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1

37–320 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–40]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND,

AND SOUTHERN COMMAND

HEARING HELD

MARCH 21, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

PAUL OOSTBURG SANZ, Professional Staff Member

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, March 21, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request from the U.S. Strategic Command, Northern

Command, Transportation Command, and Southern Command ..................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, March 21, 2007 ................................................................................... 45

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN

COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Marine Corps ............................................................................................................. 5

Keating, Adm. Timothy J., Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North

American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Navy ......................................... 7

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 8

Stavridis, Adm. James G., Commander, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Navy . 9

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Cartwright, Gen. James E. .............................................................................. 54

Keating, Adm. Timothy J. ................................................................................ 73

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A. ................................................................................ 94

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 49

Stavridis, Adm. James G. ................................................................................ 118

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 147

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 148

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 147

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, NORTHERN COMMAND, TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, AND SOUTHERN COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 21, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today’s hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings

with combatant commanders.

I am pleased to welcome General Cartwright of Strategic Command (STRATCOM); Admiral Keating of Northern Command

(NORTHCOM), who will soon be taking the reins at Pacific Command; General Schwartz at Transportation Command

(TRANSCOM); and Admiral Stavridis.

Do me a favor. Pronounce that correctly for me again.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, it is Stavridis.

The CHAIRMAN. I got it. Thank you—of Southern Command

(SOUTHCOM).

And we are honored to have all four of you today. Appreciate

what you do, and especially want to express gratitude to each of

those who work with you and for you, in and out of uniform.

Although the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere consume so much energy and resources, our attention should

be in other parts of the world, as well.

In Colombia we have spent over four billion dollars since 1999

to stem the flow of illegal drugs into our country and to aid the Colombians in their fight against homegrown terrorists. But according

to the latest figures from the Justice Department, the supply and

purity of illicit narcotics in our streets has not changed much.

The administration of President Uribe is also currently embroiled

in a criminal investigation into a seemingly widespread conspiracy

between high-ranking government officials and leaders of the

paramilitaries.

Guantanamo Bay, a name that now rings throughout our country—I would like to begin a discussion as to whether we should

continue to use the naval station there as a detention facility.

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Although recent legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and Department of Defense directives have probably improved the nature

of interrogation and detention at that place, I think it may be a bit

too late. It has become in the minds of many of our allies a textbook example of how not to run a detention facility.

NORTHCOM—Admiral Keating, I am interested in the status of

planning and training activities between NORTHCOM on the one

hand, and national guard and reserve components and local responders on the other.

And as you know, the response to Katrina highlighted the need

to better coordinate these activities, as cited in the recent Guard

and Reserve Commission report, the commission on which someone

who used to work in your shop, Stanton Thompson, has sat.

Traditionally, I have been a strong proponent of the total force

concept of integrating the reserve and active components into one

effort. And yet, I am concerned about reports that NORTHCOM

does not adequately understand the capabilities of the guard and

reserve due to the fact that NORTHCOM is overly staffed by active

duty personnel.

With regards to STRATCOM, we are interested in the

warfighter’s perspective on the balance between nuclear and conventional forces in the future.

I understand, General Cartwright, that you do recognize the

need for a national discussion on this important issue, and I think

that in that regard, I look forward to hearing your thoughts about

the Reliable Replacement Warhead and Conventional Trident

Modification programs, and what you can say publicly.

I follow with interest the expanded role the warfighter has been

playing in the missile field defense business, particularly in the

context of the North Korean test of a long-range missile last summer.

In regard to TRANSCOM, General Schwartz, I believe that the

critical issue for the committee will be to understand better the nature of our future mobility requirements. We are reaching ultimate

decision points on strategic airlift production and modernization

that will impact our capabilities.

I ask that the total of my statement be put into the record. And

I ask my ranking, my friend, Duncan Hunter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me join in welcoming our guests. It is always good to

have combatant commanders before us, because, gentlemen, you

are directly in the chain of command and carry out the orders of

the commander-in-chief, and you have extremely important pieces

of this great operation called the American security apparatus.

So, thank you for being with us this morning.

Congratulations to Admiral Keating on your recent confirmation

as commander of the Pacific Command. I know we will look forVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:33 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 037320 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-40\080000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ward to meeting with your replacement in NORTHCOM, General

Renuart, in the near future.

You know, in 2005, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the importance of NORTHCOM’s mission of support to U.S. civil authorities.

And the recently released National Guard Commission report recommends that NORTHCOM should increase its capacity to execute

its civil support mission.

So, at the appropriate time, I hope you comment on how

NORTHCOM executes its civil support mission and how it is reaching out to the national guard and working with state and local entities to ensure that it has full situational awareness.

Admiral Stavridis, welcome to your first hearing as SOUTHCOM

commander. We have had a chance to visit a little bit. Obviously,

Latin America and the Caribbean are America’s neighbors. And although there are no conventional threats in the region at this time,

developments in the region do impact U.S. security.

The U.S. and South America continue to work together. And

while there are examples of progress, there continue to be regional

security and political challenges.

Illegal drug production and trade, particularly in the Andean

Ridge, continues to be a problem. In Colombia, President Uribe, the

first modern Colombian president to win reelection, is fighting

narcoterrorism in his country with U.S. support. And I know we

have chatted a little bit. You see good trends with respect to that

issue.

In Venezuela, President Chavez maintains close relations with

Cuba and Iran, while aggressively importing arms and defense capabilities not proportional to its defense needs. And furthermore,

there are indications that radical Islamists may be taking advantage of instability in that region.

So, I am interested in learning how SOUTHCOM is working with

its regional and interagency partners to address these challenges.

Last, this committee continues to remain focused on

SOUTHCOM’s responsibilities for Guantanamo Bay. And I am

going to reserve most of my comments until next week, when the

committee intends to hold two hearings, but let me make one quick

point.

We, as a nation, cannot afford to close Guantanamo. It houses

dangerous people who are intent on killing innocent Americans.

And if you need a reminder of this fact, all you have to do is read

this recently released transcript of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s

statements to the effect that he did, in fact, involve himself in the

killing of thousands of Americans and sees no problem with killing

more Americans, if given the opportunity.

And I would just say that we have all seen the reports percolating that there may be moves to close Guantanamo and remove

these terrorists into the United States.

I think one of the most dangerous things we could do is move

people who have expertise in explosives anywhere close to the general prisoner population in the United States. I think isolation is

absolutely appropriate.

And as a guy who has been down to Guantanamo with some of

my colleagues on the committee, and having looked at the conditions, at the outstanding medical care that is given people in GuanVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:33 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 037320 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-40\080000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
4

tanamo, you know, their health care there would rival that of most

health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States.

The food is excellent. They are given taxpayer-paid-for prayer

rugs and Qurans, and their routine is interrupted five times a day

for prayer.

When you look at the reports from international agencies that

complain about lack of square footage and other things that I

would consider not to be substantial complaints, I think it is very

clear that Guantanamo is being run very professionally. But beyond that, it is a necessity in this war against terror.

So, maybe you can touch to some degree on Guantanamo. I know

we are going to have extensive hearings on Guantanamo shortly.

General Cartwright, thank you for testifying before us twice in

a couple of weeks.

In this post-Cold War environment, we have got to have a full

range of capabilities to deter and respond to multiple threats and

adversaries that span the gamut from transnational terrorists and

rogue nations like North Korea, who just tested this missile that

the chairman mentioned a few minutes ago, and is working to develop ways to deliver its new-found nuclear capabilities.

So, I think the committee would appreciate also hearing about

our Nation’s strategic posture needs. And I am particularly interested in the Conventional Trident Modification Program and hearing about the need for the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the

combatant commander’s missile defense needs. So, if you could talk

about that briefly, that would be good.

Last, the chairman mentioned the Chinese anti-satellite test

(ASAT) that occurred in January. And though its target was a Chinese weather satellite, it sent a clear message. Most people do not

try to attain the capability to shoot down their own satellites. And

I think that that heralded a new era of military competition in

space, whether we want it or not.

So, understanding this is not a classified hearing, maybe you

could testify a little bit about your thoughts with respect to that

recent test.

General Schwartz, welcome to you. You obviously are a critical

player in the nation’s warfighting operations today. And let me just

thank you. You have always been extremely responsive to all the

services and their transportation needs, especially in the

warfighting theaters.

I know you have some thoughts on where we are going to go with

lift, and you are going to have to make some difficult choices.

Thanks for your efforts on behalf of all the warfighting forces. And

please let us know how we can help you become more efficient and

stretch those TRANSCOM dollars.

So, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is absolutely timely and critical to the nation’s defenses, and I look forward to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the ranking member.

Since we have four witnesses today, I hope that you will do your

best to confine your remarks. And we will, without objection, put

your prepared statements in the record.

5

I would also recommend to the members, since we are under the

five-minute rule, that you may wish to confine your questions on

the first round, at least, to one or two of the witnesses.

So, without any further ado, General Cartwright, welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER,

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, I appreciate this opportunity to come and testify today.

Since I have had the opportunity to testify before some of your

subcommittees, and that is a matter of record, I am not going to

go into any great detail until we get to the question-and-answers,

and leave it for that. But I think there are a couple of issues that

were highlighted by both the chairman and Congressman Hunter

that are worth at least a mention here in the preamble.

The threat out there is growing, and it is expanding. And as was

said earlier, it spans from the conventional or the nation-state challenges that we have to rogue states and extremists. And this is a

broader threat than we have taken on in the past.

And so, trying to define a deterrence strategy for the 21st century and the capabilities necessary to lend credibility to that deterrence is what STRATCOM has focused its efforts on.

And I think, in moving forward here, I am going to hit just a couple of points, the first being on our offensive capabilities and the

discussion about our nuclear capabilities.

And given that this is an open hearing, let me just say that we

entered into an agreement with the Russians called the Moscow

Treaty. It set limits on our active stockpiles and drawdown, and a

goal for 2012. In 2007, which is where we are today, was the midpoint in that drawdown, and both we and the Russians have reviewed our progress in that activity.

Both of us are ahead of schedule in shutting down systems and

the active stockpile. But the active stockpile is only one part of our

stockpile. There is also the inactive portion of it.

In the strategy that has been put forth by this Administration,

and that we are working toward is, the lowest number of nuclear

weapons necessary for national security. That is the objective.

And so, as we move forward on the drawdowns in response to the

Moscow Treaty, we need to increase our other capabilities as alternatives and replacements for the drawdown of the nuclear weapons

that we have in our stockpile.

Part and parcel to that, in that drawdown through 2012, is refurbishing the stockpile that we have. And the activity that we are

undertaking here is to ensure that the weapons that we have are

the safest they can be for the people who use them and handle

them, that they are as secure as modern technology will allow us

to make them, and that they are reliable.

All three of those attributes will help us draw this stockpile

down. All three of those attributes will have effect on both the active and the inactive stockpiles. That is critical.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead, which just finished its first

study efforts, is now entering into the second phase of study. That

is our intention, to move into the more detailed engineering studies.

6

The activity associated with that and the capability that we are

seeking with this Reliable Replacement Warhead is first, safe, secure, and reliable; second, its form, fit, and function replacement

for the existing weapons.

In other words, there are no new delivery vehicles. There is no

new capability. This is taking my 1966 Mustang and making sure

that it has got four-wheel brake disc brakes, it has got seat belts—

it has got all of the things that it ought to have to be responsible,

to maintain control over and be able to use and develop these

weapons in a safe, secure way.

And that is our intent with the Reliable Replacement Warhead.

In order to get to the lowest numbers necessary for national security, we have got to see the emergence of conventional capabilities to replace or augment some of the existing nuclear capabilities.

One of those that was mentioned in the opening statement was the

conventional Trident.

What we are seeking here is prompt, global strike. And with the

technologies we have today, we can do that with conventional

weapons. And we can draw down the number of nuclear weapons

necessary to accomplish prompt global strike, number one.

And number two, we can have a capability that is beyond nuclear. In other words, today, if something happens quickly and we

have to respond quickly, the only choice that we have in a global

capability is a nuclear weapon.

That is unacceptable for the range of threats that we are going

to face in the future. We need a conventional capability. It will be

more appropriate for several of the scenarios, and I am happy to

discuss that, to the extent that we can, in this hearing.

The second piece of this activity is a defense that is credible. In

other words, what we want is a balanced offense-defense capability.

Offense is not always the right answer, and it is usually where

you do not want to end up. What we want to be able to do is drive

this to a non-confrontational issue, whatever happens to occur.

And so, a defensive capability gives us a way to defuse things,

to devalue things.

The asset out there in the world that has got the biggest market

right now are short-and medium-range ballistic missiles. And we

have got to find a way to respond to those.

They launch quickly, and they arrive quickly. They do not wait

for conventional force to close. They threaten neighbors.

How do you devalue those, so that they stop proliferating? How

do you make the governments who have them think twice about

using them, number one, and think twice about the effect that they

are going to have?

How do you change the adversary’s calculus about his opportunity to be successful with these short-and medium-range ballistic

missiles?

That is the next phase that we have got to start to take on with

ballistic missile defense.

The phase after that that we are starting to look at is cruise missiles. And what are we going to do against the proliferation of

cruise missiles and their increased sophistication?

What we are convinced, at least inside of STRATCOM, is you do

not want to build a completely separate system for cruise missiles.

7

You want to leverage the lessons that we have learned and the capabilities and command and control and sensor management that

we learned in ballistic missile and apply that to cruise missile,

rather than building a separate system.

And that is the path that we are on. I would be happy to have

more discussion about that.

Two other areas. Space: There were questions about space and

the ASAT test. I would be happy to discuss that.

But the position from the command is, number one, just because

there is a threat in space does not mean you have to respond in

space. We do not need an arms race in space.

And the last piece is cyber. In cyber, this country is under attack

on a daily basis, whether it be in the commerce and industry sectors, in the academic sectors or in the defense sectors.

We have to start to understand how we are going to contest this

environment, provide defenses for the country, rather than, as we

do today, just defend the terminals, wait for a patch and lose

money the whole time, or lose intellectual capital the whole time

that we are waiting for somebody to fix a vulnerability.

We have got to start to extend our defensive perimeters out beyond the terminals, beyond the computers and the firewalls.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest of my time here to my counterparts.

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in

the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much, and we will look

forward to asking you those questions to which you referred.

Admiral Keating, I guess this is your last appearance in your

present role.

Admiral KEATING. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your excellent service in the past.

We look forward to your future service.

Admiral Keating.

STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, COMMANDER, U.S.

NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE

DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman

Hunter, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear before you this morning to represent the men and women of North

American Aerospace Defense Command and the United States

Northern Command.

Homeland defense is the core of our national military strategy.

And while NORAD and NORTHCOM are separate commands, we

operate with complementary missions. We work together for our

sacred mission of defending our homelands.

We operate within a common security environment. We share a

headquarters staff. We embrace common values. We understand

the importance of executing our duties with a sense of urgency in

the face of very real and present dangers.

It is my honor to represent all those fine young men and women

before you today.

The core capability to accomplish our missions resides in our people. We are grateful for your support, Mr. Chairman, and all the

8

Congress, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast

Guardsmen. Their welfare and the welfare of their families is our

highest priority.

We remain resolutely committed to defending the United States

and Canada and Mexico against all threats.

To address a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Hunter, that you asked in your opening comments, we are vitally interested in providing the American people the capabilities

that they need to defend our homeland and to provide support to

civil authorities when we are directed.

That means an integrated team of active, reserve and guard

forces. That is our sole focus, the integration of this team.

We have seven general officers on our staff at the United States

Northern Command who are reserve or guard officers—seven. Over

150 troops come through our doors every morning who are reserve

or guard or Air Guard forces.

We have an annual conference in the late winter with all of the

hurricane adjutants general—the adjutants general from New York

all the way around the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf Coast of Texas.

Ten to a dozen adjutants general come every spring, and we discuss the requirements that may well be levied upon us if a hurricane is of sufficient import.

I have met with each and every adjutant general of the United

States and discussed face-to-face with them their issues and our

issues.

I am convinced that we are on the same page, Mr. Chairman,

and that we have a common purpose: to provide the American people with the support that they deserve.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating can be found in the

Appendix on page 73.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Keating, thank you, sir.

General Schwartz.

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, COMMANDER,

U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter and

members of the committee, it is also a pleasure and a privilege for

me to represent the 150,000 folks in the Transportation Command

who basically move by air, land and sea the materiel and personnel

of the Department of Defense.

We, during 2006, I think, have provided noteworthy support to

the department, as well as made considerable efforts to advance

the distribution processes and systems that we depend upon, along

with the remainder of the logistics community.

Fundamentally, I think we have focused our attention on making

sure that the right personnel, the right equipment, the right

sustainment and support is delivered at the right place and time

in order to support, as you suggested earlier, our warfighters.

In addition, we have the responsibility of being the distribution

process owner for the department. And in that, we are laboring to

improve the precision, the reliability and the efficiency of the DOD

supply chain, simply by improving business process, by making inVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:33 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 037320 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-40\080000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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formation systems interoperable and by securing enhanced mobility

assets.

I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that we take particular pride

in the rewarding aero-medical evacuation mission. And we do that

with special care.

I could not be prouder of our joint team and our national partners. We all are supporting the global war on terror while making

a concerted effort to transform the military deployment and distribution enterprise.

I am grateful to you, sir, and to the committee for allowing me

to appear before you today, for the essential support that you provide in enabling our capabilities. And I am prepared to take any

questions that you have, sir.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Schwartz can be found in

the Appendix on page 94.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, General Schwartz.

Admiral Stavridis, welcome.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, COMMANDER, U.S.

SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter, distinguished members

of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to come

before you today and discuss some of the issues, what we are doing,

and the challenges we face throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

I want to thank each of you personally for your service. And I

would encourage each of you to come travel in the region. And I

would encourage you to come to Guantanamo Bay and see it for

yourself, if you have not done so.

On behalf of all of us at Southern Command, thank you for the

support you provide to us, just as you do to my wingmen here

today.

I do want to say to General Cartwright and Admiral Keating and

General Schwartz, thank you for all the support you give to U.S.

Southern Command. We appreciate it greatly.

Our mission down south is straightforward: to promote security

cooperation and conduct operations with the 32 countries and 13

territories that are down south of Mexico. About 450 million people

live down there. And we feel our work contributes to the defense

of the United States.

Our ability to accomplish the mission is significantly influenced

by our understanding of the diversity and the culture down south,

and that is an important part of what we seek to do at U.S. Southern Command.

On that note, I would say all of us in the United States think

and understand that we live in a shared home called the Americas.

We tend to think of the term American as applying to a citizen of

the United States, but we are all Americans in this hemisphere. It

is an extraordinary and diverse part of the world.

And I would argue that the part of the world that I am engaged

in is not America’s ‘‘backyard.’’ I do not like that expression much.

10

I would not even call it America’s front porch. It is part of a shared

home that we all have together.

I have been in the job about five months. I have had a chance

to travel pretty widely since then, and I can tell you that our partners in the region are making, I think, good, strong progress.

They face significant threats and challenges: narcotics, we have

talked about a little bit; gangs—‘‘pandillas’’ and ‘‘maras’’ they are

called—to the south; illicit trafficking in human persons.

The challenges of this region are many, but they are not straightforward military challenges. And thus, there is a particular emphasis in this part of the world on working with the interagency, working with our partners at State, with Homeland Security, particularly the Coast Guard or the Drug Enforcement Agency and many

others.

I would tell you that everything we do in Latin America and the

Caribbean, frankly, depends on strong interagency linkages.

Given that, I think it is important to understand the great potential of the region. And if we can unlock that together—the United

States and the other nations of the region working together—we

and the military-to-military realm want to be part of that in a very

positive way. And that is what we seek to do.

I would like to close, as my compatriots have, by just saying how

proud I am to serve alongside the men and women of the U.S.

Southern Command: active duty, reservists, civilians, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. I could not ask, as we

would say in the Navy, for better shipmates anywhere ashore in

the world.

Thank you again to the members of the committee, the chairman

and the ranking member. Appreciate your time, and I look forward

to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in

the Appendix on page 118.]

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank you gentlemen for your excellent testimony.

I will ask one question of Admiral Stavridis and then turn to my

ranking, and then we will be off and running on the five-minute

rule.

Admiral, the United Nations, some members of the Congress and

other people in and out of our country have raised the issue of the

detention and interrogation facilities at Guantanamo.

Could the detainees be held elsewhere within your area of responsibility with the same security and effectiveness?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir. I do not believe they could be held

anywhere in my area of responsibility with the same degree of security and effectiveness.

I believe at Guantanamo Bay we are operating a humane, a

legal, and a transparent detention and interrogation facility.

Transparent—we have had over 2,000 journalists visit it over the

last four years. We have had over 2,000 high-level visitors, including many, many members of Congress. Most recently, Senator

Levin and Senator Graham came down just this past week.

We fully follow Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. We

follow the laws of the United States. We will continue to do that.

11

I believe it is a humane facility. I think compared to any facility

in the world, it is a very humane and well-run operation.

I personally cannot think of another location in my area of responsibility that would make sense to move these particular individuals. And I believe they must be kept in a place where they are

not free to do the kinds of things that have occurred before in terrorist acts against the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. My friend, Duncan Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, following your custom here, I see Mr. Conaway

and Mr. Davis down in the front row. I would be happy to pass on

my time and yield them my time under the five-minute rule, and

I will ask a few questions at the end of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. Which one do you choose?

Mr. HUNTER. You know, I think Mr. Davis is getting up there.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Davis is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you, Ranking Member Hunter, for the opportunity.

One question that many of us are interested in, particularly as

we deal with the challenges of the rising problems with Islamic

radicalism, seeing the action of our agencies, particularly during

Hurricane Katrina, other issues that we have run into, I am very

curious about your views of interagency reform needs, in Southern

Command in particular.

And generally from a Northern Command and homeland defense

standpoint, if Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis might comment on some statutory changes that might improve the interagency process, to make our interagency community a little bit

more expeditionary, but also more integrated, to anticipate the

types of things, particularly the non-military types of things, where

we can preempt or minimize the likelihood of conflict.

Admiral KEATING. Congressman Davis, I would be happy to

start, and then Jim can provide his perspective.

We have 60, at Northern Command, different agencies represented in our headquarters. So, that is true interagency representation.

It goes beyond that, however. There is actual productivity. It is

not just activity, but it is productivity during the courses of exercises—and we conduct a number of those—during the courses of

real-world operations. We benefit significantly from the presence

and the expertise represented by those 60 different agencies.

And it is not all federal. About two-thirds of those are Federal

agencies, and a third are non-federal, like Red Cross, World Health

Organization, and folks like that.

As far as the imposition of statutory concerns for us, I am unaware of any that would be of significant early benefit compared

to the day-to-day operations that we conduct and day-to-day staff

work, though I think there is merit in some consideration, and I

believe this is under way for the similar Goldwater-Nichols-like

education and joint duties as requisites for promotion within other

agencies, sir.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, as is often said on Capitol Hill, I would

like to associate myself with Admiral Keating’s remarks. I would

12

echo the fact—the good news is that there is an awful lot of interagency partnering that is going on in all the combatant commands

and with all the partners exactly as Admiral Keating indicated.

What we do at Southern Command is, we have just stood up a

new directorate. We call it the J–9. So, it is one of our key

functionalities within the command, that is devoted to the interagency. It is staffed with interagency partners. Various agencies

around the government have volunteered to put people into this

group down in Miami.

And I would argue that, as we look forward at the future of combatant commands, they will start to look a lot more interagency,

more combined, more international partners involved and in the

headquarters. We have six international partners who are in our

headquarters with us.

And again, I agree with Admiral Keating, that exactly the type

of wisdom that Congress had in passing Goldwater-Nichols, which

led to a better level of jointness between the services, I think that

is an extremely rich area for study, and should be pursued.

And again, we are trying to do it at our own level, but it certainly would be a sensible topic to pursue. Again, certainly in

Southern Command, where so many of the tasks we face, the challenges we face are not direct military kinds of things.

We are not launching Tomahawk missiles downrange in

SOUTHCOM. We are launching ideas. And we need interagency

partners to help us do that.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. That is one area that we would like to

work with you on, having seen a consistent pattern of challenges

faced, whether it was during Hurricane Katrina in Haiti, the military can only get the ball so far down the field. And I think we are

dealing with the same things in Iraq and Afghanistan right now,

where the visible cost is so much higher.

But a lot of the types of challenges that could be faced by a more

integrated—and I still get the sense that there will have to be statutory change to amend personnel policies and to change some of

these priorities, you know, ranging from reconstructing a banking

system after a hurricane to more complex matters.

So, thank you.

I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for all the great work that you all do.

Admiral Stavridis, in your testimony, you state that your region

is a highly likely base for future terrorist threats. And you comment, coupled with the significant reduction of the Navy presence

in the Gulf Coast—you know we shut down the only deepwater

base we had, which was Naval Station Ingleside.

And it was not too long ago we had a big meeting here, and the

question came up about who were the gangs involved. One of the

gangs, prominent gangs, that came up was the Mara Salvatrucha.

You are probably very familiar with them.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. But, you know, I am also concerned with the drilling

in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with keeping the commercial

13

sea lanes open in the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned with all the

refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. We do not have a deepwater sea

port.

You are doing a great job by doing exercises with the different

countries in that area. But you know what? I am very, very concerned.

And I read in the statement that you said that the economic linkage between the nations of the Americas has risen dramatically

over the last decade, with north and south trade comprising about

40 percent. Well, it seems to me that the Navy does not look north

and south—at least the overall Navy. I was told that they look east

and west.

But are you happy with what we have there? Could we do more?

I am very, very concerned. They are our neighbors, and it seems

to me that we have not really focused.

And I know it is not entirely your responsibility. We have to do

something to help you.

And then you mention about Hezbollah, as well. That terrorist

group has a prominent—and now, I know I am asking too many

questions, but they are very much in that area. And I am concerned that we do not have enough militarily to respond in case we

do have a crisis.

Maybe you can respond to—your statement was a great statement, maybe because I come from Texas, from the Gulf of Mexico.

But that was a very, very good statement, Admiral.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

I am going to ask Admiral Keating to chime in here, because he

is actually the combatant commander who has principal responsibility for the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. My border kind of runs

just south of Mexico itself, and so, he owns those waters. I own the

Caribbean waters immediately adjacent. But I think your question

is relevant to both of us.

As far as the Navy’s posture and where it is located, I would certainly leave those questions to the chief of naval operations, who

has the requirement to do the training, equipment, and organize.

I would mention that last summer we had a Navy aircraft carrier

come through those waters. A very successful deployment. We

called it the Partnership of the Americas carrier. Did a whole series of exercises that ranged from military readiness to

counterterrorism to counternarcotics to humanitarian and civic

projects.

We have multiple ship visits on any given day throughout the

waters of the Caribbean. And this summer, as you may have seen,

the President just announced that he approved an initiative that

we sent up to bring a hospital ship into those waters.

Clearly, it does not bring offensive power. But again, in this

theme that we are not sending missiles downrange in Latin America, we are sending ideas and interactions and humanitarian assistance in so many ways. And that contributes to our long-term

security.

We will have the Comfort in the region for over four months,

which I think is very positive.

We were also operating something called Enduring Friendship,

which is a counterterrorism use of funds that the Congress alloVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:33 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 037320 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-40\080000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
14

cated under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act

(NDAA) last year. That puts radars, boats and command and control apparatus in place in eight different nations of the region,

which I think are helpful against the kinds of threats you so aptly

identified.

Last, the Navy is approving the deployment of something under

an experimental type of concept called Global Fleet Stations, which

will be a high-speed vessel, a swift, which will come into the area

of operations and operate throughout the Gulf, partnering with our

nations there to try and take on these kinds of threats that you,

again, correctly articulated.

Admiral Keating, anything to add to that, sir?

Admiral KEATING. Congressman Ortiz, I would share your concern about the threat to our homeland from terrorists. We share

that concern, and we are working across the spectrum with those

capabilities in the Department of Defense, not just from a Navy

perspective, though we are actively working with the Navy, the

Coast Guard and Air Force in particular.

Their forces are integrated in the this overall system-of-systems

that we have, that we think is doing an adequate job of addressing

approaches to our homeland, whether they are air, land or maritime.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time is up. Thank you so

much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

It looks like Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Two of the happiest four-stars maybe in the world are sitting

here. I know General Cartwright, because he is a Marine aviator

on an Air Force base, and Admiral Keating, because he has taken

a back-to-back hardship tour, moving from Colorado Springs to

Honolulu.

Congratulations to you both, and to all of you.

I want to associate myself with the remarks and discussion about

the interagency process. Admiral Keating and I have had discussions about this a number of times. And if I have the chance, I

would like to get back to that.

But I would like to go to SOUTHCOM, if I could, for just a

minute. And while we were gathering before the hearing, you were

speaking in Spanish for a minute or two and sounded conversant,

if not fluent. After sort of ‘‘buenos dias’’ and ‘‘bienvenidos,’’ I tend

to run out.

But the question is, your whole area of responsibility—well, absent Brazil and Belize and maybe one or two others—is Spanishspeaking. How are you staffed? What is the competency in Spanish

of your staff right now?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is one——

Mr. KLINE. Don’t even think about it.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Estudio studiando espanol una hora cada

dia, porque es muy importante por el jefe o commando sur.

I know Congressman Ortiz got that.

Mr. KLINE. I will ask for a translation from him later.

15

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Okay. I said I am studying Spanish about an

hour a day, because I think it is very important for the commander

of U.S. Southern Command.

Of 450 million people, about 180 million speak Portuguese, which

is similar to Spanish. The rest, largely, sir, you are correct, speak

Spanish.

I think it is a crucial part of what we need to do. If we are going

to be involved in this region, we must learn the languages.

These are not extremely difficult languages, as Japanese would

be for a U.S. speaker, or Arabic or Pashto or Hindu. These are Romance languages. They are very similar to English in many ways.

What we are doing at U.S. Southern Command is, we have set

a goal that 60 percent of the personnel assigned will speak a second language, one of the languages of the region. That is a stretch

goal. It will be a challenge to achieve it.

We are putting resources behind that, everything from computer

programs that people can self-learn, to having classes, to having

testing of the——

Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. Where do you think you are now toward

this——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think I am at 40 percent, which is extremely high. DOD-wide, it might be 20 percent.

But at U.S. Southern Command, because we are lucky enough to

be in the Miami area, a lot of people volunteer to come down who

are of Hispanic descent. So, we have a rather high number of native Spanish speakers, which helps the rest of us as we seek to improve our facilities.

I believe, to learn another man’s language is to understand his

life. I think it is an important aspect of integrating and acting in

an area of operations. So, I am putting serious resources against

it in this part of the world.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. I agree with you, and I applaud you for

that effort.

I don’t know. I guess we are always looking for ways that we can

help, so if you will stay in dialogue with us. I am a little reluctant

to put something like that in a statute.

But, again, I commend you for that effort. And I am glad to hear

it is moving that way.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

And I would mention that the Department of Defense has recently increased the incentives for individuals in the armed forces

to learn foreign languages broadly around the world, and that is

very helpful. And that is being funded by the Congress, and we appreciate it greatly.

Mr. KLINE. Right. Thank you very much.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLINE. The light is still green. It will not be for much longer.

But, Admiral Keating, we have had discussions on a couple of occasions in your offices and in mine about this interagency process.

And you have been able to get quite a bit done. I mean, we talked

about plans that you have on the shelf, and those involved interagencies.

16

One of my concerns is, this is personality, it can be personalitydriven. If there is something that we can help with for process in

institutionalizing it, we would like to be able to help.

If you have got any comments now, the light is about to turn red,

but I would like to——

Admiral KEATING. And nothing directly, Congressman. I do not

know that a statutory imposition is a good idea.

But your active and abiding concern, which many of you have

demonstrated by visits, not just in Northern Command, but

throughout the United States and visiting folks like civil support

teams that are national guard and active duty, and the embedded

defense coordinating officers that are Title 10 folks with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.

As you course around the country and visit your constituents, I

would recommend those locations to you.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Keating, I am doing my best to try and figure out just

what it is, four and a half years later, that the Northern Command

does. Who is in charge of what?

I have read through your testimony. I have gone through the

staff preparation on mission and organization. I see a lot of words

in here about homeland defense, referring to a concerted national

effort to secure the homeland from threats and violence, as differentiated from homeland defense, referring to military protection

of the United States, civil support areas, called C.S., in the area

of homeland defense, with the DOD as the lead agency.

Are you or are you not in charge of civil support defense of the

United States? And if you are, who is subordinate to you, and what

is the reporting hierarchy?

Admiral KEATING. I would answer the question, Congressman,

that I am not in charge of civil support homeland defense. I am

tasked by the secretary of defense and the President for defending

the homeland and providing defense support to civil authorities.

And I think the words matter here and the distinction is important.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think so, too. I cannot figure out what you

do. As far as I can tell, you have a group of people, approximately

500, because these budgets all disappear into joint task forces and

all kinds of integrated team efforts. I cannot even find—I am doing

my best to try and figure out where all your budget is.

What precisely do you do?

Admiral KEATING. Defend our homeland and provide defense

support to civil authorities.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then what is your relationship to the

Department of Homeland Security and the National Guard Bureau?

Admiral KEATING. The relationship to the National Guard Bureau is informal.

As far as my dealings with General Steve Blum—who is a good

friend; I talk to him frequently—he has, as you are aware, budgVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:33 Sep 16, 2008 Jkt 037320 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-40\080000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
17

etary authority for the national guard and the international guard.

And so, we work with him to advocate certain programs for him.

But he has an $18-billion-a-year budget, and ours is $130 million.

So, our impact on his budget is primarily through advocacy.

In terms of our relationship with the Department of Homeland

Security, it is not a statutory relationship. It is one that is based

upon a common goal of providing security and support for the citizens of the United States.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What does that mean? Aside from being good

friends and aside from speaking to one another, what does it mean?

Admiral KEATING. It is a lot more than that, Congressman. It is

exercising frequently. It is sharing plans. It is sharing officers and

staff workers.

It is engaging in comprehensive activities across the broad range

of our assignments and Department of Homeland Security’s requirements to ensure that we are not again attacked, and that in

the event of a catastrophe, whether natural or manmade, we work,

when we are directed by the President, to operate closely with the

Department of Homeland security to mitigate suffering and save

human lives.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. That is all very well and good.

The National Guard Commission report says that, after four and

a half years, the Northern Command should develop plans for consequence management—whatever that is—and support the civilian

authorities that account for state level activities and incorporate

the use of national guard and reserve forces, as first military responders.

We have had four and a half years to plan that.

Admiral KEATING. The plans are done, Mr. Congressman. They

are on the shelf.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They were not done as of March 1, 2007, according to the National Guard Commission report.

Admiral KEATING. The report is in error, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, maybe we will need to get the National Guard

Commission here, because Admiral Keating says that this commission report, which you have referred to, is in error.

The CHAIRMAN. The National Guard Commission will be testifying before this committee on this Friday, as a matter of fact.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You do have plans now for consequence management and support of civil authorities that account for state-level

activities and incorporation of the national guard and reserve

forces in a first responder military activity in response to an attack

on the United States. They are in existence.

Admiral KEATING. They do exist and have for some time.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then who is in charge?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on what the President decides,

whether he gives it to the Department of Homeland Security or Department of Defense. By statute, it is the Department of Homeland

Security.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, so you have Title 10 and you have Title

32.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir.

18

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, that is already established as to whether the governor calls up a national guard unit under state status

for payment by the state or by the Federal Government. And you

bring in the posse comitatus situation under Title 10. We already

know that that is established.

I want to know who is in charge of these plans. Who executes

them? Do you, or the national guard, or the individual states, or

the Department of Homeland Security?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on the situation, the gravity of the

consequence management challenge presented. And we are prepared to do it, if we are tasked. We in the Northern Command are

prepared to execute that mission.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or do you figure it out as you go along?

Admiral KEATING. It depends on the situation and it depends on

who gets the assignment from the Department of Defense and the

President of the United States.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have

to examine very, very closely whether this needs to go on, or that

this is just another proliferation of tail-chasing bureaucracy.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you, as always. Let me always express gratitude

every time you come before a committee like this. Those of you who

pay the price for human freedom, at least as we know it in America. I am very grateful to each one of you.

General Cartwright, I have had an opportunity to talk to you in

the Strategic Forces Subcommittee a number of times. And I am

glad you are on our side.

Let me first talk to you a little bit. It seems like most of the

threats that this country has had in the past, just historically, for

some reason, the trend has been that we never seem to recognize

something before there is blood on the wall.

There was a time when the Nazis were just a bunch of guys in

brown shirts riding across the bicycles in France, and they were no

threat to anybody, except that they had a dangerous ideology that

had the ability to take hold.

The Cold War began when we got one of our secrets lost in Los

Alamos and the Russians kind of took it and ran with it.

In each case, we could have probably responded earlier and

maybe prevented some of the great challenges that we had. And I

think that these things sneak up on us a little bit.

But there is one thing in the distance that is not sneaking up

on us, and that is the growing power and capability of China.

I do not think they are being very quiet. And I think there is a

rumble in the distance there, and that we need to be very aware

of what is occurring there.

Their ASAT test concerns me greatly. And obviously, I think it

is important that the United States gain some superiority in space,

as soon as possible, given the implications of that ASAT test.

With that in mind, do you think there is enough urgency in this

Congress and in this country related to our missile defense capabilities in space, our capabilities to defend this country in general,

in that growing frontier?

19

General CARTWRIGHT. Sir, I think, in regards to China, and in

regards to the ASAT test, that we have set the conditions over the

past five years to improve our situation awareness, to start to understand what is an appropriate defense in space, sensors and capabilities, and to understand that our responses to threats in space

do not necessarily have to be directed or accomplished in space.

The question for me—and I think you have rightly described it—

is, are we moving quickly enough to foster ourselves in this environment? Should we be doing something else to make ourselves

ready?

And it is always difficult. I mean, the crystal ball is always better on Monday morning than it was on Friday before the game.

And so, we have moved aggressively to improve our space situation awareness. There is a substantial amount of organizational

construct. And we talked a little bit here about—we have listened

to some interagency discussion on how we change.

Many of those changes associated with space have been accomplished, and we are now in the process of executing those relationships, and starting to put them into beyond the personal, to actual

directive, to connect the dots, so to speak, between the different

agencies and their equities in space.

The second piece is, as you alluded to, where is China going in

this activity and how are they approaching it versus how we are

approaching it?

They have started to field what we call a continuum of capability, from the lowest end of capability all the way through the most

sophisticated, and filling in all of the blocks en route.

And ASAT, a direct ASAT, a direct ascent ASAT, is something

that is effective against low-earth orbit satellites. It does not reach

out into highly elliptical or other types of orbits out to geostationary. But it can reach many of the valuable satellites that we

have down in low-earth orbit.

Mr. FRANKS. General, forgive me. I hate to interrupt you, but I

am almost out of time, and you did good, but I want to get this

on the record, as well.

Related to some of the missiles that we have been testing, we

have had seven out of eight attempts with the missile three successful, and the missile two, the block two-four, against short-range

target missiles in May of 2006—all successful.

Isn’t it time—and help me understand why not—that these be

placed on our Aegis ships, so that at least we have that capability,

in case it should ever be needed?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. And we are doing a limited deployment, but you always run the risk of transitioning while you

are still testing, of building too many, and then finding out that the

configuration needs to be changed, and now you have got to go

back and re-change.

We have built what we call a hedge—we are fielding that right

now—sufficient missiles and ships that are matched in capability

that can be deployed forward in extremis. And that is the hedge

capability.

We are trying not to overbuild until we have a good understanding of what the end state ought to be and finish all of the testing.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General.

20

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sometimes the price of trying to aim ahead for some of these

dangers is sounding a little bit overwrought before everyone else is.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The next gentleman is Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you—this topic has come up

before—this issue of the statutory language that we put in the defense bill, I think, last year and maybe some other years also, in

which we essentially prohibit you all from retiring old C–5s, old C–

130E models. I think there are some other planes.

It has been difficult for me to understand why we do that. Would

you discuss that issue? My guess is that members get concerned

that, if a plane is retired it will mean that there will not be any

replacement coming to a particular local base.

But what is the reality of that? How much money is it costing

us? As somebody who has C–130Es with wing box problems in

their district, I would just as soon they would be retired and we

would try to replace them. I do not think they are doing anybody

any good.

But what is your perspective on that?

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Snyder, in prior times when

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was a major concern, these

issues about holding on to old iron perhaps had greater relevance.

At the moment, we are in a situation where it is very challenging

for the Air Force to manage the fleet in a way that optimizes their

support of my mission.

In the case of the C–130’s, as you are aware, we have had difficulty retiring the old E models. And, as a matter of fact, those E

models we have retired have to be maintained in recoverable status

out in Arizona at the bone yard, if you will, which is a more expensive way to maintain the retired asset than if you simply retired

it outright.

And so, my point as the operator on this—and, of course, the Air

Force is the organize, train and equip entity—but that I recommend that you give the Air Force the flexibility to manage the

fleets to best effect, to support the joint force mission.

And that means accessing old platforms and really making them

go away, rather than remaining on the ramp, where the youngsters

have to continue to maintain them.

A key point—the maintainers that support the airplanes are

really the coin of the realm. And if we have to spread their talent

over a larger population of air frames, some of which we cannot

really fly—it is true in the KC–135 fleet and also in the 130 fleet—

it is not the right way to run this operation.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you need affirmative language from us in the defense bill? Or do you just need us not to put prohibitive language

into the defense bill?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think the latter is the approach, which

would be not to have language which specifically affects certain

aircraft——

Dr. SNYDER. The KC–135s, the C–130s——

21

General SCHWARTZ [continuing]. Certain locations, and so on.

That is correct.

Dr. SNYDER. Are those the——

General SCHWARTZ. And for that matter, C–5s.

Dr. SNYDER. Are those the three, the C–5s, the KC–145s and C–

130Es?

General SCHWARTZ. On the lift side, that is correct, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. On another topic, would you make a comment about

the mobility capability study?

There are some who have expressed concerns—I think the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is among them—that the

study—I think maybe some people thought it was going to be a

more far-reaching or revolutionary, or whatever word you want to

use, that it seemed to endorse kind of a status quo look ahead.

Now, that may not be a fair statement. Sometimes you look

ahead and there is not a revolution on the horizon.

But what are your thoughts about that?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the mobility capability study was not

bold. I think that——

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. What? I am sorry.

General SCHWARTZ. It was not bold.

Dr. SNYDER. It was not bold, okay.

General SCHWARTZ. In other words, the way it came out, for example, was, for big airplanes there was a range of 292 to 383, and

this was a matter of how much risk you were willing to accept.

It would have been more satisfying, I think, to all of us, had the

study given us an objective. For me, big airplanes, big cargo lift airplanes, roughly 300 airplanes is the right target. And that is what

I would recommend to you as the target.

Studies inevitably are based on assumptions. And there are people—people can argue about whether the assumptions entailed

with Mounted Combat System (MCS) was adequate.

I can tell you, sir, that our sense is that about 300 big airplanes,

about 400 C–130-like airplanes. And it remains to be seen what the

tanker fleet looks like, but probably somewhere in the 400 to 500

aircraft range.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

I do not mean to ignore the other gentlemen, but thank you all

for being here.

Thank you, General Schwartz.

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Castor appears to be the last on the before-the-gavel list, unless someone comes back that was on it. Ms. Castor is recognized.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Admiral, when it comes to Southern Command and enhancing

our national security, I strongly believe that, yes, we need to continue to work on the partnerships with the nations there, yes, militarily, but also economically and politically. And I thought I would

give you a short list of a few, and ask you to comment upon them.

The Panama Canal right now is going through a widening and

modernization. Could you comment on that, what you know about

22

the status and the safety and security of that very important asset

moving forward?

Also, the struggles that we are having in Haiti. If you could comment briefly on Cuba, I would appreciate that. That could take

much longer than five minutes.

And then also, the Southern Command’s medical readiness training exercises. When I think about, as we consider the markup and

the resources that need to be spanned across the globe, I think it

will be very important to enhance our national security, like I said,

on the peacekeeping in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America.

Talk to me then—have you asked for enough on humanitarian

and civic assistance, your New Horizons program?

And if we were able to target additional resources, where would

you recommend?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you. And if I do not get through all

that, I will get back to you taking the question for the record. But

I think I can get through most of this quickly.

Panama Canal—I am a naval officer. In fact, I am a ship driver

within the Navy. We do have pilots and submariners, but I drive

ships.

I have driven ships through the Panama Canal, both when it was

run by the United States of America and during the period of time

now when it has been run by the Republic of Panama.

It is an excellent, safe, professionally run facility. And I am very,

very impressed with the work the Panamanians have done in the

canal. It is really the beating heart of the economy of the Americas,

when you look at the flow through the canal. It is extremely important. And I think it is a very well-run facility.

We do an annual exercise with 20 different countries to look at

the security of the Panama Canal. It is called Panamax. It looks

at counterterrorism threats, which are always an issue. And it will

be going on this June.

Haiti, I think, is at this moment in a stable place. It is the poorest and most impoverished country in the region, as I am sure you

know.

The United Nations is there with about 6,600 peacekeepers.

About half of those are provided from nations of the region. They

are doing a very credible job building a base of stability from

which, hopefully, prosperity can emerge.

I am traveling to Haiti, in fact, with your colleague, Congressman Meek, in April, and I am looking forward to the trip.

We do not have a large investment in terms of U.S. military

presence. I would call it a success story by the United Nations in

terms of what they are doing, and I look forward to learning more

about it when I go down there personally.

Cuba is obviously in an interesting moment in its history. Fidel

Castro’s health is a question mark. The degree to which his brother, Raul, has taken the reins of power is also under some question,

given the health of Fidel. So, I think it is very difficult to make a

prediction from this moment as to what will happen. We continue

to watch the situation closely.

Medical readiness—we have a series of projects to which you alluded, and I thank you for doing so, called the New Horizons,

which are training projects for U.S. military folks who go down into

23

countries in the region and provide services ranging from building

a clinic to putting in a well to doing medical treatments.

They are very successful as a means of both exercising the military and of undertaking the kinds of strategic communication we

are talking about here, about launching ideas into the region.

I will couple that with—the deployment of the Comfort this summer will be matched up with some of that. We treated, last year,

250,000 patients. We treated 80,000 animals. There is a veterinary

part of this that goes with it. It is a very robust part of our program.

We have requested funds from the Congress for it, and I think

they are adequate to our needs. And I solicit your support for them.

Thank you.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The next person is Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Cartwright, I would just like to make a remark, and ask

you if you would be willing to work with me. I have got a question

that is probably best answered off-line. It relates to Boost Phase

Intercept.

I have noted the preponderance of our investment and activity

and effort on mid-course and terminal intercept. And I had some

folks from the Navy in the other day, and we were talking about

boost phase. And it seems to me like we might be spending a little

more time looking at boost phase, particularly from naval platforms.

I would like to sit with you someday and spend some time just

discussing that phase of missile defense, if that is possible.

General CARTWRIGHT. I would be happy to do that, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. General Schwartz, thanks for being here this morning. I appreciate it very much.

I was first elected to Congress in 1984. It seems like a long time

ago. And one of my great experiences was to go out to McGuire Air

Force Base, which is in my district, and spend some time with the

then–21st Air Force commander, Don Logeais.

And one of the activities that we did that day was to just ride

along the flight line and look at the C–17s that were sitting out

there—the CE–141s, excuse me—that were sitting out on the flight

line.

And I think, if my memory serves me correctly, there were 62

birds that were assigned to McGuire at that time. And I remarked

what a remarkable fleet it was. And General Logeais said—now,

this was 1985—‘‘They are wearing out.’’

And we went and had lunch and he said, ‘‘There is one more

thing I want to show you.’’ And we went around the corner to a

little reception room. And there on the wall was an artist’s rendering of an airplane. It was a C–17, in 1985. And it would be six

years until the next one, until the first operational model came off

the line. It was actually in June. It was June 14, 1991, that it

rolled off the line.

That was 16 years ago. And we did not know, when we started

rolling them off the line, how many we were going to buy. First we

said—I think the initial number was 100 or 115. And I think we

24

arrived at that number for budgetary reasons. And then we bought

15 more for special ops, because we thought we needed them.

And then we said, ‘‘We are going to have to increase the size of

the fleet,’’ and then we went to 180. Last year we bought 10 more

and we went to 190.

And these birds, some of which are now 16 years old—I am going

to use Don Logeais’s words—are going to wear out and are on the

way to wearing out. For a whole bunch of reasons: We are flying

them more than we thought we would. We have been at war more

than we thought we would. We are increasing the size of the military that we carry with them, more than we thought we would.

The activities—we are doing tactical lift with them in theater in

Iraq. Never thought we would do that. The C–130’s wore out and

made us do that.

So, this is not the first time you and I have had this conversation, and I always appreciate having this conversation. But I think

it is important that we put on the record here today, what, if any,

plans you have to expand the buy of C–17s, and what needs to be

done in order for us to have the resources to do that.

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would ask only that we not

focus exclusively on the C–17.

Lift, on the air side, is a combination of platforms that are U.S.

Government-owned and -operated—clearly, the C–5 and the C–17

principally.

And, as well, there is a significant commercial component that

contributes to our ability to operate the Department of Defense’s

transportation and distribution mission.

A quick example, when we deployed the first of the five plus-up

brigades to Kuwait and Iraq over the holiday period, 29 of the 34

aircraft that supported that deployment were commercial. So, it is

a significant piece of what we do.

And what we need to do, sir, is to have the right number of organic airplanes and the capability to maintain our commercial

partners.

My belief is that, what we need is around 300 total, large-lift,

modern and reliable aircraft.

Your point about airplanes getting tired is certainly valid. And

you can compensate for that either through maintenance and repair of the aircraft or buying new.

In the end, this is a question about opportunity cost. And if we

buy additional C–17s, the question is, what else might we not get,

like a new tanker, which, as you know, I believe is a more pressing

requirement than additional C–17s.

However, sir, if the collective wisdom is we need to continue to

procure C–17s, what I would recommend is that you allow the department to adjust the fleet mix accordingly. That means to take

down lesser utility aircraft, and that means C–5As. That is the

trade space. And that is what I would recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.

Admiral Keating, first let me publicly welcome you to the Pacific

area.

Admiral KEATING. Thank you.

25

Ms. BORDALLO. There are some exciting changes and challenging

times ahead, particularly in my area, the Territory of Guam, and

the Pacific Command. I welcomed your visit yesterday, and I do

look forward to working with you in the years to come. Welcome.

General Schwartz, as the commander of Transportation Command, I respectfully request that you help provide the committee

information on an issue of particular importance to my constituents; that is, military retirees who live on Guam who are referred

off-island for specialty care and are forced to travel to those locations at their own expense.

Prior to 2005, however, the Department of Defense reimbursed

retirees for the travel expenses they incurred as a result of such

medical referrals, or retirees were able to move on MILAIR flights

from Guam and Honolulu that flew on a regular basis.

But as a result of the loss of this MILAIR service and the change

in policy and practice to no longer reimburse travel costs associated

with referred specialty care, the costs are borne solely by the retiree. These trips to access referred specialty care in Hawaii or the

state of California cost thousands of dollars.

I have raised this issue with the assistant secretary of defense

for health affairs, Dr. Winkenwerder, on a number of occasions,

and did so most recently on March 8th. I am awaiting a response

from the Pentagon about whether retirees on Guam, who had been

referred off-island for specialty treatment, can currently travel on

military aircraft on a space-available basis to receive that medical

care.

The retirees on Guam deserve resolution brought to this matter.

Insofar as TRANSCOM plays a role in the policy for Space-A travel, and in the scheduling of MILAIR traffic in the Pacific region,

I respectfully ask that you examine this issue.

What I have proposed as an interim solution until we can adequately resolve the underlying transportation service and reimbursement issue, is that the department revise its policy to report

our military retirees, who are medically referred away from Guam

to receive specialty care, access to aircraft on a space-available

basis.

I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at

the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as

authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status.

Can you comment?

General SCHWARTZ. Congresswoman, thank you for this input.

This is a system issue that I was not aware of and one that I will

certainly look into as you have requested.

Let me just give you a little bit of background, though. The retirees are entitled to Space-A travel, notwithstanding their medical

condition. And that is category three priority.

We recognize that, because of the level of effort that is currently

being devoted to Central Command, that, in the Pacific—and Admiral Keating will soon discover this—that the way we have compensated is by having commercial aircraft move cargo and people

in the Pacific theater. That has limited space-available opportunities.

26

In order to compensate, ma’am, what we have tried to do—and

we issued instructions to military aircraft in the Pacific, to maximize their Space-A capacity.

So, for example, where the tankers routinely did not carry SpaceA passengers, KC–135s, they now will. And they have guidance to

do so. That is part of the solution.

I will look at this question about the relative priority of retirees

seeking specialty medical care, and I will get back to you, ma’am.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 148.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General, and I appreciate

your response.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Chairman, following up on some of the conversation

earlier, I want to encourage the committee to look further into this

interagency process issue.

I received, yesterday, a written report from one of my constituents who just got back from Iraq. And his belief is that this is one

of our greatest deficiencies, is the inability of different agencies to

effectively work together.

And I would hope that, even though it extends, of course, beyond

this committee’s jurisdiction, I would hope that we can at least explore some of the problems, which was mentioned earlier.

Let me try to get to two areas, briefly.

Admiral Stavridis, we vote every year on funding for our efforts

in Colombia, with some people arguing that we are making no

progress. Can I get your view as to how things are going there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

I think, when thinking about Colombia, it is important to decide

where you are going to start measuring the progress. And I would

argue, we should look probably in the 1997, 1998, 1999 timeframe,

when Colombia was in really difficult straits. And there is a rich

literature of the difficulties Colombians faced in those days.

If you come forward from about the year 2000, moving forward,

let me give you a couple of metrics that I would say are strong indicators of progress.

One is that today, in 1,098 municipalities, there is a strong police

presence all around Colombia. Another is the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been diminished in its membership,

probably by about 30 percent, from 18,000 to 12,000.

Additionally, one of the three insurgent groups of those days, the

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), has been demobilized through a negotiated settlement with the government.

Kidnappings are down 76 percent. Murders are down about 50 percent.

The current president, President Uribe, enjoys very high, positive

ratings in public polls by internationally recognized firms, well

above 75 percent. Conversely, the FARC’s approval rating is below

10 percent. I think those are metrics.

Atmospherically, in my own travels in Colombia, I find you can

move about far more freely than you could five or six years ago.

My sense is, Colombia is far from perfect.

27

They continue to strive to improve their human rights record.

They are dealing now with a political problem associated with folks

who perhaps had interactions with some of the right wing insurgent groups.

But they are dealing with those in a mature, sensible way, the

way a strong democracy does. It looks at a potentially difficult situation, and it goes to the courts and it resolves them.

So, my sense is, Colombia is a nation on the move and they are

doing well. And we should be proud of the efforts of the United

States in that country, including the finances that were provided

by the Congress, and the work of the very small number of U.S.

military folks, less than 500, who have been in the country over

that period of time.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

General Cartwright, there is a press report today that the British

have foiled an al Qaeda plot to take down the internet in Britain.

You have been quoted in some trade press as not being satisfied,

shall we say, with our country’s approach to defending cyberspace.

Can you elaborate a little more on what your concerns are and

issues that you think we need to pay particular attention to in

cyberspace?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think, first, I am never satisfied, and I

am always paranoid.

To me, where we need to improve, one, we have taken effort,

both in the Department of Defense over on the director of national

intelligence and homeland security, to start to integrate offense

and defense, so that the defenders have the capability to protect

themselves, so to speak.

Second is to start to layer this capability, like we would any

other defensive plan, both in the cyberspace in defending the terminals, defending the backbone, defending the switches—all of those

things that are components of the internet, in this case—and start

to do that in a way that is consistent with the way we defend the

rest of our capabilities, onshore and expanding offshore, to be able

to understand what is out there and what might be coming toward

us.

The key to doing that, and the challenge in this environment is

that—let’s take as an example Baghdad and a virus, say, that was

launched from that part of the world toward someplace in the

United States. Even if it takes the long route from Baghdad to geosynchronous orbit and back down to Chicago, it is only about 300

milliseconds.

This is a very, very tight timeline to be able to assess the threat,

figure out what the appropriate response is, take that action and

have it be effective, before the threat reaches us. That means a

tight command and control between the interagency process, all of

those who would have equity—and the commercial sector—to be

able to do this for the country.

Understanding how to do that, understanding how not to disrupt

freedom of speech—because a lot of things travel across these internet pipelines—understand what is a threat and what is not a

threat, in those timelines, are the technologies we need to start to

understand and acquire, and are also the factors we need to start

to understand in statute.

28

Do we have this right? Can we apply the appropriate authorities

to a fight that occurs that quickly and does not have a lot of respect

for geographical boundaries?

Those are the challenges we are trying to understand, and that

is where my frustration is, trying to get the technology, understand

the fight that occurs in milliseconds, and understand how to apply

the appropriate authorities to that fight so we do not abrogate freedom of speech and other things.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning, and

thanks for your service.

I want to start out with Admiral Keating. First of all, thank you

for the things you have done at NORTHCOM.

And as you prepare to leave, I would like you to comment on

three things. First of all, the work that you have done with the Canadian government to monitor our northern border, the work that

has been done with Mexico and our southern border. And if you

could contrast those, I would appreciate it.

And then third, if you can address the progress that we have

made with former Joint Task Force (JTF)–6, now JTF-North, and

its ability to expand its agenda, not just in support of all law enforcement agencies, but in its ability to expand from narcotics and

immigration into terrorism, antiterrorism issues, as well.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir, I will do my best. And if I could wrap

all three by starting with Joint Task Force North, Congressman.

Mr. REYES. Okay. All right.

Admiral KEATING. From your district, of course, Brigadier General Tony Ierardi is now the commander, about 150 folks in his

headquarters. But I would recommend to you that their impact is

much greater than their relatively small size.

Examples: They have conducted many operations in the past two

and a half years I have been fortunate to be at Northern Command, that are broad, interagency efforts. Relatively small, very

small Title 10 or even reserve and guard inclusion—or rather, the

forces are included—in these comprehensive efforts. In San Diego

and the Pacific Northwest, down off the coast of Brownsville and

one in southern Florida are the four most recent.

And in each case it was interagency representation, Department

of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol, integrations in

customs, active, reserve and guard forces—using active and guard

forces that were training for missions overseas, integrating those

capabilities into this broad network of border protection activity.

And in each case, we satisfied several intelligence priority objectives. Are there terrorists trying to get into the country? We did not

capture any. And we continue to think that, while they may have

plans to get in, they are not executing those plans.

There is no known nexus between narcotraffickers and terrorists.

We do continue, in support of the Coast Guard, principally, to find

a significant flow of narcotics out of Jim’s AOR into ours, primarily.

And it is not just from south to north—this addresses your Canadian border interest—there is significant traffic from north to

south.

29

So, Joint Task Force North working both the southern and northern borders—all domains, not just land domain—to increase the security of our borders.

We are working with Canada. They now have, as you are aware

Canada Command, CANCOM, which is rather a counterpart to

Northern Command.

It is a newer combat organization, but they are our Northern

Command counterpart, if you will, north of the border. And we

have extensive liaison with them. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant General Dumais, is a good friend, and they are standing up

their command.

We are increasingly active on our southern border with the new

leaders there, and my relief, General Renuart, will visit them within the next month.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. REYES. I really did not get my five minutes. That red light

stayed on from the time that I was—could I ask for a ruling from

the chair?

The CHAIRMAN. If your feelings are hurt, you may go ahead and

ask one more question. [Laughter.]

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, my time is coming up. I would be

happy to let Mr. Reyes have a minute or two of my precious time.

Mr. REYES. Thank you.

Mr. HUNTER. But he will really owe.

Mr. REYES. Actually, I just wanted to thank Admiral Keating

and wish him well in his new position, as well.

And then just finish up by asking Admiral Stavridis to address

the issue, because there is a lot of interest in Congress about the

allegations of corruption in the Colombian government.

Can you give us your perspective specifically? I know you referred to it as a political problem, but I am concerned that that

may become a bigger issue here in Congress, in spite of all the

progress that you cited in Colombia.

So, if you can just address that, I would appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Certainly, sir.

I am not an expert on that. I think your question would best be

addressed to our American ambassador there, who is an extremely

capable person, Ambassador Bill Wood.

From my perspective in the military-to-military contacts I have,

what I sense is a willingness in the country to grapple with the

issue. It is not being swept under the rug. It is being covered on

the front pages of the newspaper.

People have been indicted. They are pursuing it vigorously, as

best I can tell, looking at it. They are looking it in the eye.

And I would look at that as a sign of progress in the country,

although certainly it is unfortunate, if the allegations are true.

And again, I would close by suggesting you would get a richer

understanding of the situation from our State Department counterparts who are actually in the country on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. REYES. Has that hampered our abilities to work with the Colombian government, in terms of our operations under Plan Colombia in any way?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir, it has not.

30

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral Stavridis—and I mispronounced that. I very much——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, you are good, sir.

Mr. JONES. Well, you know, when you have got a name like

Jones, it just makes everything else more difficult——

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am thinking about changing my name to

Jones. We will see. [Laughter.]

Mr. JONES. No, I am going to practice, so next time it will not

be a problem.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is fine, sir.

Mr. JONES. Admiral, the reason—I want to ask you, with the responsibility—and, of course, you said you had been there five or six

months, and maybe Admiral Keating or someone else can assist

with this.

I had the opportunity to meet with a gentleman—and I do not

want to talk too much about this—who is now an American citizen,

that helped our Federal Government in a way that he would qualify for special citizenship, and I will leave it at that—but he is from

Honduras.

And he brought to my attention that, in certain countries under

your command, that there seems to be a migration of Arabs moving

in—and I am not talking about terrorists, but I am talking about

Arabs who are coming into the population, starting businesses and

becoming a part of the community.

Are you seeing in any of these countries, or your staff, where

there are a fair number of Arabs moving from other countries into

some of these Central American countries for the purpose, not of

terrorism—I want to make that clear—but to become part of the

society?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. There are concentrations of Arab populations, as well as Islamic populations, throughout Latin America

and the Caribbean, sir.

Numbers are hard to define, as they always are, and nailing

down either religious or ethnic, particular, specific numbers in

many countries. But the numbers I have seen are in the range of

three million to six million Islamic. And of that, a significant population traces their roots to the Arab world. The total population in

the region is about 450 million, so you are probably in the 1 percent range.

The areas in which there are some concentrations, I think most

well-known is the so-called tri-border area, which is the point in

southern South America where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay

come together. In that region, there is a fairly robust Lebanese

population.

There are additionally some significant pockets in southern

Brazil in a couple of their larger cities, particularly Sao Paulo. And

on the northern coast of South America, there are some additional

pockets. Again, you are in the one percent range.

As is always the case, my assessment would be, the vast majority

of those people are living in peace and are attempting to integrate

themselves into the societies and in the country.

31

However, we are concerned in some of those populations that

there are indications of Hezbollah financing, recruiting, and proselytizing. Our intelligence folks are working closely with their

counterparts in those countries as part of the global effort against

the war on terrorism.

Mr. JONES. Well, the gentleman that I am making reference to

suggested that I get the book, I think the title is The Dove and

Abdullah. And his concern—of course, he is now an American citizen—was that many of those people, as you said yourself, Admiral,

are coming there with true purposes, the right purposes. But there

could be those who have relationships, or want to see relationships

that you made mention to, develop.

And I have thought for a long time about that, as a Member of

Congress, and nothing I can really do about it but speak out and

show interest. But I have felt for too long that this nation has not

paid the right attention that it needed to with Central and South

America, really from an economic standpoint, that if we cannot

help the natives of those countries, then they are going to look elsewhere. And that could really present a serious security problem for

us.

So, thank you very much for your answer.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Generals, Admirals.

General, if I could ask you a couple of questions on the Reliable

Replacement Warhead for the Conventional Trident Missile, the

ballistic missile conventional.

General, how will a foreign nation discriminate between a nuclear and a conventional ballistic missile coming from the center of

the ocean? Russia, China—by the time we have it out there, 2013—

potentially Iran, India.

General CARTWRIGHT. The ambiguity issue is one that we have

talked a lot about.

We, today, have treaty and protocol activities associated with

contacts. So, if we are testing or we are doing some sort of a——

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. But this is a sudden crisis, one hour.

General CARTWRIGHT. Understand. But these are in place for our

exercises, and whatnot, and have been in place for a lot of years.

We have done about 470 Trident launches with these protocols

in place, where we exchange information—principally with the

Russians today, trying to expand that out to the Chinese.

What we are trying to establish for operational activities is what

is called the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is set up right

now with Russia, so that we share real-time information——

Mr. SESTAK. So, in a real crisis—General, if you don’t mind—in

a real crisis, you would actually let them know that within an hour

you are going to launch?

General CARTWRIGHT. That is the——

Mr. SESTAK. So, you would let Russia and China know that.

General CARTWRIGHT. That is the intent today.

Mr. SESTAK. India? Iran?

32

General CARTWRIGHT. We are working to expand that out. But

the initial effort over the past year is to codify this with the Russians.

Mr. SESTAK. Well, how do you feel about China and Russia developing the same capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. To me, to start to reduce the numbers of

weapons of mass destruction is a positive attribute. To the extent

that we can replace them and get the attributes we need in an offensive system with something other than a mass destruction, that

is a positive vector.

The question is second-and third-order effects, and being able to

understand what those might be. Ambiguity——

Mr. SESTAK. So, but what do you feel about China and Russia developing one?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that they are——

Mr. SESTAK. Is that a good thing?

General CARTWRIGHT. I would certainly encourage——

Mr. SESTAK. A conventional ballistic missile from their submarines.

General CARTWRIGHT. From their submarines, from their

silos——

Mr. SESTAK. And they would warn us an hour before they would

launch it, so we would know it would not be a nuclear one.

General CARTWRIGHT. Again, there are multiple activities going

on here. Overflight, is it anywhere near your country, et cetera.

But, yes, to reduce that ambiguity to the maximum extent

practicable——

Mr. SESTAK. General, what are two scenarios you can see us

using this in?

General CARTWRIGHT. Two scenarios that would come to mind

are targets that are deep. Let us take as an example the recent

ASAT test.

If the target is deep and you want to go in there and ensure

there cannot be a second launch, then having a conventional capability against something that was launched that was conventional

in nature, as the ASAT is, that seems to me to be an appropriate

target to defend our interests in space.

Another is a fleeting target, in which the timelines are short,

whether they be short-range or medium-range ballistic missiles or

a terrorist camp, where you have an offensive action that is already

under way, and you are trying to be appropriate in maintaining

control over escalation and drive this away from a weapon of mass

destruction. That would be another scenario where this one might

be appropriate——

Mr. SESTAK. What is the end-to-end architecture needed in order

to be able to use something within one hour of detection and

launch?

General CARTWRIGHT. We look at three key pieces, the command

and control, to be able to make the decisions and do the planning

in those timelines. The second is the intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR), to connect what we call the fixed piece, and

then find, fix, and then finish.

So, you need the missile and the warhead, in this case in the

submarine. You need an ISR capability that connects the dots and

33

provides the right location of the target. And then you need the

command and control to——

Mr. SESTAK. What is the commensurate timeframe you think we

would be able to have this? And even if you have an idea of the

costs?

General CARTWRIGHT. The easier targets are the ones that are

fixed in known locations. That helps you a lot.

The harder targets are the mobile targets, those that are hidden.

The harder the target, the longer today. But today, the command

and control, we believe is in place.

The ISR needs to be integrated better, and we are working on

that. And that is not terribly expensive. It is more about connecting

the right dots.

Mr. SESTAK. But the satellite system, does this require transformational satellite (TSAT) and——

General CARTWRIGHT. No. No. We have in place both the air, the

space and the terrestrial capabilities to move this information in

that timeline.

Mr. SESTAK. But actually to see a fleeting target in one hour that

you have been hunting for, and then strike it within that hour?

General CARTWRIGHT. Again, the easier——

Mr. SESTAK. This with space-based radar——

General CARTWRIGHT. You see, your timelines are associated

with the fixed targets. The more challenging are the mobile targets.

They may take longer than an hour. It just depends on if it is in

some place you knew about, or you are going someplace you had

no idea, and you get down to mensuration, and things like that.

Mr. SESTAK. So, you are comfortable that the word from the Chinese and the Russians, that that is not a nuclear weapon, is what

we will rely upon.

General CARTWRIGHT. We are on a path to ensure that that is

the case and to reduce the ambiguity to the maximum extent practical.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, in your written testimony, you included background information pertaining to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, WHINSEC, and briefly discussed its

mission.

I have got a number of questions that I want to ask you in regard to that.

Can you elaborate for the members of this committee on this program and what it is achieving? Is it effective in promoting relations

with other nations? Is it succeeding in its mission to spread democracy while preventing human rights abuses?

And I ask these questions, Admiral, because I know—I am sure

you know—that there are members of this House of Representatives, and, indeed, maybe even members of this committee, who

would want to cut off funding for WHINSEC.

And I, as a member of the Board of Visitors, representing this

committee on the minority side, formerly on the majority side, am

very concerned.

34

And I want to also ask you specifically, as commander of the

United States Southern Command, do you believe we should fund

this institute? And what would be the consequences of actually cutting the funding to WHINSEC?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you very much, sir. I am going to ask

Admiral Keating to also comment, because Mexico is part of the

equation, I believe, in answering this question correctly.

The Western Hemisphere Institute is a superb, superb operation.

Now, it does not work for me. I am on the Board of Visitors, sir,

as you are, as is Senator Levin, representing the majority side. So,

I think there is a balanced representation on the Board of Visitors.

And I believe all of us on the Board of Visitors who have actually

spent time would attest to the fact that this 200-person faculty,

which is drawn from nations all around the region, in addition to

U.S. military personnel, has a curriculum.

It is taught in Spanish. We talked earlier about the importance

of languages here. A subset is taught in Portuguese for our Brazilian counterparts.

We put well over 1,000 students through the school in any given

year. And we create an opportunity for a real generation of midgrade officers to come to the United States, study and learn about

our military, and do it in their own language, while having the opportunity to interact with our citizens here.

They then go back to their countries, and they go on to positions

of senior leadership. The institute is one of the strongest methodologies we have to connect us with the nations of this region.

I want to specifically mention, it is, without question, the crown

jewel for the study of human rights and how a military ought to

respect human rights. It is fundamental to the curriculum.

Every student who comes gets between 20 and 50 hours of instruction in human rights and I believe leaves the institute with

a rock-solid basis to go back to their own military and inculcate

that view of the importance of human rights in a military.

So, I believe it is an exemplary institution. Again, it does not

work for me, so I am not blowing my own horn here. I am observing another command’s institute. It is part of the U.S. Army, and

I believe it is superbly run and vitally important.

Dr. GINGREY. Admiral Keating, would you care to comment, as

well?

Admiral KEATING. And, Doctor, I will try and be brief.

Because of our increasingly robust theater security cooperation

efforts with Mexico, we, too, place high importance on the institute’s progress. And we welcome them twice a year, I believe. If

that is not right, I will get back to you.

As part of their course, their curriculum, they come to Northern

Command and we spend about a day, a day-and-a-half with them.

So, we share the same opinion as the commander of Southern Command.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, in just the few seconds that I have

got left, I just want to say for the record that, of course, I have

been to the WHINSEC facility on several occasions, and I certainly

can attest to the value of the program. And I appreciate the admirals sharing that with us.

35

WHINSEC is succeeding in its mission to provide professional

education and training to military personnel. Actually, in addition

to them, law enforcement officials, civilians that support the democratic principles of the charter of the Organization of American

States.

So, I am gravely concerned about any movement toward

defunding such a great program, and I certainly appreciate the testimony of Admiral Keating and Admiral Stavridis, and I yield back

the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, may I just add, sir, that I would encourage any congressman who has any doubt to come and visit the institute.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, Admiral, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I was going to suggest the

very same thing. I think it would be a great CODEL for the members of this committee in a bipartisan way to go down to Columbus,

Georgia, the home of the infantry, a great part of my state, formerly in my district. And I think it would be—you know, what you

see with your eyes is worth 1,000 words. And I think that is exactly what we ought to do.

And I thank you, Admiral, for that suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. I associate my thoughts with the gentleman from

Georgia. I am familiar with the institute quite well, and actually,

its predecessor, which I had the occasion to visit when I was sitting

down on the front row of this committee.

So, thank you for your thoughts on that.

Last but not least, the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I have another question I

would like to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. As soon as Mr. Hunter has finished.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks

for the hearing, an excellent hearing.

And I will try to be brief. I know we have votes coming up pretty

shortly.

General Cartwright, you have got this missile defense responsibility, at least in terminal phase. And the combatant commands

are arranged mostly geographically, with areas of responsibility

that an incoming missile is going to transit fairly rapidly.

Just generally speaking, really two questions: What are your

thoughts on how effectively we are organizing to be able to handle

the transit of a single missile over several areas of responsibility?

And second, what is your personal take on how effectively and

efficiently we are developing our missile defenses? Just your general, personal take on how things are going.

General CARTWRIGHT. The first is the command and control question. Just using the example of the activities in July with North

Korea, you are spanning about nine time zones and you have at

least four different combatant commanders with equities in the activity, not the least of which is probably the target in Northern

Command.

And so, how we work this activity, because the sensors may live,

so to speak, in different AORs. They may not even belong to the

Department of Defense. They may not belong to the United States.

36

And so, we have to work this in a way that is very cross-compartment in ways that we have never had to integrate systems before.

And that has been a challenge.

I have to say, though, that the technology has moved us in a direction to solve most of those challenges and to ensure that the visibility is out there for each combatant commander that has equity.

They can see what is happening. They can know immediately

what their equities are, whether it is consequence management,

whether it is part of the fire control solution, whether it is notification that something is going to fly over someone’s territory.

So, the technology has helped us move in the right direction. I

think that we are moving in a direction that says that, if you have

an equity in this, you need to be able to have a voice.

You need to be able to see what is happening and make that

transparent, and then be able to register any concerns that you

might have with an intercept that is occurring, even though the decision timelines are down in the four- to six-minute timeline.

That system is starting to emerge. We run it daily in exercise,

to start to train to this.

The most difficult challenge is, most of the time we try to do this

by voice, when we get the senior leadership together. Voice tends

to be a very slow way to get discovery of situation awareness and

make a decision. We have got to do that part of it better. We are

exercising that now.

The secretary of defense has put in place an exercise program

that will start to move us more to a data picture, so you can see

very quickly what the situation is that everybody shares. And when

we get that, I think we will be in better stand. That is the first

piece of the question.

How is the system moving? To me, the credibility, the deterrent

value has gone up significantly since the activities associated with

the 4th of July and North Korea.

There is no doubt in our mind, and clearly in the minds of our

allies, that there is value in missile defense. It offers you an alternative to an offensive-only strategy, for many countries. That is

point one.

Point two is, I think we have to start focusing on our deployed

forces and our allies, and allowing them to plug into this system

and develop for them what they believe are the attributes of a defensive system, whether it is the Israelis and the aero system, or

the Brits—or whoever needs this.

That is the direction we have to start to move.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I might just ask, with my remaining time, if any of our witnesses have anything that they have not

talked about that is on their mind, as we conclude this hearing.

Gentlemen, any parting shots you would like to give the committee here?

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Hunter, if I may, quickly, I do

have one concern. And that relates to an issue under consideration

by the House related to the Armenian genocide in the early 1900s.

The resolution, I am told, will come to the floor either later this

month or in the very early part of April.

37

I just want to alert the members that that resolution may trigger

a reaction from the Turkish government, which would limit our access at Incirlik Air Base, which we operate there.

That cargo hub moves almost 75 percent of the cargo we send to

Iraq, and last year was 55,000 tons.

And so, I just wish to alert the members that an unintended consequence of that resolution could be to make our job much harder

to support the troops downrange.

Thank you, sir, for that opportunity.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could, sir, I would simply encourage the

committee and the members of the committee to come travel in the

region. There is no substitute for personal contact, personal knowledge.

Senator Nelson came down recently, Senator Reid, over on the

Senate side. I am going, I believe, with Representative Meek down

to Haiti in a few weeks. I would really welcome the opportunity to

see the members come travel in this important part of the world.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call Mr. Meek, General Schwartz, my

recollection is that the French assembly—correct me if I am

wrong—the French assembly passed a resolution regarding the

1915 genocide occurrence. And as a result thereof, Turkey cut off

all military connection, as well as the contracts with France.

Am I correct?

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, not all military-to-military relationships.

For example, the NATO relationships, as I understand it, remain

intact. But those commercial interfaces certainly were cut off.

As I understand it, the Office of Defense Cooperation that France

has in Ankara closed. In addition, the blanket overflight clearance,

which Turkey had allowed France to exercise, was also terminated.

And for us, the overflight clearance issue would be a significant

matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Meek.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I must say that, you note that I am a little delayed here

today, but I did get here in time.

I have, Mr. Chairman, the congressman-to-be with me. He is on

spring break this week, so we are working together here in the

Capitol—my son.

Generals, Admirals, I am glad that you all have come before us

today.

And I think the question on the resolution, General, that you just

outlined, that is the kind of information we need to know here in

Congress.

And, Admiral, as you know, we are going to go down to Haiti in

a couple of weeks. And I guess I wanted to ask you a question, because we have two free trade agreements, I believe, that is in your

area, that is being considered before Congress.

Have you heard anything from your counterparts on the other

side, on the military’s part? Is State working with you?

Because I know, down in your command, basically, the Southern

Command has been our attache, our State Department—everything. And I know that we are trying to refocus down there with

38

Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a number

of other agreements, but we have two that are pending.

Have you heard anything?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you for the question, sir. I have, indeed.

As I travel and talk to my interlocutors in the military-to-military venue, there is strong support, as they perceive it, as a matter

of security, to have that kind of agreement with the United States.

And they often refer, as you just alluded to, sir, to the Central

American Free Trade Agreement, which the Congress passed, and

has been of significant benefit in Central America in strengthening

our relations there.

So, as always, the lead on those kinds of things is with the State

Department, with the Department of Commerce, and so forth. But

from a security perspective, what I hear from my counterparts is

support for that.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, and I must say that you and the ranking member

now, Mr. Duncan, have been supportive of not only my movements

in Haiti, but also then very successful within the mark, to be charitable, not only to the Southern Command, but also to our mission.

As you know, in the last 10 years we have—or last 15 years—

we have had to go down twice to bring about peace in Haiti. Now,

more than ever, we have the opportunity, not only through the

U.N. and the United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH) and other countries like Canada and others that are

contributing in Haiti, may very well assist us in securing the kind

of democracy that we need in Haiti.

And I would encourage, just like the admiral did, members of the

House and of the Senate to travel to Haiti and travel in the Southern Command region.

Admiral, one other question as it relates to the trip, as it pertains to Cite Soleil, I know that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a presence there. As it relates

to the future and security, I know that taking down Cite Soleil—

and MINUSTAH took out the gangs—but long-term security, Haiti

so many times has been like a roller coaster. It is secured and it

is non-secured.

And because of the drug activity that is taking place, the gang

activity—for most, thuggery—what kind of plans do you feel longterm that we can put in place so that we do not have to continue

to give our military assets to a country that really should not need

it, because the Haitian people are peaceful people?

And also, as a mission to stop Haitians from taking to sea, and

that usually gets the attention of not only the United States, but

the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos and other islands?

Long term where are we? We know we made a $20 million investment recently, but where are we as it relates to long-term

plans?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thanks for the question, Congressman.

First of all, I want to really applaud the excellence of the United

Nations mission there, which is doing a fine job. As you know,

there are 6,600 peacekeepers on the ground, about half of them

39

coming from the region. So, this is very much a regional effort in

security.

And I think the first and best thing we can do, we the United

States, is to encourage that kind of a regional solution in Haiti, to

continue to ask the nations that are contributing peacekeepers,

people like Brazil and Argentina and Colombia and Chile and Uruguay, to go the next step and to be participants in economic efforts

in the country of Haiti.

Second, in terms of the narcotics, I think that is absolutely correct. That is a growing concern, and we need to—we the United

States government, through interagency means—need to bring

partnership and capability to our friends in Haiti, so they can rid

themselves of this drug scourge, and so it does not undermine this

very fragile democracy in Haiti.

So, regionalism, interagency approaches, I think are the way to

go here, and a continued judicious approach with the use of U.S.

aid, which, of course, is not my purview. And, of course, you will

be hearing testimony from Department of State representatives

there.

For our purposes we have, at U.S. Southern Command, we have

a military group commander there who is very helpful in working

with the Haitian military, and you and I will have a chance to get

a briefing from him on this subject when we go down.

Overall I am hopeful about Haiti. I think it could be an example

of where regionalism and interagency efforts, which we have talked

about this morning, could really solve a real problem in our hemisphere.

Mr. MEEK. Well, thank you so very much, Admiral.

I want to thank also the generals for being here.

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to ask the questions.

And I just would want to say to both of you publicly, I appreciate

your support, not only for the Southern Command, but also the

support that you have given me as a member of this committee, to

go down on behalf of the committee and learn more about our activities under our jurisdiction there in Haiti, so thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Florida. It is always

good to welcome members of families, so they can see their parents

hard at work.

And, Kendrick Meek, Jr., we welcome you, sir. Glad to have you

in the audience. Thank you very much.

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Keating, by the time you get to the Pacific Command,

you may be thinking that this will be a relief for you.

Are you a member, I mean, institutionally, of the Homeland Security Council?

Admiral KEATING. No, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. That is unfortunate.

I am making reference here to the Joint Force headquarters, the

National Capital Region at Fort McNair, because that deals with

incident management in terms of homeland defense. And then the

Joint Task Force Civil Support at Fort Monroe in Virginia.

40

The reason I mention that is that, that has, at least in my information, command and control responsibilities with regard to catastrophic events, including nuclear or high-yield explosive events.

The reason I bring that up is that, there is a story today—and

I bring it to your attention not expecting you to necessarily have

it in front of you, because it is so recent—a story today in The

Washington Post concerning a government report provided by the

Homeland Security Council and the Energy Department, with regard to the lack of definitive plans for a situation in which you

might have a nuclear attack or a terrorist attack using the socalled dirty bombs radiological attack.

Northern Command, again, I will not get into an argument or a

colloquy about what control and command means, or what coordination means, and so on.

But I am bringing it to your attention, because what the contention is, is that the government lacks rules and standards for sending out first responders in radiated areas to save people or warn

them of approaching fallout, even including standards for firefighters, et cetera.

Now, it would seem to me, at a minimum, that this is the kind

of coordination, should it exist, that needs to take place.

Now, if this is, in fact, so, or if this is the contention, can you

state with any certainty that, as a result of your various exercises

and planning sessions and so, that this report would also be inaccurate?

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, we conducted an exercise in the

fall, we in Northern Command and Department of Homeland——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me. I should have said parenthetically, they made specific reference to Washington, D.C. That is why

I cited the two, the Fort Monroe and Fort McNair.

Admiral KEATING. So, as a little bit of preamble, we conducted

an exercise in the fall—not just Northern Command, but a broad

interagency effort, including the Department of Homeland Security

and the Michigan National Guard in which, during the exercise

scenario, a radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb was detonated in Detroit, Michigan, and fallout went across the river into

Canada.

So, we did not just——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am familiar with that.

Admiral KEATING. So we had international implication, as well

as significant national implication.

Major General Bruce Davis, National Guard office, deployed from

Joint Task Force Civil Support Headquarters, with the lead element of his assessment team—that is what Joint Task Force Civil

Support does—to the area.

They physically went to Detroit, integrated with state and local

responders and Department of Homeland Security officials to assess the damage, figuratively, and begin to provide the command

and control and collaboration and coordination that you describe, in

a simulated event with real-world folks moving around. So, we exercise to that scenario, Congressman.

Joint Task Force National Capital Region, and one of our subordinate commands, tasked with a broader set of requirements for

addressing defending—the many aspects of defending the National

41

Capital Region, including the integrated defense system of the missiles that ring the National Capital Region.

So, with those two examples for JTF Civil Support and JTF National Capital Region, I am satisfied that I can report to you that

we have plans on the shelf for responding to disasters—natural or

manmade—up through and including nuclear disasters, on a combatant commander level.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would it be fair to say, then, that this report—and these, by the way, are at least two years old. And my

guess, my estimation is that it is probably at least two years.

Since the time these reports were done, or these observations

were made, would it be fair to say that your contention is that that

issue, or those issues raised in that report, as I outlined them to

you, have been taken into account and you are trying to exercise

or make plans to be able to address the kinds of situations that I

raised for you?

Admiral KEATING. Precisely.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Let us leave it at that.

I commend that to your attention, particularly the one from the

National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, of the Energy

Department.

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And we will take it from there. Thank you

very much.

I have some questions also for, Mr. Chairman, for TRANSCOM,

which I would like to submit for the record to get an answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I wish you good fortune and aloha, Admiral,

as you head to Honolulu.

Admiral KEATING. Looking forward to it, Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. The good news is you inherit Mr. Abercrombie.

[Laughter.]

Admiral KEATING. Can’t wait.

The CHAIRMAN. You will love it.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are used to dealing with challenges,

right?

The CHAIRMAN. He is great to work with, Admiral.

Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in

Colombia. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do not have the details on that. I will be

happy to get them and give them to you for the record, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 147.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you do that, please?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The military is always trying to apply lessons

learned. At least that is part of nearly every briefing we receive.

Admiral Keating, lessons learned from Katrina. What did you

learn, positive, negative?

Admiral KEATING. Some of both, Mr. Chairman. And we are

working very hard to differentiate between lessons observed and

42

lessons learned. All kinds of folks have long lists of should-have,

would-have, could-have.

Throughout the agencies where we spend our time—principally

FEMA, DHS and DOD—we are working hard to take lessons observed and make sure they are lessons learned, and hopefully not

mistakes repeated.

Examples would include communication. We have, since Katrina,

contracted for—through your direct help, you will recall—and obtain funding for three separate cell phone farms, if you will, so if

the infrastructure is wiped slick, let’s say, in Congressman Taylor’s

region of Gulfport, Mississippi, we airlift or through air, land or

water, media.

We will get the cell phone farms where we put up a tower, we

fire up a generator and we pass out hundreds and hundreds of cell

phones—don’t care who gets them—and satellite phones.

DHS has a dozen-plus of those same systems. National Guard

has a dozen-plus. So, where there were none, there are now upwards of 30, I think is the number, but it is between 20 and 30

of these entirely self-sufficient organic cell phone farms.

We have defense coordinating officers embedded full-time, active

duty colonels, who are trained in the art of disaster response, who

are embedded in each of the FEMA regions.

We have provided our planning expertise—and I use that term

advisedly. You will appreciate it better than most, perhaps, because we in the military have this planning culture, because we

have had the opportunity to capitalize on the educational reform

that you have provided for us.

We have provided planners to FEMA, to the Department of

Homeland Security. And we have full-time representatives in

FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, and they have

full-time representatives in our headquarters.

So, we have taken the larger strategic issues and tried to rectify

those, and we are down even in the tactical level for ability to communicate. And we do not care, it is not just guard or reserve or active forces. Whoever needs a cell phone, we will pass it out until

such time as the commercial infrastructure can re-support.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might find it of interest, Admiral,

that in Missouri National Guard, particularly the unit in Jefferson

City at the headquarters there, is training in the communication

challenge that we might have, should there be another New Madrid Fault earthquake, which last happened in 1811, which caused

the Mississippi River to flow backward. And it evidently was a

local disaster all along the Mississippi River Valley.

I jokingly told a Missouri guardsman that they are training in

this communication operation for something that is not going to

happen for another 400 years. And hopefully I am right. But they

did seem very, very serious in what they were doing.

General Cartwright, very quickly, describe the process involved

in setting the nuclear force structure requirements.

General CARTWRIGHT. In setting the nuclear force——

The CHAIRMAN. Force structure requirements.

General CARTWRIGHT. Force structure requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

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General CARTWRIGHT. We are given guidance as to the types of

capabilities that our adversaries possess, that the government desires to hold at risk. We look at that. We compare the desired effect

to the inventory required to get that effect. And then we match

them with timeliness factors to obtain those objectives.

And we set that down. We write it down, we exercise it, we wargame it, and we pass it back up. We have a feedback loop to learn

as we move forward.

There are a lot of factors in this that change our equations—precision, timeliness, delivery factors, reliability of weapons. All of

that is considered in that activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I thank you, gentlemen.

I do have one last question for General Schwartz. Very quickly,

can you touch on the thoughts of retiring C–5s, in 25 words or less?

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, again, I would not recommend retiring C–5s unless we have access to additional C–17s.

In which case I would recommend retiring the older airplanes, the

A models, first, both in a manner which we could harvest the crews

and maintenance to apply to the new airplanes and, likewise, enhance the reliability of the entire system as a result.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It has been an excellent

hearing, and I appreciate, all of us appreciate, you gentlemen being

with us.

Admiral Keating, good luck in your new assignment.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 21, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stavridis, I understand that the Afghan National Interdiction Unit is attending an 18-week jungle commando course in Colombia. Do you

know anything about that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I do believe that you may be referring to the Afghan Initiative, and I can certainly speak to that.

The Afghan Initiative was created to have Colombian counter-drug personnel

share tactics, techniques, and procedures with their Afghan counterparts in prosecuting the war on drugs. To accomplish this goal, the governments of the United

States, Britain, Colombia, and Afghanistan are coordinating various exchanges between Colombia and Afghanistan.

An Afghan delegation, headed by the Counternarcotics Minister, visited Colombia

in August 2005. This delegation visited the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the

Colombian National Police (CNP) Headquarters in Bogota. They also visited the

CNP Training Center in Espinal to observe the Colombian Anti-narcotics Police

Jungla Commando Course. This Afghan Delegation requested that a team of Colombian subject matter experts conduct a training seminar in Afghanistan.

The Colombian anti-narcotics police team visited Afghanistan in late July, 2006.

The team included the Interdiction Chief and former Director of Anti-narcotics Intelligence, a fixed wing pilot and former Intelligence Officer, a Hughes 500 attack pilot,

Head Instructor from the Anti-narcotics Police Training Center), and NAS Bogota

Advisor to Jungla Airmobile Companies. Enroute to Kabul, the team had a threeday stopover in London where the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence provided briefings on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Upon

arrival in Afghanistan, the team gave seminars to all key Afghan anti-narcotics officials (police, army, and ministry-level), the U.S. trainers and advisors in Afghanistan (Drug Enforcement Agency and Blackwater), UK Embassy Kabul personnel,

the commander of the Kabul International Airport, and the rank and file members

of the INL-funded Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU). The briefings focused

on how Colombian police officers conduct their counterdrug operations. The Colombian police identified that personnel selection, training, organization, equipment, intelligence, and planning are the keys to success.

During the Colombian team’s outbrief to the Afghan Counternarcotics Ministry

and U.S. Ambassador, Kabul, the Colombian team proposed three immediate followon exchanges:

(1) Send five Afghan Narcotics Interdiction Unit (NIU) members to the Jungla

Commando Basic Course in Espinal, Tolima (Feb. 12–June 16, 2007)

(2) Send two Colombia Jungla School instructors to the Afghan NIU training center in Kabul (March 12–May 1)

(3) Send the Commander of the Kabul International Airport and staff to Colombia

to visit the CNP airport security and counternarcotics programs (June 2007)

In April 2007, INL asked that the Colombians conduct a six week seminar for 10

Afghan NIU members starting in September 2007. During a visit by Representatives Dennis Hastert and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to Colombia in May, 2007, it was also

proposed to send five mid-level Colombian Anti-narcotics Police to Afghanistan to

observe Afghan NIU operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Given the personnel end strength increases of the Army and

Marine Corps contained in the Future Years Defense Plan, do you believe the conclusions and assumptions of the 2005 Mobility Capability Study remain valid in determining the Department of Defense’s mobility requirements?

General SCHWARTZ. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study was based on the 1-4-2-

1 Department of Defense National Defense Strategy. The assumptions used for the

MCS study have not been invalidated. The Army and the Marine Corps state the

increases in their personnel end strength are focused on increasing home station

dwell time. Therefore, unless the Services and Combatant Commanders identify a

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change in their concepts of operations, the conclusions reached in the MCS will remain valid. The next MCS, anticipated to begin in early 2008, will fully incorporate

any changes in plans and requirements as a result of the Service force structure

end strength increases.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Air Force and the Army are contemplating procurement

of a Joint Cargo Aircraft to complement the C–130 fleet and to increase efficiency

of cargo capacity used during intra-theater airlift operations. What is the requirement, concept of operations, and what command authority will exercise operational

control and tasking of both the Army and Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft?

General SCHWARTZ. Various intra-theater studies are being conducted to explore

the intra-theater demands to include the use of the JCA. The Intra-theater Lift Capability Assessment looked at in theater movement to the brigade rear. Additionally, the USTRANSCOM Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center is analyzing the

movement forward from the brigade rear to the point of use and examining potential gaps and solutions for joint future theater airlift. The next Mobility Study, anticipated to begin in early 2008, should fully incorporate these analyses, and reconfirm the JCA requirement.

JCA employment concept has not yet been finalized. However, the Draft CONOPS

states ‘‘during wartime, JCAs will be assigned to a Unified Combatant Command

structure, and while in this capacity, will support combatant commanders’ directed

operations, across the range of military operations. The Joint Forces Commander

(JFC) will have OPCON of all JCAs in the Joint Area of Operations. The JFC determines air capabilities/forces made available for joint air operations, in consultation

with component commanders.’’

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. I have proposed that retirees should qualify for Space-A travel at

the category two priority level, and therefore, treated the same as authorized personnel on environmental morale leave status.

Can you comment?

General SCHWARTZ. I take seriously your concerns regarding the appropriate priority level for retirees participating in the Space-A travel program. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) was notified of your proposal and concerns. They are currently looking at possible courses of action in order

to recommend a solution equitable not only to residents of Guam but also other retirees that might be in the same circumstances.

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