After the orig inal lease was signe d, J odie Mowdy marrie d and adopte d the surname of her 1 husband, Claude Morr ison. To avoid confusion, we will follow the t erminol og y of the lea se and other doc uments filed in this case that r efe r to her a s “Jodi e Mowdy .” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 026 -CV

Jo De e K as par -W e lls , I ndiv idua llyand a s Tr ust e e of t he Jo dy A ie llo Tr ust , A ppe lla nt
v. Jodie Mowd y , Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY NO. 05- 0564 -CC2 , HO NORAB LE TIM OTH Y L. WRIGHT , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
At issue in this decla

ratory judgme nt action is whether a tena nt brea ched a

residential pr op e rt y le a se . Ap pe lla

nt Jo De e Ka sp ar- Wel ls, the land lor d, c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in denying he r re quest for a decla ration that appe llee Jodi e Mowdy brea ched he r lea se by occupy ing 1 the prope rty

with another person and by operating a business from the re sidence . We affir m in part
and re ve rs e in p art

the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

and re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Mowdy orig inally

moved i n t o t h e prope rty at issue—a house in Georg etown, Texas—during a long -term r elationship with Marvin Rau, Kaspa r-Wells’s g randf

at h er . Upon Rau’s death in the summer of 2000, t h e p ro p er ty passed to Ka spar- Wells and her nowdece ased mother , J ody

Aiello. On Marc h 17, 2001, Mowdy signe d a lea se dra fted by either K aspar -I nte re sti ng ly , th e le a se do e s n ot c on ta in a re nta l pr ov isi on

or le a se pa y me nt a mou nt. 2 There was a

rgument sug g esting that the re lationship between the parties ha d soured a nd 3 that Kaspa

r-Wells had bee n seekingto terminate or e nd the lease for some time be fore Mowdy marr ie d M or

ri so n. Ho we ve r, no re c or d e vid e nc e wa s a c tua lly a dd uc e d o n th is p oin t. 2 Wells an Aiello or their attorne y . The short, thre e-p age lease contained the following provisions that are a

t issue here :
Tenant: J odie Mowdy

. . . . Term ination Date : Date J odie Mowdy moves out or vac ates re sidence or does not pay proper ty taxes or maintain insurance
. Use: Private re sidence Occupants (other t han T enant): None
Th e le a se do e s n ot elabo rate fu rt he r o n th e me anin g or

e ff e c t of the se pr ov isi on s. I n addition, it require s Mowdy to ma intain the premises, pay proper ty taxes, maintain insurance on the pr e mis e s, pa

y fo r util ity

se rv ic e s, and

ob e y a ll l aws and

or din anc e s a

pp lic a ble to t he pr e mis e s. Mowdy ag ree d not to assign the le ase or s u b l ea s e an y p ortion of the house w ithout the landlord’s consent. The lea se also states that its terms ar e the e ntirety of the pa rties’ a g ree ment, and provide s tha t i t s t e r

m s m a y b e a m e n d e d o n l y b y a w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t s i g n e d b y t h e l an d l o r d andte na nt. Th e le a se is s ile nt a s to any c on se qu e nc e or

re me dy fo r b re a c h o f i ts t e rm s. 2 Mowdy marrie d Claude Morrison on J anuar y 18, 2004, and he move d into the house. After lear ning that Morrison had moved in, Ka spar- Wells f i l ed t his suit for declar atory relief
. 3 She so ug ht a

de c laratio n th a t Mo wd

y br e a c he d the le a se by a llo wi ng Mo rr iso n to oc c up y the ho us e3

and by operating a business from the house. K aspar -Wells based the latter reque st primarily

on an
a ssume d n a me c e rt if

ic a te , f ile d Jun e 21 , 2 00 4, lis tin g the ho us e a s th e bu sin e ss a dd re ss o f B io Remediation Company , which is owned by Morrison and Mowdy
. Kaspa r-Wells also asked the trial court to orde r Mowdy and Morrison to vacate t he house. After a benc h trial, the trial cour t denied Kaspa r-Wells’s re quest for de clar atory relief . I n its findings of f

act a nd conclusions of law , the tr ia l c ourt de te rm ine d th a t th e le a se wa s unambi g uo us and that Mo wd

y did no t br e a c h it
. On appea l, K aspar -Wells c ontends that the trial court err ed by failing to declar e that Mowdy brea ched the lease ’s occ upancy and use pr ovisions. She seeks a reve rsal of the trial cour t’s fi nd ing s w ithre sp e c t to the a lle g e d b re a c he s o f t he le a se and

a re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. We reviewfinding s of fact and conclusions of lawacc ording to their substance and not the ir title. Mo rri

s v . Ko hls -York

, 164 S.W .3d 686, 693 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2005, pet. dism’d) (c i t i n g Ray v . Farmers’ State Bank , 576 S.W .2d 607, 608 n.1 (Tex. 1979)). When a par ty attacks the leg al s u ff

i ci en cy of an a dverse finding on an issue on which she has the burde n of proof , she must demonstrate on appea l that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, a ll vital facts in support of the issue. Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) . When a par ty attacks the fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of an a dv e rs e fi nd ingon

an is su e on

wh ic h s he ha s the burd e n of pr oo f, sh e mus t demonstrate on appea l that the adver se finding is so ag ainst the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that it is c l ea rl y wr o n g and unjust. Id. at 242. We revie w the trial c ourt’s leg al conclusions de novo. BMC Software Belg. , N.V. v. Ma r chand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). I n this case, the material fa cts reg ardi n g whether someone other

than Mowdy

occupie d the lease d4

proper ty are undisputed. There fore, we d et ermine the leg al issue of how the lease ag ree ment’s occupa n cy p ro v i s i o n must be interpre ted in light of the undisputed fac ts. W e also re view the question of whethe r Mowdy or Morrison o p er ated a business out of the lease d proper ty for leg al and fa ctual suff

iciency
. Kaspa r-Wells first asser

ts that the trial court e rre d in finding t h at M o wd y did not brea ch the lea se by

allowing Morrison to occupy the home. The trial court found as follows: “The lease did not expressly nor i mpliedly prohibit a spouse from co-habiting with Defe ndant, nor c an the law disallow marr iag e. . . . The ref ore, D efe ndant did not br eac h the lease when she marrie d Claude Morrison, and they

lived toge ther a s husband and wif e in their home.” Be fore analy

zing the conc lusion that the addition of an occ upant did not brea ch the lease , we must revie w the cour t’s deter mination that the lease is unambig uous beca use that dec ision controls the standa

rd and sc ope of r eview f or interpr eting the contra ct. See SA S Inst., Inc. v

. Br e ite nfe ld , 167 S.W .3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005) (m ea n i n g o f unambig uous contrac t is question of law) ; Reilly v

. Rangers Mgmt., I nc. , 727 S.W .2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (mea ning of ambig uous contra ct is question for the f act- finder) . Whether a c ontrac t is ambig uous is a question of law for the court. Heritage Re

s., Inc. v . NationsBank , 9 39 S.W. 2d 11 8, 12 1 ( Te x. 19 96 ). A c on tr a c t is
am b i gu o u s when its meaningis uncerta in and doubtful or is susceptible to more tha n one
rea sonable interpr etation. Id . Ambiguity does not exist mere ly

beca use the parties f

orce fully asser t diametrica lly

opposed interpr etations. C o l u mb i a Ga s T

r a n s mi s s i o n Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd. , 940 S.W. 2d 58 7, 58 9 ( Te x. 19 96 ). No r i s si le nc e in the c on tr a c t a bo ut an is su e ne c e ssa

ri ly a mbi g uo us . See H ewlett-Pack

ard Co. v. B en ch mark Elec s., Inc. , 142 S.W .3d 554, 561 (Tex. App.—Houston5

[14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)
. Silence may cre ate a latent ambig uity , the deter mination of which is an issue for the trier of

fac t. Id . at 562. We g ive the langua g e in a c on tr a c t it s p la in, g ra

mmatical m e anin g un le ss d oin g so would clea

rly defe at the par

ties’ intentions. Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Cernosek, 188 S.W .3d 354, 359 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied)
. When a written c ontrac t is worded so that it can be g iven a cer

tain or definite meaning or interpre tation, it is una mbiguous and the court c onstrues it as a matter of law. See A merican M

frs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefe r , 124 S.W .3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003). I f w e are un a

ble to h arm on ize the pr ov isi on s and g ive e ffect to a ll c la

us e s and the c on tr a c t is susceptible to more than one rea sonable interpre tation, w e will f ind the contra ct is a

mbiguous. Royal Macc abees Life Ins. Co. v. J ames , 146 S.W .3d 340, 347 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (c i t i n g National

Union Fire Ins. C o . v. Hu d s on Energy Co. , 811 S.W .2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991)). When a contra ct is silent, the question is not one of interpre ti n g t h e l an g uag e but rather one of deter mining its eff

ect. He wle tt-Pa c k

ar d , 142 S.W .3d at 561. We ag ree with the trial court that the lease in que stion is unambig uous reg ardingthe ide nti ty of the te na nt, the oc c up ants pe rm itted, and th e use o f t he pr e mis e s. Th e te rm s p la inl y state that the “ Tena

nt” is J odie Mowdy , the occ upants of t h e p re m i s es under the lease will be “none” other than the tena nt, and the only

permitted use of

the pre mises is as a “pr ivate re sidence .” These te rms are not ambiguous a nd are susceptible to def inite interpretation as a matter of law. U n d e r th e u n a mb igu o u s te r ms o f th is le a s e , o n e o c c u p an t o f th e p r e mi s e s is a ll owed a nd t h a to c c u p an ti s J o d i e M o w dy.6 Mowdy argues that “the lease does not expressly nor impliedly

p r o h ibit a spouse from cohabiting with A

ppellee, nor can the law disallow marria g e.” Mowdy also adds that “the re is no pertinent Te x as ca s e l aw that would undersc ore the notion that a tenant bre ache s a lea se upon
marr y ingand the n pe rm itt ing the sp ou se to c oh a bit wi th the te na

nt on the le a se d pr e mis e s. ” Whil e the lease does not spe ak in terms of a potential future spouse , it prohibits any occupa nt other than Mowdy reg ardle ss of who the other occupan t might be. The re is no “spouse exception” to the provision relating to the number of pe rmissible occupa nts. Nor wa s t h e lease amende d by the parties to allow a

n additional occupa

nt when Mowdy

marrie d. A l and lor d is wi thi n h is o r he r ri g hts to c ho os e to l e a se re sid e nti a l pr op e rt y fo r u se by only one occ upant, and a

lessee is c erta inly

allowed to ac cept suc h an ar ra n gement. However , a lessee may

not then unilatera lly

alter suc h a l ea s e ag ree ment to bring in an additional occ upant reg ardle ss of whethe r that additional occ upant is a parent, a sibl ing, a friend, a roommate, a sublessor, or a

new spouse. B y

prohibiting more than one oc cu p an t , the lease did not “disallow
marr ia g e .” Mo wd

y wa s f re e to m arr

y jus t a s sh e wa s fr e e to de c ide that sh e wo uld rathe r liv e wi th
someone rather than a lone. She was not, how ever , fre e to increa se the number of occ upants under her le ase w ith Kaspar- Wells absent an ag ree d am endment to t he lea se or other ag ree ment with Kaspar -Wells. By o cc u py ing the premises with anothe r per son, who happe ned to be he r hu sb and , M ow dy

br e a c he d th e un a mbi g uo us te rm s o f t he le a se . T he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingto the contra ry is error as a matter of law
. We next consider w hether the trial cour

t erre d by failing to find that Mowdy operated a business fr om the house, there by brea ching the lease term per mitti ng use of the pr emises only as7

a pr ivate re sid e nc e . K a sp ar- Wel ls a sse rt s th a t th e us e of the ho us e ’s a dd

re ss as the “ bu sin e ss addre ss” on the June 21, 2004 assumed name cer tificate—by

itself—conclusively

proves, a s a matter of law, that the house wa s being used impermissibly as a business site. We disag ree . De sp ite the fa c t th a t th e le a se d a dd re ss i s o n th e June 21 , 2 00 4 a ssume d n a me
c e rt if ic a te , o the r e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat th e le a se d p ro pe rt y wa s n ot u se d to operate a business. A ne w assumed name cer tificate f iled September 24, 2004, c hang ed the listed addre ss for B io Remediation from that of the le ased pr emises to a p o s t o ffice box i n Austin. Mo rr iso n te sti fi e d th a t he c on du c ts the bu sin e ss e nt ir ely ov e r t he te le ph on e and

thr ou g h ma il. He take s order s for c erta in industrial products from a f ew long -term c lients and fills those orders thr ou g h s up pli e rs in oth e r c iti e s, wh o se nd the pr od uc ts dir e c tly to his c lie nts
. He sa id that no B io Remediation clients, products, or any thing else have come to the house . Mowdy testified that they
ne ve r p os te d a

bu sin e ss s ig n in

fr on t of thei r ho us e , n e ve r h os te d c lie nts , a nd ne ve r t oo k b us ine ss calls on the re sidential telephone. Mor rison’s business ca

rd and the company ’s l et t er h ea d list t he Austin post office box , not the l ease d premises, as the address for B io Remediation Services. A part fr om the le a se d a dd

re ss be ing lis te d a s the c omp any ’s ho me a dd re ss on the a ssume d n a me c e rt if ic a te for thre e months, no other evidenc e sug g ests that the re sidence was used f or any purpose other

than as a pr ivate re sidence . On the contr ary , the evidenc e supports the t rial court’s finding that “[t] here is nothing in or around the Morrison home that would manifest a business being conducte d within.” We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s th a t th e le a se d p re mis e s w e re no t us e d f or the purp os e of oper ating a business and that Mowdy did not breac h the lease term re s t ri ct i ng her use of the prope rty

as a pr ivate re sidence
.Courts c annot make contra cts for the parties, HECI Explorati on Co. v. Neel , 982 S.W .2d 4 881, 888 (Tex. 1998), but courts ca n supply omitted ter

ms nece ssary

to effe ctuate the purposes of the c on tr a c t in

c ir c ums tanc e s w he re , f

or a va ri e ty of re a so ns , th e pa

rt ie s f a ile d to make e xpre ss provision about an eve nt that did occur. Lake LBJ Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson , 692 S.W .2d 897, 906 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1984), rev’d on other grounds , 734 S.W. 2d 64 9 ( Te x. 19 87 ). A c ourt c an o nly do so when it is “nec essar y to eff ectuate t he int ention of t he parties as di sclosed by the contra ct as a whole,” if such an impl ication “r est[s] entirely on the pre sumed intention of the par ties as g ather ed from the terms actua lly expressed” within the four corne rs of the contra ct. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v . P owe ll , 154 S.W .2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941). Courts may only imply a ter m into a contrac t where
“ it w a s so c le arl y

wi thi n th e c on te mpl a tio n o f t he pa rt ie s th a t th e y

de e me d it

un ne c e ssa

ry to e xpre ss it, and the re fo re omi tte d to do so ” or in s itu a tio ns wh e re “ it is ne c e ssa ry to inf e r su c h a c ov e na nt i n order to effe ctuate the full purpose of the contra ct as a whole. . . . ” Id
. We note that Kaspa

r-Wells’s pleading s seek a decla ration that Mowdy

is in breac h of the 5 lease and that the br eac h is material. The pleading s also reque st th at “in the e vent that the Court rende rs a de clar ation that there is a materia l brea ch of the L ease C o n t ra ct b y the Def endant, the Pla int if f r e qu e sts that the Court

c omp e l th e De fe nd ant t o v a c a te the pr e mis e s and no t in te rf e re wi th the Plaintiff’s s o l e u s e and posse ssion of the proper ty .” Whether suc h relief is available or appropr iate in the context of a cla im for dec laratory judgme nt we leave to the conside ration of the trial court on r emand. 8

B o t h t h e l e a s e a

n d t h e r e c o r d

ar e i n s u f f i c i e n tf o r t h i s C o u rtt o d e t e r

m i n e w h a tr e m e dy, if any , was a g ree d upon , co n templated, or should be a pplied upon a bre ach of

the occ upancy provision. Whi le the lease has a “ter mination date”—whe n Mowdy “moves out or va cate s residenc e or does not pay proper

ty taxes or maintain insurance ”—the lease is silent reg arding the reme dy or
c on se qu e nc e s f

or br e a c h o f a

ny of its pr ov isi on s. Since the trial c ourt did not find a bre ach of the 4 le a se , th e c ourt

did no t c on sid e r o r r

ule on wh e the r s uc h b re a c h is ma te ri a l or wh a t r e me dy , if any , is available to Ka spar- Wells for a bre ach by Mowdy of the oc cu p an cy p ro v ision in t he context of a claim for

decla ra t ory relief
. The trial c ourt also did not consider whe ther a n awa rd 5 of attorne y s’ fe es under

the dec laratory judgme nts act would be a ppropriate . Consequently , a
rema nd of this matter is appropr iate.9 We affir m the trial court’ s finding that Mowdy did not opera te a business at the leased premises a

nd, there fore , did not breac h the l ea s e’ s re sidential use provision. We reve rse the tr ial court’s f inding that Mowdy did not br eac h the lease ’s occ upancy provision and re nder a

decla ration th a t M o w dy b r e a c h e d th e le a s e ’ s p r o h ib it io n a g a in s t o c c u p an c y b y an y o n e o th e r th an M o w dy . We
rema nd this cause f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med in Part, Rever sed and Rende red in Part, Reve rsed a nd Remanded in Part Filed: Mar ch 16, 2007