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37–535 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–25]

INTEGRATED NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS

FOR FUTURE NAVAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

MARCH 1, 2007

(II)

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

KEN CALVERT, California

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 1, 2007, Integrated Nuclear Power Systems for Future

Naval Surface Combatants .................................................................................. 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 1, 2007 ........................................................................................ 33

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2007

INTEGRATED NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS FOR FUTURE NAVAL

SURFACE COMBATANTS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member,

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 1

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Etter, Hon. Dr. Delores M., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition); Adm. Kirkland H. Donald, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, U.S. Navy; Vice Adm. Paul E. Sullivan, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Navy; Vice Adm. Jonathan

W. Greenert, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities

and Resources, U.S. Navy; and Rear Adm. Barry J. McCullough, Director

of Surface Warfare, U.S. Navy beginning on ..................................................... 2

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 37

Donald, Adm. Kirkland H. ............................................................................... 40

Etter, Hon. Dr. Delores M., joint with Vice Adm. Paul E. Sullivan, Vice

Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, and Rear Adm. Barry J. McCullough ........ 55

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Sestak ......................................................................................................... 73

(1)

INTEGRATED NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS FOR FUTURE

NAVAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. TAYLOR. Good afternoon.

I want to welcome our witnesses.

Captain Ebbs has done a magnificent job of preparing my opening statement. Since we are scheduled for votes in a half-hour, I

am going to forego mine so we get a chance to go straight to our

witnesses.

We want to welcome the Honorable Delores Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Admiral Kirk Donald, Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program; Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan, Commander, Naval Sea Systems

Command; Vice Admiral Jonathon Greenert, Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations for Integration and Capability and Resources; and Rear

Admiral Barry McCullough, Director of the Surface Warfare Division.

Again, I am going to forego my opening statement because we

want to hear from you. I am going to yield now to my ranking

member, the great and wise Roscoe Bartlett.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous consent

to submit my statement for the record.

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I am happy you are here and look forward to your testimony.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, given that we have about 25 minutes, and

I am looking at five very smart people, Secretary Etter, would you

like to begin?

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STATEMENT OF HON. DR. DELORES M. ETTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION); ADM. KIRKLAND H. DONALD, DIRECTOR, NAVAL

NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY; VICE ADM.

JONATHAN W. GREENERT, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES,

U.S. NAVY; VICE ADM. PAUL E. SULLIVAN, COMMANDER,

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY; REAR ADM.

BARRY J. MCCULLOUGH, DIRECTOR OF SURFACE WARFARE,

U.S. NAVY

STATEMENT OF HON. DR. DELORES M. ETTER

Secretary ETTER. Thank you.

Chairman Taylor, Mr. Bartlett, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to

discuss the topic of the potential use of integrated nuclear power

systems for future naval surface combatants.

On behalf of myself and the others joining me, I would like to

submit our written testimony for the record. Admiral Donald will

have a separate statement to make.

I would like to begin by thanking the subcommittee for its keen

interest in this topic. Next, I want to assure you that the Navy

takes very seriously the strategic implications of the consideration

of nuclear power for future ship platforms, which include operational effectiveness for our Navy and joint forces, and at the national level, the issue of fossil fuel demand.

As Admiral Donald will point out, our nuclear fleet of aircraft

carriers and submarines has demonstrated significant operational

flexibility in responding to the nation’s needs. The advantages of

nuclear power are a key factor included in the analysis of future

platforms. However, the selection of a power plant for new ships

must consider a wide range of issues. These issues include design

factors for individual platforms, including performance and acquisition and life-cycle costs.

A platform decision must also be made in the larger context of

overall force structure requirements, and of Navy-wide acquisition

issues, including shipbuilding and the capabilities and capacity of

our shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy recently submitted to

Congress a report on alternative propulsion methods for surface

combatants and amphibious warships. This comprehensive report

addressed multiple ship and propulsion system concepts, including

nuclear power, evaluating them on the basis of life-cycle costs and

operational effectiveness.

In particular, the study determined the break-even points based

on the price of crude oil when nuclear propulsion alternatives become cost-effective over the life-cycle, as compared to fossil-fueled

alternatives. There were some very interesting conclusions.

First, the study confirmed that because nuclear ships can travel

at high speeds for long periods without refueling, they can surge

to theater quickly and spend more continuous time on-station after

arriving. The study also drew several important conclusions when

considering acquisition and life-cycle costs. I would like to discuss

these in terms of costs to build the ship and power demand of the

ship.

3

First, nuclear ships have overall lower operating and support

costs because of their fuel independence, but are more expensive to

build. The study found that this procurement premium ranged

from between $600 million and $800 million per ship for the fifth

ship of a class.

Also, when focusing on the life-cycle costs or the break-even point

aspect of a ship power decision, it was clear that the energy requirements of a ship, not its physical size, as one might imagine,

are the major driver in the selection of power systems. These energy requirements are dependent on the power demand of the combat system and also on how much time the ship will spend at sea,

and at what speeds.

Based on these projected energy demands, the life-cycle break- even points for small surface combatants ranged from $210 per

barrel to $670 per barrel, and for amphibious ships ranged from

$210 per barrel to $290 per barrel. Consequently, life-cycle cost

savings alone are unlikely to drive selection of nuclear power for

these ships.

However, for medium surface combatants, with their anticipated

high-combat system energy demands, this break-even point is between $70 per barrel and $225 per barrel. This indicates that nuclear power should be considered for near-term applications for

those ships.

The Navy is currently preparing an analysis of alternatives for

a new class of surface combatants, CGX. If the cost and power requirements support consideration of a nuclear propulsion system,

the Navy must also carefully consider the construction strategies

for a nuclear surface combatant. Issues include the fact that neither General Dynamics, Bath Iron Works, or Northrop Grumman

Ship Systems Ingalls, our nation’s two suppliers of large surface

combatants, are authorized by the Navy to conduct nuclear shipbuilding.

Currently, construction of the nuclear portions of any surface

combatant would need to be done at one of the two shipyards authorized to do such work: Northrop Grumman Newport News and

General Dynamics Electric Boat. The specific implications of such

a strategy on the existing and planned workload of each of these

private shipyards have not been determined.

Also, the Navy would need to conduct a detailed assessment of

the risk and cost impacts of a potential splitting of the design and

construction of a nuclear-powered surface combatant between

nuclear- and non-nuclear-capable shipyards.

To conclude, the selection of a power system for our Navy’s future surface combatants is an extremely complex process, with

many variables both at the ship platform and Navy-wide level.

There is no optimum solution across all platforms. In providing our

recent report to you, the Secretary of the Navy affirmed that we

would use the methods in the report for future design analysis, and

this would start with the CGX cruiser.

Again, the Navy fully appreciates the operational advantages of

nuclear power, particularly for ships with high energy demands.

We also take seriously the strategic implications of increased fossil

fuel independence. These will be considerations in our decision for

future ships.

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With that, we thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee, and we would be pleased to answer any

questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Etter, Admiral Sullivan, Admiral

Greenert, and Admiral McCullough can be found in the Appendix

on page 55.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The chair now recognizes Admiral Donald.

STATEMENT OF ADM. KIRKLAND H. DONALD

Admiral DONALD. Thank you very much. I have a brief statement

I would like to offer for the record.

Mr. TAYLOR. Certainly, Admiral. Because we have, with the great

help of our ranking member, foregone on our opening statements,

feel free to speak as long as you wish.

Admiral DONALD. Thank you, sir. I have prepared a briefing on

the basics of naval nuclear propulsion. I would like to give that at

this time, and I will come back and give my opening statement.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the committee and discuss the Naval

Nuclear Propulsion Program. I have prepared a briefing on the basics of naval nuclear reactors and how they actually work. To do

this, I have brought a couple of props with me today.

The first one being this model, a model that was used by Admiral

Rickover in 1951, in the early days of the naval nuclear propulsion

program when he was giving briefings widely to wide audiences, including national television, on how his technology, the pressurized

water reactor, could be employed on a warship and specifically the

submarine. At this time, the Nautilus was more concept than it

was ship, because the ship did not go to sea until 1955.

Fundamentally, what he chose for the power plant for the ship

was what we call a pressurized water reactor. To describe that a

little bit better, I have a diagram here on my left that may give

you a few more details. The pressurized water reactor cycle really

includes two distinct cycles, the first being a primary cycle, which

includes this area here with the reactor. It is the heat source and

its associated equipment provides the heat to convert the steam

that we need to drive the turbines. If you think of it, it is like a

fire-box in a boiler in a traditional ship today.

That heat energy is translated into steam in this piece of equipment here, a steam generator. That steam is then translated into

the secondary plant, which is the second cycle that is used to drive

turbines. The key issue here, the key point of design, is that the

two cycles are separate in that the water in the primary cycle,

which is high-pressure water that flows through the reactor, is separated from the water that flows in the secondary plant at a lower

pressure and is converted to steam.

The key to that technology is the team generator that you see in

there. Again, it is a heat exchanger. The steam that is generated

in the heat exchanger by contact with the piping that contains that

high-energy water from the reactor goes into propulsion equipment

and electrical equipment to generate the electrical power that is

needed for the crew, for the weapons systems, for the combat systems on the ship, and it goes to drive the propulsion train.

5

In the report, you will see there is a discussion about mechanical

propulsion and integrated propulsion systems. Mechanical uses turbines with reduction gears, a mechanical reduction system to drive

the propeller directly. Integrated propulsion systems use another

electrical generator that drives a motor that drives the propeller

itself.

We have had experiments. We have done testing. In fact, we

have prototyped electric drive in submarines before. It is a technology we are familiar with. The next generation of surface craft,

the DDG–1000, would use an integrated propulsion system of that

nature. At any rate, the steam system would be the same to supply

the steam to the driving turbines.

A couple of key points about this area here in the reactor compartment. This reactor is obviously the heat source for this cycle.

It uses the fission of uranium to generate the heat that heats the

water up. That uranium, in the case of our submarines, is loaded

in the beginning of the construction of the ship and it is never refueled.

If you compare that to this ship, the Nautilus, her first core

when she went to sea in 1955, she had to come back into port in

1957 to be refueled. We don’t do that on our submarines anymore.

On our aircraft carriers, we do have one mid-life refueling, typically

at the 20- to 25-year point, to continue the life of the ship out to

40 to 50 years.

The other thing that is noteworthy about this cycle is that the

water, the high-pressure, high-temperature water that flows

through the reactor, is completely contained inside a welded boundary. So when the water flows out of the reactor in to the steam

generator, it flows inside high-strength, high-integrity tubes that

maintain that water contained in the primary plant.

The reason for that is to not have the water flowing through the

core, which could be potentially radioactive, which will be radioactive, not come in contact with the water and the steam that will

eventually be in the propulsion spaces, which is normally occupied

by operators. The reactor compartment is not occupied during reactor operations.

The other thing to recognize is that all of the equipment in the

primary cycle is contained inside what we call the ‘‘reactor compartment.’’ It is a shielded volume that is not occupied during reactor operations because of the high radiation levels. However, the

shielding contains that radiation inside the compartment, and it

does not affect the operators who routinely operate in the engineering spaces.

So between not having the radioactive water contacted with the

steam that is in the propulsion spaces, and having the shielded

protection from the reactor, our operators operate in the vicinity of

this bulkhead right here, this compartment, for months at a time

without exceeding radiation levels that are allowed by law. In fact,

an operator on a submarine would get less radiation in the course

of a day’s duty on a submarine than you get sitting in this building

right now from either the building contents, the stone, or the cosmic radiation.

The other thing to note about this equipment in here is that because it is designed to operate in a rigorous environment, highVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:17 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037535 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-25\060280.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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pressure, high-temperature radiation, it has to be built to exacting

standards. It has to be built in a rugged fashion. They are built to

last. Furthermore, they are built to last the design-life of the ship.

So when we put it in there, we expect it to stay. And that speaks

to the discussion that Secretary Etter had about the initial premium of costs. We do have to ensure that those components are

high quality and constructed correctly and maintained over the life

of the ship to make sure that they will last for the life of that ship,

and sustain in a safe and effective way, the operation of the ship.

Finally, in the sense that they do, we do design them to last for

a long time. This is to show you that this model that we have had,

it still works, from 1951.

Thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, do you wish to continue?

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir. I do have an opening statement.

Again, sir, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here.

And thank you to your committee, Ranking Member Bartlett and

Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much. Thank you for your support

over the years of the program. Without that support, we would not

have been as successful as we have been.

The naval nuclear propulsion program began in 1948 under the

leadership of then-Captain Hyman G. Rickover. Admiral Rickover

saw his vision come to reality on January 17, 1955 when the USS

Nautilus steamed out of New London, Connecticut, under way on

nuclear power.

He continued on to revolutionize maritime power plants for cruisers, aircraft carriers, and deep-diving submersibles. The virtually

limitless power, endurance and flexibility afforded by these plants

revolutionized naval warfare by providing the capability of sustainable persistent combat power to quickly respond where needed

around the globe.

Today, as the fourth successor to Admiral Rickover, I am responsible for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion. I fulfill these responsibilities through the leadership and oversight of the network

of dedicated laboratories and training facilities, plus the nuclear-capable shipyards, equipment contractors, and suppliers that comprise the nuclear industrial base.

As the director of naval reactors, I oversee and support 103 reactor plants in 81 nuclear-powered ships, submarine NR–1, and four

training and test reactors. Since 1955, we have operated for more

than 5,800 reactor years and steamed over 136 million miles. Our

nuclear-powered warships have safely operated for more than halfa-century without a reactor accident or any release of radioactivity

that had an adverse effect on human health or the quality of the

environment.

Because of our record of safe operation, our ships have virtually

unimpeded access throughout the maritime domain. For example,

in addition to the full freedom of maneuver on the high seas, U.S.

nuclear-powered warships are welcome today in over 150 ports in

more than 50 countries worldwide, thus allowing our warships to

carry out their mission without constraint.

Over our history, we have built and operated nine nuclear-powered cruisers, 10 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and nearly 200

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nuclear-powered submarines. Every propulsion plant designed,

fully met, or exceeded the warfighters’ requirements. Today, as

ship designs advance to incorporate capabilities and warfighting

needs that require more sustained energy in addition to the need

for prompt global response and endurance, nuclear propulsion becomes an increasingly viable design option and should be considered for incorporation where the requirements dictate.

The formal advantages of nuclear propulsion do come with some

unique costs. It must be considered in design trade studies. However, these costs are often mischaracterized. When comparing lifecycle costs, the nuclear propulsion premium, the additional cost associated with a nuclear-powered warship, and that depends on the

operational tempo, the service life and mission requirements of the

ship, varies between zero and 40 percent. Larger ships demanding

higher energy levels have smaller premiums. Studies conducted by

the Navy in fiscal year 2006 indicate that the resulting up-front acquisition premium averages between $600 million and $700 million

per ship.

I would like to elaborate briefly on what that premium buys. Nuclear propulsion plant construction requires unique skills, infrastructure, and Administration to ensure that the high standards

essential to safety and effectiveness are built into each component

and into the finished integrated product. The plants are built to

last for the design life of the ship. In the case of aircraft carriers,

that is 50 years.

So the quality, ruggedness and redundancy essential to successful combat operation must be built in up-front and built to last. Additionally, this up-front cost includes paying for the full service life

of fuel for submarines and half of the fuel for the life of the aircraft

carrier.

Today, there are two authorized and experienced nuclear construction shipyards which have been in this business since the

early days of the program. They are currently operating below their

capacity. Likewise, the nuclear component industrial base is also

working below its capacity. Consequently, the cost of infrastructure

and intellectual capital needed to construct nuclear-powered warships, or the overhead, is borne by far fewer production units or

ships than is optimal in a cost-savings sense.

The safe and effective operation of naval nuclear propulsion

plants is further dependent on highly trained and competent people, our sailors. Given the plans for future capital ships that include more technology and smaller crews, I expect the same to be

true in areas outside the propulsion plant in future ships.

The cost of sustaining this fine cadre of professionals is accounted for in the total life-cycle cost calculation that will be evaluated against other potential alternatives. We continue to meet our

goals for both recruiting and retaining high-quality professional

sailors into the foreseeable future. My training pipeline does have

the capacity without further infrastructure investment to produce

the additional personnel required by future classes of ships.

We must also ensure that our nuclear-powered warships are

maintained at a high standard of material readiness. Over the

years, we have continually evaluated our maintenance requirements and continually improved the reliability of our equipment,

8

with the objective of only doing the maintenance necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the ship.

For example, the Ford Class aircraft carrier propulsion plant is

designed to have a 30 percent reduction in required maintenance.

Not only will this reduce maintenance costs, but these gains will

also provide enhanced operational flexibility. When the proper

maintenance is done throughout the life of the ship, a nuclear-powered warship’s availability is equal to or better than the fossil fuel

counterparts. Maintenance costs are also included in life-cycle

costs.

Finally, I am responsible for the ultimate disposal of a nuclear

plant at the end of the ship’s life. We have been doing that successfully for 20 years. We know how to do it. The technical procedures

are well documented and well understood. That is also included in

the life-cycle costs.

When making propulsion plant design decisions for new classes

of warships, these cost factors must be considered and balanced

against operational advantages associated with costs and availability of other fuel sources and with the mission requirements of the

ship.

The naval nuclear propulsion program has long provided safe

and reliable plants for naval warships where appropriate from a

mission need and affordability standpoint. The Navy and Department of Defense have processes in place to ensure that nuclear propulsion is adequately considered in a fact-based analysis of alternatives regarding the type of propulsion plant best for warships.

My program will continue to play a key role in that process, and

I will be actively involved.

Thank you very much for allowing me to address the committee.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Donald can be found in the

Appendix on page 40.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral.

I am going to yield to my ranking member, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I have a question relative to life-cycle costs. If it were possible

to make a nuclear Humvee, and we can’t do that yet, but if it were

possible to make a nuclear Humvee, and we were trading off the

cost of making this nuclear Humvee with the present diesel

Humvee, I have a question about what cost factors would we put

on the diesel fuel.

Presently, crude oil is about $60 a barrel, and diesel fuel is $2.59

or $2.60 or something a gallon. But I am told that by the time we

get that gallon of fuel in the Humvee in Iraq, that it costs us $400.

I am also told that 70 percent of all the tonnage that we move to

the war front is fuel.

I wonder what fuel costs we consider when looking at fuel costs

for the ship. The cost of the crude oil may be a relatively small part

of the cost of getting that fuel in the ship over there. How did we

account for this in our evaluation?

Secretary ETTER. I would like to ask Admiral Sullivan to address

that, as the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command

(NAVSEA).

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, ma’am.

Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. Mr. Bartlett.

9

The costs of refining, storing, and transporting and testing that

fuel oil was fully burdened in the study. In fact, when added to the

cost, we started with about $75 per barrel, $74.15 per barrel, and

the fully burdened cost of storing, transporting and getting the oil

out to the ship is about $152 to $153 per barrel. So that was accounted for in the study, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Was there any attempt to put a value on the fact

that we had freed ourselves from the necessity of fueling our ships?

How do you put a value on that?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Sir, in the study, we compared the nuclear

variance of the ships and we had 23 ships, as you know, in the

study. We compared the operational flexibility of those ships to the

operational flexibility of the fossil fuel variance in terms of surge

ability, ability to move quickly from one theater to another at high

speed, and in terms of time on station. In all three of those areas,

the nuclear ships came out better.

Mr. BARTLETT. But you did not put a dollar value on that when

you were comparing?

Admiral SULLIVAN. No, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am reminded of that ad. It was not a very good

ad because I can’t tell you what they were selling, but the ad goes

through, you know, so much for this, so much for that, and so much

for the other thing, but for this it is priceless. They failed because

I don’t remember what they were selling, and that is the real point

of an ad, isn’t it? That is a technique they use. What were they

selling, by the way?

Admiral SULLIVAN. MasterCard.

Mr. BARTLETT. MasterCard, all right. Selling MasterCard. Okay.

[Laughter.]

It is that way, I think, with the diesel-powered ship. I don’t know

how you put a price that is pretty priceless to be out there, never

have to go into port, never have to refuel, never worry about how

far you can go and how fast you can go because you can do anything you wish.

If the Admiral would indulge me, I would just like to note another consideration. About seven weeks ago, I guess, I came back

from China. One of my colleagues here was with us in China and

he will certify that what I am saying is true. I don’t know if he was

stunned, because he is a lot more knowledgeable on China than I

was, but I was stunned when they began their discussion of energy

by talking about post-oil. I think essentially every one of them did

it.

We first talked to some of the energy people, and they talked

about their five-point program that started out with conservation.

The second and third, I forget which was second and which was

third, was get as much of your energy as you can at home, and diversify as much as you can so you are not dependent on any one

source.

The fourth one really was interesting: Be kind to the environment. They are the least kind of any country to the environment,

and they were very apologetic for that.

They noted they have 1.3 billion people, and their highest priority—and I am not sure it is all altruistic—but their highest priority

is to make sure their people are content. If they aren’t content,

10

maybe there will be some political problems. And they apologized

for the fact that they weren’t doing well environmentally, and they

actually asked for help.

The fifth one was particularly impressive. It was international

cooperation. I would be happy if we had such an enlightened dialogue with leaders in our country. They seem to get it. China is

doing two things simultaneously that give me some pause. One is

they are going around the world and buying oil wherever they can.

You might ask, why would you do that when in today’s world it

doesn’t matter one bit who owns the oil? Which is why I didn’t go

ape when the Chinese company was about to buy Unocal because

it really doesn’t matter who owns the oil. Whoever has the dollars

can buy the oil.

So why, then, is China going around the world buying all this

oil? I was told it was perhaps because they didn’t understand the

marketplace, but it is hard for me to believe a country that is growing at 11.4 percent doesn’t understand the marketplace. Simultaneously with that, they are also aggressively building, as you know,

a blue water navy. We have launched, I think, one submarine last

year. I was told they launched 14 submarines last year. Now,

theirs are not ours, but 14 is 14. And they are very aggressively

building a blue water navy.

Do you think the day may come when they tell the world, ‘‘Gee,

we are sorry, guys, but we have 1.3 billion people and it is our oil

and we are not going to share it’’? And you would need a pretty

big navy to make that happen, wouldn’t you?

I think that we need to look down the road, and although something may not be cost-effective today, I think there are enormous

national security reasons for pursuing nuclear on a very broad

scale across our Navy. What say you?

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Bartlett, I would say I would agree with

you that clearly we need to take nuclear power and alternative energy seriously as we look forward and evaluate our classes of ships.

We are doing exactly that in our analysis of alternatives. We will

continue to do so.

Mr. BARTLETT. They are ringing the bells, Mr. Chairman. I know

you have a number of questions. I really appreciate your enthusiasm for looking at nuclear in our Navy. I would hope that we

would look beyond just the dollars.

By the way, before I yield, I would like to note that in the kind

of rough-cut study you did some time back, you had exactly a reversal of what it would cost. You had the large-deck amphibs as

being competitive at, what, about $70 or $80 a barrel, and you had

the other ships as being, so we have an exact flip this time. It is

kind of interesting.

Admiral DONALD. Sir, I can talk to that, because the quick-look

study, the original one that was done was one that we worked with

NAVSEA to develop. What is different about that study and this

one is that we took into consideration the operating profiles of the

ships. In ours, it was really more a displacement versus cost of oil

and the amount of time—a relatively basic operating profile.

We got more sophisticated, I would say, in the study that was

recently completed because it took into account mission requirements, operating profiles, a variety of those operating profiles,

11

whether it be high speed, or whatever it turns out to be. Admiral

Sullivan can address those more specifically.

Also, what was different between this study and the one that you

saw the first time, is it took into account the electric energy requirements, the energy requirements on the ships for maybe advance sensors, whether they be radars. And that turned out to be

a decisive point. I would let Admiral Sullivan discuss that further,

if you should desire any more.

Mr. BARTLETT. I can understand how that would make nuclear

more competitive for the combatants, but I don’t understand why

it changed the dynamic for the large-deck amphibs.

Admiral DONALD. Sure.

Admiral Sullivan, do you want to speak?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

The reason the large-deck amphib became less competitive for a

nuclear power plant is that we modeled a specific propulsion configuration baseline that we now have in building in the LHD–8

class, where that ship has a diesel engine running a small generator that generates about 5,000 horsepower. You can run the ship

around on that generator on the diesel engine for 85 to 90 percent

of the time it is in service. That is a very, very efficient power

plant. So when compared to that power plant baseline, nuclear

power became less competitive.

I would like to add, though, that even in the amphibious ships

in the study, on a procurement cost basis, they were definitely

more expensive. The life-cycle penalty on those ships was only

seven percent to eight percent, when you compared over the lifecycle of the ships. So it is not a big delta.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

I would like to announce to all the members that we are going

to have, I believe, five votes, and probably going to gobble up about

one hour. So we are going to try to back out where we can now.

I would encourage those of you who can return to return.

I would also like to announce that because this room is going to

be used for another briefing that we will be resuming in 2116, so

you will have about one hour to eat lunch or whatever.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. It seems to me we are going to have to, next time

we will have you scheduled at a different time. As I recall, the last

time you all were up here we had votes as well. We can’t control

that and we apologize as well.

I apologize, my questions may be basic. This is a little bit new

to me.

For Admiral Donald, I was wondering about the scalability. From

a submarine fleet to carriers, I imagine there is a difference in

scale. And then what it takes to scale, presumably something in

the middle. Is this closer to the submarine-size system or a carriersize system, or surface ships?

Admiral DONALD. Sure. Yes, sir. The design of the propulsion

plant follows the design, or is conduced in conjunction with the design of the ship itself. You have to size the power plant to meet

the needs of the ship. That calls for different capabilities, different

megawattages, different shaft horsepowers.

12

What we looked at when we worked with Admiral Sullivan in the

study for a mid-size surface combatant for the purposes of the

study, we looked at a power plant that is about half the size of the

one that we would be putting into the next generation of aircraft

carriers, the Ford Class aircraft carrier. That is typically a two-reactor ship. We would look at using a one-reactor ship. That is the

design we followed.

It would probably take some modification in some of the electrical generating equipment based on the type of propulsion train

you would put in, but that was generally about the right size for

what we considered, and provided some margin for growth in the

future of the ship, since these ships are typically designed to last

for 30 years or so. That was basically what we did.

Again, once you get into the details of the construction and design of the ship, you would have to size it appropriately. We believe

that we have technology, certainly, and components that are in the

rough size to be able to make a good estimate.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was

here earlier today to talk about the budget. A variety of issues

came up, including the CGX. This gets to the question of the timing. If there is a fish-or-cut-bait time coming, what is that time for

you all to say we are going to use this kind of system, or we are

going to stick with the traditional diesel?

Admiral DONALD. Given the timelines in the Navy shipbuilding

plan, it would start into the preliminary design in 2011, construction in 2013. We, the nuclear propulsion business, would typically

be on-point because we need to get our components, the heavy components like the reactor vessels, as you see, and those types of

equipment, the core itself, under construction quickly.

Assuming that you would use an existing plant with minor reconfiguration needed, we would need to get our heavy equipment

on order about four years prior to the start of construction.

Mr. LARSEN. About four years prior to 2011?

Admiral DONALD. Prior to 2013.

Mr. LARSEN. So two years from today.

Admiral DONALD. Approximately four years prior to construction.

Again, assuming you wouldn’t want to be doing a lot of redesign

to be able to achieve that type of timeline. I think we have to understand what the ship is going to look like, because we haven’t

gotten into that in any detail yet. There are certainly other areas

of ship design that would have to be considered that would probably result in it being as limiting as anything I would have as far

as design of the propulsion plant is concerned.

Mr. LARSEN. So whatever the ship design is, you need about two

years lead time. It is not just a matter of flipping a switch and we

are ready to go. You need about two years lead time to craft your

nuclear propulsion system for the ship that is designed.

Admiral DONALD. Prior to start of construction, again back up

approximately four years, and while, again assuming that I can use

existing components with minor redesign, I can get those on order

and then the arrangement work can be going on simultaneously.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, okay. Just a quick question. Obviously, in

Washington State, we have a historical problem with nuclear waste

disposal. It is a very difficult challenge for us, that we continue to

13

pay for. I think we are on top of that, but that is another subcommittee. Can you answer the question for us, because this may

be common knowledge, I don’t know: How do we dispose of the facilities when we decommission?

Admiral DONALD. When we inactivate a nuclear ship, it is a

multi-step process. The first thing that we do is we remove the fuel

from the ship, because we don’t allow ships to sit around idle with

fuel still in them. We do remove the fuel. That fuel is shipped to

Idaho, near Idaho Falls at the naval reactors facility which is at

the Idaho National Laboratory.

We then use that facility to examine all of our fuel post-use. That

is how we have been able to extend the lifetime of cores through

that examination, and learning from our designs, and improving on

it. Once the examinations are complete, we are now moving the

fuel out of water pits, which is where it is right now, and moving

it into what we call dry storage.

It is essentially moving the fuel out of the water pits configured

in a way for long-term dry storage into large canisters, about

350,000 pounds apiece. Those canisters are now road-ready, we call

it—ready to go to the ultimate land depository, if it is Yucca Mountain or wherever it turns out to be. We are in a position to move

that. It would remain in dry storage in that facility until the shipment is actually started. We are in production now to move that

fuel. It is going into dry storage as we speak.

Mr. LARSEN. One final question: Are those vitrified or is it just

the core and it is stored in a canister?

Admiral DONALD. No, it is actually components of the core. The

fuel rods themselves are disassembled as a part of the process, and

then they are stored in a specially designed container to maintain

the integrity of the equipment and maintain it in a safe condition

for as long as it would be in storage.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thank you.

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.

The committee will stand in recess until 4 p.m., at which time

we will reconvene in 2116. Thank you very much. I am sorry for

the inconvenience to all of you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, we apologize for the delay. Thank you for

sticking around.

The chair now recognizes Ms. Gillibrand.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you so much for coming.

I started to have a conversation with the admiral just for a second. My district is in upstate New York. We have a nuclear facility

there, the Knolls Lab.

I wanted to know, with the Navy’s current planning, how will

production be impacted in our lab? Is there any way that we can

facilitate any of the work that you plan to do?

Admiral DONALD. We had started to talk about that concept that

was used in the study that was done by Admiral Sullivan. I assume

that we will be using an existing design to the greatest extent possible. The degree to which we can do that depends on what the

14

ship configuration looks like and what the energy needs are for the

ship. But ideally, we like to use existing components.

Along with that would have to be some reconfiguration, as opposed to a major redesign. So in that sense the intellectual capital

and the resources that we have in our labs right now is sufficient

to deal with that.

If you do talk about a long-term expansion and a new class, a

larger class of ships over a longer period of time, then obviously

you have to look at what the resources are like in the lab to be able

to support the fleet support on a day-to-day-type technical support

that would have to go into that, but that would be what we would

consider.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. And do you see any other applications for the

technologies that are being developed in the lab now, to see it being

able to be used for civilian use or commercial use down the line?

Admiral DONALD. We frequently get asked for other applications

for the reactors that we build. One of the things that we have to

consider is that the plants that we build are designed for a very

specific circumstance, that is a naval vessel. With that comes a requirement to be combat ready, to withstand combat shock-loading

and things of that sort.

We tend to build things into our plants that for a commercial application, that were doing it for profit, you wouldn’t do that. It is

not the type of thing that you would do. This really would be a

gross over-design for something like that. So in that sense, the

product that we build is unique to what you would use in the military and our naval application, and not necessarily have a civilian

application.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Are there any improvements or investments to the Knolls Lab facility that you would like to see? Is there anything that you think

needs to be upgraded or updated within the facilities as they exist

now?

Admiral DONALD. First off, I would love to have the opportunity

to host you at the Knolls Lab and come visit and see the place. If

you look at our budget plan for 2008, it has the requirements that

we need for the next fiscal year to sustain the lab and do the improvements that we need to make to sustain the program for the

long haul.

We have obviously got long-term plans that we are working with,

and we will address those in the budget years. But right now, you

have taken very good care of my program and we have been able

to support the fleet accordingly. Thank you.

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral DONALD. Yes, ma’am.

Mr. TAYLOR. I thank the gentlewoman.

Admiral Donald, one of my frustrations as a representative of the

citizens, trying to see to it that the tax dollars are used to the best,

is a trend to retire ships well before their 30-year life expectancy.

We never really get to the size fleet we want.

I am curious. In your professional opinion, would a nuclear cruiser be more likely or less likely to have all the power onboard it is

going to need for that 30-year life of the ship, keeping in mind that

some people think the future of naval weapons is going to be diVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:17 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037535 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-25\060280.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
15

rected energy, and that that is going to require an enormous

amount of power when that program and platform is onboard, and

hopefully sooner than later.

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir. One point, I would just like to revert

back to the hearing earlier today. I want to correct a statement

that I made that may at least have confused people. When I talked

about the construction start, the contract start for the next cruiser,

I indicated that 2013 would be when I would need to have my components ready to start.

The implication could be that that implied authorization in 2013.

The authorization is 2011, as indicated in the CNO shipbuilding

plan. I just want to make sure I didn’t confuse anybody, other than

myself, when I said that.

To your question specifically——

Mr. TAYLOR. So for clarification, back up before your long lead

time, you are talking about you need a statement of intent either

coming from within the Navy or coming from the Congress this

year or next, right?

Admiral DONALD. No, sir. Again, it remains the same for me. The

point in time in the construction of the ship, from an authorization

at the level of what I would need to have my components landing

and commencing assembly in the yard, would be about the 2013

timeframe.

So I have to back up approximately four years from that to be

able to be ready to do that, so you are talking obviously the 2009

timeframe that I have to start getting heavy components under

order and a government furnished equipment (GFE) for the nuclear

plant under order and construction.

Mr. TAYLOR. In your testimony, at least in the testimony as I

read it, you mentioned a possible cost reduction because of economies of scale when it came to nuclear power plants for the Virginia

class and other classes.

What do you think that would translate to, given that when you

compile all of the things that are possibly in play now, which would

be authorizing a second and appropriating a second submarine this

year, if we were, as a Congress, to mandate nuclear cruisers?

Would that be part of the game plan?

Realistically, what kind of cost stabilization or what kind of cost

savings do you think we could achieve by doing both of those

things?

Admiral DONALD. First off, let me take the Virginia class first.

The analysis that we have done on going to two-per-year of Virginia would result in an approximate savings per hull of about

$200 million. There is some additional savings that you could probably gain through the work, or you would gain, in fact, through the

work that we are doing as a part of the challenge the CNO gave

us on reducing the overall price of the ship to $2 billion. But just

based on the volume and the improvement in economic order quantities, we estimate about $200 million per hull.

If you lay in now consideration for a cruiser, then first off, there

would be an impact in the industry, an immediate impact because

once you start ordering components, then you can start dissipating

overhead in these organizations, these vendors that I have, very

16

quickly to dissipate the overhead and drive down the unit price of

the components.

I have rough estimates, if you were talking about over a class of

cruisers and getting one every two years, in the end-state you

would be talking about something on the order of about seven percent reduction in the price of the GFE that we provide to the

ships—about seven percent. For an aircraft carrier, it is something on the order of about $115

million a set. For a submarine, it is something on the order of

about $35 million per set of GFE, but that is in a steady-state environment over a series build of ships. So that is probably the most

optimistic estimate that I would give you, but that you would get

some savings certainly in economic order quantity, and in being

able to spread the overhead out over a larger base.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. So playing devil’s advocate, we are not going

to hear from the other side that, well, you are taxing the industrial

base and we are going to pay a premium for this if we order too

many nuclear-powered vessels. Is that accurate? Do you foresee a

circumstance that the industrial base comes back to us and says

you are now ordering too many of these things; you have to pay a

premium? Or do we end up getting economic order quantity?

Admiral DONALD. Right now, as I look across the industrial base

that provides, let’s just talk about the components, for instance,

and I just look across that base, because we have been asserting

earlier that we were going to go to two-per-year Virginias. We had

facilitized and have sustained an over-capacity in those facilities to

support construction of those additional components.

So right now, it depends on the vendor and which one is doing

what, the capacity is running right now at probably about 65 percent of what it could be doing, on the order of that. Again, it varies

depending on the vendor specifically.

So there is additional capacity in there, and even with the addition of a second Virginia class submarine, there is still a margin

in there, if you are talking about a single cruiser in the early

phases of design, we still have margin in there that I believe we

can sustain that work in addition to the submarine work within

the industrial base.

We would have to look at that in more detail once we determine

what the design looks like and the degree to which we can use existing components. If you had to design new components, that

would add a little bit more complexity to it, but that is a rough estimate of what I would provide for you now.

Mr. TAYLOR. I believe the secretary had in her testimony, and

made reference that we have two nuclear-certified yards at this

time.

Admiral DONALD. Right.

Mr. TAYLOR. Keeping in mind that we have five surface-combatant shipyards, or capable shipyards at this moment. To what extent could the other three participate in bidding on these? To what

extent could a very large portion of the hull be built, and then

towed to either one of the two nuclear yards for the nuclear components? How expensive is it for a yard that is not at the moment

nuclear-certified to become nuclear-certified? How big a hurdle is

that?

17

Admiral DONALD. I think it may be best to split that question in

two pieces. I will cover the latter piece, the discussion of——

Mr. TAYLOR. How would you do it ideally?

Admiral DONALD. I am sorry?

Mr. TAYLOR. And the third part would be, under ideal circumstances, how would you see this taking place?

Admiral DONALD. I will go ahead and address the piece of that

about what it takes to certify and to re-establish or establish another nuclear-capability yard, and then I will ask that Secretary

Etter and probably Admiral Sullivan discuss the second piece of it.

Just the basics of what it takes to have a nuclear-certified yard,

to build one from scratch, or even if one existed once upon a time

as it did at Pasacagoula, and we shut it down, first and foremost

you have to have the facilities to do that. What that includes, and

I have just some notes here, but such things as you have to have

the docks and the dry-docks and the pier capability to support nuclear ships, whatever that would entail.

You would have to have lifting and handling equipment, cranes,

that type of thing; construction facilities to build the special nuclear components, and to store those components and protect them

in the way that would be required. The construction facilities

would be necessary for handling fuel and doing the fueling operations that would be necessary on the ship—those types of things.

And then the second piece is, and probably the harder piece

other than just kind of the brick-and-mortar type, is building the

structures, the organizations in place to do that work, for instance,

nuclear testing, specialized nuclear engineering, nuclear production

work.

If you look, for instance, at Northrop Grumman Newport News,

right now, just to give you a perspective of the people you are talking about in those departments, it is on the order of 769 people in

nuclear engineering; 308 people in the major lines of control department; 225 in nuclear quality assurance; and then almost 2,500

people who do nuclear production work. So all of those would have

to be, you would have to find that workforce, certify and qualify

them, to be able to do that. And then finally you have to train

them, obviously, and then qualify them to do the work.

So my view of this is we have some additional capacity at both

Electric Boat and at Northrop Grumman Newport News. My primary concern is if we are serious about building another nuclearpowered warship, a new class of warship, cost is obviously going to

be some degree of concern, and certainly this additional cost, which

would be—and I don’t have a number to give you right now, but

I think you can see it would be substantial to do it even if you

could. It probably doesn’t help our case to move down the path toward building another nuclear-powered case, when we have the capability existing already in those existing yards.

And then I would turn it over to Secretary Etter or Admiral Sullivan, whoever wants to take that next piece of it.

Secretary ETTER. I think this is really an Admiral Sullivan question.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Sir, we are building warships in modular sections now. So if we were going to, could you assemble this, could

you build modules of this ship in different yards and put it together

18

in a nuclear-certified yard, the answer is yes, definitely, and we do

that today with the Virginia Class. As you know, we are barging

modules of submarines up and down the coast.

What I would want is, and sort of following along with what Admiral Donald said, you would want the delivering yard to be the

yard where the reactor plant was built, tooled, and tested, because

they have the expertise to run through all of that nuclear work and

test and certify the ship and take it out on sea trials.

But the modules of the non-reactor plant, which is the rest of the

ship, could be built theoretically at other yards and barged or

transported in other fashion to the delivering shipyard. If I had to

do it ideally, that is where I would probably start talking to my industry partners, because although we have six shipyards, it is really two corporations, and those two corporations each own what is

now a surface combatant shipyard and they each own a nuclearcapable shipyard.

I would say if we were going to go do this, we would sit down

with them and say, you know, from a corporation standpoint, what

would be the best work flow? What would be the best place to construct modules? And how would you do the final assembly and testing of a nuclear-powered warship?

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

The chair yields to Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry I was late. I think probably most of these questions

have been asked, but I am a slow learner, so if you don’t mind.

A question I had was about the steaming hours that you used in

your study, from going through it, it looked like you based it upon

historical, looking back at fiscal year 2001 through 2004, or something like that. Why didn’t you just use the steaming hours that

you planned for, you know, the 51 or the 22?

Secretary ETTER. I think Admiral McCullough might be able to

address that, or is that Admiral Sullivan, too? Okay.

Admiral SULLIVAN. What we really did, and that is a great question because historically we didn’t do a very good job of understanding the operating profile and the total energy requirements of

the ship. So what we did, yes, we took that history for the small

combatant and medium combatant and amphibious ship, based on

the last, it was probably ten years.

But we also said, okay, let’s talk about the prediction for looking

at the mission suites of similar ships, predicting into the future,

using the operational analysis that worked up to the 313-ship

Navy, looked ahead and bounded the problem by having a high operating profile, a medium operating profile and a low operating

profile.

And then, really, the reason we looked at the history was as a

check to make sure we were not out of bounds with our high, low

and medium operating profiles. So that produced a range of breakeven analyses, which gives you the range that we have given you.

Mr. SESTAK. But when you came back and you said the high

operational tempo was probably unlikely, and you kind of came

back and said it is probably more about the $115 one. It looked to

me as though your analysis for that one was based upon what history was, somewhere between the lower operating profile and the

19

medium one. It was hard to discern it, but it seemed to me you

were trying to say we based it on historical patterns, those two,

and that is the more likely. Is that right?

Admiral SULLIVAN. No, sir. We actually went ahead, it is budgeted, but for the emissions suite analysis of similar type ships and

looked ahead at those sorts of operating profiles.

Mr. SESTAK. The only reason is that the Navy has gone down in

its funding on the one hand. Instead of 22 days at home, 28 days

under way, 22 days at home, it has come in with a budget last year

saying 36 days under way per quarter for four deployed forces. As

a matter of fact, this year they upped it some to 40-some.

So I didn’t know whether, you know, we should be using what

the Navy, as we go forward in this analysis, should we be using

what we are going to be funding for? I mean, does that help any?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I would tend to think that Barry ought to

take this question. I will tell you that the reason that you look at

history is it varies a lot. There are some years when we don’t do

a whole lot of steaming. There are some years where there is budget constraint, and there are other years where if you looked at that

profile, 2003 was way up there because we went to war. We took

the whole fleet and steamed. I think 75 percent of the fleet was forward-deployed much of that year.

So the good thing about the history is that it smooths, if you take

it over the long haul, and these ships are 30- to 50-year service life,

depending on which kind of ship you are talking about, you tend

to average out those that you budget for in a 5-year cycle. Beyond

that, I ought to turn it over to Barry.

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. If you look at our typical operating patterns in home port, even though we are funding initially to

28 days-a-quarter under way, we found that we were really only

using about 22 or 22–1/2 of those days. So I would tell you that

home port or in Continental United States (CONUS) steaming days

that we funded in the budget at 22 is about right.

When you look at what we do deployed overseas, it is in excess

of what we put in the budget. But when we balanced all the requirements we had across the spectrum of our portfolio, we believed that 45 days was about acceptable with risk.

Mr. SESTAK. Again, this, as well as energy requirements, are the

two strong drivers. Correct? At least for this portion of the study,

for cost?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. So it really does matter where that variable comes

from, I gather.

Admiral SULLIVAN. But if you are within the lower limit, that is

something you ought to look at. That means you ought to be considering nuclear power for the ship. We didn’t say that if it looks

like the lower limit, you shouldn’t, because most of the range of

price of oil was above that limit. If it is close to the lower limit,

you should look at that.

Mr. SESTAK. The radar requirement, I gather, for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) is about 31 megawatts?

20

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes. If you look at the energy requirements in the spectrum of sensitivity radar we are looking at, it is

around 30 megawatts.

Mr. SESTAK. About 30?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Plus or minus.

Mr. SESTAK. About 30 or 31. And that is the other big driver in

this, correct?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. If you look at our requirements

for this particular ship, it is on the order of 30 megawatts. If historically you look at Aegis ships and you run an Aegis combat system, it is about five megawatts to run the combat system and ship

service load in a combat condition.

Mr. SESTAK. Admiral, isn’t there some real efforts in order to, as

you look at CGX, and I know I am getting into worlds that you

can’t get into, but isn’t there a real effort to draw down, push down

that power requirement for CGX?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, as you noted, the sensitivity equation and the proportionality is based on aperture size, and power

is a cubic. So if you can get more area in the aperture, you can

drive the power requirements down, and we are trying to balance

that. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. SESTAK. So 31 may be a variable right now?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The 31 is the power requirement, ship

service distribution.

Mr. SESTAK. Based on how we do things today, not about how we

are trying to change CGX TBMD radar, is that right? Or would

that be unfair to say that there are efforts to——

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I will let Admiral Sullivan take that

piece of it.

Admiral SULLIVAN. As Barry said, it is all about aperture and

power. What is available today takes a lot of power and takes a lot

of cooling. So the 31 megawatts, that is about the requirement that

we had in our medium surface combatant. You would like to, obviously, reduce that power draw, and there are several development

programs out there to in fact take the power requirement down.

However, that is going to be a risk balancing. Do you take the

aggressive technology that takes the power out, and maybe costs a

lot more money, or maybe doesn’t come true when you need it in

the timeline of this ship? Or do you take the less aggressive power

reduction and have it be something you can bet on, put the generating capacity in the ship, and then go off and design the ship? On

a timeline of this ship design, the radar may be the pacing requirement.

Mr. SESTAK. I believe the radar is the pacing requirement, right?

It is also a driver, one of the two main drivers for this. And so

whichever way you do go is going to be a determinant in this study,

right?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. The other issue, and I am not sure how pertinent

it is, because obviously, like our DDGs that we might set off in the

Sea of Japan, the three, well, I don’t know how many are out there

now, but you know the three I am talking about.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

21

Mr. SESTAK. If they are just going to sit around out there to do

that mission, something like nuclear power can be attractive. My

question, though, is as you watch the Iranians, and I saw your survivability, you know, what you put down for the other major issue,

survivability, that there are a number of other means that can help

enhance the survivability of a ship.

When we watch the Iranians, apparently the Iranians are supplying these explosively formed penetrators (EFP), which even our

best armor doesn’t seem to be able to protect against. Is this a concern for a nuclear-powered ship as you have them out there?

Admiral SULLIVAN. EFPs are a concern, as are many, many other

terrorist threats to all our ships. We have researched that well. We

know that the effects are. I would be happy to discuss them in a

classified session if you want.

Mr. SESTAK. And the other thing, this reactor is a nondevelopmental reactor, correct?

Admiral DONALD. That is correct. The study that was done, what

we assumed, and it was about the approximate fit given what we

understood, what the assumptions were for the power learning. It

is the exact same reactor that we are designing and constructing

right now to go into the Ford class aircraft carrier.

Mr. SESTAK. So there is no re-coring? Or is there a re-coring requirement?

Admiral DONALD. There is.

Mr. SESTAK. Is that cost in this?

Admiral DONALD. It is. That is in there.

Mr. SESTAK. It ought to be in there.

Admiral DONALD. That is in the life-cycle costs. Right.

Mr. SESTAK. That is in it. So you have already, Admiral, included

that in here?

Admiral DONALD. That is correct. I think that is correct.

Mr. SESTAK. I couldn’t find it in the study.

Admiral DONALD. For the carrier, it is a mid-life refueling. For

the cruiser, it is a life-of-the-ship.

Mr. SESTAK. So it is for the life of the ship?

Admiral DONALD. It is.

Mr. SESTAK. That is what I thought it said.

Admiral DONALD. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. So there is no re-coring requirement?

Admiral DONALD. Correct.

Mr. SESTAK. How many years will it give?

Admiral DONALD. Thirty years, approximately 30 years.

Mr. SESTAK. So the non-recurring costs are not in here, the nonrecurring?

Admiral DONALD. That is correct. The non-recurring costs associated with the design work that would be needed to reconfigure the

existing components is not included in the calculation. That is

right.

Mr. SESTAK. Would that include the disposition of the material

after we are done with the life of the ship?

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir. It does. That is incorporated. The ultimate disposal of the fuel and the reactor components is included

in the life-cycle cost.

Mr. SESTAK. It is included in the life-cycle costs?

22

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. I am sorry. I just jotted down, and it looks as

though it is only a ten percent impact, Admirals, for the training

of the manpower. In other words, in your pipeline. Admiral, I guess

this is yours, the training for nuclear-powered?

Admiral DONALD. Right.

Mr. SESTAK. The impact on the additional training is not that

enormous?

Admiral DONALD. No. We, in looking at the training pipeline,

there are a couple of dynamics that are in work right now. First

off, the Enterprise is going to be going away, and that is a pretty

significant training load just to keep that crew operating. And also

as the CVN–21 comes on, the Ford class carriers come on, and the

Nimitz starts to go away, we are targeting a 50 percent reduction

in the reactor department sizing over there.

So for the foreseeable future, the training infrastructure that we

have right now will meet the needs to sustain this class, if you

choose to do it.

Mr. SESTAK. In regards to the Enterprise, what is the disposition

cost of the Enterprise going to be?

Admiral DONALD. Right now, the estimated disposition price of

that is on the order of about $1.1–1.2 billion. That includes not just

the nuclear piece of it, but that is the entire ship disposition cost.

Mr. SESTAK. And the very last question is, the price today that

we pay for fuel is about $74. Is that what we mean by ‘‘bbl’’?

Admiral SULLIVAN. The basis used for the study was $74 per barrel, and then the fully-burdened cost of storing it, testing it, transporting it out to the ships, I think I had——

Mr. SESTAK. $156 or so.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. I see. Let me question, does that actually represent

what you are paying today?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Well, today the price of oil—I checked—is

about $62 a barrel.

Mr. SESTAK. I see. So today is it $62, and then it would ratchet

up to probably $140, you know, for the additional costs. And that

‘‘bbl,’’ that is just the cost of the crude oil.

Admiral SULLIVAN. It is the cost to refine, store—the fully burdened cost of what we pay to get the oil to the ship.

Mr. SESTAK. Does that include the infrastructure costs within it?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I don’t think it includes the cost of the oilers,

but I would have to check on that.

Mr. SESTAK. How about storage?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. The reason I was asking is, it seems as though that

price—and I am sorry, if I can work through this, because I was

a poli sci major—but that price, let’s say it is $74, because I think

that is what your study said, if that includes the infrastructure

costs, should that be the price we use in the study? Because the

infrastructure cost is going to be the same for the Navy, whether

or not the price of oil goes up or down? So shouldn’t we extract the

cost of the infrastructure for it?

23

Admiral SULLIVAN. I am not sure I understand the question, be- cause the cost we used in the study was actually the $150 burdened cost.

Mr. SESTAK. Which includes the infrastructure costs?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. Because this will be a small subset of ships, the

CGX. I think you are planning—how many are you planning?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Nineteen.

Mr. SESTAK. Nineteen.

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. So out of the 316 ships, this infrastructure cost of $156 is going to be fixed to some cost. So shouldn’t you be basing

the break-even point cost on the variable cost of oil absent the cost

of the infrastructure, because the infrastructure cost is going to be

the same for many of the other ships?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I guess I have to take that for the record, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. But you understand what I am asking?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. I mean, the study would come out totally different

if that is a fixed infrastructure cost for the other 290-some ships.

Admiral SULLIVAN. I don’t want to get out in front of going and

pulling the true costs out, but I believe the incremental costs that

we cost are the oil to go to the ships——

Mr. SESTAK. Could you back that? Because if it is true the fixed

costs are sunk anyway, then you should only be doing it, and that

would make the outcome——

But you understand the question?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. If only I had that nuclear-trained background.

[Laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral McCullough, following up on Mr. Sestak’s

question, it is my understanding that one of the major responsibilities of the next generation of cruisers is to provide missile defense

for the carriers.

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would that be in its top three missions?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Mr. TAYLOR. And, you know, I have been amazed at how our enemies have found our weaknesses. So I have to believe that any potential rival is going to particularly know that we want to play an

away game. He is going to realize that the Achilles heel of the

American military is fuel.

I am told we have about five oilers in the Pacific. If I was a foe

of the United States, I would find a way in my opening round to

take care of those five oilers by some means. So what good is a missile defense for a nuclear-powered cruiser if it can’t keep up with

the carrier because it ran out of fuel?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Well, sir, first I would say when we build

a ship of this capability, we are going to have to reevaluate the

concept of operations under which we employ it. Maybe it is a

mindset change from the days of when the cruiser had to run with

the carrier, so the carrier operates under the umbrella of protection

that the CGX provides to the sea-base.

24

As far as your discussion about oilers, operationally, Admiral

Greenert can help me with this.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. The oiler distribution in the Pacific,

there are five oilers, that is correct. But when we operate the oilers, we distribute the oilers. In other words, they would not all

gather in and around the sea-base. And we also have other alternatives for a means of refueling. So my point is, if an opposing

force could distribute their navy in the manner that we have our

oilers distributed, that would be a threat.

But what I would offer, sir, is that it would be a very, very complex matter, one taking great scheming and many alternatives. I

would submit beyond what we would foresee with anybody that we

know today, that threat today, and extrapolate to 2020.

Mr. TAYLOR. Going back to the admiral’s point of the explosively

formed projectiles, five Boston whalers in five ports. I mean, you

are not talking about distributing the Navy. You are talking about

whatever rules for whatever means—rocket propelled grenades

(RPGs) hitting a rudder. I don’t see that as all that far-fetched.

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. Using these as examples, if you

will, as you look at this, one of our concepts of operation would be

to keep these whalers under way and at various stations. The point

being, and within the concept of operations, to not have yourself in

various modes, if you will, where you are liable to that.

The way we rotate the oilers, the way we use our fueling stops

beyond the oilers, because there are other opportunities in the

Western Pacific other than just the oilers for fueling. We would

protect them as capital ships in a threat environment, and that includes today’s environment. That would be key and critical to the

fleet commander’s operations, to preclude the very scenario you

have said where we have too many in port and vulnerable to that

kind of attack.

Mr. TAYLOR. To that point, what value, if any, was given to the

nuclear force plan as a means of being able to keep up with a carrier at any time, without the need for oilers? Are we removing that

vulnerability of the need to refuel? Was that weighted? Going back

to the admiral’s questions about, did you consider your fixed costs?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Again, the cost savings of having that ship be

free, the medium surface combatant in this case, which is not CGX.

It is a notional ship design. It is included in the operational effectiveness study, but it is not added or subtracted as a cost of the

cost of doing this. It is not part of the study.

Mr. TAYLOR. It is recognized as a good thing to have, but not included in the cost value.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Okay.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair yields to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank you for your service.

In lieu of a question, I would just make a statement that I had

the opportunity to grow up in Charleston, South Carolina. We were

so proud in my growing up to see the Polaris submarines and the

Trident submarines. I just grew up with a great appreciation of

how the nuclear Navy made such an impact in protecting the

American people and ultimate victory in the Cold War.

25

And then I have had the privilege of touring the Nuclear Power

School there in Charleston two years ago. It was just awesome to

see the young people being trained. They were able to receive college credits, which I was not at all aware of, and to learn a skill

that indeed they will be able to carry the rest of their lives.

So I want to thank you for your service, and I look forward to

working with the chairman in a way to back you up. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Mr. WILSON. I yield.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

The chair yields to the ranking member.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I have a couple of questions about disposal. How much of the fuel

has been consumed in that 30 or 33 years?

Admiral DONALD. Typically, again it depends somewhat on the

type of core and how it has been employed, but typically about half

of the fuel has been consumed over the life of the ship.

Mr. BARTLETT. I was always intrigued by the challenge of something that is so hot that I have to squirrel it away for a quarterof-a-million years and I can’t get near it, that it ought to be good

for something. If there is that much energy left in it, it has just

got to be good for something.

Who ought to be addressing that challenge? Because in an increasingly energy-deficient world, there is going to be some interest. Who should be addressing that challenge? It has to be good for

something, doesn’t it?

Admiral DONALD. There is right now, the Department of Energy,

that is the answer, and certainly commercial partners if they

choose to get into this. But there is an initiative right now called

the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which involves a combination of technologies, including reprocessing, taking spent fuel and

reprocessing it, and recovering the nuclear material that may be of

further use, and disposing it in a couple of advanced, or means of

disposing it as a waste in a more probably user-friendly, environmentally friendly way than what is done typically today. But that

is all advanced technology. It is a program of record. It is ongoing

in the Department of Energy right now.

Today, however, if you look in the nuclear industry, and in fact,

in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, we used to recycle spent

fuel. We would bring it in. It is a chemical process basically of dissolving the fuel and extracting the uranium that was still usable

and then reusing it. One of the problems with that technology,

however, at the time, it was very expensive compared to what the

price of uranium was. So it was deemed to not be economically feasible.

The other problem with reprocessing, in the sense that we do it

today, and certainly we did in the United States, it also generates

some pretty significant waste streams over and above what you

would normally have with the spent fuel. So in that sense, it didn’t

make much economic sense. And there were some environmental

legacies that you had to be concerned about, and a decision was

made that we are just not going to do that any longer.

We are in the business of doing dry storage right now. You are

right. There is a resource there that it would be helpful if we could

26

get to in an economically correct way and an environmentally satisfactory way. That is the effort that is going on right now in the Department of Energy, with their Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

Mr. BARTLETT. Oil at $100 or so a barrel will have a way of focusing the mind, I think.

Admiral DONALD. It certainly can. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. I was absent for a few minutes here. My apologies. The reason was that there is a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that is out on peak oil. There are now two reports

out there for a year or so. One is the big study done by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the Department of

Energy, which concluded that we probably were or shortly would

be at peak oil with perhaps devastating consequences. They made

statements like, ‘‘the world has never faced a problem like this; the

mitigation consequences will be unprecedented.’’

Then there is another study done by the Corps of Engineers at

the request of the Army, which has concluded about the same

thing. Today, there was an Associated Press (AP) article saying

that T. Boone Pickens—who I didn’t know until I read the article,

started his career as an oil geologist—he now says that we are at

peak oil.

I was walking over from the last vote with Dave Hobson. I want

to pass on to you his compliment of the military. He said that you

all were doing a good job with energy. You are doing about the only

thing that is being done in our country relative to energy. Thank

you very much.

If in fact T. Boone Pickens is right; if in fact these other studies

are correct, today we are dependent on fossil fuels for about 85 percent of all of our energy. The remaining 15 percent, nuclear provides about 8 percent of it; 20 percent of our electricity; 8 percent

of our total energy. And we are at 7 percent renewables.

So if in fact it is true, and I think it is true, that we are at peak

oil, and no matter what we do, we are not going to pump more oil

in the future. It is going to be less and less and less for about another 150 years, until we run down the other side of Hubbert’s

Peak. It is not like we are running out of oil. We are just running

out of our ability to produce a lot of oil really cheap, enough to

meet the demands of a growing economy which requires about two

percent.

I am very interested in the possibilities of making some of our

commercial power from power plants that we would also use in our

military. I noted during the break we were discussing that we are

about the only society in the world that can afford the luxury of

evaporating drinking water to get rid of the excess heat from our

power plants.

In just about all the rest of the world, the power plant is situated

in a city near people, and the surplus heat they use for what is

called ‘‘district heating,’’ and with an ammonia cycle refrigeration,

you can cool your home with that, as well as you heat your home

in the wintertime.

Maybe I am a dreamer, but I can envision the day when we are

making thousands of nuclear power plants that we are now distributing through the cities. I can be from here to that chair, sleeping

27

near your nuclear reactor in the submarine. I have less radiation

than if I am laying out on the beach. Correct?

Admiral DONALD. That is correct.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. So I have no reason to believe that they

wouldn’t be perfectly acceptable in the cities. We have a very long

history. You gave the statistics, which were stunning, about how

many man-years and how many steaming hours you had, and not

a single accident or even a hint of an accident.

I would like you to give us for the record how many homes we

could provide with electricity from one of your nuclear power

plants. I would like to know if you were, maybe like Henry Ford

made his Model T on an assembly line, rather than at the local

buggy works, which is the way they made the buggies before he put

a motor in it, how much we could save in producing these power

plants.

As I mentioned, Admiral Donald, I look forward to the day that

our nuclear power plants for our military vessels are commercial

off the shelf. You noted that the commercials wouldn’t need to have

the hardening that you have for vibration and so forth, but you get

what I am saying. I just think we have an enormous potential here

to meet an incredibly important need in our country to provide

power from other than fossil fuels.

I might note that there are three groups that have common cause

here. One is the group that believes that greenhouse gas production is producing global warming. I think they are probably correct.

There is a second group—Jim Woolsey and McFarland and a whole

bunch of others that wrote a letter to the President probably 2 or

3 years ago now saying, ‘‘Mr. President, the fact that we have only

2 percent as known reserves of oil, and use 25 percent of the

world’s oil, and import almost two-thirds of what we use, is a totally unacceptable national security risk.’’

So certainly, those interested in the national security implications of peak oil have common cause with those who are concerned

about greenhouse gases and global warming. I am concerned about

both of those, but I am even more concerned about the fact that

even though we may with dumb luck get through those, there is

no dumb luck that will get us by peak oil, if these studies are correct, and if T. Boone Pickens is correct that we are now peaking

in oil production.

I hope I am wrong, but I believe that the over-arching issue in

the next decade is going to be energy. It is going to dwarf everything else, and we will realize that we have been majoring in minors here in the Congress with all these things that we are focusing our attention on.

So I see a big, big potential for the knowledge that you all have

to contribute in a very big way to our society, and to benefit from

that in getting much lower production costs for your nuclear power

plants. Am I wrong?

Admiral DONALD. Certainly, if we produced more, and we talked

about that already, about dissipating overhead. You do more, it

does gain you some cost savings.

What I would like to do is take your questions for the record, because I haven’t spent a whole lot of time thinking about applicaVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:17 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 037535 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-25\060280.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
28

tions for the power plants as ideal for a commercial use. So I will

take those for the record and we will get back to you.

The other thing I would add to the discussion is, while we do

have a safety record that we are certainly very proud of, and we

guard jealously, and we also understand that you are only as good

as your last safe day of operations, that you can never let down

your guard.

We have to maintain vigilance. As you are well aware, it doesn’t

come easy. There is a tremendous amount of effort, oversight, and

energy involved, personal energy involved on the part of a number

of people in our organization to make sure that those standards are

sustained, and that you do continue safe operations.

So the idea of proliferation of many reactors throughout the nation, we just would have to keep in mind that that comes with an

overhead to make sure that you are being proper stewards of the

public trust and protecting the environment, protecting their safety

as well. Otherwise, a problem there would create a problem for all

of us in the nuclear industry. So I would just be cautious in an idea

of thousands of these things around and doing that type of work,

but I will take your questions and we will get back to you.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. I would like to suggest that the alternative of shivering in the dark, which will be a very real alternative, will make the minimal risks involved with nuclear quite

more acceptable.

Admiral DONALD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for a good

hearing.

Panel, thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

I have come to become a believer in Mr. Bartlett’s theory as far

as peak oil. Whether he is 100 percent right or half right, he is

right. It is just a matter of sooner than later. I am convinced that

50 years from now, every surface combatant will be powered by

something other than what we are powering ships with now. It is

going to be nuclear or something beyond that.

So the argument of whether or not we are still using diesels and

turbines in major surface combatants I think is off the table 50

years from now, and probably off the table 25 years from now.

With that in mind, that the future is nuclear powered, I think

Admiral Rickover was right, if not premature, and you know, we

have a yard that predominantly makes submarines, a yard that

predominantly makes carriers, two yards that predominantly make

surface combatants, going back to my previous question.

If the future is nuclear power, and if those two yards wanted to

stay in the surface combatant business, what is the investment on

the part of an Ingalls? What is the investment on the part of a

Bath, to make themselves ready for the future?

Admiral DONALD. With respect to nuclear certification?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral DONALD. That is the specific question? What I would

like to do is, in addition to the remarks I made prior to define what

it would take, what I would request is to take that question for the

record and maybe put some numbers against that and get back to

you.

29

Mr. TAYLOR. The third thing, Admiral Donald—and I know nothing is ever as simple as we would like it to be—one of the great

things about our gas turbine is that we can drop it down the stack

or remove it through the stack.

If the option would be for a very substantial portion of that ship

to be built and then to be engineered in a way where the nuclear

power plant could be installed or removed, if that is even an option,

and I know that this is actually a lot more complex than a gas turbine, but using that analogy, could a ship be designed so that to

a very large extent it could be made as a ship and then towed to

one of the places and installed? I would be curious.

Admiral DONALD. As Admiral Sullivan pointed out, we do do

modular construction. In fact, we do that in the Virginia class

today. If we are talking about, again going back to the previous discussion that we had about the realities of the next generation of

surface ships, whether CGX or not, if we really are interested in

a nuclear variant, the only thing that I would say is that one of

the assumptions we made is that you would be using existing components to the extent you could, with a minimum of redesign.

The idea that we would create a modular power plant now to

meet the need of the next generation of surface combatant would

probably add significant complexity and significant costs to what

you would be talking about doing. So probably not for the next generation, but if you were looking at something beyond that, then we

would certainly look at it, and we would look at modular by any

stretch of the imagination, just in the course of business.

But we have not spent a whole lot of time and energy at naval

reactors looking at a modular-type design to be dropped into a

plant or a ship in the sense that a gas turbine would be—at least

not yet. And that was not the assumption that we used in the

study or in any other work we did associated with the study.

Mr. TAYLOR. This would be for the panel: What do you think is

the timeline for a working directed-energy weapon? How far away

are we from that? Are we five years from it, 15 years from it?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We have a prototype railgun down in Auburn, but that is not directed energy. We are looking at 2022 to

weaponize that. So now you are talking about something that is directed energy that is in the real early stages of development, so I

don’t see it anytime before that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Is the railgun, like the radar, energy intensive?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. At this stage of the game, yes,

sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. And the form of energy is?

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. It is electricity stored in a capacitor

bank, the one we have at Auburn.

Mr. TAYLOR. And if you can, give me a term of how much energy

would be required for that.

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. It is just about 20 megawatts of swing

power. When you shot it, that is what you would have to recharge

to.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. So that is 20 megawatts, plus the 31

megawatts for the theater missile. Would one of the power plants

out of a carrier, if we were to put that into a cruiser, would that

30

supply enough energy to power the cruiser, power the missile defense, and power the railgun?

Admiral DONALD. The calculations, the assumption that we made

with the power plant for the next-generation surface combatant, or

the medium-size surface combatant, would meet the needs for the

operating profile, plus assumptions for the radar.

I don’t believe it included railguns in it. I would defer to them

on that. It left margin in for growth in the ship to the tune of about

25 percent during the life of the ship. So that is a rough approximation, given what we know about what this shop could possibly

look like, but it did include margin.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay, one last question before I yield to my ranking

member.

I am very much impressed with the thoroughness of your report.

I am obviously pleased with the conclusion. You did stop short of

saying the United States Navy has said ‘‘our submarines will be

nuclear.’’ The United States Navy has said, ‘‘Our carriers will be

nuclear.’’ You stopped short of saying it is the recommendation of

the United States Navy to have a nuclear-powered cruiser.

I am curious why.

Secretary ETTER. I would suggest that we are really waiting on

the analysis of alternatives. We believe we need that data in order

to be able to determine what really is the right path ahead. We

think that study is of sufficient detail and, as we discussed earlier,

some of the key things that are driving that are the radar. But we

believe with the results from the analysis, that we will be able to

determine what would be the right path ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. Madam Secretary, what is the timeline on that report?

Secretary ETTER. We are looking for the report to be out toward

the end of the year. I would ask Admiral McCullough to explain

the steps that are still needed to finish that.

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, ma’am. We have broken the AOA,

the analysis of alternatives, into phases because different parts of

the analysis will drive subsequent parts. As I said earlier, a lot

about our sensitivity has to do with the size of the aperture. So

once you look at the potential threat in the 2024 timeframe, and

then we look at a projected threat through the engineered service

life of the ship, we will know how big the aperture has to be for

the radar.

The aperture size will drive the size of the deck house. We expect

to have the radar analysis done by the end of June. And then we

will start the development of the radar, the further refinement in

the radar in the program. Once you know how big the deck house

is, based on the radar, you will understand how big the hull on the

ship has to be.

Then. given the hull size, we will evaluate the propulsion plant

that needs to go in the ship, again with the growth to achieve capability throughout the engineered service life of the ship. We anticipate that that part of the study will conclude late in the fiscal year

to support our milestone decision.

Mr. TAYLOR. Great. Thank you.

What is the status of the direct energy conversion in lieu of the

steam conversion?

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Admiral DONALD. Really since 1988, we at naval reactors have

had an evolving process of looking at alternatives for using the nuclear energy in more efficient, more effective, more innovative ways

to generate power, as opposed to what we do today with a pressurized water reactor that has become so popular. There have been a

number of technologies we have looked at.

One that we did look at was called a thermophotovoltaic energy

transfer process. We studied that in some depth, and in fact made

some significant strides in that. For instance, the efficiency of the

thermophotovoltaic collector, when we first started this work back

in the mid-1990’s, the best you could hope for was an efficiency of

about four percent. When we completed the work that we have

done to date on that, we had the efficiency in upwards of about 20

percent, which has never been done anywhere.

We felt that we had taken that technology about as far as we

could, with the idea that it would be available for a ship application in the foreseeable future. The difficulty that we ran into had

nothing to do necessarily with the technology we were investigating, but it involved different types of reactors that you would need

to generate the heat. In other words, you are talking about a factor

of about four or five hotter reactors that you would have to have,

that would run at an elevated temperature to make this work.

That just is not feasible in a ship that you and I can foresee

today. So what we have done is we have wrapped that technology

up and we have placed it on the shelf. We are looking at other possibilities to take advantage of nuclear energy on ships. We continue

to press the envelope in that regard. But right now, for practical

applications for shipboard use, the pressurized water reactor remains the best alternative for the foreseeable future.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. In 2 months and 13 days, on May 14, it will be

the 50th anniversary of a talk that Hyman Rickover gave to a

group of physicians in Minnesota. If Google can’t find it for you,

call our office and we will get you a copy of the talk.

If you thought he was a great intellect, after you read that talk,

you will agree he was a great, great intellect. It is on energy. I

would encourage you to get the talk. It is just a fascinating talk.

He was a man really, really interested in a lot of different areas,

and you will be fascinated by his talk.

Mr. TAYLOR. Last question, and I do mean last question.

The additional expense, if at Bath or Ingalls, it would have to get

nuclear certified? Is there any benefit to that, as a result of doing

that, that is translated to other conventionally powered ships? Do

they get better at anything? Does the process become more efficient

in any way, safer in any way? It is a matter of curiosity on my

part.

Admiral DONALD. I would say, one of the things that we do take

some degree of pride in in our business is that we do believe we

have a rigorous engineering approach to our business in a formal

way. We do work very hard to put processes in place to ensure

safety and ensure effectiveness, and to ensure efficiency in the way

we do our business. So in that sense, we like to think that we could

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make any organization better, just by maybe taking on some of the

things that we do.

But beyond that, I am not sure I would be the one that would

be in a position to assess what advantage that would be to a commercial business or not. There are some things that we do that because of the level of detail and obviously we are concerned about

the consequence of should things go wrong. We do put layers of defense in place and we do get into a degree of detail that probably

some other industries would find to be somewhat cumbersome, but

are necessary if you are going to manage a complex technology, an

unforgiving technology like nuclear.

So I am sure there are some pluses or minuses in that, but I

think it would be better to ask commercial industry how they felt

about that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral Sullivan, I am just curious, obviously the

pressure requirements, the safety requirements on your welds for

your piping and things of that nature, I have got to believe that

those additional requirements have got to translate into an improved process throughout the yard. I was just curious.

Admiral SULLIVAN. As the admiral said, I think when you introduce the nuclear culture into a shipyard, it spreads and you get

better. There is an overhead price to pay for that.

So, again, yes. If you introduce nuclear power engineering in all

the things that Admiral Donald listed earlier—all of the testing,

the certification, the engineering, the rigorous adherence to standards, the welds, and all of that—if that spreads across the yard, it

is definitely an improvement, and everyone grows a culture of safety. That takes a long time and it costs a lot of money, so you would

have to actually do the business case of is it worth going down that

path.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

Gentlemen, Madam Secretary, I thank you very much for being

here.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 1, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 1, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 1, 2007

(73)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK

Mr. SESTAK. Shouldn’t you be basing the break-even point cost on the variable

cost of oil absent the cost of the infrastructure, because the infrastructure cost is

going to be the same for many of the other ships?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes. The Report to Congress (RTC) breakeven cost analysis

discriminated between power plant baselines based only on costs which were variable with the market price of crude oil and also which were discriminators between

baselines. Although these variable burdened costs were included in the analysis, the

breakeven data in the study is presented directly against the price of crude oil for

ease of comparison to market prices. The below information provides a more detailed discussion of the burdening.

The RTC Studies burdened the cost of fuel to reflect the variable costs attributable to warfare and mobility mission energy consumption. Fuel burdening assumptions are:

• The baseline market price of fuel used in this analysis is $74.15 per barrel of

crude oil, and its burdening buildup is shown below in the figure below.

Fully Burdened $152.95

Direct (DESC) $96.60

Crude Oil $74.15

Refinement $13.76

Transportation $2.67

Facilities/Operations $5.93

Mark-Up $0.09

Indirect $56.35

Storage & Handling $0.05

Navy FISC

Navy Barge $0.05

Delivery $52.10

Oiler Acquisition $14.67

Oiler O&S/Charter Costs $37.43

Environment $4.20

• As the price of crude oil increases or decreases, the other elements of the burdened rate are assumed to remain constant with the exception of Oiler O&S/

Charter costs. Fuel makes up 20% of the Oiler O&S/Charter costs; therefore,

20% is varied based on Crude Oil cost.

The RTC breakeven cost analysis assumed that all sources of burdening were applied to the fuel used to energize mobility and warfare mission systems in the power

and propulsion plant variants in this study. The direct costs of burdening reflect the

contracted price of product paid uniformly by the services to the Defense Energy

Support Center. The Navy specific indirect burdening is based on the depreciated

cost of Navy delivery assets (oilers), operating and support costs, and the cost of

chartered asset fuel delivery. Acquisition costs of the oilers that support the groups

of ships forming the surrogate future fleet modeled in the study were depreciated

and proportioned to total fuel—Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) (F76) and JP–5 (aviation

fuel)—delivered. Only the variable, depreciated cost of Navy oilers apportioned to

the DFM used by organic ship power and propulsion systems was included in the

burdening. Other indirect variable costs attributable to other non-propulsion plant

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fluid delivery that are constant between propulsion plant baselines are not discriminators between power and propulsion systems and so were not included.

Excerpt from 1 March Testimony, House Armed Services Sub-Committee on Sea

Power and Expeditionary Warfare is provided for context.

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