United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

Actions Needed to 

Enhance DOD 

Planning for 

Reposturing of U.S. 

Forces from Iraq 

September 2008 

 

GAO-08-930 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2008

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for 

Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq 

Highlights of GAO-08-930, a report to 

congressional committees. 

The redeployment of U.S. forces 

from Iraq, a process the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

refers to as “reposturing,” will be a

massive and expensive effort. As of

March 2008, for example, there 

were about 173,000 pieces of 

equipment in Iraq, worth about 

$16.5 billion, that will need to be 

returned to the United States. The 

redeployment process following 

Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 

much shorter war, lasted at least 14

months. DOD guidance emphasizes 

the importance of early planning 

for this redeployment process. 

GAO performed this work under 

the Comptroller General’s 

Authority. GAO examined the (1)

status of logistical planning for 

reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq

and associated assumptions and (2) 

extent to which DOD established 

roles and responsibilities for 

managing and executing retrograde

from Iraq. GAO also identified 

issues that DOD will need to 

consider in its reposture planning.

GAO reviewed documents and 

interviewed officials from over 20

DOD organizations in the United

States and Kuwait. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense take steps to

clarify the chain of command over 

logistical operations for retrograde

of equipment and materiel. Also, 

Congress may wish to consider

directing DOD to report specific

details on the status of reposturing 

plans and how it intends to mitigate 

issues such as those we identify. 

DOD generally concurred with our 

recommendations. 

While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq is yet to be 

determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in fall 

2007, and DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts in May 

2008 to develop a logistical framework based on three key assumptions. The 

result of this planning was an order published by Multi-National Forces-Iraq 

(MNF-I) that contained the process for reposturing units, materiel, and 

equipment and established working groups to continue the planning and seek 

solutions to emerging challenges. DOD’s three key assumptions are: (1) any 

reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State 

assessments of conditions on the ground; (2) there will be sufficient lead time 

to refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and force 

posture in Iraq is issued; and (3) the reposturing of forces will be deliberate

and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a 

sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigades’ worth of equipment and materiel 

out of Iraq each month. 

While efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing, DOD, 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the military services have not yet 

clearly established all of the roles and responsibilities for managing and 

executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Although 

CENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as executive agent 

for synchronizing retrograde of materiel and equipment from the Iraqi theater 

of operations, no unified or coordinated structure exists to account for the 

roles of the variety of teams and units engaged in retrograde operations. Until 

recently ARCENT did not have operational control over the two units 

responsible for retrograding the bulk of equipment in Iraq. 

We identified the following nine issues that DOD should consider as it 

develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq: (1) 

agreed-upon guidance for environmental cleanup and the disposition of 

property, which could affect the time and cost of closing bases in Iraq; (2) 

guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from Iraq; (3) 

accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-owned 

property; (4) the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in 

Kuwait and other neighboring countries; (5) availability of power-washing 

equipment and stands, called wash racks, and the number of customs 

inspectors in Kuwait; (6) capacity of military transports and convoy security 

assets, including limits on the main supply route; (7) increased demand for 

access to mental health care providers; (8) infrastructure requirements of 

returning units; and (9) requirements for training and equipment reset to 

restore readiness. DOD has begun to address these issues. 

While the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008 directs DOD 

to brief the congressional defense committees on certain issues related to 

reposturing, DOD is not required to provide the specific information identified 

in our report. We believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, 

Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-930. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis

at 202-512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 7

Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are 

Predicated on Three Key Assumptions 11 

Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks 

Necessary Authority 16 

Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning 23 

Conclusions 36

Recommendations 37

Matter for Congressional Consideration 37 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix III Department of Defense Classes of Supply 71 

Appendix IV Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams 72 

Appendix V Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model 73 

Appendix VI Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater

Provided Equipment 76 

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 80 

Tables 

Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template 15 

Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and 

Redeployment 73

Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and 

Redeployment, by Unit Type 74 

Page i GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Figures 

Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in 

Kuwait 10

Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed 

Government-Owned Property 27 

Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks 32 

Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack 33 

Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided

Equipment 77

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Page ii GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 10, 2008 

Congressional Committees 

Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 100-hour war during which 

U.S. forces advanced approximately 190 miles into Iraq, it took some 14 

months to redeploy most of the deployed materiel and equipment out of 

the theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since that 

time the United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq, rotating

forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing operations. As of 

April 26, 2008, there were approximately 149,400 Department of Defense 

(DOD) contractors and, as of July 1, 2008, approximately 147,400 U.S.

troops deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DOD officials 

reported that these forces were located on approximately 311 installations, 

matured during 5 years of operations, with some installations more than 

500 miles from Kuwait. Most of the equipment used by U.S. troops in 

Iraq—approximately 80 percent according to DOD officials—is theater 

provided equipment, which is a pool of permanent stay behind equipment

consisting of specific line items of modified table of organization and 

equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks, and items 

purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi Freedom that remains in Iraq. 

Although much of this equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in 

and out, significant amounts will be brought back to the United States if 

and when there is a decrease in the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. As of March 

2008, this pool of theater provided equipment totaled approximately 

173,000 major end items such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles (HMMWV) and Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, 

worth approximately $16.5 billion. The retrograde process for returning 

these equipment items to the United States will be a massive and 

expensive effort. 

Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 100-hour war during which 

U.S. forces advanced approximately 190 miles into Iraq, it took some 14 

months to redeploy most of the deployed materiel and equipment out of 

the theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since that 

time the United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq, rotating

forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing operations. As of 

April 26, 2008, there were approximately 149,400 Department of Defense 

(DOD) contractors and, as of July 1, 2008, approximately 147,400 U.S.

troops deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. DOD officials 

reported that these forces were located on approximately 311 installations, 

matured during 5 years of operations, with some installations more than 

500 miles from Kuwait. Most of the equipment used by U.S. troops in 

Iraq—approximately 80 percent according to DOD officials—is theater 

provided equipment, which is a pool of permanent stay behind equipment

consisting of specific line items of modified table of organization and 

equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks, and items 

purchased specifically for Operation Iraqi Freedom that remains in Iraq. 

Although much of this equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in 

and out, significant amounts will be brought back to the United States if 

and when there is a decrease in the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. As of March 

2008, this pool of theater provided equipment totaled approximately 

173,000 major end items such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles (HMMWV) and Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, 

worth approximately $16.5 billion. The retrograde process for returning 

these equipment items to the United States will be a massive and 

expensive effort. 

In January 2007, the president announced he would temporarily increase,

or “surge,” the U.S. force level in Iraq by an additional 5 brigades, bringing 

the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 20.

1

 The brigades were 

in place by June 2007 and began withdrawing in September 2007. In his 

April 2008 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq the commander, 

In January 2007, the president announced he would temporarily increase,

or “surge,” the U.S. force level in Iraq by an additional 5 brigades, bringing 

the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 20.

1

 The brigades were 

in place by June 2007 and began withdrawing in September 2007. In his 

April 2008 Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq the commander, 

 1

This figure includes Army brigade combat teams and equivalent Marine Corps

organizations. 

Page 1 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), recommended that the drawdown from

20 to 15 brigade combat teams continue and that, upon the withdrawal of 

the last of these combat teams in July 2008, MNF-I undertake a 45-day 

period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, MNF-I 

would commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on 

the ground and, over time, determine when it could make a 

recommendation for further reductions. In July 2008, however, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that, based on what he 

observed during a recent trip to Iraq, he expects to be able to recommend 

further troop reductions to the President and Secretary of Defense in the 

fall of 2008. In addition, in June 2008 GAO also issued its own assessment 

of progress in Iraq and called for a new strategy given the changing 

conditions.2 Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006 (as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008) requires the President to report to the Congress quarterly on 

U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq, including, to the extent 

practical, (1) an assessment of the levels of U.S. Armed Forces required in

Iraq for the 6-month period following the date of the report, the missions 

to be undertaken by the Armed Forces in Iraq for such period, and the 

incremental costs or savings of any proposed changes to such levels or 

missions; and (2) a description of the range of conditions that could 

prompt changes to the levels of U.S. Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 

6-month period following the date of the report or the missions to be 

undertaken by the Armed Forces in Iraq for such period, including the 

status of planning for such changes to the levels or missions of the Armed 

Forces in Iraq. Not later than 30 days after submission of each subsequent 

report, appropriate senior DOD officials are required to brief the 

congressional committees on these same matters.3

While we have been monitoring the full range of challenges that DOD 

would likely face, both in Iraq and here in the United States, as it begins to 

draw down its forces in Iraq, this report is focused on the logistical 

organizations and processes that would support a drawdown from Iraq or, 

as DOD officials call it, a “reposturing” effort, especially the retrograde of 

 2

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, 

Updated Strategy Needed, GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008). 

3

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1227 (2006) 

(as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-181, § 1223 (2008)). 

Page 2 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
materiel and equipment.4

 Our analysis indicated that the redeployment of 

military personnel, although important, was not as complex, resource 

intensive, or time consuming.5

 Because of the complexity of the issues and 

broad congressional interest and requests, we have been assessing DOD’s 

planning for the reposturing effort since August 2007, under the authority 

of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative. 

Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which 

logistical planning for the reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq has begun 

and the assumptions upon which it is based, and (2) DOD has established 

roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of 

materiel and equipment from Iraq. In addition, we identified several issues

that DOD will need to consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for 

reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. 

To determine what planning has been done regarding the potential 

reposturing of forces from Iraq and upon what assumptions DOD has 

based its plans, we reviewed relevant documents, to include command 

briefings and in-progress reviews, orders, and staff analyses that we 

obtained from several DOD organizations including U.S. Central Command

(CENTCOM), MNF-I, and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT).6

 We also 

interviewed officials who were directly involved in the logistical planning 

efforts to determine the status and scope of these efforts. We also traveled

to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD officials from a variety of 

organizations who participated in a logistical summit held at Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait. We also obtained copies of the briefings and the logistical 

reposturing order that resulted from this summit. Based on these 

discussions as well as the documents we obtained, we were able to 

determine the assumptions upon which the planning effort was based. 

 4

We focused our review primarily on the Army because it has the largest logistical footprint 

in Iraq. The majority of units, materiel, and equipment in the Iraqi theater belong to the 

Army with relatively few additional services’ units, materiel, and equipment. Marine Corps

officials told us that the Marines will use Army logistics systems and pipeline to enter and 

exit the Iraqi theater. In addition, DOD officials have stated that the Air force and Navy

have negligible logistical footprints in Iraq. 

5

Discussion with DOD officials in Kuwait indicated that the capacity of the base 

infrastructure in Kuwait to temporarily house and out-process personnel could be rapidly 

expanded with 30 days notice. Moreover, during unit redeployments the majority of

personnel from each redeploying unit are quickly moved to the United States, leaving only 

a small stay-behind detachment to manage the retrograde of unit equipment.

6

For a listing of all the organizations visited during the course of this engagement see app. I.

Page 3 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and 

responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and 

equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed briefings, e-mail 

correspondence, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections of the 

U.S. Code, and other data obtained from DOD organizations in both the 

United States and Kuwait. These officials provided us with information 

about the way the retrograde process is supposed to work as well as any 

challenges they have encountered. While in Kuwait, we also visited 

locations at which various aspects of the redeployment and retrograde 

process are performed and spoke with local commanders and on-site 

supervisors about their experiences and challenges. 

During the course of this engagement we identified several issues that 

DOD will need to consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for 

reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. We identified these issues by reviewing 

our past work as well as documents we obtained from various defense 

commands and activities, including staff analyses, briefings, orders, 

doctrinal publications, and relevant laws and regulations. The officials we 

spoke with included commanders and staff officers who had direct 

knowledge of the issues we identified. Moreover, we visited several 

locations in both the United States and Kuwait where the issues we 

identified would have an impact and, while there, we discussed the 

possible ramifications of these issues with local DOD officials. 

We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. Appendix I includes more detailed 

information on our scope and methodology. 

While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq has yet to be 

determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in 

fall 2007, and in May 2008 DOD began coordinating these individual 

planning efforts to develop a logistical framework based on three key

assumptions. According to DOD officials, initial planning efforts were 

uncoordinated because the three organizations undertaking them—the 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command(AMC), and 

Headquarters, Department of the Army—conducted their planning effort 

on their own initiative and with little input from CENTCOM and MNF-I, 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
the commands overseeing operations in Iraq. By late 2007, however, a 

move began to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of DOD 

organizations engaged in planning for a reposturing of U.S. forces in Iraq. 

This culminated in a May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, 

and resulted in an order published by MNF-I that contained the process for 

the redeployment of units and retrograde of materiel and equipment. The 

order also established a working group chartered to continue the planning 

with an eye toward seeking solutions to challenges, including several of 

the challenges we discuss later in this report. DOD’s planning efforts to 

date have been based on the following three key assumptions: 

• any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of 

State assessments of conditions on the ground; 

• there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an 

order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued; and 

• the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 

180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more 

than 2.5 brigades’ worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each 

month. 

Although efforts have begun to synchronize planning for reposturing, 

DOD, CENTCOM, and the military services have not clearly established 

roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of 

materiel and equipment from Iraq. Joint doctrine states that unity of 

command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of 

command, well-defined relationships, and clear delineation of 

responsibilities and authorities. However, although CENTCOM has 

designated an executive agent for the synchronization of the retrograde of

materiel and equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or

coordinated structure exists to account for the role of a variety of teams 

and units engaged in retrograde operations, such as the disposition of 

excess property and maintaining accountability of major end items like 

tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). This 

results in confusion and a lack of clarity on the ways those teams should 

be utilized. In addition, while the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead 

element for retrograde of Army material and equipment from the 

CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT had no direct command authority 

over the two Army units responsible for the retrograde of the bulk of 

materiel and equipment in Iraq, a situation that resulted in inefficiency and 

significant amounts of materiel and equipment in Kuwait sitting idle and 

awaiting disposition instructions. Finally, another example of this lack of 

unity of command is that data systems used during the retrograde process 

Page 5 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
are incompatible. Although a fix for this data system incompatibility has 

been identified, the fix has not yet been implemented. 

We identified several other issues that will affect the development of plans 

for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. Specifically, based on our discussion 

with DOD officials and analysis of planning efforts to date, the 

effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s redeployment of equipment and 

people will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that address 

and include:

• guidance for the management of hazardous materials and waste and 

the disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of 

closing installations in Iraq; 

• guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq; 

• accountability and disposition of contractor-managed governmentowned property; 

• the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait 

and other neighboring countries; 

• availability of wash racks and the number of customs inspectors in 

Kuwait; 

• capacity of military owned and operated transports and convoy 

security assets, including limits on the main supply route; 

• increased demand for access to mental health care providers;

• infrastructure requirements of returning units; and 

• requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness. 

DOD has begun to address these issues. For example, it is addressing the 

accountability of contractor-managed property and increasing the number 

of mental health providers. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008 requires DOD to brief the congressional defense 

committees on certain matters that were to be addressed, to the extent 

practicable, in the President’s report. These matters include an assessment 

of U.S. force levels required in Iraq, the missions they will undertake in 

Iraq, the incremental costs or savings of any proposed changes to such 

levels or missions, and a description of the range of conditions that could 

prompt changes to the levels of U.S. forces required in Iraq, including the

status of planning for such changes to the levels or missions of U.S. forces 

in Iraq. However, certain issues we have identified above are not 

specifically covered by this requirement. 7

 We believe that more specific 

 7

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1227 (2006) 

(as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110-181, § 1223 (2008)). 

Page 6 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
reporting from DOD on these issues and DOD’s mitigation plans related to

these issues will enable Congress to better exercise effective oversight of 

DOD’s plans. 

In light of our observations, to ensure that DOD can efficiently and 

effectively retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM 

and the military departments, take steps to clarify a unified or coordinated 

chain of command over logistical operations in support of the retrograde 

effort. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation

with the military departments, correct the incompatibility weaknesses in 

the various data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and 

materiel while they are in-transit. Further, to enhance its ability to exercise

its oversight responsibilities, Congress may wish to consider directing 

DOD to modify its briefings submitted in accordance with the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to include specific details 

on the status of its reposturing planning and how it intends to mitigate 

issues such as those we identified in this report. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the second 

recommendation. The department also provided a number of general 

comments and technical comments that we considered and incorporated, 

as appropriate. The department’s comments and our evaluation of those 

comments are discussed in detail in a later section of this report. A 

complete copy of DOD’s written comments, including the department’s 

general and technical comments and our evaluation of each of those 

comments, is included in appendix II.

According to DOD officials, U.S. forces in Iraq will not be “drawn down” 

but rather “repostured.” MNF-I defines “resposture operations,” a nondoctrinal term, as “the realignment of forces, basing, and resources to 

adjust to changes in the operating environment.”8

 Joint doctrine, as 

outlined in DOD’s joint publications for both operations and planning 

emphasizes the importance of end-state planning and planning for the 

termination of combat operations. Inherent in DOD’s reposture planning is 

the concept of redeployment, which joint doctrine defines as “the transfer 

of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s 

operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel

Background 

 8

Annex E to MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, Logistics Reposture Guidance (May 28, 2008). 

Page 7 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or outprocessing.”9

 Associated with redeployment is another non-doctrinal 

concept—retrograde.10 As of May 2008 there was no agreed-upon 

definition for retrograde as it applies to reposture planning. However, 

according to some of the proposed definitions the term generally refers to

the evacuation of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Moreover, our 

analysis of DOD documents indicates that the terms “retrograde” and 

“redeployment” are often used interchangeably. For clarity we use the 

term “redeployment” to refer to the movement of units (including a unit’s 

complement of personnel, equipment, and materiel) and “retrograde” 

when referring to the movement of materiel and equipment. 

Our analysis of previous GAO reports and testimonies on Operations 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicated that retrograde of materiel and

equipment would consume the most time and resources throughout the 

reposturing effort.11 Since the 1990s, we have identified DOD’s supply 

chain management as a high-risk area, because DOD has been unable to 

consistently meet its goal of delivering the “right items to the right places 

at the right time.” Since 1991, we have issued a number of reports 

highlighting weaknesses in DOD’s supply chain management throughout 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

12

The logistics infrastructure that supports the redeployment and retrograde 

effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and complex, consisting of

 9

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (May 30, 2008). 

10The terms “retrograde movement,” “retrograde operation,” and “retrograde personnel” are

doctrinal terms defined in JP 1-02. However, these definitions do not apply to the way in

which the term “retrograde” is being used by logistics planners with regard to the reposture

planning. 

11See GAO Operation Desert Storm: DOD’s Funding Actions Relating to Leftover 

Inventories, GAO/NSIAD-93-143FS (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 1993); Materiel Disposal: 

Alleged Improper Disposition and Destruction of Serviceable Materiel and Supplies in 

Saudi Arabia, GAO/NSIAD-93-139R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 1993); Operation Desert

Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992); and Desert Shield/Storm Logistics: Observations by U.S.

Military Personnel, GAO/NSIAD-92-26 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 1991). 

12See GAO, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Reports and Testimonies: 1991-93, 

GAO/NSIAD-94-134W (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1994); Defense Logistics: Preliminary

Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi

Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); and Defense Logistics: Actions

Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future

Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

Page 8 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
military organizations that operate in both Iraq and Kuwait, and it is 

through Kuwait’s three seaports and two airports that the vast majority of 

U.S. forces, materiel, and equipment flow out of the theater of operations.

Moreover, there are myriad logistics organizations in both Iraq and Kuwait

that also support these operations, including elements CENTCOM, U.S. 

Transportation Command, DLA, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment 

Command, AMC, U.S. Marine Corps Central Command, U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, and U.S. Special 

Operations Command Central.. 

In this report we examine certain components of the logistics

infrastructure that support the redeployment and retrograde effort as well 

as certain aspects of the redeployment and retrograde processes. To 

properly frame this discussion, however, it is necessary to have some 

sense of the size of the force in Iraq and the logistics activities in Kuwait 

that support the redeployment and retrograde of this force. (Figure 1 

shows the locations of select installations in Iraq and key logistics 

activities in Kuwait.) For example, although public discussion of the size 

of the U.S. force in Iraq generally emphasizes the number of brigade 

combat teams, according to DOD officials as of May 2008 there were the 

equivalent of 47 brigades’ worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread 

over some 311 installations of varying size. The majority of this materiel 

and equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD officials, is theater 

provided equipment, approximately 582,000 pieces of equipment worth 

about $15.5 billion. Theater provided equipment is permanent stay behind 

equipment consisting of specific line items of modified table of 

organization and equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks, 

and items purchased specifically for Operations Iraqi Freedom that remain 

in Iraq. The 582,000 pieces of equipment include all the accountable line

items on the property books for the theater provided equipment such as 

up-armored HMMWVs, Mine Resistant Armored Program Vehicles, other

wheeled and tracked vehicles, generators, body armor, and technologies 

used to counter improvised explosive devices. In addition, as of summer 

2007 there were more than 60,000 materiel containers in Iraq and over 

127,000 short-tons of ammunition in Iraq and Kuwait. 

Page 9 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in Kuwait 

Sources: GAO, Art Explosion, and GAO analysis of Stars and Stripes and DOD data.

Al-Hijarah

Desert

Camp Korean 

Village

Anah

Mosul Tal Afar

Dahuk

Al Qayyara Makhmur

Bartala

Kuysanjaq

Tikrit

Samara

Bayji

Haditha

Kunaysah

Tullaiha

Al Walid

Al Qaim

Fallujah

Karbala

Al HindiyahHillah

Aziziyah

Al Kut 

An Numaniya

As Samawah 

As Salman

Nasariyah

Safwan Um Qasr

Ash Shatrah

Qal’at Sukkar Al Amarah

Al Qurnah

Najaf Ad Diwaniyah 

Ar Rumaythah 

Baghdad

Mosul Air Base

FOB Marez

Al Asad Air Base

FOB Q-West

Kirkuk Air Base

Camp Fallujah

K-2 Air Base

Camp Lancer

Ramadi

FOB McHenry

Kuwait 

Al Jahra Kuwait

City 

FOB Rustamiyah

Qalat Sikar Air Base

Camp Al Qaim

Bashur Airfield

Balad Air Base

Camp Anaconda

Tallll Air Base 

Camp Adder

Camp Cedars I

Camp Cedars II

Camp Arifjan

Kuwait 

Naval Base

Camp Taqqadum “TQ”

Baghdad International Airport

Camp Slayer, Camp Victory 

Camp Taji

Ali Al Salem 

Air Base

Kuwait City 

International Airport

Camp Buehring

Camp Virginia

Ash Shuwaihk Port

Ash Shuaybah Port

FOB Delta

Camp Bucca

Page 10 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
While various individual defense commands began planning for the 

reposturing of postsurge forces from Iraq in the fall of 2007, those planning

efforts were not coordinated until May 2008 and were based on three key

assumptions. At the outset these planning efforts were uncoordinated and 

lacked a joint perspective. However, in late 2007, an effort was begun to 

synchronize the planning efforts of various DOD organizations as they 

related to reposture operations in the Iraqi theater of operations. The 

result of this effort was a series of logistics synchronization conferences 

as well as MNF-I’s publication of a logistics reposture order in May 2008. 

In the fall of 2007 three DOD organizations—AMC, DLA, and 

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)—began separate planning 

initiatives designed to deal with issues relating to the retrograde of 

materiel and equipment from Iraq. As part of their planning processes, 

each of the three organizations established working groups or forums for 

subordinate entities to communicate about issues arising from their 

planning. Despite working on the same broad set of issues, however, there

was little coordination among the three organizations. Moreover both 

CENTCOM, the combatant command whose area of responsibility 

includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-I, the headquarters responsible for 

operations in Iraq, provided little input and guidance to these efforts. 

Planning Efforts, 

Begun in Fall 2007 

and Coordinated in 

2008, Are Predicated 

on Three Key 

Assumptions 

Reposture Planning Began 

Fall 2007 but Initial Efforts 

Were Uncoordinated 

Army Materiel Command officials told us that they issued a warning order

on September 6, 2007, directing its subordinate units to be prepared to 

develop plans in support of the transition from current operations to the 

reduction of forces in Iraq. The warning order established a biweekly 

video teleconference, which first met on September 14, 2007, as a forum 

for all AMC units and staff to discuss upcoming requirements in support of 

Iraqi theater reposturing efforts. Moreover, the command also stood up a 

Theater Drawdown Working Group. The original intent of this working 

group was to conduct a mission analysis of what it would take to redeploy

multiple brigade combat teams quickly; however, by November 2007 the

working group became an umbrella organization that synchronized AMC’s 

various planning efforts in support of a reposturing of forces from Iraq. 

Among the issues AMC and its subordinate organizations explored were 

the capacities of its depots, the disposition of excess equipment in the 

Iraqi theater of operations, additional resources that might be required in

theater based on the pace of the unit redeployments, rebuilding Army 

Prepositioned Stocks in theater, AMC capabilities in theater to support the 

reposturing effort, identifying what AMC support was required for 

reducing the number of installations in theater, and identifying the need 

for changes in contracts or additional funding. 

Page 11 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, their agency established a 

Retrograde Task Force in September 2007 when it became clear that DOD 

was looking at the reposturing of forces in Iraq.13 The mission of the 

Retrograde Task Force was to plan and coordinate the execution of DLA 

actions in support of retrograde operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

It was also to develop an integrated support plan for those operations by 

December 2007. The Retrograde Task Force canvassed DLA’s customers—

such as the military services, CENTCOM, and ARCENT—to gather data on 

their respective roles and responsibilities for a reposturing effort and 

conducted a mission analysis to coordinate and anticipate future DLA 

actions and identify gaps and seams in the overall retrograde effort. 

Headquarters, Department of the Army issued its guidance for the 

retrograde of materiel from the CENTCOM area of responsibilities on 

October 23, 2007. HQDA designated ARCENT as the Army’s “lead element 

for retrograde” of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, 

but also stated that AMC is “responsible for executing HQDA retrograde 

policy.” The order provided a set of business rules—by class of supply14—

that all Army units, commands, and agencies involved in the retrograde 

process in the CENTCOM area of responsibility were to follow. It also 

provided disposition instructions for these classes of supply. Finally, the 

order also established a monthly video teleconference, hosted by the 

HQDA, G-4 (Logistics), to provide a forum in which issues and obstacles 

affecting retrograde operations could be discussed. 

Although these DOD organizations made efforts to synchronize their 

planning—for example, both AMC and DLA participated in Headquarters,

Department of the Army’s monthly video teleconferences and DLA 

identified Service headquarters as “external links” to its Retrograde Task 

Force—there was, according to DOD officials, little coordination among 

the separate retrograde planning efforts. In particular, while AMC and 

HQDA focused solely on the retrograde of Army materiel and equipment, 

other DOD officials felt a joint approach headed by either the Joint Staff or 

CENTCOM was required. Moreover, CENTCOM and MNF-I provided little 

guidance; according to officials from CENTCOM, they were waiting on 

 13According to DLA officials, although organization of the Retrograde Task Force began in

late summer 2007, the Retrograde Task Force was not officially active until September 10, 

2007. 

14DOD classes of supply, and what is included in each class of supply, are laid out in app. III 

of this report. 

Page 12 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
input from MNF-I while according to officials representing MNF-I, all 

discussion of reposturing was “close hold” in that headquarters until after 

the MNF-I commander’s congressional testimony in April 2008. 

Reposture Planning 

Coordinated by May 2008 

The synchronization of planning efforts by various defense commands for 

reposturing of post-surge forces began in late 2007, but was not 

coordinated until May 2008. According to DOD officials, by late 2007 it had 

become clear that not only were the various reposturing planning efforts 

uncoordinated and lacking a joint focus, but the perspectives of 

organizations in the United States differed from those of organizations in 

the Iraqi theater of operations. To rectify this, senior DLA officials met 

with their counterparts in CENTCOM and MNF-I to discuss means by 

which reposture planning could be better coordinated and more inclusive. 

Recognizing the added value of a more inclusive and coordinated planning

effort, CENTCOM and MNF-I officials invited DLA to embed members of

its Retrograde Task Force inside logistics organizations in Kuwait and 

Iraq. This action established an in-theater planning cell embedded in the 

organizations involved with logistical planning for reposturing within the 

Iraqi theater of operations. These organizations included MNF-I, MultiNational Corps, Iraq, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the 

CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, and the 401st 

and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades. 

As a result of these efforts, coordination among DOD organizations 

involved in redeployment and retrograde planning increased. For example, 

when representatives from DLA arrived in Iraq and Kuwait they 

discovered that CENTCOM and ARCENT were holding separate 

retrograde video teleconferences; these were eventually merged into one

joint video teleconference. In addition, although the major focus had been 

on Army retrograde processes because the Army has the largest ground 

presence in the theater, once a coordinated reposture planning effort was 

undertaken other services got involved in the redeployment and 

retrograde planning process as well. 

The end result of the increased coordination and synchronized planning 

among the organizations involved with reposture planning for Iraq was a 

logistics summit held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, from May 4-9, 2008. At this 

summit the logistics processes for the retrograde of all classes of supply 

were synchronized, discussions about what to do with contractoracquired, government-owned property were held, and general and flag 

officers were briefed. Representatives from CENTCOM, U.S. 

Transportation Command, DLA, MNF-I, MNC-I, ARCENT, the 1st Theater 

Page 13 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Sustainment Command, HQDA, and the Navy, Marine Corps, Special 

Operations, and Air Force component commands in theater attended the 

summit. Based on the summit, MNF-I finalized and published its 

overarching guidance for logistics reposturing operation on May 28, 2008. 

This order defined retrograde disposition processes for each class of 

supply within the Iraqi theater of operations, codified a 180-day unit 

redeployment template, and addressed basing.15 Moreover, the order also 

established a Logistics Reposture Working Group16 and assigned the group 

three key tasks: 

• Analyze the allocation of resources available to execute the logistics 

reposturing processes to identify potential shortfalls and to address 

synchronization issues between various operational and strategic 

entities. 

• Review limitations, constraints, and risks associated with the logistics 

reposturing processes and develop mitigation measures. 

• Review after action report issues from unit redeployments and base 

reposturing in order to identify policy and procedural gaps and 

inconsistencies. 

Assumptions Guiding 

Reposture Planning 

Based on GAO analysis as well as discussion with DOD officials, both the 

May 2008 conference and the subsequent logistics reposture order were 

based on three assumptions. The first is that any reposturing initiative will

be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments of conditions of 

the ground. The second is that there will be sufficient lead time to refine 

the plans for reposturing once an order with a specific timetable and force 

posture in Iraq is issued. The third is that the reposturing of forces will be 

deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day redeployment template for 

units leaving Iraq and a model that states the theater logistics

infrastructure can sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more 

than a total of five brigades’ worth of equipment and materiel in and out of

Iraq, per month. 

 15Basing options include a base’s closure, a transfer to the government of Iraq, or a “shrink 

and share” of a base where both Iraqis and Coalition forces collocate in a landlord-tenant 

relationship. 

16The Logistics Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with all key legistics

organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It meets monthly and addresses strategic, 

operational, and theater-level logistics issues. It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility 

or Operational Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics-related issues. 

Page 14 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
The MNF-I 180-day template, summarized in table 1, details the actions 

U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must complete 180 days prior to the 

unit’s available-to-load date.17 Twenty-two total organizations–17 separate

theater entities plus 5 additional property and retrograde support teams–

participate in this process.18

Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template 

Number of days before departure Actions

180 to 160 ID types of equipment, request disposition and plan coordination with all retrograde teams

150 to 100 Finalize any early reset plans, set deployment timeline 

100 to 80 Disposition instructions issued, request and authorize donation authority 

80 to 60 Schedule strategic transportation 

60 to 40 Order containers, dispose of excess supplies, develop detailed movement plan, schedule 

wash racks 

40 to 20 Move excess vehicles, validate movement of people 

20 to 0 Complete customs and agriculture inspections, move equipment from wash racks to sterile 

yard to marshaling yard to pier to ship 

Source: GAO analysis based on MNF-I FRAGO 08-232. 

In addition to the 180-day redeployment template, logistics planners in the 

Iraqi theater of operation assume the theater’s logistics infrastructure can 

sustain a flow of approximately 2.5 brigades’ worth of materiel and 

equipment into and out of Iraq each month based on a rate-of-flow model 

they have created. (See appendix V for a more detailed discussion of this 

model). This model takes into consideration historical property book data,

the number of convoys that can be run each month, and the average time it 

takes a unit to clean its equipment and clear customs in Kuwait. However, 

according to DOD officials and GAO analysis, while this rate-of-flow model 

may be a useful planning tool, it should not be used to predict how long it 

would take to retrograde all the equipment and materiel in Iraq. One 

reason for this is the actual amount of equipment and materiel with which 

any one brigade will redeploy varies and these amounts directly affect the 

number of convoys required to move the unit and the amount of time it 

will take the unit to clean its equipment before it can be retrograded. For 

example, during the summer of 2008 the average heavy brigade combat 

team redeployed with significantly less equipment and materiel than 

 17The available-to-load date is the period of time in which a unit’s materiel and equipment is

ready to be loaded at a sea or airport. 

18See App. IV for a list of the support teams and their higher headquarters.

Page 15 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
projected in the model because the unit used a large amount of theater 

provided equipment that remained in Iraq when it redeployed. Moreover, 

GAO has identified several issues, explained in detail later in this report, 

that may affect both the volume and pace at which materiel and equipment 

can flow through the retrograde pipeline. Several of these issues are not 

currently accounted for by the model. 

Despite recent initiatives to synchronize and coordinate the planning 

efforts of DOD organizations with regard to the reposturing of forces from 

Iraq, clear roles and responsibilities with regard to managing and 

executing the redeployment and retrograde process have not yet been 

established. According to joint doctrine, “unity of command must be 

maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined 

command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and 

authorities.”19 Combatant commanders exercise “authoritative direction 

over logistics,” and may organize logistics resources within theater 

according to operational needs.20 CENTCOM’s retrograde order designates 

an executive agent for the synchronization of retrograde operations in 

Iraq. At the same time, because each military department has unique 

authorities and roles, including the requirement to provide logistical 

support to its own assigned forces, CENTCOM efforts to establish a truly 

unified command structure with respect to logistics may be complicated.

21

With no unified or coordinated structure to account for the roles of the 

theater property and retrograde support teams that assist units with the 

retrograde of material and equipment, there is confusion and a lack of 

clarity about how these teams should be utilized. In addition, while the 

Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of Army 

material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT 

did not have direct command authority over the two Army units in the 

theater responsible for retrograding the vast bulk of the equipment in Iraq. 

Because of this the retrograde process was inefficient and resulted in 

significant amounts of theater provided equipment sitting idle in Kuwait 

awaiting disposition instructions. Finally, based on GAO analysis, a 

significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command over the 

Executive Agent for 

Retrograde of 

Materiel and 

Equipment Lacks 

Necessary Authority 

 19Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, IV-19 (May 14, 

2007). 

20Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, V-2 (July 18, 2008). 

21Joint Publication 4-0 notes that “the joint logistician will rarely have unity of joint logistics 

command, and subsequently control of joint logistics is more challenging.” 

Page 16 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
retrograde process is the use of incompatible data systems. Although a fix

for this incompatibility has been identified, the implementation of the fix 

has not been enforced. 

No Single Organization 

Has Authority over Theater 

Property and Retrograde 

Support Teams 

No single organization has command authority over all of the theater 

property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the redeployment 

and retrograde process. According to ARCENT, the lack of unity of 

command over these teams makes their use unclear and confusing. There 

are 10 theater property and retrograde support teams that assist units with 

redeployment and the retrograde of material and equipment.22 ARCENT 

has tactical control authority over only 2 of these teams, the Mobile 

Redistribution Team and the Redistribution Property Assistance Team.23

The Mobile Redistribution Team assists redeploying units with identifying, 

documenting, and providing disposition instructions for excess supplies 

and repair parts in order to reintegrate required supplies into the 

distribution pipeline. The Redistribution Property Assistance Team is 

focused primarily on accountability, turn-in, and retrograde of theater 

provided equipment. Of the remaining 8 theater property and retrograde 

support teams, 2 report to AMC, 2 report to MNC-I, and 1 each report to 

U.S. Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution 

Command, DLA, and the Marine Corps Logistics Command. Each of these 

8 teams also provides redeploying units with essential services and 

expertise. For example, the Joint Redeployment Support Team, which 

reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the mission of supplying 

customs, disposition, hazardous material, and transportation expertise to 

redeploying units and is to enable in-transit visibility over a unit’s materiel 

and equipment from its forward operating base to the unit’s home station 

or to an identified depot. Another team, the Inventory Property Assistance 

Team, reports to MNC-I. The Inventory Property Assistance Team’s 

mission is to track material and equipment shortages and excesses for 

units in Iraq and, when a unit is redeploying, provide instructions for 

either the redistribution or retrograde of that unit’s material and 

equipment. It has the added mission of conducting inventories during the 

 22See App. IV for a complete list of the theater property and retrograde support teams.

23ARCENT has tactical control over Task Force 586, which is the headquarters that controls 

these units. This allows ARCENT to control and direct these assets through Task Force 

586. However, Army Materiel Command also exercises some control over the RPAT 

because the RPAT supports the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade, over which AMC has 

command authority through its subordinate command, Army Sustainment Command. 

Page 17 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
closure of forward operating bases, conducting the transfer of 

government-furnished equipment,24 and conducting inventories of “found” 

equipment containers in Iraq. ARCENT has proposed a command 

structure within MNF-I and MNC-I to coordinate command and control 

over the assistance teams in order to better synchronize retrograde efforts

in the theater, but as of May 2008 this structure has not been adopted. As a 

result, according to ARCENT, the use of the various teams during the 

retrograde process is both unclear and confusing.

Until Recently No Theater 

Logistical Organization 

Had Command Authority 

over Units Responsible for 

the Retrograde of Most 

Equipment in Theater 

Until recently, there was no single theater logistical organization with 

command authority over the two units responsible for retrograding theater 

provided equipment, which accounts for 80 percent of the equipment in 

Iraq. As a result significant amounts of theater provided equipment were 

sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. The two units 

responsible for retrograding theater provided equipment are the 402nd 

Army Field Support Brigade in Iraq and the 401st Army Field Support 

Brigade in Kuwait. Together, these field support brigades relieve 

redeploying units of accountability for theater provided equipment, 

arrange for its transportation from Iraq to Kuwait, and process the 

equipment through the wash racks, customs, and on to its designated 

destination. According to emerging Army doctrine (currently in draft), 

when Army field support brigades are deployed in support of a 

contingency mission to an operational theater and when directed by 

higher authority, they will fall under the operational control of a theater or 

expeditionary sustainment command.25 According to joint doctrine,26 a 

theater sustainment command is the logistics command and control 

element assigned to the Army Service Component Command and is the 

single Army logistics headquarters in a theater of operations. Theater 

sustainment commands may also employ one or more expeditionary 

sustainment commands to aid them with command and control. 

Prior to June 2008 in the Iraqi theater of operations, neither ARCENT—

CENTCOM’s Army Service Component Command and Army’s designated

lead element for retrograde operations in the theater—nor ARCENT’s 

 24Government-furnished equipment is equipment provided to a contractor for use in 

fulfilling the terms of a contract. This equipment is maintained by the contractor and 

returned to the government at the contract’s conclusion and/or termination.

25FM 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade Operations, Initial Draft, (May 1, 2008). 

26JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008). 

Page 18 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
subordinate theater and expeditionary sustainment commands had any 

direct command authority over the 401st or 402nd Army Field Support 

Brigades. Instead, higher headquarters for both the field support brigades

was the Army Sustainment Command located at Rock Island Arsenal, 

Illinois.27 This command relationship appeared to be inconsistent with 

emerging Army doctrine and Joint doctrine, and HQDA had apparently 

denied ARCENT authority over all Army organizations in the CENTCOM

AOR that support the retrograde process, including the 401st and 402nd. In

an effort to provide some in-theater oversight for the retrograde process,

AMC has designated the ARCENT G-4 as the commander, Army Materiel 

Command, southwest Asia (AMC-SWA). However, like ARCENT and its 

theater and expeditionary sustainment commands, this commander had no

direct command authority over the field support brigades whose actions 

he is charged to synchronize and oversee. Moreover, he did not have a 

staff to assist him in his duties aside from a chief of staff. According to 

CENTCOM officials, in June 2008 CENTCOM designated ARCENT as 

having operational control over the 401st Army Field Support Brigade and

the 402

nd Army Field Support Brigade. While CENTCOM’s action may 

result in changes in the retrograde process for transferring theater 

provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait, we have not yet evaluated the 

effect of this change. 

Before this change occurred, the lack of unity of command made the 

process for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait 

inefficient and resulted in significant amounts of this equipment sitting idle 

in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. This was because the 

headquarters with the authority to coordinate the theater provided 

equipment retrograde process (Army Sustainment Command) lacked

visibility over the process while the headquarters with visibility over the 

process (AMC-SWA) lacked the command authority and the staff to 

coordinate the actions of the field support brigades that execute the 

process. For example, on May 16, 2008, 177 pieces of theater provided 

equipment rolling stock28 that were no longer needed in theater were 

sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions, some since March 

 27Army Sustainment Command is a subordinate organization to Army Materiel Command

and is responsible for field support, materiel management, contingency contracting, and 

Army pre-positioned stocks. 

28Class VII Items are further divided into rolling stock and nonrolling stock. Rolling stock 

includes wheeled vehicles, tracked combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction 

equipment, trailers, semitrailers, and standard trailer-mounted equipment such as 

generators. Nonrolling stock includes all class VII items not classified as rolling stock.

Page 19 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
2008. Army Sustainment Command took no actions to rectify this situation 

and the commanding general, AMC-SWA, who is also the ARCENT G-4, did 

not have authority to direct that action be taken. Instead, he used his 

personal contacts with DOD officials in the United States to obtain the 

needed disposition instructions. Despite these actions, however, problems 

persisted with the retrograde process. For example, a DOD official in 

Kuwait provided documentation showing that over 2,100 non-rolling stock 

items of theater provided equipment—including such items as 120mm 

mortars, gun mounts, radio sets, and generators—were also sitting idle in

Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. 

Logistical Organizations 

Have Not Enforced or 

Lack the Authority to 

Enforce Improvements to 

the Retrograde Process 

One significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command is that 

logistical organizations have not enforced or lack the authority to enforce 

improvements to a retrograde process that is slow and does not maintain 

in-transit visibility. ASC has identified a solution to the problem and 

ordered its implementation, but it has not enforced its order despite 

having the authority to do so. Until recently, ARCENT lacked the 

necessary authority over the field support brigades to enforce Army 

Sustainment Command’s solution. As a result, significant stores of TPE 

that are no longer needed in theater are sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting 

disposition instructions. 

The current process for retrograding theater provided equipment no 

longer needed in Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit visibility.29

This is caused by the frequent manual manipulation of data. According to

DOD’s Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, all DOD 

components shall structure their materiel management to provide 

responsive, consistent, and reliable support to the warfighter (customer) 

during peacetime and war using DOD standard data systems that provide 

timely, accurate in-transit asset information.30

Retrograde Process for Certain 

Theater Provided Equipment Is 

Slow and Does Not Maintain InTransit Visibility 

Currently, when theater provided equipment moves to Kuwait the 401st 

Army Field Support Brigade undertakes two concurrent manual processes 

to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment. Accountability 

is established by manually entering equipment data into one system, while 

 29A detailed explanation of the systems and organization involved in this process is

contained in App.VI. 

30See DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation Chapter 1, DOD 4140.1-R, §

C1.3.1.1; § C1.3.1, § C1.3.2 and § C5.8, (May 23, 2003). 

Page 20 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
a second manual entry is made in a different system to provide visibility 

over each item by serial number. The visibility system, however, is a 

nonstandard Army information system. DOD guidance states that the DOD 

components should execute a supply chain strategy that promotes the use 

of shared common data and that wherever possible, adopt commercial 

data exchange and user interface standards and procedures while ensuring 

interoperability. 

Once accountability and visibility over theater provided equipment has 

been established, personnel from the 401st Army Field Support Brigade 

request disposition instructions. This labor-intensive manual process 

involves sending spreadsheets populated with equipment data from 

Kuwait to Army Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island, 

Illinois, and then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Command31

responsible for each particular item, which, in turn, sends disposition 

instructions back through this chain to the 401st. This process can take

months because of the manual workarounds used to pass and manipulate 

the data. 

While equipment can be shipped once disposition instructions are received 

in Kuwait, in-transit visibility of the equipment is temporarily lost during 

shipment because the process used to direct shipment of the equipment—

called Inter-Depot Transfer—bypasses the Global Transportation 

Network, DOD’s system for providing near real-time in-transit visibility 

information. This lack of in-transit visibility is contrary to current DOD 

guidance that requires timely, accurate in-transit asset information be 

available to all users and logistics managers and in a standard format 

adequate to satisfy needs. 

The 401st Army Field Support Brigade uses another manual process to 

compensate for this lack of in-transit visibility by coordinating with 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements at Kuwaiti ports 

in order to obtain final load manifests for each vessel. The manifest is 

forwarded to item managers in the United States so they can prepare to 

receive the equipment; however, manifest information does not reach the 

brigade until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail. 

 31The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands, each of which 

is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are: Aviation and Missile, Chemical 

Materials Agency, Communications-Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tankautomotive & Armaments Command. 

Page 21 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Army Sustainment Command has stated that “the current process 

used...to manage and obtain disposition is slow and cumbersome with a 

high potential to be overwhelmed if reposturing is accelerated.” In 

addition to the more than 2,100 pieces of nonrolling stock TPE awaiting 

dispositions instructions cited above—some reportedly for years—a DOD 

official stated that in the past rolling stock has been sitting idle in Kuwait 

for anywhere from 3 to 9 months. 

Although Army Sustainment Command has issued an order outlining 

changes to the retrograde process that corrects the problems we have 

identified, neither of the field support brigades in the Iraqi theater of 

operations have followed it. In April 2008, Army Sustainment Command 

issued an order directing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades 

to use Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced transactions to transfer 

equipment between Iraq and Kuwait in order to maintain accountability 

and visibility.32 Moreover, the order directed that disposition instructions 

for all theater provided equipment not required in theater should be 

requested through the Standard Army Retail Supply System.33 According to

a DOD official this will allow the automated request of disposition 

instructions, thereby reducing the time necessary to receive the 

instructions. Moreover, the system will provide data to the Global 

Transportation Network, thereby improving in-transit visibility over 

equipment. However, for reasons that were not made clear, this order has 

not been implemented and Army Sustainment Command has not 

compelled the field support brigades to comply. 

Logistical Organizations Have 

Not Enforced or Lack the 

Authority to Enforce 

Compliance with Orders to 

Implement Improvements to 

the Retrograde Process 

In January 2008, ARCENT, as the lead agent for retrograde, requested that 

Headquarters, Department of the Army delegate to ARCENT more 

authority over the retrograde process. Specifically, according to ARCENT

officials, ARCENT requested that it be given authority to determine and 

issue disposition instructions and that it be given authority to direct all 

Army organizations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility that support 

the retrograde process. As of May 2008, ARCENT had not received these 

 32Army Sustainment Command Operations Order 30-08, Retrograde of Theater Provided 

Equipment (TPE) (Apr. 18, 2008). 

33The Standard Army Retail Supply System is a Combat Service Support peacetime and 

wartime logistics Standard Army Management Information System that (1) performs the

supply functions of ordering, receiving, storing, and issuing supplies; (2) supports supply 

management functions such as excess disposition and redistribution; and (3) offers 

improved communications and advanced automation functionality. One of its benefits is 

providing asset visibility at the Brigade Combat Team, Corps, theater, and national levels. 

Page 22 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
authorities. Until recently, ARCENT had no authority to direct the field

support brigades to comply with Army Sustainment Command’s order to

fix the data incompatibility problem in theater. While CENTCOM’s action 

designating ARCENT as having operational control over the support 

brigades may result in changes in the disposition instruction process, we 

have not yet evaluated the effect of this command change. 

We identified nine issues that will affect the development of plans for 

reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. These nine issues are discussed, in 

detail, in the following sections. Although the pace and overall extent of a 

potential reposturing are uncertain, DOD has begun to address these 

issues. While DOD officials are not required to report specific information 

about these nine issues or possible mitigation plans related to these issues, 

as part of the briefings they are required to provide to the congressional 

defense committees,34 we believe that without more specific reporting 

from DOD, Congress may not be able to effectively exercise oversight 

responsibilities of DOD’s plans. 

According to ARCENT officials, closing or handing over U.S. installations 

in Iraq will be time-consuming and costly, although time and costs are 

difficult to estimate without a bilateral agreement addressing base 

closures. As of May 31, 2008, 311 U.S. installations in Iraq will have to be 

closed or turned over to the Iraqis during a reposturing effort, depending 

on the scope of U.S. reposturing. According to ARCENT officials, 

experience has shown it takes 1 to 2 months to close the smallest platoonor company-size installations, which contain between 16 and 200 combat 

soldiers or marines. However, Multi-National Corps-Iraq has never closed

an installation the size of complex installations such as Balad Air Force 

Base, which contains approximately 24,000 inhabitants and has matured 

over 5 years, making accurate predictions about the time it will take to 

close them difficult. ARCENT officials estimate it could take longer than 

18 months to close a base of that size, likening the process to shutting 

down and moving a small U.S. city. 

Issues That DOD 

Needs to Consider in

Its Reposture 

Planning 

Time and Cost Estimates 

for Base Closures in Iraq 

 34National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1227

(2006) (as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 

No. 110-181, § 1223 (2008)). 

Page 23 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
According to DOD officials, time and costs are difficult to estimate without 

an agreement between the United States and Iraq on base closure, 

especially with regard to guidance of the management of hazardous 

materials and waste and the transfer of personal property.35 ARCENT 

officials stated that both issues are traditionally addressed in Status of 

Forces Agreements; however, as of July 18, 2008, the United States and 

Iraq do not have such an agreement.

36 Hence, although CENTCOM 

guidance states that the base commander is responsible for the removal or 

remediation of all hazardous materials and waste, ARCENT officials stated 

that base commanders do not know to what extent they must remediate 

the waste, and therefore may have difficulty estimating the time and cost 

of cleaning installations. In addition, according to ARCENT officials, 

absent an agreement with Iraq on the disposition of personal property, “all

bunkers, trenches, fighting positions, and force protection barriers... will 

be removed” in accordance with CENTCOM policy. 

ARCENT officials asserted that, absent a bilateral agreement with Iraq 

addressing the base closure or hand-over process, the U.S. will have to 

negotiate the terms of closure for each base individually, which could 

potentially slow the base closing process. For example, ARCENT officials 

noted that since the owners or lessees of the land on which the 

installations currently reside include the Iraqi Ministries of Interior, 

Defense, and Justice, and other Iraqi national government entities as well 

as private individuals, property transfers would be complicated and time 

consuming. Moreover, ARCENT officials stated that in the absence of a 

bilateral agreement that provides guidance for the management of 

hazardous waste and materials, it is normal practice to follow the 

established guidelines for this management, which generally are more 

stringent and therefore potentially more costly and time consuming. 

 35MNF-I defines personal property as any property than can be moved and reused without

significant refurbishment or degradation from its intended purpose. Personal property

includes government property (those items owned by services and components) and items

owned by individuals. Examples include re-locatable buildings, window air conditioning

units (not to include split air conditioning unit), generators, desks, chairs, computers,

office supplies, cots, foot lockers, and clothing. 

36As of July 18, 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were still negotiating the terms of their 

bilateral agreement, although the exact nature of the agreement was still being negotiated. 

Page 24 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the reposturing of U.S. 

forces in Iraq did not include a theater-wide plan for the reposturing of 

contractors. According to MNF-I’s May 2008 logistics reposture order, 

logistics planners were to coordinate with the Defense Contracting 

Management Agency (DCMA) to identify contractual issues associated 

with logistics reposture operations. But as of June 2008, DCMA officials 

stated that they were not aware of a theater-wide plan for the reposturing 

of contractors. In fact, according to DOD officials, CENTCOM contracting 

planners did not begin participating in planning for the reposturing 

operations until July 2008. 

While there is no theater-wide plan, since May 2008 Army LOGCAP 

officials have been participating in theater-wide logistics reposturing 

planning. Reposture planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it is the 

largest logistical support contract in Iraq. According to a DOD official, 

examples of such participation include LOGCAP personnel attending a 

series of logistics conferences held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait in May 2008, 

working with logistics reposture planning teams in MNF-I and MNC-I, and 

participating in the Logistics Reposture Working Group. However, 

according to a DOD official responsible for coordinating LOGCAP 

planning efforts with reposturing planning efforts, challenges remain in 

the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP contractor personnel. For 

instance, decisions about reposturing of these contractors are often made

before requirements have been clearly identified and DOD officials 

responsible for planning the reposturing of these contractors do not 

receive timely and accurate information from the customers or units using 

these contracts. 

Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. 

government property under the control of contractors may present 

challenges to reposturing from Iraq. According to Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of 

contractor-managed government-owned property37 in Iraq. According to 

the same officials, the largest portion of all contractor-managed 

government-owned property in Iraq, $3.37 billion, falls under the LOGCAP, 

an Army program to provide contracted resources to support U.S. 

Uncertainties Regarding 

Plans for Contractors 

Accountability and 

Disposition of ContractorManaged GovernmentOwned Property 

 37For simplicity, we use the term contractor-managed government-owned property to 

incorporate all items which the contractor manages expressly to perform under the 

contract, including items given to the contractor by the government (government-furnished

equipment), or acquired/fabricated by the contractor. 

Page 25 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
contingency operations. Examples of LOGCAP equipment include laundry 

and bath facilities, food service, sanitation, housing, maintenance, 

transportation, construction, and power generation and distribution. 

According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, nonLOGCAP contractor-managed government-owned property falls into four 

main categories. These are the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, 

selective programs under DOD’s Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan, programs run by the Gulf Region Division of the Army 

Corps of Engineers, and hundreds of smaller programs run by individual 

U.S. government agencies. Defense Contract Management Agency officials 

reported that property in these four categories includes, but is not limited 

to, plant equipment and materiel to support various reconstruction efforts 

like the Iraqi Department of Public Works. 

Several DOD organizations have already begun planning for the 

disposition of excess contractor-managed government-owned property 

from Iraq.38 For example, in October 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness increased the donation 

threshold for all excess U.S.-owned personal property in Iraq from $5,000 

to $10,00039 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I. According to 

DOD officials, in June 2008, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Logistics and Materiel readiness increased the authority to transfer 

(formerly known as donation authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal 

property in Iraq from $10,000 to $15,000. In addition, in 2007 the Army 

published guidelines for the retrograde of contractor-acquired

government-owned property from CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.40

The Army followed this up in December 2007 with a business case analysis

of the effective disposition of contractor-acquired government-owned 

property and a conference in May 2008 during which it updated and 

developed polices and processes for maintaining accountability over this 

 38Excess contractor-managed government-owned property is a subset of foreign excess

personal property, which is defined as U.S.-owned personal property located outside of the

United States that is excess to government needs. 

39The October 2007 memo increasing donation authority to $10,000 updated an August 4,

2006, DOD memo based on the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service’s cost-benefit 

analysis dated June 9, 2006, which estimated the cost at which care and handling of an item 

exceeds the proceeds from its sale. 

40Headquarter, Department of the Army, HQDA Materiel Retrograde Policy; (October 23, 

2007). 

Page 26 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
property.41 The Army’s analysis indicates that approximately 85 percent of 

all contractor-acquired government-owned property in Iraq should be 

transferred,42 sold, or scrapped in Iraq once it is declared excess,43 while 

the remaining 15 percent can be sold or reused elsewhere. Finally, in its 

Logistics Reposture Guidance, MNF-I established policies and procedures 

for disposing of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. 

This process is shown in figure 2 below. 

Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government-Owned Property 

Government of Iraq

Government of Iraq wants? DLA disposal 

facilities

MNF-I/MNC-I

determines

others’ need 

in theater?

Other military 

or contractors

globally

Needed by 

military or 

contractors

globally? 

Contractor 

determines

property that

 is excess to 

their mission

Other 

contractors

or military in

theater 

ARCENT/HQDA 

decide if igoes to sale

or to pre-positioned 

stock? 

Sale/

Pre-positioned 

stock 

Pre-positioned 

stock 

More/less

than

$5000?

Physical

inventory

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

no

more

If sale

sold 

through

less

Legend:

MNC-I: Multi-National Corps-Iraq

ARCENT: U.S. Army Central

HQDA: Headquarters, Department of the Army

DLA: Defense Logistics Agency

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information

Despite the above efforts, however, three challenges exist to maintaining 

accountability for and managing the disposition of contractor-managed 

 41According to an Army official, this analysis included property acquired/fabricated by the 

contractor, but not government-furnished equipment. Consequently, the analysis included 

much, but not all contractor-managed government-owned property.

42The property can be transferred to other military units or contractors in theater, the 

government of Iraq, or other military units or contractors around the world.

43 The Army’s analysis considers this property to be (1) uneconomical to return to the

United States or (2) prohibited from return to the United States given policy, regulations, or 

agreements. 

Page 27 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
government-owned property in Iraq. The first challenge is determining the 

original or fair-market value of contractor-managed government-owned 

property and determining any security restrictions on its disposition. 

According to MNF-I, the failure to sort and identify U.S. government 

materiel in Iraq has already resulted in the retrograding of items that are 

unserviceable, are still needed in theater, or are uneconomical to 

retrograde. Moreover, according to the Department of the Army’s business 

case analysis, the LOGCAP property book kept by the prime contractor 

had numerous omissions, and many items were not properly listed, 

creating doubt about the inventory’s accuracy. Without accurate 

accountability of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, 

the U.S. government may fail to realize all possible financial and practical

gains from this property. 

The second challenge facing DOD, according to Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials, is the time-consuming and labor-intensive 

task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractormanaged government-owned property. According to MNF-I, before 

contractor-managed government-owned property can be disposed of it 

must be transferred from the contractor’s records to a military unit’s 

property book. However, officials from the Defense Contracting 

Management Agency stated that contractors and government officials 

must perform a joint inventory of all property before it is transferred. 

Defense Contract Management Agency officials assert that completing this 

inventory will require planning, travel to storage locations, and the 

physical staging of property for easier counting, all of which are time 

consuming. Moreover, the same officials stated that security concerns 

have previously hindered their ability to travel to all inventory locations. 

According to AMC, if the security situation inhibits contractors from

moving equipment, the contractors can abandon the equipment to U.S. 

forces that will then be responsible for its disposition. Defense Contract 

Management Agency officials stated that without adequate time and 

resources to plan and execute a thorough inventory of contractormanaged government-owned property in Iraq, the risks of losing 

accountability over this property will increase. 

The third challenge is that DLA may not have sufficient data to adequately

plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in 

Page 28 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
theater.44 MNF-I policy states that contractor-managed government-owned 

property that is excess to government requirements, and is not donated to 

the Iraqi government, will be disposed of at DLA facilities. To prepare for 

this, DLA officials attached to MNF-I told us they spent 3 months 

performing a detailed analysis of how much equipment will end up at 

these facilities in theater. Despite these efforts, however, there are six 

factors that may affect DLA’s ability to accumulate sufficient data to 

adequately plan capacity needs at DLA’s disposal facilities. 

• LOGCAP inventory accuracy. A Department of the Army business case 

analysis stated that problems with the LOGCAP property book created 

doubt about the inventory’s accuracy. While according to an Army 

official the LOGCAP prime contractor is currently performing an 

inventory of all of its property in Iraq, the process is adding new items 

to their property books, making older property estimates outdated. 

• Lack of property disposal estimates. According to DOD officials, MNF-I 

requested but never received the services’ estimates of what they 

anticipate sending to the disposal facilities. 

• Lack of property book data. According to DOD officials, MNF-I did not 

receive property books from the Army Corps of Engineers and only 

received partial information from the Air Force Contract Augmentation 

Program. 

• Lack of visibility over non-DOD property. According to Defense 

Contract Management Agency officials, it is difficult to determine how 

much equipment is managed by contractors under the hundreds of 

smaller programs run by individual U.S. government agencies.

• Lack of individual item accountability. According to DOD officials, 

many of the systems used to account for contractor-managed 

government-owned property only track types of items, but not 

necessarily the individual items themselves, making detailed estimates 

difficult. 

• Insufficient training. According to DOD officials, some retrograde 

process teams sent to aid redeploying units have not had sufficient 

training, causing them to send unnecessary property to disposal 

facilities. 

DLA has implemented other initiatives to mitigate and prepare for 

increased operations at the disposal facilities. For example, DLA fielded 

 44DLA runs four Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in Iraq and one in Kuwait, 

which are responsible for disposing of surplus DOD property through reutilization, 

transfer, donation, and sale. The sale of this surplus property is accomplished by awarding

contracts to vendors that in turn resell the property. 

Page 29 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
individuals to accompany a key retrograde assistance team to prevent 

unnecessary equipment from ending up at these facilities and, according to

DLA officials, in one instance they successfully rerouted 194 of 200 

containers, reducing the chance of double-handling this property. 

However, without a comprehensive picture of all property in theater, DLA 

may not be able to fully prepare its disposal facilities for the contractormanaged government-owned property that will flow to them, particularly 

in the event of a full-scale reposturing. 

Use of Facilities in Kuwait 

and Other Neighboring 

Countries

The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel 

retrograded as part of any reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq would be 

governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as well as 

restrictions on the use of those facilities. According to DOD officials, 

Kuwait is the main point of exit for all personnel, equipment, and materiel

in Iraq. At present there are three U.S. bases and five Kuwait facilities that 

the United States is using to support operations in Iraq, including 

retrograde and redeployment operations. The U.S.-Kuwait Defense 

Cooperation Agreement governs the use of these facilities. According to 

DOD officials, any reposturing effort must take into consideration the 

terms of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and ongoing negotiations 

related to that agreement, particularly given that in their view, the 

government of Kuwait desires to limit the size of the U.S. footprint in 

Kuwait. DOD has explored alternative routes and ports through which to 

redeploy units and retrograde equipment and material but these, too, are 

constrained because of capacity and other considerations. For example, in

February 2008 the Marine Corps began testing the feasibility of using an 

alternate port in the region for redeployment and retrograde operations.45

However, Marine Corps officials stated that though the tests have been 

successful, at present the country in which that port is located only allows

the transport of containerized cargo through its territory and will not 

permit U.S. military security detachments to escort the cargo. As a result 

of these restrictions, Marine Corps officials reported they could retrograde 

only 20 to 30 percent of their nonsensitive materiel and equipment in Iraq 

through this port. ARCENT officials are also studying the feasibility of 

using two other alternate ports in the region. However, according to 

ARCENT documents, one port has limited utility as a retrograde port 

because the shallow draft of the harbor makes its unsuitable for larger 

 45 The Marines have previously used this alternate port to resupply its forces in western 

Iraq. 

Page 30 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
ships, the port’s facilities are in need of significant renovation, and local 

security at the port is questionable. The third port is limited to 

containerized cargo as well as being limited by the amount of cargo traffic 

that can travel along the port’s approach roads. 

Availability of Wash Racks 

and Customs Personnel 

Limits on the availability of wash racks in Kuwait and a limited number of 

customs inspectors comprise another constraint on the pace at which 

retrograde operations can be effected. Prior to returning to the United 

States all materiel and equipment must be cleaned to U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) standards. These standards are outlined in The Armed 

Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 31, which states that

“USDA inspection standards only allow a thin film of road dust on vehicles 

and equipment arriving at the CONUS [continental United States] final port 

of entry,” which DOD officials interpret to mean that materiel and 

equipment cannot have even a “pinchable” amount of dirt. To meet these 

standards of cleanliness, DOD officials stated that all vehicles returning to 

the United States are pressure washed. This involves, first, removing the 

vehicle’s secondary equipment and any add-on armor. Next, the vehicle 

moves to a wash rack where the pressure washing occurs. For larger 

vehicles, such as tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and M88 recovery 

vehicles this can take anywhere from 40 to 80 hours (larger vehicles must 

also have their engines removed and the engine compartment cleaned as 

well). Smaller vehicles, such as HMMWVs, take anywhere from 4 to 8 

hours. 

At present there are 211 wash racks available for use by U.S. forces in 

Kuwait, 81 at Camp Arifjan and another 130 at Kuwait Naval Base.46

According to DOD officials, the wash racks at Camp Arifjan operate 24 

hours a day. However, wash rack operations at Kuwait Naval Base are 

subject to occasional work stoppages and other restrictions. For example, 

when ammunition is being loaded or unloaded at the naval base, wash 

rack operations there are suspended for safety reasons. According to DOD 

officials, at present this only occurs for 6 days each quarter, but if the 

retrograde of ammunition were accelerated this could occur more often. 

Moreover, theater provided equipment, which is washed by contracted 

third-country nationals, cannot be washed at Kuwait Naval Base because 

of security concerns. And of the 130 wash racks at the naval base, only 100 

 46 DOD officials stated that an additional 20 wash racks should be operational at Camp 

Buehring by August 2008; we were not able to confirm this.

Page 31 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
are useable for the cleaning of equipment because the remaining 30 lack 

the necessary filters that separate contaminates from the wash water. 

Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks 

Source: DOD.

Page 32 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack 

Source: DOD.

After being washed, vehicles are inspected by military personnel who have 

been specially trained and certified by the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection Agency. These customs inspectors ensure that before any 

vehicle or piece of equipment is placed in a sterile lot, the last stop before 

it boards transport for return to the United States, it meets USDA 

standards of cleanliness. In Kuwait, these trained inspectors are provided 

by the U.S. Navy. Navy officials have stated that at present there is no 

shortage of trained and certified customs inspectors in Kuwait given the 

current throughput of retrograding material and equipment. However, 

other DOD officials have noted that were the pace of retrograde increased, 

more customs inspectors would be necessary. They also stated that absent 

an increase in the number of inspectors, otherwise clean vehicles would 

be delayed from entering the sterile lot and would therefore require 

additional cleaning to meet customs standards of cleanliness. In turn, this 

could cause a backlog of vehicles and materiel in Kuwait. 

Page 33 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
The availability in theater of military owned and operated heavy 

equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits on 

the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of Iraq. 

According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment transports 

(HET) support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of operations: commercially 

contracted unarmored transports and armored military transports with 

military crews. Both types of transport are used to haul vehicles like tanks, 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and HMMWVs over long distances.47 They also 

carry containers. 

Availability of 

Transportation and 

Security Assets and Route 

Restrictions 

According to DOD officials, there are sufficient quantities of civilian HETs 

in the Iraqi theater of operations. However, one factor affecting the 

frequency with which convoys can be mounted is the availability of 

military HETs and convoy security assets. According to officials from the 

1st Theater Sustainment Command, most convoys comprise both civilian 

and military HETs, with the latter being interspersed throughout the 

convoy to facilitate control and security. Any increase in the number of 

civilian HETs without a corresponding increase in the number of military 

HETs, they maintain, increases the risk of accidents. However, DOD 

officials have reported shortages of military HETs in theater. In addition,

officials from the 1st Theater Sustainment Command stated that each 

convoy is accompanied by a mounted security detachment. According to

ARCENT officials, the availability of these convoy security assets could 

also inhibit the flow of materiel out of Iraq by decreasing the frequency

with which convoys can be mounted. 

One other factor that could inhibit the rate by which units can be 

redeployed and material and equipment retrograded out of Iraq into 

Kuwait is the capacity of the primary supply route. Prior to May 2007, U.S.

convoys used a six-lane concrete highway. However, according to III 

Corps officials, the government of Kuwait funded the construction of an 

alternate route that opened in May 2007. These officials explained that the 

new route is not wide enough to handle two-way HET traffic and is 

deteriorating. III Corps officials stated that, because of this, the flow of 

convoys north and south along the newer route must be staggered, which 

further limits the number and frequency of retrograde convoys. Moreover, 

according to DOD officials under all but the most extreme reposturing 

 47According to DOD officials, although it is possible to self-deploy vehicles from Iraq to

Kuwait (i.e., drive them out under their own power), the resulting wear and tear on a

vehicle makes this an unattractive alternative. Hence, when possible, vehicles are 

transported out of Iraq on heavy equipment transports.

Page 34 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
scenarios, substantial numbers of convoys will need to continue flowing 

north to resupply Coalition forces in Iraq. 

Home Station Issues During our visits to units and installations in the United States as well as 

conversations with DOD officials, we became aware of several issues that 

could challenge units once they have returned to their home stations. 

Although these issues need to be explored further, they are included in 

this report because of their potential impact. These issues are: 

• A lack of sufficient numbers of mental health professionals to care for 

returning service members and their families. According to Army 

officials and GAO analysis there is already a deficiency in the number 

of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental 

health problems being reported by service members and their families. 

The Army has already taken steps to meet this challenge through hiring 

and contracting for additional mental health care professionals to meet 

the rising demand, but they report that there remains a dearth of 

qualified mental health professionals to provide the requisite care for 

service members and their families. 

• A lack of sufficient infrastructure. According to Army officials there is 

already insufficient infrastructure such as barracks, administrative and

headquarters buildings, motor pools, and maintenance and training 

areas on several installations. This is due to the “Grow the Army” 

initiative which has increased the number of brigade combat teams in 

the Army since the beginning of the war in Iraq. As a result, some 

installations have more Army units assigned to them than there are 

facilities to support. Currently, the Army is able to mitigate this

challenge because a certain number of units are always deployed. This 

allows the Army to use the same facilities for more than one unit. 

However, installation management officials are concerned that in the 

event of a major reposturing of units out of Iraq and the concomitant 

return of Army units to their home stations there will not be enough 

room to accommodate all of the equipment, unit headquarters staff, 

and soldiers stationed at an installation. 

• Needed future investments in training and equipment. According to 

recent testimony by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, 

resetting the force so that it is capable of “full spectrum operations” 

will require substantial future investments in time, money, and 

resources. This point was underscored for us during discussions with 

officials from the 1st Cavalry Division that had recently returned from 

Iraq. They told us that it would not be until 6 to 9 months after 

Page 35 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
returning from Iraq that their brigade combat teams would have the 

necessary equipment with which to train. 

Lastly, though DOD is not required to report on the specific issues we 

identify in this report or possible mitigation plans related to these issues as 

part of the briefings they are required to provide to the congressional 

defense committees, we believe that without such specific information 

Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight 

responsibilities and stewardship over DOD. 

Although DOD began in May 2008 to coordinate its planning for the 

reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq among its various relevant commands 

and organizations, it has not adequately delineated roles and 

responsibilities for the execution of the associated retrograde process. 

Specifically, although CENTCOM has designated an executive agent for 

the synchronization of retrograde operations in the theater, no unified or

coordinated chain of command exists to account for the roles played by a 

variety of teams engaged in retrograde operations. In addition, while the 

Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of Army 

material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT 

had no command authority over the two Army units responsible for the 

retrograde of the bulk of material and equipment in Iraq. Instead, there are

a variety of organizations, some in theater and others in the United States, 

that exercise influence over the retrograde process, either directly or 

through subordinate organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. The 

resulting lack of a unified or coordinated command structure is not only 

inconsistent with joint doctrine, but also increases confusion and causes 

inefficiencies in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of 

identified mitigation initiatives. 

Conclusions 

In addition, we identified several other issues that DOD will need to 

consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces 

from Iraq to support future U.S objectives and strategy. While DOD has 

begun to address these issues, none of them have been fully addressed. 

Moreover, because Congress will have a role in funding and overseeing the 

reposturing effort, it is important that the Congress be informed of these 

issues since they will likely affect DOD’s overall reposturing costs and 

execution. While DOD is required to brief the congressional defense 

committees on certain issues related to reposturing, it is not required to 

provide the specific information identified in our report. We believe that 

without such information, Congress may not be able to effectively exercise 

Page 36 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
its oversight responsibilities and assess the extent to which DOD’s plans 

are effective, efficient, and well-coordinated. 

To ensure that DOD can efficiently and effectively retrograde its materiel 

and equipment from Iraq, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in

consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps to 

clarify the chain of command over logistical operations in support of the 

retrograde effort. These steps should address not only the Army field 

support brigades but also the theater property and retrograde support 

teams. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation

with the military departments, correct the incompatibility weaknesses in 

the various data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and 

materiel while they are in transit. 

To enhance its ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities, Congress 

may wish to consider directing DOD to include in its briefings submitted in 

accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008, specific details on the status of its reposturing planning and how it 

intends to mitigate specific reposturing issues, including those we 

identified in this report, as well as other challenges the department 

envisions as it proceeds with its reposturing efforts. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with our two recommendations. Specifically, the department partially 

concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with our 

second recommendation. DOD also commented that from the time we 

began this review to the completion of our data collection, the operational 

environment in theater has changed, processes have been modified, and 

actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns identified in our draft 

report. We recognize in our report that the operational environment has 

changed over time and that DOD has recently modified some processes 

and taken actions to enhance its planning for the reposturing of forces 

from Iraq. However, as discussed below, we continue to believe that DOD 

needs to take additional actions to implement our recommendations and 

improve the efficiency of its retrograde process. 

Recommendations 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In response to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in 

consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps to 

clarify the chain of command over logistical operations in support of the 

retrograde effort, DOD stated that the current retrograde command and 

Page 37 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive results. DOD 

further commented that CENTCOM has designated the U.S. Army Central 

Command (ARCENT) as the executive agent for the retrograde process, 

and that ARCENT also has operational control of the two Army Field 

Sustainment Brigades we discuss in the report. DOD believes that the 

established liaison and supporting/supported relationships by retrograde 

support teams are achieving unity of effort in retrograding theater 

property through the regular Logistics Reposture Working Groups where 

collaboration and coordination occur. DOD further commented that, for a 

longer term solution, CENTCOM is taking steps to refine and solidify a 

theater logistics command and control structure from its current construct 

to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under the CENTCOM 

Commander. DOD stated that its plan for this new command is phased, 

conditions-based, and its execution will be coordinated within the overall 

theater posture process with appropriate DOD agencies and the military 

services. We support DOD’s and CENTCOM’s long-term plan to refine and 

solidify its command and control structure for managing and executing the 

retrograde process. In addition, we are aware that subsequent to 

completing our audit work in Kuwait and drafting our report, CENTCOM 

refined the logistical command and control structure by placing the 401st 

and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades under the operational control of 

the commanding general, Army Materiel Command, Southwest Asia. 

Although we have not had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of this 

new command arrangement, we believe it to be a significant step toward 

the attainment of unity of command over the theater provided equipment

retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not implemented a similar 

action with regard to the command and control of the ten theater property 

and retrograde support teams that facilitate the redeployment and 

retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this lack of unity of 

command over these teams makes their roles and responsibilities as they 

relate to the retrograde of equipment and materiel unclear and confusing. 

As a result, we continue to believe that DOD, in consultation with 

CENTCOM and the military departments, needs to immediately address 

the current confusion and lack of clarity regarding the command and 

control of the various commands and support teams that support the 

retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait. 

DOD fully concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary 

of Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the 

incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 

visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD 

commented that it is actively assessing various data systems used to 

maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while in transit. 

Page 38 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
DOD also provided a number of general and technical comments which we 

have incorporated in the report as appropriate. A complete copy of DOD’s 

written comments, including the department’s general and technical 

comments and our evaluation of each of those comments, is included in 

appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and

Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make 

copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who made 

key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix VII. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 39 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 41 GAO-08-930 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

begun logistical planning for the reposturing of forces from Iraq and upon 

what assumptions it based its plans, we reviewed relevant briefings, 

orders, and staff analyses relating to the logistical planning effort and 

discussed the effort with DOD officials who were directly involved. We 

met with many of these individuals several times over the course of this 

engagement either in person, telephonically, or by video teleconference.

As a result, we were able to obtain updated information that allowed us to 

discuss the means by which the logistical planning effort evolved over 

time. We also obtained copies of the briefings presented during the May 

2008 logistical summit held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as well as a copy of 

the logistical reposturing order that resulted from that summit, and met 

with many of the senior DOD officials who participated in that summit. 

The documents we obtained and officials we spoke with were from U.S. 

Transportation Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central 

Command; Multinational Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army 

Materiel Command,; Headquarters, Department of the Army; 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Central at both Fort 

McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps, Central; U.S. Army Forces Command; Headquarters, II Marine 

Expeditionary Force; Headquarters, III Corps; and the 1st Theater Support 

Command. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and 

responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and 

equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed documents from and 

interviewed officials in the organizations that were either directly 

responsible for the retrograde process or that negotiated the process. We 

also reviewed relevant DOD regulations and joint and Army doctrine 

publications. To determine how the retrograde process was actually 

executed we obtained documents and interviewed officials from 

Multinational Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel 

Command, to include the commanding general, Army Material Command, 

Southwest Asia; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia, 

and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; 

Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; the 1st Theater Support 

Command; and the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades. To gain 

insight on the experience of units that had passed through the retrograde 

process we obtained documents and interviewed officials from III Corps 

and the 1st Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, Texas, and the II Marine 

Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

During the course of this engagement we became aware of several 

challenges that could have an impact on the resposturing of U.S. forces 

from Iraq and have included a discussion of these challenges in this report 

in order to provide Congress with information it needs to effectively carry 

out its oversight functions. We based our discussion of those issues on 

documents we obtained and interviews with officials from Headquarters,

Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps; U.S. Central 

Command; U.S. Transportation Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command; 

the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command; III Corps and Fort 

Hood, Texas; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; Headquarters, II 

Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, 

Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and 1st Theater Support Command. 

We have also provided in this report several challenges facing units once 

they have returned to their home stations. As with the challenges above, 

we became aware of these issues during the course of our engagement. 

Although these issues need to be explored further, they are included in 

this report because of the impact they could have on the morale and 

welfare of service members and their families and the potential costs and 

challenges associated with rebuilding unit readiness. We became aware of 

these issues following discussions with officials from U.S. Army Forces 

Command; Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management; U.S. Army 

Medical Command; U.S. Army Installation Management Command; the 

U.S. Army Surgeon General’s Office; III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas; the 

1st Cavalry Division; and Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force.

From the fall of 2007 through the spring of 2008, we also made several 

attempts to visit Iraq to speak with officials from Multinational Force-Iraq, 

Multinational Corps-Iraq, and various organizations involved with the 

logistical aspects of reposturing. But for reasons that are not entirely clear, 

DOD stated that it was unable to accommodate these visits. However, we 

were able to mitigate our inability to visit Iraq by: 

• interviewing officials with knowledge of the logistical aspects of 

reposturing who had recently returned from tours on the MNF-I or 

MNC-I staffs; 

• visiting Headquarters, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, after it returned 

from its block leave following its return from Iraq, where III Corps 

served as Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq; 

• interviewing officials from organizations stationed in Iraq who were in 

Kuwait during our visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and 

• submitting lists of questions through U.S. Central Command for 

organizations in Iraq. 

Page 42 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Although we were not always able to obtain full answers to our list of 

questions, based on our analysis of the information we were able to obtain 

we determined that we had sufficient information to substantiate our 

findings. 

We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 43 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-08-930 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

1

DRAFT GAO REPORT “OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE DOD 

PLANNING FOR REPOSTURING OF U.S. FORCES 

FROM IRAQ,” DATED AUGUST 8, 2008 

GAO CODE 351092/GAO-08-930 

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT 

x Current retrograde efforts. As of August 2008, during fiscal year 2008, U.S. Army 

Central (ARCENT) has retrograded over 7,000 major end items back to CONUS. 

U.S. Marine Central is also successfully retrograding end items for reset. Defense 

Logistic Agency (DLA), through Defense Reutilization and Market Services in 

theater, has disposed of 175 million pounds of scrap metal. Through its transportation 

priority program, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has saved the 

Army over 40% in shipping costs by using empty cargo aircraft backhaul capability. 

x Chain of command for logistics operations in support of retrograde. Directive 

Authority for Logistics (DAFL) has not been assigned from USCENTCOM. 

USCENTCOM has designated ARCENT as the executive agent for logistics 

reposture/retrograde. In the Iraqi theater, MultiNational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) has 

established processes and procedures for addressing theater logistics issues. These 

lines of operations include basing, unit redeployment, and materiel disposition. Unity 

of effort is accomplished by working groups that have been established to collaborate 

and coordinate with joint stakeholders and partners. (Services, USCENTCOM, DLA, 

USTRANSCOM). For example, both MNF-I and MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) 

have established Logistics Reposture Working Groups. They are enduring forums 

that meet regularly with all the key logistics organizations in Iraq and Kuwait to 

address respective strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues. Two of the 

key documents are the MNF-I FRAGO 08-232 and draft MNC-I FRAGO that 

establish redeployment timelines. 

x Retrograde Support Teams are specifically addressed within these unit redeployment 

timelines. Each of the assistance teams have specific missions based on guidance and 

direction from parent commands and from operational commands in theater. Each 

assistance team is synchronized within the redeployment timeline and brings its own 

set of expertise to facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts. 

x Theater Property and Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) - The majority of 

equipment is organizational and will retrograde as a unit responsibility. Army 

Materiel Command’s (AMC) forward Field Support Brigades are responsible for 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 46 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

2

retrograde of excess theater provided equipment and assuming control of 

organizational equipment directed for sustainment-level reset. 

x In transit visibility of materiel - For Army systems, AMC, with its subordinate 

commands and the various headquarters in theater, is actively working to establish a 

Reposturing Common Operating Picture (RCOP) to mitigate the cited incompatibility 

weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and 

materiel while in transit. While significant challenges in this process remain, AMC 

has already identified system interfaces to be used. Moreover, a RCOP Working 

Group will meet regularly to establish the necessary systems interfaces and address 

procedures used for accountability, transportation scheduling and documentation, and 

equipment in-transit visibility. In addition to these efforts, USCENTCOM J4 has 

joined with JFCOM J9 to identify distribution/in-transit visibility requirements, 

processes and capability gaps to the Joint Staff J4 to support the development of intransit visibility capabilities for Joint Logistics Organizations within Global Combat 

Support System – Joint (GCSS-J). 

1. Highlight Page, second paragraph. We recommend rewording of the first four lines of 

this paragraph to more accurately portray what has occurred since May 2008. As noted 

from page 15, the draft clearly states representatives from throughout the logistics 

community and theater met as a result of the increased coordination and synchronized 

planning, and the outcome was the MNF-I publication of its overarching guidance for the 

logistics reposturing. 

2. Pages 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 25, 26, 33. There are several references to “bases” 

throughout the report, especially linked to the number 311. This does not accurately 

characterize the force laydown in Iraq. The word “bases” should be replaced by 

“locations” in most cases to reflect the true nature of the places used by U.S. forces.

3. Page 1. The draft report states, “as of July 2008, this pool of theater provided 

equipment totaled approximately 582,000 individual pieces worth about $15.5 billion.” 

Army G8 reports that, for Class VII items in Iraq only, a property book pull from the end 

of March 2008, used in a J8/OSD Study, found 173,000 items (Class VII only) worth 

approximately $16.5 billion.

4. Page 2. Recommend deletion of the sentence: “In addition, in June 2008, GAO also 

issued an assessment of progress in Iraq and called for DOD and the DOS to develop an 

updated strategy given the changing conditions.” This sentence is not relevant to the 

GAO’s objectives for this engagement, and the referenced GAO report’s conclusions 

were rebutted by DoD. 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 9. 

Page 47 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

3

5. Pages 1-3. Discussions regarding the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 

appear as a distraction from the draft report and its overall conclusions. 

6. Page 5. First paragraph, please add: “Army Headquarters G-4 began hosting 

retrograde video teleconferences (VTCs) in June 2006 and moved to monthly VTCs in 

August 2007. The purpose of the VTCs was to synchronize retrograde planning efforts. 

DLA and AMC participated in the VTCs. Starting in October 2007, Army Headquarters 

G-4 expanded the Retrograde Task Force to include OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Marine 

Corps, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and USTRANSCOM, NG, and OCAR. 

7. Page 7. Concerning capacity of military transports and convoy security assets and 

limits on the main supply route, we partially concur. We concur with the draft GAO 

report that sufficient commercial heavy equipment transports (HET) assets exists in 

theater to augment military HET assets for redeployment operations. Additionally, other 

transports such as flatbeds and lowboys, can move all but the heaviest equipment, 

reducing the need for HET transports. However, we partially concur with the statement 

regarding limits on convoy security assets. While convoy security requirements stretch 

resources, approved commercial security firms can be contracted to provide additional 

security teams that can be used for sustainment missions, freeing up military escort teams 

to support redeployment. Additionally the military has an active program that eliminates 

the requirement to provide security for low priority materials, thereby freeing up more 

military escort teams. If necessary, military units can provide security for their own 

assets as they redeploy. We concur with the GAO statement regarding insufficiency of 

mass redeployments through Kuwait, and DoD is actively engaged in increasing the 

availability and capacity of redeployment of assets through alternative ports in Jordan and 

Turkey, as well as Iraq’s own major port, Umm Qasr. Efforts are also underway to make 

greater use of the Iraq railroad and Iraqi Transportation Network, which will have the 

potential to move significant amounts of cargo to points near redeployment ports. 

8. Page 7, 37-38. Concerning the increased demand for access to mental healthcare 

providers, the draft GAO report states, “According to Army officials and GAO analysis, 

there is already a shortfall in the number of mental health providers given the rise in the 

number of mental health problems being reported by service members and their 

families.” We concur and note: MNF-I CJ1/4/8 Surgeon is following established 

procedures to ensure all service members take Post Deployment Health Assessments 30 

days prior to redeploying. Service members are required to take another Post 

Deployment Health Assessment 90-120 days after returning to CONUS and home station. 

These surveys are essential to monitor mental health throughout DoD. In addition, teams 

of mental health professionals conduct surveys in theater to keep commanders apprised 

on issues of mental health. 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 

See comment 12. 

See comment 13. 

Page 48 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

4

9. Page 12. The report states that “Despite working on the same broad set of issues, 

however, there was little coordination and communication among the three organizations. 

Moreover, both USCENTCOM, the combatant command whose area of responsibility 

includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-I, the headquarters responsible for operations in Iraq, 

provided little input and guidance to these planning efforts.” Recommend delete above 

statement and change statement to read: “The coordination was maintained at an 

informal liaison level.” The Army Sustainment Command (ASC) liaison officer at 

USCENTCOM J4 worked with ASC and USCENTCOM J4 to prepare the command for 

future reposture/retrograde efforts in July and August 2007. This assisted in preparing 

AMC’s warning order. 

10. Page 15. Recommend adding the following: “The MNF-I Logistics Reposture 

Working Group is an enduring forum with all the key logistics organizations in the Iraq 

and Kuwait theater. It meets monthly and addresses strategic, operational, and theater 

level logistics issues. It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) or Operational 

Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics related issues.” 

11. Page 15. The MNF-I FRAGO on Logistics Reposture Guidance not only addresses 

Materiel Disposition and Unit Redeployment, but also addresses basing. Recommend 

adding the following: “Basing options include a base’s closure, a transfer to the 

Government of Iraq, or a ‘shrink and share’ of a base where both Iraqis and Coalition 

forces collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.” 

12. Page 17. Regarding unity of command, although the command and control is not a 

text book joint doctrinal command and control system, it is the theater process by which 

units have redeployed successfully since the beginning of OIF. It requires constant 

management, interface, and decision making across all levels of logistics.

Deliberate/advance planning, communication via liaison officers, and collaboration are 

all essential to making the process function. 

13. Pages 6-7. We recommend deleting the footnote attached to the standards for 

environmental management and guidance for the disposition of property. Additionally, 

MNF-I has procedures in place regarding environmental management and base 

closure/return.

14. Page 6-7. In addition, MNF-I, working with MNC-I, has a base closure/return plan 

in place that has been used successfully in the past and is currently being refined as we 

engage more with the GoI on closures/returns and property transfers (real property and 

personal property). A Combined Basing Board is now in the planning phases and will 

involve the Iraqi Government for decisions on base closures/return/property transfers 

once a site has been nominated by Coalition forces to close/return. MNF-I, in 

conjunction with MNC-I, is working to limit the current environmental management 

See comment 14. 

See comment 15. 

See comment 16. 

See comment 17. 

See comment 18. 

See comment 19. 

Page 49 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

5

requirement. Although time and cost of environmental management will be difficult to 

assess, progress is being made to reduce this. Examples include: 

x There are 17 operational incinerators in Iraq, with 23 under construction or 

funded, which will reduce cost/time of burn pit management. 

x MNF-I anticipated a $54 million contract award date of September 1, 2008 for 

five Hazardous Waste Disposal Centers, which will also reduce cost/time of 

environmental management. 

15. Summary, 3rd paragraph. Delete “agreed upon standards for environmental cleanup 

and”

16. Page 7. 1st bullet. Delete “standards for environmental cleanup and.” 

17. Page 7. Delete footnote 7. 

18. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Delete “environmental clean up and.” 

19. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete “both issues are” and insert “this 

issue is.” 

20. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the fourth sentence. 

21. Page 27, 1st paragraph. Delete the last sentence (beginning with “Moreover”). 

22. Comment on Environmental Remediation (Comments 13-21 above). The draft 

report makes several assertions, both directly and by implication, relating to 

environmental remediation that are not accurate. The statements are also conclusory 

without supporting information. It is the longstanding policy of the Department of 

Defense that it does not engage in environmental remediation for the purpose of returning 

an installation to the host nation. Likewise, it is the longstanding policy of the 

Department of Defense that it does not engage in environmental remediation after return 

of an installation, other than in very limited circumstances where the remediation effort 

began prior to the decision to return and is already underway. See, e.g., DoD Instruction 

4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DoD Activities Overseas, and DoD Instruction 

4165.69, Realignment of DoD Sites Overseas. 

 It is relatively rare that a Status of Forces Agreement addresses the issue of 

environmental remediation and, without exception, none provide “standards” for such 

remediation. This is consistent with the Department’s policy that such remediation will 

not be conducted by the United States, other than pursuant to DoDI 4715.8. The issue of 

environmental remediation at installations outside the United States has been the subject 

of negotiations at numerous locations. To the extent that the United States “pays” for 

See comment 20. 

See comment 21. 

See comment 22. 

See comment 23. 

See comment 24. 

See comment 25. 

See comment 26. 

See comment 27. 

Page 50 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

6

such remediation after return, it is through the mechanism of reducing the residual value 

payment to reflect the cost of cleanup. Since the residual value payment reflects the 

current value, it is perfectly consistent with standard real estate assessment practice to 

consider the cost of any required environmental remediation as a deduction from total 

value. In fact, the requirements of DoDI 4165.69 to perform a baseline survey is 

designed to facilitate an informed discussion of the residual value in relation to any 

required environmental remediation. 

 The Department of Defense conducts environmental remediation at its locations 

outside of the United States for the purpose of protecting our personnel (and visitors) 

located on our installations. Such remediation is not conducted to comply with, e.g., the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 

which has no extraterritorial application. Such remediation is only conducted to address 

known imminent and substantial endangerments. What constitutes a known imminent 

and substantial endangerment is wholly dependent on the specific factual situation and is 

not amenable to the setting of general “standards” as is the case in the United States.

Unless the United States has agreed to be bound by host nation law, which has not 

happened in the area of environmental remediation, there is no legal “standard” to be 

applied for purposes of environmental remediation of installations being used by United 

States forces.

 It should also be noted that it is not uncommon for United States forces to be 

stationed on real property that is already contaminated by prior users. Such 

contamination frequently is discovered only after occupancy, particularly with regard to 

locations occupied during combat operations where there is rarely time or resources to 

conduct an environmental survey. 

 These comments should not be read as asserting that the Department expects to 

simply abandon hazardous materials when departing a site in a foreign location. It is also 

longstanding Departmental policy to handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner 

that conforms to practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given the 

circumstances. For instance, a site should not have solid waste (refuse) scattered around 

and, to the extent it does, the waste should be cleaned up prior to departure. Hazardous 

materials should be retrograded. Hazardous wastes should be disposed of by proper 

disposal or treatment when generated. These are standard practices required by existing 

policy and procedures. 

 The draft report’s assertions regarding establishing standards for environmental 

remediation are based on flawed assumptions and a misunderstanding of Department 

policy and practices worldwide. 

23. Comment on Environmental Management. Change “environmental cleanup” and 

“cleanup” wherever they appear to “environmental management” and “management” as 

the case may be. The situations being addressed, e.g., reducing burn pit volume by use of 

incinerators, is a management function, not cleanup function. Cleanup would be removal 

of contamination such as a chemical plume under the surface. Proper disposition of 

waste in a burn pit is actually an environmental management function (“compliance” 

See comment 28. 

Page 51 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

7

function). To avoid possible misunderstanding, the term “cleanup” should only be used 

when referring to remediation, not to disposing of waste. 

24. Page 11. Delete “FOB McKenzie”. It has been closed. 

25. Page 18. Regarding assistance teams, each of the assistance teams have specific 

missions based on guidance and direction from parent commands and from operational 

commands here in theater. Each assistance team is synchronized within the 

redeployment timeline and brings its own set of expertise to facilitate in retrograde and 

reposture efforts at specific dates. 

26. Page 18-19. Regarding base closure, MNF-I is in the process of establishing a 

Combined Basing Plan and Process. An Operational Planning Team will conduct a 

mission analysis to close, transfer, or share Coalition forces bases, and integrate and 

collaborate their efforts with the Government of Iraq.

27. Page 18, 19, 51. Change Redistribution Property Accountability Teams to 

Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPAT). 

28. Page 18. Delete. “No single organization has authority over Theater Property and 

Retrograde Support Teams.” Replace with: “AMC has Authority over Theater Property 

and Retrograde Support Teams.” The 402nd AFSB under the Army Sustainment 

Command/AMC is the C2 for all RPATs in Iraq. They also control RFATs 

(Redistribution Fly-away Assistance Teams), which remotely go where a permanent 

RPAT site is not located.

29. Page 20. Delete: “No Theater Logistical Organization has Command Authority over 

Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment in Theater.” Replace with:

“AMC has Command Authority over most units responsible for the retrograde of 

equipment in Theater.” The 402nd AFSB is responsible for retrograde in Iraq and the 

401st AFSB is responsible for retrograde in Kuwait. All of these units fall under 

AMC/ASC and the AMC Forward Commanding General is also the ARCENT/CFLCC 

C4.

30. Page 19. The report states “For example, the Joint Redeployment Support Team, 

which reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the mission of supplying customs, 

disposition, hazardous material, and transportation expertise to redeploying units and is to 

enable in-transit visibility over a unit’s materiel and equipment from its FOB to the unit’s 

home station or to an identified depot.” Comment: This statement implies that the JRST 

is executing its mission in the Iraq Theater of Operations. The concept of using JRSTs 

has not been executed because the capability already exists in theater with the 

Deployment Support Brigade. We recommend deleting this sentence. 

See comment 29. 

See comment 30. 

See comment 31. 

See comment 32. 

See comment 33. 

See comment 34. 

See comment 35. 

Page 52 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

8

31. Pages 22-25. The section titled “Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or 

Lack the Authority to Enforce Improvements to the Retrograde Process (to include 

Appendix VI)” is not accurate. Recommend the entire section and Appendix be deleted 

from the GAO report. The correct automation flow is attached. 

Retrograde Systems 

and Processes

x All items retrograded from Iraq have Radio Frequency Identification Device 

(RFID) tags attached; RFID tags provide in-transit visibility via an in transit 

visibility (ITV) system. The accountable record and visibility system used for this 

process is Standard Depot System (SDS), which is a standard wholesale system 

used by the Army. USCENTCOM’s RFID database can view the exact location of 

any item with an attached RFID tag at any time. 

x The description of the process in this section of the GAO report is incorrect. 

Below is the correct process for accountability and visibility from the war fighter 

to AMC: 

 Unit creates Army Reset Management Tool (ARMT) plan in Logistics 

Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET. 

 Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to 

life cycle management command (LCMC) for decision and disposition 

(DISPO).

 If equipment meets RESET criteria, LCMC enters what depot to ship to. 

 Equipment is electronically transferred from PBUSE (Property Book Unit 

Supply Enhanced) to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) 

via interface. 

 AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via interface. 

 Site generates Excel spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain InterDepot Transfer (IDT) from Iraq to Kuwait. 

 Upon receipt of IDT, it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID 

Tag.

See comment 36. 

Page 53 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

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9

x SDS is a standard accountability system as is Standard Army Retail Supply 

System (SARSS), and neither system tracks by serial number except for weapons 

and sensitive items. The Army War Reserve Deployment System (AWRDS) is 

used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS. AWRDS has automated 

interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and PBUSE (Property Book Unit 

Supply Enhanced) the retail system. 

x AWRDS creates the document needed to provide the LCMC with a list of items 

that require disposition. SARSS can produce an automated request for disposition, 

but it still requires manual intervention by the LCMC item managers to provide 

disposition. The reason this is manual is the LCMC must determine where to send 

items for repair-based on available work load. This process takes 72 stateside 

work hours to complete. 

x There is no loss of visibility of items being shipped out of Kuwait because the 

Global Transportation Network (GTN) has visibility of the RFID tags that are 

installed on all equipment. The IDT creates an automated Pre-Positioned Materiel 

Receipt Document (PMRD) on the gaining depot’s SDS. 

x Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping manifest, it is not required because 

all of the information on the items is available through GTN. 

x The OPORD addressed in this section was published and released on 18 Apr 08 

without proper coordination. Upon receipt of the OPORD, the 401st AFSB, 402nd

AFSB, and LOGSA Commanders raised numerous concerns with using SARSS. 

During a teleconference between ASC and the commanders, the decision was 

made to put the OPORD on hold until a decision by the ASC commanding general 

(CG) could be made. The ASC CG tasked ASC Field Support to work jointly with 

LOGSA, AMC, LCMC’s, 401st AFSB, and 402nd AFSB to review the proposed 

processes and resolve the concerns. On 23 Jul 08 a decision was made by the 

ASC CG to continue to use SDS and AWRDS, and a FRAGO was published to 

the OPORD. 

32. Page 23, 4th paragraph. We recommend rewording of this paragraph for clarity. In 

addition, that fact that the manifest does not reach the 401st until 24-48 hours after sail 

really is not an issue since the motor vessel will take at least three weeks to reach 

CONUS, leaving time for the CONUS teams to prepare to receive the materiel. 

33. Pages 25-6, final paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after “costly” and strike the 

rest of the sentence. 

34. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after “estimate” and strike 

the rest of the sentence. 

See comment 37. 

See comment 38 

See comment 39. 

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10

35. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the second sentence. 

36. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete “absent an agreement with Iraq on the disposition 

of personal property” and substitute therefore “absent a legal basis for turnover and 

agreement by Iraq to take possession.” 

37. Page 26, final paragraph. Delete the first sentence. 

38. Page 26, final paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete “For example.” 

39. Comments on SOFA (Comments 33-38 above). The draft report makes several 

assertions, both directly and by implication, relating to what is typically addressed in 

status of forces agreements (SOFA), and regarding what will or should be contained in a 

bilateral agreement with Iraq. The statements are inaccurate and misleading. 

 SOFAs are the product of bilateral negotiations. Therefore, no two are the same, nor 

do any two contain the same provisions. In particular, “base closures” are not typically 

addressed in a SOFA (or related access agreement). A “typical” SOFA (or access 

agreement) might address the following: 1) DoD access to government-owned property, 

2) DoD authorization to make improvements to such property, 3) DoD’s obligation to 

return the property, once no longer needed,; and, 4) consultation with the host nation at 

the time such property is returned regarding compensation for the residual value of any 

DoD-funded improvements to the property. It is relatively rare that a SOFA (or access 

agreement) will address in any detail the issue of “base closure” or estimates of costs of 

such closures or property returns. It also is noteworthy that SOFAs (and access 

agreements) are typically negotiated during peace time, and before DoD has any sizable 

presence and/or has been granted use of government property in the host nation. 

 Bilateral agreements with Iraq are currently under negotiation. It would be 

inappropriate to speculate what might or should be in those agreements in this report. 

 Finally, there is no legal requirement for “an agreement with Iraq on the disposition 

of personal property.” 

40. Page 27. Regarding, “Joint doctrine states that detailed planning should be done for 

contracting support and contractor integration to ensure that contractor support is fully 

integrated and on par with forces planning. Such planning should identify sources of 

supplies and services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational 

requirements,” we partially concur with this statement. Joint doctrine regarding contract 

support and contractor integration is insufficient. The Joint Staff J4 is presently 

addressing this issue by developing Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract 

Support), which combatant commands, to include USCENTCOM, reviewed and 

commented on. This joint publication, when released, will present new doctrinal 

concepts that provide much improved guidance for integrating contract support and 

management of contractors into military plans. DoD contracting personnel generally are 

not planners, and DoD lacks sufficient operational contract support planners to ensure 

See comment 40. 

See comment 41. 

See comment 42. 

See comment 43. 

See comment 44. 

See comment 45. 

See comment 45. 

Page 55 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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11

contract support and contractor integration is effectively represented in plans. In 

December 2007, OSD began to address this issue by providing joint operational contract 

support planners (JOCSPs) to each of the combatant commands, including 

USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has two JOCSPs that are reviewing concept plans 

(CONPLANS) and preparing Annex W’s (Contract Support Integration Plan). In fact, 

USCENTCOM JOCSPs have been tasked by the Joint Staff J4 to develop an Annex W 

planning template for all of DoD’s combatant commands. This template will eventually 

be incorporated into JOPES and future editions of the JP 4-10 by the Joint Staff.

Recommend changing statement to read as: “Previous joint doctrine did not effectively 

provide guidance regarding contract support and contractor integration. However, DoD 

is addressing this with Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support). 

DoD contracting personnel are generally not experienced planners and combatant 

commands did not effectively integrate contract support and contractor integration into 

military plans. However, OSD recently addressed this issue by providing combatant 

commands with Joint Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSPs). JOCSPs are 

developing contractor support integration plans and contractor management plans, and 

integrating them into the combatant commands plans.”

41. Page 28-33. Regarding guidance and plans for reposture of contractors from Iraq, 

the draft GAO report states “As of July 2008, reposture planning did not include a 

theater-wide plan for the reposture of approximately 149,400 contractors in Iraq, more 

than half of whom (58%) were U.S. citizens or third country nationals. Reposture 

planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it is the largest logistical support contract 

in Iraq. However, challenges remain in the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP 

contractor personnel.” We partially concur and provide the following: 

x The LOGCAP contractor (KBR) has base closing Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOP) that will follow MNF-I and MNC-I base closure planning and includes plans 

for contractor personnel. KBR’s SOP has been developed from previous base 

closings and updated with lessons learned.

x For planning integration, LOGCAP forward Liaison office (LNO) maintains a 

military officer at the Colonel level who focuses on MNF-I reposture planning 

groups; there is also a LNO in MNC-I C4 who facilitates theater reposture planning. 

x For accountability, the LOGCAP contractor force protection issue is calculated 

throughout the reposture process as troop strengths are phased from the base. 

42. Concerning accountability and disposition of contractor managed government owned 

property, GAO states “According to DOD officials, the largest portion of all CMGO 

property in Iraq, $3.37 billion (96%) falls under LOGCAP. The Army’s analysis 

indicates that approximately 85% of all CMGO property in Iraq will be transferred, sold, 

or scrapped in Iraq when U.S. forces reposture, while the remaining 15% can be sold or 

See comment 46. 

See comment 47. 

Page 56 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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reused elsewhere. Three challenges remain: the need to determine FMV of CMGO and 

resolving any security restrictions, the time consuming & labor intensive task of 

accounting for and determining disposition of CMGO - transfer from contractor to 

military records, joint inventories, and DLA may not have sufficient data to adequately 

plan capacity at theater DRMOs).” We concur and provide the following: MNF-I 

FRAGO 08-232 published in May 08 includes CMGO property in its materiel disposition 

process, a CMGO FRAGO and MNC-I C4 FRAGO provides amplifying guidance on 

CMGO property, and while accountability of property is an on-going issue, progress is 

being made in improving the process and identifying excess materiel and equipment for 

reposture. DLA is also conducting on-site surveys of its four DRMO sites in Iraq, and it 

is included in the deliberate planning with reference to base closure and transfer.

43. Page 29. Recommend adding the following sentences in quotes as an update to 

donation threshold authority. Several DoD organizations have already begun planning 

for the disposition of excess contractor-managed property from Iraq. For example, in 

October 2007, DoD increased the donation threshold for all excess U.S. owned personal 

property in Iraq from $5,000 to $10,000 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I.

Add the following: “In June 2008, DoD (DUSD, Logistics and Materiel Readiness) 

increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as donation authority) for all U.S.-

owned excess personal property in Iraq from $10,000 to $15,000. This DoD memo is a 

tiered authority which provides commanders greater flexibility and more decisionmaking capability at their respective levels.”

44. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the arrow labeled “sale” and pointed to 

“DRMS” be deleted. If an item is slated for sale or prepositioned stock, the sale will not 

cause the item to go the DRMS.

45. Page 30, Figure 2. If an “over $5000” item is not needed by military or contractors 

globally, there is an arrow showing it going to DRMS. However, the policy provides that 

before such an item would go to DRMS, an attempt will be made to donate the item to 

the Government of Iraq. This step needs to be included and shown in Figure 2.

See comment 48. 

See comment 49. 

See comment 50. 

Page 57 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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13

(Proposed change to Figure 2, Page 30)

46. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the box labeled “MNC-I determines others’ 

needs in theater” should be rewritten to state “MNF-I/MNC-I team determines others’ 

needs in theater.”

47. Page 31. The report states that “DoD officials assert that completing this inventory 

will require planning, travel to storage locations, and physically staging the property for 

easier counting, which is time consuming.” However, the policy assumes that the 

inventory will take place where the property is and that property will not be moved and 

stored solely to enable inventory and counting actions. The policy does not envision 

movement and storage for counting and, in fact, specifies a streamlined process (i.e. early 

donations of low value items) to aid in minimizing time requirements. We partially 

concur that, in general, the task will be time consuming and labor intensive even without 

the additional movement and storage being asserted. While a move for counting may on 

occasion be necessary, depending on the number of days allowed to clear a base, it is 

expected to be the exception and not the rule. 

48. Page 53, paragraph 1. Entire statement is inaccurate: Please see attached slides.

Below is the process for accountability and visibility from the War Fighter to AMC: 

1. Unit creates ARMT (Army Reset Management Tool) plan in Logistics 

Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET. 

2. Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to the 

Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) for decision and disposition. 

Needed by 

Military or 

Contractors 

Globally 

GOI

Wants? DRMS

no

GOI

no

yes 

(Remove) 

See comment 51. 

See comment 52. 

See comment 53. 

Page 58 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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14

3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to. 

4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced) 

electronically to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) via 

interface.

5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for Standard Depot System (SDS) 

electronically via interface. 

6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain IDT Inter 

Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait. 

7. Upon receipt of IDT it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID Tag. 

SDS is a standard accountability system, as is SARSS, and neither system tracks by serial 

number except for weapons and sensitive items. AWRDS is used to track the serial 

number in tandem with SDS. AWRDS has automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale 

system, and PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced), the retail system. 

49. Page 54, paragraph 1. The AWRDS creates the document needed to provide the 

LCMC with a list of items that require disposition. SARSS can produce an automated 

request for disposition, but it still requires manual intervention by the LCMC item 

managers to provide disposition. The reason this is manual is the LCMC must determine 

where to send items for repair based on available work load. This process takes 72 

stateside work hours to complete. 

50. Page 54, paragraph 2. Visibility over the items being shipped out of Kuwait is never 

lost, as the Global Transportation Network has visibility of the RFID tags that are 

installed on all equipment. The IDT (Inter-Depot-Transfer) creates an automated PMRD 

(Pre-Positioned Materiel Receipt Document) on the gaining depots SDS. 

51. Page 54, paragraph 3. Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping manifest, this is 

not required, as all of the information on the items is available through GTN.

52. As a general comment, the Department has an exiting data sharing strategy (DoD 

Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004) that provides policy responsibility to implement 

data sharing throughout the Department of Defense. Communities of interest, which 

have cross cutting data sharing interests, should be established when there is a need and 

should be used to implement viable solutions for data sharing strategies and solutions for 

their functional areas. 

See comment 54. 

See comment 55. 

See comment 56. 

See comment 57. 

Page 59 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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Retrograde Process Flow Using

SDS/AWRDS

Manual Process

Automated Process

Unit LOGSA LCMC AFSB Iraq AFSB Kuwait ASC

Potential SDR Process Owner

S Processing Time

S=Start

# Note

Proposed

SDDC WPS

Movement

To CONUS

S+5

3

5 4

ARI/TPE

ARMT

Plan

Created

Unit Turns

In to RPAT

Unit

PBUSE To

AWRDS

AWRDS To

SDS

IDT

Requested

Off Line

IDT

Received

IDT

Processed

Dropped

From SDS

RFID Tag

Created

AWRDS

Offered To

SDDC For

Movement

To Kuwait

AG Cleaned Offered To

Custom

Clearance

S S+2 S+5 S+5

S+5 S+7 S+5 S+7

S+7 S+8 S+25 S+25

1

6

2

7

Provides

DISPO For

Depot

ARMT

Notifies

LCMC For

DISPO

Page 60 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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Retrograde Process Flow as Designed

(Continued)

1. Unit creates ARMT plan in LIW nominating equipment for RESET.

2. LOGSA sends ARMT data electronically to LCMC for decision and 

DISPO.

3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to.

4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE electronically to AWRDS via 

interface.

5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via interface.

6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain IDT 

Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.

7. Upon receipt of IDT it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID 

Tag.

Page 61 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
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Comment 1: We recognize DOD’s retrograde efforts as of August 2008. No

change required. 

Comment 2: We are aware that subsequent to completing our audit work 

in Kuwait and drafting our report, CENTCOM refined the logistical 

command and control structure in June 2008 by placing the 401st and 

402nd Army Field Support Brigades under the operational control of the 

commanding general, Army Materiel Command, Southwest Asia. Although 

we have not had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of this new 

command arrangement, we believe it to be a significant step toward the 

attainment of unity of command over the theater provided equipment 

retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not implemented a similar 

action with regard to the command and control of the eight of the ten 

theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the 

redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this lack 

of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and

responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and materiel

unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe that DOD, in 

consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, needs to 

immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity regarding 

the command and control of the various commands and teams that 

support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait. 

GAO’s Responses to 

DOD’s Technical 

Comments 

Comment 3: As we discussed in this report, five of the ten theater property 

and retrograde support teams assist units during the redeployment and 

retrograde process and in our report we briefly outline some of the actions

for which they provide assistance in accordance with MNF-I’s 180-day 

redeployment template (see table 1 of this report and the accompanying

narrative). In addition, we provide more detail on each of the team’s 

missions and higher headquarters in appendix IV of this report. No change 

required. 

Comment 4: DOD commented that “The majority of equipment is 

organizational and will retrograde as a unit responsibility.” However, 

according to DOD officials we interviewed during this engagement, and 

who have direct oversight over the property books, the majority of 

equipment in Iraq, some 80 percent, is theater provided equipment. No 

change required. 

Comment 5: We recognize DOD is making efforts to improve In-transit 

visibility of materiel. No change required. 

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Comment 6: See comment 2. No change required. 

Comment 7: Except where required for purposes of clarity and accuracy 

we have substituted the word “installation” or “installations” for “base” or 

“location.” 

Comment 8: Based upon subsequent analysis and communication with 

subject matter experts, we updated the information in this paragraph to 

reflect new data. 

Comment 9: Although DOD disagreed with GAO’s recommendation in the 

report in question, the intent of this reference is to provide for the reader a 

broader context in which the present report should be considered. 

Comment 10: The purpose of the discussion regarding the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is to provide background 

information about DOD’s reporting requirements and to demonstrate that, 

given the challenges to reposturing outlined in this report, Congress might 

elect to modify those reporting requirements. 

Comment 11: During the course of this engagement we met with 

representatives from a variety of organizations in order to determine the 

extent to which DOD has begun its logistical planning for the reposturing 

of forces from Iraq (see appendix I, scope and methodology). Although it 

is possible that some preliminary discussions regarding reposturing, 

redeployment, or retrograde operations may have occurred prior to the 

time outlined in this report, based on our meetings with DOD officials, the 

documents they provided us, and our analysis we determined that 

planning for the reposturing of post-surge forces from Iraq began in the 

fall of 2007 and that those planning efforts were not coordinated until May 

2008. No change required. 

Comment 12: According to Army officials responsible for planning and 

executing convoy operations in Iraq and Kuwait, the number of HETs, 

convoy security assets, and crews to operate these assets were factors that 

limit the number of convoys that can be run given standard operating 

procedures current as of June 2008. The existence of potential mitigation

strategies–such as using private security contractors, eliminating the 

requirement to provide security for low priority materials, and military 

units providing their own security–does not change the fact that the 

factors we outlined in this report remain limiting factors. No change 

required. 

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Comment 13: We recognize DOD’s interests to increase mental health 

surveillance for returning service members. No change required. 

Comment 14: We met with representatives from a variety of organizations

several times over the course of this engagement either in person, 

telephonically, or by video teleconference (see appendix I, scope and

methodology). As a result, we were able to obtain updated information 

that allowed us to discuss the means by which the logistical planning 

effort evolved over time. Based on these interviews and the information 

and documents we obtained during these meetings, our analysis indicates 

that despite working on the same broad set of issues, until late 2007 there

was little coordination among Army Materiel Command, the Defense 

Logistics Agency, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Moreover, 

according to CENTCOM officials, with whom we met in February 2008, 

they, too, were waiting on input from MNF-I, and, according to officials 

representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was “close hold” in that 

headquarters until after the MNF-I commander’s congressional testimony 

in April 2008. 

Comment 15: To provide more details and context to the discussion, we 

changed the text to incorporate DOD’s additional information. 

Comment 16: See comment 15. 

Comment 17: We agree that the logistical command and control 

arrangement is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control 

system. However, based on our analysis of joint doctrine and information 

obtained from officials in the organizations that were either directly 

responsible for the retrograde process or that negotiated the process, we 

determined that the resulting lack of a unified or coordinated command 

structure is not only inconsistent with joint doctrine, it also increases 

confusion and causes inefficiencies in the retrograde process and inhibits 

the adoption of identified mitigation initiatives. No change required. 

Comment 18: For purposes of clarity, we deleted the footnote. As 

discussed in this report, CENTCOM has procedures in place regarding 

environmental management and property disposition during base 

closure/return. Furthermore, as we explain in this report, according to 

DOD officials responsible for executing environmental management and 

base closure/return in Iraq, these officials had not, as of May 2008, 

received guidance detailed enough to predict the time and cost 

requirements of executing the environmental management and property 

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disposition tasks that may be associated with base closure/return. See also

comment 27. 

Comment 19: See comment 18. 

Comment 20: We believe that DOD comments 20 and 21 are duplicate 

comments, no change required; see comment 21. 

Comment 21: We changed “standards” to “guidance.” See comment 27. 

Comment 22: As DOD suggested, we deleted the footnote. See comment 

18. 

Comment 23: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning the 

potential environmental management of installations in Iraq that may be 

closed as a result of reposturing. No change required. 

Comment 24: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning for both 

the potential disposition of personal property located on installations in 

Iraq and the potential environmental management of these installations. 

No change required. 

Comment 25: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 

potential disposition of personal property located on installations in Iraq. 

Comment 26: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 

potential environmental management of installations in Iraq. No change

required. 

Comment 27: We disagree with DOD’s comments that we made incorrect 

assertions about environmental remediation, that we made flawed 

assumptions regarding remediation, or that we have a misunderstanding of

the department’s policies and practices. GAO is not making specific 

assertions regarding these issues. Rather, we are reporting that, as of May 

2008, Army officials responsible for planning for logistical reposturing 

operations were considering these issues and that these considerations 

affected their planning. The information in this section accurately reflects 

May 2008 statements made by the Army officials responsible for both 

planning and executing environmental remediation operations in Iraq. 

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Moreover, according to CENTCOM guidance all hazardous material and

waste is to be removed or remediated from installations in Iraq used by 

U.S. forces. In May 2008, ARCENT officials responsible for planning the 

potential environmental management of installations in Iraq stated that 

they had not received sufficiently specific guidance from their higher 

headquarters with regard to environmental remediation on installations in 

Iraq that may be closed as a result of reposturing. While they expected

such guidance to be part of a future bilateral agreement between the U.S. 

and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current planning purposes 

was the set of standards used in the U.S. for similar types of remediation 

practices. These officials explained that, in the absence of such guidance 

guidance, it is common practice to use such U.S. standards when planning

and executing environmental remediation of foreign installations used by 

U.S. forces. This explanation is confirmed by DOD’s comment that “It is 

also longstanding Departmental policy to handle hazardous materials and 

waste in a manner that conforms to practice in the United States, to the 

extent feasible given the circumstances.” These Army officials also 

explained that until they received such guidance on environmental 

remediation, they may have difficulty estimating the time and cost of 

cleaning these installations. In another comment on this report, DOD 

concurs, stating that the “time and cost of environmental management [of 

installations in Iraq] will be difficult to assess.” 

In regard to language used in the report, we have changed some terms for 

the purposes of clarity. We have changed “standards” to “guidance” and

“status of forces agreements” to “bilateral agreements,” where appropriate. 

Comment 28: We changed “environmental cleanup” and “cleanup” to 

“management,” where appropriate. See comment 27. 

Comment 29: We updated figure 1 accordingly. 

Comment 30: See comment 3. 

Comment 31: See comment 18. 

Comment 32: According to Annex D of MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, summary 

attached as Appendix IV of this report, RPAT(s) stands for Redistribution 

Property Assistance Team(s). No change required. 

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Comment 33: DOD maintains that Army Materiel Command has authority 

over theater property and retrograde support teams and lists one such 

team for which this is the case. We agree that AMC exercises command 

authority over two of these teams. However, according to documents 

obtained from ARCENT and MNF-I, there are ten such teams and 

command authority over these teams is distributed among various 

organizations (see appendix IV of this report). No change required. 

Comment 34: See comment 2. 

Comment 35: DOD contends that our statement about the Joint 

Redeployment Support Team implies that the team is executing its mission

in the Iraqi theater of operations and that the concept of using this team 

has not been executed because the capability already exists in theater with 

the Deployment Support Brigade. However, in a briefing given during the 

May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, ARCENT listed the 

Joint Redeployment Support Team as a team available to assist units and 

commanders with redeployment and retrograde of materiel and 

equipment, despite the fact that at the time of the briefing the team had 

not yet been sourced with personnel. In addition, in its Logistics Reposture 

Guidance (MNF-I FRAGO 08-232) MNF-I makes specific mention of the

use of this team as it relates to redeployment and retrograde operations 

and delineates the specific mission for which this team is responsible (see 

appendix IV). In neither case is there any mention of the Deployment 

Support Brigade undertaking the mission outlined for the Joint 

Redeployment Support Team. No change required. 

Comment 36: GAO has recently reported that DOD's Radio Frequency 

Identification (RFID) system is an emerging technology and continues to 

experience many implementation challenges. While not the focus of this 

report, DOD continues to experience issues with rates of error in the 

reading of RFID tags even while mandating the increased use of the tags. 

However, at this time, GAO does not believe that RFID is a reliable means

for ensuring visibility over in-transit equipment and materiel. 

We also recognize DOD’s efforts to improve the in-transit visibility of 

supplies. Yet, the description of the retrograde process for theater 

provided equipment contained in this report is based on GAO’s site visit to 

Kuwait in May 2008. The description was validated by the responsible 

subject matter experts at the 401st Army Field Support Brigade as 

accurately depicting the systems used to manage the equipment as well as

the difficulties encountered during shipment. In addition, official emails 

and tracking documents indicated that significant amounts of equipment 

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were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. Moreover, in 

DOD’s official comments to this report, they concur with our 

recommendation to correct the incompatibility weaknesses in the various 

data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while 

they are in transit. DOD’s general comments indicate that the process has 

changed and they provided us with a map of their proposed process as 

well as the July 23, 2008, order directing the use of Standard Depot System 

and Army War Reserve Deployment System to resolve issues with 

maintaining accountability and visibility and reducing the time for 

disposition instructions. However, this order will not be implemented until 

8 September, 2008 and we have not yet been able to evaluate the 

effectiveness of the new process. No changes required. 

Comment 37: See comment 36. 

Comment 38: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by Army officials responsible for both planning and 

executing installation hand-over operations. No change required. 

Comment 39: According to CENTCOM policy, all bunkers, trenches, 

fighting positions, and force protection barriers are considered to be 

personal property and will be removed from installations. Additionally, in 

May 2008, DOD officials responsible for planning for the potential 

disposition of such property located on installations in Iraq stated that 

while they expected more specific guidance on the disposition of personal 

property to be part of a future bilateral agreement between the U.S. and 

Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current planning purposes was 

CENTCOM’s policy. These DOD officials also explained that until they 

received more specific guidance on the disposition of such personal 

property, they may have difficulty estimating the time and cost of 

disposition. See also comment 27. No change required. 

Comment 40: See comment 27. 

Comment 41: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 

disposition of personal property from installations. No change required.

Comment 42: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 

statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the 

potential disposition of personal property located on installations in Iraq 

and the potential environmental remediation on these installations. No 

change required. 

Page 68 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Comment 43: See comment 42. 

Comment 44: See comment 24. In addition, with regard to the discussion 

of bilateral agreements, our report accurately reflects May 2008 statements

made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the potential 

disposition of personal property located on installations in Iraq and the 

potential environmental remediation on these installations. Moreover, 

GAO is not speculating on the potential existence or contents of any 

bilateral agreement(s) between the U.S. and Iraq, or any potential legal 

requirement for such an agreement. Rather, we are reporting that, as of 

May 2008, Army officials responsible for planning for logistical reposturing 

operations were considering that such an agreement(s) may exist in the 

future and that these considerations affected their planning. No change

required. 

Comment 45: We concur with DOD’s assessment that CENTCOM did not 

effectively integrate contract support and contractor integration into its 

planning efforts for the logistics of reposturing. We also acknowledge that 

developing Joint Publication 4-10 and providing combatant commands 

with Joint Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSPs) indicate 

potential progress in addressing the current challenges that CENTCOM 

faces in regard to effectively integrating contract support and contractor 

integration into its planning efforts. However, GAO has investigated 

neither the potential implementation of 4-10 nor the activities of 

CENTCOM’s JOCSPs and thus cannot assess whether progress has been 

made in this area, or adopt the text suggested by CENTCOM. It is 

important to note that the paragraph DOD cites in this comment has 

changed due to subsequent communication between GAO and DOD 

subject matter experts. However, there is no change required in response 

to DOD’s comment. 

Comment 46: It is important to note that the paragraph DOD quotes in its 

comment has changed due to subsequent communication between GAO 

and DOD subject matter experts. However, we have three responses to 

this DOD comment. First, KBR is the LOGCAP contractor. Thus, while a 

KBR base-closure SOP may be useful in LOGCAP reposturing planning, its 

existence does not address the lack of theater-wide reposturing planning.

The later is CENTCOM’s responsibility, not KBR’s. Second, the LOGCAP 

program has had these two positions involved in reposturing planning 

since the Spring of 2008. While this coordination is facilitating LOGCAP 

reposturing planning, the challenges explained in our report existed 

despite this coordination. Third, our report did not address the specific 

issue of contractor force protection and so we cannot assess the 

Page 69 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

significance of such a calculation. There is no change required in response 

to DOD’s comment. 

Comment 47: We acknowledge DOD’s concurrence. No change required. 

Comment 48: Based upon additional information provided by DOD, we 

added the first sentence. However, we were not able to assess whether the

memo is a “tiered authority which provides commanders greater flexibility 

and more decision making capability at their respective levels.” We 

therefore did not add the second sentence. 

Comment 49: For clarity purposes, we changed figure 2. 

Comment 50: See comment 49. 

Comment 51: See comment 49. 

Comment 52: In this sentence, “travel” refers to officials traveling to sites 

in order to complete inventories, not to the travel of property. No change 

required. 

Comment 53: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 54: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 55: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 56: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 57: We recognize DOD’s existing data sharing strategy provides 

policy responsibility to implement data sharing through the department. 

No change required. 

Page 70 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix III: Department of Defense Classes 

of Supply 

Page 71 GAO-08-930 

Appendix III: Department of Defense Classes 

of Supply 

Class of

Supply Name Explanation

Class I Subsistence Class I is subsistence materiel ranging from military-specification rations to 

commercial food items. 

Class II Clothing, Individual 

Equipment, and Tools 

Class II is composed of organizational clothing and individual equipment, such as 

tentage and individual weapons; consumable items such as tools and administrative 

and housekeeping supplies; and industrial supplies such as cable, rope, screws, and 

bolts. 

Class III Petroleum, Oils, and 

Lubricants (POL) 

Class III Includes bulk and packaged POL; hydraulic and insulating oils, 

preservatives, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicing and antifreeze compounds, 

and components and additives of such products; and liquid and compressed gases, 

natural gas, coal, and electricity. Bulk fuel, the major Class III commodity, is 

propulsion fuel for aircraft, ships, and vehicles. 

Class IV Construction Materiel Class IV includes all construction raw materials and fortification and barrier items 

such as lumber, wire, and sandbags. 

Class V Ammunition Class V materiel consists of munitions of all types; bullets and projectiles, bombs, 

explosives, land mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, propellants, and their 

associated items. 

Class VI Personal Demand Items Class VI materiel includes various nonmilitary health, comfort, and recreational items 

procured and managed by the Service exchanges, as well as Service morale, 

welfare, and recreation organizations 

Class VII Major End Items Class VII is composed of major war fighting equipment that constitutes the combat 

forces. Class VII includes ships, aircraft, missiles, tanks, launchers, and vehicles that 

are normally procured by the individual Service acquisition commands as part of 

major acquisition programs. 

Class VIII Medical Materiel Class VIII consists of pharmaceutical, medical and surgical supplies and materiel, 

and medical equipment, including medical-specific repair parts, medical gases, blood, 

and blood products. 

Class IX Repair Parts Class IX includes all repair parts, except medical equipment parts. 

Class X Materiel for Nonmilitary 

Programs 

Class X items support nonmilitary programs such as economic and agricultural 

development, civic action, and various relief and education programs. Class X also 

includes any items that are not included under other classes. 

Source: Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix IV: Theater Property and 

Retrograde Support Teams 

Page 72 GAO-08-930 

Appendix IV: Theater Property and 

Retrograde Support Teams 

Team Mission Higher HQ and C2 

Materiel Redistribution 

Team (MRT) 

Conducts identification, documentation, and coordinates disposition 

and movement of excess class II, III(P), IV, VIII, and IX. 

Direct Support to 316th 

Expeditionary Support Command; 

under tactical control of ARCENT

through Task Force 586* 

Redistribution Property 

Assistance Team 

(RPAT) 

Facilitates the expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII Theater 

Provided Equipment (TPE), improves property accountability, and 

enables asset visibility of the received equipment. 

Direct Support to 402nd Army Field 

Support Brigade; under tactical 

control of ARCENT through Task 

Force 586* 

Defense Remediation 

Team (DRT) 

Assists units in sorting and creating documentation for property during 

shipment and turn-in to a Defense Reutilization Marketing Office. 

Defense Logistics Agency through 

the Defense Reutilization and

Marketing Services Officer-inCharge - Iraq 

Deployment and 

Distribution Support 

Team (DDST)

Provides units in Iraq with Unit Movement Officer refresher course. 

Assists in building movement plans for organizational and RESET 

equipment, hazardous material documentation, blocking and bracing, 

and container safety inspections. 

Surface Deployment and 

Distribution Command through the 

840th Deployment Distribution

Support Battalion 

Joint Redeployment 

Support Team (JRST) 

Facilitates the return of forces in order to reset combat capability for 

future operations. Combines and synchronizes the efforts of the other 

support teams to prepare accurate Joint Planning and Execution 

System data. 

U.S. Transportation Command

Inventory Property 

Assistance Team 

(IPAT) 

Tracks shortages and excess. Manages and maintains “virtual 

warehouses.” Provides redistribution instructions and tracks

redistribution; tracks operational needs statement, joint urgent 

operational needs statements and solutions for them. 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq

Organizational Property 

Assistance Team 

(OPAT) 

Coordinates for redistribution and facilitates the transfer of Department 

of the Army G3 (Operations) designated TPE and manages Category 

V listing published by DA. 

Theater Property Book Officer (2nd 

Battalion, 402nd Army Field 

Support Brigade) 

Reset Team Provides unit training on Department of the Army/Army Materiel 

Command RESET program and Automated RESET Management 

Tool. 

Army Material Command through 

the Army Sustainment Command 

and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army 

Field Support Brigade in Iraq

Reset Fly Away Team 

(RFAT) 

Expedites RESET planning and shipping of Life Cycle Management 

Command specific priority RESET equipment. 

Army Material Command through 

the Army Sustainment Command 

and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army 

Field Support Brigade in Iraq

Marine LOGCOM

Retrograde Team (LRT) 

Receives, stores, and prepares for shipment and redistributes excess 

principle end items to fill home station equipment shortfalls or to 

depots to be repaired for further redistribution to the operating forces. 

Marine Corps Logistics Command 

(Forward) 

Source: GAO analysis of Multi-National Forces-Iraq data. 

a

The MRTs and RPATs have a complex command. Both of these teams are sourced with Air Force 

Personnel under Task Force 586, an Air Force headquarters. However, both teams are under the 

tactical control of ARCENT, which exercises that tactical control through Task Force 586. Moreover, 

because the RPAT is in direct support to the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in Iraq, Army Materiel

Command also has some control over this asset which it exercises through its subordinate command,

Army Sustainment Command. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure 

Throughput Model 

Page 73 GAO-08-930 

Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure 

Throughput Model 

Department of Defense (DOD) officials have developed a model that 

approximates the volume of equipment and materiel that can flow through 

the Iraqi theater of operations logistics infrastructure and the rate at which 

that infrastructure can sustain this flow.1

 In summary, the model states the 

theater logistics infrastructure can sustain the deployment and 

redeployment of no more than a total of five brigades’ worth of equipment

and materiel in and out of Iraq per month. Specifically, DOD has modeled 

two scenarios (see table 2, below). In the first, the deployment and 

retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and materiel are prioritized. In the 

second scenario, the deployment and retrograde of TPE and unit 

equipment and materiel are balanced with the retrograde of non-unit 

stocks, such as containers of supplies. In both scenarios, the 1st Theater 

Support Command can sustain the delivery of a certain amount of Class I 

(food, water) and Class III-B (packaged petroleum products such as motor 

oil) to forces in Iraq. 

Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment 

Support logistics activity Scenario oneaScenario Twob

Sustainment of Forces in Iraq 7 sustainment convoys to and returning 

from Iraq, per day 

7 sustainment convoys to and returning 

from Iraq, per day 

Deploying Unit Equipment, Materiel 2.5 brigade equivalents, 

per month 

2.0 brigade equivalents, 

per month 

Redeploying TPE, or Unit Equipment, 

Materiel 

2.5 brigade equivalents, 

per month 

2.0 brigade equivalents, 

per month 

Redeploying Non-Unit Theater Stocks None 1.0 brigade equivalent, per month 

Source: GAO analysis.

a

Scenario one prioritizes the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of theater provided equipment, unit 

equipment, and materiel. 

b

Scenario two balances the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of theater provide equipment, unit 

equipment, and materiel with non-unit theater stocks. 

According to DOD officials and documents, the model is based on three 

types of brigades: heavy or Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT/SBCT); 

infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT); and separate brigades (BDE SEP). 

For each brigade type DOD planners compiled unit property book data, 

added an additional 20 percent to the equipment totals to account for 

theater provided equipment, and then used the resulting brigade types in 

detailed planning for key phases of the redeployment and retrograde 

process such as convoy and wash rack operations. According to DOD 

officials, in this manner they were able to approximate the redeployment 

 1

GAO did not verify the accuracy of this model. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure 

Throughput Model 

Page 74 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom 

and retrograde requirements and time frames for each type brigade. For 

example, the model assumes that a heavy or Stryker brigade combat team 

has almost twice the number of vehicles found in a separate brigade, and 

thus, requires almost 25 percent more convoys to retrograde these 

vehicles and almost double the amount of time on the wash racks. 

Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment, by 

Unit Type 

Unit type 

Planning factors HBCT / SBCT IBCT BDE SEP 

Vehicles in Unit 1,600 1,240 830 

TEU (containers) in unit2 170 220 270 

Convoy packages 46 42 37 

Wash rack days 7 5.5 4 

Source: GAO analysis. 

According to DOD officials, the predictive power of the rate-of-flow model 

is limited, and thus, it should not be used to calculate the minimum 

amount of time required to redeploy the total amount of equipment 

currently in Iraq. They explained that while the model assumes units are 

redeploying with a full set of equipment, the actual amount of equipment 

and materiel that needs to be transported, cleaned, inspected, and loaded 

onto ships will vary with each unit moving through the system. This means 

that in any given period of time, the actual amount of equipment and 

materiel being redeployed may be different than the amounts assumed in 

the model. For example, according to DOD officials, in the first quarter of 

fiscal year 2008 the theater logistical infrastructure was able to deploy an 

average of two brigades into Iraq and redeploy an average of three 

brigades out of Iraq each month. In addition, DOD officials have stated 

that during a period lasting about 1 month—from late November 2008 to 

early January 2009—four units will redeploy. They explained that this is 

possible because two of the units are leaving Iraq with only containers and 

the other two are redeploying with relatively little of their own equipment, 

having used mostly TPE while in theater. These two examples indicate 

that while the theater throughput model may provide planners with an 

estimate of the theater’s deployment and redeployment/retrograde 

 

2

DOD uses both military and commercial containers to ship and store supplies. Because 

most military containers are 20-feet long, and many commercial containers are 40-feet long, 

DOD uses 20-foot equivalent units (TEU) as a way to measure the total volume of 

containers in its inventory. One 20-foot container equals one TEU; one 40-foot container 

equals two TEU. 
Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure 

Throughput Model 

Page 75 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom 

capacity, the model should not be used to predict the number of actual 

units that can redeploy during any 1 month period.
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping 

Excess Theater Provided Equipment 

Page 76 GAO-08-930 

Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping 

Excess Theater Provided Equipment 

The current process for retrograding certain excess theater provided 

equipment (TPE) from Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit 

visibility. This is caused by the frequent manual manipulation of data. 

According to Department of Defense’s (DOS’s) Supply Chain Materiel 

Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their 

materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable 

support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war.1

 In 

addition, DOD components are required to implement material 

management functions using commercial, off-the-shelf items or DOD 

standard data systems, as well as ensure timely, accurate in-transit asset 

information and maintain visibility and accountability over items in the 

pipeline.2

 Moreover, DOD components should implement and maintain 

supply chain material management systems to provide a timely and 

complete process.3

Figure 5 below describes the physical and data networks for Class VII 

TPE—including manual data transfers and key organizations—involved in

the process. 

 1

DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation Chapter 1, § 

C1.3.1.1, (May 23, 2003). 

2

See DOD 4140.1-R, § C1.3.1, § C1.3.2 and § C5.8. 

3

See DOD 4140.1-R, § C7.1. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping 

Excess Theater Provided Equipment 

Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided Equipment 

Note: Processes in grey require manual manipulation of equipment data.

Input

to AWRDS

Input to

Standard Depot

System

Request

Equipment

Disposition

Instructions

Disposition Instructions

Issued by Life Cycle

Management Command

Visibility reestablished

24 to 48 hours after vessel

leaves by

manifest

Disposition

input into

system

Inter Depot

Transfer

Accountability System

Visibility System

Acronyms

RPAT: Redistribution Property 

Assistance Team

AFSB: Army Field Sustainment

Brigade

AWRDS: Army War Reserve 

Depot System

Transfer to 

RPAT 

using Property 

Book Unit 

Supply 

Enhanced

Equipment data

removed from 

AWRDS

Material

Release

Order

Transfer

from RPAT 

to 401st 

AFSB

Turn in equipment

to RPAT in Iraq

401stAFSB receives

equipment in Kuwait

Equipment cleaned 

and stored 

in sterile yard to await 

disposition instructions

Equipment 

loaded 

on vessel for 

shipment

Physical Network

Data Network

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Currently, when Class VII theater provided equipment is transferred from 

the owning unit to one of the Retrograde Property Assistance Teams4

supporting the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) in Iraq, the 

accountability data for the equipment are transferred from the unit to the 

402nd AFSB using the Army’s Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced 

system5 as shown in figure 5. Once the equipment moves to Kuwait, 

however, the 401st AFSB, which receives the equipment, must undertake 

two concurrent manual processes to establish accountability and visibility 

 4

The Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPATs) facilitate the expedient turn-in of all 

excess Class VII, theater provided equipment (TPE), improve property accountability, and 

enable asset visibility of the received equipment. RPATs operate at six permanent locations 

throughout the theater Area of Operations (AO) to accomplish this mission. 

5

Army documents stated that the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced is the Army’s Webbased property accountability system that provides real-time total asset visibility 

throughout all levels of Army management and secures transfers to the Standard Army

Retail Supply System. Additionally, it is a Standard Army Information Management System. 

Page 77 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping 

Excess Theater Provided Equipment 

for the equipment. Accountability is established by manually entering 

equipment data into the Standard Depot System (SDS). However, SDS 

tracks equipment by the total number of items, not individual serial 

numbers. Hence a second manual entry is made into the Army War 

Reserve Depot System (AWRDS) to provide visibility over each item by 

serial number. AWRDS—a non-standard Army information management 

system—was originally designed to provide visibility over Army prepositioned equipment sets, but it has been modified to support SDS.6

 This 

is contrary to DOD guidance that accountability and visibility should be 

established using standard data systems that share data. 

Once accountability and visibility over the theater provided equipment 

have been established, brigade personnel request disposition instructions. 

This labor-intensive manual process involves sending spreadsheets 

populated with equipment data from Kuwait to Army Sustainment 

Command headquarters in Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and then on to the 

specific Life Cycle Management Commands7

 responsible for each 

particular item who, in turn, send disposition instructions back through 

this chain to the 401st AFSB. This process can take months or years 

because of the manual workarounds used to pass and manipulate the data. 

Once disposition instructions are received in Kuwait, equipment can be

shipped; however in-transit visibility of the equipment is temporarily lost. 

When disposition instructions for a certain item of TPE are received, that

item drops from the AWRDS database and uses a process called InterDepot Transfer to manage shipment of that item. By dropping the item 

from AWRDS, however, the 401st AFSB loses visibility over the item, 

because Inter-Depot Transfers are not entered into the Global 

Transportation Network, DOD’s system for providing near real-time intransit visibility information. This lack of in-transit visibility is contrary to 

current DOD guidelines to maintain timely, accurate visibility over items in 

the distribution pipeline.

 6

Army documents state that Standard Army Management Information Systems provide a 

seamless and inoperable network of logistics systems using integrated communication 

tools.

7

The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands, each of which 

is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are: Aviation and Missile, Chemical 

Materials Agency, Communications-Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tankautomotive & Armaments Command. 

Page 78 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping 

Excess Theater Provided Equipment 

The 401st AFSB uses another manual process to compensate for this by 

coordinating with Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 

elements at Kuwaiti ports in order to obtain final load manifests for each 

vessel. The manifest is then forwarded to the appropriate Life Cycle 

Management Command in the United States so that item managers there

can prepare for the receipt of the equipment; however this information 

does not reach the 401st AFSB until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail. 

Page 79 GAO-08-930 Operational Iraqi Freedom
Appendix VII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 80 GAO-08-930 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, David A. Schmitt, Assistant 

Director; Guy A. Lofaro, Analyst in Charge; John Lee; Katherine Lenane; 

Gregory Marchand; John J. Marzullo; Tristan T. To; Christopher Turner; 

Cheryl Weissman, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this 

report. 

Operational Iraqi Freedom

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(351092) 
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