# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 121/2012

| | ISSN 1977-0987
  doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2012.121.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5526 ta' April 2012 |

ISSN 1977-0987

doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2012.121.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5526 ta' April 2012

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2012/C 121/01 | Awtorizzazzjoni għal għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-TFUE – Fir-rigward ta' dawn il-każijiet il-Kummissjoni ma tqajjimx oġġezzjonijiet (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2012/C 121/02 | Ftehim monetarju bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino | 5 |
| 2012/C 121/03 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin) (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2012/C 121/04 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába) (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2012/C 121/05 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp) (
  1
  ) | 19 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2012/C 121/01

Awtorizzazzjoni għal għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-TFUE – Fir-rigward ta' dawn il-każijiet il-Kummissjoni ma tqajjimx oġġezzjonijiet (
  1
  )

1

1

2012/C 121/02

Ftehim monetarju bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino

5

2012/C 121/03

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin) (
  1
  )

1

18

2012/C 121/04

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába) (
  1
  )

1

18

2012/C 121/05

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp) (
  1
  )

1

19

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2012/C 121/06 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 20 |
| 2012/C 121/07 | Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-proċedura stipulata fl-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE | 21 |
| | Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri |
| 2012/C 121/08 | Ir-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv? | 24 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2012/C 121/09 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-muniċipalità ta’ Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS (NEAS) | 25 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2012/C 121/06

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

20

2012/C 121/07

Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-proċedura stipulata fl-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE

21

Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri

2012/C 121/08

Ir-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv?

24

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2012/C 121/09

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-muniċipalità ta’ Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS (NEAS)

25

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO) |
| 2012/C 121/10 | Avviż ta' kompetizzjoni ġenerali | 38 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2012/C 121/11 | Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni (Każ COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas) (
  1
  ) | 39 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

2012/C 121/10

Avviż ta' kompetizzjoni ġenerali

38

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2012/C 121/11

Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni (Każ COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas) (
  1
  )

1

39

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

---

(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

---

II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/1

---

Awtorizzazzjoni għal għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-TFUE

Fir-rigward ta' dawn il-każijiet il-Kummissjoni ma tqajjimx oġġezzjonijiet

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2012/C 121/01

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni | 22.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna | SA.30742 (N 137/10) |
| Stat Membru | Il-Litwanja |
| Reġjun | Klaipėdos apskritis |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | Klaipėdos keleivių ir krovinių terminalas |
| Il-bażi legali | Komisijos sprendimas K(2007) 3740 (2007 m. liepos 30 d.), patvirtinantis veiksmų programą „Ekonomikos augimas“ dėl Bendrijos paramos iš Europos regioninės plėtros fondo ir Sanglaudos fondo pagal Konvergencijos tikslą Lietuvos Respublikoje |
| It-tip tal-miżura | Għajnuna individwali |
| L-għan | Żvilupp settorjali, Żvilupp reġjonali |
| Il-forma tal-għajnuna | Għotja diretta |
| L-estimi | EUR 17 900 000 |
| L-intensità | 65 % |
| It-tul ta' żmien | 1.2.2011-31.12.2012 |
| Setturi ekonomiċi | Trasport |
| Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna | Susisiekimo ministerija |
| Gedimino Av. 17 |
| LT-01505 Vilnius |
| LIETUVA/LITHUANIA |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni

22.2.2012

In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna

SA.30742 (N 137/10)

Stat Membru

Il-Litwanja

Reġjun

Klaipėdos apskritis

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

Klaipėdos keleivių ir krovinių terminalas

Il-bażi legali

Komisijos sprendimas K(2007) 3740 (2007 m. liepos 30 d.), patvirtinantis veiksmų programą „Ekonomikos augimas“ dėl Bendrijos paramos iš Europos regioninės plėtros fondo ir Sanglaudos fondo pagal Konvergencijos tikslą Lietuvos Respublikoje

It-tip tal-miżura

Għajnuna individwali

L-għan

Żvilupp settorjali, Żvilupp reġjonali

Il-forma tal-għajnuna

Għotja diretta

L-estimi

EUR 17 900 000

L-intensità

65 %

It-tul ta' żmien

1.2.2011-31.12.2012

Setturi ekonomiċi

Trasport

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna

Susisiekimo ministerija

Gedimino Av. 17

LT-01505 Vilnius

LIETUVA/LITHUANIA

Aktar informazzjoni

—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tneħħew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni | 28.3.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna | SA.33054 (12/N) |
| Stat Membru | Ir-Renju Unit |
| Reġjun | — |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | Post Office Limited (POL): Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially viable network for the period 2012-2015 and the continuation of a working capital facility |
| Il-bażi legali | Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011, Postal Services Act 2000, Industrial Development Act 1982 |
| It-tip tal-miżura | Għajnuna individwali |
| L-għan | Servizzi ta' interess ekonomiku ġenerali |
| Il-forma tal-għajnuna | Għotja diretta |
| L-estimi | Baġit globali: GBP 1 155 miljun |
| L-intensità | — |
| It-tul ta' żmien | 1.4.2012-31.3.2015 |
| Setturi ekonomiċi | Il-posta u t-telekomunikazzjonijiet |
| Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna | Department for Business, Innovation and Skills |
| 1 Victoria Street |
| London |
| SW1H 0ET |
| UNITED KINGDOM |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni

28.3.2012

In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna

SA.33054 (12/N)

Stat Membru

Ir-Renju Unit

Reġjun

—

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

Post Office Limited (POL): Compensation for net costs incurred to keep a non-commercially viable network for the period 2012-2015 and the continuation of a working capital facility

Il-bażi legali

Post Office Network Subsidy Scheme (Amendment) Order 2011, Postal Services Act 2000, Industrial Development Act 1982

It-tip tal-miżura

Għajnuna individwali

L-għan

Servizzi ta' interess ekonomiku ġenerali

Il-forma tal-għajnuna

Għotja diretta

L-estimi

Baġit globali: GBP 1 155 miljun

L-intensità

—

It-tul ta' żmien

1.4.2012-31.3.2015

Setturi ekonomiċi

Il-posta u t-telekomunikazzjonijiet

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

1 Victoria Street

London

SW1H 0ET

UNITED KINGDOM

Aktar informazzjoni

—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tneħħew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni | 23.1.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna | SA.33868 (11/N) |
| Stat Membru | Il-Ġermanja |
| Reġjun | Thüringen |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. 618/2007 — Deutschland
  Richtlinie des Freistaats Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung |
| Il-bażi legali | Richtlinie des Landes Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung |
| It-tip tal-miżura | Skema ta' għajnuna |
| L-għan | Ir-riċerka u l-iżvilupp, Żvilupp reġjonali |
| Il-forma tal-għajnuna | Għotja diretta |
| L-estimi | | Baġit annwali: EUR 34,5 miljun |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni

23.1.2012

In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna

SA.33868 (11/N)

Stat Membru

Il-Ġermanja

Reġjun

Thüringen

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. 618/2007 — Deutschland

Richtlinie des Freistaats Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung

Il-bażi legali

Richtlinie des Landes Thüringen zur einzelbetrieblichen Technologieförderung

It-tip tal-miżura

Skema ta' għajnuna

L-għan

Ir-riċerka u l-iżvilupp, Żvilupp reġjonali

Il-forma tal-għajnuna

Għotja diretta

L-estimi

Baġit annwali: EUR 34,5 miljun

| | Baġit globali: EUR 207 miljun |
| --- | --- |

Baġit globali: EUR 207 miljun

L-intensità

—

It-tul ta' żmien

sal-31.12.2013

Setturi ekonomiċi

Is-setturi kollha

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna

| Thüringer Aufbaubank |
| --- |
| Gorkistraße 9 |
| 99084 Erfurt |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Thüringer Aufbaubank

Gorkistraße 9

99084 Erfurt

DEUTSCHLAND

| Postfach 90 02 44 |
| --- |
| 99105 Erfurt |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Postfach 90 02 44

99105 Erfurt

DEUTSCHLAND

Aktar informazzjoni

—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tneħħew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni | 22.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna | SA.34088 (11/N) |
| Stat Membru | Il-Polonja |
| Reġjun | Zachodniopomorskie |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | PKS w Świdwinie sp. z o.o. |
| Il-bażi legali | 1) | Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji – art. 56 ust. 1 pkt 2; |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni

22.2.2012

In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna

SA.34088 (11/N)

Stat Membru

Il-Polonja

Reġjun

Zachodniopomorskie

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

PKS w Świdwinie sp. z o.o.

Il-bażi legali

1)

Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji – art. 56 ust. 1 pkt 2;

| 2) | Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji oraz ustawy, Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę, o finansach publicznych – art. 5; |
| --- | --- |

2)

Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 2010 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji oraz ustawy, Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę, o finansach publicznych – art. 5;

| 3) | Rozporządzenie Ministra Skarbu Państwa z dnia 6 kwietnia 2007 r. w sprawie pomocy publicznej na ratowanie i restrukturyzację przedsiębiorców. |
| --- | --- |

3)

Rozporządzenie Ministra Skarbu Państwa z dnia 6 kwietnia 2007 r. w sprawie pomocy publicznej na ratowanie i restrukturyzację przedsiębiorców.

It-tip tal-miżura

Għajnuna individwali

L-għan

Ir-ristrutturar ta' impriżi f'diffikultà

Il-forma tal-għajnuna

Għotja diretta

L-estimi

Baġit globali: PLN 0,4 miljun

L-intensità

50 %

It-tul ta' żmien

sal-31.12.2015

Setturi ekonomiċi

It-trasport fuq l-art u t-trasport permezz ta' pajpijiet

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna

| Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa |
| --- |
| ul. Krucza 36/Wspólna 6 |
| 00-522 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |
| http://www.msp.gov.pl/ |

Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa

ul. Krucza 36/Wspólna 6

00-522 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

http://www.msp.gov.pl/

Aktar informazzjoni

—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tneħħew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni | 27.2.2012 |
| --- | --- |
| In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna | SA.34228 (12/N) |
| Stat Membru | Spanja |
| Reġjun | País Vasco |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | Subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de comunicación en euskera |
| Il-bażi legali | Borrador de Orden, de 21 de diciembre de 2011, de la Consejera de Cultura, por la que se regula y convoca la concesión de subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de la comunicación en euskera en el año 2012 (Convocatoria Hedabideak) |
| It-tip tal-miżura | Skema ta' għajnuna |
| L-għan | Kultura |
| Il-forma tal-għajnuna | Għotja diretta |
| L-estimi | | Baġit annwali: EUR 4,875 miljun |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-Deċiżjoni

27.2.2012

In-numru ta' referenza tal-għajnuna

SA.34228 (12/N)

Stat Membru

Spanja

Reġjun

País Vasco

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

Subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de comunicación en euskera

Il-bażi legali

Borrador de Orden, de 21 de diciembre de 2011, de la Consejera de Cultura, por la que se regula y convoca la concesión de subvenciones destinadas a la consolidación, desarrollo y normalización de los medios de la comunicación en euskera en el año 2012 (Convocatoria Hedabideak)

It-tip tal-miżura

Skema ta' għajnuna

L-għan

Kultura

Il-forma tal-għajnuna

Għotja diretta

L-estimi

Baġit annwali: EUR 4,875 miljun

| | Baġit globali: EUR 4,875 miljun |
| --- | --- |

Baġit globali: EUR 4,875 miljun

L-intensità

65 %

It-tul ta' żmien

sal-31.12.2012

Setturi ekonomiċi

Il-Midja

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità responsabbli mill-għajnuna

| Dirección de Promoción del Euskera |
| --- |
| Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística |
| Departamento de Cultura |
| Gobierno Vasco |
| C/ Donostia, 1 |
| 01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz |
| Álava, País Vasco |
| ESPAÑA |

Dirección de Promoción del Euskera

Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística

Departamento de Cultura

Gobierno Vasco

C/ Donostia, 1

01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz

Álava, País Vasco

ESPAÑA

Aktar informazzjoni

—

It-test tad-deċiżjoni fil-lingwa jew lingwi awtentika/awtentiċi, li minnu tneħħew il-partijiet kunfidenzjali kollha, jinsab fuq is-sit:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/state_aids_texts_mt.htm

---

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/5

---

FTEHIM MONETARJU

bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino

2012/C 121/02

L-UNJONI EWROPEA,

u

R-REPUBBLIKA TA' SAN MARINO,

Billi:

| (1) | Fl-1 ta’ Jannar 1999, l-euro ħadet post il-munita ta’ kull Stat Membru li pparteċipa fit-tielet stadju tal-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja, fost dawn l-Italja, f’konformità mar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 974/98 (1) tat-3 ta’ Mejju 1998. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Fl-1 ta’ Jannar 1999, l-euro ħadet post il-munita ta’ kull Stat Membru li pparteċipa fit-tielet stadju tal-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja, fost dawn l-Italja, f’konformità mar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 974/98 (1) tat-3 ta’ Mejju 1998.

| (2) | Qabel l-introduzzjoni tal-euro, l-Italja u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino kienu kkonkludew arranġamenti bilaterali dwar kwistjonijiet monetarji, fejn l-aħħar wieħed kien il-Convenzione monetaria tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica di San Marino, li ġiet konkluża fil-21 ta’ Diċembru 1991. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Qabel l-introduzzjoni tal-euro, l-Italja u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino kienu kkonkludew arranġamenti bilaterali dwar kwistjonijiet monetarji, fejn l-aħħar wieħed kien il-Convenzione monetaria tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Repubblica di San Marino, li ġiet konkluża fil-21 ta’ Diċembru 1991.

| (3) | Id-Dikjarazzjoni Nru 6 annessa mal-Att Finali tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea tgħid li l-Komunità għandha tiffaċilita l-innegozjar mill-ġdid tal-arranġamenti eżistenti mar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino skont kif jista’ jkun meħtieġ minħabba l-introduzzjoni tal-munita unika. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Id-Dikjarazzjoni Nru 6 annessa mal-Att Finali tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea tgħid li l-Komunità għandha tiffaċilita l-innegozjar mill-ġdid tal-arranġamenti eżistenti mar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino skont kif jista’ jkun meħtieġ minħabba l-introduzzjoni tal-munita unika.

| (4) | Fid-29 ta’ Novembru 2000, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja kkonkludiet Ftehim Monetarju f’isem il-Komunità Ewropea mar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Fid-29 ta’ Novembru 2000, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja kkonkludiet Ftehim Monetarju f’isem il-Komunità Ewropea mar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino (2).

| (5) | Skont dan il-Ftehim Monetarju, ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tuża l-euro bħala l-munita uffiċjali tagħha u tagħti status ta' valuta legali lill-karti u l-muniti tal-euro. Għandha tiżgura li r-regoli tal-Unjoni Ewropea (UE) dwar il-karti u l-muniti tad-denominazzjoni tal-euro – inklużi dawk marbutin mal-ħarsien tagħha kontra l-iffalsifikar – ikunu applikabbli fit-territorju tagħha. Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tieħu l-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex tiġġieled kontra l-iffalsifikar u tikkoopera mal-Kummissjoni, mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew (il-BĊE) u mal-Europol. Sakemm jiġi ffirmat ftehim ta’ kooperazzjoni bejn l-Europol u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tikkoopera mal-Europol permezz tal-Awtoritajiet Taljani kompetenti f’dan il-qasam. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Skont dan il-Ftehim Monetarju, ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tuża l-euro bħala l-munita uffiċjali tagħha u tagħti status ta' valuta legali lill-karti u l-muniti tal-euro. Għandha tiżgura li r-regoli tal-Unjoni Ewropea (UE) dwar il-karti u l-muniti tad-denominazzjoni tal-euro – inklużi dawk marbutin mal-ħarsien tagħha kontra l-iffalsifikar – ikunu applikabbli fit-territorju tagħha. Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tieħu l-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex tiġġieled kontra l-iffalsifikar u tikkoopera mal-Kummissjoni, mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew (il-BĊE) u mal-Europol. Sakemm jiġi ffirmat ftehim ta’ kooperazzjoni bejn l-Europol u r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tikkoopera mal-Europol permezz tal-Awtoritajiet Taljani kompetenti f’dan il-qasam.

| (6) | Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tqis b’mod partikolari r-Rakkomandazzjonijiet tat-Task Force ta’ Azzjoni Finanzjarja (FATF), u notevolment dawk fejn din it-Task Force tistieden lill-membri tagħha u lill-membri ta’ Korpi Reġjonali tat-tip FATF biex japplikaw il-kontramiżuri meħtieġa fil-ġuriżdizzjonijiet identifikati bħala ta’ riskju għoli. Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, li għandha rappreżentanza fil-Kumitat ta' Esperti dwar l-Evalwazzjoni tal-Miżuri ta' Kontra l-Ħasil tal-Flus u l-Iffinanzjar tat-Terroriżmu, tqis b’mod xieraq ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet li saru jew li għad irid isiru fir-rapporti ta’ evalwazzjoni reċiproka fir-rigward tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, sabiex ittejjeb ir-rispons tagħha għal theddid ta’ ħasil tal-flus. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tqis b’mod partikolari r-Rakkomandazzjonijiet tat-Task Force ta’ Azzjoni Finanzjarja (FATF), u notevolment dawk fejn din it-Task Force tistieden lill-membri tagħha u lill-membri ta’ Korpi Reġjonali tat-tip FATF biex japplikaw il-kontramiżuri meħtieġa fil-ġuriżdizzjonijiet identifikati bħala ta’ riskju għoli. Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, li għandha rappreżentanza fil-Kumitat ta' Esperti dwar l-Evalwazzjoni tal-Miżuri ta' Kontra l-Ħasil tal-Flus u l-Iffinanzjar tat-Terroriżmu, tqis b’mod xieraq ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet li saru jew li għad irid isiru fir-rapporti ta’ evalwazzjoni reċiproka fir-rigward tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, sabiex ittejjeb ir-rispons tagħha għal theddid ta’ ħasil tal-flus.

| (7) | Dan il-Ftehim Monetarju ma jimponi ebda obbligu fuq il-BĊE u l-Banek Ċentrali nazzjonali li jinkludu l-istrumenti finanzjarji tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino fil-lista/i ta’ titoli eliġibbli għall-operazzjonijiet ta’ politika monetarja tas-Sistema Ewropea tal-Banek Ċentrali. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Dan il-Ftehim Monetarju ma jimponi ebda obbligu fuq il-BĊE u l-Banek Ċentrali nazzjonali li jinkludu l-istrumenti finanzjarji tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino fil-lista/i ta’ titoli eliġibbli għall-operazzjonijiet ta’ politika monetarja tas-Sistema Ewropea tal-Banek Ċentrali.

| (8) | Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha settur bankarju li jippretendi li jaħdem aktar mill-qrib ma’ dak taż-żona tal-euro. Għalhekk, sabiex jinħoloq ambjent ta' kundizzjonijiet ekwi, il-leġiżlazzjoni bankarja u finanzjarja rilevanti tal-UE, il-leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-falsifikazzjoni ta' mezzi ta’ ħlas bi flus mhux kontanti u r-rekwiżiti ta’ rapportar ta’ statistika għandhom isiru applikabbli, b’mod gradat, għar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha settur bankarju li jippretendi li jaħdem aktar mill-qrib ma’ dak taż-żona tal-euro. Għalhekk, sabiex jinħoloq ambjent ta' kundizzjonijiet ekwi, il-leġiżlazzjoni bankarja u finanzjarja rilevanti tal-UE, il-leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-falsifikazzjoni ta' mezzi ta’ ħlas bi flus mhux kontanti u r-rekwiżiti ta’ rapportar ta’ statistika għandhom isiru applikabbli, b’mod gradat, għar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino.

| (9) | Għandu jiġi ffurmat Kumitat Konġunt magħmul minn rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja, il-Kummissjoni u l-BĊE sabiex jeżamina l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim, jiddeċiedi kemm ikun il-limitu massimu annwali għall-ħruġ ta' muniti u jevalwa l-miżuri li jittieħdu mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għall-implimentazzjoni rilevanti tal-leġiżlazzjoni tal-UE. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Għandu jiġi ffurmat Kumitat Konġunt magħmul minn rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, ir-Repubblika tal-Italja, il-Kummissjoni u l-BĊE sabiex jeżamina l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim, jiddeċiedi kemm ikun il-limitu massimu annwali għall-ħruġ ta' muniti u jevalwa l-miżuri li jittieħdu mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għall-implimentazzjoni rilevanti tal-leġiżlazzjoni tal-UE.

| (10) | Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun il-korp ġudizzjarju inkarigat mis-soluzzjoni ta’ kwalunkwe tilwim li jista’ jinqala’ mill-applikazzjoni tal-Ftehim. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun il-korp ġudizzjarju inkarigat mis-soluzzjoni ta’ kwalunkwe tilwim li jista’ jinqala’ mill-applikazzjoni tal-Ftehim.

FTIEHMU KIF ĠEJ:

Artikolu 1

Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tkun intitolata tuża l-euro bħala l-munita uffiċjali tagħha skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1103/97 tas-17 ta’ Ġunju 1997 dwar ċerti dispożizzjonijiet li jirrigwardaw l-introduzzjoni tal-Euro (3) u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 974/98 tat-3 ta’ Mejju 1998 dwar l-introduzzjoni tal-euro. Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tagħti status ta’ valuta legali lill-karti u l-muniti tal-euro.

Artikolu 2

Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino ma għandha toħroġ ebda karti, muniti jew sostituti tal-flus ta' ebda tip sakemm il-kundizzjonijiet għal dan il-ħruġ ma jkunux miftehma mal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-kundizzjonijiet biex jinħarġu muniti tal-euro mid-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ dan il-Ftehim huma stipulati fl-Artikoli li ġejjin.

Artikolu 3

Il-limitu massimu annwali (f’terminu ta’ valur) għall-ħruġ tal-muniti tal-euro mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandu jiġi kkalkulat mill-Kumitat Konġunt stabbilit permezz ta’ dan il-Ftehim bħala t-total ta’:

| — | Parti fissa, li l-ammont inizjali tagħha għall-ewwel sena wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ dan il-Ftehim huwa stabbilit għal EUR 2 600 000. Il-Kumitat Konġunt jista’ jirrevedi l-parti fissa kull sena bil-għan li jqis kemm l-inflazzjoni – abbażi tal-inflazzjoni HICP tal-Italja fl-aħħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta fil-ħin li jsir il-kalkolu – kif ukoll ix-xejriet sinifikanti possibbli li jaffettwaw is-suq tal-kollezzjonisti tal-muniti tal-euro; |
| --- | --- |

—

Parti fissa, li l-ammont inizjali tagħha għall-ewwel sena wara d-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ dan il-Ftehim huwa stabbilit għal EUR 2 600 000. Il-Kumitat Konġunt jista’ jirrevedi l-parti fissa kull sena bil-għan li jqis kemm l-inflazzjoni – abbażi tal-inflazzjoni HICP tal-Italja fl-aħħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta fil-ħin li jsir il-kalkolu – kif ukoll ix-xejriet sinifikanti possibbli li jaffettwaw is-suq tal-kollezzjonisti tal-muniti tal-euro;

| — | Parti varjabbli, li tikkorrispondi għall-valur tal-ħruġ medju per capita ta’ muniti tar-Repubblika tal-Italja fl-aħħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta mmultiplikat bin-numru ta’ abitanti ta’ San Marino. |
| --- | --- |

—

Parti varjabbli, li tikkorrispondi għall-valur tal-ħruġ medju per capita ta’ muniti tar-Repubblika tal-Italja fl-aħħar 12-il xahar li għalihom tkun disponibbli d-dejta mmultiplikat bin-numru ta’ abitanti ta’ San Marino.

Artikolu 4

1.   Il-muniti tal-euro maħruġa mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandhom ikunu identiċi għal dawk li jinħarġu mill-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea li adottaw l-euro f'dak li jikkonċerna l-valur nominali, l-istatus ta’ valuta legali, il-karatteristiċi tekniċi, il-karatteristiċi artistiċi tan-naħa komuni u l-karatteristiċi artistiċi komuni tan-naħa nazzjonali.

2.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tikkomunika minn qabel l-abbozzi tal-uċuħ nazzjonali tal-muniti euro tagħha lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea, li trid tivverifika l-konformità tagħhom mar-regoli tal-UE.

Artikolu 5

1.   Il-muniti tal-euro maħruġin mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandhom jiġu stampati mill-Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato tar-Repubblika tal-Italja.

2.   B’deroga għall-paragrafu 1, San Marino jista jqabbad Zekka tal-UE biex tistampa muniti oħra tal-euro flok dik imsemmija fil-paragrafu 1, bi qbil mal-Kumitat Konġunt.

3.   Mill-inqas 70 % tal-muniti tal-euro li huma maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni għandhom jinħarġu fiċ-ċirkolazzjoni bil-valur nominali sa mis-sena ta' wara d-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ ta' dan il-Ftehim. Dan il-proporzjon għandu jilħaq it-80 % wara tliet snin. Għaldaqstant, il-Kumitat Konġunt se jirrevedi b’mod regolari kemm dan il-proporzjon ikun xieraq.

4.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tista’ toħroġ muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti. Dawn għandhom ikunu inklużi mal-limitu massimu annwali msemmi fl-Artikolu 3. Il-ħruġ ta’ muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti, mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino, għandu jsir skont il-linji gwida tal-Unjoni Ewropea dwar il-muniti tal-euro għall-kollezzjonisti, li jipprovdu fost oħrajn li l-karatteristiċi tekniċi u artistiċi u denominazzjonijiet tal-muniti tal-euro maħruġin għall-kollezzjoni għandhom jippermettu li ssir distinzjoni bejnhom u bejn il-muniti tal-euro li jkunu maħsubin għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni.

Artikolu 6

1.   B’konformità mal-Artikolu 128(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, il-volum tal-muniti tal-euro maħruġin mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandu jiżdied mal-volum tal-muniti maħruġin mill-Italja għall-għan tal-approvazzjoni, mill-BĊE, tal-volum totali tal-ħruġ ta’ muniti mir-Repubblika tal-Italja.

2.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tavża lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea u lir-Repubblika tal-Italja, mhux aktar tard mill-1 ta’ Settembru ta’ kull sena, dwar il-volum u l-valur nominali tal-muniti tal-euro li jkun biħsiebha toħroġ fis-sena ta’ wara. Għandha tinforma wkoll lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea dwar il-kundizzjonijiet previsti għall-ħruġ ta’ dawn il-muniti, b’mod partikolari dwar il-proporzjon ta’ muniti għall-kollezzjonisti u l-arranġamenti dettaljati għall-introduzzjoni ta’ muniti għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni.

3.   Hekk kif jiġi ffirmat dan il-Ftehim, ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tikkomunika l-informazzjoni kif imsemmija fil-paragrafu 2 għas-sena ta’ wara d-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-Ftehim.

Artikolu 7

1.   Dan il-Ftehim huwa bla ħsara għad-dritt tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino li tkompli toħroġ muniti tad-deheb bid-denominazzjoni ta’ scudi.

2.   Il-muniti għall-kollezzjonijisti u l-muniti tad-deheb bid-denominazzjoni ta’ scudi li jinħarġu mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino mhux se jkollhom valuta legali fl-Unjoni Ewropea.

Artikolu 8

1.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha tidħol risponsabbli li tadotta l-miżuri kollha xierqa, permezz ta’ traspożizzjonijiet diretti, jew possibbilment, permezz ta’ azzjonijiet ekwivalenti, bil-għan li timplimenta l-atti legali u r-regoli tal-UE elenkati fl-Anness ma’ dan il-Ftehim, fl-oqsma ta’:

| (a) | il-karti u l-muniti tal-euro; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

il-karti u l-muniti tal-euro;

| (b) | il-liġi bankarja u finanzjarja, b’mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-attività u s-superviżjoni tal-istituzzjonijiet ikkonċernati; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

il-liġi bankarja u finanzjarja, b’mod partikolari fir-rigward tal-attività u s-superviżjoni tal-istituzzjonijiet ikkonċernati;

| (c) | il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-iffalsifikar ta’ mezzi ta’ pagament kemm ta’ flus kontanti kif ukoll mezzi oħra, ta’ medalji u towkins u r-rekwiżiti ta’ rapportar ta’ statistika. Fir-rigward tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-ġbir ta' informazzjoni statistika, ir-regoli dettaljati għall-implimentazzjoni u l-adattamenti tekniċi (inkluż id-derogi xierqa fid-dawl tal-istatus speċifiku ta’ San Marino) għandhom jiġu maqbula mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew sa mhux aktar tard minn 18-il xahar qabel ma jkun meħtieġ li jinbeda r-rapportar ta’ statistika. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus, il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-iffalsifikar ta’ mezzi ta’ pagament kemm ta’ flus kontanti kif ukoll mezzi oħra, ta’ medalji u towkins u r-rekwiżiti ta’ rapportar ta’ statistika. Fir-rigward tal-leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-ġbir ta' informazzjoni statistika, ir-regoli dettaljati għall-implimentazzjoni u l-adattamenti tekniċi (inkluż id-derogi xierqa fid-dawl tal-istatus speċifiku ta’ San Marino) għandhom jiġu maqbula mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew sa mhux aktar tard minn 18-il xahar qabel ma jkun meħtieġ li jinbeda r-rapportar ta’ statistika.

| (d) | il-miżuri neċessarji għall-użu tal-euro bħala munita unika adottati skont l-Artikolu 133 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

il-miżuri neċessarji għall-użu tal-euro bħala munita unika adottati skont l-Artikolu 133 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea;

2.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino għandha timplimenta l-atti legali u r-regoli msemmija fil-paragrafu 1 sal-iskadenzi speċifikati fl-Anness, li jibdew jgħoddu hekk kif dan il-Ftehim jidħol fis-seħħ.

3.   Il-limitu massimu msemmi fl-Artikolu 3:

| (a) | jitnaqqas awtomatikament u temporanjament b’1/3 jekk u meta data ta’ skadenza speċifikata fl-Anness ma tinżammx, sakemm l-atti legali u r-regoli tal-UE kkonċernati ma jkunux għadhom ġew adottati; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

jitnaqqas awtomatikament u temporanjament b’1/3 jekk u meta data ta’ skadenza speċifikata fl-Anness ma tinżammx, sakemm l-atti legali u r-regoli tal-UE kkonċernati ma jkunux għadhom ġew adottati;

| (b) | jista’ jitnaqqas temporanjament b’1/2 permezz ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill li jaġixxi b’maġġoranza kwalifikata fuq proposta tal-Kummissjoni u wara li jkun sema’ r-rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino jekk u meta r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tonqos għal aktar minn sentejn milli tikkonforma ma' wieħed jew ma' diversi mill-atti legali jew regoli tal-UE elenkati fl-Anness, li hija adottat qabel l-iskadenza stabbilita. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

jista’ jitnaqqas temporanjament b’1/2 permezz ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill li jaġixxi b’maġġoranza kwalifikata fuq proposta tal-Kummissjoni u wara li jkun sema’ r-rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino jekk u meta r-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tonqos għal aktar minn sentejn milli tikkonforma ma' wieħed jew ma' diversi mill-atti legali jew regoli tal-UE elenkati fl-Anness, li hija adottat qabel l-iskadenza stabbilita.

Il-limitu massimu għandu jittella’ għal-livell normali tiegħu billi tintuża l-istess proċedura, hekk kif ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tkun adottat il-miżuri xierqa biex tindirizza l-kwistjonijiet li jkunu wasslu għat-tnaqqis temporanju.

4.   Ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tista’ titlob għall-assistenza teknika tal-entitajiet li jikkostitwixxu d-delegazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea sabiex tiffaċilita l-implimentazzjoni rilevanti tal-leġiżlazzjoni tal-UE.

5.   L-Anness għandu jiġi emendat mill-Kummissjoni darba kull sena jew, jekk ikun xieraq aktar spiss, bil-għan li jitqiesu dejjem l-atti legali u r-regoli rilevanti ġodda tal-UE, kif ukoll l-emendi għal dawk li diġà jeżistu. Wara li jsir dan, il-Kumitat Konġunt għandu jiddeċiedi dwar id-dati ta’ skadenza xierqa u raġonevoli għall-implimentazzjoni mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tal-atti legali u r-regoli ġodda miżjudin mal-Anness.

6.   Il-Kumitat Konġunt jista’, f’każijiet eċċezzjonali, jirrevedi d-data ta’ skadenza eżistenti speċifikata fl-Anness.

7.   L-Anness aġġornat għandu jiġi ppubblikat f' Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

Artikolu 9

L-istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu u, fejn ikun xieraq, istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħra awtorizzati biex iwettqu l-attivitajiet tagħhom fit-territorju tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino jista’ jkollhom aċċess għas-sistemi ta’ sald u ħlas interbankarji u tat-titoli fiż-żona tal-euro skont termini u kundizzjonijiet xierqa li jiġu deċiżi mill-Bank tal-Italja, bi qbil mal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

Artikolu 10

1.   Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandu jkollha l-kompetenza esklussiva biex issolvi t-tilwim kollu li jista' jirriżulta bejn il-partijiet minħabba l-applikazzjoni ta' dan il-Ftehim u li ma jkunx ġie solvut fi ħdan il-Kumitat Konġunt.

2.   Jekk l-Unjoni Ewropea, rappreżentata mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea, filwaqt li tkun qed taġixxi fuq rakkomandazzjoni tad-delegazzjoni tal-UE fil-Kumitat Konġunt, jew ir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino tikkunsidra li l-Parti l-oħra ma tkunx issodisfat xi obbligu skont dan il-Ftehim, din tista’ tressaq il-kwistjoni quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Is-sentenza tal-Qorti għandha torbot lill-Partijiet, li għandhom jieħdu l-miżuri meħtieġa biex jikkonformaw mas-sentenza f’perjodu ta’ żmien stabbilit mill-Qorti fis-sentenza tagħha.

Artikolu 11

1.   Għandu jiġi stabbilit Kumitat Konġunt. Dan għandu jkun magħmul minn rappreżentanti tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino u tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Il-Kumitat Konġunt għandu jadotta r-Regoli ta’ Proċedura tiegħu b’kunsens. Id-delegazzjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tkun magħmula minn rappreżentanti tal-Kummissjoni u tar-Repubblika tal-Italja, flimkien mar-rappreżentanti tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

2.   Il-Kumitat Konġunt għandu jiltaqa' mill-inqas darba fis-sena. Il-Presidenza għandha talterna kull sena bejn rappreżentant tal-Unjoni Ewropea u rappreżentant tar-Repubblika ta’ San Marino. Il-Kumitat Konġunt għandu jadotta d-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu b’vot unanimu tal-partijiet.

3.   Il-Kumitat Konġunt għandu jaqsam l-opinjonijiet u l-informazzjoni u jadotta d-deċiżjonijiet imsemmija fl-Artikoli 3, 5 u 8. Għandu jeżamina l-miżuri li jittieħdu mir-Repubblika ta’ San Marino u jagħmel ħiltu biex isolvi kull tilwim li jista’ jinqala’ minħabba l-implimentazzjoni ta’ dan il-Ftehim.

4.   L-Unjoni Ewropea se tkun l-ewwel li tippresjedi fuq il-Kumitat Konġunt hekk kif dan il-Ftehim jidħol fis-seħħ, kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 13.

Artikolu 12

Dan il-Ftehim jista’ jintemm minn kull waħda mill-Partijiet permezz ta’ notifika minn sena qabel.

Artikolu 13

Dan il-Ftehim għandu jidħol fis-seħħ fl-ewwel ġurnata tax-xahar wara d-data li fiha l-Partijiet ikunu nnotifikaw lil xulxin li l-proċess tagħhom ta' ratifika, ta' konklużjoni jew ta' adozzjoni, ikun lest skont ir-regoli applikabbli għal kull Parti.

Artikolu 14

Il-Ftehim Monetarju tad-29 ta’ Novembru 2000 għandu jiġi rrevokat mid-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ ta’ dan il-Ftehim. Referenzi għall-Ftehim tad-29 ta’ Novembru 2000 għandhom jiġu mifhuma li jirreferu għal dan il-Ftehim.

Magħmul fi Brussell, fis-27 ta’ Marzu 2012, f'żewġ dokumenti oriġinali bil-lingwa Ingliża.

Għall-Unjoni Ewropea

Olli REHN

Il-Viċi President tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea responsabbli għall-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Monetarji u l-Ewro

Għar-Repubblika ta' San Marino

Antonella MULARONI

Ministru tal-Affarijiet Barranin

---

(1)  ĠU L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 1.

1

(2)  ĠU C 209, 27.7.2001, p. 1.

2

(3)  ĠU L 162, 19.6.1997, p. 1.

3

---

ANNESS

| DISPOŻIZZJONIJIET LEGALI LI GĦANDHOM JIĠU IMPLIMENTATI | DATA TA’ SKADENZA GĦALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI
  (APPLIKABBLI MID-DĦUL FIS-SEĦĦ TAL-FTEHIM) |
| --- | --- |
| Il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus |
| Id-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta’ Ottubru 2005 dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-ħasil tal-flus u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15).
  Emendata bi: | Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1). |

DISPOŻIZZJONIJIET LEGALI LI GĦANDHOM JIĠU IMPLIMENTATI

DATA TA’ SKADENZA GĦALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI

(APPLIKABBLI MID-DĦUL FIS-SEĦĦ TAL-FTEHIM)

Il-prevenzjoni tal-ħasil tal-flus

Id-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta’ Ottubru 2005 dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-ħasil tal-flus u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15).

Emendata bi:

Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

| | Id-Direttiva 2008/20/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2005/60/KE dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-money laundering u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni kkonferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 46). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2008/20/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2005/60/KE dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-użu tas-sistema finanzjarja għall-iskop tal-money laundering u l-finanzjament tat-terroriżmu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni kkonferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 46).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

Issupplimentata bi:

| | Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2007/845/ĠAI tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2007 dwar il-kooperazzjoni bejn l-Uffiċċji għall-Irkupru tal-Assi tal-Istati Membri fil-qasam tar-rintraċċar u l-identifikazzjoni ta’ rikavati mill-kriminalità, jew proprjetà oħra relatata magħha (ĠU L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2007/845/ĠAI tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2007 dwar il-kooperazzjoni bejn l-Uffiċċji għall-Irkupru tal-Assi tal-Istati Membri fil-qasam tar-rintraċċar u l-identifikazzjoni ta’ rikavati mill-kriminalità, jew proprjetà oħra relatata magħha (ĠU L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103).

| | Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/70/KE tal-1 ta' Awwissu 2006 li tistabbilixxi miżuri implimentattivi għad-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar id-definizzjoni ta’ persuni esposti politikament u l-kriterji tekniċi għal proċeduri ssimplifikati tad-diliġenza dovuta mal-klijent u għal eżenzjoni għal raġunijiet ta’ attività finanzjarja mwettqa fuq bażi okkażjonali jew limitata ħafna (ĠU L 214, 4.8.2006, p. 29). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/70/KE tal-1 ta' Awwissu 2006 li tistabbilixxi miżuri implimentattivi għad-Direttiva 2005/60/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar id-definizzjoni ta’ persuni esposti politikament u l-kriterji tekniċi għal proċeduri ssimplifikati tad-diliġenza dovuta mal-klijent u għal eżenzjoni għal raġunijiet ta’ attività finanzjarja mwettqa fuq bażi okkażjonali jew limitata ħafna (ĠU L 214, 4.8.2006, p. 29).

| | Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta’ fondi (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta’ fondi (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006, p. 1).

| | Ir-Rettifika għar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta’ fondi, (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006) (ĠU L 323, 8.12.2007, p. 59). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Rettifika għar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1781/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2006 dwar informazzjoni dwar il-pagatur, li għandha takkumpanja t-trasferimenti ta’ fondi, (ĠU L 345, 8.12.2006) (ĠU L 323, 8.12.2007, p. 59).

| | Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1889/2005 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta’ Ottubru 2005 dwar kontrolli ta’ flus kontanti deħlin fil-Komunità jew ħerġin mill-Komunità (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 9). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1889/2005 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-26 ta’ Ottubru 2005 dwar kontrolli ta’ flus kontanti deħlin fil-Komunità jew ħerġin mill-Komunità (ĠU L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 9).

| | Id-Deċiżjoni Kwadru tal-Kunsill 2001/500/ĠAI tas-26 ta' Ġunju 2001 dwar il-ħasil tal-flus, l-identifikazzjoni, l-intraċċar, l-iffriżar, il-qbid u l-konfiska tal-mezzi u l-qligħ mill-kriminalità (ĠU L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Deċiżjoni Kwadru tal-Kunsill 2001/500/ĠAI tas-26 ta' Ġunju 2001 dwar il-ħasil tal-flus, l-identifikazzjoni, l-intraċċar, l-iffriżar, il-qbid u l-konfiska tal-mezzi u l-qligħ mill-kriminalità (ĠU L 182, 5.7.2001, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2000/642/ĠAI tas-17 ta’ Ottubru 2000 li tikkonċerna l-arranġamenti għall-kooperazzjoni bejn l-unitajiet tal-intelliġenza finanzjarja tal-Istati Membri fir-rigward tal-iskambju tal-informazzjoni (ĠU L 271, 24.10.2000, p. 4).

Sena waħda

Il-prevenzjoni tal-frodi u tal-iffalsifikar

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1338/2001 tat-28 ta’ Ġunju 2001 li jistabbilixxi miżuri neċessarji għall-protezzjoni mill-iffalsifikar tal-euro (ĠU L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 6).

Emendat bi:

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 44/2009 tat-18 ta’ Diċembru 2008 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1338/2001 li jistabbilixxi l-miżuri neċessarji għall-protezzjoni kontra l-iffalsifikar tal-euro (ĠU L 17, 22.1.2009, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2003/861/KE tat-8 ta’ Diċembru 2003 li tikkonċerna l-analiżi u l- kooperazzjoni fir-rigward ta' muniti foloz tal-euro (ĠU L 325, 12.12.2003, p. 44).

Sena waħda

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2182/2004 tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2004 dwar midalji u tokens simili għall-muniti tal-euro (ĠU L 373, 21.12.2004, p. 1).

Emendat bi:

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 46/2009 tat-18 ta’ Diċembru 2008 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 2182/2004 dwar midalji u tokens simili għall-muniti tal-euro (ĠU L 17, 22.1.2009, p. 5).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni Qafas tal-Kunsill 2000/383/ĠAI tad-29 ta’ Mejju 2000 dwar iż-żieda fil-protezzjoni permezz ta’ pieni kriminali u sanzjonijiet oħra kontra l-iffalsifikar fid-dawl tad-dħul tal-euro (traduzzjoni mhux uffiċjali) (ĠU L 140, 14.6.2000, p. 1).

Emendat bi:

Id-Deċiżjoni Kwadru 2001/888/ĠAI tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2001 li temenda d-Deċiżjoni Kwadru Nru 2000/383/ĠAI dwar iż-żieda fil-protezzjoni permezz ta’ pieni kriminali u sanzjonijiet oħra kontra l-iffalsifikar fid-dawl tad-dħul tal-euro (traduzzjoni mhux uffiċjali) (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 3).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2001/887/ĠAI tas-6 ta’ Diċembru 2001 dwar il-protezzjoni tal-euro kontra l-iffalsifikar (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2001, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni Qafas tal-Kunsill 2001/413/ĠAI tat-28 ta’ Mejju 2001 li tiġġieled frodi u ffalsifikar ta’ mezzi ta’ ħlas bi flus mhux kontanti (ĠU L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Regoli dwar il-karti u l-muniti tal-euro

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 975/98 tat-3 ta' Mejju 1998 dwar denominazzjonijiet u speċifikazzjonijiet tekniċi tal-muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 6).

Emendat bi:

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 423/1999 tat-22 Frar 1999 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 975/98 dwar denominazzjonjiet u speċifikazzjonijiet tekniċi tal-muniti euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 52, 27.2.1999, p. 2).

Sena waħda

Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tal-10 ta’ Mejju 1999 dwar is-sistema għall-immaniġġjar tal-kwalità għall-muniti tal-euro.

Sena waħda

Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tat-23 ta’ Novembru 1998 u tal-5 ta’ Novembru 2002 dwar il-muniti għall-kollezzjonisti.

Sena waħda

Ir-Rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/23/KE tad-19 ta’ Diċembru 2008 dwar il-linji gwida komuni għall-uċuħ nazzjonali u l-ħruġ ta’ muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni, (C(2008) 8625) (ĠU L 9, 14.1.2009, p. 52).

Sena waħda

Il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2001/C 318/03 tat-22 ta’ Ottubru 2001 dwar il-protezzjoni tad-drittijiet tal-awtur tad-disinn tal-wiċċ komuni tal-muniti tal-euro (C(2001) 600 finali) (ĠU C 318, 13.11.2011, p. 3).

Sena waħda

Regolament (UE) Nru 1210/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Diċembru 2010 li jikkonċerna l-awtentikazzjoni tal-muniti tal-euro u t-trattament ta' muniti tal-euro li mhumiex tajba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 339, 22.12.2010, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Il-Linja ta’ gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2003/5 tal-20 ta' Marzu 2003 dwar l-infurzar ta' miżuri kontra r-riproduzzjoni tal-karti tal-flus euro irregolari u dwar il-bdil u l-irtirar tal-karti tal-flus euro (ĠU L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 20).

Sena waħda

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2003/4 tal-20 ta’ Marzu 2003 dwar id-denominazzjonijiet, l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet, ir-riproduzzjoni, il-bdil u l-irtirar tal-karti tal-flus euro (ĠU L 78, 25.3.2003, p. 16).

Sena waħda

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 2532/98 tat-23 Novembru 1998 dwar il-poteri tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew li jimponi sanzjonijiet (ĠU L 318, 27.11.1998, p. 4-7).

Sena waħda

(BĊE/2010/14). Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2010 dwar il-verifika tal-awtentiċità u l-kundizzjoni u r-riċirkulazzjoni tal-karti tal-flus tal-euro (ĠU L 267, 9.10.2010, p. 1).

Sena waħda

Leġiżlazzjoni Bankarja u Finanzjarja

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/73/KE tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li timplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill rigward ir-rekwiżiti organizzattivi u l-kundizzjonijiet ta' ħidma tal-kumpaniji tal-investiment u t-termini definiti għall-għanijiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26-58).

6 snin

Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1287/2006 tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li jimplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-obbligi tad-ditti ta’ investiment li jżommu r-reġistri, ir-rapportaġġ tat-tranżazzjonijiet, it-trasparenza tas-suq, l-ammissjoni tal-istrumenti finanzjarji għan-negozjar, u t-termini ddefiniti għall-finijiet ta’ dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 1-25).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 1997/5/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta' Jannar 1997 dwar it-trasferimenti transkonfini ta' kreditu (ĠU L 43, 14.2.1997, p. 25-30).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 2006/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta’ Ġunju 2006 dwar l-adegwatezza kapitali ta’ ditti tal-investiment u istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 239M, 10.9.2010, p. 201-255).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2008/23/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/49/KE dwar l-adegwatezza tal-kapital tal-kumpaniji tal-investiment u istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni mogħtija lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 54). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2008/23/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/49/KE dwar l-adegwatezza tal-kapital tal-kumpaniji tal-investiment u istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni mogħtija lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 54).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/27/KE tal-Kummissjoni tas-7 ta’ April 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward ta' dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 97). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/27/KE tal-Kummissjoni tas-7 ta’ April 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/49/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward ta' dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 97).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma’ istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta’ fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji, u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma’ istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta’ fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji, u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-rimunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-rimunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta’ Ġunju 2006 rigward il-bidu u l-eżerċizzju tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu (tfassil mill-ġdid) (ĠU L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2007/18/KE tas-27 ta’ Marzu 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-esklużjoni jew l-inklużjoni ta' ċerti istituzzjonijiet mill-ambitu tal-applikazzjoni u tat-trattament ta' exposures għall-banek ta' żvilupp multilaterali (ĠU L 87, 28.3.2007, p. 9). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2007/18/KE tas-27 ta’ Marzu 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-esklużjoni jew l-inklużjoni ta' ċerti istituzzjonijiet mill-ambitu tal-applikazzjoni u tat-trattament ta' exposures għall-banek ta' żvilupp multilaterali (ĠU L 87, 28.3.2007, p. 9).

| | Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta’ evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u ż-żidiet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (ĠU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta’ evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u ż-żidiet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (ĠU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1).

| | Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

| | Id-Direttiva 2008/24/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE dwar l-istabbiliment u l-eżerċizzju tal-attività ta' istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 38). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2008/24/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE dwar l-istabbiliment u l-eżerċizzju tal-attività ta' istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 38).

| | Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2009/83/KE tas-27 ta’ Lulju 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tad-dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 196, 28,7.2009, p. 14). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2009/83/KE tas-27 ta’ Lulju 2009 li temenda ċerti annessi tad-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tad-dispożizzjonijiet tekniċi li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-ġestjoni tar-riskju (ĠU L 196, 28,7.2009, p. 14).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma’ istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta’ fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma’ istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta’ fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).

| | Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2010/16/UE tad-9 ta' Marzu 2010 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tal-esklużjoni ta’ ċerta istituzzjoni mill-ambitu [kamp] tal-applikazzjoni (ĠU L 60, 10.3.2010, p. 15). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2010/16/UE tad-9 ta' Marzu 2010 li temenda d-Direttiva 2006/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill fir-rigward tal-esklużjoni ta’ ċerta istituzzjoni mill-ambitu [kamp] tal-applikazzjoni (ĠU L 60, 10.3.2010, p. 15).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-remunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/76/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE u 2006/49/KE dwar ir-rekwiżiti kapitali għall-kotba tal-kummerċ u għar-rititolizzazzjonijiet, u r-reviżjoni superviżorja tal-politiki dwar ir-remunerazzjoni (ĠU L 329, 14.12.2010, p. 3).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva 2009/110/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar il-bidu, l-eżerċizzju u s-superviżjoni prudenzjali tan-negozju tal-istituzzjonijiet tal-flus elettroniċi li temenda d-Direttivi 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 2000/46/KE (ĠU L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1).

Rettifika tad-Direttiva 2007/64/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta’ Novembru 2007 dwar is-servizzi ta’ ħlas fis-suq intern li temenda d-Direttivi 97/7/KE, 2002/65/KE, 2005/60/KE u 2006/48/KE u li tħassar id-Direttiva 97/5/KE (ĠU L 319, 5.12.2007) (ĠU L 187, 18.7.2009, p. 5).

Emendata bi:

Id-Direttiva 2009/111/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 li temenda d-Direttivi 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2007/64/KE dwar banek affiljati ma’ istituzzjonijiet ċentrali, ċerti elementi ta’ fondi proprji, espożizzjonijiet kbar, arranġamenti superviżorji u l-ġestjoni tal-kriżijiet (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 97).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 86/635/KEE tat-8 ta' Diċembru 1986 dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta’ banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn (ĠU L 372, 31.12.1986, p. 1).

Rettifika tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 86/635/KEE tat-8 ta’ Diċembru 1986 dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta’ banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn (ĠU L 60, 3.3.1987, p. 17).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2001/65/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2001 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE u 86/635/KEE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' valutazzjoni għall-kontijiet annwali u kkonsolidati ta’ ċerti tipi ta’ kumpaniji kif ukoll ta’ banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħra (ĠU L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 28). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2001/65/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2001 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE u 86/635/KEE fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' valutazzjoni għall-kontijiet annwali u kkonsolidati ta’ ċerti tipi ta’ kumpaniji kif ukoll ta’ banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħra (ĠU L 283, 27.10.2001, p. 28).

| | Id-Direttiva 2003/51/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta’ Ġunju 2003 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE, 86/635/KEE u 91/674/KEE fuq il-bilanċ ta' kontijiet annwali u konsolidati ta' ċertu kumpaniji, banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u impriżi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 178, 17.7.2003, p. 16). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2003/51/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta’ Ġunju 2003 li temenda d-Direttivi 78/660/KEE, 83/349/KEE, 86/635/KEE u 91/674/KEE fuq il-bilanċ ta' kontijiet annwali u konsolidati ta' ċertu kumpaniji, banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u impriżi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 178, 17.7.2003, p. 16).

| | Id-Direttiva 2006/46/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta' Ġunju 2006 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 78/660/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali ta' ċerti tipi ta' kumpanniji, 83/349/KEE dwar kontijiet konsolidati, 86/635/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u 91/674/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' intrapriżi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 224, 16.8.2006, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2006/46/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-14 ta' Ġunju 2006 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 78/660/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali ta' ċerti tipi ta' kumpanniji, 83/349/KEE dwar kontijiet konsolidati, 86/635/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' banek u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji oħrajn u 91/674/KEE dwar il-kontijiet annwali u l-kontijiet konsolidati ta' intrapriżi tal-assigurazzjoni (ĠU L 224, 16.8.2006, p. 1).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva 94/19/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, tat-30 ta’ Mejju 1994 dwar skemi ta' garanzija għal depożiti (ĠU L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta’ Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (ĠU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta’ Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (ĠU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9).

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/14/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 94/19/KE dwar skemi ta' garanzija għal depożiti fir-rigward tal-livell ta’ kopertura u taż-żmien għar-rimborż (ĠU L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/14/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 94/19/KE dwar skemi ta' garanzija għal depożiti fir-rigward tal-livell ta’ kopertura u taż-żmien għar-rimborż (ĠU L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3).

4 snin

Id-Direttiva 2001/24/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-4 ta’ April 2001 fuq ir-riorganizzazzjoni u l-istralċ ta’ istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu (ĠU L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 15).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 89/117/KEE tal-Kunsill tat-13 ta' Frar 1989 dwar l-obbligi ta' fergħat stabbiliti fi Stat Membru, ta’ istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji li jkollhom l-uffiċċji ewlenin tagħhom barra dak l-Istat Membru rigward il-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dokumenti tal-kontijiet annwali (ĠU L 44, 16.2.1989, p. 40).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 2002/87/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Diċembru 2002 dwar is-superviżjoni supplimentari ta’ istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, dwar impriżi ta' assigurazzjoni u ditti tal-investiment f'konglomerat finanzjarju, u li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill Nru 73/239/KEE, 79/267/KEE, 92/49/KEE, 92/96/KEE, 93/6/KEE u 93/22/KEE u d-Direttivi 98/78/KE u 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (ĠU L 35, 11.2.2003, p. 1).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta’ Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (ĠU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2005/1/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta’ Marzu 2005 li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 73/239/KEE, 85/611/KEE, 91/675/KEE, 92/49/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttivi Nru 94/19/KE, 98/78/KE, 2000/12/KE, 2001/34/KE, 2002/83/KE u 2002/87/KE, sabiex tiġi stabbilita struttura organizzattiva ġdida għall-kumitati dwar is-servizzi finanzjarji (ĠU L 79, 24.3.2005, p. 9).

| | Id-Direttiva 2008/25/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2002/87/KE dwar is-superviżjoni supplimentari ta’ istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, impriżi tal-assigurazzjoni u ditti tal-investiment f'konglomerat finanzjarju, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 40). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2008/25/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2002/87/KE dwar is-superviżjoni supplimentari ta’ istituzzjonijiet ta’ kreditu, impriżi tal-assigurazzjoni u ditti tal-investiment f'konglomerat finanzjarju, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 81, 20.3.2008, p. 40).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ April 2004 dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill Nru 85/611/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttiva 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill u li tħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 93/22/KEE (ĠU L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1).

Rettifika tad-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ April 2004 dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji li temenda d-Direttivi tal-Kunsill 85/611/KEE u 93/6/KEE u d-Direttiva 2000/12/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill u li tħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 93/22/KEE (ĠU L 45, 16.2.2005, p. 18).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2006/31/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ April 2006 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward ta’ ċerti limiti ta’ żmien, ĠU L 114, 27.4.2006, p. 60. |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2006/31/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ April 2006 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward ta’ ċerti limiti ta’ żmien, ĠU L 114, 27.4.2006, p. 60.

| | Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE, fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta’ evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u żiediet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (ĠU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2007/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ Settembru 2007 li temenda d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 92/49/KEE u d-Direttivi 2002/83/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2005/68/KE u 2006/48/KE, fir-rigward tar-regoli ta' proċedura u l-kriterji ta’ evalwazzjoni għall-evalwazzjoni prudenzjali ta' akkwisti u żiediet fil-holdings fis-settur finanzjarju (ĠU L 247, 21.9.2007, p. 1).

| | Id-Direttiva 2008/10/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 33). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2008/10/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-11 ta’ Marzu 2008 li temenda d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE dwar is-swieq fl-istrumenti finanzjarji, fir-rigward tas-setgħat ta’ implimentazzjoni konferiti lill-Kummissjoni (ĠU L 76, 19.3.2008, p. 33).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

Issupplimentata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/73/KE tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li timplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill rigward ir-rekwiżiti organizzattivi u l-kundizzjonijiet ta' ħidma tal-kumpaniji tal-investiment u t-termini definiti għall-għanjiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva tal-Kummissjoni 2006/73/KE tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li timplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill rigward ir-rekwiżiti organizzattivi u l-kundizzjonijiet ta' ħidma tal-kumpaniji tal-investiment u t-termini definiti għall-għanjiet ta' dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26).

| | Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1287/2006 tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li jimplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-obbligi tad-ditti ta’ investiment li jżommu r-reġistri, ir-rapportaġġ tat-tranżazzjonijiet, it-trasparenza tas-suq, l-ammissjoni tal-istrumenti finanzjarji għan-negozjar, u t-termini ddefiniti għall-finijiet ta’ dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 322M, 2.12.2008, p. 253-277). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1287/2006 tal-10 ta’ Awwissu 2006 li jimplimenta d-Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-obbligi tad-ditti ta’ investiment li jżommu r-reġistri, ir-rapportaġġ tat-tranżazzjonijiet, it-trasparenza tas-suq, l-ammissjoni tal-istrumenti finanzjarji għan-negozjar, u t-termini ddefiniti għall-finijiet ta’ dik id-Direttiva (ĠU L 322M, 2.12.2008, p. 253-277).

6 snin

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 924/2009 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta' Settembru 2009 dwar il-ħlas transkonfinali fil-Komunità u li jħassar ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 2560/2001 (ĠU L 266, 9.10.2009, p. 11).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 2002/47/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta’ Ġunju 2002 dwar arranġamenti finanzjarji kollaterali (ĠU L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43).

Emendata bi:

Id-Direttiva 2009/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta’ Mejju 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 98/26/KE dwar il-finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta’ pagamenti u titoli u d-Direttiva 2002/47/KE dwar arranġamenti finanzjarji kollaterali rigward sistemi konnessi u talbiet għal kreditu (ĠU L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37).

6 snin

Ir-Rakkommandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni 97/489/KE tat-30 ta' Lulju 1997 dwar it-transazzjonijiet permezz ta' strumenti elettroniċi ta' ħlas u b'mod partikolari r-relazzjoni bejn min joħroġ u l-pussessur (ĠU L 208, 2.8.1997, p. 52).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 97/9/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-3 ta’ Marzu 1997 dwar skemi ta' kumpens għall-investitur (ĠU L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 98/26/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-19 ta’ Mejju 1998 dwar finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta' pagamenti u titoli (ĠU L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45).

Emendata bi:

| | Id-Direttiva 2009/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta’ Mejju 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 98/26/KE dwar il-finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta’ pagamenti u titoli u d-Direttiva 2002/47/KE dwar arranġamenti finanzjarji kollaterali rigward sistemi konnessi u talbiet għal kreditu (ĠU L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2009/44/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-6 ta’ Mejju 2009 li temenda d-Direttiva 98/26/KE dwar il-finalità ta' settlement fis-sistemi ta' settlement ta’ pagamenti u titoli u d-Direttiva 2002/47/KE dwar arranġamenti finanzjarji kollaterali rigward sistemi konnessi u talbiet għal kreditu (ĠU L 146, 10.6.2009, p. 37).

| | Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120). |
| --- | --- |

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

6 snin

Id-Direttiva 2010/78/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li temenda d-Direttivi 98/26/KE, 2002/87/KE, 2003/6/KE, 2003/41/KE, 2003/71/KE, 2004/39/KE, 2004/109/KE, 2005/60/KE, 2006/48/KE, 2006/49/KE u 2009/65/KE fir-rigward tas-setgħat tal-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea), l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tal-Assigurazzjoni u l-Pensjonijiet tax-Xogħol) u l-Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq) (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 120).

4 snin

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1093/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li jistabbilixxi Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Bankarja Ewropea) u li jemenda d-Deċiżjoni Nru 716/2009/KE u jħassar id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/78/KE (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).

4 snin

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1095/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 li jistabilixxi Awtorità Superviżorja Ewropea (Awtorità Ewropea tat-Titoli u s-Swieq), u li jemenda d-Deċiżjoni Nru 716/2009/KE u jħassar id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2009/77/KE (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84).

4 snin

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1092/2010 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta’ Novembru 2010 dwar is-sorveljanza makroprudenzjali tal-Unjoni tas-sistema finanzjarja u li jistabbilixxi Bord Ewropew dwar ir-Riskju Sistemiku (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 1).

4 snin

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (UE) Nru 1096/2010 tas-17 ta’ Novembru 2010 li jagħti lill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew kompiti speċifiċi rigward il-funzjonament tal-Bord Ewropew dwar ir-Riskju Sistemiku (ĠU L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 162).

4 snin

Leġiżlazzjoni dwar il-ġbir ta’ informazzjoni statistika (l-Artikolu 6.1 tal-mandat)

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 25/2009 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tad-19 ta' Diċembru 2008 dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji (Riformulazzjoni) (BĊE/2008/32) (ĠU L 15, 20.1.2009, p. 14).

Emendat bi:

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 883/2011 tal-25 ta’ Awwisu 2011 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 25/2009 dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji (Riformulazzjoni) (BĊE/2008/32) (ĠU L 228, 3.9.2011, p. 13).

4 snin

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tal-20 ta’ Diċembru 2001 dwar statistika fuq rati ta' imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self għal familji u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2001/18) (ĠU L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 24).

Emendat bi:

| | Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 674/2010 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tat-23 ta’ Lulju 2010 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta’ households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2010/7) (ĠU L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 23). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 674/2010 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tat-23 ta’ Lulju 2010 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta’ households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2010/7) (ĠU L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 23).

| | Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 290/2009 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tal-31 ta’ Marzu 2009 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2009/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta’ households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2009/7) (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 75). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 290/2009 tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew tal-31 ta’ Marzu 2009 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2009/18) dwar l-istatistika fir-rigward tar-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji għal depożiti u self fil-konfront ta’ households u korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2009/7) (ĠU L 94, 8.4.2009, p. 75).

| | Ir-Regolament tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew Nru 2181/2004 tas-16 ta’ Diċembru 2004, li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 2423/2001 (BĊE/2001/13) dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ ikkonsolidata tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika dwar ir-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji fuq id-depożiti u s-self miżmuma mill-familji u l-korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2004/21) (ĠU L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42). |
| --- | --- |

Ir-Regolament tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew Nru 2181/2004 tas-16 ta’ Diċembru 2004, li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 2423/2001 (BĊE/2001/13) dwar il-karta tal-bilanċ ikkonsolidata tas-settur tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 63/2002 (BĊE/2001/18) dwar l-istatistika dwar ir-rati tal-imgħax applikati mill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji monetarji fuq id-depożiti u s-self miżmuma mill-familji u l-korporazzjonijiet mhux finanzjarji (BĊE/2004/21) (ĠU L 371, 18.12.2004, p. 42).

4 snin

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/9 tal-1 ta’ Awwissu 2007 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 341, 27.12.2007, p. 1).

Rettifika tal-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/9 tal-1 ta’ Awwissu 2007 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 84, 26.3.2008, p. 393).

Emendata bi:

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/31 tad-19 ta’ Diċembru 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 53, 26.2.2009, p. 76). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/31 tad-19 ta’ Diċembru 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (riformulazzjoni) (ĠU L 53, 26.2.2009, p. 76).

| | Linja Gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2009/23 tal-4 ta’ Diċembru 2009 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 16, 21.1.2010, p. 6). |
| --- | --- |

Linja Gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2009/23 tal-4 ta’ Diċembru 2009 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 16, 21.1.2010, p. 6).

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2011/13 tal-25 ta’ Awwissu 2011 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 228, 3.9.2011, p. 37). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2011/13 tal-25 ta’ Awwissu 2011 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2007/9 fuq statistika monetarja, ta’ istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u tas-suq (ĠU L 228, 3.9.2011, p. 37).

4 snin

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/7 tal-21 ta' Novembru 2002 dwar ir-rapporti tal-istatistika meħtieġa mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji għal kull kwart tas-sena (ĠU L 334, 11.12.2002, p. 24).

Emendata bi:

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2005/13 tas-17 ta’ Novembru 2005 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 30, 2.2.2006, p. 1). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2005/13 tas-17 ta’ Novembru 2005 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 30, 2.2.2006, p. 1).

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2006/6 tal-20 ta’ April 2006 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 46). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2006/6 tal-20 ta’ April 2006 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 115, 28.4.2006, p. 46).

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/13 tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2007 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 311, 29.11.2007, p. 47). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2007/13 tal-15 ta’ Novembru 2007 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 311, 29.11.2007, p. 47).

| | Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/6 tas-26 ta’ Awwissu 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 259, 27.9.2008, p. 12). |
| --- | --- |

Il-Linja gwida tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew BĊE/2008/6 tas-26 ta’ Awwissu 2008 li temenda l-Linja Gwida BĊE/2002/7 dwar l-obbligi ta’ rappurtar tal-istatistika tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew fil-qasam tal-kontijiet finanzjarji trimestrali (ĠU L 259, 27.9.2008, p. 12).

4 snin

---

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/18

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6513 – Avenance Italy/Gemeaz Cusin)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2012/C 121/03

Fit-23 ta’ Marzu 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6513. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6513. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/18

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6479 – MNV/Rába)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2012/C 121/04

Fil-11 ta’ April 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6479. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6479. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/19

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.6533 – Goldman Sachs/Advent International/TransUnion Corp)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2012/C 121/05

Fis-17 ta’ April 2012, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6533. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32012M6533. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/20

---

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

Il-25 ta’ April 2012

2012/C 121/06

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3206 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 107,35 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4399 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,81940 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 8,8958 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,2018 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 7,5625 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 24,804 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 287,83 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,1738 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,3765 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,3417 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,2771 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,3016 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,2468 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,6217 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,6440 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 506,66 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 10,2555 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 8,3269 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,5325 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 12 149,96 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,0408 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 56,314 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 38,7490 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 40,859 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 2,4784 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 17,3461 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 69,3910 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3206

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

107,35

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4399

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,81940

SEK

Krona Żvediża

8,8958

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,2018

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

7,5625

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

24,804

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

287,83

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,6993

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,1738

RON

Leu Rumen

4,3765

TRY

Lira Turka

2,3417

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,2771

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,3016

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,2468

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,6217

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,6440

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 506,66

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

10,2555

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

8,3269

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,5325

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

12 149,96

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,0408

PHP

Peso Filippin

56,314

RUB

Rouble Russu

38,7490

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

40,859

BRL

Real Brażiljan

2,4784

MXN

Peso Messikan

17,3461

INR

Rupi Indjan

69,3910

---

(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

---

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/21

---

Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-proċedura stipulata fl-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE,

2012/C 121/07

Skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Artikolu 1(4) tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 96/67/KE tal-15 ta’ Ottubru 1996 dwar l-aċċess għas-suq tal-groundhandling fl-ajruporti tal-Komunità (1), il-Kummissjoni hija meħtieġa tippubblika, għall-informazzjoni, lista tal-ajruporti msemmija fid-Direttiva.

| | Ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jaqbeż 2 miljun moviment ta' passiġġieri jew 50 000 tunnellata ta’ merkanzija fl-2010 | Ajruporti oħra miftuħa għat-traffiku kummerċjali fl-2010 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| L-Awstrija | Wien/Schwechat | Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck |
| Il-Belġju | Brussels National, Charleroi–Brussels South, Liège–Bierset, Oostende–Brugge | Antwerpen, Kortrijk–Wevelgem |
| Il-Bulgarija | Sofia | Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, Gorna Oriahovitza |
| Ċipru | Larnaca | Paphos |
| Ir-Repubblika Ċeka | Praha/Ruzyně | Bmo/Tuřany, Karlovy Vary, Mnichovo Hradiště, Ostrava Mošnov, Pardubice, Olomouc, Benešov, Broumov, Břeclav, Bubovice, Česká Lípa, České Budějovice, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Havlíčkův Brod, Hodkovice nad Mohelkou, Hořice, Hosín, Hradec Králové, Hranice, Cheb, Chomutov, Chotěboř, Chrudim, Jaroměř, Jičín, Jihlava, Jindřichův Hradec, Kladno, Klatovy, Kolín, Krnov, Křižanov, Kyjov, Letkov, Letňany, Mariánské lázně, Medlánky, Mikulovice, Mladá Boleslav, Moravská Třebová, Most, Nové Město nad Metují, Panenský Týnec, Plasy, Podbořany, Policka, Příbram, Přibyslav, Rakovník, Raná, Roudnice, Sazená, Skuteč, Slaný, Soběslav, Staňkov, Strakonice, Strunkovice, Šumperk, Tábor, Točná, Toužím, Ústí nad Orlicí, Velké Pončí, Vlašim, Vrchlabí, Vysoké Mýto, Vyškov, Zábřeh, Zbraslavice, Žamberk |
| Id-Danimarka | Copenhagen Airport, Billund Airport | Aalborg Airport, Aarhus Airport, Esbjerg Airport, Bornholm Airport, Karup Airport, Sønderborg Airport, Thisted Airport, Roskilde Airport |
| L-Estonja | | Lennart Meri Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Kärdla, Kuressaare |
| Il-Finlandja | Helsinki–Vantaa | Enontekiö, Halli, Helsinki–Malmi, Ivalo, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kauhava, Kemi–Tornio, Kittilä, Kokkola–Pietarsaari, Kuopio, Kuusamo, Lappeenranta, Maarianhamina, Oulu, Pori, Savonlinna, Rovaniemi, Tampere–Pirkkala, Turku, Utti, Vaasa, Varkaus, Mikkeli, Seinäjoki |
| Franza | Paris-CDG, Paris–Orly, Nice–Côte d’Azur, Lyon–Saint Exupéry, Marseille–Provence, Toulouse–Blagnac, Bâle–Mulhouse, Bordeaux–Mérignac, Nantes–Atlantique, Beauvais–Tille | Pointe-à-Pitre–Le Raizet, Strasbourg Entzheim, Martinique Aimé Césaire, La Réunion Roland Garros, Montpellier–Méditerranée, Lille Lesquin, Ajaccio Napoléon Bonaparte, Bastia Poretta, Biarritz–Anglet–Bayonne, Brest–Bretagne, Pau Pyrénées, Hyères Le Palyvestre, Tarbes–Lourdes–Pyrénées, Grenoble Isère, Carcassonne, Rennes St Jacques, Perpignan–Rivesaltes, Figari Sud Corse, Cayenne Rochambeau, Clermont-Ferrand–Auvergne, Limoges, Calvi Ste Catherine, Bergerac Roumanière, Chambéry/Aix-les-Bains, Dzaoudzi Pamandzi, Metz Nancy Lorraine, St Martin Grand Case, Lorient–Lann–Bihoue,Nîmes/Arles Camargue, La Rochelle Île de Ré, St Barthélémy, Dinard–Pleurtuit–St-Malo, Rodez Marcillac, St Pierre Pierrefonds, Quimper–Cornouaille, Tours-Val de Loire, Poitiers–Biard–Futuroscope, Paris Le Bourget, Caen Carpiquet, Béziers–Vias, Deauville Normandie, Annecy–Meythet, Le Havre Octeville, St Pierre–Pointe Blanche, Lannion, Avignon Caumont, Castres Mazamet, Angoulême, Agen La Garenne, Maripasoula, Rouen-Vallée de Seine, Aurillac Tronquières, Brive Souillac, St Etienne Bouthéon, Cannes Mandelieu, Miquelon, Saint Nazaire Montoir, Dijon Bourgogne |
| Il-Ġermanja | Berlin–Tegel, Schönefeld, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt-Main, Hahn, Hamburg, Hannover–Langenhagen, Köln–Bonn, Leipzig, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Weeze | Augsburg, Altenburg – Nobitz, Borkum, Braunschweig, Dortmund, Dresden, Erfurt, Friedrichshafen, Heringsdorf, Hof–Plauen, Karlsruhe–Baden-Baden, Kassel–Calden, Kiel–Holtenau, Lübeck–Blankensee, Mannheim City, Memmingen, Mönchengladbach, Münster–Osnabrück, Paderborn–Lippstadt, Saarbrücken–Ensheim, Rostock–Laage, Schwerin–Parchim, Siegerland, Westerland–Sylt, Zweibrücken (2) |
| Il-Greċja | Athens, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos | Corfu–Kerkyra, Kos, Chania, Zante, Alexandroupoulis, Aktio, Araxos, Kalamata, Kalymnos, Kastoria, Kavala, Kozani, Aghialos, Astypalaia, Chios, Ioannina, Ikaria, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kefalonia, Kithira, Leros, Limnos, Mykonos, Milos, Mytilene, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Santorini, Syros, Sitia, Skiathos, Skyros |
| L-Ungerija | Budapest Ferihegy | Pécs–Pogány Repülőtér, Győr–Pér Repülőtér, Fly Balaton Repülőtér Sármellék, Airport Debrecen |
| L-Irlanda | Dublin Airport, Cork Airport | Shannon Airport, Donegal Airport, Ireland West Airport Knock, Kerry Airport, Galway Airport, Sligo Airport, Waterford Airport |
| L-Italja | Roma–Fiumicino, Milano–Malpensa, Milano–Linate, Bergamo Orio al Serio, Venezia Tessera, Catania Fontanarossa, Napoli Capodichino, Bologna Borgo Panigale, Roma–Ciampino, Palermo Punta Raisi, Pisa San Giusto, Cagliari Elmas, Torino Caselle, Verona Villafranca, Bari Palese, Treviso | Firenze, Lamezia Terme, Olbia, Alghero, Genova, Brindisi, Trapani, Trieste, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, Ancona, Pescara, Rimini, Parma, Brescia, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Cuneo, Perugia, Foggia, Crotone, Bolzano, Elba, Grosseto, Salerno, Albenga, Siena, Taranto, Tortoli |
| Il-Latvja | Riga International airport | Liepaja airport, Ventspils airport |
| Il-Litwanja | | Vilnius International Airport, Palanga International Airport, Kaunas International Airport, Siauliai Military Airport |
| Il-Lussemburgu | Luxembourg–Findel | |
| Malta | Luqa-Malta International Airport | |
| Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi | Amsterdam–Schiphol, Maastricht–Aachen, Eindhoven | Groningen–Eelde, Rotterdam |
| Il-Polonja | Chopina w Warszawie, Kraków–Balice, Katowice–Pyrzowice, Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy | Wrocław–Strachowice, Poznań–Ławica, Łódź–Lublinek, Szczecin–Goleniów, Bydgoszcz–Szwederowo, Rzeszów–Jasionka, Zielona Góra–Babimost |
| Il-Portugall | Lisboa, Faro, Oporto, Madeira | Ponta Delgada, Porto Santo, Horta, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Pico, São Jorge, Flores, Corvo, Bragança, Vila Real, Cascais, Lajes. |
| Ir-Rumanija | Aeroportul Internațional Henri Coandă–București, Aeroportul Internațional București Băneasa–Aurel Vlaicu | Aeroportul Internațional Timișoara–Traian Vuia, Aeroportul Internațional Mihail Kogălniceanu–Constanța, Aeroportul Arad, Aeroportul George Enescu–Bacău, Aeroportul Baia Mare, Aeroportul Cluj-Napoca, Aeroportul Craiova, Aeroportul Iași, Aeroportul Oradea, Aeroportul Satu Mare, Aeroportul Sibiu, Aeroportul Ștefan cel Mare–Suceava, Aeroportul Târgu Mureș–Transilvania, Aeroportul Tulcea–Delta Dunării, Aeroportul Tuzla |
| Is-Slovakkja | | Bratislava, Košice, Piešťany, Sliač, Poprad, Žilina |
| Is-Slovenja | | Airport Jože Pučnik Ljubljana, Airport Edvard Rusjan Maribor, Airport Portorož |
| Spanja | Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Madrid/Barajas, Málaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Tenerife Norte, Tenerife Sur, Valencia | Asturias, Coruña (A), Jerez, Murcia/San Javier, Reus, Vigo, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Albacete, Algeciras/Helipuerto, Almería, Badajoz, Burgos, Ceuta/Helipuerto, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Madrid/Cuatro Vientos, Madrid/Torrejón, Gomera (La), Granada, Hierro (El), Huesca-Pirineos, León, Lleida/Alguaire, Logroño, Melilla, Palma (La), Pamplona, Sabadell, Salamanca, San Sebastián, Santander, Son Bonet, Valladolid |
| L-Isvezja | Göteborg–Landvetter, Stockholm–Arlanda, Stockholm/Skavsta, Stockholm/Bromma | Arvidsjaur, Arvika, Borlänge, Eskilstuna, Falköping, Gällivare, Gällivare/Vassare, Gävle, Göteborg/Säve, Hagfors, Halmstad, Hemavan Tärnaby, Hultsfred–Vimmerby, Jönköping, Kalmar, Karlsborg, Karlskoga, Karlstad, Kiruna, Kiruna/Luosajärvi, Kramfors–Sollefteå, Kristianstad, Lidköping, Linköping/Malmen, Linköping/Saab, Ljungbyhed, Luleå/Kallax, Lycksele, Malmö/Sturup, Mora/Siljan, Norrköping/Kungsängen, Oskarshamn, Pajala–Ylläs, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skövde, Stockholm/Västerås, Storuman, Strömstad/Näsinge, Sundsvall–Härnösand, Sveg, Såtenäs, Söderhamn, Torsby/Fryklanda, Trollhättan–Vänersborg, Umeå, Uppsala, Vidsel, Vilhelmina, Visby, Växjö/Kronoberg, Åre–Östersund, Ängelholm, Örebro, Örnsköldsvik |
| Ir-Renju Unit | Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Luton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, Prestwick, East Midlands International, Southampton, Belfast International, London City, Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds Bradford | Barra, Benbecula, Biggin Hill, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Cambridge, Campbeltown, Cardiff Wales, City of Derry, Doncaster Sheffield, Durham Tees Valley, Exeter, Farnborough, Gloucestershire, Humberside, Inverness, Islay, Isles of Scilly, Kirkwall, Lands End, Lerwick, Lydd, Manston, Newquay, Norwich, Oxford, Penzance Heliport, Plymouth, Scatsa, Shoreham, Southend, Stornoway, Sumburgh, Tiree, Wick |

Ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jaqbeż 2 miljun moviment ta' passiġġieri jew 50 000 tunnellata ta’ merkanzija fl-2010

Ajruporti oħra miftuħa għat-traffiku kummerċjali fl-2010

L-Awstrija

Wien/Schwechat

Linz, Graz, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck

Il-Belġju

Brussels National, Charleroi–Brussels South, Liège–Bierset, Oostende–Brugge

Antwerpen, Kortrijk–Wevelgem

Il-Bulgarija

Sofia

Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, Gorna Oriahovitza

Ċipru

Larnaca

Paphos

Ir-Repubblika Ċeka

Praha/Ruzyně

Bmo/Tuřany, Karlovy Vary, Mnichovo Hradiště, Ostrava Mošnov, Pardubice, Olomouc, Benešov, Broumov, Břeclav, Bubovice, Česká Lípa, České Budějovice, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Frýdlant nad Ostravicí, Havlíčkův Brod, Hodkovice nad Mohelkou, Hořice, Hosín, Hradec Králové, Hranice, Cheb, Chomutov, Chotěboř, Chrudim, Jaroměř, Jičín, Jihlava, Jindřichův Hradec, Kladno, Klatovy, Kolín, Krnov, Křižanov, Kyjov, Letkov, Letňany, Mariánské lázně, Medlánky, Mikulovice, Mladá Boleslav, Moravská Třebová, Most, Nové Město nad Metují, Panenský Týnec, Plasy, Podbořany, Policka, Příbram, Přibyslav, Rakovník, Raná, Roudnice, Sazená, Skuteč, Slaný, Soběslav, Staňkov, Strakonice, Strunkovice, Šumperk, Tábor, Točná, Toužím, Ústí nad Orlicí, Velké Pončí, Vlašim, Vrchlabí, Vysoké Mýto, Vyškov, Zábřeh, Zbraslavice, Žamberk

Id-Danimarka

Copenhagen Airport, Billund Airport

Aalborg Airport, Aarhus Airport, Esbjerg Airport, Bornholm Airport, Karup Airport, Sønderborg Airport, Thisted Airport, Roskilde Airport

L-Estonja

Lennart Meri Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, Kärdla, Kuressaare

Il-Finlandja

Helsinki–Vantaa

Enontekiö, Halli, Helsinki–Malmi, Ivalo, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kauhava, Kemi–Tornio, Kittilä, Kokkola–Pietarsaari, Kuopio, Kuusamo, Lappeenranta, Maarianhamina, Oulu, Pori, Savonlinna, Rovaniemi, Tampere–Pirkkala, Turku, Utti, Vaasa, Varkaus, Mikkeli, Seinäjoki

Franza

Paris-CDG, Paris–Orly, Nice–Côte d’Azur, Lyon–Saint Exupéry, Marseille–Provence, Toulouse–Blagnac, Bâle–Mulhouse, Bordeaux–Mérignac, Nantes–Atlantique, Beauvais–Tille

Pointe-à-Pitre–Le Raizet, Strasbourg Entzheim, Martinique Aimé Césaire, La Réunion Roland Garros, Montpellier–Méditerranée, Lille Lesquin, Ajaccio Napoléon Bonaparte, Bastia Poretta, Biarritz–Anglet–Bayonne, Brest–Bretagne, Pau Pyrénées, Hyères Le Palyvestre, Tarbes–Lourdes–Pyrénées, Grenoble Isère, Carcassonne, Rennes St Jacques, Perpignan–Rivesaltes, Figari Sud Corse, Cayenne Rochambeau, Clermont-Ferrand–Auvergne, Limoges, Calvi Ste Catherine, Bergerac Roumanière, Chambéry/Aix-les-Bains, Dzaoudzi Pamandzi, Metz Nancy Lorraine, St Martin Grand Case, Lorient–Lann–Bihoue,Nîmes/Arles Camargue, La Rochelle Île de Ré, St Barthélémy, Dinard–Pleurtuit–St-Malo, Rodez Marcillac, St Pierre Pierrefonds, Quimper–Cornouaille, Tours-Val de Loire, Poitiers–Biard–Futuroscope, Paris Le Bourget, Caen Carpiquet, Béziers–Vias, Deauville Normandie, Annecy–Meythet, Le Havre Octeville, St Pierre–Pointe Blanche, Lannion, Avignon Caumont, Castres Mazamet, Angoulême, Agen La Garenne, Maripasoula, Rouen-Vallée de Seine, Aurillac Tronquières, Brive Souillac, St Etienne Bouthéon, Cannes Mandelieu, Miquelon, Saint Nazaire Montoir, Dijon Bourgogne

Il-Ġermanja

Berlin–Tegel, Schönefeld, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt-Main, Hahn, Hamburg, Hannover–Langenhagen, Köln–Bonn, Leipzig, München, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Weeze

Augsburg, Altenburg – Nobitz, Borkum, Braunschweig, Dortmund, Dresden, Erfurt, Friedrichshafen, Heringsdorf, Hof–Plauen, Karlsruhe–Baden-Baden, Kassel–Calden, Kiel–Holtenau, Lübeck–Blankensee, Mannheim City, Memmingen, Mönchengladbach, Münster–Osnabrück, Paderborn–Lippstadt, Saarbrücken–Ensheim, Rostock–Laage, Schwerin–Parchim, Siegerland, Westerland–Sylt, Zweibrücken (2)

Il-Greċja

Athens, Iraklio, Thessaloniki, Rodos

Corfu–Kerkyra, Kos, Chania, Zante, Alexandroupoulis, Aktio, Araxos, Kalamata, Kalymnos, Kastoria, Kavala, Kozani, Aghialos, Astypalaia, Chios, Ioannina, Ikaria, Karpathos, Kasos, Kastelorizo, Kefalonia, Kithira, Leros, Limnos, Mykonos, Milos, Mytilene, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Santorini, Syros, Sitia, Skiathos, Skyros

L-Ungerija

Budapest Ferihegy

Pécs–Pogány Repülőtér, Győr–Pér Repülőtér, Fly Balaton Repülőtér Sármellék, Airport Debrecen

L-Irlanda

Dublin Airport, Cork Airport

Shannon Airport, Donegal Airport, Ireland West Airport Knock, Kerry Airport, Galway Airport, Sligo Airport, Waterford Airport

L-Italja

Roma–Fiumicino, Milano–Malpensa, Milano–Linate, Bergamo Orio al Serio, Venezia Tessera, Catania Fontanarossa, Napoli Capodichino, Bologna Borgo Panigale, Roma–Ciampino, Palermo Punta Raisi, Pisa San Giusto, Cagliari Elmas, Torino Caselle, Verona Villafranca, Bari Palese, Treviso

Firenze, Lamezia Terme, Olbia, Alghero, Genova, Brindisi, Trapani, Trieste, Forlì, Reggio Calabria, Ancona, Pescara, Rimini, Parma, Brescia, Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Cuneo, Perugia, Foggia, Crotone, Bolzano, Elba, Grosseto, Salerno, Albenga, Siena, Taranto, Tortoli

Il-Latvja

Riga International airport

Liepaja airport, Ventspils airport

Il-Litwanja

Vilnius International Airport, Palanga International Airport, Kaunas International Airport, Siauliai Military Airport

Il-Lussemburgu

Luxembourg–Findel

Malta

Luqa-Malta International Airport

Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi

Amsterdam–Schiphol, Maastricht–Aachen, Eindhoven

Groningen–Eelde, Rotterdam

Il-Polonja

Chopina w Warszawie, Kraków–Balice, Katowice–Pyrzowice, Gdańsk im. Lecha Wałęsy

Wrocław–Strachowice, Poznań–Ławica, Łódź–Lublinek, Szczecin–Goleniów, Bydgoszcz–Szwederowo, Rzeszów–Jasionka, Zielona Góra–Babimost

Il-Portugall

Lisboa, Faro, Oporto, Madeira

Ponta Delgada, Porto Santo, Horta, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Pico, São Jorge, Flores, Corvo, Bragança, Vila Real, Cascais, Lajes.

Ir-Rumanija

Aeroportul Internațional Henri Coandă–București, Aeroportul Internațional București Băneasa–Aurel Vlaicu

Aeroportul Internațional Timișoara–Traian Vuia, Aeroportul Internațional Mihail Kogălniceanu–Constanța, Aeroportul Arad, Aeroportul George Enescu–Bacău, Aeroportul Baia Mare, Aeroportul Cluj-Napoca, Aeroportul Craiova, Aeroportul Iași, Aeroportul Oradea, Aeroportul Satu Mare, Aeroportul Sibiu, Aeroportul Ștefan cel Mare–Suceava, Aeroportul Târgu Mureș–Transilvania, Aeroportul Tulcea–Delta Dunării, Aeroportul Tuzla

Is-Slovakkja

Bratislava, Košice, Piešťany, Sliač, Poprad, Žilina

Is-Slovenja

Airport Jože Pučnik Ljubljana, Airport Edvard Rusjan Maribor, Airport Portorož

Spanja

Alicante, Barcelona, Bilbao, Fuerteventura, Girona, Gran Canaria, Ibiza, Lanzarote, Madrid/Barajas, Málaga, Menorca, Palma de Mallorca, Santiago de Compostela, Sevilla, Tenerife Norte, Tenerife Sur, Valencia

Asturias, Coruña (A), Jerez, Murcia/San Javier, Reus, Vigo, Vitoria, Zaragoza, Albacete, Algeciras/Helipuerto, Almería, Badajoz, Burgos, Ceuta/Helipuerto, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Madrid/Cuatro Vientos, Madrid/Torrejón, Gomera (La), Granada, Hierro (El), Huesca-Pirineos, León, Lleida/Alguaire, Logroño, Melilla, Palma (La), Pamplona, Sabadell, Salamanca, San Sebastián, Santander, Son Bonet, Valladolid

L-Isvezja

Göteborg–Landvetter, Stockholm–Arlanda, Stockholm/Skavsta, Stockholm/Bromma

Arvidsjaur, Arvika, Borlänge, Eskilstuna, Falköping, Gällivare, Gällivare/Vassare, Gävle, Göteborg/Säve, Hagfors, Halmstad, Hemavan Tärnaby, Hultsfred–Vimmerby, Jönköping, Kalmar, Karlsborg, Karlskoga, Karlstad, Kiruna, Kiruna/Luosajärvi, Kramfors–Sollefteå, Kristianstad, Lidköping, Linköping/Malmen, Linköping/Saab, Ljungbyhed, Luleå/Kallax, Lycksele, Malmö/Sturup, Mora/Siljan, Norrköping/Kungsängen, Oskarshamn, Pajala–Ylläs, Ronneby, Skellefteå, Skövde, Stockholm/Västerås, Storuman, Strömstad/Näsinge, Sundsvall–Härnösand, Sveg, Såtenäs, Söderhamn, Torsby/Fryklanda, Trollhättan–Vänersborg, Umeå, Uppsala, Vidsel, Vilhelmina, Visby, Växjö/Kronoberg, Åre–Östersund, Ängelholm, Örebro, Örnsköldsvik

Ir-Renju Unit

Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Luton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow, Bristol, Liverpool, Newcastle, Prestwick, East Midlands International, Southampton, Belfast International, London City, Aberdeen, Belfast City, Leeds Bradford

Barra, Benbecula, Biggin Hill, Blackpool, Bournemouth, Cambridge, Campbeltown, Cardiff Wales, City of Derry, Doncaster Sheffield, Durham Tees Valley, Exeter, Farnborough, Gloucestershire, Humberside, Inverness, Islay, Isles of Scilly, Kirkwall, Lands End, Lerwick, Lydd, Manston, Newquay, Norwich, Oxford, Penzance Heliport, Plymouth, Scatsa, Shoreham, Southend, Stornoway, Sumburgh, Tiree, Wick

---

(1)  ĠU L 272, 25.10.1996, p. 36

(2)  L-ajruporti li t-traffiku annwali tagħhom jammonta għal inqas minn 10 000 passiġġier fis-sena mhumiex elenkati.

---

Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/24

---

Ir-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 “L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv?”

2012/C 121/08

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri tinfurmak li r-Rapport Speċjali Nru 4/2012 “L-użu ta’ Fondi Strutturali u ta’ Koeżjoni għall-kofinanzjament ta’ infrastrutturi tat-trasport fil-portijiet: investiment effettiv?” għadu kif ġie ppubblikat.

Ir-rapport jista’ jiġi kkonsultat jew imniżżel mill-websajt tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri: http://eca.europa.eu

Verżjoni stampata tar-rapport tista’ tinkiseb mingħajr ħlas fuq talba lill-Qorti tal-Awdituri:

| Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri |
| --- |
| Unità “Verifika: Il-Produzzjoni ta’ Rapporti” |
| 12, rue Alcide de Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel +352 4398-1 |
| Posta elettronika: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri

Unità “Verifika: Il-Produzzjoni ta’ Rapporti”

12, rue Alcide de Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel +352 4398-1

Posta elettronika: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

jew billi timla formola ta’ ordni elettronika fl-EU-Bookshop.

---

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/25

---

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-muniċipalità ta’ Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS (“NEAS”)

2012/C 121/09

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 393/11/COL tal-14 ta’ Diċembru 2011, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA |
| --- |
| Reġistru |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA

Reġistru

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm mistura wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Proċedura

Permezz ta’ ittra datata s-7 ta’ Jannar 2009, ġie rreġistrat ilment kontra l-muniċipalità ta’ Narvik (“il-Muniċipalità”) rigward il-bejgħ tad-dritt tal-muniċipalità ta’ Narvik għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil Narvik Energi AS (“NEAS”). L-Awtorità rċeviet u reġistrat l-ittra fl-14 ta’ Jannar 2009 (Avveniment Nru 504391).

Bl-ittra tas-16 ta’ Lulju 2009 (Avveniment Nru 519710), l-Awtorità talbet informazzjoni addizzjonali mingħand l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. B’ittra datata t-2 ta’ Ottubru 2009 (Avveniment Nru 532247), l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi wieġbu għat-talba għal aktar informazzjoni.

Il-Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

Il-Muniċipalità ta’ Narvik u Narvik Energi AS għamlu kuntratt fis-16 ta’ Ottubru 2000 li fuq il-bażi tiegħu l-muniċipalità biegħet id-drittijiet tagħha għall-elettriku konċessjonarju lil NEAS għal 50.5 sena għal NOK 126 miljun. L-Awtorità vvalutat il-probabbiltà ta’ jekk it-tranżazzjoni saritx skont il-prinċipju tal-investitur f’ekonomija tas-suq, jiġifieri, jekk il-muniċipalità bigħetx id-dritt għall-elettriku konċessjonarju għall-valur tiegħu fis-suq, u jekk il-prezzijiet u t-termini tat-tranżazzjoni kienux ikunu aċċettabbli għal investitur privat li jopera f’ekonomija tas-suq.

L-Awtorità għandha dubji fir-rigward tar-referenza sabiex jitqabbel il-kuntratt inkwistjoni. Barra minn hekk, kien hemm riskji tas-suq u regolatorji sinifikanti li setgħu affettwaw l-assunzjonijiet/varjabbli fil-mudelli tal-valutazzjoni użati biex jevalwaw il-prezz tad-dritt. Bħala riżultat, l-istimi tal-valur provduti mill-konsulenti esterni varjaw minn madwar NOK 70 miljun għal NOK 145 miljun. Il-firxa relattivament wiesgħa fil-valur tista’ tindika li hemm inċertezza dwar il-valur propja fis-suq tal-assi matul perjodu ta’ 50 sena.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità nnutat li ebda proċedura ta’ sejħa għall-offerti miftuħa u kompetittiva ma ġiet organizzata ex-ante u l-ebda klawsoli ta’ aġġustament ex-post fil-prezz ma ġew inklużi fil-kuntratt.

L-awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jipprovdu biżżejjed informazzjoni biex juru li l-kuntratt daħal fis-seħħ skont il-prinċipju tal-investitur f’ekonomija tas-suq u li għalhekk ma kienx jinvolvi għajnuna mill-Istat.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità għandha dubji jekk il-kuntratt bejn il-muniċipalità u n-NEAS huwiex konformi mal-prinċipju tal-investitur f’ekonomija tas-suq, u għalhekk f’dan l-istadju ma tistax teskludi li l-ftehim imsemmi hawn fuq ma kienx jinvolvi għajnuna mill-Istat fi ħdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

Għalhekk, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta’ investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 393/11/COL

of 14 December 2011

to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement with regard to the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3 SCA’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 13(1) of Part II,

HAVING REGARD to the Authority’s Decision of 14 July 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (1).

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 7 January 2009, a complaint was filed against Narvik municipality (‘the municipality’) regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS (‘NEAS’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 January 2009 (Event No 504391). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 7 January 2009, a complaint was filed against Narvik municipality (‘the municipality’) regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to Narvik Energi AS (‘NEAS’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 14 January 2009 (Event No 504391).

| (2) | By letter dated 16 July 2009 (Event No 519710), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 2 October 2009 (Event No 532247), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 16 July 2009 (Event No 519710), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 2 October 2009 (Event No 532247), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The complaint

| (3) | According to the complaint, on 16 October 2000 the municipality entered into a contract with NEAS for the sale of 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years. For this, NEAS paid the municipality one upfront lump sum of NOK 126 million. The contract, that was entered into after negotiation between the contracting parties and without a competitive tender procedure, contained no index adjustment or other price adjustment clauses. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

According to the complaint, on 16 October 2000 the municipality entered into a contract with NEAS for the sale of 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years. For this, NEAS paid the municipality one upfront lump sum of NOK 126 million. The contract, that was entered into after negotiation between the contracting parties and without a competitive tender procedure, contained no index adjustment or other price adjustment clauses.

| (4) | The complainant further alleges that the decision to enter into the contract was adopted by Narvik Municipal Council on the basis of incorrect and/or incomplete information. Allegedly expert reports critical of the duration of the contract and the inherent difficulty in establishing a market price for electricity were not disclosed to the Municipal Council prior to taking the decision to enter into the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The complainant further alleges that the decision to enter into the contract was adopted by Narvik Municipal Council on the basis of incorrect and/or incomplete information. Allegedly expert reports critical of the duration of the contract and the inherent difficulty in establishing a market price for electricity were not disclosed to the Municipal Council prior to taking the decision to enter into the contract.

| (5) | The complainant argues that the market price for the concession power over the contract period is significantly higher than NOK 126 million. Therefore the contract involves State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The complainant argues that the market price for the concession power over the contract period is significantly higher than NOK 126 million. Therefore the contract involves State aid.

| (6) | The contract that forms the subject of the complaint is entitled ‘Lease of concession power for a period of 50,5 years ...’ (2). However, throughout this Decision the Authority will refer to the contract as a contract of sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power. The Authority will, in its preliminary assessment, assess not only the contract but also all supplementary agreements to it, as well as any other circumstances surrounding and related to the sale. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The contract that forms the subject of the complaint is entitled ‘Lease of concession power for a period of 50,5 years ...’ (2). However, throughout this Decision the Authority will refer to the contract as a contract of sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power. The Authority will, in its preliminary assessment, assess not only the contract but also all supplementary agreements to it, as well as any other circumstances surrounding and related to the sale.

3.   Background

3.1.   
  Concession power regime

| (7) | Any municipality which has hydropower production within its borders is entitled to receive an annual amount of concession power from concessionaires for waterfall exploitation. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Any municipality which has hydropower production within its borders is entitled to receive an annual amount of concession power from concessionaires for waterfall exploitation.

| (8) | The system of concession power is laid down in Section 2(12) of the Industrial Licensing Act (3) and Section 12(15) of the Waterfalls Regulation Act (4). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The system of concession power is laid down in Section 2(12) of the Industrial Licensing Act (3) and Section 12(15) of the Waterfalls Regulation Act (4).

| (9) | Each municipality’s entitlement to concession power is decided on the basis of its ‘general electric power supply needs’ (5) and can be up to 10 per cent of a plant’s yearly production. The legal basis for the municipalities’ right to concession power, referred to above, states that municipalities may dispose of the concession power as they see fit (irrespective of the fact that the amount to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of their ‘general electric power supply needs’). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Each municipality’s entitlement to concession power is decided on the basis of its ‘general electric power supply needs’ (5) and can be up to 10 per cent of a plant’s yearly production. The legal basis for the municipalities’ right to concession power, referred to above, states that municipalities may dispose of the concession power as they see fit (irrespective of the fact that the amount to which they are entitled is calculated on the basis of their ‘general electric power supply needs’).

| (10) | The price paid by the municipalities for the concession power is determined on an annual basis by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). The municipalities also carry the costs of feeding the concession power into the grid. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The price paid by the municipalities for the concession power is determined on an annual basis by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP). The municipalities also carry the costs of feeding the concession power into the grid.

| (11) | The majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019.

3.2.   
  Narvik municipality and the contract with Narvik Energi AS

| (12) | Narvik municipality is located in the county of Nordland. NEAS is a company that is active in the production and sale of electricity. NEAS was 100 per cent owned by the municipality until 2001, when the municipality reduced its ownership stake in the company to 50,01 per cent. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Narvik municipality is located in the county of Nordland. NEAS is a company that is active in the production and sale of electricity. NEAS was 100 per cent owned by the municipality until 2001, when the municipality reduced its ownership stake in the company to 50,01 per cent.

| (13) | In 1999, Narvik municipality had the right to purchase approximately 128 GWh of concession power annually. Approximately 10 per cent of this concession power was generated by NEAS, while the remaining 90 per cent was generated by other hydropower companies within the municipality (in which Narvik municipality had no stake). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In 1999, Narvik municipality had the right to purchase approximately 128 GWh of concession power annually. Approximately 10 per cent of this concession power was generated by NEAS, while the remaining 90 per cent was generated by other hydropower companies within the municipality (in which Narvik municipality had no stake).

| (14) | Historically, the municipality had sold its concession power to NEAS under short- or longer-term contracts. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Historically, the municipality had sold its concession power to NEAS under short- or longer-term contracts.

| (15) | After the expiry of a three-year contract on 31 December 1998, the parties could not reach an agreement as to the prolongation of the contract. Until the concession power price for 1999 was published on 26 March 1999, the municipality therefore sold its concession power on a power exchange at spot prices. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

After the expiry of a three-year contract on 31 December 1998, the parties could not reach an agreement as to the prolongation of the contract. Until the concession power price for 1999 was published on 26 March 1999, the municipality therefore sold its concession power on a power exchange at spot prices.

| (16) | In March 1999, with knowledge of the concession power price for that year, the municipality arranged a tender procedure for the sale of its concession power for the remainder of 1999. On 30 March 1999, the Municipal Council sold this concession power to the highest bidder, Kraftinor, for a price of NOK 109,50/MWh. Since the municipality itself paid NOK 111,10/MWh plus feeding costs of NOK 20/MWh for the concession power, the municipality incurred a loss of approximately NOK 2,3 million under this contract (compared to a budgeted surplus of NOK 3,5 million). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In March 1999, with knowledge of the concession power price for that year, the municipality arranged a tender procedure for the sale of its concession power for the remainder of 1999. On 30 March 1999, the Municipal Council sold this concession power to the highest bidder, Kraftinor, for a price of NOK 109,50/MWh. Since the municipality itself paid NOK 111,10/MWh plus feeding costs of NOK 20/MWh for the concession power, the municipality incurred a loss of approximately NOK 2,3 million under this contract (compared to a budgeted surplus of NOK 3,5 million).

| (17) | According to the Norwegian authorities, electricity prices had been falling for several years and had reached their lowest point in 1998, but had picked up again in 1999. In 1999, the difference between concession power price and market price was, however, relatively small. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

According to the Norwegian authorities, electricity prices had been falling for several years and had reached their lowest point in 1998, but had picked up again in 1999. In 1999, the difference between concession power price and market price was, however, relatively small.

| (18) | Due to the volatile and relatively low electricity spot prices, it was decided in a Municipal Council meeting held on 30 March 1999 that a long-term strategy for the future handling of the municipality’s concession power was to be developed and presented to the Municipal Council in August 1999. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Due to the volatile and relatively low electricity spot prices, it was decided in a Municipal Council meeting held on 30 March 1999 that a long-term strategy for the future handling of the municipality’s concession power was to be developed and presented to the Municipal Council in August 1999.

| (19) | On 15 October 1999, the municipal administration proposed a strategy for the future handling of the concession power to the Municipal Council executive committee (‘Executive Committee’). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

On 15 October 1999, the municipal administration proposed a strategy for the future handling of the concession power to the Municipal Council executive committee (‘Executive Committee’).

| (20) | On 19 October 1999, the Executive Committee confirmed the proposal of the administration and recommended to the Municipal Council that the overall goal for handling the municipality’s concession power should be ‘to maximize return on a long-term basis in order to obtain a stable planning horizon with less uncertainty from year to year (6).’ The proposed strategy for achieving this goal had four elements:






  1. | Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return, however with adjustment clauses that give additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(20)

On 19 October 1999, the Executive Committee confirmed the proposal of the administration and recommended to the Municipal Council that the overall goal for handling the municipality’s concession power should be ‘to maximize return on a long-term basis in order to obtain a stable planning horizon with less uncertainty from year to year (6).’ The proposed strategy for achieving this goal had four elements:

1.

Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return, however with adjustment clauses that give additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period;

| 2. | Concession power is sold under different contracts of different lengths to diversify risk; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Concession power is sold under different contracts of different lengths to diversify risk;

| 3. | The mayor is granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council; and |
| --- | --- |

3.

The mayor is granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council; and

| 4. | Profits from the sale of the concession power is deposited into a fund to be dispersed according to decisions by the Municipal Council. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Profits from the sale of the concession power is deposited into a fund to be dispersed according to decisions by the Municipal Council.

| (21) | The strategy proposal was discussed on 25 November 1999 as Municipal Council Case 99/52 (‘Strategy for handling of concession power’). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The strategy proposal was discussed on 25 November 1999 as Municipal Council Case 99/52 (‘Strategy for handling of concession power’).

| (22) | The Municipal Council confirmed the recommendation of the Executive Committee with one adjustment, suggested by the mayor and confirmed by way of an amendment to the strategy: instead of the mayor being explicitly ‘granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council’, the final decision stated that ‘as a first step in executing this strategy, NEAS is invited to discuss their interest in the matter as outlined in their letter to the municipality dated 9 November (7).’ |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Municipal Council confirmed the recommendation of the Executive Committee with one adjustment, suggested by the mayor and confirmed by way of an amendment to the strategy: instead of the mayor being explicitly ‘granted power of attorney to enter into agreements according to the strategy decided by the Municipal Council’, the final decision stated that ‘as a first step in executing this strategy, NEAS is invited to discuss their interest in the matter as outlined in their letter to the municipality dated 9 November (7).’

| (23) | The letter from NEAS dated 9 November questioned the proposed strategy of selling the concession power under different contracts of different lengths to spread risk. Instead, NEAS suggested one long-term contract (‘for example 50 years’ (8)) and was open to including a price adjustment clause in the contract with Narvik Municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The letter from NEAS dated 9 November questioned the proposed strategy of selling the concession power under different contracts of different lengths to spread risk. Instead, NEAS suggested one long-term contract (‘for example 50 years’ (8)) and was open to including a price adjustment clause in the contract with Narvik Municipality.

| (24) | According to the documentation provided by the Norwegian authorities, NEAS had also proposed this type of contract earlier in the process. In a letter dated 15 April 1999, NEAS had approached the municipality stating its interest in entering into a long-term contract regarding the concession power, primarily through a purchase with an upfront lump sum payment, or alternatively as a long-term lease — suggested initially at 60 years — with annual payments to Narvik Municipality (9). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

According to the documentation provided by the Norwegian authorities, NEAS had also proposed this type of contract earlier in the process. In a letter dated 15 April 1999, NEAS had approached the municipality stating its interest in entering into a long-term contract regarding the concession power, primarily through a purchase with an upfront lump sum payment, or alternatively as a long-term lease — suggested initially at 60 years — with annual payments to Narvik Municipality (9).

| (25) | Aside from the issue of the concession power, there were also discussions about NEAS’ future role in the market, and the municipality’s role as the owner of NEAS (10). |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Aside from the issue of the concession power, there were also discussions about NEAS’ future role in the market, and the municipality’s role as the owner of NEAS (10).

| (26) | According to the Norwegian authorities, NEAS was at the time observing extensive regional consolidation amongst power companies and the entry of national/international operators into local markets. NEAS needed to strengthen its equity base in order to acquire shares in other electricity companies, particularly Nordkraft AS. NEAS had also signed letters of intent with Hålogaland Kraft AS and Vesterålskraft AS, two local power companies, to form a regional production company and a regional energy transportation company. These changes were planned to take effect as of 1 January 2001. In order for NEAS to be able to complete these transactions with a combination of equity and borrowed capital, Narvik Municipality — NEAS’ sole owner — was expected to inject additional equity into NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

According to the Norwegian authorities, NEAS was at the time observing extensive regional consolidation amongst power companies and the entry of national/international operators into local markets. NEAS needed to strengthen its equity base in order to acquire shares in other electricity companies, particularly Nordkraft AS. NEAS had also signed letters of intent with Hålogaland Kraft AS and Vesterålskraft AS, two local power companies, to form a regional production company and a regional energy transportation company. These changes were planned to take effect as of 1 January 2001. In order for NEAS to be able to complete these transactions with a combination of equity and borrowed capital, Narvik Municipality — NEAS’ sole owner — was expected to inject additional equity into NEAS.

| (27) | On 16 December 1999, the Municipal Council discussed Case 99/65 (‘Sale of equity positions’). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

On 16 December 1999, the Municipal Council discussed Case 99/65 (‘Sale of equity positions’).

| (28) | In this meeting, the Municipal Council assessed both its ownership position in NEAS and the above-mentioned capital needs of NEAS. It was decided that the municipality’s ownership stake in NEAS, the capital needs of NEAS and the handling of concession power, should be assessed jointly by a negotiation team consisting of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the leader of the opposition, as well as the director, the deputy director and the head of procurement of the municipal administration (‘the negotiation team’). The negotiation team was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions in Cases 99/52 and 99/65, and to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this meeting, the Municipal Council assessed both its ownership position in NEAS and the above-mentioned capital needs of NEAS. It was decided that the municipality’s ownership stake in NEAS, the capital needs of NEAS and the handling of concession power, should be assessed jointly by a negotiation team consisting of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the leader of the opposition, as well as the director, the deputy director and the head of procurement of the municipal administration (‘the negotiation team’). The negotiation team was given the responsibility of implementing the decisions in Cases 99/52 and 99/65, and to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee.

| (29) | During the winter and spring of 2000, both the municipality and NEAS sought external advice concerning the valuation of the concession power, the implications of the municipality injecting capital into NEAS, as well as the municipality reducing its ownership position in NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

During the winter and spring of 2000, both the municipality and NEAS sought external advice concerning the valuation of the concession power, the implications of the municipality injecting capital into NEAS, as well as the municipality reducing its ownership position in NEAS.

| (30) | NEAS engaged Arthur Andersen (‘AA’) to make an assessment of the value of the concession power. AA’s report was delivered on 20 May 1999. It estimated a net present value (‘NPV’) of the concession power transferred for 50 years to be in the range of NOK 71,4-117,4 million with a base case value of NOK 87,7 million (11). |
| --- | --- |

(30)

NEAS engaged Arthur Andersen (‘AA’) to make an assessment of the value of the concession power. AA’s report was delivered on 20 May 1999. It estimated a net present value (‘NPV’) of the concession power transferred for 50 years to be in the range of NOK 71,4-117,4 million with a base case value of NOK 87,7 million (11).

| (31) | NEAS also commissioned a value assessment from Deloitte & Touche (‘DT’). In its report dated 3 May 2000, DT estimated the NPV of the concession power, again for 50 years, to be approximately NOK 110-130 million (12). |
| --- | --- |

(31)

NEAS also commissioned a value assessment from Deloitte & Touche (‘DT’). In its report dated 3 May 2000, DT estimated the NPV of the concession power, again for 50 years, to be approximately NOK 110-130 million (12).

| (32) | Narvik Municipality, on the other hand, initially asked Danske Securities (‘DS’) to assess whether Narvik Municipality should transfer its concession power to NEAS as a part of a restructuring process in NEAS, or if Narvik Municipality should sell the power independently. DS concluded, in a report dated 14 February 2000, that there were no economic or strategic reasons for transferring the concession power to NEAS. DS also — ‘on its own initiative’ (13) — made a value assessment of a 50-year contract, and concluded that such a contract had a value in the range of NOK 80-145 million. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Narvik Municipality, on the other hand, initially asked Danske Securities (‘DS’) to assess whether Narvik Municipality should transfer its concession power to NEAS as a part of a restructuring process in NEAS, or if Narvik Municipality should sell the power independently. DS concluded, in a report dated 14 February 2000, that there were no economic or strategic reasons for transferring the concession power to NEAS. DS also — ‘on its own initiative’ (13) — made a value assessment of a 50-year contract, and concluded that such a contract had a value in the range of NOK 80-145 million.

| (33) | DS was subsequently commissioned to perform a second assessment of the value of the concession power. In order to do so, it contacted three market participants — Statkraft SF, CBF Kraftmegling AS, and Norwegian Energy Brokers AS — and asked how they would value a 50-year concession power contract. Based on the responses, DS concluded, in a report dated 23 February 2000, that the NPV of the concession power was in the range of NOK 100-140 million (14). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

DS was subsequently commissioned to perform a second assessment of the value of the concession power. In order to do so, it contacted three market participants — Statkraft SF, CBF Kraftmegling AS, and Norwegian Energy Brokers AS — and asked how they would value a 50-year concession power contract. Based on the responses, DS concluded, in a report dated 23 February 2000, that the NPV of the concession power was in the range of NOK 100-140 million (14).

| (34) | In addition to external advice, there were also internal assessments made by the head of procurement at the municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In addition to external advice, there were also internal assessments made by the head of procurement at the municipality.

| (35) | In the first assessment presented to the Executive Committee in October 1999, he concluded that the overall risk for the municipality was high for long-term contracts defined as contracts between 10 and 40 years (15). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

In the first assessment presented to the Executive Committee in October 1999, he concluded that the overall risk for the municipality was high for long-term contracts defined as contracts between 10 and 40 years (15).

| (36) | In his second assessment, presented to the negotiation team on 16 March 2000, various options for handling the concession power were discussed. By this time, however, the negotiation team had narrowed the scope of his mandate (16). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In his second assessment, presented to the negotiation team on 16 March 2000, various options for handling the concession power were discussed. By this time, however, the negotiation team had narrowed the scope of his mandate (16).

| (37) | Notwithstanding this, in his second assessment, the head of procurement continued to focus on the importance of the length of the contract. His assessment of the marginal value of the entitlement to concession power over time was that ‘... to enter into a very long contract such as 50 years gives very little additional value for us as sellers compared to a shorter contract (for example 20 years with NOK 83 million) (17).’ After internal discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a long-term contract, the negotiation team made its recommendation to the Municipal Council: it recommended a contract with a duration of 50,5 years as appropriate to reduce the municipality’s risk and to provide a long-term planning horizon. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Notwithstanding this, in his second assessment, the head of procurement continued to focus on the importance of the length of the contract. His assessment of the marginal value of the entitlement to concession power over time was that ‘... to enter into a very long contract such as 50 years gives very little additional value for us as sellers compared to a shorter contract (for example 20 years with NOK 83 million) (17).’ After internal discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a long-term contract, the negotiation team made its recommendation to the Municipal Council: it recommended a contract with a duration of 50,5 years as appropriate to reduce the municipality’s risk and to provide a long-term planning horizon.

| (38) | On 22 May 2000, the Municipal Council decided that the municipality should sell its entitlement to concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years and reduce its ownership in NEAS by as much as 49 percent by the end of 2000 (18). From the information presented by the Norwegian Authorities, the above-mentioned independent expert reports were referred to in the memorandum distributed to the council members prior to taking the decision, but copies of the reports appear not to have been distributed (19). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

On 22 May 2000, the Municipal Council decided that the municipality should sell its entitlement to concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years and reduce its ownership in NEAS by as much as 49 percent by the end of 2000 (18). From the information presented by the Norwegian Authorities, the above-mentioned independent expert reports were referred to in the memorandum distributed to the council members prior to taking the decision, but copies of the reports appear not to have been distributed (19).

| (39) | The contract was entered into on 16 October 2000. The municipality sold its entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years for the price of NOK 126 million with all attached rights and obligations (20). No price adjustment mechanism was included in the contract, and the price was to be paid as one upfront lump sum. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The contract was entered into on 16 October 2000. The municipality sold its entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS for 50,5 years for the price of NOK 126 million with all attached rights and obligations (20). No price adjustment mechanism was included in the contract, and the price was to be paid as one upfront lump sum.

| (40) | By a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2000, the parties agreed that NOK 60 million would be paid to the municipality in cash, whereas the remaining NOK 66 million was to be injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

By a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2000, the parties agreed that NOK 60 million would be paid to the municipality in cash, whereas the remaining NOK 66 million was to be injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.

| (41) | In 2001, the municipality reduced its ownership in NEAS to 50,01 per cent. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In 2001, the municipality reduced its ownership in NEAS to 50,01 per cent.

3.3.   
  Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (42) | The Norwegian Authorities are of the opinion that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms and that only the final arrangement regarding how the consideration was to be structured, as reflected in supplementary agreement of 29 November 2000, was influenced by the municipality’s ownership interest in NEAS. The Norwegian Authorities point out that according to the decision of the Municipal Council dated 25 November 1999, it was an absolute precondition for the conclusion of any agreement with NEAS that the power would be sold on market terms (21). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian Authorities are of the opinion that the contract with NEAS was concluded at market terms and that only the final arrangement regarding how the consideration was to be structured, as reflected in supplementary agreement of 29 November 2000, was influenced by the municipality’s ownership interest in NEAS. The Norwegian Authorities point out that according to the decision of the Municipal Council dated 25 November 1999, it was an absolute precondition for the conclusion of any agreement with NEAS that the power would be sold on market terms (21).

| (43) | Since there was considerable uncertainty associated with price developments on both the revenue and cost side, and since there was also certain political uncertainty associated with the concession power regime in general, a long-term contract was deemed to offer the best stability in relation to future revenues. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Since there was considerable uncertainty associated with price developments on both the revenue and cost side, and since there was also certain political uncertainty associated with the concession power regime in general, a long-term contract was deemed to offer the best stability in relation to future revenues.

| (44) | The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as one lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Norwegian Authorities further argue that it was appropriate for no price adjustment clause to be included, since the purchase price was paid as one lump sum, and not on an ongoing basis.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (45) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (46) | In the following, the Authority will assess the likelihood of whether the municipality has granted State aid to NEAS in connection with the sale of its entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years and at the price of NOK 126 million. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In the following, the Authority will assess the likelihood of whether the municipality has granted State aid to NEAS in connection with the sale of its entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power for a period of 50,5 years and at the price of NOK 126 million.

1.1.   
  Economic advantage

| (47) | When governments make financial transactions and investments, the European Court of Justice has stated that in order to confirm whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (22). In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Commission has developed the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor (23). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

When governments make financial transactions and investments, the European Court of Justice has stated that in order to confirm whether a State measure constitutes aid, it is necessary to establish whether the recipient undertaking receives an economic advantage, which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (22). In order to assess the presence of an economic advantage, the Commission has developed the principle of a (hypothetical) market economy investor (23).

| (48) | If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

If the transaction in question was carried out in accordance with the market economy investor principle, i.e., if the municipality sold the entitlement to concession power for its market value, and the price and terms of the transaction would have been acceptable for a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, the transaction would not confer an economic advantage on NEAS and thus not involve the grant of State aid. On the contrary, State aid could be involved if the transaction was not carried out at market price.

| (49) | In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power right, must enjoy a wide margin of discretion. However, while the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities to operate in the market on commercial terms, it should be assessed whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market investor. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In making this assessment, the Authority cannot replace the municipality’s commercial judgement with its own, which implies that the municipality, as the owner of the concession power right, must enjoy a wide margin of discretion. However, while the Authority fully recognises the right for public authorities to operate in the market on commercial terms, it should be assessed whether a similar agreement would have been concluded by a private market investor.

| (50) | An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to the municipality at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Generally, an informed ex ante assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of State aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

An assessment of the price and terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS should be based on the information available to the municipality at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Generally, an informed ex ante assessment would be sufficient to exclude the presence of State aid, even if the assumptions used in the assessment prove to be wrong with hindsight.

| (51) | In the following, the Authority will therefore assess whether a private investor would have entered into a contract to sell the entitlement to 128 GWh of concession power, every year for 50,5 years, for one upfront lump sum payment of NOK 126 million, and without a competitive tender procedure and without including any price adjustment clauses in the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In the following, the Authority will therefore assess whether a private investor would have entered into a contract to sell the entitlement to 128 GWh of concession power, every year for 50,5 years, for one upfront lump sum payment of NOK 126 million, and without a competitive tender procedure and without including any price adjustment clauses in the contract.

| (52) | Throughout the preliminary assessment, the Authority will be mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into. From the information provided by the Norwegian Authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Throughout the preliminary assessment, the Authority will be mindful of the context in which the transaction was entered into. From the information provided by the Norwegian Authorities, the Authority understands that at the time the contract was entered into the municipality was in a situation where it needed both access to liquidity (in order to meet its loan obligations), as well as capital to inject into NEAS.

1.1.1.   Contract for the sale of the municipality’s entitlement to annual concession power to NEAS

| (53) | As described in section 3.1 of Part I above, the concession power regime gives the municipality the right to purchase 128 GWh of concession power annually, at a price determined by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. This price is meant to reflect the long-term costs of a representative power plant, and is presumed in the long run to be lower than the average market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

As described in section 3.1 of Part I above, the concession power regime gives the municipality the right to purchase 128 GWh of concession power annually, at a price determined by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum. This price is meant to reflect the long-term costs of a representative power plant, and is presumed in the long run to be lower than the average market prices.

| (54) | Municipalities may dispose of this concession power as they see fit, including using it for its own needs or selling the electricity in the market. Furthermore, the municipality can choose to sell the electricity in the spot market (24), or on the basis of short- or longer-term contracts. If the municipality decides to sell the electricity on short- or longer-term contracts it is necessary, in order to exclude State aid, to sell the electricity at market terms. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Municipalities may dispose of this concession power as they see fit, including using it for its own needs or selling the electricity in the market. Furthermore, the municipality can choose to sell the electricity in the spot market (24), or on the basis of short- or longer-term contracts. If the municipality decides to sell the electricity on short- or longer-term contracts it is necessary, in order to exclude State aid, to sell the electricity at market terms.

| (55) | A point of departure would therefore be to identify any possible market prices (‘benchmark prices’) to which the contract in question could have been compared. Any benchmark price should, ideally, be based on contracts of similar type and duration (25). In this regard, the Authority observes that financial derivatives contracts (26) for the Nordic power markets, as offered by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, are limited to a maximum duration of six years (27). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

A point of departure would therefore be to identify any possible market prices (‘benchmark prices’) to which the contract in question could have been compared. Any benchmark price should, ideally, be based on contracts of similar type and duration (25). In this regard, the Authority observes that financial derivatives contracts (26) for the Nordic power markets, as offered by NASDAQ OMX Commodities Europe, are limited to a maximum duration of six years (27).

| (56) | Reference can also be made to long-term power contracts entered into between electricity companies and energy intensive companies. These contracts are different from financial contracts and thus are not immediately comparable, but it is important to note that the duration of these contracts normally does not exceed 25-30 years, and they usually include price adjustment mechanisms. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Reference can also be made to long-term power contracts entered into between electricity companies and energy intensive companies. These contracts are different from financial contracts and thus are not immediately comparable, but it is important to note that the duration of these contracts normally does not exceed 25-30 years, and they usually include price adjustment mechanisms.

| (57) | It is not clear from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities whether or not there is a market — and thus benchmark prices — for contracts of similar type and duration as the contract in the present case. If there are no benchmark prices, and thus no well-functioning market for contracts of comparable type and duration, this may be an indication that buyers and/or sellers of concession power find the risk of entering into contracts of this duration too high. However, the long duration of the contract is in itself insufficient to establish that the transaction was not in line with the market economy investor principle. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

It is not clear from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities whether or not there is a market — and thus benchmark prices — for contracts of similar type and duration as the contract in the present case. If there are no benchmark prices, and thus no well-functioning market for contracts of comparable type and duration, this may be an indication that buyers and/or sellers of concession power find the risk of entering into contracts of this duration too high. However, the long duration of the contract is in itself insufficient to establish that the transaction was not in line with the market economy investor principle.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority must assess the risks and uncertainties involved in the contract in the present case, and ask whether or not these risks have been assessed by the municipality in a manner presumed acceptable to a market investor. In order to do so, it is appropriate to assess at least two sources of uncertainty/risk that affect the market price of the concession power entitlements: regulatory risks and market risks. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority must assess the risks and uncertainties involved in the contract in the present case, and ask whether or not these risks have been assessed by the municipality in a manner presumed acceptable to a market investor. In order to do so, it is appropriate to assess at least two sources of uncertainty/risk that affect the market price of the concession power entitlements: regulatory risks and market risks.

1.1.1.1.   Regulatory risks

| (59) | According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. A priori, it is not possible for the Authority to determine what, if any, changes may be made to the regime. However, it is evident that any changes that are made to the entitlements — such as increasing or decreasing the volume of the municipality’s concession power entitlements, changing how the concession power price is calculated or changing the structure of the right to concession power — may affect the market price of concession power entitlements. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements are due for assessment in 2019. A priori, it is not possible for the Authority to determine what, if any, changes may be made to the regime. However, it is evident that any changes that are made to the entitlements — such as increasing or decreasing the volume of the municipality’s concession power entitlements, changing how the concession power price is calculated or changing the structure of the right to concession power — may affect the market price of concession power entitlements.

| (60) | This regulatory risk was identified by two external advisors consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the contract. The municipality instructed law firm Hjort DA (‘Hjort’) to assess inter alia the tax implications of selling the concession power entitlements. Hjort suggested that 50-year contracts are highly unusual, even for the energy sector, and argued that ‘there is therefore reason to be critical about the value judgments that are/will be made, will be able to capture the long period as is suggested (28).’ Hjort also stated that the actual volume of the concession power entitlement may change over time, and pointed to the regulatory risk involved in the review of the concessions. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

This regulatory risk was identified by two external advisors consulted in the process leading up to the signing of the contract. The municipality instructed law firm Hjort DA (‘Hjort’) to assess inter alia the tax implications of selling the concession power entitlements. Hjort suggested that 50-year contracts are highly unusual, even for the energy sector, and argued that ‘there is therefore reason to be critical about the value judgments that are/will be made, will be able to capture the long period as is suggested (28).’ Hjort also stated that the actual volume of the concession power entitlement may change over time, and pointed to the regulatory risk involved in the review of the concessions.

| (61) | The same risks were also reflected in a report from Danske Securities AS (‘DS’), which was commissioned by the municipality to perform a value assessment of the concession power entitlements (the second assessment referred to in section 3.2 of Part I above). DS asked three market participants to put a value on a 50-year concession power contract. It follows from the report that questions could be raised whether Statkraft SF would enter into an agreement longer than until 2019, when the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements were due for assessment, because of the risk inherent in this process (29). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The same risks were also reflected in a report from Danske Securities AS (‘DS’), which was commissioned by the municipality to perform a value assessment of the concession power entitlements (the second assessment referred to in section 3.2 of Part I above). DS asked three market participants to put a value on a 50-year concession power contract. It follows from the report that questions could be raised whether Statkraft SF would enter into an agreement longer than until 2019, when the majority of the municipality’s concession power entitlements were due for assessment, because of the risk inherent in this process (29).

| (62) | Given that 60 per cent of the contract period in the present case is beyond 2019, the market price of a long-term contract such as the one between the municipality and NEAS is exposed to regulatory risk. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the effects of this risk are ambiguous, ultimately depending on whether or not the changes may be favourable to the beneficiaries of the concession power entitlements. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Given that 60 per cent of the contract period in the present case is beyond 2019, the market price of a long-term contract such as the one between the municipality and NEAS is exposed to regulatory risk. It is the Authority’s preliminary view that the effects of this risk are ambiguous, ultimately depending on whether or not the changes may be favourable to the beneficiaries of the concession power entitlements.

1.1.1.2.   Market risks

| (63) | In order to establish a market value of an entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power, with revenue and costs occurring 50 years into the future, a market investor would normally apply a discounted cash flow analysis (‘DCF’) method. This method projects future cash flows (revenues and costs) and discounts them, using a weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’) as a discount factor, to arrive at a net present value (‘NPV’) of the future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, this NPV would reflect the market price of the underlying asset. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In order to establish a market value of an entitlement to 128 GWh of annual concession power, with revenue and costs occurring 50 years into the future, a market investor would normally apply a discounted cash flow analysis (‘DCF’) method. This method projects future cash flows (revenues and costs) and discounts them, using a weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’) as a discount factor, to arrive at a net present value (‘NPV’) of the future cash flows. Under normal circumstances, this NPV would reflect the market price of the underlying asset.

| (64) | In the current case, there are in particular five variables that affect the NPV of the concession power entitlement: (i) the annual concession power cost, (ii) the cost of feeding electricity into the grid, (iii) the total volume of concession power, (iv) the market price of electricity, and (v) the discount factor. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

In the current case, there are in particular five variables that affect the NPV of the concession power entitlement: (i) the annual concession power cost, (ii) the cost of feeding electricity into the grid, (iii) the total volume of concession power, (iv) the market price of electricity, and (v) the discount factor.

| (65) | The first three variables — the annual concession power cost, the cost of feeding electricity into the grid and the total volume of concession power — are all exposed to the regulatory risk described above. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The first three variables — the annual concession power cost, the cost of feeding electricity into the grid and the total volume of concession power — are all exposed to the regulatory risk described above.

| (66) | As regards the first variable (the price of the concession power), it appears from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that this price is reasonably predictable. It is assumed that there will be limited, if any, real increases in the concession power price over the duration of the contract (30). |
| --- | --- |

(66)

As regards the first variable (the price of the concession power), it appears from the information provided by the Norwegian authorities that this price is reasonably predictable. It is assumed that there will be limited, if any, real increases in the concession power price over the duration of the contract (30).

| (67) | Concerning the second variable (the cost of feeding the electricity into the grid), it is the Authority’s understanding that this cost has been relatively constant over time and is predicted to remain steady in real terms over time. In addition, this cost amounts to approximately NOK 0,02 per KWh, and is thus of lesser importance relative to the other variables when calculating the net present value. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Concerning the second variable (the cost of feeding the electricity into the grid), it is the Authority’s understanding that this cost has been relatively constant over time and is predicted to remain steady in real terms over time. In addition, this cost amounts to approximately NOK 0,02 per KWh, and is thus of lesser importance relative to the other variables when calculating the net present value.

| (68) | As for the third variable (the total volume of concession power available to the municipality), the municipality anticipates a continued right to 128 GWh annually for the foreseeable future, and a constant amount of electricity is also assumed in the valuation models developed by the external advisors. Concerning the volume of electricity, however, the Authority raises two specific questions:






  (i) | whether the contract in question was entered into on the basis of valuations of 128 GWh or 116 GWh (the latter being only the volume of concession power not generated by NEAS itself); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(68)

As for the third variable (the total volume of concession power available to the municipality), the municipality anticipates a continued right to 128 GWh annually for the foreseeable future, and a constant amount of electricity is also assumed in the valuation models developed by the external advisors. Concerning the volume of electricity, however, the Authority raises two specific questions:

(i)

whether the contract in question was entered into on the basis of valuations of 128 GWh or 116 GWh (the latter being only the volume of concession power not generated by NEAS itself); and

| (ii) | what volume was contractually sold by the municipality to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

what volume was contractually sold by the municipality to NEAS.

| (69) | As regards the first question, both the AA report and the first DT value assessment used 116 GWh, being the concession power generated by electricity companies other than NEAS. The value assessment by DS also used 116 GWh, and they explicitly stated in their final report that:
  ‘... [w]e have assumed a volume of 116 GWh, though we cannot understand the reason why concession power delivered by NEAS itself should not be included in the calculations (31).’ |
| --- | --- |

(69)

As regards the first question, both the AA report and the first DT value assessment used 116 GWh, being the concession power generated by electricity companies other than NEAS. The value assessment by DS also used 116 GWh, and they explicitly stated in their final report that:

‘... [w]e have assumed a volume of 116 GWh, though we cannot understand the reason why concession power delivered by NEAS itself should not be included in the calculations (31).’

| (70) | To illustrate this point, on 4 October 2000 (and thus just prior to signing the contract), NEAS had the value of the concession power reassessed by DT. By this point, DT had concluded that the value of the contract was NOK 150-170 million and not 110-130 million, as stated earlier in May 2000 (32). It appears that this change was partly due to the minor adjustment of some of the assumptions used in the NPV calculation (amongst others the discount factor and the electricity prices), but it was also updated to reflect the value of 128 GWh of concession power and not 116 GWh. This second report was not disclosed to the municipality prior to it entering into the contract. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

To illustrate this point, on 4 October 2000 (and thus just prior to signing the contract), NEAS had the value of the concession power reassessed by DT. By this point, DT had concluded that the value of the contract was NOK 150-170 million and not 110-130 million, as stated earlier in May 2000 (32). It appears that this change was partly due to the minor adjustment of some of the assumptions used in the NPV calculation (amongst others the discount factor and the electricity prices), but it was also updated to reflect the value of 128 GWh of concession power and not 116 GWh. This second report was not disclosed to the municipality prior to it entering into the contract.

| (71) | If incorrect assumptions about the volume have been used when determining the price of the contract, approximately 12 GWh of concession power generated each year by NEAS appear to have been transferred to NEAS without any apparent remuneration to the municipality. An economic advantage could thus have been conferred upon NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

If incorrect assumptions about the volume have been used when determining the price of the contract, approximately 12 GWh of concession power generated each year by NEAS appear to have been transferred to NEAS without any apparent remuneration to the municipality. An economic advantage could thus have been conferred upon NEAS.

| (72) | As regards the second question, the Authority finds reason to point out an apparent uncertainty as regards how the risk of future changes in the volume of concession power would be handled between the contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards the second question, the Authority finds reason to point out an apparent uncertainty as regards how the risk of future changes in the volume of concession power would be handled between the contracting parties.

| (73) | Concession power is defined in the contract as the total volume of concession power to which the municipality is entitled from the three current concessionaires (Article 1) (33). This suggests that the risk of any changes in the volume is transferred to NEAS. However, it is stipulated in Article 2 that in total the concession power is 128 GWh annually, which leaves open the question of what happens if that volume of the concession power entitlement is increased or decreased in the future. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Concession power is defined in the contract as the total volume of concession power to which the municipality is entitled from the three current concessionaires (Article 1) (33). This suggests that the risk of any changes in the volume is transferred to NEAS. However, it is stipulated in Article 2 that in total the concession power is 128 GWh annually, which leaves open the question of what happens if that volume of the concession power entitlement is increased or decreased in the future.

| (74) | The two remaining variables — i.e. the market price of electricity and the discount factor — greatly impact the net present value of the concession power entitlement. These two variables were identified by DT as the factors to which the value estimates of the entitlement were especially sensitive to marginal adjustments. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The two remaining variables — i.e. the market price of electricity and the discount factor — greatly impact the net present value of the concession power entitlement. These two variables were identified by DT as the factors to which the value estimates of the entitlement were especially sensitive to marginal adjustments.

| (75) | The fourth variable (the market price of electricity) is considered to be highly volatile, resulting in uncertainty about future price developments, in particular over time. This is reflected in the fact that the expert reports referred to above only project future electricity prices approximately 10 years forward, beyond which electricity prices are assumed constant in real terms (34). This uncertainty of future electricity prices is, as mentioned previously, also reflected in the fact that financial contracts on the Nordic power markets are limited to a maximum duration of six years. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The fourth variable (the market price of electricity) is considered to be highly volatile, resulting in uncertainty about future price developments, in particular over time. This is reflected in the fact that the expert reports referred to above only project future electricity prices approximately 10 years forward, beyond which electricity prices are assumed constant in real terms (34). This uncertainty of future electricity prices is, as mentioned previously, also reflected in the fact that financial contracts on the Nordic power markets are limited to a maximum duration of six years.

| (76) | The fifth variable (the discount rate) used in the present value calculations is the weighted average cost of capital, which is meant to capture the riskiness of the cash flows. The discount rate reflects both the time value of money (investors normally have a time preference and would rather have cash up front than having to wait, therefore they must be compensated for this delay), as well as a risk premium. Moreover, and similarly to the fourth variable (the market price of electricity), it may be difficult to accurately predict, for example, inflation and interest rates 50 years into the future (35). |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The fifth variable (the discount rate) used in the present value calculations is the weighted average cost of capital, which is meant to capture the riskiness of the cash flows. The discount rate reflects both the time value of money (investors normally have a time preference and would rather have cash up front than having to wait, therefore they must be compensated for this delay), as well as a risk premium. Moreover, and similarly to the fourth variable (the market price of electricity), it may be difficult to accurately predict, for example, inflation and interest rates 50 years into the future (35).

| (77) | To illustrate the importance of the above variables in the valuation process, DT estimated that a one per cent increase in the return on capital requirement (WACC) would reduce the value of the concession power entitlement by NOK 22 million, while a one per cent reduction in the return on capital requirement would increase the value by NOK 29 million (36). The value was also very sensitive to changes in electricity spot prices: a NOK 0,01 change in real spot prices over a 10 year period relative to the estimated prices in the model would change the value by NOK 16 million (37). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

To illustrate the importance of the above variables in the valuation process, DT estimated that a one per cent increase in the return on capital requirement (WACC) would reduce the value of the concession power entitlement by NOK 22 million, while a one per cent reduction in the return on capital requirement would increase the value by NOK 29 million (36). The value was also very sensitive to changes in electricity spot prices: a NOK 0,01 change in real spot prices over a 10 year period relative to the estimated prices in the model would change the value by NOK 16 million (37).

| (78) | As a result, the value estimates by the external advisors ranged from approximately NOK 70 million to NOK 145 million (38). The relatively large range indicates uncertainty about the actual market value of the concession power entitlement over a period of 50 years. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

As a result, the value estimates by the external advisors ranged from approximately NOK 70 million to NOK 145 million (38). The relatively large range indicates uncertainty about the actual market value of the concession power entitlement over a period of 50 years.

1.1.1.3.   Competitive tender ex ante and/or price adjustment clauses ex post (‘safety valves’)

| (79) | In the absence of benchmark prices against which the contract in question could be compared, and in light of the uncertainty concerning key variables/assumptions in the valuation models used to assess the value of the concession power entitlement, the Authority questions whether a market investor would have taken further steps to establish the market value. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

In the absence of benchmark prices against which the contract in question could be compared, and in light of the uncertainty concerning key variables/assumptions in the valuation models used to assess the value of the concession power entitlement, the Authority questions whether a market investor would have taken further steps to establish the market value.

| (80) | One way to increase the likelihood that the municipality sold the concession power at market prices would have been to use a competitive and unconditional tender procedure. A competitive bidding process would have allowed the market value of the concession power entitlement to be determined ex ante. Moreover, if the municipality allowed interested parties to make bids without stipulating a fixed duration, this would more likely have revealed the true market price of the underlying assets over the lifetime of the asset, which may have revealed whether a 50-year contract was the optimal length in order to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis (39).’ |
| --- | --- |

(80)

One way to increase the likelihood that the municipality sold the concession power at market prices would have been to use a competitive and unconditional tender procedure. A competitive bidding process would have allowed the market value of the concession power entitlement to be determined ex ante. Moreover, if the municipality allowed interested parties to make bids without stipulating a fixed duration, this would more likely have revealed the true market price of the underlying assets over the lifetime of the asset, which may have revealed whether a 50-year contract was the optimal length in order to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis (39).’

| (81) | The Authority has, in that regard, taken note of the decision by the Municipal Council of 25 November 1999, in which a competitive tender procedure was expected to be part of the strategy when selling the concession power rights:
  ‘Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return ... Concession power is sold under different contracts with different length to diversify risk.’ (underlining by the Authority) |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Authority has, in that regard, taken note of the decision by the Municipal Council of 25 November 1999, in which a competitive tender procedure was expected to be part of the strategy when selling the concession power rights:

‘Concession power is sold to the highest bidder on long-term contracts with a fixed return ... Concession power is sold under different contracts with different length to diversify risk.’ (underlining by the Authority)

| (82) | If the municipality had sold the entitlement to the highest bidder, potentially to a company other than NEAS, it would seem that the municipality would subsequently still have capital available to inject into NEAS, which was part of the reason for selling it in the first place. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

If the municipality had sold the entitlement to the highest bidder, potentially to a company other than NEAS, it would seem that the municipality would subsequently still have capital available to inject into NEAS, which was part of the reason for selling it in the first place.

| (83) | In addition to using a competitive tender process, another way to safeguard that the transaction was carried out at market terms would have been to require some form of price adjustment clause in the contract ex-post, to provide for potential fluctuations in electricity prices resulting in them deviating significantly from the forecasted prices used in the valuation models. This would also have been in line with the decision of 25 November 1999, that was the foundation of the transaction, in which it was stated that:
  ‘Concession power is sold ... with adjustment clauses that gives additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period.’ (underlining by the Authority) |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In addition to using a competitive tender process, another way to safeguard that the transaction was carried out at market terms would have been to require some form of price adjustment clause in the contract ex-post, to provide for potential fluctuations in electricity prices resulting in them deviating significantly from the forecasted prices used in the valuation models. This would also have been in line with the decision of 25 November 1999, that was the foundation of the transaction, in which it was stated that:

‘Concession power is sold ... with adjustment clauses that gives additional returns if the prices are substantially higher than the projected prices in the contract period.’ (underlining by the Authority)

| (84) | Accordingly, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the lack of competitive tender procedure and/or the insertion of price adjustment clauses in the contract entails that we cannot exclude that the transaction involved State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Accordingly, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the lack of competitive tender procedure and/or the insertion of price adjustment clauses in the contract entails that we cannot exclude that the transaction involved State aid.

1.1.1.4.   Conclusion

| (85) | In light of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority is in doubt whether the terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS concerning the sale of the entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years for the sum of NOK 126 million can be considered in line with the market economy investor principle. Therefore, the Authority cannot rule out that an advantage was granted to NEAS as a result of this transaction. If the entitlement was sold for a price below its market value, an economic advantage was granted to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In light of the information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority is in doubt whether the terms of the contract between the municipality and NEAS concerning the sale of the entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years for the sum of NOK 126 million can be considered in line with the market economy investor principle. Therefore, the Authority cannot rule out that an advantage was granted to NEAS as a result of this transaction. If the entitlement was sold for a price below its market value, an economic advantage was granted to NEAS.

1.2.   
  Presence of State resources

| (86) | The Authority understands that the price of NOK 126 million was paid by NEAS to the Municipality of Narvik by way of NOK 60 million paid to the municipality in cash, and NOK 66 million injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Authority understands that the price of NOK 126 million was paid by NEAS to the Municipality of Narvik by way of NOK 60 million paid to the municipality in cash, and NOK 66 million injected into NEAS (at the time 100 % owned by the Municipality) as an equity contribution in kind.

| (87) | If the price NEAS paid for the entitlement was lower than the actual market price of the asset, the difference would represent foregone revenue for the municipality. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

If the price NEAS paid for the entitlement was lower than the actual market price of the asset, the difference would represent foregone revenue for the municipality.

1.3.   
  Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods

| (88) | A selective economic advantage is considered to exist when it is found that a measure does not apply generally to all the undertakings in an EEA State (40). In the present case, the aid measure appears to be selective in that it favours NEAS in comparison to other undertakings as only NEAS signed the contract with the municipality. The contract was the result of individual negotiations between the municipality and NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

A selective economic advantage is considered to exist when it is found that a measure does not apply generally to all the undertakings in an EEA State (40). In the present case, the aid measure appears to be selective in that it favours NEAS in comparison to other undertakings as only NEAS signed the contract with the municipality. The contract was the result of individual negotiations between the municipality and NEAS.

1.4.   
  Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (89) | The measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement in order to be State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties of the EEA Agreement in order to be State aid.

| (90) | A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of NEAS vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of production and sale of electricity. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) EEA for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

A support measure granted by the State would strengthen the position of NEAS vis-à-vis other undertakings that are competitors active in the same business areas of production and sale of electricity. Any grant of aid strengthens the position of the beneficiary vis-à-vis its competitors and accordingly distorts competition within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. To the extent that the company is active in areas subject to intra-EEA trade, the requirements of Article 61(1) EEA for a measure to constitute State aid are fulfilled.

| (91) | According to a report by the power exchange Nord Pool (41), by the year 2000 there was a well-functioning Nordic power market. An effect on trade between the Contracting Parties as a result of the aid measure cannot, therefore, be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

According to a report by the power exchange Nord Pool (41), by the year 2000 there was a well-functioning Nordic power market. An effect on trade between the Contracting Parties as a result of the aid measure cannot, therefore, be excluded.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (92) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (93) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the contract between the municipality of Narvik and NEAS to the Authority. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the contract between the municipality of Narvik and NEAS to the Authority. Therefore, the Authority concludes that if the measure constitutes State aid, the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (94) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) EEA are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) EEA are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) EEA.

| (95) | Article 61(2) EEA is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) EEA apply to the present case. Furthermore, the aid does not appear to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, further to Article 61(3)(c) EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Article 61(2) EEA is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Nor does Article 61(3)(a) or Article 61(3)(b) EEA apply to the present case. Furthermore, the aid does not appear to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas, further to Article 61(3)(c) EEA.

| (96) | The Authority has so far not received any information that would indicate that the sale of concession power to NEAS is compatible with Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

The Authority has so far not received any information that would indicate that the sale of concession power to NEAS is compatible with Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority therefore doubts that the transaction under assessment can be justified under the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (97) | On the basis of the facts and assessment above, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the contract relating to the sale by Narvik municipality of its entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that this measure can be regarded as complying with Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus doubts that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

On the basis of the facts and assessment above, the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the contract relating to the sale by Narvik municipality of its entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts that this measure can be regarded as complying with Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority thus doubts that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (98) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3 SCA, the Authority is obliged to open the procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure in question is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (99) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. The Authority specifically asks the Norwegian Authorities to reply to the two questions raised in paragraphs 68 to 73 of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 SCA, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. The Authority specifically asks the Norwegian Authorities to reply to the two questions raised in paragraphs 68 to 73 of this Decision.

| (100) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to NEAS. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities, within one month of receipt of this Decision, to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to concession power to NEAS.

| (101) | The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipient of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

| (102) | The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of law, |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiary will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, is initiated against Norway regarding the sale of Narvik municipality’s entitlement to annual concession power for 50,5 years to Narvik Energi AS, for the sum of NOK 126 million.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide, within one month of the notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 14 December 2011.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sverrir Haukur GUNNLAUGSSON

College Member

---

(1)  Decision 195/04/COL, 14.7.2004 published in OJ C 139, 25.5.2006, p. 57 and EEA Supplement No 26, 25.5.2006, p. 1 as amended by Decision 319/05/COL, 14.12.2005 published in OJ C 286, 23.11.2006, p. 9 and EEA Supplement No 57, 23.11.2006, p. 31.

1

(2)  Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1: ‘Avtale mellom Narvik kommune og Narvik Energi AS om leie av konsesjonskraft for en periode av 50,5 år og om at konsesjonskraften anvendes som tinginnskudd ved aksjekapitalutvidelse i Narvik Energi AS.’

2

(3)  http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_16_of_14_-December_1917.pdf

3

(4)  http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/OED/Vedlegg/Lover%20og%20reglement/Act_No_17%20of_14_-December_1917.pdf

4

(5)  According to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, this includes electric power for industry, agriculture and households, but not power for power intensive industries and wood conversion.

5

(6)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13: ‘Narvik kommunens konsesjonskraft håndteres ut fra hva som gir størst mulig avkastning på lang sikt. Målet er samtidig å gi kommunen en mer stabil planleggingshorisont gjennom å redusere usikkerheten fra år til år.’

6

(7)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

7

(8)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 12.

8

(9)  Event No 532249, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 7.

9

(10)  See footnote 8.

10

(11)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

11

(12)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 38 onwards.

12

(13)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 28.

13

(14)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 16 onwards.

14

(15)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 14 onwards.

15

(16)  His mandate was narrowed to only assessing, inter alia, risk, time to settlement, tax implications and profit maximization for three scenarios (all involving Narvik Municipality transferring the concession power right to NEAS for a 50-year period and Narvik Municipality reducing its ownership stake in NEAS from 100 per cent to 51 per cent).

16

inter alia

(17)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 27.

17

(18)  See footnote 11.

18

(19)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 6.

19

(20)  Event No 532254, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

20

(21)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 22.

21

(22)  Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [2006] ECR I-3547, para. 60.

22

SFEI

La Poste

(23)  The market economy investor principle is described in more depth in the Authority’s guidelines for State aid to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector and public authorities holdings.

23

(24)  Spot market transactions through an electricity exchange are presumed not to include State aid because the market price is determined efficiently in a competitive market.

24

(25)  Namely, bilateral wholesale concession power contracts entered into prior to or around the same time.

25

(26)  Futures, forward, option and CfD.

26

(27)  http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/about/

27

(28)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 32.

28

(29)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 17.

29

(30)  Price is only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI) To illustrate this point, in their valuation model DT adjusted the concession power price with 75 per cent of CPI over the life of the contract in their base case, and simulated results at 50 and 100 per cent of CPI respectively, to assess the sensitivity of the value assessment to changes in this assumption.

30

(31)  See footnote 13.

31

(32)  Event No 532253, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 1 onwards.

32

(33)  Statkraft SF, Nordkraft AS and NEAS.

33

(34)  Price only adjusted for expected inflation (CPI).

34

(35)  This is reflected in the fact that both SSB and the Norwegian Central Bank only make predictions on economic indicators such as inflation and interest rates approximately 5-10 years forward, see for example: http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/87289/Figurer_foredrag_reg_nett_11_11_2011.pdf

35

(36)  Event No 532252, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 41.

36

(37)  See footnote 32.

37

(38)  Excluding the last study by DT, which estimated a value in the range of NOK 150-170 million.

38

(39)  Event No 532250, Enclosure to the Norwegian authorities’ letter of 2.10.2009, p. 13. This would be important because the independent advisers involved in the valuation process only assessed the value of the concession power for a period of 50 years, and did not necessarily assess how to ‘maximize return on a long-term basis.’

39

(40)  Case C-256/97 DM Transport SA [1999] ECR I-3913, para. 27.

40

DM Transport SA

(41)  Nord Pool, ‘Trade at Nord Pool ASA’s financial market’, 8 March 2010, http://www.nasdaqomxcommodities.com/digitalAssets/69/69445_tradenordpoolfinancialmarket.pdf

41

---

V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/38

---

AVVIŻ TA' KOMPETIZZJONI ĠENERALI

2012/C 121/10

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għall-Għażla tal-Persunal (EPSO) qed jorganizza l-kompetizzjoni ġenerali li ġejja:

EPSO/AD/232/12 – kap tal-unità (AD 12) tal-lingwa Bulgara fil-qasam tat-traduzzjoni ġuridika

L-avviż tal-kompetizzjoni huwa ppubblikat bil-Bulgaru biss fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 121 A tat-26 ta' April 2012.

Għal aktar informazzjoni ikkonsulta s-sit tal-EPSO http://eu-careers.eu

---

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 26.4.2012 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 121/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.4.2012

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 121/39

---

Notifika minn qabel ta' konċentrazzjoni

(Każ COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2012/C 121/11

| 1. | Fis-17 ta' April 2012, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta' konċentrazzjoni proposta, skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1), li permezz tagħha l-impriża AGC Glass Europe SA, (“AGC”, il-Belġju), li hija kkontrollata minn Asahi Glass Co., Ltd (“Asahi”, il-Ġappun) takkwista, skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll sħiħ b’mod konġunt tal-impriżi Interpane International Glas GmbH (il-Ġermanja) u Interpane Glass Holding AG (l-Isvizzera) (flimkien, “Interpane”), permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Fis-17 ta' April 2012, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta' konċentrazzjoni proposta, skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1), li permezz tagħha l-impriża AGC Glass Europe SA, (“AGC”, il-Belġju), li hija kkontrollata minn Asahi Glass Co., Ltd (“Asahi”, il-Ġappun) takkwista, skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll sħiħ b’mod konġunt tal-impriżi Interpane International Glas GmbH (il-Ġermanja) u Interpane Glass Holding AG (l-Isvizzera) (flimkien, “Interpane”), permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:






  — | għal AGC: il-produzzjoni u l-ipproċessar ta' ħġieġ ċatt għall-industrija tal-bini, tal-karozzi, għall-industrija solari u industriji speċjalizzati oħrajn, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—

għal AGC: il-produzzjoni u l-ipproċessar ta' ħġieġ ċatt għall-industrija tal-bini, tal-karozzi, għall-industrija solari u industriji speċjalizzati oħrajn,

| — | għal Asahi: ħġieġ, apparat elettroniku, skrinijiet, kimiki, ċeramika u operazzjonijiet oħrajn, |
| --- | --- |

—

għal Asahi: ħġieġ, apparat elettroniku, skrinijiet, kimiki, ċeramika u operazzjonijiet oħrajn,

| — | għal Interpane: l-immanifatturar u l-ipproċessar ta' ħġieġ tal-arkitettura. |
| --- | --- |

—

għal Interpane: l-immanifatturar u l-ipproċessar ta' ħġieġ tal-arkitettura.

| 3. | Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni ssib li l-operazzjoni nnotifikata tista' taqa' fl-ambitu tar-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madanakollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni ssib li l-operazzjoni nnotifikata tista' taqa' fl-ambitu tar-Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madanakollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jibagħtu kwalunkwe kumment li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta lill-Kummissjoni.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bil-feks (+32 22964301), jew b'emejl lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew bil-posta, taħt in-numru ta' referenza COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas, fl-indirizz li ġej:





  Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| --- | --- |
| Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni |
| Reġistru tal-Amalgamazzjonijiet |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jibagħtu kwalunkwe kumment li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta lill-Kummissjoni.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni bil-feks (+32 22964301), jew b'emejl lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew bil-posta, taħt in-numru ta' referenza COMP/M.6557 – AGC Glass Europe/Interpane International Glas, fl-indirizz li ġej:

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kompetizzjoni

Reġistru tal-Amalgamazzjonijiet

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament tal-KE dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

---