KILLING IN THE NAME OF GOD: 

OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA 

by 

Jerrold M. Post, M.D. 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 18 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Killing In The Name Of God: 

Osama Bin Laden And Al Qaeda 

Jerrold M. Post, M.D. 

November 2002 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 18 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 18 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

i

Contents: 

 Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Author................................................................................................. iii 

Introduction..................................................................................................1 

Osama bin Laden: A Political Personality Profile.......................................3 

Al Qaeda: Ideology and Philosophy...........................................................8 

Al Qaeda: Leadership, Structure and Organization..................................19 

Al Qaeda: What Next................................................................................22 

Notes..........................................................................................................23 
ii

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center. 
iii

The Author 

Dr. Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and 

International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program at 

the George Washington University. Dr. Post has devoted his entire career 

to the field of political psychology, coming to George Washington after a 

21-year career with the U.S. government where he founded and directed 

the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. At 

George Washington, he co-founded and directs the George Washington 

University Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management. Dr. Post 

received his B.A. magna cum laude from Yale College. After receiving 

his M.D. from Yale, where he was elected to Alpha Omega Alpha, honor 

medical society, he received post-graduate training in psychiatry at 

Harvard Medical School and the National Institute of Mental Health, and 

in international studies from Johns Hopkins. A practicing psychiatrist, he 

is a Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, a member of the 

American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and the American College 

of Psychiatrists. A leading expert on Saddam Hussein, Dr. Post has 

testified before the House Armed Services Committee and the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee on Saddam’s personality and political 

behavior. He is a frequent commentator on national and international 

radio and television on world events, and he is the co-author of When 

Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King, Yale, 1995, 

and Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, Yale, 1997. 
iv
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 1 

Killing In The Name Of God: 

Osama Bin Laden And Al Qaeda 

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.1

What manner of men are these, living in American society, for years in 

some cases, aiming to kill thousands while dying in the process? Surely, 

one would think, they must be crazed psychotics. No normal person could 

do such a thing. But, in fact, the al Qaeda terrorists were psychologically 

“normal.” By no means were they psychologically disturbed. Indeed, terrorist 

groups expel emotionally disturbed individuals—they are a security risk. 

In many ways, these new terrorists shatter the profile of suicidal 

terrorists developed in Israel. Seventeen to twenty-two in age, 

uneducated, unemployed, unmarried, the Israeli suicide bombers were 

dispirited unformed youth, looking forward to a bleak future, when they 

were recruited, sometimes only hours before the bombing. The group 

members psychologically manipulated the new recruits, persuading them, 

psychologically manipulating them, “brainwashing” them to believe that 

by carrying out a suicide bombing, they would find an honored place in 

the corridor of martyrs, and their lives would be meaningful; moreover, 

their parents would win status and would be financially rewarded. From 

the time they were recruited, the group members never left their sides, 

leaving them no opportunity of backing down from their fatal choice. 

The values communicated to the recruits by the commanders are 

revealed in their answers to questions posed in a series of interviews of 35 

incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists, who agreed to be interviewed in 

Israeli and Palestinian prisons. Twenty of the terrorists belonged to 

radical Islamic terrorist groups—Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. 

The psychologically oriented interviews attempted to understand their life 

history socialization, and recruitment. They were asked to explain their 

attitudes towards suicide, which the Koran proscribes, and whether they 

had any moral red lines in terms of numbers of casualties and extent of 

destruction they were willing to inflict. Their answers are revealing. 

One interviewed terrorist took umbrage at the term “suicide.” “This 

is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, reflects mental weakness. This is 

“istishad” or martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah. 
2 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

One of the commanders interviewed was Hassan Salame, commander 

of the suicide bombers who carried out the wave of bombing in 1996 that 

precipitated the defeat of Prime Minister Shimon Peres and the election of 

Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Forty-six Israelis died in the bombings. 

Salame is sentenced to 46 consecutive life sentences. Concerning suicidal 

terrorism, he said: “A suicide bombing is the highest level of jihad, and 

highlights the depth of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry 

out one of the more important articles of faith.” Another commander 

asserted: “It is suicide attacks which earn the most respect and elevate the 

bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom.” 

Asked how they could justify murdering innocent victims, another 

interview subject bridled: “I am not a murderer. A murderer is someone 

with a psychological problem; armed actions have a goal. Even if 

civilians are killed, it is not because we like it or are bloodthirsty. It is a 

fact of life in a people’s struggle. The group doesn’t do it because it wants 

to kill civilians, but because the jihad must go on.” 

Asked whether there were any moral red lines, another leader 

responded: “The more an attack hurts the enemy, the more important it 

is. That is the measure. The mass killings, especially the suicide 

bombings, were the biggest threat to the Israeli public and so most effort 

was devoted to these. The extent of the damage and the number of 

casualties are of primary importance. In a jihad, there are no red lines.” 

The attitudes reflected in these statements characterize the ethos 

of radical Islamic terrorism. But there is a striking contrast between 

the Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel and the nineteen terrorists 

who carried out the attacks of September 11th, an unprecedented act 

of mass casualty terrorism. They had lived in western society, in some 

cases for many years, exposed to its freedoms and opportunities. The 

leaders were older, in their mid-thirties and late twenties, and a 

number had received higher education. Mohammed Atta, the apparent 

ringleader, was thirty-three. Atta and two other hijackers had 

received graduate training at the technological university in Hamburg, 

Germany. Most came from financially comfortable middle class 

families in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They blended in with society, 

eschewing the dress, customs and personal grooming of traditional 

Muslims. And yet, on the appointed day, like the Manchurian 

Candidate, they carried out their mission to hijack four airliners, and 

gave their lives while killing just over 3,000 people. 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 3 

As I have come to understand them, the al Qaeda terrorists differ 

strikingly from the suicide bombers in Israel. Fully formed adults, they 

had internalized their values. They were “true believers” who 

subordinated their individuality to the group. They uncritically accepted 

the direction of the destructive charismatic leader of the organization, 

Osama bin Laden, and to them what he declares is moral is moral, indeed 

is a sacred obligation. 

Osama bin Laden: A Political Personality Profile 

What matter of man can inspire such acts? How could the son of a 

multi-billionaire construction magnate in Saudi Arabia become the leader 

of this powerful radical Islamic terrorist organization? 

Osama bin Laden was born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1957, the 17th 

of 20-25 sons of Mohamed bin Laden, who had 52-54 children in total.2

 

Originally an immigrant from Yemen, Muhamed bin Laden, by 

befriending the royal family, had established a major construction 

company and had amassed a fortune of some 2-3 billion dollars by the 

time of his death in a 1967 plane crash. Although estimates range from 18 

million to as high as 200 million, it is most commonly agreed that bin 

Laden inherited approximately 57 million dollars at age 16 from his 

father’s estate.3

Osama was the only child of Mohammed and the least favorite of 

Mohammed’s ten wives, Hamida, a Syrian woman of Palestinian descent.4

Hamida was reportedly a beautiful woman with a free and independent 

spirit who, as a result, often found herself in conflict with her husband. 

Reportedly by the time Osama was born, Hamida had been ostracized by 

the family and had been nicknamed “Al Abeda” (the slave). As her only 

child, Osama was referred to as “Ibn Al Abeda” (son of the slave). Unlike 

the other bin Laden children who had natural allies in their immediate 

circle of siblings, Osama and his mother had no such natural allies in the 

family and, as a consequence, there may have been a defensive alliance 

between Osama and his mother against the larger family which treated 

“the slave and the son of the slave” with contempt. This familial 

exclusion was perhaps the basis of Osama bin Laden’s later estrangement 

from his family. Reports are inconsistent as to how much of a presence 

Hamida was in her son’s life during his early developmental years,5 but it 
4 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

is clear that Mohamed bin Laden divorced Hamid prior to his death in 

1967, when Osama bin Laden was ten years old. 

Osama bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. 

He is a certified civil engineer, and was working toward a degree in 

Business Management (although it is not clear that he completed his 

course work) preparing him to play a leadership role in the family’s far 

flung business interests.6

 These two skill areas would serve him in good 

stead in Afghanistan. 

An important influence on Osama bin Laden’s political ideology was 

Abdullah Azzam, a radical Palestinian professor at the university who 

became an important intellectual mentor for bin Laden. It was Azzam, a 

noted Islamist, who provided the vision to bin Laden of what should be 

done in response to the invasion of the Muslim state of Afghanistan by the 

Soviet Union, and what role bin Laden could play. In particular, he 

conveyed to bin Laden the importance of bringing together Muslims from 

around the world to defend Afghanistan against the godless Soviet Union. 

Demonstrating his already blossoming management skills, Osama bin 

Laden assisted Assam who founded the international recruitment network 

Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services Office). The MAK advertised all 

over the Arab world for young Muslims to fight the Afghanistan jihad. In 

addition to the Arab and Muslim world, recruitment booths were set up in 

the United States and Europe. This massive international recruitment 

effort brought in Muslims from around the world – 5,000 were recruited 

from Saudi Arabia, 3,000 from Algeria, and 2,000 from Egypt. These 

were to become known as the Afghan Arabs, the nucleus of bin Laden’s 

loyal followership. 

A leader is not formed until he encounters his followers, and bin 

Laden’s leadership experience during the struggle in Afghanistan 

against the Soviet invasion was crucial in the psychological 

development of bin Laden as a leader and was transformational for him. 

He came to Afghanistan unformed, and naïve. Using his own funds, he 

built clinics and hospitals, generously contributing to the Mujahideen

movement. Eschewing an opulent life style, he lived an ascetic life in 

caves with his followers. 

Regularly preaching about their holy mission, and inspirational in his 

rhetoric, bin Laden inspired his followers who came to adulate him. That 

they were able, with substantial American aid to be sure, to triumph over 

the Soviet Union, in what was to become the Soviet Vietnam, surely 

confirmed for Osama bin Laden and his followers the correctness of bin 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 5 

Laden’s vision. In the Koran it is said that Allah favors the weak and the 

underdog. Surely they could not have triumphed over the godless Soviets 

unless God was on their side. This was the template of the destructive 

charismatic relationship between bin Laden and his religiously inspired 

Islamic warriors, the Mujahideen. 

Bin Laden had not yet broken with the Saudi government, which after 

all was the main foundation of his family’s wealth. But he had 

successfully vanquished one of the three major enemies identified by 

Muhammad Abdel Salam Farag, who wrote The Neglected Duty: The 

Existing Arab State, the Western-Zionist Nexus, and the Communists. 

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the critical enemy among this triad was 

the “enemy who was near,” the Arab state, according to leading Islamic 

fundamentalists. In Farag’s manifesto, he argued, “We must begin with 

our Islamic country by establishing the rule of God in our nation...the first 

battle for jihad is the uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them 

with an Islamic system from which we can build.”7

Bin Laden came to see the Soviet superpower as a “paper tiger” that 

could be defeated, but also set his sights on the remaining super-power, 

the United States, as a next target. This represented a fundamental 

departure from the strategy of Farag, replacing “the enemy that is near” 

with “the enemy that is afar,” the superpowers. 

With the victory in Afghanistan, bin Laden the warrior king and his 

loyal Afghan Arab fighters were eager to continue to pursue the jihad. 

Bin Laden broadened his vision and determined to pursue the jihad on a 

worldwide basis, seeking to reconstruct the nation of Islam throughout the 

world, assisting Muslims who were in conflict: Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, 

Chechnya, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and so forth. 

While bin Laden was committed to the international struggle, 

Abdullah Azzam believed in focusing all efforts on building Afghanistan 

into a model Islamic state, leading to increasing tension between Osama 

and his mentor. Following a split with Abdullah Azzam in 1988, bin 

Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a founding father of the Islamic Jihad of 

Egypt, with the nucleus of their loyal followers established al Qaeda (The 

Base) as a direct outgrowth of MAK. The following year Abdullah 

Azzam died in a mysterious car bomb explosion. The most prominent 

theory has been that the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) engineered the 

assassination.8

 Supporting this theory was that earlier that year Azzam 

had publicly and savagely attacked Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United 
6 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

States, accusing them of the “massacre” of thousands of mujahideen in 

Afghanistan. 

Another key area of speculation has been the rivalry between the 

Egyptian and non-Egyptian members in the growing MAK/al Qaeda 

empire. There are reports that it was the Egyptians, directed by Zawahiri, 

who killed Azzam, with or with or without bin Laden’s knowledge and 

acquiescence, thus removing a major obstacle to Zawahiri’s growing 

influence over bin Laden. There has been widespread speculation that as a 

result of their diverging views of the future of MAK/al Qaeda it was 

Osama who engineered his mentor’s death, but there has never been any 

proof linking him to the death of his one-time mentor. 9

 

Regardless of who was responsible for the death of Azzam, bin Laden 

was left as the undisputed leader of the movement. Between the dismissal 

of U.S. help and the removal of Azzam from his leadership role, in the 

minds of both the leader and his followers, bin Laden became solely 

responsible for the victory over the Soviet superpower and the expansion 

of the jihadist movement. 

With the defeat of the Soviet Union, the warrior king bin Laden and 

his loyal warriors had lost their enemy. As Eric Hoffer has observed, the 

power of a charismatic leader derives from his capacity to focus hatred 

against a single enemy, as Hitler did in the 1930s, unifying the German 

people in their hatred of the Jews. While in Sudan in 1993, bin Laden 

found his previous allies, the United States, with a military base on Saudi 

soil in the wake of the crisis in the Gulf. Decrying this “desecration” of 

holy Saudi soil by the infidel Americans, bin Laden had seamlessly 

transferred his enmity from the first defeated superpower, the Soviet 

Union, to the remaining superpower, the United States. As if to 

reinforce bin Laden’s messianic vision to his followers, over the next 

decade al Qaeda had a series of triumphs against this new enemy: The 

bombing of the Khobar Towers, the first World Trade Center bombing, 

the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the attack 

on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and of course the most spectacular terrorist 

act in history, the events of September 11, an act of mass casualty superterrorism. 

Moreover, bin Laden actively criticized the Saudi royal family for 

their apostasy, decrying their stewardship of the land of the two cities, 

Mecca and Medina. The vigor of his criticism led Saudi Arabia to revoke 

his citizenship in 1994, and his family, which depended upon the Saudi 

leadership for their wealth, turned against him. Now bin Laden was 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 7

righteously attacking the other two enemies in the triad of enemies, the 

Western-Israeli nexus, and one of the newly designated apostate Arab 

nations, Saudi Arabia. But he maintained the primary focus on the 

external enemy, the United States. 

Yes, the leadership of the apostate nations had to be replaced, but 

now it was the United States that was the prime enemy, for America was 

responsible for propping up the corrupt leadership of these countries. 

Thus, he continued the strategy born in Afghanistan of focusing on the 

enemy who is afar, the Zionist-Crusaders, rather than the enemy who is 

near, the targhut or oppressive domestic rulers. 

In the October 1996 Declaration of War, bin Laden justified his 

aggression as defensive aggression, asserting that the Islamic nation was 

under attack. 

. . . The people of Islam had suffered from aggression, inequality 

and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusader alliance 

and their collaborators to the extent that Muslims’ blood became 

the cheapest and their wealth looted in the hands of enemies. 

Their blood has spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying 

pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon are still fresh in 

our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, 

Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya and In Bosnia-Herzegovina took 

place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the 

conscience.10 

With this, bin Laden and Zawahiri, who is widely believed to be bin 

Laden’s pen, justified defensive jihad, while blaming the Zionist-Crusader 

alliance for every fight against Muslims. But the fourth jihad, the jihad of 

the sword, is a defensive jihad only, that is against those who take up arms 

against Muslims. In 1996, the target was only the American military in 

Saudi Arabia, with the stated goal of expelling the U.S. from Arabian soil, 

although the Declaration of War did expand the enemy to include not only 

military bearing arms but also non-combatants, justifying the attack in 

June 1996 on the American military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi 

Arabia, Khobar Towers. Of course, to bin Laden’s stated dismay, the 

enemy “that is afar,” the United States, in fact, was near, indeed within the 

holy land of Arabia. 
8 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

In 1998, a major expansion of the mission occurred, with the 

“Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and 

Crusaders” in which all Americans, civilian and military were declared to 

be the enemy, the civilians because they supported anti-Muslim U.S. 

policy. 

From: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders 

World Islamic Front Statement (February 1998 Fatwa) 

In compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to 

all Muslims: 

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians 

and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do 

it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to 

liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from 

their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the 

lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This 

is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the 

pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight 

them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there 

prevail justice and faith in God.” 

We -- with God’s help -- call on every Muslim who believes in 

God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to 

kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and 

whenever they find it. 

According to bin Laden’s fatwah, it is not bin Laden, but God, who 

has ordered religious Muslims to kill all the Americans, God, for whom 

bin Laden speaks with authority. There is not an action that bin Laden 

orders that is not couched and justified in language from the Koran. 

Al Qaeda: Ideology and Philosophy 

The ideological and philosophical underpinnings of al Qaeda can be 

found in several important documents. During my service as expert 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 9 

witness in the spring 2001 trial of Osama bin Laden terrorists convicted 

for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, I obtained 

a copy of the al-Qaeda operations manual. This document, introduced into 

evidence by the U.S. Department of Justice, was seized in Manchester, 

England in the home of Anas al-Liby, a fugitive charged in the al Qaeda 

terrorism conspiracy. 

The provenance of the manual is somewhat obscure. Portions of it 

were circulating in radical Egyptian circles, suggesting that Ayman al 

Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s personal physician and designated 

successor, a founder of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, probably played a 

central role developing the al Qaeda terrorism manual. Evidence in 

support of the conjecture that it is Zawahiri that is actually the author is 

the absence of references to Jews and Christians in the cited religious 

verses, for the main target of the radical Egyptians were Muslim leaders, 

referred to as apostates or murtid, those who renounce Islam. 

This is an altogether remarkable document. On the one hand, it 

resembles nothing more than a basic tradecraft-training manual, 

concerned with how to operate in a hostile environment. There are 

detailed instructions on everything from ciphers to how to resist 

interrogation. But it is also a manual of terror, with no less than three 

of the eighteen lessons (chapters) devoted to techniques for 

assassination. 

But it is not merely a list of instructions, for it is also written to 

inspire the undercover operator as he carries on his dangerous work. And 

the language at times is quite eloquent. The document reflects a 

sophisticated approach on the part of al Qaeda operational officials, for 

there is a continuing emphasis on lessons learned. Many of the chapters 

cite previous mistakes, which provide the basis for the points emphasized 

in the lesson. And they do not learn lessons only from their past mistakes, 

but from adversaries as well. In one section, they cite the astute 

observational skill of an Israeli Mossad counter-espionage agent who 

foiled a terrorist plot, and cite Soviet KGB sources in others. Thus, the 

manual reflects the adaptive learning of the organization, and the care 

with which al Qaeda prepares its operatives. No detail is too small, as 

exemplified by the instruction in lesson eight, which is concerned with 

Member Safety, “Do not park in no parking zones.” 

Many of the instructions are accompanied by elaborate justification, 

citing suras (verses) from the Koran, scholars who have provided 

commentary on the Koran, or hadiths (tradition). These elaborate 
10 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

justifications are offered especially when the instructions recommended 

seem to contradict Islamic teaching. In this text, the suras are not 

numbered, and while some are fairly well known, others are more obscure. 

Similarly, the sources of some of the hadiths are given, while the sources of 

others are not identified. The authenticity of many of the suras and hadiths

is questionable, and several of the suras are taken out of context. For the 

Islamic youth taught to respect without questioning religious scholars, these 

can provide apparently persuasive religious authority justifying acts of 

violence. As Daniel Brumberg11 sagely notes, in evaluating the authenticity 

of the sources, sura 3, 78, which speaks to Christians and Muslims, seems 

most aptly to apply to the writers of this manual. 

There are among them (People of the Book) 

A section who distort 

The Book with their tongues 

(As they read the Book) you would think 

It is part of the Book 

But it is not part 

Of the Book: and they say 

“That is from Allah,” 

But it is not from Allah: 

It is they who tell 

A lie against Allah 

And (well) they know it. 

This document goes a long way towards explaining how the 

September 11 hijackers were able to maintain their cover, in the United 

States, “the land of the enemies.” Lesson Eight, Measures That Should Be 

Taken By The Undercover Member, instructs the members to: 

1. Have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic 

orientation (beard, toothpick, book, (long) shirt, small Koran) 

2. Be careful not to mention the brother’s common expressions 

or show their behaviors (special praying appearance, “may 

Allah reward you”, “peace be on you”, while arriving and 

departing, etc) 

3. Avoid visiting famous Islamic places (mosques, libraries, 

Islamic fairs, etc.) 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 11 

The explanation offered to “An Important Question: How can a 

Muslim spy live among enemies if he maintains his Islamic 

characteristics? How can he perform his duties to Allah and not want to 

appear Muslim?” in lesson eleven is compelling. 

“Concerning the issue of clothing and appearance (of true 

religion), Ibn Taimia – may Allah have mercy on him – said, “If 

a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to 

have a different appearance from (those around him). The 

(Muslim) man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, 

provided his actions brings a religious benefit...Resembling the 

polytheist in religious appearance is a kind of “necessity permits 

the forbidden” even though they (forbidden acts) are basically 

prohibited.” 

Citing verses from the Koran, the instruction in effect says that Allah 

will forgive you for not living the life of a good Muslim, for it is in the 

service of Allah, in the service of jihad. 

An interesting example of the manner in which episodes in the life of 

the prophet are employed to justify acts which Muslim tradition forbids is 

found in the section “Justification for Beating and Killing Hostages” in 

lesson eleven. 

 “Religious scholars have permitted beating. (The handbook 

provides an example from the life of the prophet.) The prophet 

– Allah bless and keep him – who was praying, started to depart 

saying, “Strike him if he tells you the truth and release him if he 

lies.” Then he said, “That is the death of someone (the 

hostage).” In this tradition, we find permission to interrogate 

the hostage for the purpose of obtaining information. It is 

permitted to strike the non-believer who has no covenant until he 

reveals the news, information and secrets of his people. The 

religious scholars have also permitted the killing of a hostage if 

he insists on withholding information from Moslems. They 

permitted his killing so that he would not inform his people of 

what he learned about the Muslim condition, number and 

secrets. In the Honein attack, after one of the spies learned 

about the Muslims kindness and weakness then fled, the prophet 
12 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

– Allah bless and keep him – permitted (shedding) his blood and 

said, “Find and kill him.” 

The reference to religious scholars as the authoritative source is to 

be noted. These scholars “use a tradition” (i.e., a hadith) from Imam 

Mosallem, who in turn quotes Thabit Ibn Ans, probably a companion of 

the Prophet. The discussion is in the wake of the battle of Badr, in 

which a black slave was taken hostage, and apparently beaten on the 

orders of the Prophet himself. During the battle of Badr, there were 

two targets, one a line of traders with a wide variety of goods, led by 

Abu Sayfan coming from Syria, and the other a large army, which 

could not easily be vanquished. Mohammad had his men attack the 

latter, confirming the Muslims’ virtue in their readiness to abandon 

worldly goods for their cause. And in the battle supreme enemies of 

the Muslims were killed. 

There is, it should be emphasized, no reference in any of the relevant 

suras in the Koran (for example sura 8, 5-19, that Mohammad gave his 

permission to beat or to kill hostages. Rather the key point is that the 

victory came only from Allah who (sura 9) provided “a thousand angels” 

and, as in sura 10, “there is no help except from Allah.” 

Thus, the battle is used as a parable to signify man’s dependence on 

God, not to justify beating and killing hostages. Once again, by lifting the 

story of the battle out of context, the authors have misused religious 

stories and verses to provide justification for their goals. Furthermore, 

there is no reference in the Koran to the actions or statements attributed to 

Muhammad, although what the hadith claims may be accurate. But it is 

possible this story of the action and command of the Prophet was created 

to be persuasive. Indeed, the cold order attributed to the Prophet to “Find 

and kill him” is in jarring contrast to the image of the Prophet stressing 

mercy and compassion found throughout the Koran. 

The assertion that the Prophet says, “Islam is supreme and there is 

nothing above it” can not be found in the Koran. The singular in the 

statement is discordant with many suras in the Koran, which while 

advancing the truth of Islam, do not imply that Islam is superior, nor 

are they meant to suggest that previous religions were intrinsically 

untrue. 

In a more disturbing section of the training manual, the authors 

outline the “Characteristics of Members that Specialize in the Special 

Tactical Operations.” Among the various characteristics listed are: 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 13 

• Individual’s physical and combat fitness (jumping, climbing, 

running, etc.) 

• Good training on the weapon of assassination, assault, 

kidnapping, and bombing (special operations); Possessing 

cleverness, canniness and deception 

• Possessing intelligence, precision and alertness 

• Tranquility and calm personality (that allows coping with 

psychological trauma such as those of the operation of 

bloodshed, mass murder.) Likewise, (the ability to withstand) 

reverse psychological traumas, such as killing one or all 

members of his group. (He should be able) to proceed with the 

work with calmness and equanimity. 

These characteristics resemble those of the stated requirements for 

members in general, but with some refinements. The member in general 

shall have a calm and unflappable personality that can tolerate murder. 

While the special operations member, according to the last point, shall not 

only be calm in the face of mass murder but must be able to kill “one or all 

members of his group,” and to do this with calmness and equanimity – 

surely a description of a psychopathic personality. 

The training manual’s dedication provides perhaps one of the best 

insights into the al Qaeda leadership’s view of their struggle: 

In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate 

To those champions who avowed the truth day and night ... 

... And wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases ... 

The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate 

regimes does not know Socratic debates ..., Platonic ideals ..., 

nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, 

the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the 

diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun... 

Islamic governments have never and will never be established 

through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are 

established as they [always] have been 

by pen and gun 

by word and bullet 

by tongue and teeth 
14 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

The literary quality and rhetorical force of this dedication is striking. 

Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, Aristotelian diplomacy—characteristics 

of a democracy—are dramatically contrasted with the absolutist, 

uncompromising nature of the confrontation with apostate regimes, 

referring to the moderate modernizing Islamic nations, who have strayed 

from the Islamist path, who will know only “the dialogue of the bullet, the 

ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the 

cannon and machine gun.” 

The three dangling last lines, in their pairing of qualities responsible 

for the establishment of Islamic governments pair words connoting 

violence (gun, bullet, teeth) with words reflecting persuasive rhetoric (pen, 

word, tongue.) Powerful rhetoric is highly valued in Arab leaders, and a 

notable aspect of Osama bin Laden’s leadership is his capacity to use 

words to justify and to inspire. 

Al Qaeda: Leadership, Structure and Organization 

Al Qaeda is unique among terrorist organizations in its organization 

and structure. Perhaps reflecting his training in business management, bin 

Laden in effect serves as chairman of the board of a holding company 

(“Radical Islam, Inc.”), a loose umbrella organization of semi-autonomous 

terrorist groups and organizations with bin Laden providing guidance, 

coordination, and financial and logistical facilitation. 

Unlike other charismatically led organizations, such as Guzman’s 

Sendero Luminosa (Shinning Path) of Peru, or Ocalan’s terrorist PKK 

(Kurdistan’s Workers Party) of Turkey, both of which were mortally 

wounded when their leader was captured, bin Laden has established a 

system by which designated successors are seamlessly promoted into open 

positions. Ayman al-Zawahiri has been designated as bin Laden’s 

successor and number two. A leading Islamic militant, Zawahiri is a 

physician who founded the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the new faction, 

Talaa’al al Fateh (Vanguard of Conquerors.) It was Zawahiri’s group that 

responsible for the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of 

Egypt and is considered responsible for the assassination of President 

Sadat. In fact, Zawahiri, who is responsible for more day to day decisions, 

can be seen as serving as CEO to bin Laden as Chairman of the Board. 

Chairman of the Islamic Committee and responsible for many of the 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 15 

Fatwas and other official writings of al Qaeda, Zawahiri indeed is reputed 

to be even more apocalyptic and extreme in his views than bin Laden. 

There has been speculation about the amount of influence Zawahiri has 

over bin Laden, with some believing that Zawahiri is the charismatic 

“behind the scenes” driving force of al Qaeda. The now deceased number 

three, Atef, also of the Islamic Jihad of Egypt, was chairman of the 

military committee and training before his death in Afghanistan in the fall 

of 2001 during U.S. raids following the September 11th attacks in the 

United States. In another example of the successor system, following 

Atef’s death, Abu Zubaydah formerly head of personnel and recruiting, 

became head of the Military Committee until his capture by U.S. and 

Pakistani forces in Pakistan in the Spring of 2001. No doubt another 

successor has moved into the vacant position. Despite the fact that neither 

bin Laden nor Zawahiri has been seen in public since the fall 2001 U.S. 

attacks in Afghanistan, the fact that the al Qaeda’s global network 

continues to operate is testimony to the effective leadership structure of 

the organization. 

Conceptually, al Qaeda differs significantly from other terrorist 

groups and organizations in its structural composition. Unprecedented in 

its transnational nature, al Qaeda has proved a challenge to law 

enforcement officials. It’s organizational structure, diffuse nature, broad 

based ethnic composition, emphasis on training, expansive financial 

network and its technological and military capabilities makes it not only a 

formidable force but difficult to detect. 

Al Qaeda was reorganized in 1998 to enable the organization to more 

effectively manage its assets and pursue its goals. Gunaratna has 

characterized the revamped al Qaeda structure as having four distinct but 

interconnected elements: (1) a pyramidal structure to facilitate strategic 

and tactical direction, (2) a global terrorist network, (3) a base force 

capable of guerrilla warfare inside Afghanistan, and (4) a loose coalition 

of transnational terrorist and guerrilla groups. Strategic and tactical 

direction comes from al Qaeda’s Consultation Council (Majlis al-Shura) 

consisting of five committees (Military, Business, Communications, 

Islamic Studies and Media), each headed by a senior leader in the 

organization, which oversee the operations of the organization. 

It is believed that bin Laden himself oversees the Business 

Committee, which has developed and continues to oversee al Qaeda’s 

extensive and sophisticated global financial resources. The committee, 

comprised of professional bankers, financiers and accountants coordinates 
16 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

the vast financial empire of al Qaeda including legitimate institutions 

such as state and privately funded charities, banks and companies, as 

well as more clandestine entities. Although Gunaratna claims that many 

estimates of al Qaeda’s funding for external operations have been 

exaggerated, he does place the annual budget of al Qaeda around $50 

million.12 Despite efforts by the international law enforcement 

community, al Qaeda’s financial network appears to remain strong. 

Ayman Al Zawahiri is believed to head the Islamic Studies 

Committee. Comprised of various Islamic scholars and religious 

clerics, this committee issues the organization’s Fatwas and other 

official writings. Although less has been written about this committee, 

they are clearly crucial to maintaining and generating the support of the 

masses of followers who subscribe to the organization’s ideology. 

The military committee, responsible for recruiting, training and 

operations is clearly one of the most powerful committees within the al 

Qaeda organization. Prior to his death in the fall of 2001 during the 

conflict in Afghanistan, Mohammed Atef headed this committee. 

Following his death, Abu Zubaydah seamlessly replaced Atef. In 

addition to maintaining and running the various training camps 

throughout the world, including those in Afghanistan, this committee 

reportedly planned and directed many of the organization’s terrorist 

attacks. There have been a series of operational triumphs for al Qaeda 

over the past decade —Khobar Towers, the first World trade Center 

bombing, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 

the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and, of course, the most 

spectacular terrorist act in history, the events of September 11, the 

largest single act of mass casualty super-terrorism ever. Additionally, 

the military committee is responsible for developing the training 

methods and materials used the various camps. As head of the 

committee, as in his previous position, Zubaydah screened applicants for 

al Qaeda training camps sent successful recruits to various places in the 

world to establish new al Qaeda cells. Following the capture of Abu 

Zubaydah by U.S. and Pakistani forces in March 2002, it is unclear who 

now heads this committee, although there is no doubt the position has 

been filled. 

Al Qaeda also maintains its own guerrilla army, known as the 55th 

Brigade, an elite body trained in small unit tactics. This group, 

comprised of approximately 2,000 fighters, was reportedly the “shock 

troops” of the Taliban, having been integrated into their army from 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 17

1997-2001.13 These elite fighters came from Arab states such as Egypt, 

Saudi Arabia, Yemen and others, Central Asian states such as 

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan and Kazakhstan, and Asian and 

Southeast Asian states, primarily Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, 

Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of the members had fought in either the 

Soviet/Afghan war or other regional conflicts including conflicts in 

Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh and others.14 Well-equipped with 

weaponry left by the Soviets after their retreat from Afghanistan as 

well as newer technology this group remains a formidable presence 

despite having suffered serious losses during the fall 2001 U.S.-led 

attacks on Afghanistan. 

Al Qaeda’s global network consists of permanent or independently 

operating semi-permanent cells of al Qaeda trained militants established in 

over seventy-six countries worldwide as well as allied Islamist military 

and political groups globally.15 The strict adherence to a cell structure has 

allowed al Qaeda to maintain an impressively high degree of secrecy and 

security. These cells are independent of other local groups al Qaeda may 

be aligned with, and range in size from two to fifteen members. Al Qaeda 

cells are often used as support for terrorist acts. Moreover, as was the case 

with the al Qaeda bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, locals who have been 

trained by, but are not official members of, al Qaeda, may be activated to 

support an operation. Although the September 11 hijackers were members 

of sleeper cells in the United States, most cells are used to establish safe 

houses, procure local resources and support outside operatives as needed 

to carry out an attack. 

Al Qaeda’s approach of allying itself with various existing terrorist 

groups around the world enhances the organizations transnational reach. 

Al Qaeda has worked to establish relationships with diverse groups – not 

only geographically diverse but they have also developed working 

relationships with organizations, such as Hezballah and the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), that do not necessarily follow the strict al 

Qaeda version of Salafi/Sunni Islam. According to Gunaratna, al Qaeda 

established relationships with at least thirty Islamist terrorist groups, 

including such well known groups as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Harakat 

ul-Ansar (Pakistan); Al-Ittihad (Somalia); Islamic Jihad and Hamas 

(Palestine); and Al Gama`a al-Islamiya (Egypt). In addition to its primary 

logistical base in Afghanistan, al Qaeda maintained a direct presence in 

Sudan, Yemen, Checnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, and the Philippines through 

relationships with Islamist organizations already existing in these 
18 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

countries. 16 In essence, Bin Laden and his senior leaders have “grown” 

the al Qaeda “corporation” through mergers and acquisitions. Bin Laden 

has worked to minimize differences between the groups within the 

organization, emphasizing their similarities and uniting them with the 

vision of a common enemy – the West. 

Having maintained bases in Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan and 

elsewhere as well as an ideological doctrine that rings true to much of 

the Islamic community, al Qaeda’s membership base reaches every 

corner of the world encompassing several dozen constituent 

nationalities and ethnic groups.17 Its ideology has allowed al Qaeda to 

unite the previously unorganized global community of radical Islam, 

providing leadership and inspiration. Beyond the actual al Qaeda cells 

maintained in over 60 countries worldwide, al Qaeda sympathizers 

exist in virtually every country on earth. The sympathizers are not only 

the disenfranchised youth of impoverished communities, but include 

wealthy and successful businessmen in countries such as Saudi Arabia 

and Egypt. 

Like many terrorist organizations, al Qaeda does not have a formal 

recruitment strategy, rather it relies on familial ties and relationships, 

spotters in mosques who identify potential recruits and the volunteering 

of many members. Al Qaeda members recruit from their own family 

and national/social groups, and once trained these members are often 

reintegrated into their own communities. Very similar to the Muslim 

Brotherhood, the concept of “brotherhood” draws on the concept that 

familial ties in the Islamic world are binding. Al Qaeda members refer 

to each other as “brother” and tend to view the organization as their 

extended family. 

Al Qaeda training camps have trained both formal al Qaeda members 

as well as members of Islamist organizations allied with al Qaeda. 

According to reports, al Qaeda training is broken into essentially three 

separate courses: (1) Basic Training – training specific to guerrilla war 

and Islamic law; (2) Advanced Training – training in the use of 

explosives, assassination and heavy weapons; and (3) Specialized Training 

– training in techniques of surveillance and counter-surveillance, forging 

and adapting identity documents and conducting maritime or vehiclebased suicide attacks.18

Al Qaeda has developed extensive training materials used in their 

camps and other training situations. In addition to paramilitary training, a 

great emphasis is placed on Islamic studies – Islamic law, history and 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 19 

current politics. The extensive training materials produced by al Qaeda, 

exemplified by the manual discussed at the beginning of this paper, clearly 

demonstrate al Qaeda’s twin training goals – the indoctrination of recruits 

in both military and religious studies. 

Al Qaeda: What Next? 

The unique and far reaching transnational nature of al Qaeda 

represents one of the greatest threats currently facing the international 

security. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York 

and Washington D.C., NATO, for the first time since its founding 52 

years ago, invoked article V stating that an attack on one member state of 

NATO was considered an attack on all member states of NATO. A 

massive air and ground campaign was launched against al Qaeda, its 

operational bases and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan. As a result 

of the campaign, al Qaeda has suffered severe losses, including the death 

and or capture of several senior leaders. Despite these losses and the 

dispersal of members throughout the world, in testament to its 

organizational structure al Qaeda remains operationally in tact – 

wounded for sure, but certainly not destroyed. 

For many al Qaeda followers the fall 2001 attacks in Afghanistan 

only served to reinforce their sense of righteous belief in their cause and 

their perception of the west as anti-Islamic aggressors. Although we have 

not seen a second large-scale al Qaeda attack, there is nothing to suggest 

that al Qaeda is no longer operational. Al Qaeda spends up to years 

planning a single operation, so it is quite conceivable they already have 

other terrorist events planned. Despite al Qaeda’s Afghan base having 

been destroyed and its leadership dispersed, it’s cellular structure remains 

intact with active cells and sleeper cells throughout the world. Most likely 

though, due to the highly focused international attention, the next wave of 

al Qaeda attacks will be on a smaller scale and undertaken by cells 

operating independently. 

There are several possible scenarios to consider for the future of al 

Qaeda following the September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent U.S.-

led war in Afghanistan: 
20 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

1. In the event of Bin Laden's death or capture, al Qaeda's flat, 

dispersed organizational structure, the presence of a designated 

successor, the nature of Bin Laden's and Zawahiri's leadership 

and charisma and their enshrined religious mission-all suggest 

that the terrorist network would survive. His loss would 

assuredly be a setback, but since Zawahiri is already running al 

Qaeda's daily operations, his transition to the top job would be 

virtually seamless. The organization's luster for alienated 

Muslims would dim, but, within the organization, Zawahiri's 

considerable stature and charismatic attractiveness should permit 

him to carry on the network's mission. Bin Laden has not been 

seen in public since September 23, 2001, and he is believed by 

some to have been killed or seriously wounded in the attack on 

Tora Bora. Bin Laden's death would surely lead to his 

designation as a martyr in the cause of Islam and might well 

precipitate terrorist actions. His capture could lead to retaliatory 

hostage-taking or other terrorist actions. In either event, al Qaeda 

would survive. 

2. There have been various reports that Zawahiri had been killed 

or seriously injured in bombing raids in Afghanistan in the Fall of 

2001. A number of inner-circle members have also been said to 

have died. Should Zawahiri, in fact, be dead or incapacitated, and 

Bin Laden survives, this would also be a major setback. But 

because it has systematically prepared individuals for and 

promoted them to leadership positions, al Qaeda, with Bin Laden 

alive, would eventually recover and continue. 

3. Should both Bin Laden and Zawahiri, as well as other key 

leaders, be killed or captured, in effect eliminating the leadership 

echelon, this would be a major, possibly fatal, blow to the 

terrorist network, although the international jihadist movement 

inspired by al Qaeda and its senior leadership would no doubt 

continue. It is likely that in this scenario members of most al 

Qaeda cells would disperse and attach themselves to locally 

based groups, and reprisal attacks could be expected. Other 

groups inspired by al Qaeda’s success and mission would 

continue to operate, most likely though limited to their regional 

area of operation. The transnational nature of the al Qaeda as an 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 21 

effective terrorist network in and of itself would most likely be 

destroyed. 

4. Finally, should Bin Laden disappear, the myth of the hidden 

imam would probably be infused with mythic power, and others 

might well speak in Bin Laden's name in attempting to continue 

al Qaeda's terrorist mission. 

While President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have 

taken pains to clarify that the War on Terrorism is not a war against 

Muslims, but a war against terrorism, seeking to frame this as a religious 

war, bin Laden has now laid claim to the title of commander-in-chief of the 

Islamic world, opposing the commander-in-chief of the Western world, 

President George W. Bush. Alienated Arab youth find resonance in his 

statements, and see him as a hero. For many al Qaeda followers the fall 

2001 attacks in Afghanistan only served to reinforce their sense of righteous 

in their cause and their perception of the west as anti-Islamic aggressors. Al 

Qaeda has become a catalyst for an international jihadist movement that will 

continue to grow independent of the original parent organization. 
22 . . . Killing In The Name Of God
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 23 

Notes 

1. Jerrold Post is Professor Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International 

Affairs at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. He is the co-author of 

Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, which has been published in Germany. 

2. There are varying reports about Osama bin Laden’s exact location within the 

family, although 17th of 20/25 sons of 52 or 53 children is the most consistent figure 

available. Example sources include: Dickey, Christopher and Daniel McGinn. “Meet 

the bin Ladens” Newsweek. Found at: http://www.msnbc.com/news/639250.asp; 

Dorschner, John, “Osama bin Laden: The Mastermind of Terror.” Knight Ridder 

Newspapers, September 24, 2001. Found at: http://www.freep.com/news/nw/terror2001/ 

osama24_20010924.html; Miller, John. ABC interview with Osama bin Laden, see 

http://www.terrorism.com/documents/crs-report.shtml. 

3. As noted, there is no single agreed upon figure as to the inheritance of Osama 

bin Laden and reports vary. Sources include: Beyer, Lisa. “The Most Wanted Man in 

the World.” Found at: http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101010924/wosama.html; 

McFadden, Robert D., “Bin Laden’s Journey From Rich, Pious Boy to the Mask of Evi,”. 

The New York Times, September 30, 2001.; Dorschner, John, “A Shadowy Empire of 

Hate was Born of a War in Afghanistan,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, September 24, 

2001. 

4. Nearly all reports refer to Osama bin Laden as the only child (or the only son) of 

his mother with Muhammed bin Laden. Following her divorce, Osama bin Laden’s 

mother remarried and subsequently started a second family. 

5. While some reports (see Robinson) claim that Muhammed had Hamida removed 

from the family before Osama turned one-year-old, other reports more consistently note 

that she was ostracized by the family but do not indicate that her departure from the 

family (following her divorce with Muhammed) was as early as Robinson indicates. 

6. While most reports indicate that Osama did indeed obtain his civil engineering 

certificate and at least start his degree in Business Management, Rohan Gunaratna in his 

Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2002), states that contrary to other reports, bin Laden did not study engineering. 

7. Hashim, A. “Usama bin Laden’s” Worldview and Grand Strategy,” paper 

presented to conference at Navy War College, November 19,2001. 

8. Adam Robinson, Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist (New York: 

Arcade Publishing, 2001). 

9. Gunaratna, op. cit. 
24 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

10. Declaration of War (1) available on the World Wide Web at 

http://www.msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/199610/19961013.10.html. 

11. The editor wishes to acknowledge his appreciation of the critical review of the 

text by Daniel Blumberg, an expert on radical Islam who is Professor of Government and 

Middle Eastern Affairs at Georgetown University. Commentary on the suras draws on 

the analysis of Professor Blumberg. 

12. Gunaratna, 60-63. 

13. Gunaratna, 58. 

14. Gunaratna, 59. 

15. Countries believed to have active al Qaeda cells include: Britain, France, 

Germany, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 

Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Borneo, Brunei, Nauru, 

Fiji, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, UAE, West Bank and 

Gaza, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, South 

Africa, U.S., Canada, as well as a growing presence in South America. See Gunaratna, 

79. 

16. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 5-6. 

17. Gunaratna, 96. 

18. Gunaratna, 72 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 25 
26 . . . Killing In The Name Of God

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

 The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to 

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the 

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by 

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Editor, The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538) 
Killing In The Name Of God. . . 27