Present: All the Justices 

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 

FOR THE COUNTY OF YORK 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

v. Record No. 981246 April 16, 1999 

852 L.L.C. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 

N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 

 In this land use controversy, we consider whether the trial 

court erred in reversing a board of zoning appeals' decision 

that had affirmed a zoning administrator's interpretation of a 

local ordinance prescribing computation of developable land 

area. At issue is whether a landowner should be allowed a 100% 

density credit that is set forth in the ordinance. 

 The ordinance in question is titled "Computation of 

buildable or developable area." York County, Va., Code § 24.1-

203 (1996). As pertinent, the section provides: "In accordance 

with the comprehensive plan, certain land areas shall not be 

developed at all and others may only be credited partially 

toward buildable or developable area. These shall be determined 

on a case-by-case basis utilizing the percentages shown in the 

table below where . . . [t]he 'Density' column contains the 

percentage of the specified land type which may be included in 

calculations of net developable density." 
 The table in § 24.1-203 provides for specified density 

credits for various land types. In subparagraph (g), "0%" 

density credit is allowed for: "Areas of existing ponds, lakes, 

or other impounded water bodies . . . ." In subparagraph (h), 

"100%" density credit is allowed for: "Stormwater management 

ponds or basins." In subparagraph (i), "50%" density credit is 

allowed for certain "non-tidal wetlands." 

 Appellee 852 L.L.C. owns a parcel of undeveloped land at 

the intersection of Hampton Highway (Route 134) and Big Bethel 

Road in York County. The parcel contains approximately 30 acres 

with a body of water of about 11 acres situated in the center. 

The parcel is zoned "RMF (residential multi-family)." The 

landowner plans to construct a multi-family apartment project on 

the developable area. 

 In 1997, the landowner sought a ruling from the County's 

zoning administrator "about density credit for the existing 

lake." The landowner contended it was entitled to 100% density 

credit under subparagraph (h) of the ordinance. Responding in a 

letter dated August 1, 1997, the administrator decided to "allow 

a density credit for 5.6 acres of lake area." According to the 

administrator, "This allowance represents an area of 18.6% of 

the 30-acre site." 

 The landowner appealed the administrator's decision to 

appellant Board of Zoning Appeals for the County of York. 

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Following an October 1997 public hearing, the Board adopted a 

resolution upholding the administrator's decision. 

 The landowner presented to the circuit court, pursuant to 

former Code § 15.1-497 (now § 15.2-2314), a petition for 

certiorari for review of the Board's decision. The court 

allowed the writ and the Board timely filed a return, later 

amended, which included a verbatim copy of the minutes of the 

public hearing. 

 The trial court considered the matter upon the record 

without taking testimony and upon argument of counsel in a March 

1998 hearing. At the close of the hearing, the trial court 

stated that the language of the ordinance is "clear and simple," 

that it was "conceded" the body of water was a "storm water 

management" facility, and that the ordinance required the 

landowner "be given 100 percent density allocations." The court 

said that the Board "applied erroneous principles of law" and 

that its decision "was plainly wrong and in violation of the 

intended purpose of the zoning ordinance." 

 In an April 1998 final decree, the trial court reversed the 

Board's decision and ruled that the landowner be "granted a 

density credit equal to 100% of the total acreage of the lake 

located on its property." The Board appeals. 

 On appeal, the Board argues that the ordinance "is 

ambiguous when applied to the subject property." 

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"Unfortunately," according to the Board, "the ordinance does not 

clearly provide for density credit calculations for a pond which 

is all at once an existing impoundment of water and a stormwater 

management facility and a nontidal wetland." The Board 

contends, "Some degree of interpretation is needed to have the 

ordinance make sense in the present situation." 

 The "present situation" to which the Board refers is that 

the existence of the body of water in question is a sequel to 

mining of the land in the early 1970s to sell dirt to the 

"Highway Department." The borrow pit thus created eventually 

filled with water that drained from adjacent properties, as 

reflected in two recorded drainage easements, as well as water 

that drained from the subject property. In 1996, when the 

landowner was considering purchase of the subject property, the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a notice that the body of 

water is a nontidal wetland within its jurisdiction. 

 During the public hearing, the zoning administrator 

articulated the rationale for his decision. He stated that he 

"initially took the position that we were dealing with an 

existing body of water and our Ordinance is very clear. It says 

for an existing body of water you get 0% credit for density." 

When the landowner complained this was an unfair interpretation 

of the ordinance, the administrator stated that "in deference" 

to the landowner's arguments he was "willing to look at it as a 

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stormwater management facility; but not in its entirety, only 

for that portion that would be required to meet the stormwater 

management requirements of this drainage area." Thus, he 

arrived at the 18.6% allowance for the 30-acre site. 

 The Board argues that the body of water "will be" used as a 

stormwater management pond when the area is developed. "Just as 

surely," the Board contends, "it is an existing lake much larger 

than needed to contain storm flows" from the landowner's parcel 

and from approximately 15 acres of adjacent land. "No less," 

the County continues, "it is a nontidal wetlands within the 

jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers." 

 "And so," the Board argues, "the resolution of this 

conundrum cannot arise only from the text of County Code section 

24.1-203 because the pond cannot be afforded density credits 

simultaneously of 100 percent, zero percent, and 50 percent. 

The Zoning Administrator's proposal, on the other hand, offers a 

fair interpretation of the ordinance which recognizes legitimate 

development expectations, while protecting the County from 

overdevelopment." We disagree with the Board's argument. 

 Certainly, from the County's perspective the zoning 

administrator equitably solved the problem presented in this 

case. Nonetheless, his decision extended beyond permissible 

ordinance interpretation and became prohibited legislative 

action taken by an administrator. 

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 The principles applicable here are settled. When an 

ordinance is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for 

interpretation or construction; the plain meaning and intent of 

the ordinance must be given it. Donovan v. Board of Zoning 

Appeals, 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996); McClung

v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 

(1959). 

 But, a "decision of a board of zoning appeals is presumed 

to be correct on appeal to a circuit court; the appealing party 

bears the burden of showing that the board applied erroneous 

principles of law or that its decision was plainly wrong and in 

violation of the purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance." 

Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 Va. 37, 44, 353 S.E.2d 

727, 732-33 (1987). 

 And, a consistent construction of an ordinance by officials 

charged with its enforcement is given great weight. 

"Nevertheless, if the administrative interpretation of a portion 

of an ordinance is so at odds with the plain language used in 

the ordinance as a whole, such interpretation is plainly wrong, 

and must be reversed." Cook v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 244 Va. 

107, 111, 418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992). This is such a case. 

 We agree with the trial court, and with the zoning 

administrator's observation at the public hearing, that the 

language of the ordinance is clear. The ordinance provides that 

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computation of buildable or developable area "shall" be 

determined utilizing the percentages set forth in the ordinance. 

Under subparagraph (h), "Stormwater management ponds or basins" 

are entitled to a density credit of 100 percent. 

 As the trial court found, it was conceded at the public 

hearing that the body of water in question presently is an 

existing stormwater management facility, receiving runoff from 

the subject parcel as well as adjacent properties, and that it 

is not a mere pond, lake, or wetland. For example, as the 

public hearing began, the Board's secretary, in summarizing "the 

background and factual information" relating to the landowner's 

application stated, "In the current request, the applicant and 

the staff agree that the lake serves stormwater management 

needs." Also, during the hearing, the zoning administrator said 

"we're willing to look at it as a stormwater management 

facility." 

 In addition, the evidence supported the concession. The 

1996 notice from the Corps of Engineers stated that the "pond is 

used for stormwater management." 

 Therefore, the zoning administrator should have interpreted 

the ordinance as written. Nowhere does the ordinance permit the 

administrator to allocate a reduced density credit based on what 

the administrator and his staff determine is the appropriate 

percentage "necessary for a development site such as the subject 

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property," as the administrator said in his August 1997 ruling. 

Had the County Board of Supervisors intended the administrator 

to have such latitude, it would have so provided in the 

ordinance; such latitude may not properly be created by 

administrative interpretation. 

 Consequently, we hold the trial court did not err in 

reversing the Board's decision that adopted the zoning 

administrator's interpretation. The interpretation was plainly 

wrong and the Board applied erroneous principles of law in 

adopting it. Thus, the judgment below will be 

Affirmed. 

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