World Bank, the multilateral development banks, frankly, the private sector.  We’re looking at some issues like innovative financing for things like energy projects.  We’re doing a lot of work on this in this space in Kenya.  So I think that the potential for these new partnerships in the humanitarian space can also create opportunities for development along the lines of what you were talking about.  And all of this, of course, would also contribute to stability.  So I thank you for the question.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much for that answer.  We have another hand raised from Emmanuel Igunza, a freelance journalist for NPR Radio.  Emmanuel, would you like to ask your question live?QUESTION:  Yeah.  Thank you very much.  I just want to ask, in your engagement with the Ethiopian Government, did you raise the issue about their own thousand – tens of thousands of people who have been displaced within the country due to the conflicts in Oromia and in Amhara regions?  Because the criticism of particularly the U.S. has been that it is not quite strong in trying to deal with the government in addressing these issues.  Thank you very much.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  I had wide-ranging discussions with Ethiopian officials about a variety of humanitarian issues.  It was – because my trip was broadly focused on the Sudan response, that was the primary focus of our discussions.  But we also talked about how the United States remains the largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia for a variety of populations, including internally displaced persons.  And in fact, we provided over a billion dollars last fiscal year and nearly $89 million to date this fiscal year to provide life-saving support for refugees, asylum seekers, the internally displaced people that you’re asking about, stateless persons, and others who are affected by conflict, drought, food instability.So I hope that answers your question.  Thank you, Mr. Igunza.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you.  So switching gears a little bit, we have a question from Mr. Aggrey Mutambo of The EastAfrican in Kenya.  And his question is:  “Could you speak generally about how the U.S. Government is helping countries in the East African region address the problem of labor migration, especially to Gulf countries?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Sure, that’s a – it’s a great question.  It was something we had a lot of conversations about, so thanks, Mr. Mutambo, for that question.Look, the U.S. policy is to support safe, orderly, and humane migration and the opportunities that it provides globally.  That is our global position.  In Africa in particular, PRM, the bureau that I lead, funds the Africa Regional Migration Program, and we also fund the International Organization for Migration and its regional migration response plan.  Beyond that funding that is supportive of the labor migration – lawful, safe, humane labor migration – we facilitate dialogue between countries related to migration and to facilitate discussions about migrants who wish to return home from countries where they have been living.  And in particular, we have been doing that for migrants wishing to return home from Yemen or Djibouti.So it is an area where we are engaging, and it is an area of growing interest in this region, but as I’m sure all of you are following all over the world, these are issues of interest all over the world.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  I think we might have time for just one more question.  And so there was a question submitted by Ms. Lucia Blanco of the EFE Spanish News Agency based in Kenya.  And her question is:  “One year after the war started in Sudan, what is the situation of the refugees that arrive in Chad?  What is the displacement situation in the country related to the conflict in Oromo and Amhara?  And what did authorities tell you about those conflicts?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Okay, so let me start with Chad.  The situation of refugees arriving to Chad is devastating.  They are arriving with almost nothing but the clothes that they are wearing.  They are arriving after having been victimized on the route.  They are arriving with immense needs and profound trauma; many, many of them survivors of gender-based violence, sexual violence.  As I mentioned earlier, 90 percent of them women and children with profound needs and very few resources of their own.  Moreover, I met with refugees while I was there who had arrived in 2004 fleeing from the situation in Darfur, and they unanimously said that as terrible as the situation that they had lived was, the situation of refugees arriving today is much worse.So it is a profound challenge.  It is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world right now, and it is a crisis that requires a response by many countries, many organizations to help support the people and the Government of Chad as they try to deal with this immense challenge with a great deal of humanity.Ethiopia, as I mentioned earlier, has a different set of issues.  It has refugees from I believe 27 other countries currently living in Ethiopia, and as I mentioned earlier, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and many others.  They have also received Sudanese refugees, but nowhere near the scale or the number of those who have been arriving to Chad.But in Ethiopia, the issue remains – the larger humanitarian issues – remains the issue of internally displaced persons, including those from Amhara and Oromo.  And we did talk about those situations while I was there, and I was proud to reinforce U.S. support for all vulnerable people, including with the funding that we are providing across the humanitarian needs in Ethiopia, which are different from those in Chad but which the United States is proud to support and which, like the situation in Chad, also requires support and contributions from other governments, other organizations, and new and innovative solutions like working in this peace development nexus space, getting the participation of the World Bank or the private sector.So there is more than enough work to do to meet all of the needs in both countries, and it was – I was grateful to have the opportunity to visit both countries and to see the response, and to thank the governments of both countries.  But I have to say I’ve returned a bit traumatized myself by the suffering that I witnessed while I was there, and hopeful of being able to do more and to persuade my partners in other countries to do more to respond more forcefully or at greater scale to meet the scale of the needs.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  Do you have any final thoughts or words to share with the group?ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  I just want to thank everyone for their attention.  I want to thank you for all that you (inaudible) you do to publicize these (inaudible) and the more that we can all do to bring the attention of the world (inaudible) that we’ll be able to find the support needed to meet them.  So I thank you for your work and for your attention and humanity.  And my apologies, again, for my jetlag and my memory lapse earlier in thinking about the statement.  But I think I’d like to close with the statement from the Chadian prime minister that this is a situation that truly is one of shared poverty and shared humanity.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Well, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  You’ve been very generous with your time, and we do understand that you just returned from that very important trip.So that concludes today’s briefing.  I’d like to thank the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Assistant Secretary of State Julieta Valls Noyes for joining us.  Thank you to all the journalists for participating.  A recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFmediahub@state.gov.  I would also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you very much.# # #
- Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Bitter Travels to Nigeria and Ethiopia HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Bitter Travels to Nigeria and Ethiopia				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Bitter Travels to Nigeria and Ethiopia																																		Media Note																														March 25, 2024																																							Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Rena Bitter will travel March 24-28 to Lagos and Addis Ababa. In Nigeria, she will visit the U.S. consulate general in Lagos, where she will tour consular operations and meet with consular staff. In Ethiopia, she will visit the U.S. embassy in Addis Ababa, meet with our consular personnel, and hold discussions with Ethiopian immigration officials. The Assistant Secretary’s trip highlights our sustained commitment to the protection of U.S. citizens overseas and the facilitation of legitimate travel and immigration to the United States.For updates on Assistant Secretary Bitter’s travel follow @TravelGov on social media.						Tags																													Africa																															Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Consular Affairs																																Consular Assistance																																							Consular Issues																															Ethiopia																								Nigeria																								Office of the Spokesperson
- Assistant Secretary Noyes Travels to Ethiopia and Chad Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Julieta Valls Noyes will travel to Ethiopia and Chad March 18-23. In both countries, Assistant Secretary Noyes will meet with senior government, international organization, and non-governmental organization partners to discuss refugee resettlement; humanitarian assistance across the continent, including protection of humanitarian workers; and implementation of pledges made at the December 2023 Global Refugee Forum. In Chad, additional engagements will focus on response to both the Sudan crisis and the broader humanitarian situation in Chad in coordination with the Government of Chad and international organization partners.