73756 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 236 / Monday, December 9, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

(b) Effective/applicability date. This 

section applies to a technical 

termination of a partnership under 

section 708(b)(1)(B) that occurs on or 

after December 9, 2013. 

■ Par. 3. Section 1.708–1 is amended by 

adding paragraph (b)(6) to read as 

follows: 

§ 1.708–1 Continuation of partnership. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(6) Treatment of certain start-up or 

organizational expenses following a 

technical termination—(i) In general. If 

a partnership that has elected to 

amortize start-up expenditures under 

section 195(b) or organizational 

expenses under section 709(b)(1) 

terminates in a transaction (or a series 

of transactions) described in section 

708(b)(1)(B) or paragraph (b)(2) of this 

section, the new partnership must 

continue to amortize those expenditures 

using the same amortization period 

adopted by the terminating partnership. 

See section 195 and § 1.195–1 for rules 

concerning the amortization of start-up 

expenditures and section 709 and 

§ 1.709–1 for rules concerning the 

amortization of organizational expenses. 

(ii) Effective/applicability date. This 

paragraph (b)(6) applies to a technical 

termination of a partnership under 

section 708(b)(1)(B) that occurs on or 

after December 9, 2013. 

* * * * * 

■ Par. 4. Section 1.709–1 is amended 

by: 

■ 1. Designating the text in paragraph 

(b)(3) as paragraph (b)(3)(i), adding a 

heading to newly designated paragraph 

(b)(3)(i) and adding paragraph (b)(3)(ii); 

■ 2. Adding a sentence at the end of 

paragraph (b)(5). 

The additions read as follows: 

§ 1.709–1 Treatment of organization and 

syndication costs. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) Liquidation of partnership—(i) In 

general. * * * 

(ii) Technical termination of a 

partnership. If a partnership that has 

elected to amortize organizational costs 

under section 709(b) terminates in a 

transaction (or a series of transactions) 

described in section 708(b)(1)(B) or 

§ 1.708–1(b)(2), the termination shall 

not be treated as resulting in a 

liquidation of the partnership for 

purposes of section 709(b)(2). See 

§ 1.708–1(b)(6) for rules concerning the 

treatment of these organizational costs 

by the new partnership. 

* * * 

(5) * * * Paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this 

section applies to a technical 

termination of a partnership under 

section 708(b)(1)(B) that occurs on or 

after December 9, 2013. 

Heather C. Maloy, 

Deputy Commissioner for Operations 

Support. 

[FR Doc. 2013–29177 Filed 12–6–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4830–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 

29 CFR Part 1910 

[Docket No. OSHA–2013–0020] 

RIN 1218–AC82 

Process Safety Management and 

Prevention of Major Chemical 

Accidents 

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA), Department of 

Labor. 

ACTION: Request for information. 

SUMMARY: In response to Executive 

Order 13650, OSHA requests comment 

on potential revisions to its Process 

Safety Management (PSM) standard and 

its Explosives and Blasting Agents 

standard, potential updates to its 

Flammable Liquids standard and Spray 

Finishing standard, and potential 

changes to PSM enforcement policies. In 

this Request for Information (RFI), the 

Agency asks for information and data on 

specific rulemaking and policy options, 

and the workplace hazards they address. 

OSHA will use the information received 

in response to this RFI to determine 

what action, if any, it may take. 

DATES: Submit comments and additional 

material on this Request for Information 

March 10, 2014. All submissions must 

bear a postmark or provide other 

evidence of the submission date. The 

following section describes the available 

methods for making submissions. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments and 

additional materials by any of the 

following methods: 

Electronically: Submit comments and 

attachments electronically at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, which is the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal. Follow the 

instructions online for making 

electronic submissions. 

Facsimile: OSHA allows facsimile 

transmission of comments and 

additional material that are 10 pages or 

fewer in length (including attachments). 

Send these documents to the OSHA 

Docket Office at (202) 693–1648. OSHA 

does not require hard copies of these 

documents. Instead of transmitting 

facsimile copies of attachments that 

supplement these documents (for 

example, studies, journal articles), 

commenters must submit these 

attachments to the OSHA Docket Office, 

Technical Data Center, Room N–2625, 

OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC 

20210. These attachments must identify 

clearly the sender’s name, the date, 

subject, and docket number (OSHA– 

2013–0020) so that the Docket Office 

can attach them to the appropriate 

document. 

Regular mail, express mail, hand 

delivery, or messenger (courier) service: 

Submit comments and any additional 

material (for example, studies, journal 

articles) to the OSHA Docket Office, 

Docket No. OSHA–2013–0020 or RIN 

1218–AC82, Technical Data Center, 

Room N–2625, OSHA, U.S. Department 

of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave. NW., 

Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 

693–2350. (OSHA’s TTY number is 

(877) 889–5627.) Contact the OSHA 

Docket Office for information about 

security procedures concerning delivery 

of materials by express mail, hand 

delivery, and messenger service. The 

hours of operation for the OSHA Docket 

Office are 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., e.t. 

Instructions: All submissions must 

include the Agency’s name and the 

docket number for this Request for 

Information (that is, OSHA–2013–0020). 

OSHA will place comments and other 

material, including any personal 

information, in the public docket 

without revision, and these materials 

will be available online at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA 

cautions commenters about submitting 

statements they do not want made 

available to the public and submitting 

comments that contain personal 

information (either about themselves or 

others) such as Social Security numbers, 

birth dates, and medical data. 

If you submit scientific or technical 

studies or other results of scientific 

research, OSHA requests (but is not 

requiring) that you also provide the 

following information where it is 

available: (1) Identification of the 

funding source(s) and sponsoring 

organization(s) of the research; (2) the 

extent to which the research findings 

were reviewed by a potentially affected 

party prior to publication or submission 

to the docket, and identification of any 

such parties; and (3) the nature of any 

financial relationships (e.g., consulting 

agreements, expert witness support, or 

research funding) between investigators 

who conducted the research and any 

organization(s) or entities having an 

interest in the rulemaking and policy 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS

Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 236 / Monday, December 9, 2013 / Proposed Rules 73757 

1https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/ 

processsafetymanagement/. 

options discussed in this RFI. 

Disclosure of such information is 

intended to promote transparency and 

scientific integrity of data and technical 

information submitted to the record. 

This request is consistent with 

Executive Order 13563, issued on 

January 18, 2011, which instructs 

agencies to ensure the objectivity of any 

scientific and technological information 

used to support their regulatory actions. 

OSHA emphasizes that all material 

submitted to the record will be 

considered by the Agency if it engages 

in rulemaking. 

Docket: To read or download 

submissions or other material in the 

docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov 

or the OSHA Docket Office at the 

address above. The http:// 

www.regulations.gov index lists all 

documents in the docket. However, 

some information (e.g., copyrighted 

material) is not available publicly to 

read or download through the Web site. 

All submissions, including copyrighted 

material, are available for inspection at 

the OSHA Docket Office. Contact the 

OSHA Docket Office for assistance in 

locating docket submissions. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Press inquiries: Mr. Frank Meilinger, 

Director, OSHA Office of 

Communications, Room N–3647, U.S. 

Department of Labor, 200 Constitution 

Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; 

telephone: (202) 693–1999; email: 

meilinger.francis2@dol.gov. 

General and technical information: 

Ms. Lisa Long, Director, Office of 

Engineering Safety, OSHA Directorate of 

Standards and Guidance, Room N–3609, 

U.S. Department of Labor, 200 

Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, 

DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693–2222; 

email: long.lisa@dol.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Copies of this Federal Register 

notice and news releases: Electronic 

copies of these documents are available 

at OSHA’s Web page at http:// 

www.osha.gov. Copies of this Federal 

Register notice also are available at 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

I. Background 

A. Executive Order 13650 

On August 1, 2013, President Obama 

signed Executive Order 13650, entitled 

Improving Chemical Facility Safety and 

Security. Section 6(e)(ii) of the order 

requires OSHA to publish, within 90 

days, an RFI designed to identify issues 

related to modernization of its PSM 

standard 1 and related standards 

necessary to meet the goal of preventing 

major chemical accidents. In response to 

the Executive Order, OSHA is 

publishing this RFI to collect data and 

information on its PSM standard and 

related standards, as well as other 

regulatory issues involving hazardous 

chemicals. 

B. Process Safety Management of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals 

OSHA originally promulgated the 

§ 1910.119 Process Safety Management 

(PSM) standard in 1992 in response to 

a number of catastrophic chemicalrelease incidents that occurred 

worldwide. The incidents spurred broad 

recognition in the safety community 

that accidental releases of highly 

hazardous chemicals can result in 

multiple worker injuries or fatalities. 

The main objective of the PSM standard 

is to prevent or minimize employee 

exposure to the hazards associated with 

uncontrolled releases of highly 

hazardous chemicals. 

The PSM standard is a comprehensive 

management program for highly 

hazardous chemicals that integrates 

technologies, procedures, and 

management practices to help assure 

safe and healthful workplaces. One of 

the key components of the PSM 

standard is the requirement that 

employers perform a process hazard 

analysis, which is a careful review of 

what could go wrong and what 

safeguards employers must implement 

to prevent uncontrolled releases. The 

PSM standard also mandates written 

operating procedures; employee 

training; prestartup safety reviews; 

evaluation of the mechanical integrity of 

critical equipment; and written 

procedures for managing change. In 

addition, the PSM standard specifies a 

permit system for hot work; 

investigation of incidents involving 

releases or near misses of covered 

chemicals; emergency-action plans; 

compliance audits at least every three 

years; and trade-secret protection. 

While the PSM standard has been 

effective in improving process safety in 

the United States and protecting 

workers from many of the hazards 

associated with uncontrolled releases of 

highly hazardous chemicals, major 

incidents have continued to occur. 

(1) On April 23, 2004, an explosion 

and fire at Formosa Plastics in Illiopolis, 

Illinois, killed five workers and severely 

injured three others. According to the 

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board’s (CSB) report on 

the incident (CSB Report No, 2004–10– 

I–IL), while Formosa failed to properly 

implement many OSHA-required 

elements of its PSM program, 

modernization of the PSM standard to 

include several issues discussed below 

would likely have prevented or 

minimized the consequences of this 

incident. In 2005, OSHA reached a 

settlement agreement with Formosa 

with 48 citations, 31 of which were PSM 

citations, and fines totaling $300,000. 

The CSB report contains a detailed 

analysis of the root causes of this 

incident. 

(2) On March 23, 2005, 15 workers 

died and more than 170 others were 

injured at the BP Refinery in Texas City, 

Texas. As a result of the incident, OSHA 

issued over 300 citations and fined BP 

over $21 million. Many of the citations 

were for PSM violations, including 

failing to properly implement 

mechanical integrity, training, and 

standard operating procedures. In a 

2009 follow-up investigation, OSHA 

found numerous deficiencies at the BP 

Texas City Refinery and issued 270 

failure-to-abate notices. In a 2010 

settlement agreement with OSHA, BP 

agreed to pay a penalty of $50.6 million 

to resolve the notices. 

(3) On April 2, 2010, an explosion and 

fire at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, 

Washington, killed seven workers. The 

incident occurred when a heat 

exchanger suddenly ruptured during 

maintenance, releasing a highly 

hazardous chemical that subsequently 

exploded. The company operated under 

the jurisdiction of the Washington State 

Department of Labor and Industries 

Division of Occupational Safety and 

Health (DOSH), which adopted OSHA’s 

PSM standard into its state plan 

regulations at WAC 296–67. DOSH 

inspectors found that Tesoro failed to 

properly implement its PSM program by 

inadequately testing its equipment and 

continuing to operate failing equipment. 

As the result of the incident, DOSH 

issued 44 citations, 36 of which were 

PSM citations, to Tesoro, totaling $2.39 

million. The root cause investigation is 

ongoing, however, modernization of the 

PSM standard to include several issues 

discussed below would likely have 

prevented or minimized the 

consequences of this incident. 

(4) On April 17, 2013, an ammonium 

nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer 

Company storage and distribution 

facility in West, Texas, killed at least 15 

people—the majority of whom were 

firefighters responding to a fire at the 

facility—and injured over 160 others. 

The West Fertilizer facility is not 

currently covered by PSM, however it is 

a stark example of how potential 

modernization of the PSM standard may 

include such facilities and prevent 

future catastrophe. 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS

73758 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 236 / Monday, December 9, 2013 / Proposed Rules 

2https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/ 

owadisp.show_document?p_table=

STANDARDS&p_id=9760. 

In 2007, OSHA initiated its Petroleum 

Refinery PSM National Emphasis 

Program (NEP) to reduce or eliminate 

the workplace hazards associated with 

the catastrophic release of highly 

hazardous chemicals in petroleum 

refineries. The program outlined a new 

approach for inspecting PSM-covered 

facilities that allowed for a greater 

number of inspections using better 

allocation of OSHA resources. In 2009, 

OSHA built upon that inspection 

program by implementing a pilot PSMCovered Chemical Facilities NEP, which 

it later expanded into a full NEP. Under 

both of the PSM NEPs, OSHA was able 

to increase the number of PSM-covered 

facilities inspected and gained valuable 

inspection data. 

C. Rulemaking and Enforcement Policy 

Change Options Under Consideration 

OSHA has determined that revisions 

to its PSM standard may be needed to 

address issues in coverage. As specified 

in Executive Order 13650, the Agency is 

also considering related revisions to its 

Explosives and Blasting Agents standard 

to address potential issues in coverage; 

updates to its Flammable Liquids 

standard and Spray Finishing standard 

to better align with current versions of 

applicable consensus standards; and 

changes in its enforcement policies for 

these standards. OSHA identified a 

number of rulemaking and policy 

options through the Agency’s PSM 

NEPs, its investigation of major 

accidents, and its review of 

recommendations from the safety 

community. OSHA identified the 

following topics as potential candidates 

for rulemaking or enforcement policy 

changes: 

1. Clarifying the PSM exemption for 

atmospheric storage tanks; 

2. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and 

Servicing; 

3. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities; 

4. Expanding PSM Coverage and 

Requirements for Reactivity Hazards; 

5. Updating the List of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of 

the PSM Standard; 

6. Revising the PSM Standard to 

Require Additional Management-System 

Elements; 

7. Amending Paragraph (d) of the 

PSM Standard to Require Evaluation of 

Updates to Applicable recognized and 

generally accepted good engineering 

practices (RAGAGEP); 

8. Clarifying the PSM Standard by 

Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP; 

9. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph 

(j) of the PSM Standard to Cover the 

Mechanical Integrity of Any SafetyCritical Equipment; 

10. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the 

PSM Standard with an Explicit 

Requirement that Employers Manage 

Organizational Changes; 

11. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM 

Standard to Require Coordination of 

Emergency Planning with Local 

Emergency-Response Authorities; 

12. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM 

Standard to Require Third-Party 

Compliance Audits; 

13. Expanding the Requirements of 

§ 1910.109 to Cover Dismantling and 

Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, 

and Pyrotechnics; 

14. Updating §§ 1910.106 and 

1910.107 Based on the Latest Applicable 

Consensus Standards; 

15. Updating the Regulations 

Addressing the Storage, Handling, and 

Management of Ammonium Nitrate; 

16. Changing Enforcement Policy of 

the PSM Exemption for Retail Facilities; 

and 

17. Changing Enforcement Policy for 

Highly Hazardous Chemicals Listed in 

Appendix A of the PSM Standard 

without Specific Concentrations. 

The subsections below discuss each of 

these potential rulemaking topics in 

greater detail. 

1. Clarifying the PSM Exemption for 

Atmospheric Storage Tanks 

Pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of 

§ 1910.119, the PSM standard applies to 

processes involving a flammable liquid 

or gas on site in one location in a 

quantity of 10,000 pounds or more. 

However, paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) 

contains an exemption for ‘‘[f]lammable 

liquids stored in atmospheric tanks or 

transferred which are kept below their 

normal boiling point without benefit of 

chilling or refrigeration.’’ 

In Secretary of Labor v. Meer 

Corporation (1997) (OSHRC Docket No. 

95–0341), an administrative law judge 

ruled that PSM coverage does not 

extend to flammables stored in 

atmospheric tanks, even if the tanks are 

connected to a process. As a result, 

employers can exclude the amount of 

flammable liquid contained in an 

atmospheric storage tank, or in transfer 

to or from storage, from the quantity 

contained in the process when 

determining whether a process meets 

the 10,000-pound threshold quantity. 

The Meer decision was contrary to 

OSHA’s earlier interpretation 2 of 

paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B), which was that 

the standard covered all stored 

flammables when connected to, or in 

close proximity to, a process. 

OSHA believes that revising 

paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) to include 

flammable liquids in atmospheric 

storage tanks within or connected to a 

PSM covered processes would improve 

the safety of workers by remedying the 

issue in PSM enforcement that has 

existed since the Meer decision. In the 

questions in this RFI, the Agency 

requests comment on revising paragraph 

(a)(1)(ii)(B) to clarify that the PSM 

standard covers all stored flammables 

when connected to, or in close 

proximity to, a process. 

2. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and 

Servicing 

Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of § 1910.119 

exempts oil- and gas-well drilling and 

servicing operations from PSM 

coverage. The preamble to the PSM final 

rule explained that OSHA excluded 

these operations because it had begun a 

separate rulemaking for oil and gas well 

drilling and servicing operations (48 FR 

57202). However, the Agency 

subsequently removed the oil and gas 

well drilling and servicing operations 

rulemaking from its regulatory agenda 

and never promulgated a final rule for 

these operations. In light of this history, 

OSHA requests public comment on 

whether to retain or remove the 

§ 1910.119(a)(2)(ii) exemption. 

3. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities 

On March 4, 1998, a catastrophic 

vessel failure and fire killed four 

workers at an oil- and gas-production 

facility near Pitkin, Louisiana, owned by 

Sonat Exploration Company. Sonat was 

using well fluid to purge air from a twomile pipeline that connected a 

separation facility to a production well 

when the separation vessel failed. In its 

investigation report on the incident 

(Report No. 1998–002–I–LA), the CSB 

stated that ‘‘[t]wo elements of the PSM 

standard, process hazard analyses and 

written operating procedures, are 

particularly relevant to the Sonat 

incident.’’ The CSB further concluded 

that ‘‘[t]he incident would likely have 

been prevented if process safety 

management principles or good 

engineering practice had been followed 

more effectively at the facility.’’ 

The exemption in § 1910.119(a)(2)(ii) 

does not extend to oil- and gas-well 

production operations such as the Sonat 

facility noted in the previous paragraph. 

A December 20, 1999, memo from 

Compliance Programs director Richard 

Fairfax to OSHA regional 

administrators, entitled PSM 

Applicability to Oil/Gas Production 

Facilities, explained that ‘‘production 

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3 Instability/reactivity ratings listed are set by the 

National Fire Protection Association’s Standard 

System for the Identification of the Hazards of 

Materials for Emergency Response (NFPA 704). 

4NFPA 704 instability/reactivity of one: 

‘‘normally stable, but can become unstable at 

elevated temperatures and pressures.’’ 

5NFPA 704 instability/reactivity of two: 

‘‘undergoes violent chemical change at elevated 

temperatures and pressures.’’ 

facilities . . . were always intended to 

be covered under PSM.’’ The memo 

described covered production 

operations as follows: 

Production, as recognized by the petroleum 

industry, is a phase of well operations that 

deals with bringing well fluids to the surface, 

separating them, and then storing, gauging 

and otherwise preparing the product for the 

pipeline. This production phase occurs after 

a well has been drilled, completed, and 

placed into operation, or after it has been 

returned to operation following workover or 

servicing. A completed well includes a 

‘‘Christmas tree’’ (control valves, pressure 

gauges and choke assemblies to control the 

flow of oil and gas) which is attached at the 

top of the well where pressure is expected. 

It is at this point, the top of the well, where 

the covered PSM process begins. The 

distance between separation equipment and 

the well is not a factor when determining 

PSM applicability for production facilities. 

The American Petroleum Institute 

(API) objected to the December 20, 1999, 

memo, asserting that PSM coverage of 

oil- and gas-production facilities was 

invalid because OSHA did not conduct 

an economic analysis during the 

original PSM rulemaking proceedings 

addressing such coverage. In a March 7, 

2000, letter to API, OSHA conceded that 

the original economic analysis for the 

PSM standard did not include oil- and 

gas-production operations, and stated 

further that the Agency would suspend 

enforcement of the PSM standard for 

oil- and gas-production operations until 

it performed the analysis. OSHA is 

considering completing this analysis so 

that it can resume enforcement of the 

PSM standard for oil- and gasproduction facilities. 

OSHA believes that implementation 

of an effective PSM program in 

accordance with the requirements in 

§ 1910.119 by oil and gas production 

facilities could prevent or mitigate 

accidents like the Sonat explosion. In 

the questions in this RFI, the Agency 

requests public comment on completing 

an economic analysis and possibly 

resuming enforcement for PSM-covered 

oil- and gas-production facilities. OSHA 

will review the comments received to 

determine what action, if any, the 

Agency will take. 

4. Expanding PSM Coverage and 

Requirements for Reactivity Hazards 

Paragraph (a) of § 1910.119 states that 

the standard applies to any ‘‘process 

which involves a chemical at or above 

the specified threshold quantities listed 

in Appendix A,’’ and to any ‘‘process 

which involves a Category 1 flammable 

gas (as defined in 1910.1200(c)) or a 

flammable liquid with a flashpoint 

below 100 °F (37.8 °C) on site in one 

location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds 

(4535.9 kg),’’ unless the process meets 

one of the exceptions in 

§ 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(A) and (B). 

Appendix A of § 1910.119 contains a list 

of 137 highly hazardous chemicals that 

present a potential for a catastrophic 

event at or above the listed threshold 

quantities. A number of the chemicals 

listed in Appendix A are highly reactive 

chemicals based on a variety of metrics, 

including consensus standard sources, 

but the list does not cover all highly 

reactive chemicals. 

OSHA has long been aware of the 

need to update the PSM standard to 

address hazards associated with reactive 

chemicals. In response to a 1995 

chemical explosion that killed five 

workers at Napp Technologies, Inc., in 

Lodi, New Jersey, OSHA received a 

petition to revise its PSM standard to 

address reactivity hazards. OSHA and 

the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) investigated the Napp 

Technologies accident and concluded in 

a jointly issued 1997 report (EPA–550– 

R–97–002) that the explosion was most 

likely triggered by an uncontrolled 

chemical reaction of water, sodium 

hydrosulfite, and aluminum powder. 

Aluminum powder and sodium 

hydrosulfate are relatively stable 

chemicals, with instability/reactivity 

ratings 3 of one 4 and two,5 respectively. 

However, when both of these chemicals 

are mixed with water the reaction is 

extremely hazardous. In 2000, OSHA 

added an advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking (ANPRM) for reactive 

chemicals (RIN 1218–AB63) to its 

regulatory agenda. However, OSHA 

removed the item from its regulatory 

agenda in 2002 and never published the 

ANPRM. In 2003, the labor unions refiled their petition for OSHA to revise 

its PSM standard to address reactivity 

hazards. 

The CSB has also made a number of 

recommendations to OSHA on how the 

PSM standard could be amended to 

more comprehensively control reactive 

hazards. In a 2002 report, the CSB 

broadly recommended that OSHA 

extend PSM coverage to chemicals 

based on a class of highly reactive 

properties, similar to the way the 

existing PSM standard defines a class of 

flammable liquids or gases. The CSB 

explained that a performance-based 

approach to evaluating reactive hazards 

would allow for both a comprehensive 

analysis and flexibility in 

implementation, but it cautioned that a 

proper hazard analysis of reactive 

hazards would require expertise in 

reactivity hazards. 

One approach to regulating reactive 

hazards is the New Jersey Toxic 

Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA). 

Enacted in 1986, the TCPA is a New 

Jersey statute that contains many 

process safety elements similar to the 

PSM standard, but the TCPA differs 

from PSM by explicitly covering 

reactive hazards, including reactive 

mixtures. Unlike the PSM standard, 

which contains only one list of covered 

hazardous chemicals in Appendix A, 

the TCPA contains multiple lists. This 

includes the List of Individual Reactive 

Hazardous Substances, as well as a list 

of Reactive Hazard Substances Mixture 

Functional Groups. N.J.A.C. 7:31–6.3(a), 

Table I, Part D, Group I, N.J.A.C. 7:31– 

6.3(a), Table I, Part D, Group II. These 

functional groups include certain 

molecular structures that have been 

identified as highly reactive, based on 

scientific research and accident history. 

Under the TCPA, covered facilities must 

determine if any of the chemicals they 

are intentionally mixing include 

components on the Functional Group 

list. If so, then the facility must 

determine the heat of the reaction and 

the corresponding threshold quantity for 

TCPA coverage. This approach takes 

into account not only certain specific 

chemicals, but also their overall 

reactivity in determining the level of 

coverage. 

In the questions in this RFI, OSHA 

invites comment on different regulatory 

approaches to covering reactive hazards, 

including the approach used in the 

TCPA. 

5. Updating the List of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of 

the PSM Standard 

Appendix A of § 1910.119 contains a 

list of 137 highly hazardous chemicals 

that present a potential for a 

catastrophic event at or above the 

threshold quantity of the standard. 

OSHA compiled the Appendix A list of 

chemicals from multiple sources, 

including: 

• New Jersey’s Toxic Chemical 

Prevention Act; 

• Delaware’s Extremely Hazardous 

Substances Risk Management Act; 

• The World Bank’s Manual of 

Industrial Hazard Assessment 

Techniques; 

• U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s List of Extremely Hazardous 

Substances; 

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6 Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, CCPS. 

http://www.aiche.org/ccps. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid. 

9http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/BSEEFact-Sheet/SEMS-II-Fact-Sheet.aspx. 

• U.S. Department of Transportation’s 

Emergency Response Guidebook; 

• Council of the European 

Communities’ Council Directive of June 

24, 1982, on the Major Accident 

Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities 

(82/501/EEC); 

• United Kingdom Health and Safety 

Executive’s A guide to the Control of 

Major Accident Hazards Regulations 

1999 (as amended); 

• API’s Recommended Practice 750— 

Management of Process Hazards; 

• National Fire Protection 

Association’s (NFPA) NFPA 49— 

Hazardous Chemicals Data; and 

• Organization Resources Counselors, 

Inc.’s Recommendations for Process 

Hazards Management of Substances 

with Catastrophic Potential. 

Every chemical listed in Appendix A 

appeared in at least one of these sources 

as warranting a high degree of 

management control due to its 

extremely hazardous properties; most of 

the chemicals appeared in several of the 

sources. 

Appendix A has remained unchanged 

since OSHA promulgated the PSM 

standard in 1992. In the questions in 

this RFI, OSHA requests public 

comment on which chemicals, if any, 

the Agency should add to Appendix A 

through rulemaking. OSHA further 

seeks comment on methods for 

periodically updating Appendix A to 

ensure adequate protection of workers 

in PSM-covered facilities when new 

hazards are discovered and as 

technology and advancements in 

chemical science evolve. 

6. Revising the PSM Standard To 

Require Additional Management-System 

Elements 

Executive Order 13650 requires 

OSHA to ‘‘identify issues related to 

modernizing the PSM standard.’’ When 

OSHA promulgated the PSM standard 

in 1992, the standard adopted 

management-system elements based on 

best practices from industry at the time. 

However, best practices have continued 

to evolve since 1992 and additional 

management-system elements may now 

be recognized to be necessary to protect 

workers. In this RFI, OSHA seeks public 

comment on additional managementsystem elements that would increase 

worker protection if required under the 

PSM standard. 

The Center for Chemical Process 

Safety (CCPS) is an example of a safety 

organization that recommends 

additional management-system 

elements. CCPS specifies in its Risk 

Based Process Safety (RBPS) program 20 

different management-system elements, 

a number of which are not included in 

the PSM standard. One such RBPS 

element is ‘‘Measurement and Metrics,’’ 

described by CCPS as a system for 

establishing indicators to track the 

effectiveness of the management 

system.6 In this element, the employer 

typically uses metrics to track leading 

and lagging safety indicators, and to 

identify opportunities for improvement. 

Another RBPS element is ‘‘Management 

Review and Continuous Improvement,’’ 

which CCPS describes as ‘‘the ongoing 

‘due diligence’ review by management 

that fills the gap between day-to-day 

work activities and periodic formal 

audits.’’ 7 A third RBPS element is 

‘‘Process Safety Competency,’’ which 

CCPS explains ‘‘encompasses three 

interrelated actions: (1) Continuously 

improving of knowledge and 

competency, (2) ensuring that 

appropriate information is available to 

people who need it, and (3) consistently 

applying what has been learned.’’ 8

OSHA also is considering adopting 

management-system elements from 

safety standards that other federal 

agencies promulgated since 1992. For 

example, the Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement’s (BSEE) 

Revisions to Safety and Environmental 

Management Systems (SEMS II) final 

rule (78 FR 20423; 04/05/2013), which 

revised a number of requirements in 30 

CFR 250, Subpart S, contains 

management-system elements not 

included in the PSM standard. In its 

SEMS II Fact Sheet (April, 2013) 9, BSEE 

describes three of the main additional 

elements as follows: 

• Developing and implementing a stop 

work authority that creates procedures and 

authorizes any and all offshore industry 

personnel who witness an imminent risk or 

dangerous activity to stop work. 

• Developing and implementing an 

ultimate work authority that requires offshore 

industry operators to clearly define who has 

the ultimate work authority on a facility for 

operational safety and decision-making at 

any given time. 

• Requiring an employee participation 

plan that provides an environment that 

promotes participation by offshore industry 

employees as well as their management to 

eliminate or mitigate safety hazards. 

OSHA invites public comment on any 

additional management-system 

elements, or on expanding existing 

elements, including those elements 

discussed in this RFI to improve worker 

protection in facilities covered under 

the PSM standard. The Agency requests 

that commenters submit data and 

information on management-system 

elements from consensus standards, 

safety organizations, federal standards, 

or other sources that could increase 

worker safety if OSHA expanded the 

PSM standard to include the elements. 

7. Amending Paragraph (d) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Evaluation of 

Updates to Applicable RAGAGEP 

Paragraph (d)(3)(ii) of § 1910.119 

requires employers to document that 

covered equipment complies with 

RAGAGEP. ‘‘For existing equipment 

designed and constructed in accordance 

with codes, standards, or practices that 

are no longer in general use,’’ paragraph 

(d)(3)(iii) of § 1910.119 further requires 

employers to ‘‘determine and document 

that the equipment is designed, 

maintained, inspected, tested, and 

operating in a safe manner.’’ However, 

the PSM standard does not require 

employers to evaluate updates to 

applicable RAGAGEP or to examine 

new RAGAGEP after evaluating and 

documenting compliance with either 

§ 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) or (iii). 

Through extensive collaboration and 

evaluation of incidents, many safety 

organizations periodically update their 

standards to improve work practices 

and protect workers against newly 

identified hazards. Since the practices 

constituting RAGAGEP under the PSM 

standard are constantly changing as a 

result of this process, evaluating 

updates to applicable RAGAGEP 

ensures that employers base a facility’s 

PSM program on the most up-to-date 

and accurate safety information 

available. 

An accident that occurred at a 

Formosa Plastics facility in Point 

Comfort, Texas, on October 6, 2005, 

illustrates the importance of evaluating 

updates to applicable RAGAGEP. A 

trailer towed by a forklift became 

snagged and pulled a small drain valve 

out of a strainer in a liquid propylene 

system at the facility. Escaping 

propylene rapidly vaporized, causing a 

series of explosions and fires that 

injured 16 workers. According to the 

CSB’s investigation report on the 

incident (CSB Report No. 2006–01–I– 

TX), Formosa and the company that 

sold the plant design failed to evaluate 

updates to applicable RAGAGEP for 

fireproofing structural steel that 

supports critical safety systems. The 

CSB concluded in its report that had 

Formosa fireproofed the steel according 

to more recent RAGAGEP, then ‘‘the 

consequences of this incident would 

likely have been less severe.’’ OSHA 

invites public comment on the best 

approach to revising paragraph (d) of 

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10CCPS provides the following examples of 

organizational changes: ‘‘a reduction in the number 

of operators on a shift, a change in the maintenance 

contractor for the site, changing from 5-day 

operation to 7-day operation, or rotation of plant 

managers.’’ Guidelines for the Management of 

Change for Process Safety, CCPS. 11https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/

owadisp.show_document?p_

table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=28628. 

the PSM standard to require employers 

to evaluate updates to applicable 

RAGAGEP could help prevent or 

mitigate accidents like the October 6, 

2005, Formosa explosion, and increase 

worker protection in PSM-covered 

facilities. 

8. Clarifying the PSM Standard by 

Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP 

The term ‘‘recognized and generally 

accepted good engineering practices’’ 

(RAGAGEP) appears in paragraphs 

(d)(3)(ii) and (j)(4)(ii) of § 1910.119, but 

the PSM standard does not contain a 

definition for the term. For guidance 

purposes, OSHA’s Petroleum Refinery 

NEP directive (CPL 03–00–010) 

provides one example of a RAGAGEP 

definition from CCPS’s Guidelines for 

Mechanical Integrity Systems: 

Recognized And Generally Accepted Good 

Engineering Practices’’ (RAGAGEP)—are the 

basis for engineering, operation, or 

maintenance activities and are themselves 

based on established codes, standards, 

published technical reports or recommended 

practices (RP) or similar documents. 

RAGAGEPs detail generally approved ways 

to perform specific engineering, inspection or 

mechanical integrity activities, such as 

fabricating a vessel, inspecting a storage tank, 

or servicing a relief valve. 

Although the CCPS’s definition of 

RAGAGEP is not an official OSHA 

definition, it is consistent with OSHA’s 

intent when it promulgated the 

standard. In its PSM proposal, OSHA 

would have required employers to 

follow commonly accepted consensus 

standards and industry codes. 55 FR 

29150, 29155 (July 17, 1990). In 

promulgating the final rule, OSHA 

changed the requirement that employers 

comply with applicable published codes 

to the requirement that they comply 

with ‘‘recognized and generally 

accepted good engineering practices.’’ In 

making this change, OSHA explained 

that RAGAGEP would include codes 

and standards published by 

organizations such as NFPA, ASTM, 

and ANSI, as well as ‘‘appropriate 

internal standards.’’ 57 FR at 6390–91. 

OSHA made the change in response to 

comments expressing a number of 

concerns about the proposed language. 

These included comments about 

employers’ difficulties in obtaining 

relevant codes and standards, potential 

confusion on which codes were 

required by OSHA in a given situation, 

the possibility that codes and standards 

could become outdated, and the 

inability of employers to use more 

stringent internal standards. OSHA 

believed it was clear from the context of 

this change that it intended 

‘‘appropriate internal standards’’ to be 

those employers developed when 

published codes and standards were 

unavailable or outdated, or that were 

more stringent than published 

standards. 57 FR at 6390–91. However, 

OSHA did not include a definition of 

RAGAGEP in the standard itself. 

In this RFI, OSHA invites public 

comment on whether the Agency should 

clarify the PSM standard by including 

an explicit definition of RAGAGEP in 

§ 1910.119 to assist employers in 

complying. OSHA requests that 

commenters specify if the Agency 

should adopt the CCPS’s definition of 

RAGAGEP in § 1910.119, or any other 

appropriate definition, and whether 

inclusion of a definition would increase 

worker protection and enhance process 

safety. 

9. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph (j) 

of the PSM Standard To Cover the 

Mechanical Integrity of Any SafetyCritical Equipment 

Paragraph (j) of § 1910.119 requires 

employers to implement an ongoing 

mechanical-integrity program with 

respect to their PSM-covered processes. 

For processing, storing, or handling 

highly hazardous chemicals, employers 

must use equipment designed, 

constructed, installed, and maintained 

to minimize the risk of an uncontrolled 

release. Elements of an effective 

mechanical-integrity program include: 

Identifying and categorizing equipment 

and instrumentation; inspecting and 

testing their frequency; maintaining 

procedures; training maintenance 

personnel; having criteria for acceptable 

test results; documenting test and 

inspection results; and documenting 

manufacturer recommendations for 

equipment and instrumentation. 

Paragraph (j)(1) states that the 

mechanical-integrity requirements of 

the PSM standard apply to: Pressure 

vessels and storage tanks; piping 

systems (including piping components 

such as valves); relief and vent systems 

and devices; emergency shutdown 

systems; controls (including monitoring 

devices and sensors, alarms, and 

interlocks); and pumps. In the preamble 

to the PSM final rule, OSHA explained 

that ‘‘if an employer deems additional 

equipment to be critical to a particular 

process, that employer should consider 

that equipment to be covered by this 

paragraph and treat it accordingly’’ (57 

FR 6389, February 24, 1992). In light of 

the limited list of covered equipment in 

paragraph (j)(1), OSHA addresses 

hazards associated with other types of 

safety-critical equipment through 

citations for violations of Section 5(a)(1) 

of the OSH Act. 

Revising paragraph (j) to explicitly 

apply the mechanical-integrity 

requirements of the PSM standard to all 

equipment the employer identifies as 

critical to process safety-critical 

equipment, in addition to the 

equipment currently listed in the 

standard, would provide industry with 

proper notice regarding coverage of such 

equipment. OSHA invites comment on 

whether the addition of this provision to 

paragraph (j) will increase worker safety 

and whether any further clarifying 

revisions would be recommended to 

ease implementation. 

10. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the PSM 

Standard With an Explicit Requirement 

That Employers Manage Organizational 

Changes 

Paragraph (l) of § 1910.119 requires 

employers to establish and implement 

written procedures to manage change, 

including all modifications to 

equipment, technology, procedures, raw 

materials, and processing conditions 

other than replacements in kind. 

Temporary changes are subject to the 

management-of-change requirements of 

the standard. Employers must properly 

identify and review all PSM-covered 

changes before implementation. 

The existing standard does not 

explicitly state that employers must 

follow management-of-change 

procedures for organizational changes,10

such as changes in management 

structure, budget cuts, or personnel 

changes; however, as noted in a March 

31, 2009, Memorandum for Regional 

Administrators from Richard Fairfax,11

it is OSHA’s position that paragraph (l) 

covers organizational changes if the 

changes have the potential to affect 

process safety. Since the original 

promulgation of the PSM rule, it has 

become well established in the safety 

community that organizational changes 

can have a profound impact on worker 

safety and, therefore, employers should 

evaluate organizational change like any 

other change. Illustrating the significant 

hazards that organizational changes can 

produce, the CSB identified a lack of 

organizational management of change as 

a significant factor behind the 2005 BP 

Texas City Refinery accident that killed 

15 workers and injured over 170 others 

(CSB Report No. 2005–04–I–TX). OSHA 

invites comments on whether revising 

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12 Following the West, Texas facility explosion, 

OSHA and partner agencies EPA and ATF issued 

updated guidance on Ammonium Nitrate. See, 

Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and 

Management of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550–S– 

13–001, EPA, OSHA, and ATF, August, 2013. 

13 Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, 

CCPS. http://www.aiche.org/ccps. 

14United States of America Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration, BP Products North 

America Inc. Settlement Agreement, September 21, 

2005. 

15The U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention (USP) is a 

scientific nonprofit organization that sets standards 

for the identity, strength, quality, and purity of 

medicines, food ingredients, and dietary 

supplements manufactured, distributed and 

consumed worldwide. http://www.usp.org/aboutusp. 

16OSHA has no data showing an increase in 

accidents with this activity and is not seeking 

comment on changing this exclusion. 

paragraph (l) to clarify that the PSM 

standard’s organizational managementof-change requirements will increase 

worker safety. 

11. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Coordination of 

Emergency Planning With Local 

Emergency-Response Authorities 

Paragraph (n) of § 1910.119 requires 

employers to establish and implement 

an emergency-action plan in accordance 

with § 1910.38, OSHA’s Emergency 

Action Plans (EAP) standard, and to 

meet applicable requirements in 

paragraphs (a), (p), and (q) of 

§ 1910.120, the Agency’s Hazardous 

Waste Operations and Emergency 

Response (HAZWOPER) standard. 

While some OSHA standards, such as 

§ 1910.146, Permit-Required Confined 

Spaces, require employers to coordinate 

emergency planning with local 

emergency-response authorities, the 

existing PSM standard does not contain 

such a requirement. Existing §§ 1910.38 

and 1910.120 do not require 

coordination of emergency planning 

with outside parties if the employer 

chooses to evacuate employees from the 

danger area when an emergency occurs 

that does not permit employees to assist 

in handling the emergency. 

When emergency responders and 

other workers do not have adequate 

information or employer coordination 

about hazardous chemicals in a facility, 

they are at elevated risk of death and 

serious injury. On April 17, 2013, an 

ammonium nitrate explosion at the 

West Fertilizer Company storage and 

distribution facility in West, Texas, 

killed at least 15 people—the majority of 

whom were firefighters responding to a 

fire at the facility—and injured over 160 

others.12 OSHA believes that revising 

paragraph (n) of the PSM standard to 

require facilities to coordinate 

emergency planning with local 

emergency-response authorities could 

help prevent or mitigate similar 

accidents by allowing first responders to 

develop the appropriate strategies in 

advance of their arrival and seeks 

comment on the appropriate mechanism 

and corresponding language to 

incorporate such coordination 

requirements into paragraph (n). 

12. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Third-Party 

Compliance Audits 

Paragraph (o)(1) of § 1910.119 requires 

employers to audit the PSM program in 

their facilities for compliance every 

three years. Paragraph (o)(2) further 

requires that the audits ‘‘be conducted 

by at least one person knowledgeable in 

the process.’’ However, § 1910.119 does 

not require employers to use a third 

party in conducting the compliance 

audits. According to CCPS, ‘‘Third party 

auditors (typically, consulting 

companies who can provide 

experienced auditors) potentially 

provide the highest degree of 

objectivity.’’ 13

It is notable that BSEE’s Safety and 

Environmental Management Systems 

(SEMS) standard, 30 CFR 250, Subpart 

S, requires audits conducted by an 

independent third party, subject to 

approval by BSEE, or by designated and 

qualified personnel if the employer 

implements procedures to avoid 

conflicts of interest. In addition, BSEE’s 

SEMS II revisions to the standard 

require that, by June 4, 2015, the team 

lead for compliance audits must be 

independent and represent an 

accredited audit service provider. In the 

preamble to its SEMS II final rule, BSEE 

discussed its third-party-auditing 

requirements as follows: 

Consistent audits performed by well 

trained and experienced auditors are critical 

to ensuring that SEMS programs are 

successfully implemented and maintained on 

the OCS. As a result, we are adopting 

industry best practices related to SEMS 

audits and auditor qualifications. Industry is 

already voluntarily adopting these practices 

in many deepwater operations. We believe 

that the application of these requirements to 

all OCS operations will result in more robust 

and consistent SEMS audits. (78 FR 20430; 

04/05/2013.) 

In its investigation report on the 2005 

BP Texas City Refinery explosion, the 

CSB identified a lack of rigorous 

compliance audits as a contributing 

factor behind the accident. As the CSB 

noted in its report, the resulting 

settlement agreement 14 between OSHA 

and BP required BP to retain a thirdparty compliance auditor with PSM 

expertise, subject to approval by OSHA, 

to assess the company’s PSM program. 

OSHA is aware that third-party 

compliance auditors exist and are 

already utilized by some of the PSM 

regulated community. In the questions 

in this RFI, OSHA seeks comment on 

whether revising paragraph (o) of the 

PSM standard to require employers to 

use a qualified third party for 

compliance audits would increase 

worker protection through a more 

rigorous and objective PSM auditing 

process. 

OSHA is also seeking comment on 

increasing the required frequency of 

compliance audits. In addition, the 

Agency is seeking comment on 

requiring specific timeframes for 

responding to deficiencies found in the 

compliance audit process. 

13. Expanding the Requirements of 

§ 1910.109 To Cover Dismantling and 

Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, 

and Pyrotechnics 

Paragraph (k)(1) of § 1910.109 

provides that the standard applies to 

‘‘the manufacture, keeping, having, 

storage, sale, transportation, and use of 

explosives, blasting agents, and 

pyrotechnics,’’ and does not apply to 

the sale and use of fireworks or the use 

of explosives in the form prescribed by 

the U.S. Pharmacopeia.15 16 Although 

dismantling and disposing of explosives 

can be just as hazardous as the covered 

activities listed in paragraph (k), 

dismantling and disposal are not 

activities that the existing standard 

covers. 

On April 8, 2011, an accidental 

explosion in Waikele, Hawaii, killed 

five workers who were disposing of 

fireworks seized by the Federal 

Government as contraband. The 

workers, employed by contractor 

Donaldson Enterprises, Inc., were 

disassembling the firework tubes by 

hand and separating black powder and 

aerial shells into plastic-lined cardboard 

boxes, which they then soaked in diesel 

for burning. The CSB investigated the 

explosion and determined (CSB Report 

No. 2011–06–I–HI) that gaps in federal 

regulations—specifically with regard to 

dismantling and disposal of 

explosives—contributed to the accident. 

Hawaii administers its own state safety 

and health program approved under the 

OSH Act, and adopted the federal 

OSHA standards in their entirety. 

OSHA believes that expanding the 

scope of § 1910.109(k) to cover 

dismantling and disposal of explosives, 

blasting agents, and pyrotechnics, in the 

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17Applicable consensus standards may include, 

but are not limited to: NFPA 30, NFPA 30A, NFPA 

30B, NFPA 33. 

18Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, 

and Management of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550– 

S–13–001, published by EPA, OSHA, and ATF, 

August, 2013. 

19Texas City, Texas, Disaster, April 16, 17, 1947. 

Fire Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas, 

1947. 

workplace in addition to the activities 

covered under the existing standard, 

would prevent tragic accidents similar 

to the Hawaii accident. While the U.S. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives exercises jurisdiction 

over many aspects of the explosives 

industry through its Commerce in 

Explosives standard at 27 CFR Part 555, 

OSHA seeks comment on whether 

expanding the scope of 29 CFR 1910.109 

to address hazards associated with 

dismantling and disposal of explosives 

would lead to increased worker 

protection and whether ATF’s current 

regulations would make any revisions to 

OSHA’s regulations duplicative. 

14. Updating §§ 1910.106 and 1910.107 

Based on the Latest Applicable 

Consensus Standards 

OSHA is considering updating its 

Flammable Liquids standard and Spray 

Finishing standard. OSHA first 

published these standards in 1974 and 

based the requirements on NFPA 

consensus standards from the 1960s. 

The format and requirements of the 

standards are significantly out of date, 

and need updating based on the latest 

applicable consensus standards.17

OSHA seeks recommendations on 

updates that should be considered and 

comments on how such updates will 

lead to increased worker protection. 

15. Updating the Regulations 

Addressing the Storage, Handling, and 

Management of Ammonium Nitrate 

Industry manufactures millions of 

tons of ammonium nitrate annually in 

the United States. Consumers 

commonly use high-density ammonium 

nitrate in fertilizer and use low-density 

ammonium nitrate in making 

explosives. The NFPA assigns a 

reactivity rating of 3 (in a range of 0–4) 

to ammonium nitrate, which means that 

it is capable of detonation, explosive 

decomposition, or explosive reaction; 

ignition requires a strong initiating 

source or heating the substance under 

confinement. Stored ammonium nitrate 

is generally stable, but explosions of 

ammonium nitrate can be severe and 

have resulted in many injuries and 

fatalities. OSHA’s requirements for 

storage of ammonium nitrate are 

contained in § 1910.109, and are based 

on a 1970 NFPA consensus standard. 

As discussed earlier in this RFI, on 

April 17, 2013, an ammonium nitrate 

explosion at the West Fertilizer 

Company storage and distribution 

facility in West, Texas, killed at least 15 

people and injured over 160 others 

leading OSHA and its partner agencies 

EPA and ATF to issue an updated 

chemical advisory on the safe storage, 

handling, and management of 

ammonium nitrate.18 An ammonium 

nitrate explosion that occurred in Texas 

City, Texas, on April 16, 1947, was the 

deadliest industrial accident in United 

States history. In that case, the initial 

explosion of a ship carrying ammonium 

nitrate, and the subsequent chain 

reaction of fires and explosions in other 

ships and nearby oil-storage facilities, 

killed at least 581 people and injured 

thousands of others.19

In the questions in this RFI, OSHA 

invites comment on safe work practices 

for storing, handling, and managing 

ammonium nitrate. OSHA further seeks 

comment on how to update its 

regulatory requirements to improve its 

approach to preventing the hazards 

associated with ammonium nitrate. 

16. Changing Enforcement Policy of the 

PSM Exemption for Retail Facilities 

The PSM standard contains an 

exemption from coverage for retail 

facilities at 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i). 

Although the term ‘‘retail facility’’ is not 

defined, the Preamble to the Final PSM 

standard noted that chemicals in retail 

facilities are generally in small 

packages, containers, and allotments, 

and gives the example of gasoline 

stations as a type of facility that would 

typically qualify for the exemption. 57 

FR 6356, 6369 (February 24, 1992). 

Other Federal Government agencies 

have explicit definitions of retail 

facilities. In particular, the U.S. 

Department of Commerce, which is 

responsible for the development of the 

North American Industry Classification 

System (NAICS) that organizes 

businesses into specific industrial 

sectors for economic and statistical 

purposes, characterizes retail trade as 

follows: 

The Retail Trade sector comprises 

establishments engaged in retailing 

merchandise, generally without 

transformation, and rendering services 

incidental to the sale of merchandise. The 

retailing process is the final step in the 

distribution of merchandise; retailers are, 

therefore, organized to sell merchandise in 

small quantities to the general public. 

North American Industry Classification 

System Manual (‘‘NAICS Manual’’), 

Sector 44–45—Retail Trade. 

OSHA has stated that this NAICS 

Manual definition applies in 

interpreting the retail exemption. In a 

November 8, 1995, memo from 

Enforcement Programs director Richard 

Fairfax to Acting Region 10 

Administrator Richard S. Terrell, OSHA 

distinguished retail end users from 

wholesale end users: 

[T]he ‘‘retail facilities’’ exception is 

intended to apply to an establishment in the 

retail trade as delineated in the Standard 

Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual. With 

exceptions, retail trade establishments sell 

merchandise to the general public for 

personal or household consumption. On the 

other hand, wholesale trade establishments 

may sell similar merchandise for exclusive 

use by industry . . . Income derived from 

selling [merchandise] to industry may not be 

counted as ‘‘income obtained from direct 

sales to end users’’ for the purpose of 

qualifying for the ‘‘retail facilities’’ exception 

under paragraph 1910.119(a)(2)(i). 

Notwithstanding this general 

statement, OSHA has also issued letters 

saying that a facility that is primarily 

engaged in selling anhydrous ammonia 

product to farmers (a wholesale 

operation under the NAICS definition) 

could qualify for the § 1910.119(a)(2)(i) 

retail-facilities exemption. For example, 

the January 26, 2001 letter from Richard 

Fairfax to J.D. Varn III of Varnco, Inc. 

which states that a facility selling 75% 

of its anhydrous ammonia to farmers 

qualifies for the retail exemption 

because the farmers were the ‘‘end 

users’’ of the product. 

Applying the retail-facility exemption 

in this way is inconsistent with the 

normal meaning of ‘‘retail’’ and the 

preamble’s explanation of the purpose 

of the exemption. As stated in the 

preamble, OSHA chose to exclude retail 

facilities from PSM coverage because 

the limited container, package, or 

allotment sizes of the chemicals 

typically found at these facilities do not 

present the same safety hazards as those 

encountered at establishments working 

with large, bulk quantities of materials. 

Facilities selling large or bulk quantities 

of materials would typically fall into 

Sector 42—Wholesale Trade of the 

NAICS system, which includes facilities 

that sell or arrange the purchase or sale 

of raw and intermediate materials and 

supplies used in production. As a result 

of increased workplace hazards 

associated with large, bulk quantities of 

highly hazardous chemicals, OSHA 

believes that only retail-trade facilities 

listed in NAICS sectors 44 and 45 that 

sell highly hazardous chemicals in 

small containers, packages, or 

allotments to the general public qualify 

for the retail-facilities exemption in 29 

CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i). 

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20 General Guidance On Risk Management 

Programs For Chemical Accident Prevention (40 

CFR Part 68); EPA 555–B–04–001; U.S. EPA; March 

2009. 

In light of OSHA’s inconsistent 

statements on the application of the 

retail exemption, the Agency is inviting 

comment on what the exemption should 

cover and whether OSHA’s current 

enforcement policy adequately 

addresses workplace hazards associated 

with these facilities. 

17. Changing Enforcement Policy for 

Highly Hazardous Chemicals Listed in 

Appendix A of the PSM Standard 

Without Specific Concentrations 

Appendix A of the PSM standard lists 

highly hazardous chemicals and 

threshold quantities that must be met to 

establish PSM coverage. Although 

Appendix A provides specific 

concentrations for 11 of its listed 

chemicals, the standard is silent on 

concentrations for the remaining 126 

listed chemicals. For example, 

Appendix A lists hydrogen peroxide at 

concentrations of 52% by weight or 

greater, but the appendix does not 

provide a specific concentration for 

hydroxylamine. OSHA has issued 

interpretation letters taking a variety of 

positions regarding coverage of 

chemicals that have no listed 

concentration. Under one such 

approach, OSHA considers PSM 

coverage to apply if threshold quantities 

of such chemicals are present at 

commercial grade. As noted in a 1994 

Letter of Interpretation from Compliance 

Programs Deputy Direction H. Berrien 

Zettler to Mr. Luc Hamelin of IVACO, 

Inc., OSHA defined commercial grade to 

mean ‘‘a typical maximum 

concentration of the chemical that is 

commercially available and shipped.’’ 

The letter added that, to determine 

commercial grade concentrations, an 

employer may refer to any published 

catalogue of chemicals for commercial 

sales. 

In 1999, an explosion at Concept 

Sciences, Inc. in Allentown, 

Pennsylvania, killed five people as the 

company was attempting to produce 

concentrated hydroxylamine. A U.S. 

District Court dismissed a subsequent 

criminal indictment related to this 

incident based on inconsistencies in 

OSHA’s statements regarding coverage 

of hydroxylamine. The Court pointed 

out that the PSM standard is ambiguous 

with respect to concentrations of 

Appendix A chemicals. It concluded 

that in light of a series of OSHA letters 

that were themselves inconsistent, no 

reasonable person in the defendant’s 

position could determine how a 

chemical is covered by the standard. 

U.S. v. Ward, 21 BNA OSHC 1882, 1884 

(2001). In light of this, OSHA believes 

it is important to issue a clear and 

authoritative statement about PSM 

coverage of chemicals for which 

Appendix A does not include a specific 

concentration. 

With respect to the commercial grade 

approach, OSHA also realizes that it is 

difficult to determine the maximum 

commercial grade of many of the highly 

hazardous chemicals listed in Appendix 

A. In addition, the maximum 

commercial grade of a chemical may 

change over time due to technological 

innovation or changes in industry. 

Furthermore, even where the 

concentration of a PSM-listed highly 

hazardous chemical falls below the 

correctly determined maximum 

commercial grade, the chemical may 

still present a hazard because 

substances in a mixture retain their 

original properties. For example, a 

solution of any concentration of 

hydroxylamine can form pure 

hydroxylamine crystals, which can 

rapidly decompose and cause fires or 

explosions. 

An interpretative approach that is 

consistent with the regulatory language 

and that addresses this concern is the 

approach currently used by EPA under 

the Risk Management Program (RMP). 

Similar to OSHA’s list of highly 

hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of 

the PSM standard, the EPA RMP 

provides a list of toxic substances in 40 

CFR 68, Appendix A—Table of Toxic 

Endpoints. However, in contrast to 

OSHA’s ‘‘commercial grade’’ policy for 

PSM-listed chemicals, EPA considers a 

mixture containing an RMP-listed 

substance to be covered if the 

concentration is greater than one 

percent and the calculated weight of the 

substance in the mixture is greater than 

the threshold quantity.20 With a few 

exceptions, this rule does not apply in 

cases where the operator can 

demonstrate that the partial pressure of 

the substance in the mixture is less than 

10 mmHg. 

OSHA invites comment on whether it 

should adopt the EPA’s policy for RMPlisted substances as a simpler and more 

practical approach to addressing 

hazards associated with Appendix A 

chemicals that do not have listed 

concentrations. If OSHA adopts this 

policy, the Agency would consider a 

PSM-listed chemical in a mixture to be 

covered if the concentration of the 

chemical were greater than one percent 

and the calculated weight of the 

chemical in the mixture were greater 

than the threshold quantity. OSHA 

believes this represents a more practical, 

consistent, and straightforward 

approach to coverage of Appendix A 

chemicals under the PSM standard. 

D. Effects of Possible Regulatory and 

Policy Changes 

As part of this RFI, the Agency is 

requesting data and information on the 

potential economic impacts of each 

option. OSHA requests that commenters 

discuss potential economic impacts, 

whenever possible, in terms of 

quantitative benefits (e.g., reductions in 

injuries, fatalities, and property 

damage), costs (e.g., compliance costs or 

decreases in production), and offsets to 

costs (e.g., less need for maintenance 

and repairs) when responding to the 

questions in this RFI. OSHA also 

requests that commenters provide data 

and information on economic effects 

that the options may have on market 

conditions or services (e.g., market 

structure and concentration). In 

addition, OSHA invites public comment 

on unintended consequences and 

consistencies or inconsistences with 

other policies or regulatory programs. 

OSHA requests that commenters 

discuss economic impacts in as specific 

terms as possible. For example, if a 

rulemaking or policy change would 

necessitate additional employee 

training, then helpful information 

would include the following: the 

training courses necessary; the types of 

employees who would receive the 

training; the length and frequency of the 

courses; topics covered; any retraining 

necessary; and the training costs if 

conducted by a third-party vendor or inhouse trainer. The Agency invites 

comment on the time and level of 

expertise required to implement 

potential changes discussed in this RFI, 

even if dollar-cost estimates are not 

available. For discussion of equipmentrelated costs, OSHA requests that 

commenters estimate relevant factors 

such as purchase price, cost of 

installation, cost of equipment 

maintenance, cost of training, and 

expected life of the equipment. 

E. Impacts on Small Entities 

The Agency would like to determine 

whether the options in this RFI will 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. If 

the options have such impacts, then 

under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 

U.S.C. §§ 601–612, OSHA must, if it 

engages in rulemaking, develop a 

regulatory flexibility analysis and 

assemble a Small Business Advocacy 

Review Panel before publishing a 

proposal. Regardless of the economic 

impacts, OSHA seeks ways of 

minimizing burdens on small entities 

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21The definition of ‘‘reactive hazard substance 

(RHS) mixture’’ in the TCPA references a list of 

chemical functional groups specified in N.J.A.C. 

7:31–6.3(a), Table I, Part D, Group II. Whether any 

of the chemical functional groups are present 

determines, in part, coverage of an RHS mixture 

under the TCPA. 

consistent with OSHA’s statutory and 

regulatory requirements and objectives. 

The Agency requests that, when 

responding to the questions in this RFI, 

commenters discuss any special 

circumstances related to small entities, 

such as potential market-structure 

disruptions or uniquely high costs that 

small entities may bear. 

II. Request for Data, Information, and 

Comments 

OSHA is providing the following 

questions to collect data, information, 

and comments on the options discussed 

in this RFI. The Agency invites the 

public to respond to any questions for 

which they have specific knowledge, 

data, or information, regardless of their 

involvement in PSM-covered 

operations. 

OSHA would appreciate detailed 

responses to the following questions. 

When responding, please reference the 

specific question number to which you 

are responding. 

A. General Information 

1. To assist in classifying comments, 

please provide information on the 

workplace (or industry) about which 

you are commenting, including the type 

of facility, NAICS code (if available), 

number of employees, types and 

volumes of chemicals handled, when 

the facility began operation, and other 

relevant information. 

2. If you are commenting about a 

specific workplace or industry, does the 

workplace or industry conduct 

operations covered by the PSM 

standard? Please explain. 

B. Clarifying the PSM Exemption for 

Atmospheric Storage Tanks 

3. Does your facility have any 

atmospheric storage tanks that are 

exempt from PSM coverage under 

§ 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B)? If so, what facts 

led you to conclude that the exemption 

applies, and do you treat the exempted 

tanks as if they were PSM-covered for 

safety or other reasons? Please explain. 

4. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents related to flammable liquids 

stored in atmospheric tanks exempted 

from PSM coverage under 

§ 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B). 

5. Would limiting the 

§ 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption to 

apply only to flammable liquids stored 

in terminals and tank farms prevent 

worker injuries and fatalities? What 

would be the economic impacts of 

limiting the exemption in this way (e.g., 

costs and benefits of extending PSM 

coverage to additional types of tanks)? 

Are there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider with respect to this 

option? 

6. Should OSHA limit the 

§ 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption to 

apply only to specific NAICS codes? If 

so, which NAICS codes should OSHA 

exempt? 

7. Should the § 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) 

exemption apply only to ‘‘storage 

tanks,’’ such that ‘‘process tanks’’ are 

explicitly covered under PSM? If so, 

how should OSHA define the terms 

‘‘storage tanks’’ and ‘‘process tanks’’? 

What would be the economic impacts of 

limiting the exemption in this way? Are 

there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider with respect to this 

option? 

8. Are there any other options related 

to the § 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption 

of flammable liquids stored in 

atmospheric tanks that OSHA should 

consider to prevent worker injuries and 

fatalities? If so, what would be the 

economic impacts of the option(s), and 

are there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider with respect to the 

option(s)? 

C. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and 

Servicing 

9. Does your facility conduct oil- and 

gas-well drilling or servicing operations 

not covered under § 1910.119? If so, do 

you treat these activities as covered by 

the PSM standard for safety or other 

reasons? Are the activities covered 

under other federal or state regulations? 

Please explain. 

10. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving oil-and gas-well 

drilling or servicing operations. 

11. Would removing the 

§ 1910.119(a)(2)(ii) exemption for oiland gas-well drilling and servicing 

operations prevent worker injuries and 

fatalities? What would be the economic 

impact of removing the exemption? Are 

there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider with respect to this 

option? 

D. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities 

12. Does your facility conduct oil- and 

gas-production operations for which 

OSHA is not currently enforcing PSM 

requirements? If so, do you follow PSM 

requirements for these operations for 

safety or other reasons? Are the 

activities covered under other federal or 

state regulations? Please explain. 

13. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving oil- and gasproduction facilities. 

14. What would be the economic 

impact of resuming enforcement of the 

PSM standard for oil- and gasproduction facilities? Are there any 

special circumstances involving small 

entities that OSHA should consider 

with respect to this option? 

E. Expanding PSM Coverage and 

Requirements for Reactivity Hazards 

15. What are the best criteria to use in 

classifying reactive hazards? What do 

you consider to be a reactive chemical? 

What do you consider to be a reactive 

mixture? 

16. Do you consider some reactive 

hazards to be outside coverage of the 

existing PSM standard? If so, please 

describe these hazards. 

17. Should OSHA add reactive 

chemicals to the list of PSM-covered 

chemicals in Appendix A of § 1910.119? 

If so, which reactive chemicals? 

18. If your facility is in New Jersey 

and covered by the New Jersey TCPA, 

has the TCPA been effective in 

protecting New Jersey workers from 

reactive hazards? Please describe any 

economic impacts associated with 

TCPA coverage (e.g., costs and benefits, 

cost savings, shifts in usage of reactive 

chemicals, special circumstances 

involving small entities, etc.). 

19. Should OSHA revise the PSM 

standard to use chemical functional 

groups similar to those in the TCPA 21

to define hazardous reactive mixtures? If 

so, which chemical functional groups 

should OSHA use? 

20. Does your facility follow NFPA 

400 for reactive hazards? If so, please 

describe the economic impacts 

associated with following NFPA 400 

(e.g., cost of additional equipment, cost 

of additional training, benefits of quality 

management, special circumstances 

involving small entities, etc.). Is 

following NFPA 400 an effective way of 

protecting workers from reactive 

hazards? Please explain. 

21. Has your facility implemented a 

reactive-hazards management program 

other than a program specified by the 

TCPA and NFPA 400? If so, please 

describe your facility’s program, 

whether it protects worker more or less 

than the TCPA and NFPA 400, any 

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economic impacts associated with the 

program, and any special circumstances 

involving small entities. 

22. What specific regulatory 

approach, if any, should OSHA use to 

comprehensively address reactive 

hazards, what would be the economic 

impacts of this approach, and would 

there be any special circumstances 

involving small entities? Are there 

specific requirements that OSHA should 

add to the PSM standard to ensure that 

employers adequately manage reactive 

hazards? 

23. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving reactive hazards not 

covered under the existing PSM 

standard. Would reactive-hazards 

management requirements in PSM have 

prevented the incidents? 

F. Updating the List of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of 

the PSM Standard 

24. What chemicals, if any, should 

OSHA add to the list of highly 

hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of 

§ 1910.119 to prevent worker injuries 

and fatalities? Please provide any 

sources, data, or incident examples 

related to the hazards associated with 

the chemicals. What would be the 

economic impacts of adding the 

chemicals to Appendix A? Are there any 

special circumstances involving small 

entities that OSHA should consider 

with respect to adding the chemicals to 

Appendix A? 

25. How often should OSHA update 

the list of highly hazardous chemicals in 

Appendix A of § 1910.119? 

26. Is there a method, other than 

periodically updating the list of highly 

hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of 

§ 1910.119 through rulemaking, that 

OSHA should use to prevent worker 

injuries and fatalities? Please explain. 

G. Revising the PSM Standard To 

Require Additional Management-System 

Elements 

27. Does your facility follow any 

management-system elements not 

required under § 1910.119 for PSMcovered operations? If so, please 

describe the additional managementsystem elements, the safety benefits, any 

economic impacts associated with 

following the elements, and any special 

circumstances involving small entities. 

28. Would expanding the scope of the 

PSM standard to require additional 

management-system elements, or 

expanding the scope of existing PSM 

management-system elements, prevent 

worker injuries and fatalities? If so, 

please describe the elements, the safety 

benefits, any economic impacts 

associated with expanding the scope of 

the PSM standard in this way, and any 

special circumstances involving small 

entities that OSHA should consider. 

29. In systems using management and 

metrics, how do facilities develop useful 

leading indicators? Should the PSM 

standard require facilities to share these 

indicators with employees or OSHA? 

30. Would expansion of the PSM 

standard’s employee participation 

provision to include requirements such 

as the SEMS stop-work authority, or 

other efforts to involve employees in all 

management-system elements, prevent 

worker injuries and fatalities? 

31. Are there any other managementsystem elements in the existing PSM 

standard that OSHA should expand 

with additional requirements (e.g., a 

new requirement that employers 

perform a root-cause analysis for 

incidents under § 1910.119(m))? If so, 

please describe the additional 

requirements, the safety benefits, any 

economic impacts associated with 

expanding the PSM elements in this 

way, and any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider. 

32. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents that the employer could have 

prevented by following managementsystem elements not required under the 

existing PSM standard. 

H. Amending Paragraph (d) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Evaluation of 

Updates to Applicable RAGAGEP 

33. From what sources (e.g., codes, 

standards, published technical reports, 

consensus standards) does your facility 

select applicable RAGAGEP for 

operations covered under the PSM 

standard? 

34. Does your facility evaluate 

updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If so, 

how does your facility monitor any 

updates, and how often do you evaluate 

them? 

35. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving failure to evaluate 

updates to applicable RAGAGEP for 

PSM-covered operations. 

36. What would be an appropriate 

time period in which to conduct this 

evaluation? Would such a requirement 

be more appropriate in another 

paragraph of the PSM standard? For 

example, should such a requirement 

become part of the Process Hazard 

Analysis revalidation requirements at 29 

CFR 1910.119(e)(5)? 

37. Would requiring employers to 

evaluate updates to applicable 

RAGAGEP prevent worker injuries and 

fatalities? Is there another approach that 

can be used to ensure the incorporation 

of RAGAGEP into facility operations 

that is tangible and documentable? 

What would be the economic impacts of 

this requirement? Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to this option? 

I. Clarifying the PSM Standard by 

Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP 

38. What does your facility use as a 

definition for RAGAGEP? 

39. Would adding a definition for 

RAGAGEP to the PSM standard improve 

understanding of PSM requirements and 

prevent worker injuries and fatalities? If 

so, what specific definition for 

RAGAGEP should OSHA add to the 

PSM standard? What would be the 

economic impacts of adding such a 

definition? Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to this option? 

40. What criteria does your facility 

use to develop appropriate internal 

standards? For instance, if there is an 

applicable consensus standard, what 

steps do you take to ensure that your 

internal standards are at least as 

protective as the applicable standard? 

J. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph (j) 

To Cover the Mechanical Integrity of 

Any Safety-Critical Equipment 

41. Does your facility have any 

equipment not covered under 

§ 1910.119(j) that is critical to process 

safety? If so, what type(s) of equipment? 

Did you identify the equipment as 

safety-critical through a PSM process 

hazard analysis? How did your facility 

determine that the equipment was 

safety-critical, and does your facility 

treat the equipment as if it were PSM 

covered for safety or other reasons? 

Please explain. 

42. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents related to the mechanical 

integrity of safety-critical equipment not 

covered under § 1910.119(j). 

43. Would expanding the scope of 

§ 1910.119(j) to cover the mechanical 

integrity of all equipment the employer 

identifies as critical to process safety, in 

addition to the equipment listed in 

existing § 1910.119(j), prevent worker 

injuries and fatalities? What would be 

the economic impact of expanding the 

scope of § 1910.119(j) in this way? Are 

there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

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should consider with respect to this 

option? 

K. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the PSM 

Standard With an Explicit Requirement 

That Employers Manage Organizational 

Changes 

44. What do you consider to be an 

organizational change within the 

context of process safety management 

practices? For example, would you 

consider the following, or similar, 

changes to be organizational changes: 

reducing the number of operators in a 

shift; changing from 5-day to 7-day 

operations; changing from 8-hour to 12- 

hour operator shifts; replacing a unit 

manager; relocating a technical group to 

a remote corporate location; or changing 

a supervisory or compensation 

structure? 

45. If your facility has established and 

implemented written procedures for 

management of organizational changes, 

please describe any economic impacts 

associated with the procedures. 

46. Would clarifying § 1910.119(l) 

with an explicit requirement that 

employers manage organizational 

changes prevent worker injuries and 

fatalities? What would be the economic 

impact of such a clarification? Are there 

any special circumstances involving 

small entities that OSHA should 

consider with respect to this option? 

47. Please describe any organizational 

changes made in your facility or 

organization that have had the potential 

to affect process operations. Were 

management-of-change procedures 

followed before making the changes? 

48. What do you consider to be the 

best safety practices concerning 

management of organizational change? 

49. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving the failure to 

manage organizational change. Would 

following management-of-change 

procedures under § 1910.119(l) prevent 

these incidents? 

L. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Coordination of 

Emergency Planning With Local 

Emergency-Response Authorities 

50. Does your facility provide 

information to, or coordinate emergency 

planning with, local emergencyresponse authorities? If so, please 

explain any special circumstances that 

necessitated the information sharing or 

coordination of emergency planning. 

51. If OSHA proposes a regulatory 

amendment to require coordination, 

what types of information should OSHA 

require PSM-covered facilities to 

provide to local emergency-response 

authorities? For example, should OSHA 

require employers to provide safety data 

sheets for all on-site chemicals, list the 

quantities of chemicals, list the location 

of chemicals, provide block-flow 

diagrams, list fire-mitigation systems 

present, or report known fire and 

explosion risks in the facility? What 

would be the economic impact of 

requiring employers to provide such 

information? Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to this option? What would be the cost 

to emergency-response authorities of 

coordinating emergency planning with 

PSM-covered employers? 

52. What, if any, steps should OSHA 

require PSM-covered facilities to take in 

coordinating emergency planning with 

local emergency-response authorities? 

What additional benefits would accrue 

from requiring training exercises in 

addition to information sharing? What 

would be the economic impact of such 

requirements, and would there be any 

special circumstances involving small 

entities or security concerns that OSHA 

should consider? 

53. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents related to local emergency 

response authorities responding to a 

PSM-covered facility without adequate 

information on the chemicals present. 

M. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM 

Standard To Require Third-Party 

Compliance Audits 

54. Does your facility use a third party 

for conducting compliance audits under 

§ 1910.119(o) for safety or other reasons? 

Please explain. 

55. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents that could have been 

prevented or minimized by more 

effective compliance audits conducted 

for operations covered under 

§ 1910.119(o). Were the ineffective 

compliance audits conducted by inhouse staff or a third party? 

56. Would revising § 1910.119(o) to 

require employers to use a third party 

for compliance audits prevent worker 

injuries and fatalities? What would be 

the economic impacts of revising 

§ 1910.119(o) in this way (e.g., typical 

consultant fees, additional work hours 

required, special circumstances 

involving small entities, etc.)? 

57. Should OSHA revise § 1910.119(o) 

to require employers to use compliance 

auditors (internal or third party) with 

certain minimum credentials or 

certifications? If so, what minimum 

credentials or certifications should the 

Agency require? What burden might this 

place on small businesses? 

58. Should OSHA revise 

§ 1910.119(o)(1) to require a compliance 

audit frequency less than every three 

years? 

59. Would revising § 1910.119(o) to 

require employers to respond to 

deficiencies found in the compliance 

audit within certain timeframes prevent 

worker injuries and fatalities? What 

would you consider to be an appropriate 

timeframe? 

N. Expanding the Requirements of 

§ 1910.109 To Cover Dismantling and 

Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, 

and Pyrotechnics 

60. Does your facility conduct 

explosives dismantling or disposal 

activities not covered under § 1910.109? 

If so, do you treat these activities as 

covered under § 1910.109 for safety or 

other reasons? Please explain. 

61. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving dismantling or 

disposal of explosives, blasting agents, 

and pyrotechnics. Would coverage of 

these dismantling and disposal 

activities under § 1910.109 prevent such 

incidents from occurring? 

62. Are your operations currently 

covered under regulations issued by 

ATF? Are there specific areas of 

workplace safety that are not covered by 

ATF that should be considered by 

OSHA? Is there overlap or 

inconsistencies between the 

Requirements of § 1910.109 and ATF 

regulations that would need to be 

addressed before an expansion would be 

recommended? 

63. What would be the economic 

impacts if OSHA expanded the scope of 

§ 1910.109 to cover the dismantling and 

disposal of explosives, blasting agents, 

and pyrotechnics? Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to this option? 

O. Updating §§ 1910.106 and 1910.107 

Based on the Latest Applicable 

Consensus Standards 

64. Is your facility covered by 

§§ 1910.106 or 1910.107? If so, what are 

the operations covered by the 

standard(s)? 

65. Are there other federal, state, or 

local requirements that cover flammable 

liquids or spray finishing operations in 

your facility? If so, do the requirements 

protect workers more or less than 

§§ 1910.106 and 1910.107? Please 

explain. 

66. Does your facility follow NFPA 

30, 30A, or 30B for flammable liquids, 

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or NFPA 33 for spray-finishing 

operations? If so, which edition(s)? Are 

there any other consensus standards 

applicable to flammable liquids or 

spray-finishing operations that your 

facility follows? 

67. On which standards (e.g., 

consensus, federal, state, local) were the 

design and operation of your facility 

primarily based? 

68. Should OSHA replace §§ 1910.106 

and 1910.107 with the latest editions of 

NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, and 33? If so, 

should OSHA replace §§ 1910.106 and 

1910.107 entirely or only in part? What 

would be the economic impacts of these 

options (e.g., cost of additional 

equipment, cost of additional training, 

benefits of quality management, special 

circumstances involving small entities, 

etc.)? 

69. Are there gaps in safety coverage 

in §§ 1910.106 or 1910.107? If so, what 

are the gaps, would NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, 

and 33 address the gaps, and what 

would be the economic impacts of 

addressing the gaps through 

rulemaking? Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to addressing the gaps through 

rulemaking? 

70. Are there any requirements in 

§§ 1910.106 and 1910.107 that prevent 

worker injuries and fatalities better than 

the safety practices in the latest editions 

of NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, and 33? If so, 

which requirements? 

71. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving gaps in safety 

coverage in §§ 1910.106 or 1910.107. 

72. Are the § 1910.106 provisions 

related to facility types (e.g., bulk plant, 

chemical plant, distillery) a useful 

classification system? If not, what type 

of a classification system should the 

standard use instead? Please explain. 

73. If OSHA updates § 1910.106 and 

1910.107 through rulemaking, what 

revisions to the scope and application of 

the standards would provide the best 

protection to workers? 

P. Updating the Regulations Addressing 

the Storage, Handling, and Management 

of Ammonium Nitrate 

74. Does your facility store, handle, or 

manage ammonium nitrate? If so, in 

what form (e.g., solid, liquid) and in 

what grade (e.g., high density, low 

density) is the ammonium nitrate? 

Please explain. 

75. Does your facility comply with 

§ 1910.109(i) for the storage of 

ammonium nitrate? Are there any other 

standards, including consensus 

standards, applicable to ammonium 

nitrate storage, handling, and 

management that your facility follows? 

If so, which ones? 

76. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving the storage, 

handling, and management of 

ammonium nitrate. 

77. How can OSHA update its 

standards and improve its enforcement 

policy relating to the storage, handling, 

and management of ammonium nitrate 

to prevent worker injuries and fatalities? 

Please discuss the economic impacts 

associated with such improvement, 

including any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider. 

Q. Changing Enforcement Policy for the 

PSM Exemption for Retail Facilities 

78. Does your facility qualify for the 

PSM exemption for ‘‘retail facilities’’ 

under OSHA’s current enforcement 

policy? If so, would changing OSHA’s 

enforcement policy to only exempt 

facilities in NAICS sectors 44 and 45 

that sell highly hazardous chemicals in 

small containers, packages, or 

allotments to the general public result in 

PSM coverage for your facility? 

79. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving highly hazardous 

chemicals at ‘‘retail facilities’’ exempt 

from PSM coverage under 

§ 1910.119(a)(2)(i). 

80. Please discuss any economic 

impacts that would result from changing 

OSHA’s retail-facilities policy to only 

exempt facilities in NAICS sectors 44 

and 45 that sell highly hazardous 

chemicals in small containers, packages, 

or allotments to the general public. Are 

there any special circumstances 

involving small entities that OSHA 

should consider with respect to this 

option? 

81. Is there a definition of ‘‘retail 

facilities’’ that OSHA should use to 

protect workers under the PSM 

standard? Please discuss any economic 

impacts associated with your suggested 

definition. Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to your or other definitions? 

R. Changing Enforcement Policy for 

Highly Hazardous Chemicals Listed in 

Appendix A of the PSM Standard 

Without Specific Concentrations 

82. Does your facility handle any 

chemicals excluded from PSM coverage 

on the basis that the concentration is 

below the ‘‘maximum commercial 

grade’’? If so, what are these chemicals 

and concentrations, and would OSHA 

adopting EPA’s policy for RMP-listed 

chemicals in mixtures as OSHA’s 

enforcement policy for PSM-listed 

chemicals without specific 

concentrations result in PSM coverage 

of the chemicals in your facility? 

83. Please provide any data or 

information on workplace accidents, 

near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents involving highly hazardous 

chemicals excluded from PSM coverage 

on the basis that that the concentration 

was below the ‘‘maximum commercial 

grade.’’ 

84. Please discuss any economic 

impacts that would result from OSHA 

adopting EPA’s policy for RMP-listed 

chemicals in mixtures as OSHA’s 

enforcement policy for PSM-listed 

chemicals without specific 

concentrations. Are there any special 

circumstances involving small entities 

that OSHA should consider with respect 

to this option? 

85. Is there a different enforcement 

policy that OSHA should use to protect 

workers from the hazards associated 

with the chemicals listed in Appendix 

A of the PSM standard without specific 

concentrations? Please discuss any 

economic impacts associated with your 

suggested enforcement policy. Are there 

any special circumstances involving 

small entities that OSHA should 

consider with respect to your suggested 

enforcement policy? 

Authority and Signature 

David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for 

Occupational Safety and Health, 

authorized the preparation of this notice 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, and 657, 

Secretary’s Order 1–2012 (77 FR 3912; 

Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR part 1911. 

David Michaels, 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 

Safety and Health. 

[FR Doc. 2013–29197 Filed 12–6–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 

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